Sav-On Drugs, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 26, 1983

267 N.L.R.B. 639 (N.L.R.B. 1983)

SAV-ON DRUGS, INC.
Say-On Drugs, Inc. and Susan Enderby and Retail
Clerks Union, Local 324, affiliated with United
Food and Commercial Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO, Party to the Contract
Retail Clerks Union, Local 324, affiliated with
United Food and Commercial Workers Interna-
tional Union, AFL-CIO and Susan Enderby.
Cases 21-CA-19801 and 21-CB-7570
26 August 1983
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND ZIMMERMAN
On 26 April 1982 Administrative Law Judge
Richard D. Taplitz issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent Retail
Clerks Union, Local 324, filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings,1 findings,
and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondents, Sav-On
Drugs, Inc., Anaheim, California, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns; and Retail Clerks
Union, Local 324, affiliated with United Food and
Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-
CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
take the action set forth in the said recommended
Order.
I The Respondent Union excepts to certain rulings of the Administra-
tive Law Judge at the hearing with respect to the participation of Sav-
On Drugs, Inc., as co-Respondent. Even assuming that the Administra-
tive Law Judge's rulings in this regard were erroneous, we do not find
on this record that the Respondent Union was prejudiced thereby.
Because we adopt the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the
Respondent Union did not enjoy the support of a majority of employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit, we need not consider the Union's ex-
ceptions with regard to its good faith in demanding and accepting recog-
nition. See Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
267 NLRB No. 110
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD D. TAPLITZ, Administrative Law Judge:
This case was tried at Los Angeles, California, on No-
vember 2, 3, and 4 and December 8, 1981. The charges
in Cases 21-CA-19801 and 21-CB-7570 were filed on
December 8, 1980, by Susan Enderby, an individual. An
amended charge was filed by the same Charging Party in
Case 21-CA-19801 on January 20, 1981. An order con-
solidating those cases and a complaint issued on January
21, 1981. The complaint alleges that Sav-On Drugs, Inc.,
herein called the Company, violated Section 8(aX1), (2),
and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amend-
ed, and that Retail Clerks Union, Local 324, affiliated
with United Food and Commercial Workers Internation-
al Union, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. Both the Company
and the Union filed answers to the complaint. However,
by letter to the Regional Director for Region 21 dated
October 21, 1981, the Company requested that it be per-
mitted to withdraw its answer. That request was re-
newed before me at the opening of the trial, at which
time the request was granted and the Company's answer
was withdrawn. Pursuant to Section 102.20 of the
Board's Rules and Regulations the Company is deemed
to have admitted as true all of the allegations of the com-
plaint.'
Issue
The primary issue is whether the Company and the
Union violated the Act by entering into a collective-bar-
gaining agreement covering employees at a newly
opened store when that new store could not be properly
considered as an accretion to an existing multistore bar-
gaining unit and when the Union did not represent an
uncoerced majority of the employees of the new store.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate,
to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-ex-
amine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs
that have been carefully considered were filed on behalf
of the General Counsel, the Company, and the Union.
Upon the entire record2 of the case, and from my obser-
vation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The Company, a California corporation with a princi-
pal place of business in Anaheim, California, is engaged
in the operation of a chain of retail drugstores in Califor-
nia. During the calendar year ending December 31, 1980,
the Company derived gross revenues in excess of
$500,000. It annually purchases and receives goods
valued in excess of $50,000 which originate directly out-
side of California. The Company is an employer engaged
See Dempubco Publishing Co, 244 NLRB 325 (1979).
The unopposed motion of counsel for the General Counsel to correct
the transcript to the record is hereby granted.
639
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Sequence of Events
The Company is a party to a collective-bargaining
agreement with the Union that is effective from July 1,
1979, through June 30, 1983. The recognition clause of
that contract sets forth a bargaining unit which consists
of employees "who perform work within [the Compa-
ny's] drugstores presently operated and hereinafter estab-
lished, owned or operated by [the Company] within the
present territorial jurisdiction of the Local Union." The
territorial jurisdiction of the Union covers Orange
County, the city of Long Beach, and parts of Los Ange-
les County. The contract contains a union-security clause
which states:
A. UNION SHOP. All employees shall, as a con-
dition of employment, become members of the
Union not later than the thirty-first (31st) day of
their employment or the thirty-first (31st) day fol-
lowing the date of signature or the effective date of
this Agreement, whichever is later, and shall remain
members in good standing as a condition of contin-
ued employment.
Though the bargaining unit set forth in the contract
covers employees in both present and future drugstores
operated by the Company in the territorial jurisdiction of
the Union, the practice of the parties has not conformed
to the agreement. The Company operates either 38 or 39
stores in the Union's territorial jurisdiction. The Compa-
ny contends that 31 of the stores with about 625 employ-
ees are unionized and that 8 stores with about 150 em-
ployees are not. The Union contends that 33 stores are
unionized and 5 are not. In either event it is agreed that
some of the Company's drugstores in the Union's territo-
rial jurisdiction are not considered by the parties to be
part of the multistore bargaining unit set forth in the
contract.
The dispute in this case centers on the Company's
store 321 in Orange Hill, California, which is within the
Union's territorial jurisdiction.3 James B. Dobson is man-
ager of that store. He became manager on October 13,
1980, when he began preparing the store for the opening
that took place on November 7, 1980. Though store 321
is part of the Company's chain of drugstores, Dobson has
a good deal of local autonomy as manager of that store.
He is responsible for the entire day-to-day operation of
the store. He hires all employees, schedules their work,
and is in charge of payroll. He is responsible for training
new employees and for the discipline of all employees.
Dobson's immediate supervisor is Maury Freidson, the
s The Company operates three other stores within a 12-mile radius of
store 321. They are store 115, about 3 miles away; store 131, about 5
miles away; and store 261 in Tustin at an undisclosed distance.
Company's district manager, who works out of Anaheim,
California. Dobson has consulted with Freidson with
regard to firing employees when Dobson thought there
might be some question and in those cases Freidson
made the ultimate decision. However, in general, Dobson
is responsible for the discharge of employees. With the
help of his assistant managers, Dobson is in charge of the
ordering of merchandise. He takes care of advertising
though on some occasions he does so in conjunction
with other store managers. In general he is responsible
for all aspects of store 321 relating to employees, cus-
tomers, and business.4
On October 13, 1980, Dobson put a sign on the side-
walk in front of store 321 saying that employment appli-
cations were being accepted. Two employees applied for
work that day and both were hired. Dobson put an ad in
newspapers and continued the hiring procedure. By the
time the store opened on November 7, 1980, Dobson had
hired 30 to 35 employees. More were hired after the
store opened. 5 Shortly after Dobson began hiring em-
ployees he called his district manager, Maury Freidson.
He told Freidson that some of the applicants had asked
whether the store was union or nonunion and he asked
Freidson what he should tell the employees. Freidson
said that all he could say was that the Company was
under contract with the Union. Dobson also spoke to an-
other company official before the opening of the store.
That official was Clifford Marker who is in charge of the
Company's industrial relations. Dobson asked Marker if
store 321 would be a union or nonunion store. Marker
told Dobson to read article I of the union agreement.
Article I of that agreement sets forth the bargaining unit
and it covers drugstores presently operated and "herein-
after established, owned or operated by the Employer
within the present territorial jurisdiction of the Local
Union." Marker also told Dobson that they were a union
store and that they were to cooperate with the Union.
Dobson told Marker that some employees had asked if
they had a choice in the matter and that Marker replied
by saying that they could not get involved in that, that
they had to treat it as if it were a union store, and that
Dobson was not to interfere in anything.
All parties to this proceeding appear to be in agree-
ment that the employees of store 321 constitute a sepa-
rate appropriate bargaining unit. Paragraph 7 of the com-
plaint alleges:
7. The following employees of Respondent Em-
ployer constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9(b) of the Act:
All employees of Respondent Employer at its
Store Number 321, located at 4550 East Chap-
man Boulevard, Orange, California; excluding all
4 Both Dobson and his supervisor, District Manager Freidson, are su-
pervisors within the meaning of Sec. 2(11) of the Act.
5 Dobson used some temporary employees who were assigned from
other stores for the opening of store 321. About 15 or 20 such employees
were used to help prepare the store for the opening. About 12 temporary
cashiers were used for the grand opening. Most of the temporary em-
ployees left after 2 days, but a few remained for a week or two.
640
SAV-ON DRUGS, INC.
office clerical employees, professional employees,
guards, displaypersons, demonstrators, inventory
employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
The Union in its answer and the Company by the with-
drawal of its answer admit the allegations of that section
of the complaint.
Of the 30 to 35 applicants that Dobson interviewed
and hired prior to the opening of the store, 7 or 8 of
them asked about the Union. He responded to each of
those employees by telling them that the Company was
under contract with the Union.
At or about 8 a.m. on November 6, 1980, the day
before store 321 opened, the Company held a meeting
with the 30 to 35 employees who had already been
hired. The meeting took place in the receiving depart-
ment in the back room of the store and it was attended
by Company officials Dobson, Freidson, Vice President
C. Lyle Call, President Robert L. Call, and Robert
Sasine from the training department. It was an orienta-
tion meeting with regard to the Company's policies and
procedures but in the course of that meeting the Union
was mentioned. Both Dobson and Freidson addressed
the employees concerning the Union. Dobson told the
employees that the Company was under contract with
the Union and that union representatives would be in the
store to take their applications. One of the employees
asked if the employees had to join the Union and
Dobson replied by saying that the Company was under
contract with the Union. 6 Freidson did not testify and a
number of employees as well as Dobson gave somewhat
varied versions of what he said. Dobson testified that
Freidson told employees that union representatives
would be in the store to take applications, that employ-
ees would be asked to sign cards, and that employees
should read before signing. Russell MacDonald testified
that, in response to an employee's question, Freidson said
that the store had been predesignated as a union store
and that there already was a contract with the Union;
that, when another employee asked if the employees had
a choice, Freidson said "no"; and that, when an employ-
ee asked if they could petition against the Union, Freid-
son replied by saying that they could but that it would
not work. Stacy Toth testified that Freidson said that the
store had a contract with the Union and people would
come in to have the employees sign; and that, when an
employee asked if they had to sign, Freidson said that he
could not say anything about it. Brenda Basinger testified
that Freidson said that the store had been designated as a
union store; that an employee asked if the employees had
to join and Freidson replied by saying that it had been
designated as a union store; and that Susan Enderby
asked if they would be terminated if they did not sign
and Freidson responded by saying that it had been desig-
nated a union store and he could not say anything else.
Susan Enderby testified that Freidson said that the Union
would be sending some people in to sign employees up,
that Enderby asked why they had to join, and that
Freidson responded by speaking about a closed shop and
saying that the Company was bound by a contract. Mar-
6 This finding is based on the credited testimony of Dobson.
garet Meils testified that an employee asked if it were a
union store and that one of the management officials said
that the Company honored the union contract. Donald
Cunningham testified that an employee asked whether
the employees had to join the Union and Freidson an-
swered by saying that the Company was under contract
with the Union. Narcisa Ardona testified that Dobson
said the Company had a contract with the Union and
that Freidson said that union representatives would talk
to them. While the testimony of the various employees
differed with regard to detail, the credible thread that
goes through the bulk of the testimony is that Freidson
told the employees that the Company had a contract
with the Union, that he told them that union representa-
tives would be there to sign them up, and that in re-
sponse to employee questions concerning whether they
had to join the Union Freidson replied by repeating that
the Company had a contract with the Union. I believe
that some of the employees read more into Freidson's
statement than he actually said. However that misreading
was fully understandable. Both Dobson and Freidson
spoke about the Company having a contract with the
Union. In an abstract sense those remarks were truthful
because the Company did have a contract with the
Union covering other stores. However in the context in
which the remarks were made the employees were fully
justified in assuming that the remarks were geared to
store 321. Both Dobson and Freidson will be presumed
to have intended the reasonably anticipated results of
their conduct. They both led the employees to believe
that store 321 had a contract with the Union. When
asked whether the employees had to join, they respond-
ed by repeating that the Company had a contract with
the Union. In fact the contract that they were referring
to on its face covered store 321 and had a union-security
clause that required the discharge of nonmembers after a
certain grace period. Dobson and Freidson may well
have believed that their ambiguous language could be
used as a protective device. However they clearly con-
veyed to the employees the message that the Company
was bound by a contract and the employees were subject
to that contract and had to join the Union,
About 4 p.m. that day employee Susan Enderby had a
private conversation with Freidson in the store. She
asked him why she had to join the Union, why the store
had been designated a union store, and why no one had
asked whether or not they wanted to join. She also asked
about store benefits. Freidson told Enderby that he could
not answer any questions and that she was putting him in
a very difficult position.?
Later that day Enderby had a private conversation
with Dobson in the store. She asked Dobson what would
happen to her if she refused to join the Union. Dobson
replied that after a certain amount of time, if she did not
join the Union, the store would receive notice from the
Union that she would have to be terminated and the
store would have to terminate her. She asked what
7 These findings are based on the uncontradicted testimony of Ender-
by.
641
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
would happen if she joined but did not pay dues and he
replied the same thing would happen. 8
Store 321 opened on November 7, 1980. Store Manag-
er Dobson followed the terms and conditions of the col-
lective-bargaining contract from that day on. On No-
vember 20, 1980, the trust funds that were specified in
the contract were notified that the Company signed a
drug labor agreement which provided for the contribu-
tions to the drug trust funds. On that form, which the
Union furnished to the trust funds, the phrase "Opened
11/7/80" was written over the words "effective Date of
Contract." The Union takes the position that the Compa-
ny is responsible for trust fund payments from the date
the first employee was hired at the store, which would
be October 13, 1980, rather than the date the store
opened on November 7, 1980. It is the Union's position
that the contract became effective retroactively to that
date when the Union obtained majority standing on No-
vember 14, 1980.
Shortly after the store opened a notice with the
Union's emblem on it was posted in the store saying that
on a particular date the Union would be at the store so
that the employees might make application.9
On November 13, 1980, the Union's business represent-
ative, Gary Crawford,' ° went to store 321 to solicit au-
thorization cards. He was accompanied by union em-
ployees Joann Hanson and Morton Baum as well as by
Sara Higuchi, an employee of the drug trust fund. Craw-
ford asked Store Manager Dobson for a place in the
store where he could sign employees for the Union.
Dobson told him that he could use the employee lounge
but that he should not interfere with business when em-
ployees were taking care of customers. On that day 14
employees signed authorization cards. 1 One of those
employees, Narcisa Ardona, had a dispute with the
Union over her card. She signed an application card and
an authorization and shortly thereafter had second
thoughts about it. On the same day she asked Crawford
for the application back and Crawford told her to come
back that afternoon. She was busy and did not come
back that afternoon but did talk with Dobson. She told
him that she had been pressured into giving the union
card and that the Union would not give it back to her.
The following day she again spoke to Crawford and
asked for the card back. He said that she could go to the
main office and pick it up. She never did pick up the
card. '2
s This finding is based on the credited testimony of Enderby. Dobson
did not refer to this conversation in his testimony but he did aver that he
had conversations with three or four employees, that an employee asked
if she (or he) would lose her job if she did not sign; and that he replied
that under the union contract, if she did not join within 30 days, after
notification from the Union he would have to terminate her.
a Both the Company and the Union deny placing the notice there.
I' Crawford is an admitted agent of the Union.
I" They were Keith Williams, Jose Garcia, Narcisa Ardona, Margaret
Miels, Blanca Herrara, Mary Grajeda, Cindy Valdez, Brenda Basinger,
Teresa Fernandez, Nancy Tutor, Colleen Clancy, Robert Cone, Virginia
Watson, and Irene Westergard.
1' The finding is based on the credited testimony of Ardona and
Dobson. Crawford acknowledged in his testimony that he told one em-
ployee that if she wanted her application back she could come to the
union office and pick it up.
Josephine Henley testified that Crawford told her that
she had to sign the card and when she refused to do so
he said that eventually she would have to sign. Crawford
acknowledged that he spoke to Henley on November 14
but he denied telling her she had to sign. Henley may
well have had the impression from the previous incidents
that she had to sign but I credit Crawford that he did
not specifically say that she had to. That evening Henley
asked Dobson whether she had to sign and Dobson re-
plied that all he could tell her was that the Company
was under contract with the Union. 13
As part of its organizational drive the union represent-
atives told a number of employees that they would not
have to pay initiation fees if they signed before a particu-
lar date. On November 25, 1980, Crawford posted a
notice on the Company bulletin board which stated:
Attention employees-if you have not made applica-
tion with Retail Clerks Union, please do so by De-
cember 8, 1980, to receive free initiation. Thank
you.
Gary Crawford
Union Secretary-Treasurer Bob Gable credibly testified
that union policy is to waive initiation fees for 30 days
from the opening of a new store. That policy applies to
all employees in the bargaining unit whether they joined
before or after a majority was achieved.
On November 14 Crawford went back to the store and
obtained three additional authorization cards.' 4
At that time Crawford also had an application for
membership that contained an authorization that had
been signed by Donald Cunningham on August 28, 1978,
when he was working at store 115. In addition Crawford
had a similar application from Mary Rawson which was
signed on October 28, 1980, when she transferred from
another store to store 321.'5 Crawford testified that from
his observation of the Company's work schedule he con-
cluded that there were 34 employees in the bargaining
unit at that time and that he had authorizations from 19,
which constituted a majority. He averred that shortly
after he came to that conclusion he spoke to Susan En-
derby about joining the Union. Enderby credibly testi-
fied that Crawford told her that it was a union store and
she had to join, that if she did not join she would be ter-
minated, and that it was to her advantage to join before
December 7 so that she would not have to pay initiation
fees. 15
On November 13, 1980, Crawford filled out and
signed a union form which stated that on November 14
Is This finding is based on the credited testimony of Dobson. Henley
testified that Dobson simply said "Oh, okay," when she told them she
was not going to sign. I believe that Dobson's recollection in this regard
was better than Henley's.
14 They were from Carolyn Ledbetter, Russell MacDonald, and Rosa
Quevedo.
i5 Rawson went on sick leave on November 6, 1980, the day before
the store opened, and never returned to store 321. She was, however,
listed on the payroll that ended November 16, 1980.
t6 Crawford acknowledged in his testimony that he told her that he
had a majority of cards in his pocket and that when a majority of em-
ployees wanted a union, everyone had to be union.
642
SAV-ON DRUGS, INC.
he obtained 17 cards and 2 applications at store 321; that
there were 34 bargaining unit employees; and that he had
verified the above with the work schedule for the pay-
roll period ending November 16, 1980. He gave that
form to the Union's secretary-treasurer, Bob Gable. On
the same day, November 14, Gable called the Company's
vice president and director of labor relations, Clifford
Marker, and told him that the Union had majority status
at store 321. Marker replied that he did not doubt the
majority and that if the Union would send him a letter to
that effect the contract would be put into effect. By
letter to Marker dated November 14, Gable stated that
the Union represented a majority of the employees at
store 321 and had authorization cards from 19 of 35 bar-
gaining unit employees. The Union did not make any
claim to the Company prior to the opening of the store
or prior to obtaining its claimed majority that the con-
tract covered the new store because of an accretion.
The Company's payroll records for the week ending
November 16, 1980, list the names of 43 employees at
store 321. Three of those employees1 7 are pharmacists
and it was stipulated that they are not part of the bar-
gaining unit. Two employees"8 are listed as employees of
home stores other than store 321 and were temporary
employees. They may not be counted as part of the bar-
gaining unit. That leaves 38 employees. However, of
those 38, 2 employees't were terminated before Novem-
ber 14, 1980, when the Union claimed majority status.
They cannot be counted as part of the bargaining unit, so
the total employee complement was 36.20 Even assuming
that the application of Cunningham was not stale and
that Rawson was an employee of store 321 on November
14, the card of Ardona cannot be counted toward the
majority. On November 13 she had clearly indicated to
Crawford that she wanted the card back. Whether or not
the Union violated the Act by refusing to return the card
at that time, her manifestation that she did not want to
authorize the Union to represent her was known to the
Union on November 13 and she could not be counted as
a union adherent on November 14. That would leave 18
authorizations and the Union did not represent a majori-
ty of the 36.
About the last week in November 1980 Crawford had
a conversation with Enderby in the store. He told her
that the deadline for joining was December 8 rather than
December 7 and there were several people in the store
who would not join. He asked her whether she was
trying to instigate something and told her that she could
get a lot of people in trouble, and that she could cause
'7 Wilmer LaCrosse, Bill Kurduris, and Daniel Mitchel.
ts Art Inuma and Christine Sumner. Daniel Mitchel was also listed as
a temporary employee, but he was excluded as a pharmacist.
19 Lynda Sue Hill and Annette rFker. The Company's report to the
drug trust funds for the month ending November 23, 1980, shows that
Lynda Sue Hill was terminated on November 9, 1980, and that Annette
Kiker was terminated on November 10, 1980.
'0 The Union contends in its brief that employees Alvarado and
Graham were not part of the work force on November 14, 1980. Howsev-
er, they are both listed as employees on the Company's payroll records
for the week ending November 16. In addition they are listed as employ-
ees on the report to the drug fund for the month ending November 23,
1980. The drug fund list shows terminations during that month and nei-
ther of those employees were listed as terminated. I find that they were
both in the bargaining unit on November 14.
people to lose their jobs or to pay the initiation fee. She
replied by saying that she did not understand why she
did not have a choice. He said that it was a legal con-
tract and she did not have a choice.2 '
On December 1, 1980, Crawford spoke to Enderby
and Russell MacDonald at the store. One of those em-
ployees asked Crawford why it was going to be a union
store. Crawford, who had a contract with him, showed
them the accretion language in the contract. Crawford
credibly testified concerning his response as follows:
"First I said, 'The accretion language in the contract,
when a new store opened that the store would be under
a Union contract' . . . . They wanted to know why it
was like that. And it was just in the contract. After we
picked up a majority of the employees, then it more or
less sealed the fact that it was a Union store."
Sometime thereafter employees circulated two peti-
tions stating that employees did not want union represen-
tation. Though some of the employees signed the peti-
tions nothing became of them.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
1. Introduction
An employer interferes with employee rights in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, assists a labor organi-
zation in violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act, and dis-
criminates against employees in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act when it recognizes and enters into a
collective-bargaining agreement containing a union-secu-
rity clause with a labor organization that does not repre-
sent an uncoerced majority of the employees in an ap-
propriate bargaining unit. In a similar vein a labor orga-
nization coerces employees in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and causes or attempts to cause dis-
crimination in violation of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act
when it enters into such a relationship. Ladies Garment
Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). Where an em-
ployer and a labor organization have a valid collective-
bargaining agreement covering established retail stores,
that agreement can be lawfully extended to a newly
opened store even where a majority of the employees in
the newly opened store have not authorized the labor or-
ganization to represent them if the new store can be
properly considered as an accretion to the bargaining
unit set forth in the existing contract. In such circum-
stances the labor organization's majority status in the
overall unit is sufficient and there is no separate bargain-
ing unit for the new store. Where the new store is not an
accretion to the existing bargaining unit it must be treat-
ed separately and the recognition and contract in that
separate unit is lawful only if the labor organization has
secured uncoerced bargaining authorizations from a ma-
jority of the employees in the separate unit.
In the instant case the Union has taken what it de-
scribes as a "belt and suspenders" position. The "belt" is
a theory that store 321 was a lawful accretion to the bar-
gaining unit in its existing multistore contract with the
Company. The "suspenders" position is that the Union
21 These findings are based on the credited testimony of Enderby.
643
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
did represent an uncoerced majority of the employees in
a separate bargaining unit consisting of the employees of
store 321 as of November 14, 1980, when the contract
was "entered into," and that contract was then made ret-
roactive to the date the first employee was hired.
2. The accretion issue
The Union's argument that store 321 was an accretion
to the existing bargaining unit, which covered drugstores
presently operated and "hereinafter established," is sub-
stantially undercut by its own admission in its answer
that the employees of store 321 constituted a unit appro-
priate for bargaining. The Board has held that the princi-
ples of accretion do not resolve the issue in a case where
the stores in question "have a sufficient separate exist-
ence to constitute separate appropriate units." Houston
Division of Kroger Co., 219 NLRB 388 (1975). In an ab-
stract sense different bargaining units can each be appro-
priate for bargaining. However, where the interrelation
of operations, interchange of employees, bargaining his-
tory, and other criteria for determining accretion are
such as to warrant a finding that an accretion exists, then
in that particular factual situation a separate bargaining
unit status for the new store is not appropriate. Here the
Company and the Union have admitted that the employ-
ees of the new store constitute an appropriate unit.
Moreover the controlling Board law establishes that
store 321 was not an accretion to the overall unit. In Sav-
On Drugs, 138 NLRB 1032 (1962), the Board modified its
policy, which prior to that time had been to emphasize
the administrative grouping of merchandising outlets in
determining whether separate bargaining units were ap-
propriate, and held that the same unit policies that apply
to multiplant enterprises would also apply to retail chain
operations. The Board set forth its underlying philoso-
phy in Melbet Jewelry Co., 180 NLRB 107, 109 (1969),22
holding:
The Board, here, must examine fundamentals and
put the Section 7 rights guaranteed the employees
and the appropriate unit concept of Section 9(b)
into proper perspective. Excessive preoccupation
with "appropriate unit" in the circumstances of this
case leads to the abrogation of those rights. Section
7 of the Act is not subordinate to Section 9(b). As
the Board indicated in Haag Drug,3 quite the oppo-
site is true. Section 9(b) directs the Board to select
units to "assure to employees the fullest freedom in
exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act .. ."-
which rights, of course, are those set out in Section
7. If the Board were to permit the extension of the
contracts covering other stores to the employees of
this store (thereby very effectively disenfranchising
them) on the ground that this store (although an ap-
propriate unit in itself) may be part of that unit also,
it would, in our opinion, do serious violence to the
mandate that employees' rights are to be protected
"2 See also Safeway Stores, 256 NLRB 918 (1981); Plumbing Distribu-
tors, 248 NLRB 413, 414 (1980).
and that appropriate unit findings under Section
9(b) must be designed to preserve those rights.
Haag Drug Company. Incorporated, 169 NLRB No. 111, and
the cases cited therein and in fn 2 above.
In that case the Board described the factual situation and
gave its conclusion as follows:
It is evident from the facts noted above, to which
the parties stipulated, that this case involves a typi-
cal retail chain-store operation. Thus, the factors of
centralized managerial control are quite evident,
and from these factors the Respondents argue that
the appropriate unit in this case is comprised of all
stores within the metropolitan trading area, and that
the Orchard Park store is an accretion to the exist-
ing unit. We disagree. We find that the other factors
involved in this case show that the Orchard Park
store is a separate appropriate unit, and is not an ac-
cretion to the existing unit. Thus, the Orchard Park
Store was staffed by new employees recruited
through the New York State Employment Service,
there has been almost no interchange of nonsupervi-
sory employees between stores; and the store man-
ager is in charge of the day-to-day operations of his
store and possesses the power to hire and train new
employees, to layoff and recall employees, and to
act as the first step in the grievance procedure.
There is, therefore, that degree of autonomy in the
day-to-day operations of this single store which the
Board has held in other cases under the same cir-
cumstances to warrant the finding that a single store
unit is appropriate and there is no accretion.
The instant case even more clearly calls for the conclu-
sion that the new store was not an accretion to the old
bargaining unit. Here, Dobson, the manager of store 321,
does all the hiring of employees, schedules their work
and is in charge of payroll. He is responsible for the
training of new employees and for the discipline of all
employees. Though he sometimes confers with the dis-
trict manager about the discharge of employees in ques-
tionable cases, he is generally responsible for the termi-
nation of employees. He and his assistant managers order
merchandise and he has a substantial say in the store's to
employees, customers and business. In addition the histo-
ry of bargaining indicates that the multi-store bargaining
unit set forth in the contract, which covers present and
future drugstores in the Union's territorial jurisdiction,
has not been applied to all the Company's drugstores in
that territorial jurisdiction. A number of such stores are
non-union. The Union has made no demand on the Com-
pany that recognition be granted with regard to store
321 on the basis of an accretion theory. Under all these
circumstances I find that store 321 must be treated as a
separate bargaining unit and not as an accretion to the
bargaining unit set forth in the July 1,. 1979, through
June 30, 1983 contract between the Company and the
Union. See B. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 109 LRRM 2843 (6th
Cir. 1982), enfg. 250 NLRB 776 (1980).
644
SAV-ON DRUGS, INC.
3. The question of majority status
Between October 13 and November 6, 1980, Dobson,
the store manager of store 321, told 7 or 8 of the 30 to
35 applicants whom he hired that the Company was
under contract with the Union. At a meeting with all the
employees on November 6, 1980, Dobson and District
Manager Freidson conveyed to the employees the mes-
sage that the Company was bound by a contract with
the Union, that the employees were subject to that con-
tract, and that the employees had to join the Union. On
the same day Dobson told employee Enderby that he
would have to join the Union. On the same day Dobson
told employee Enderby that he would have to terminate
her if she did not join the Union. The store opened on
November 7, 1980. On November 13 and 14, 1980, the
Company gave the Union a location in the store to sign
up employees. The Union then obtained authorization
cards from all but two2 3 of the employees it relied on
for its claim of majority support. One of the positions
taken by the Union was that store 321 was an accretion
to the existing multistore bargaining unit covered by the
1979-83 contract. That contract contained a union-securi-
ty clause. The Union claims that it is not responsible for
the Company's actions if the Company interfered with
the rights of the employees. However it was the Union's
contract with the Company that the Company described
to the employees. The bargaining unit in that contract
covered employees in drugstores "presently operated and
hereinafter established" within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Union, and therefore, on its face the contract was
applicable to store 321. The Union is in an untenable po-
sition where it argues that there was a binding contract
containing a union-security clause covering the employ-
ees of store 321 through an accretion theory but that the
Company should not have assisted the Union by telling
the employees about that contract. The employees who
authorized the Union to represent them on and after No-
vember 13, 1980, did so at a time when that contract,
which appeared on its face to cover them and which
contained a union-security clause, was in effect. They
gave their authorizations after the Company informed
them that the Company was under contract with the
Union and after the Company gave them reason to be-
lieve that the contract covered them and that they
would have to join the Union. Under these circum-
stances it may be fairly assumed that the authorizations
were not the result of the free choice of the employees
but were the fruits of unlawful coercion. I find that the
Union did not represent an uncoerced majority2 4 of the
employees. 22 It follows and I find that the Company ex-
tended recognition and entered into a collective-bargain-
ing contract containing a union-security clause with the
Union when the Union did not represent an uncoerced
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining
as Those two were Cunningham and Rawson, both of whom were
transferees from other stores, who authorized the Union to represent
them before the Union began its organizing drive at store 321 on Novem-
ber 13, 1980.
24 In addition, as found above, the Union did not even represent a nu-
merical majority of the employees.
s' See Sav-On Drugs, 227 NLRB 1638 (1977); Sheraton-Kauai Corp.,
177 NLRB 25 (1969), enfd. 429 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1970).
unit in store 321 and that the Company thereby violated
Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and the Union violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act.
4. The additional allegations that the Company
violated the Act
Paragraph 13(a) of the complaint alleges that the Com-
pany violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act in Octo-
ber and November 1980 by Dobson's remarks to appli-
cants for employment that store 321 was a "union" store.
As found above in October and November 1980 Dobson
told applicants whom he hired that the Company was
under contract with the Union. The applicants were ap-
plying for work at store 321 and the only way they
could have interpreted that remark was in terms of the
Company having a contract with the Union at that store.
As there was no contract covering that store, Dobsor's
remarks interfered with the employees' right guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act and assisted the Union in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.
Paragraph 13(b) of the complaint alleges that on No-
vember 6, 1980, the Company through Dobson violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act by telling employees
that store 321 had been designated a "union" store and
that union representatives would be at the store to "sign
them up." As found above, Dobson told the employees
that the Company was under contract with the Union
and that the union representatives would be there to sign
them up. Though I did not find that Dobson told the
employees that the store had been designated a union
store, I find little distinction between that and the remark
that the Company was under contract with the Union.
By repeating to the assembled employees on November
6, 1980, what he had previously told to some of the ap-
plicants with regard to the Company being under con-
tract with the Union, Dobson again violated Section
8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. There is little to be added by a
separate finding that Dobson violated the Act by telling
employees that the Union would be there to sign them
up and I therefore will not make that finding.
Paragraph 13(c) of the complaint alleges that the Com-
pany violated Section 8(a)X) and (2) of the Act at the
meeting on November 6, 1980, through Freidson's re-
marks to employees that were the same as those alleged
to have been made by Dobson in paragraph 13(b) of the
complaint. In view of the findings with regard to para-
graph 13(b) of the complaint a separate finding of a vio-
lation by the Company through Freidson would be re-
dundant.
Paragraph 13(d) of the complaint alleges that on No-
vember 13 and 14, 1980, the Company violated Section
8(a)(l) and (2) of the Act by granting the Union access
to the employees at the store during working hours in
order to establish contact with the employees. Such con-
duct in itself is not a violation of the Act. Say-On Drugs,
227 NLRB 1638, 1647 (1977). While such conduct could
arguably be considered a separate violation where it is
645
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
part of other misconduct, a full remedy for that other
misconduct is all that is needed in the instant case.2 6
Paragraph 13(e) of the complaint alleges that, on or
about November 13, the Company through Dobson vio-
lated Section 8(a)(l) and (2) of the Act by telling em-
ployees that the Company would discharge them if they
did not sign up with the Union. Though I have not
found that Dobson made such a remark on November 13
I have found that he did tell Enderby on November 6,
1980, that he would have to discharge her if she did not
join the Union. November 6 is close enough to Novem-
ber 13, 1980, to be covered by the "on or about" lan-
guage in the complaint. As there was no lawful contract
or union-security clause in effect on November 6, 1980, 1
find that the Company through Dobson on November 6,
1980, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act by
threatening Enderby with discharge if she did not join
the Union.
5. The additional allegations that the Union violated
the Act
Paragraph 14(a) of the complaint alleges that the
Union violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act on or about
November 13 and 14, 1980, by telling employees at store
321 that they had better sign up with the Union by De-
cember 7, 1980, or else they would be subjected to initi-
ation fees of over $100. In itself there was nothing un-
lawful about the Union's policy with regard to waiving
initiation fees. Endless Mold, Inc., 210 NLRB 159 (1974);
B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 209 NLRB 1175 (1974). Nothing
is to be gained by a separate finding that the Union vio-
lated the Act by such conduct. To the extent that it was
interrelated with unlawful conduct the remedy will be
sufficient in that it will proscribe the unlawful conduct.
Paragraph 14(b) of the complaint alleges that the
Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act on or about
November 13, 1980, by refusing to return an employee's
union application and authorization upon the employee's
demand for its return. As found above Narcisa Ardona
signed an application card and authorization on Novem-
ber 13, 1980, and shortly thereafter asked the Union to
return it. Crawford told her to come back that afternoon
but she was unable to do so. The fbllowing day she
again asked Crawford for the card and he told her that
she could go to the main office and pick it up. I do not
believe that that incident was of sufficient gravity to
warrant a finding that the Union violated the Act.
Paragraph 14(c) of the complaint alleges that on or
about November 14, 1980, the Union violated Section
8(b)(l)(A) of the Act by telling employees at store 321
that it had been designated a "union" store. As found
above on or about November 14, 1980, Crawford told
Enderby that it was a union store, that she had to join,
and that if she did not join she would be terminated. 27 I
"6 It is noted that in Sav-On Drugs, 227 NLRB 1638 (1977), a finding
was made that the employer's conduct in permitting its premises to be
used by a labor organization during working hours was part of a larger
picture of coercion but the Board did not find a separate violation in that
regard.
'7 Though Crawford may have believed at that time that a majority of
the employees had authorized the Union to represent them, as found
above, the Union did not have an uncoerced majority.
find that Crawford's remark to Enderby violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
Paragraph 14(d) of the complaint alleges that on or
about November 17, 1980, the Union violated Section
8(b)(1)(XA) of the Act by posting a notice instructing em-
ployees to sign up with the Union by December 8, 1980,
in order to qualify for free initiation fees. For the reasons
set forth in discussion of paragraph 14(a) of the com-
plaint, I am unprepared to find a separate violation in
that regard.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Company and the Union, as set
forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with
the business operation of the Company set forth in sec-
tion I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial rela-
tionship to trade, traffic, and commerce among several
States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Company has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1), (2),
and (3) of the Act, and that the Union has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, I recommend that they be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom, and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
It is recommended that the Company be ordered to
withdraw and withhold recognition from the Union as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees
employed at its store 321, and to cease and desist from
giving any force or effect to any collective-bargaining
agreement covering those employees, or to any exten-
sion, renewal, or modification thereof, unless and until
the Union is certified by the Board as the collective-bar-
gaining representative of the employees at that store.
Nothing herein shall be construed, however, to require
the Company to vary any wage or other substantive fea-
tures of its relationship with the employees which have
been established in the performance of the contract. It is
further recommended that the Union be ordered to cease
and desist from acting as the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in store 321, and to cease and
desist from giving any force or effect to any collective-
bargaining agreement covering those employees, or to
any extension, renewal, or modification thereof, unless
and until the Union is certified by the Board as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of the employees in that
store. It is further recommended that the Company and
the Union be ordered, jointly and severally, to reimburse
all present and former employees employed at store 321,
who joined the Union on or after November 13, 1980,
for all initiation fees, dues, and other moneys which may
have been exacted from them together with interest
thereon as set forth in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651
(1977).
646
SAV-ON DRUGS, INC.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Company is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By recognizing the Union as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative for the employees employed at store
321 at a time when that store was not an accretion to a
multistore bargaining unit and when the Union did not
represent an uncoerced majority of those employees, the
Company violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
4. By entering into a collective-bargaining agreement
with the Union covering the employees of store 321
which contained a union-security clause, at a time when
that store was not an accretion to a multistore bargaining
unit and when the Union did not represent an uncoerced
majority of those employees, the Company violated Sec-
tion 8(aX1), (2), and (3) of the Act.
5. By telling applicants for employment and employees
of store 321 that the Company was under contract with
the Union, at a time when that store was not an accre-
tion to a multistore bargaining unit and when the Union
did not represent an uncoerced majority of those em-
ployees, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of
the Act.
6. By threatening to discharge an employee if she did
not join the Union, at a time when there was no lawful
contract or union-security clause in effect covering that
employee, the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2)
of the Act.
7. By accepting recognition as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees employed by the Com-
pany at store 321 and by entering into and maintaining a
collective-bargaining agreement containing a union-secu-
rity clause covering said employees at a time when that
store was not an accretion to a multistore bargaining unit
and when it did not represent an uncoerced majority of
those employees, the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)XA)
and (2) of the Act.
8. By telling an employee that store 321 was a union
store, that she had to join the Union, and that if she did
not join the Union she would be terminated, at a time
when there was no lawful contract or union-security
clause in effect, the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act.
9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section
10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom-
mended:
ORDER2 8
A. The Company, Sav-On Drugs, Inc., Anaheim, Cali-
fornia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
as In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Assisting or contributing support to Retail Clerks
Union, Local 324, affiliated with United Food and Com-
mercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, by rec-
ognizing or bargaining with that Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of its employees at
store 321, unless and until said Union is certified by the
Board as the collective-bargaining representative of said
employees.
(b) Maintaining or giving any force or effect to any
multistore or other collective-bargaining agreement be-
tween it and said Union covering the employees at store
321, or any extension, renewal, or modification thereof,
unless and until said Union is certified by the Board as
the collective-bargaining representative of those employ-
ees.
(c) Telling applicants for employment or employees of
store 321 that it is under contract with said Union, at a
time when that store is not an accretion to a multistore
bargaining unit and when said Union does not represent
an uncoerced majority of those employees.
(d) Threatening to discharge any employee if that em-
ployee does not join the Union, at a time when there is
no lawful contract or union-security clause in effect cov-
ering that employee.
(e) In any like or related manner restrain or coerce
you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Withdraw and withhold recognition from said
Union as the collective-bargaining representative of its
employees at store 321, unless and until said Union is
certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargain-
ing representative of such employees.
(b) Jointly and severally with said Union reimburse all
former and present employees employed at store 321,
who joined the Union on or after November 13, 1980,
for all initiation fees, dues, and other moneys which may
have been exacted from them with interest thereon in the
manner provided in "The Remedy" section of this Deci-
sion.
(c) Post at its store 321 copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix A."29 Copies of said notice on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after
being duly signed by its authorized representative, shall
be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by it to ensure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 21
signed copies of said notice in sufficient number to be
posted by the above-named Union in places where no-
tices to members are customarily posted.
sa In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
647
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.
B. The Union, Retail Clerks Union, Local 324, affili-
ated with United Food and Commercial Workers Inter-
national Union, AFL-CIO, its officers, representatives,
and agents, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Acting as the collective-bargaining representative
of the employees of Sav-On Drugs, Inc., at store 321,
unless and until it is certified by the Board as the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the employees at that
store.
(b) Maintaining or giving any force or effect to any
multistore or any other collective-bargaining agreement
between it and said Company covering the employees of
store 321, or any extension, renewal, or modification
thereof, unless and until it is certified by the Board as the
collective-bargaining representative of those employees.
(c) Telling any employee that store 321 is a union
store, that the employee has to join the Union, or that
the employee will be terminated if she does not join,
where there is no lawful contract or union-security
clause in effect covering that employee.
(d) In any like or related manner restrain or coerce
you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Jointly and severally with said Company reimburse
all former and present employees employed at store 321,
who joined said Union on or after November 13, 1980,
for all initiation fees, dues, and all other moneys which
may have been exacted from them with interest thereon
in the manner provided in "The Remedy" section of this
Decision.
(b) Post at its business offices, meeting halls, and
places where notices to members are customarily posted,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."3 °
Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 21, after being duly signed by its au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to ensure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(c) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 21
signed copies of said notice in sufficient number to be
posted by the above-named Company in places where
notices to employees are customarily posted.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that those portions of the com-
plaint as to which no violation has been found are
hereby dismissed.
SD See fn. 29, above.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT assist or contribute support to
Retail Clerks Union, Local 324, affiliated with
United Food and Commercial Workers Internation-
al Union, AFL-CIO, by recognizing or bargaining
with that Union as the exclusive collective-bargain-
ing representative of our employees at store 321,
unless and until said Union is certified by the Board
as the collective-bargaining representative of said
employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain or give any force or
effect to any multistore or any other collective-bar-
gaining agreement between us and said Union cov-
ering the employees at store 321, or any extension,
renewal, or modification thereof, unless and until
said Union is certified by the Board as the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of those employees.
WE WILL NOT tell any applicant for employment
or employee of store 321 that we are under contract
with said Union, at a time when that store is not an
accretion to a multistore bargaining unit and when
said Union does not represent an uncoerced majori-
ty of those employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge any employ-
ee if that employee does not join said Union, at a
time when there is no lawful contract or union-se-
curity clause in effect covering that employee.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL withdraw and withhold recognition
from said Union as the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of our employees at store 321, unless and
until said Union is certified by the Board as the ex-
clusive representative of such employees.
WE WILL jointly and severally with said Union
reimburse all former and present employees em-
ployed at store 321, who joined the Union on or
after November 13, 1980, for all initiation fees, dues,
and other moneys which may have been exacted
from them with interest.
SAV-ON DRUGS, INC.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT act as the collective-bargaining
representative of the employees of Sav-On Drugs,
Inc., at store 321, unless and until we are certified
648
SAV-ON DRUGS, INC.
by the Board as the collective-bargaining represent-
ative of the employees at that store.
WE WILL NOT maintain or give any force or
effect to any multistore or any other collective-bar-
gaining agreement between us and said Union cov-
ering the employees at store 321, or any extension,
renewal, or modification thereof, unless and until
said Union is certified by the Board as the collec-
tive-bargaining representative of those employees.
WE WILL NOT tell any employee that store 321 is
a union store, that the employee has to join the
Union, or that the employee will be terminated if
she does not join, where there is no lawful contract
or union-security clause in effect covering that em-
ployee.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re-
strain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL jointly and severally with said Compa-
ny reimburse all former and present employees em-
ployed at store 321, who joined our Union on or
after November 13, 1980, for all initiation fees, dues,
and other moneys which may have been exacted
from them with interest thereon.
RETAIL CLERKS UNION, LOCAL 324, AF-
FILIATED WITH UNITED FOOD AND COM-
MERCIAL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL
UNION, AFL-CIO
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