SCA Tissue North America, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 30, 2003

338 N.L.R.B. 1130 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1130
SCA Tissue North America, LLC and Paper, Allied-
Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers In-
ternational Union, AFL–CIO, CLC. Case 28–
CA–17548
April 30, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND ACOSTA
On August 22, 2002, Administrative Law Judge Greg-
ory Z. Meyerson issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and a reply
brief. The General Counsel filed a brief in response to
the exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2
and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, SCA Tissue North America,
LLC, Bellemont, Arizona, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns shall take the action set forth in the Order.

1 The Board’s established policy is not to overrule credibility resolu-
tions unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the credibility determinations are incorrect. Standard
Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir.
1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for
reversing the findings.
2 In adopting the judge’s finding that the General Counsel met his
burden of establishing that Sandoval’s union activity was a motivating
factor for his discharge, we rely on the following evidence of animus:
(1) Plant Manager Graverson’s warning to all employees that they
could not talk about the Union on the shop floor, when no such restric-
tion existed for other topics; (2) Supervisor Stievo’s order to Sandoval
to remove his union button because it violated the Respondent’s “no
jewelry” policy, which had never been enforced; (3) Stievo’s direction
to Sandoval to cover up his union T-shirt with his jacket while he was
walking across the shop floor; and (4) Stievo’s parting comment to
Sandoval about his “attitude.” Contrary to the judge, we do not infer
animus from the Respondent’s hiring of a labor consultant, or from the
fact that members of management cried at an emotionally charged
meeting with employees during the campaign. Additionally, we do not
rely on the timing of Sandoval’s discharge to establish a violation of the
Act.
Member Liebman would rely on timing as an additional factor in
finding the Respondent’s unlawful motivation for the discharge of
Sandoval on September 24, 2001. She agrees with the judge that, in the
circumstances, Sandoval’s increased organizing activity beginning in
August, and the possibility of a new representation election in early
December contributed to the Respondent’s determination to fire him
unlawfully.
William Mabry III and Jerome E. Schmidt, for the General
Counsel.
Susan M. Love, of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GREGORY Z. MEYERSON, Administrative Law Judge. Pursu-
ant to notice, I heard this case in Flagstaff, Arizona, on April 4–
5, and May 22–24, 2002. Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical
and Energy Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC (the
Union), filed an unfair labor practice charge in this case on
October 30, 2001. Based on that charge, the Regional Director
for Region 28 of the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) issued a complaint on December 26, 2001. The com-
plaint alleges that SCA Tissue North America, LLC (the Re-
spondent or the Employer), violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The Respondent
filed a timely answer to the complaint denying the commission
of the alleged unfair labor practices.
All parties appeared at the hearing, and I provided them with
the full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evi-
dence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue
orally and file briefs. Based on the record, my consideration of
the briefs filed by counsel for the General Counsel and counsel
for the Respondent, and my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses,1 I now make the following findings of fact and con-
clusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the
Respondent is a Delaware Corporation, with an office and place
of business in Bellemont, Arizona (the facility), where it has
been engaged in the business of manufacturing paper products.
Further, I find that during the 12-month period ending October
30, 2001, the Respondent, in the course and conduct of its busi-
ness operations, purchased and received at its facility goods
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located outside
the State of Arizona.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent is now, and at
all times material has been, an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that at
all times material herein, the Union has been a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
1 The credibility resolutions made in this decision are based on a re-
view of the testimonial record and exhibits, with consideration given
for reasonable probability and the demeanor of the witnesses. See
NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). Where witnesses
have testified in contradiction to the findings herein, I have discredited
their testimony, as either being in conflict with credited documentary or
testimonial evidence, or because it was inherently incredible and un-
worthy of belief.
338 NLRB No. 175
SCA TISSUE NORTH AMERICA, LLC 1131
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Dispute
The complaint alleges that the Respondent discharged em-
ployee Frederick Sandoval on September 24, 2001,2 because of
his activities on behalf of the Union. The Respondent admits
discharging Sandoval, but denies the commission of any unfair
labor practices. According to the Respondent, Sandoval was
discharged for cause, namely leaving work early without per-
mission on two consecutive dates, September 19 and 20. The
Respondent contends that this constituted job abandonment,
which was a dischargeable offense. However, it is the General
Counsels position that the Respondent’s stated reason for the
discharge was merely a pretext, and that the true reason for
Sandoval’s termination was because of his activity in attempt-
ing to organize the facility for the Union.
B. The Facts
Frederick Sandoval was first employed at the Respondent’s
facility on July 10, 1995. He was originally hired as a machine
operator and converted to a machine maintenance mechanic in
May 2000. As a maintenance mechanic, Sandoval was respon-
sible for machine repair and preventive maintenance on the
Respondent’s equipment. The facility manufactures paper
products and the production equipment used in the process is
frequently in need of repair or preventive maintenance. At the
time of the events in question, David Stievo was the mainte-
nance manager and the person in charge of the maintenance
department.
In September 2000, the Union began an organizing campaign
at the Respondent’s facility. Sandoval and maintenance me-
chanic David Hetzler met with Union Representative Israel
Vasquez at a local bar and grill to discuss organizing. Vasquez
gave them union campaign material including flyers, buttons,
bumper stickers, and authorization cards. The organizing ef-
forts were conducted among the Respondent’s maintenance,
shipping, production, and receiving employees at the facility.
Sandoval concentrated his activities on the day shift, where he
worked at the time, while Hetzler concentrated on the night
shift. According to Sandoval, his union activity included pass-
ing out approximately 180 flyers, distributing about 45 union
authorization cards, collecting about 30 signed cards, talking
with fellow employees about the advantages of a union, attend-
ing meetings, and wearing a union button.
Sandoval testified that one of the machine operators who re-
turned a signed union authorization card to him was Laura
Bliss, who was subsequently promoted to the position of crew
team leader.3 Bliss, who was a crew team leader at the time
Sandoval was discharged, acknowledged that she knew he was
a union supporter at the time of the organizing effort. Accord-
ing to Sandoval, various supervisors, including General Man-
ager Mike Graverson and Production Supervisor Karlene
Nadeau, had occasion to observe him engaging in union activ-
ity during the period prior to the union election. Employee

2 All dates are in 2001 unless otherwise indicated.
3 The parties stipulated that crew team leader Laura Bliss was a su-
pervisor as defined by Sec. 2(11) of the Act.
witnesses Brenda Stokes and Michelle Eubank testified regard-
ing the openness with which Sandoval conducted his union
activity. Eubank commented that Sandoval “was pretty bois-
terous about it,” meaning his feelings about the Union.
During the election campaign, Sandoval was one of a small
number of employees to wear a union button at work.4
Sandoval testified that during the second week of November
2000, he wore a union button at work, however, within about 3
hours Maintenance Manager David Stievo instructed him to
remove it. According to Sandoval, he and Stievo then had a
conversation about whether or not the button violated the Re-
spondent’s “no jewelry” policy, with Sandoval questioning why
some jewelry, like wedding rings, was allowed on the produc-
tion floor but not his union button. Ultimately, Sandoval fol-
lowed Stievo’s request and removed the button. Curiously,
Stievo testified initially that he did not recall seeing Sandoval
with a union button or any conversation with him about the
Respondent’s “no jewelry policy.” However, when he testified
again later in the hearing, Stievo contradicted his earlier testi-
mony by saying that he did remember Sandoval wearing a un-
ion button and asking him to take it off.
The Union filed a representation petition to represent a unit
of employees at the Respondent’s facility on October 16, 2000.
General Manager Graverson testified that he learned of the
union organizing campaign shortly thereafter. The Respondent
immediately launched a counter campaign. While the Respon-
dent characterizes the campaign as intended to educate the em-
ployees, it is without serious doubt that the Respondent’s cam-
paign was designed to convince the employees to vote against
union representation.
Graverson testified that the Respondent hired labor consult-
ant John Coit to instruct management on how to effectively
deal with the organizing campaign. During the period prior to
the election, managers and supervisors had individual conversa-
tions with employees in an effort to explain the Respondent’s
position and to convince them that it was in their best interest to
reject the Union. Further, meetings were held with groups of
employees where supervisors would explain the collective-
bargaining process to employees and set out the Respondent’s
position that both the Employer and the employees were better
off without union representation. Graverson admitted taking
the organizing campaign very personally and becoming emo-
tional at the meetings. He testified that he felt the interest his
employees had in being represented by the Union reflected
badly on him. It was at one of those meetings, attended by
approximately 25 to 30 employees, where both Production
Supervisor Nadeau and General Manager Graverson cried.
During the campaign, the Respondent also distributed pro-
employer literature and made some policy changes. Graverson
testified that the literature emphasized the uncertainty of union
representation. The Respondent’s human resources director,
Samuel Hull, testified that the Employer adopted a policy of
disciplinary leniency for the duration of the campaign. The
4 Employee witness Michelle Eubank testified to seeing only a total
of four or five employees wearing union buttons, while Supervisor
David Stievo testified that less than 22 employees were union button
wearers.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1132
Respondent claims that this policy was meant to create an at-
mosphere free of coercion. Hull testified that “[i]n fact, we
really tried not to give any discipline during that period because
it was during the union campaign, and we were trying to do
everything possible in our power to demonstrate our fair hand-
edness, that we were obeying the rules . . . .” According to
Sandoval, it was during this period that Graverson instructed
employees not to talk about the Union on the production floor.
Previous to this time, there had never been any restriction as to
what employees could discuss, and, thereafter, employees were
still free to discuss any topic, with the exception of the Union.
Although questioned about this incident, Graverson did not
deny making the statement, but, rather, testified that “I proba-
bly did say that.”5
Sandoval testified that in November 2000, he had a conver-
sation with David Stievo, when Stievo approached him and
asked why he wanted the Union “so bad.” Sandoval explained
that management had treated employees unfairly, and he felt
that the Union would change such treatment. Sandoval also
stated that he was going to vote in favor of union representa-
tion. Allegedly, Stievo became upset at Sandoval and from that
point on did not speak to Sandoval. Stievo acknowledged that
he discussed the Union with Sandoval, but he testified that he
did not specifically know Sandoval was a union supporter.
The representation election was conducted on December 1
and 2, 2000. The employees voted against union representation
by a vote of 82 to 22. Following the election, Sandoval contin-
ued to express his support for the Union. He informed fellow
employee Michelle Eubank that another election could be held
1 year after the first election, and he told Eubank to “watch and
see, and you’ll be voting next year.” Coworkers Eubank,
Brenda Stokes, and Jessie Lomas all testified that following the
election they heard Sandoval continue to express his support for
the Union.
Approximately 4 months after the election, Lomas and
Sandoval had occasion to discuss unions with crew team leader
Eric Duiker6 at a local bar and grill. Sandoval testified that he
told Duiker that a union would help morale and he intended to
start another union campaign, and “hopefully the people would
wise up.” Sandoval expressed fear that the Respondent would
fire him because of his efforts on behalf of the Union, however,
Duiker told him that would not happen. Both Lomas and Dui-
ker recalled a conversation with Sandoval at about this same
time at the bar and grill where Sandoval expressed a continuing
interest in organizing a union at the facility. Further, both
Sandoval and Lomas testified about conversations regarding the
Union that Sandoval had in the summer of 2001 with other
employees, while they were taking smoking breaks in the
smoking area outside the facility. On one of these occasions,
Sandoval told employees that while they had missed the oppor-
tunity to bring in the Union, they could be successful “in the

5 Any misconduct committed by the Respondent during the pre-
election period would be barred by Sec. 10(b) of the Act from being
alleged to constitute unfair labor practices. However, any such conduct
can still be raised in order to demonstrate union animus.
6 Duiker’s testimony establishes his exercise of supervisory author-
ity. Accordingly, I conclude that he is a supervisor as defined by Sec.
2(11) of the Act.
next election.” According to Sandoval and Lomas, this conver-
sation took place in the presence of Duiker, a smoker. Also
during the summer of 2001, Sandoval had an opportunity to
discuss the Union with Electrical Supervisor Jeremy Reynolds.7
According to Sandoval, during this conversation, which took
place in the smoking area, he told Reynolds that the employees
“needed to go union” in order to improve conditions at the fa-
cility. Allegedly, Reynolds agreed that conditions needed to be
improved, however, he was not convinced a union was the right
approach.
Sandoval testified that in early September 2001, he intensi-
fied his organizing efforts by openly speaking to new hires and
employees who were upset at how the Respondent treated em-
ployees. He contends that he increased his efforts because he
understood that by December 2001, a new election could be
held. It is the General Counsel’s position that as the Respon-
dent’s supervisors and managers also understood a new election
could soon be held, that the Respondent attempted to create a
reason to terminate Sandoval. Just prior to this period of time,
in July 2001, Maintenance Manager David Stievo approached
Sandoval about an alleged “attendance problem.” Stievo men-
tioned several “sick days” which Sandoval had allegedly taken
back in February and March 2001. Sandoval informed Stievo
that his attendance was excellent and the days on which he was
allegedly absent were actually his days off. After checking the
records, Stievo was forced to admit that he had made a mistake
and no discipline was issued.
In late August 2001, Sandoval, as well as several other main-
tenance mechanics, registered for an electrical class held at a
local community college. As this class could potentially help
the maintenance mechanics in the performance of their job
duties, the Respondent agreed to pay the cost of tuition, de-
pending on the grade received in the class. Although Sandoval
alleged that the Respondent made it difficult for him to get off
work to register for the class, he did manage to get registered.
However, after starting the class, which was given at night,
events occurred that made it more difficult for Sandoval to
attend.
Until mid-September 2001, Sandoval had worked the day
shift, from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., which allowed him time to attend
night class. In early September, however, there was a tempo-
rary vacancy in the night maintenance crew, which the Respon-
dent decided to cover by having several day-shift mechanics
alternate in working the night shift. Sandoval was one of the
mechanics selected, although he contends that his selection was
unfair considering his seniority. In any event, while the regular
night shift ran from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m., David Stievo agreed to
alter Sandoval’s night work schedule to run from 9 p.m. to 9
a.m., so as not to disrupt his class schedule.
Sandoval’s first evening of work began on September 18,
when he was scheduled to work from 9 p.m. to 9 a.m. At about
4 a.m. on September 19, Sandoval informed his supervisor,
Laura Bliss, that he needed to go home because he was sleepy
7 The parties stipulated that Jeremy Reynolds was a supervisor as de-
fined by Sec. 2(11) of the Act.
SCA TISSUE NORTH AMERICA, LLC 1133
and did not feel safe continuing to work in that condition.8
Both sides agree that Bliss informed Sandoval that he needed to
wait until David Stievo got to work so he could explain his
problem to Stievo. However, Bliss testified that she was even
more specific, directing Sandoval to wait for Stievo in the
breakroom, where he would be safe. In any event, Sandoval
returned to work and periodically went to look for Stievo. Bliss
left at 6 a.m., however, Stievo had still not arrived. Michael
Moberly, maintenance mechanic, arrived for the start of his
regular shift at 6 a.m. Moberly commented to Sandoval that he
looked tired and should just go home, as there was now “cover-
age.”9 Since Moberly was now present to provide “coverage,”
and as Stievo had still not arrived, Sandoval decided to leave.
The Respondent contends that he did so without permission,
and in direct contradiction of Bliss’ direction to wait for Stievo.
It is the General Counsel’s position that as there was “cover-
age,” Sandoval could reasonably assume, based on past practice
at the facility, that he could leave.
Sandoval clocked out upon leaving, but did not sign the “de-
viation sheet” located near the time clock. The purpose of the
sheet was to note schedule changes apart from what the time
clock would record.10 According to Sandoval, as he was exit-
ing from he facility, his vehicle drove past Stievo’s vehicle as
Stievo was arriving, and the two men waved to each other.
Stievo testified that he did not recall seeing Sandoval departing
the facility as he arrived. However, the security guard logs for
the morning of September 19, which are handwritten, reflect
that Sandoval left the facility at 6:21 a.m. and Stievo arrived at
6:20 a.m. Stievo contends he did not realize on September 19
that Sandoval had left work early that day.
On the evening of September 19, Sandoval was again sched-
uled to work the night shift and reported for work at 9 p.m. At
the beginning of the shift, he was approached by coworker, Dan
Harbottle. Reportedly, Harbottle, who worked days, wanted to
begin his shift the next morning (Sept. 20) at 6 a.m. rather than
9 a.m., and he informed Sandoval that he would be available to
cover if Sandoval wanted to leave early. On the morning of
September 20, both Harbottle and maintenance mechanic David
Hetzler arrived for work at 6 a.m. As there was adequate “cov-
erage,” Sandoval decided to leave work early. Just prior to
leaving, Sandoval had a conversation with Hetzler in which
Hetzler cautioned him about leaving work without permission.
Sandoval informed Hetzler that he was not concerned, as he
was tired, had perfect attendance, could afford an “occur-
rence,”11 and there was “coverage.”

8 Sandoval testified that at a safety meeting earlier that month, Gen-
eral Manager Graverson had informed the employees that if any em-
ployee felt unsafe, the employee could refuse to perform the unsafe
activity and then report the incident to a supervisor.
9 It appears from the testimony of a number of employees that the
references to “coverage” meant the presence of an employee at the
facility who could perform the duties of another employee who needed
to be absent for some reason.
10 The Respondent does not contend Sandoval attempted to obtain
pay for work that he did not perform on either day when he left early.
11 By the term “occurrence,” Sandoval apparently meant an atten-
dance violation for having left work early on 2 consecutive days.
There is no dispute that Sandoval clocked out at 6:06 a.m.
and left the facility at 6:40 a.m. on September 20, as is reflected
in the gate logs. The parties agree that Sandoval did not sign
the deviation sheet, nor did he seek permission from any super-
visor to leave work early. However, the General Counsel con-
tends that since there was “coverage” on the morning of Sep-
tember 20, Sandoval had a reasonable belief that he could leave
work early, even without direct permission from a supervisor.
It is the position of the Respondent that by leaving work early
on a second consecutive day, Sandoval had abandoned his job.
The Respondent argues that the second incident was more
egregious than the first, as on the second day, Sandoval did not
even attempt to obtain permission from a supervisor.
According to Stievo, he first became aware that Sandoval
had left work early on the two consecutive mornings when
maintenance mechanic Mark Stevenson brought the matter to
his attention on September 20. Stievo then conducted an inves-
tigation, after which he concluded that Sandoval had, in fact,
left work early on September 19 and 20. The investigation
consisted of talking with Mike Moberly and Dave Hetzler, and
checking the time records and the gate logs. However, it
should be noted that Stievo did not contact Sandoval during his
initial investigation of the incident.
On September 21, Stievo met with Human Relations Gener-
alist Beth Moser and General Manager Graverson to discuss the
investigation. According to Moser, after reviewing the witness
statements and time records, she recommended that Sandoval
be terminated. Graverson supported that recommendation and
Stievo accepted it. It is the Respondent’s position, that the
decision to discharge Sandoval was made because by leaving
work early on 2 consecutive days without permission, he had
abandoned his job.
Stievo and Sandoval were not scheduled to be at the facility
together until September 24. On that day Stievo and Moser met
with Sandoval and told him an investigation had been con-
ducted which disclosed that he had left work early without
permission on 2 consecutive mornings. Further, he was told
that his actions constituted job abandonment for which he was
being terminated. Sandoval strongly denied that he had aban-
doned his job and argued he had “coverage” on both days.
Also, he indicated that on the first date he felt tired, had sought
permission from Laura Bliss, and had left work only after he
was unable to locate Stievo. Both Moser and Stievo testified
that Sandoval also claimed Bliss had given him permission to
leave. However, Sandoval does not acknowledge making such
a statement. Although the termination papers had already been
prepared, Stievo decided to contact Bliss before making the
termination final. Sandoval was sent home and Stievo called
Bliss. Bliss reported to Stievo that Sandoval did request per-
mission to go home due to fatigue, but she denied telling
Sandoval he could leave. Following his conversation with
Bliss, Stievo called Sandoval and informed him that a final
decision had been made to terminate him.
Several days following his discharge, Sandoval returned to
the facility to collect his personal belongings. Stievo escorted
Sandoval to his toolbox, which contained his personal items.
While walking across the production floor, Sandoval removed
his jacket to reveal a T-shirt. The shirt was red, with 5-inch
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1134
white lettering that read “Work Union,” or words to that effect.
Stievo immediately told Sandoval to put his jacket back on,
which request Sandoval ignored. While the parties disagree as
to exactly what was said next, both agree that Stievo made a
reference to Sandoval’s “attitude.” Stievo testified the refer-
ence was merely an expression of his philosophy that a person
should try to maintain a positive attitude. It is the Respondent’s
position that the final decision to terminate Sandoval was based
not only on his having left work early without permission on 2
consecutive days, but also because he lied during the investiga-
tion about receiving permission from Laura Bliss to leave work
early. The Respondent argues that its policy manual does not
require progressive discipline, rather, it depends upon what
conduct constitutes the infraction. According to the Respon-
dent, Sandoval was not fired for an “attendance problem,” but,
rather, because he violated the Respondent’s “code of conduct”
by leaving work early without permission on 2 consecutive
days, failing to follow the instruction of Supervisor Bliss, and
lying about Bliss’ comments. The Respondent contends that
these infractions were egregious, and required immediate dis-
missal, without the reliance upon progressive discipline. (GC
Exhs. 3a, 1-073 & 1-074; 3b, 1-127 & 1-128; and 26.)
The General Counsel contends that Sandoval had an excel-
lent attendance record during his 6 years of employment with
the Respondent. Sandoval testified that he had never received
any written warnings nor been disciplined in any way during
his term of employment. While Sandoval’s personnel file does
reflect several “employee conferences,” Production Supervisor
Nadeau testified that after discussing with Sandoval the matters
reflected in these documents, she may not have informed him
that any written reference was being placed in his personnel
file, nor given him a copy. (GC Exh. 25.) Further, it is the
position of the General Counsel that under the Respondent’s
attendance policy, “job abandonment” requires at least 2 con-
secutive days with no contact from an employee, which was not
the situation with Sandoval. (GC Exh. 37–38.) The General
Counsel argues that the Respondent’s stated reasons for
Sandoval’s termination are pretextual, and a review of the dis-
ciplinary action issued to other employees will so demonstrate.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The central issue before the undersigned is the question of
the Respondent’s motivation in terminating Frederick
Sandoval. In Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989, the Board
announced the following causation test in all cases alleging
violations of Section 8(a)(3) or (1) turning on employer motiva-
tion. First, the General Counsel must make a prima facie show-
ing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct
was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s decision. This
showing must be by a preponderance of the evidence. Then,
upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to dem-
onstrate that the same action would have taken place even in
the absence of the protected conduct. The Board’s Wright Line
test was approved by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Transportation Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
In the present case, I conclude that the General Counsel has
made a prima facie showing that Frederick Sandoval’s pro-
tected conduct was a motivating factor in the Respondent’s
decision to terminate him. In Farmer Bros. Co., 303 NLRB
638, 649 (1991), enfd. 988 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1993), the Board
held that in order to establish a prima facie case, the General
Counsel must show: (1) that the discriminatee engaged in pro-
tected activities; (2) that the employer had knowledge of such
activities; (3) that the employer’s actions were motivated by
union animus; and (4) that the employer’s conduct had the ef-
fect of encouraging or discouraging membership in a labor
organization.
There can be no doubt that Sandoval engaged in significant
protected union activity. During the organizing campaign in
the fall of 2000, he was very active on behalf of the Union.
Sandoval distributed approximately 180 flyers to employees,
distributed about 45 union authorization cards, received 30
signed cards from employees, spoke with numerous employees
about the benefits of being represented by the Union, attended
union meetings, and wore a union button. Of particular signifi-
cance was Sandoval’s continuing union activity into the year
following the representation election. Sandoval, as well as a
number of other employee witnesses, credibly testified that he
continued in an open and vocal manner to talk with numerous
employees about the benefits of union representation. As the
time approached when a new election could be held, Sandoval
increased his activity. He frequently reminded employees that
while he felt they had made a mistake in voting against union
representation in December 2000, that they could have another
chance to be represented. He explained to employees that a
second election could be held 1 year later. Sandoval was, how-
ever, discharged in September 2001, less than 3 months before
a second election could be held.
In my opinion, the Respondent was well aware of Sandoval’s
union activity, both in the fall of 2000, and in the 10 months
following the representation election in December 2000.
While, as noted above, I have concluded that he was a visible
union organizer, it is not necessary to draw inferences about
Employer knowledge, as a number of the Respondent’s super-
visors acknowledged awareness of Sandoval’s union activity.
Sandoval testified that crew team leader Laura Bliss, who had
been a production employee during the fall 2000 campaign,
submitted a signed union authorization card to him. Regarding
Sandoval’s union activity and support, Bliss testified, “We
knew that he was. I knew he was.” Further, crew team leader
Eric Duiker testified as to a conversation that he had with
Sandoval following the election in which Sandoval told him
about the benefits of union representation, and expressed a
continuing interest in organizing for the Union.
Despite testimony from certain of the Respondent’s supervi-
sors that they had direct knowledge of Sandoval’s union activ-
ity, other supervisors seemed reluctant to admit awareness.
General Manager Graverson’s testimony in this regard was
particularly vague and “hazy.” Regarding Sandoval, he testi-
fied, “Fred was not pro-company, so I would assume he would
be for the Union.” However, when asked by counsel for the
General Counsel whether he was aware that Sandoval was still
in favor of the Union after the election, Graverson testified,
“No, I didn’t know that.” At another point in his testimony
Graverson said, “. . . I made the assumption that he [Sandoval]
SCA TISSUE NORTH AMERICA, LLC 1135
was more in favor of the Union than against, and I didn’t and
still don’t have a problem with that.” Still later Graverson testi-
fied, “I don’t think it was a secret that Fred was a union sup-
porter. Union campaigner, a whole different story.”
I do not find Michael Graverson to be a credible witness. I
believe that his testimony regarding his knowledge of
Sandoval’s union activity, as well as in other areas, was at best
disingenuous. It is simply incredible that Graverson was un-
aware of Sandoval’s union activity at the same time that several
of his supervisors, namely Bliss and Duiker, knew that
Sandoval was actively organizing on behalf of the Union.
Graverson was the facility general manager, the person in
charge of the plant. It is preposterous to think that supervisors
would fail to inform him of significant information regarding
the attempt to organize the facility. The only reason that super-
visors would have had for not discussing Sandoval’s union
activity with upper management would have been if those ac-
tivities were so well known by management that reporting them
would have been superfluous. Accordingly, I find Graverson’s
testimony inherently implausible, and conclude that Graverson
was well aware of Sandoval’s union activity throughout the
time period in question.
For similar reasons, I find David Stievo to be an incredible
witness. As with Graverson, Stievo’s testimony is vague re-
garding his knowledge of Sandoval’s union activity. Further, it
is inconsistent. At first he denied any knowledge of Sandoval’s
union activity or even whether he was a union supporter. He
claimed to not even recall seeing Sandoval wearing a union
button or having a conversation with Sandoval in which he
directed him to remove the button. However, when he testified
for the second time his memory had apparently improved, be-
cause he suddenly recalled the union button incident. In my
opinion, Stievo exercised selective memory. He was able to
remember facts that supported the Respondent’s position, such
as altering Sandoval’s schedule to permit him to take an eve-
ning class. However, when it came to Sandoval’s union activ-
ity, his memory seemed to fail him. Further, it is foolish to
think that Stievo could have remained ignorant of Sandoval’s
union activity when other supervisors in the Respondent’s hier-
archy have admitted being aware of that activity. Therefore, I
am of the opinion that Stievo was also well aware of
Sandoval’s union activity, from the fall of 2000 through the
time of his discharge.
In general, I found Frederick Sandoval to be a credible wit-
ness. His testimony was inherently plausible and was, for the
most part, supported by the weight of the objective evidence.
While his testimony did occasionally become emotional, that
was not unreasonable considering the circumstance surrounding
his discharge. His testimony appeared to have a “ring of au-
thenticity” about it. Therefore, I accept his testimony regarding
the volume and nature of his union activity, which occurred
from the fall of 2000 until his discharge. Further, I conclude
that the Respondent, including Supervisors Graverson and Sti-
evo, had knowledge of that union activity.
Regarding the question of whether the Respondent’s action
in discharging Sandoval was motivated by union animus, the
Respondent takes the position that it has not exhibited any un-
ion animus. The Respondent argues that as it has a number of
plants where employees are represented by unions and as many
of the facility’s managers had previously worked in union
plants, it was not hostile to the organizing efforts of the facil-
ity’s employees, including Sandoval. However, in my view,
this argument is plainly disingenuous. While the Respondent,
of course, had a legal right to oppose the Union’s organizing
efforts, it is a mischaracterization for the Respondent to suggest
that its campaign was just intended to “educate” the employees.
Rather, the Respondent was engaged in a strenuous effort to
defeat the Union. The Respondent employed consultant John
Coit to assist the facility managers in preparing the campaign.
The campaign itself utilized the supervisors and managers in
both individual and group meetings with employees where
collective bargaining was discussed, and the alleged disadvan-
tages of being represented by a union were explained to the
employees.
Clearly, the Respondent considered the campaign much
more than simply an academic exercise intended only for in-
formation dissemination. The Respondent’s supervisors took
the campaign personally. At a group meeting with employees
both Michael Graverson and Production Supervisor Karlene
Nadeau cried. The atmosphere was emotionally charged.
Graverson testified that he took the campaign very personally.
He felt the organizing efforts reflected badly on him and hoped
his employees would find it unnecessary to have a union repre-
sent them. While the Respondent, obviously, had the legal
right to oppose the Union’s organizing efforts, it is inaccurate
to characterize the Employer’s efforts as anything less than
strongly hostile to the Union.
There does appear to be direct evidence of union animus di-
rected specifically against Sandoval by Supervisor Stievo. As
has been set forth above, Stievo directed Sandoval to remove a
union button, because allegedly it violated the Respondent’s
“no jewelry” policy. However, the alleged failure to uniformly
enforce this policy as it applied to wedding rings remained
unanswered. Stievo’s union animus continued even following
Sandoval’s discharge when Stievo told Sandoval to cover up
his union T-shirt the day Sandoval returned to the facility to
retrieve his personal belongs. Further, I am of the view that
Stievo’s parting remark to Sandoval about his “attitude” was
intended as a reference to Sandoval’s union activity.
While these incidents on the part of Stievo were not alleged
as unfair labor practices, and were by the hearing date time
barred by Section 10(b) of the Act, they can still serve as evi-
dence of union animus. In the same way, Graverson’s state-
ment to employees that they could not talk about the Union
while on the production floor, although they could apparently
discuss any other subject, shows hostility to the Union. As is
noted above, Graverson does not deny making this statement.
Therefore, it is apparent to the undersigned that both Stievo and
Graverson have exhibited direct evidence of union animus.
But, even without direct evidence, animus or hostility to-
wards an employee’s union activity may be inferred from all
the circumstances. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362
F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966); and U.S. Soil Conditioning Co., 235
NLRB 762 (1978). Such an inference is warranted here. As I
have noted above, the Respondent engaged in a very aggressive
campaign to defeat the Union’s organizing efforts. While an
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1136
employer certainly has the legal right to oppose a Union’s or-
ganizing efforts, this Respondent’s supervisors made sure the
employees understood this was a personal matter. It is undis-
puted that Supervisor Nadeau and General Manager Graverson
both cried during their presentation to a large group of employ-
ees. Graverson, who was the highest-ranking manager at the
facility, testified that he took the organizing campaign very
personally and admitted becoming emotional at the meetings.
He was disappointed that some of his employees found it nec-
essary to seek union representation and felt it reflected badly on
him. It was the Respondent’s supervisors and managers who
chose to interject a personal element into the campaign and
created an emotionally charged atmosphere. Sandoval, as an
active and vocal union supporter, had a certain amount of that
emotion directed towards him in the form of hostility from the
supervisors. This was especially true as the time approached
when a second election could be held and Sandoval continued
with his organizational activities. Under these circumstances, I
believe my inference about the Respondent’s animus directed
towards Sandoval for his protected activity has considerable
support in this record.
As I have noted, Sandoval was an active and vocal union
supporter. He was one of only a handful of open union sup-
porters at the facility. Further, following the election he con-
tinued to organize on behalf of the Union, and increased his
efforts as the time approached when a second election could be
held. Any disciplinary action taken against him because of his
union activity would, unquestionably, have had the chilling
effect of discouraging other employees from supporting the
Union. As Sandoval’s union support was widely known, and
his termination seemed unduly harsh, coworkers could easily
infer that he was fired for his union activity. In this way, the
Respondent warned its other employees that continuing activi-
ties on behalf of the Union would not be tolerated.
The General Counsel, having met its burden of establishing
that the Respondent’s actions were motivated, at least in part,
by antiunion considerations, the burden now shifts to the Re-
spondent to show that it would have taken the same action ab-
sent the protected conduct. Senior Citizens Coordinating
Council of Riverbay Community, 330 NLRB 1100 (2000); and
Regal Recycling, Inc., 329 NLRB 355 (1999). The Respondent
must persuade by a preponderance of the evidence. Peter Vi-
talie Co., 310 NLRB 865, 871 (1993). The Respondent has
failed to meet this burden.
The Respondent takes the position that Sandoval was fired
primarily because in leaving work early on 2 consecutive morn-
ings, he abandoned his job. Also, allegedly he was insubordi-
nate in failing to follow Supervisor Bliss’ instruction and lied
about receiving permission from Bliss to leave work. Specifi-
cally, the Respondent does not allege that Sandoval was fired
because of an attendance problem or because of a poor em-
ployment record. It is worth noting that the Respondent does
not make such a claim because Sandoval, prior to the incident
in question, had an excellent attendance record and was consid-
ered a good employee. A review of his personnel file does not
alter that view, despite the presence of several “employee con-
ference” reports, which Sandoval credibly testified were never
shown to him. The logical conclusion that I reach from this
unrebutted testimony is that the matters covered in these reports
were not considered significant by management. (GC Exh. 25.)
Regarding the events of September 19 and 20, I am of the
opinion that what occurred was far different than simple job
abandonment. To begin with, on September 18–19, Sandoval
did not suddenly leave work without warning, but, rather, he
first approached Supervisor Bliss at about 4 a.m., and informed
her that he was tired, felt unsafe, and needed to go home.
While there is some dispute about precisely what Bliss told
Sandoval, all agree that Sandoval was told to wait until he had a
chance to talk with Supervisor Stievo. Sandoval unsuccessfully
tried to find Stievo and went to his office several times. After 6
a.m., with Bliss gone and Stievo still not at work, Sandoval
decided to leave. However, he did so only after determining
that “coverage” was available in the form of maintenance me-
chanic Mike Moberly.
The parties dispute what the concept of “coverage “ meant.
A number of employee witnesses, including Sandoval, David
Hetzler, Patrick Rush, and Jessie Lomas, testified that if an
employee found a coworker willing to perform his duties, if
necessary, the employee could leave work. The Respondent’s
managers contend “coverage” meant that a replacement em-
ployee, not scheduled to work that shift, would perform the
absent employee’s work, not simply another employee who was
already working the shift. Also, the Respondent takes the posi-
tion that with or without “coverage,” an employee, who wanted
to leave work early, still needed permission from a supervisor.
In view of the conflicting evidence presented, all of which
seemed credible, I am of the opinion that there was no consis-
tent policy regarding “coverage.” However, that does not alter
the fact that prior to leaving work early on the morning of Sep-
tember 19, Sandoval was of the belief he had arranged “cover-
age,” as he understood that concept. Of course, he had not
secured permission from a supervisor, but he had at least made
efforts to do so.
In my view, Sandoval’s reason for wanting to leave work
early on September 19, and his efforts to obtain permission to
do so, constitute mitigating circumstances which need to be
considered in determining whether his discharge for job aban-
donment was merely a pretext. The Respondent contends that
Sandoval compounded his misconduct by lying to Stievo and
Moser about receiving permission from Bliss to leave work
early. Sandoval testified that he made no such claim and I
credit his denial. For the reasons stated above, I have found
him to be a credible witness. In any event, it appears to me that
this is really a nonissue. On September 24, Stievo had con-
cluded the investigation, had decided to terminate Sandoval,
and had already prepared the termination papers. The addi-
tional reason given for termination, namely that Sandoval lied
about Bliss’ instruction, seems like an “after the fact” attempt
by the Respondent to justify its action. This stacking on of
reasons for the termination may well demonstrate that the Re-
spondent was not comfortable with its originally stated reason
for discharging Sandoval.
Concerning his shift of September 19–20, Sandoval also did
not simply leave work early. He first obtained what he be-
lieved to constitute “coverage.” Sandoval departed after 6 a.m.,
only after he determined that employees Hetzler and Harbottle
SCA TISSUE NORTH AMERICA, LLC 1137
were available to cover his shift. While the Respondent did not
consider this “coverage,” surely Sandoval’s continuing interest
in securing “coverage,” as he understood the term, should have
been considered by the Respondent as a mitigating circum-
stance in evaluating whether he had abandoned his job.
The Respondent raised the issue of Sandoval’s failure to sign
the “deviation sheet” on either September 19 or 20, although it
does not appear that the Respondent takes the position that this
was a further basis for the termination.12 In any event, I believe
that this is also a nonissue, as the deviation sheet is primarily
intended to prevent employee overpayments. However,
Sandoval clocked out on both dates and there is no contention
that he attempted in any way to obtain pay for which he was not
entitled.
It is important to note that General Manager Graverson testi-
fied the Respondent attempts to take mitigating factors into
consideration when disciplining. Similarly, Supervisor Karlene
Nadeau testified that the Respondent tries to be flexible when
determining what discipline to issue to an employee. However,
it does not appear to me that the Respondent was willing to
consider significant mitigating circumstances when disciplining
Sandoval. Rather, this long-term employee with a good work
record was given the ultimate discipline, termination.
Both parties introduced voluminous personnel records for
numerous employees into evidence. The General Counsel was
attempting to demonstrate that Sandoval was treated in a dispa-
rate fashion, while the Respondent was attempting to show that
its discharge of Sandoval was consistent with the discipline
issued to other employees. However, the Respondent acknowl-
edged that there was no truly analogous situation, as there was
no other nonprobationary employee who had left work early
without permission on 2 consecutive days. In any event, in
reviewing the employee personnel records in evidence, the
undersigned was mindful of the fact that the Respondent takes
the position that Sandoval was not fired because of either poor
attendance or poor work performance. On the contrary, his
attendance and work performance were good. Rather, accord-
ing to the Respondent, he was fired for job abandonment, a
code of conduct violation.
After a review of the record evidence, I am of the opinion
that there are a significant number of examples of employees
who had left work early and who were either issued minimal or
no discipline by the Respondent. However, as was argued by
the Respondent, these are, for a variety of reasons, not really
analogous situations. I believe it is more appropriate to com-
pare Sandoval’s discharge to the disciplinary action issued to
other employees who committed fairly significant offenses,
which would certainly be considered a breach of the Respon-
dent’s code of conduct. The employee handbook lists under
“Personal Conduct” examples of behavior that is so serious, a
final warning or termination may result from a single incident.
(GC Exh. 26.) Leaving work without permission is one of
those items listed.
The employment record of Lowell Spence is worth consider-
ing. (GC Exh. 14.) Spence was employed as a machine opera-

12 Graverson testified that there was no written policy subjecting
employees to discipline for failing to complete a deviation form.
tor. General Manager Graverson testified he did not associate
Spence with any union activity. Spence received repeated
warnings about tardiness and absenteeism in late 1999. In De-
cember 1999, Spence tested positive for drugs, and between
January and April 2000, there were reports of Spence sleeping
on the job. However, he received only a “final warning,” until
he was found sleeping on the job for a second time, at which
point he was terminated on December 7, 2000. This was obvi-
ously an employee with a deeply flawed employment history,
including repetitive attendance problems, illegal drug use, and
sleeping on the job. Yet, he was given a number of “second
chances,” while Sandoval was not.
Employee Jerry Hall is another production employee not
known as a union supporter. A number of the Respondent’s
managers testified about Hall intentionally listing a woman he
was not married to as his spouse on his insurance forms in an
effort to obtain medical care for her. Despite what certainly
might be considered insurance fraud, Hall only received a 1-
week suspension, and remained employed by the Respondent.
His personnel file included instances of attendance problems,
and several safety violations (GC Exh. 28), yet the Respon-
dent’s managers still were willing to consider mitigating cir-
cumstances, specifically that he thought he had the right to list
his “significant other” as his wife on the insurance forms.
However, the Respondent was apparently not willing to con-
sider Sandoval’s mitigating circumstances.
Another employee who should be considered is Dan Watrus,
also not known as a union supporter. At the time of the hear-
ing, Watrus had been employed at the facility for about 1-1/2
years, and was still an employee. Supervisor Karlene Nadeau
testified as to Watrus’s poor employment record. In addition to
attendance violations, which included a “no call, no show,” he
reportedly also maintained his equipment poorly and received a
warning for attitude. (GC Exhs. 21 and 34.) Watrus was an
employee with much less seniority than Sandoval. His work
record, which included a “no call, no show” was certainly much
worse than Sandoval’s, and yet he received no discipline more
severe than a written warning. It certainly appears that
Sandoval, who was terminated, was treated is a much harsher
fashion.
Finally, I have considered the employment record of Ken
Nason, another employee not known as a union supporter. He
was accused of having sexually harassed a number of female
employees, spoke disrespectfully to a shift leader in the pres-
ence of other employees, and made a racist remark toward an-
other employee. He received only a written reprimand for all
that misconduct, and was still employed by the Respondent at
the time of the hearing. (GC Exh. 18.) Once again, one is left
to ponder why Sandoval was not shown the same “flexibility”
in the area of discipline that Supervisor Nadeau testified the
Respondent utilized.
I am of the opinion that the Respondent’s stated primary rea-
son for discharging Sandoval, that of job abandonment, was
merely a pretext. The record amply demonstrates that employ-
ees with much less seniority, and poor employment records,
were disciplined in a less severe way for conduct considerably
more egregious than that for which Sandova was terminated.
Accordingly, the Respondent has failed to rebut the General
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1138
Counsel’s prima facie case by any standard of evidence. It is,
therefore, appropriate to infer that the Respondent’s true motive
was unlawful, that being because of union activity. Williams
Contracting, Inc., 309 NLRB 433 (1992); Limestone Apparel
Corp., 255 NLRB, 722 (1981), enfd. 705 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.
1982); and Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d
466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966).
The Respondent was not able to offer any reasonable expla-
nation for its failure to consider the several mitigating circum-
stances surrounding Sandoval’s conduct in leaving work with-
out permission. Its failure to exercise “flexibility,” as it did for
other employees, leaves the undersigned with the strong im-
pression that the Respondent’s discharge of Sandoval was not
really based on job abandonment or a violation of the code of
conduct, but, rather, on his union activity. Were it not for that
union activity, I believe the Respondent would have been
“flexible,” and Sandoval would not have been discharged.
In my view, the timing of the termination explains a great
deal about the Respondent’s motivation. Sandoval was dis-
charged on September 24, less than 3 months prior to when
another representation election could have been held. At the
time of his discharge, Sandoval was actively attempting to
bring about such an election. As I have noted above, the Re-
spondent was well aware of those efforts, as Sandoval’s union
activity was conducted in a rather open and vocal manner. I
believe that in an attempt to avoid another representation elec-
tion, the Respondent seized on an opportunity to fire Sandoval
because of his failure to secure permission prior to leaving
work early. However, I am convinced that were it not for his
union activity and the Respondent’s fear of another representa-
tion election, the Respondent would not have discharged
Sandoval.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that the Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging Fre-
derick Sandoval on September 24.13
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, SCA Tissue North America, LLC, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and En-
ergy Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act by discharging Frederick Sandoval on September 24, 2001.
4. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

13 The complaint alleges that the Respondent maintained a practice
of permitting maintenance department employees to leave work early
provided coverage by other employees was available. Further, it is
alleged that the failure to follow that practice with respect to Sandoval
constitutes a violation of the Act. However, as is noted above, I found
the evidence insufficient to establish that there was a consistent policy
or practice regarding “coverage.” Therefore, I find the Respondent’s
conduct in not following the alleged practice not to be a separate viola-
tion of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged its em-
ployee Frederick Sandoval, my recommended Order requires
the Respondent to offer him immediate reinstatement to his
former position, displacing if necessary any replacement, or if
his position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without loss of seniority and other privileges. My recom-
mended Order further requires the Respondent to make
Sandoval whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits,
computed on a quarterly basis from the date of his discharge to
the date the Respondent makes a proper offer of reinstatement
to him, less any net interim earnings as prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as com-
puted in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987).
The recommended Order further requires the Respondent to
expunge from its records any reference to the discharge of
Sandoval, and to provide him with written notice of such ex-
punction, and inform him that the unlawful conduct will not be
used as a basis for further personnel actions against him. Ster-
ling Sugars, Inc., 261 NLRB 472 (1982). Further, the Respon-
dent must not make reference to the removed material in re-
sponse to any inquiry from any employer, employment agency,
unemployment insurance office, or reference seeker, or use the
expunged material against Sandoval in any other way. Finally,
the Respondent shall be required to post a notice that assures
the employees that it will respect their rights under the Act.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended14
ORDER
The Respondent, SCA Tissue North America, LLC,
Bellemont, Arizona, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any em-
ployee for supporting Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and
Energy Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC, or any
other union.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Freder-
ick Sandoval full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
SCA TISSUE NORTH AMERICA, LLC 1139
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previ-
ously enjoyed.
(b) Make Frederick Sandoval whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the
decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful discharge of Frederick
Sandoval, and within 3 days thereafter notify him in writing
that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used
against him in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Bellemont, Arizona, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”15 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 28, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since September 24, 2001.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official

15 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties

WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against any
of you for supporting Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and
Energy Workers International Union, AFL–CIO, CLC, or any
other union.
WE WILL NOT in any similar or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Federal labor law.
WE WILL , within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
offer Frederick Sandoval full reinstatement to his former job or,
if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Frederick Sandoval whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits resulting from his discharge, less
any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL , within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge
of Frederick Sandoval, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter,
notify him in writing that this has been done and that the dis-
charge will not be used against him in any way.
SCA TISSUE NORTH AMERICA, LLC