Schlumberger Technology Corporation

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 22, 2020

2019002863 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/569,185 12/12/2014 Lucian Johnston IS12.3256-US-NP 8733
23718 7590 06/22/2020
Schlumberger Technology Center
10001 Richmond Avenue
IP Administration Center of Excellence
HOUSTON, TX 77042
EXAMINER
KONERU, SUJAY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/22/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
SMarckesoni@slb.com
USDOCKETING@slb.com
jalverson@slb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LUCIAN JOHNSTON and JEAN-MICHEL DENICHOU
Appeal 2019-002863
Application 14/569,185
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ROBERT E. NAPPI, and
CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject Claims 1–5 and 7–10. Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Schlumberger Technology Corporation. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to control of a drilling process that includes
multiple workflows having interdependencies. Claim 1, reproduced below,
is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
identifying a plurality of workflows in a multi-workflow
process, wherein the multi-workflow process is a drilling
process;
receiving information as acquired by one or more sensors
during the drilling process;
identifying an interdependency between a first workflow
and a second workflow of the drilling process;
based at least in part on at least a portion of the
information and during the drilling process, determining a
physical severity in which the first workflow and the second
workflow are impacted in response to a change in a state or
value of the interdependency;
quantifying the physical severity as quantified severity
information; and
during the drilling process, presenting the quantified
severity information.

Claim 1 (emphases added).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Cox et al. (“Cox”) US 6,720,967 B1 Apr. 13, 2004
Pastusek et al. (“Pastusek”) US 2007/0272442 A1 Nov. 29, 2007
Minsky et al. (“Minsky”) US 2009/0106063 A1 Apr. 23, 2009
Sabharwal US 2014/0278733 A1 Sept. 18, 2014
Mancini US 2015/0081221 A1 Mar. 19, 2015

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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–3 and 7–10 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Minsky in view of Sabharwal in view of Mancini in view
of Pastusek.
Claims 4 and 5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Minsky in view of Sabharwal in view of Mancini in view
of Pastusek in further view of Cox.
Claims 1–5 and 7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
OPINION
I. 35 U.S.C. § 103
a. Claims 1–3 and 7
Appellant argues Claims 1–3 and 7 as a group. Appeal Br. 36. We
select Claim 1 to represent the group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding the combination, Appellant contends that the Examiner has
interpreted Claim 1 inconsistent with Appellant’s Specification and the
interpretation one with ordinary skill in the art of drilling would give to
Claim 1. Appeal Br. 23. Appellant further contends that such an
interpretation has permitted the Examiner to apply Minsky and Sabharwal,
which Appellant contends are non-analogous art. See Appeal Br. 22, 23. In
this light, Appellant contends that “Minsky and Sabharwal are not
‘reasonably pertinent’ to the problem to be solved as ‘drawn from the
specification and the inferences that would reasonably have been drawn
from the specification by a person of ordinary skill in the art.’” Appeal Br.
24. Appellant specifically contends that Minsky and Sabharwal do not
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disclose a multi-workflow drilling process or “any multi-workflow process
that is a manufacturing process that produces a product.” Appeal Br. 24.
Appellant contends that Minsky does not teach “a multi-workflow
technological manufacturing process” that determines “a physical severity,”
but instead is directed to a “human activity” and “untethered from physical
realities of a multi-workflow manufacturing process.” Appeal Br. 28.
Appellant makes a similar contention regarding Sabharwal. Appeal Br. 31.
Thus, Appellant contends “[a] person having ordinary skill in the art
(PHOSITA) would not have looked to the abstract, business enterprise
concepts of Minsky or Sabharwal.” Appeal Br. 25. Appellant further argues
that Mancini and Pastusek do not remedy the deficiencies of Minsky and
Sabharwal because neither teaches or suggests a “multi-workflow drilling
process” with workflows having interdependencies. Appeal Br. 26, 34.
In response, the Examiner maintains that “Appellant’s claims are
related to problems that are pertinent to workflows so references directed to
workflows are analogous art.” Ans. 8. The Examiner further maintains that
the “original claims” did not include “drilling data,”and that is why Minsky
and Sabharwal were applied to original claim 1. Ans. 8. The Examiner also
maintains that “drilling data” simply adds context to the claimed process,
and that the claimed process can “be used with other types of data such as
for drilling processes or for other types of processes such as those related to
financial processes or enterprise management.” Ans. 8. Moreover, the
Examiner maintains that “[A]ppellant’s claims are very broad as they related
[sic] to the workflow interdependency functionality, analysis and
presentation” and that “[t]here is nothing in the claims that would prevent
such a tool or methodology to be used for other types of data and that the
drilling aspect of the claims merely provides one specific context for such a
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solution.” Ans. 9. We agree with the Examiner and further find that the
amended claim 1 is rejected base on the totality of what the prior art
references teach as suggested to the skilled artisan.
Furthermore, the Examiner maintains that since the term “[w]orkflow
is a very broad term and can be a model” (Ans. 10), Mancini teaches
“various drilling sections that have their own workflows or at least can be
reasonably be considered workflows to one of ordinary skill in the art as
they are processes that get modelled and integrated into risk assessment.”
Ans. 8–9.
In the Reply Brief, along the same lines of the reasoning as
Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, Appellant contends that “the
Examiner has ‘oversimplified’ the claimed subject matter to an extent that
the Examiner’s construction bears little resemblance to the specification or
what would be understood by a PHOSITA” and “[t]he claimed subject
matter has no parallels in ‘financial processes or enterprise management’
that are related to humans and about humans.” Reply Br. 22, 24 (emphasis
omitted).
As outlined above, the thrust of Appellant’s argument is that Claim 1
is directed towards something “physical,” such as “a manufacturing process
that produces a product” or a multi-workflow drilling process and that one
with ordinary skill in the art would not turn to Minsky and Sabharwal
because they are not directed towards producing products and/or are
untethered to the physical realities of the claimed invention. See Appeal Br.
23, 24. We have not been persuaded by Appellant’s arguments.
While Claim 1 recites the terms “drilling process” and “physical
severity” and includes the limitation “during the drilling process, presenting
the quantified severity information,” the terms “drilling process” and
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“physical severity” are not specifically limited to or only associated with a
specific “drilling operation,” as Appellant contends. Appellant’s
Specification indicates that “a drilling process can be used to drill a borehole
into a formation” and that such “a typical drilling process can quite complex
[sic] and may include a number of workflows that are implemented
concurrently in the drilling process.” Spec. ¶ [6]. Appellant’s Specification
also indicates “workflows for drilling processes have been developed prior
to a drilling operation.” Spec. ¶ [7] (emphasis added). The workflows of
the drilling process are described in paragraph [32] of the Specification and
include, inter alia, “workflows for directional drilling, pore pressure, well
placement, anti-collision . . . .” Additionally, Appellant’s Specification
states “[t]he disclosed interdependent multi-workflow management system
may occur in real-time or during planning phases of a drilling operation.”
Spec. ¶ [33] (emphasis added). In summary, according to Appellant’s
disclosure, “directional drilling” (i.e., the drilling operation) corresponds to
one workflow of several workflows of an entire “drilling process.” Claim 1
does not include the term “directional drilling” or “drilling operation” and
nothing in Claim 1 limits “drilling process” to either “directional drilling,”
“drilling operation,” or “manufacturing a borehole.”
It is well settled that, during patent examination, claims must be given
their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The
broadest reasonable interpretation standard requires the words of the claims
to be given their “broadest reasonable meaning . . . in their ordinary usage as
they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into
account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may
be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s
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specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
However, although we interpret claims broadly but reasonably in light of the
Specification, we nonetheless must not import limitations from the
Specification into the claims. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (citations
omitted).
In this case, because nothing in “method” Claim 1 limits “drilling
process” and “physical severity” to either “directional drilling” or “drilling
operation,” we agree with the Examiner that Claim 1 under its broadest
reasonable meaning is “related to problems that are pertinent to workflows
so references directed to workflows are analogous art” and, as a result, “it is
reasonable for the Minsky and Sabharwal references to be considered
analogous art.” Ans. 8.
Therefore, we find Appellant’s argument to be unpersuasive of error,
and we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of Claims 1–3 and 7 under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
b. Claim 8
Appellant argues, “[n]one of the references provide sufficient
evidence of the multi-workflow drilling process of claim 1 that includes
determining a physical severity in which a first workflow and a second
workflow of the drilling process are impacted in response to a change in a
state or value of the interdependency.” Appeal Br. 37.
In response, the Examiner maintains that Mancini teaches, in
paragraph [11], the selection of “control parameters to optimize drilling
performance.” Ans. 10. The Examiner further maintains:
physical severity is shown in Mancini at para [0019], [0069]-
[0070] because Mancini shows risks for a failure mode of a
section of wellbore where the failure can be for things like lateral
vibration or that environmental conditions can be high risk. Both
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of those type of risks and failures are physical and the level of
severity is shown because there are calculations being made and
presented at, for instance, para [0175].

Ans. 11.

In the Reply Brief, “Appellant reiterates that none of the
references show evidence of multi-workflow drilling that includes
determining a physical severity that is impacted.” Reply Br. 25
(emphasis omitted).
Based on our review, we have not been persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner finds Minsky teaches a multi-
workflow process and determining a severity in which workflows are
impacted in response to a change in a state or value of the
interdependency between the workflows. Final Act. 7, 8. We agree
with the Examiner’s findings. Our review of Mancini also finds that
Mancini teaches modeling a drilling process to evaluate risk of failure
during a drilling process. Mancini ¶ 1. Mancini also teaches that the
drilling process includes a workflow which can be impacted by a
change in a state or value. Mancini ¶ 67, 68. Mancini also teaches
where the severity is a physical severity. Mancini ¶ 69.
Therefore, we find Appellant’s argument to be unpersuasive of error,
and we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of Claim 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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c. Claims 9 and 10
Appellant argues Claims 9 and 10 as a group.2 Appeal Br. 36; Reply
Br. 26. We select Claim 9 to represent the group. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant argues Claim 9 on the same basis as Appellant’s arguments
for Claims 1 and 8, but further adds “[t]he term ‘control flow’ in Minsky is
not sufficient evidence of ‘a drilling process controller’.” Appeal Br. 38–40
(emphasis omitted).
In response, the Examiner maintains that both Minsky and Mancini
show a controller. Ans. 11.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates “[t]he record is lacking
evidence of the drilling process controller.” Reply Br. 26.
Based on our review and based on the same reasoning set forth for
Claim 8 in the section above, we have not been persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments. Furthermore, we agree with the Examiner that Minsky teaches a
controller. Ans. 11. Also, as we discussed above and consistent with the
Examiner’s findings, Mancini is directed towards a drilling process.
Mancini ¶ 1.
Therefore, we find Appellant’s argument to be unpersuasive of error,
and we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of Claims 9 and 10 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103.

2 Appellant indicates that “claim 1 is not representative of independent
claims 9 and 10,” but Appellant does not set forth a separate argument for
independent claim 10. Consequently, claim 10 will fall with independent
claim 9.
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d. Claims 4 and 5
Appellant again argues, “Mancini does not disclose ‘physical severity’
as being related to workflows of a multi-workflow drilling process.” Appeal
Br. 40 (emphasis omitted). Appellant further argues that Cox does not teach
“‘presenting the quantified severity information in a graphical web diagram,
wherein workflows relying on the interdependency are connected by arrows’
as in dependent claim 4” and “‘wherein quantifying the physical severity
information comprises adjusting the thickness or line weight of the arrows
based on the degree of severity’ as in dependent claim 5.” Appeal Br. 46.
In response, the Examiner maintains “[t]he cited sections of
Cox explicitly shows these limitations and because Cox can be
considered analogous art because Cox is directed to interaction with
workflow data and thus related to the type of workflows shown in
Minsky and Sabharwal.” Ans. 10. In the Final Action, the Examiner
finds that Cox teaches, in Figure 6 and col. 8, line 27, through col. 9,
line 34, presenting the quantified severity information in a graphical
web diagram by adjusting the thickness or line weight of the arrows
based on the degree of severity. Final Act. 16.
We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive. Appellant
has not, in either the Appeal Brief or Reply Brief, persuasively
identified how the Examiner’s findings with respect to Cox fail to
teach or suggest the limitations of Claims 4 and 5. Because Appellant
has not shown error in the Examiner’s factual findings or conclusion
of obviousness, we affirm the Examiner’s rejections of Claims 4 and 5
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

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II. 35 U.S.C. § 101
Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law that is
reviewable de novo. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
a. Legal Principles
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, under Step 2A, we first determine what concept the claim is
“directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before
us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a
third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
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such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If, under Step 2A, the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, then,
under Step 2B, “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine
whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must
include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
On January 7, 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) published revised patent subject matter eligibility guidance. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,
2019 (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, Step 2A of the
Alice two-step framework is divided in two prongs. For Step 2A, Prong 1,
we look to whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions falling into
certain groupings of abstract ideas (e.g., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes). For Step 2A, Prong 2, if the claim recites
such a judicial exception, we look to whether the claim recites any additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
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(h)).
Only if a claim recites a judicial exception and does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then determine, under Step 2B
of the Alice two-step framework, whether the claim adds a specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood,
routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.
b. Discussion – Claim 1
i. Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
In the Final Action before the Revised Guidance, the Examiner
maintains that Claim 1 is directed to the abstract ideas of “being an idea
itself” and “being a type of organizing human activity.” Final Act. 4, 5. The
Examiner also maintains that Claim 1 does not include an inventive concept
and, is therefore, ineligible for patenting. Final Act. 5. In the Answer, the
Examiner maintains that the “field of drilling [of the claims] merely provides
a context for the type” of information required by Claim 1. Ans. 3. The
Examiner also maintains that the invention of Claim 1 uses technology to
implement an activity that was previously performed by humans. Ans. 4.
The Examiner further maintains that Claim 1 is not “sufficiently tethered” to
an actual drilling operation, “which provides a physical tangible product.”
Ans. 4. Regarding the inventive concept, the Examiner finds that
Appellant’s Specification (namely, in ¶¶ [30], [31], [38], [39], and [41–45])
describes that the invention that relies on generic and well-known
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components and, as a result, the additional elements included in Claim 1 do
not amount to an inventive concept. Ans. 6.
ii. Appellant’s Arguments and Contentions
In the Appeal Brief, Appellant argues that “the pending claims are
directed to an improvement in a technical field, in particular the field of
drilling” and, thus, not abstract. Appeal Br. 7. Specifically, Appellant
contends that “[s]uch a technological process is an improvement over the
historical process that involved skilled individuals making determinations
individually and communicating effectively.” Appeal Br. 11 (emphasis
omitted). In the Reply Brief, in view of the Revised Guidance, Appellant
contends that the Examiner’s interpretation of Claim 1 is unreasonably
broad. Reply Br. 2. Appellant argues, “Appellant’s claims are not directed
to ‘computerizing’ human activity as it would have been performed in
accordance with past practices; rather, Appellant’s claims are directed to an
improvement in a technological process that is a manufacturing process.”
Reply Br. 3 (emphasis omitted). Appellant further contends that “claim 1 is
for drilling” and that “[t]here is no doubt that drilling is a manufacturing
process that manufactures a borehole in the Earth.” Reply Br. 12 (emphasis
omitted); see also Reply Br. 13.
iii. Analysis
For Step 2A, Prong 1, of the Revised Guidance, we agree with the
Examiner and find that the emphasized portions of Claim 1, reproduced
above, recite elements that fall within the abstract idea grouping of certain
methods of organizing human activity. Final Act. 5. We also find that the
emphasized portions of Claim 1 recite elements that fall within the abstract
idea grouping of mental processes. The Revised Guidance requires us to
evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract
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idea). According to the Revised Guidance, to determine whether a claim
recites an abstract idea, we must identify limitations that fall within one or
more of the designated subject matter groupings of abstract ideas.
According to the October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update produced
by the USPTO, “a claim recites a judicial exception when the judicial
exception is ‘set forth’ or ‘described’ in the claim.” See October 2019
Patent Eligibility Guidance Update Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df (“October Update”). The Revised Guidance lists “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity” as one such grouping and characterizes certain
methods of organizing human activity as including, inter alia, “managing
personal behavior.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The Revised Guidance lists mental
processes as including “concepts performed in the human mind.” Id. We
find that the elements of Claim 1 describe these judicial exceptions.
Specifically, regarding certain methods of organizing human activity,
we agree with the Examiner that Claim 1 sets forth the human activity of
“workflow management,” which, in our view, is a form of “managing
personal behavior” of the Revised Guidance. Final Act. 5. Furthermore,
regarding mental processes, we find that nothing in Claim 1 precludes the
steps of Claim 1 from being performed in the human mind. For example,
the emphasized steps of Claim 1 include identifying workflows, receiving
information, identifying an interdependency relationship between the
workflows, determining how much the workflows are physically impacted
by a change in state of the interdependency relationship based on the
information, and quantifying the severity of the impact. A human mind is
easily capable of performing these steps and these steps relate to a form of
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managing personal behavior. Thus, we find that Claim 1 recites abstract
ideas.
Turning to Prong 2 of the Step 2A of the Revised Guidance, we
recognize that Claim 1 includes additional elements such as specifying that
the workflows pertain to a drilling process, the received information is
sensor information, and the quantified severity is presented. However, as
discussed above, our review of Appellant’s Specification finds that the term
“drilling process” includes preparation stages prior to an actual drilling
operation and that Claim 1 does not specifically require performing drilling
or conducting a “drilling operation” in which a drill or similar apparatus
actually drills into the Earth or any other material to form a borehole.
Furthermore, our review of Appellant’s Specification finds that the term
“sensor,” which precedes the term “information,” is nominal. Appellant’s
Specification indicates that the “[v]arious sensors, as are known in the art,
may be placed on the drilling rig 10 to take measurements of the drilling
equipment” (see Spec. ¶ [30]), but Claim 1 does not recite specific types of
sensors, “drilling equipment,” or that the “measurements” are taken. As a
result, these additional elements are not enough to distinguish the steps of
Claim 1 from describing certain methods of organizing human activity or a
mental process. Thus, Claim 1 does not integrate the recited abstract ideas
into a practical application.
Therefore, based on our analysis under the Revised Guidance, we
agree with the Examiner and find that Claim 1 is directed to abstract ideas.
As a result, we focus our attention on Step 2B of the Alice two-step
framework.
Step 2B of the Alice two-step framework requires us to determine
whether any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient
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to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial
exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. As discussed above, Claim 1 includes
additional elements such as specifying that the workflows pertain to a
drilling process, the received information is sensor information. We agree
with the Examiner’s findings that the additional elements of Claim 1, when
considered individually and in an ordered combination, correspond to
nothing more than generic and well-known components used to implement
the abstract ideas. See Ans. 6. In other words, we find that the additional
elements, as claimed, are well-understood, routine, and conventional and
“behave exactly as expected according to their ordinary use.” See In re TLI
Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 615 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus,
implementing the abstract idea with these generic and well-known
components “fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner
that Claim 1 does not provide significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
Therefore, because Claim 1 is directed to the abstract ideas of certain
methods of organizing human activity and mental processes and does not
provide significantly more than the abstract idea itself, we agree with the
Examiner that Claim 1 is ineligible for patenting and affirm the Examiner’s
rejection of Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
c. Discussion – Claims 2–5 and 7
For Claims 2–5 and 7, the Examiner maintains that these claims
include the abstract ideas of Claim 1, but do not include an inventive
concept and are ineligible for patenting. Final Act. 5.
In the Appeal Brief, Appellant contends that the Examiner has failed
to provide evidence that the limitations of Claims 2–5 and 7 are abstract and
do not include an inventive concept. Appeal Br. 19–21. For Claims 4 and 5,
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Appellant argues that these claims includes features of Appellant’s Figure 5,
which are “improvements of the technological process of drilling.” Appeal
Br. 20. For Claim 7, Appellant argues that the claim “recites machines
(computing system and display) that transform sensor data of a technological
process that is a manufacturing process that produces a borehole.” Appeal
Br. 20–21.
We have not been persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and find that
Claims 2–5 and 7 do not integrate the abstract ideas of Claim 1 into a
practical application or include an inventive concept. We find that Claims 2
and 3 do not include any additional elements and find that Claims 4, 5, and 7
include additional elements pertaining to the receiving of the information
and the presenting information. Appellant’s Specification describes that the
presentation occurs on a user interface, which may include a graphical user
interface (see Spec. ¶ [31]), that is part of a processing system, but
Appellant’s Specification gives no indication that such components are
anything but “well-understood, routine and conventional” components.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Claims 2–5 and 7 are
ineligible for patenting and affirm the Examiner’s rejections of Claims 2–5
and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 7–10 103 Minsky, Sabharwal,
Mancini, Pastusek
1–3, 7–
10

Appeal 2019-002863
Application 14/569,185
19
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
4, 5, 103 Minsky, Sabharwal,
Mancini, Pastusek,
Cox
4, 5
1–5, 7 101 Eligibility 1–5, 7
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 7–
10

FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED