Sarath K. Balachandran

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 11, 2020

2018008329 (P.T.A.B. May. 11, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/268,357 05/02/2014 Sarath K. BALACHANDRAN 9610/12203 5627
32642 7590 05/11/2020
STOEL RIVES LLP - SLC
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 1100
ONE UTAH CENTER
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
EXAMINER
SUBRAMANIAN, NARAYANSWAMY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3695
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/11/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patlaw@stoel.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SARATH K. BALACHANDRAN
____________

Appeal 2018-008329
Application 14/268,357
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ANTON W. FETTING, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.

FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
Sarath K. Balachandran (Appellant2) seeks review under
35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims 2–11 and 18–27, the only

1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal
Br.,” filed April 25, 2018) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed August 22,
2018), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed June 26, 2018), and
Final Action (“Final Act.,” mailed September 25, 2017).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as ATS
TOLLING LLC (Appeal Br. 1).
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claims pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the
appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
The Appellant invented a way of automating the processing of
vehicular violations and, more particularly, automating the processing of
vehicular violations involving vehicles operated, for example, by a fleet
operator or a rental-car agency. Specification para. 2.
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 2, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some
paragraphing added).
2. A computing device of a violation processing entity,
comprising:
[0.1] a first communication interface configured to
receive, from a device of a vehicle rental or lease entity, rental
or lease agreement data including unique vehicle identifiers of
rental or lease vehicles of the vehicle rental or lease entity and
identifiers of responsible parties for the rental or lease vehicles;
[0.2] one or more data storage devices configured to store
the rental or lease agreement data; and
[0.3] one or more processors operably coupled to the one
or more data storage devices and configured to:
[1] compare identification data identifying a violating
vehicle from a violation notice to the unique vehicle identifiers
of the rental or lease vehicles of the vehicle rental or lease
entity; and
[2] if the identification data matches one of the unique
vehicle identifiers:
[2.1] identify a responsible one of the responsible parties
that is responsible for one of the rental or lease vehicles
that corresponds to a matching one of the unique vehicle
identifiers; and

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[2.2] charge the responsible one of the responsible parties
for the violation notice, or cause the first communication
interface to transmit violation data to the device of the
vehicle rental or lease entity to enable the rental or lease
entity to charge the responsible one of the responsible
parties for the violation notice, the violation data
identifying the responsible one of the responsible parties.
Claims 2–11 and 18–27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.3
ISSUES
The issues of eligible subject matter turn primarily on whether the
claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of results desired.
ANALYSIS
STEP 14
Claim 2, as a device claim, nominally recites one of the enumerated
categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The issue before us
is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Although claim 2 is nominally a device claim, the only structure recited is a
preliminary context composed of three generic conventional computing
system devices. The remaining bulk of claim 2 recites procedural steps
typical of a method claim. Thus, the substantive parts of the claim are
method steps and we will refer to claim 2 as a method claim from here on
for that reason.

3 A non-statutory double patenting rejection (Final Act. 12) was withdrawn.
Ans. 3.
4 For continuity of analysis, we adopt the steps nomenclature from 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (“Revised Guidance”).
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STEP 2
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . .
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat
else is there in the claims before us? To answer that question, .
. . consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as
an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional
elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-
eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this
analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citations
omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first determine what the
claims are directed to. This begins by determining whether the claims recite
one of the judicial exceptions (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea). Then, if the claims recite a judicial exception, determining
whether the claims at issue are directed to the recited judicial exception, or
whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical
application of that exception, i.e., that the claims “apply, rely on, or use the
judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54. If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, then finally
determining whether the claims provide an inventive concept because the
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additional elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than the
recited judicial exception.
STEP 2A Prong 1
At a high level, and for our preliminary analysis, we note that method
claim 2 recites receiving data, comparing data, if data matches, then
identifying a party, and charging the party directly or indirectly. Comparing
data and identifying data are rudimentary data analysis. Charging a party is
transmitting data regarding a charge. Thus, claim 2 recites receiving,
analyzing, and transmitting data. None of the limitations recite
technological implementation details for any of these steps, but instead recite
only results desired by any and all possible means. There is an additional
prefatory limitation of providing components of a computing apparatus, but
this is no more than reciting the computer context for the steps recited. The
limitations listed are high level functional descriptions of what modules and
data the system would provide, and so only serve to recite labels for the
hardware and software that perform the subsequent steps.
From this we see that claim 2 does not recite the judicial exceptions
of either natural phenomena or laws of nature.
Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract
idea are patent in-eligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which
extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas
include (1) mathematical concepts,5 (2) certain methods of organizing

5 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio
Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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human activity,6 and (3) mental processes.7 Among those certain methods
of organizing human activity listed in the Revised Guidance are commercial
or legal interactions. Like those concepts, claim 2 recites the concept of
applying vehicle violation penalties. Specifically, claim 2 recites operations
that would ordinarily take place in advising one to charge a penalty to a
party identified on a rental or lease agreement. The advice to charge a
penalty to a party identified on a rental or lease agreement involves charging
the responsible one of the responsible parties for the violation notice, which
is an economic act, and identifying a responsible one of the responsible
parties, which is an act ordinarily performed in the stream of commerce. For
example, claim 2 recites “charge the responsible one of the responsible
parties for the violation notice,” which is an activity that would take place
whenever one is applying a vehicular penalty. Similarly, claim 1 recites
“identify a responsible one of the responsible parties,” which is also
characteristic of applying a vehicular penalty.
The Examiner determines the claims to be directed to processing
violation notices. Final Act. 3.
The preamble to claim 2 recites that it is a device of a violation
processing entity. The steps in claim 2 result in charging someone for a

6 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 628; Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Ultramercial,
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed Cir. 2014); Smart Sys.
Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2017); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
7 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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violation absent any technological mechanism other than a conventional
computer for doing so.
As to the specific limitations, limitation 0.1 recites receiving data.
Limitations 1 and 2 recite generic and conventional analyzing and
transmitting of vehicular violation data, which advise one to apply generic
functions to get to these results. The limitations thus recite advice for
charging a penalty to a party identified on a rental or lease agreement. To
advocate charging a penalty to a party identified on a rental or lease
agreement is conceptual advice for results desired and not technological
operations.
The Specification at paragraph 2 describes the invention as relating to
automation of processing of vehicular violations and, more particularly,
automation of processing of vehicular violations involving vehicles
operated, for example, by a fleet operator or a rental-car agency. Thus, all
this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 2 recites applying vehicle violation
penalties. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination.
This in turn is an example of commercial or legal interactions as a
certain method of organizing human activity because vehicular violations are
legal penalties applied using commercial practices. The concept of applying
vehicle violation penalties by charging a penalty to a party identified on a
rental or lease agreement is one idea for charging a party. The steps recited
in claim 2 are part of how this might conceptually be premised.
Our reviewing court has found claims to be directed to abstract ideas
when they recited similar subject matter. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (2015) (tracking financial
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transactions); Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044,
1054 (2017) (processing a financial application).
From this we conclude that at least to this degree, claim 2 recites
applying vehicle violation penalties by charging a penalty to a party
identified on a rental or lease agreement, which is a commercial and legal
interaction, one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in
the Revised Guidance, and, thus, an abstract idea.
STEP 2A Prong 2
The next issue is whether claim 2 not only recites, but is more
precisely directed to this concept itself or whether it is instead directed to
some technological implementation or application of, or improvement to,
this concept i.e. integrated into a practical application.8
At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this
exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At
some level, “all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or
apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”
Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply
because it involves an abstract concept. “[A]pplication[s]” of
such concepts “‘to a new and useful end,’” we have said,
remain eligible for patent protection. Accordingly, in applying
the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that
claim the “‘buildin[g] block[s]’” of human ingenuity and those
that integrate the building blocks into something more.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted).
Taking the claim elements separately, the operation performed by the
computer at each step of the process is expressed purely in terms of results,
devoid of implementation details. Limitation 0.2 recites a pure data

8 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175 (1981).
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gathering step. Limitations describing the nature of the data do not alter this.
Limitation 0.1 recites conventional data transmission. Limitation 0.3 recites
a generic processor to perform the steps. Steps 1 and 2 recite generic
computer processing expressed in terms of results desired by any and all
possible means and so present no more than conceptual advice. All
purported inventive aspects reside in how the data is interpreted and the
results desired, and not in how the process physically enforces such a data
interpretation or in how the processing technologically achieves those
results.
Viewed as a whole, Appellant’s claim 2 simply recites the concept of
applying vehicle violation penalties by charging a penalty to a party
identified on a rental or lease agreement as performed by a generic
computer. This is no more than conceptual advice on the parameters for this
concept and the generic computer processes necessary to process those
parameters, and do not recite any particular implementation.
Claim 2 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of
the computer itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field. The 10 pages of Specification do not bulge
with disclosure, but only spell out different generic equipment9 and
parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps
such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of applying
vehicle violation penalties by charging a penalty to a party identified on a

9 The Specification does not describe requirements for a computer and does
not recite the word “computer.” Claim 2 recites generic processors,
although the original filed Specification and claims did not describe
processors. Figure 6 portrays the Rental Reservation System as a
conventional personal computer.
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rental or lease agreement under different scenarios. They do not describe
any particular improvement in the manner a computer functions. Instead,
claim 2 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to
apply vehicle violation penalties by charging a penalty to a party identified
on a rental or lease agreement using some unspecified, generic computer.
Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26.
None of the limitations reflect an improvement in the functioning of a
computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, applies
or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for
a disease or medical condition, implements a judicial exception with, or uses
a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture
that is integral to the claim, effects a transformation or reduction of a
particular article to a different state or thing, or applies or uses the judicial
exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of
the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the exception.
We conclude that claim 2 is directed to achieving the result of
applying vehicle violation penalties by advising one to charge a penalty to a
party identified on a rental or lease agreement, as distinguished from a
technological improvement for achieving or applying that result. This
amounts to a commercial or legal interaction, which falls within certain
methods of organizing human activity that constitute abstract ideas. The
claim does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
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STEP 2B
The next issue is whether claim 2 provides an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in the claim provide significantly
more than the recited judicial exception.
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not generally alter
the analysis at Mayo step two
the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea
“on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of “additional
featur[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (citations omitted).
“[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic
computer.” Id. at 225. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer for receiving, analyzing, and transmitting data amounts to
electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a
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computer. All of these computer functions are generic, routine, conventional
computer activities that are performed only for their conventional uses. See
Elec. Power Grp. LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
See also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming”). None of
these activities is used in some unconventional manner nor does any produce
some unexpected result. Appellant does not contend it invented any of these
activities. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer
to perform generic computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even
if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular
content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection
and analysis other than abstract.” SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898
F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claim 2 add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis-
transmission is equally generic and conventional. See Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving,
selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving
payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath &
Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data
retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission),
Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d
1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of processing, routing, controlling,
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and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and
conventional.
We conclude that claim 2 does not provide an inventive concept
because the additional elements recited in the claim do not provide
significantly more than the recited judicial exception.
REMAINING CLAIMS
Claim 2 is representative. The other independent claims are
substantially similar at least as regards this analysis. The remaining
dependent claims merely describe process parameters. We conclude that the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and not to
the practical application of that concept.
As to those remaining structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea.
This Court has long “warn[ed] . . . against” interpreting
§ 101“in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on
the draftsman’s art.’”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any
particular machine.
LEGAL CONCLUSION
From these determinations we further determine that the claims do not
recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself or to any
other technology or technical field, a particular machine, a particular
transformation, or other meaningful limitations. From this we conclude the
claims are directed to the judicial exception of the abstract idea of certain
methods of organizing human activity as exemplified by the commercial and
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legal interaction of applying vehicle violation penalties by advising one to
charge a penalty to a party identified on a rental or lease agreement, without
significantly more.
APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
As to Appellant’s Appeal Brief arguments, we adopt the Examiner’s
determinations and analysis from pages 2–11 of the Final Action and pages
3–12 of the Answer and reach similar legal conclusions. We now turn to the
Reply Brief.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “[c]laim 2 is
[s]imilar to [c]laim 1 of Example 34 [a]mounting to a [t]echnical
[i]mprovement in the [t]echnical [f]ield of [a]utomatic [v]iolation
[p]rocessing.” Reply Br. 24 (emphasis omitted). Appellant refers to the
Examiner’s alleged failure to follow Office guidelines. See Reply Br. 29–
34. However, any failure by the Examiner to follow the Director’s guidance
is appealable only to the extent that the Examiner has failed to follow the
statutes or case law. That is, to the extent the Director’s guidance goes
beyond the case law and is more restrictive on the Examiner than the case
law, failure of the Examiner to follow those added restrictions is a matter for
petition to the Director. We review Appellant’s particular arguments against
the case law and find no requirement in the law that restricts “abstract ideas”
to only those particular concepts that the courts have identified already as an
abstract idea explicitly. As we determine supra, the claims are within the
scope of what the courts have found to be abstract ideas.
We further direct Appellant’s attention to the Office’s notation that
Example 34 is based on the Federal Circuit's findings in BASCOM
(BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir.
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2016)). Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Business Methods,
Example 34. Initially, we remind Appellant that BASCOM did not find
claims eligible on the substance, but rather that the Appellees did not
provide sufficient evidence to support a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in which
facts are presumed in the non-movant’s favor.
The key fact in BASCOM was the presence of a structural change in
“installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-
users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user. This
design gives the filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer
and the benefits of a filter on the ISP server.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350.
The instant claims have no analogous structural benefit. This structural
change occurred in the context of the internet as it existed at filing in
March 1997 when dial up internet service was still prevalent. It was not the
idea of having user customizable filtering located separately from the user
that was inventive, but the manner of accomplishing it in that context, as the
relatively primitive internet architecture at that time did not readily lend
itself to such filtering. Filtering located separately from the user was already
performed. “To overcome some of the disadvantages of installing filtering
software on each local computer, another prior art system relocated the filter
to a local server.” Id. at 1344. But it was known that allowing user
customization there was desirable. “However, the one-size-fits-all filter on
the local server was not ideal.” Id.
The BASCOM filter was invented prior to the now prevalent use of
self-identifying devices with media access control (MAC) addresses. Thus,
absent that, “BASCOM explains that the inventive concept rests on taking
advantage of the ability of at least some ISPs to identify individual accounts that
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communicate with the ISP server, and to associate a request for Internet content
with a specific individual account.” Id. Thus, BASCOM solved the problem of
how to create the structural relationship known to be desired by finding a way to
relate a user to a centrally located filter at a time when how to do so was unclear.
It was not the structural relation per se, but how it was accomplished that was
inventive. No analogous technological hurdle is described in the instant record.
Indeed the whole point of Appellant’s claimed invention appears to be simply to
use existing data communications technology to communcate vehicular
violations information by automatically transmitting such information.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “claim 2 amounts
to an improvement in the technology of automatic violation processing.”
Reply Br. 26. Claim 2 presents an improvement in information flow, not
computer technology. “[T]the claims are focused on providing information
to traders in a way that helps them process information more quickly, not on
improving computers or technology. . . . The “tool for presentation” here
. . . is simply a generic computer.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC,
921 F.3d 1378, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the use of the
computing device of the violation processing entity as a device that is
separate from the device of the vehicle rental or lease entity removes the
dependence on vehicle rental or lease entity devices.” Reply Br. 27. Simply
distributing processes was conventional distributed processing, which
inherently removed dependence among processes by such distribution.10

10 As an example of distributed processing being conventional, see e.g.,
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the Examiner
failed to meet the burden to show that the combination of elements of
[c]laim 2 were well-known routine and conventional.” Reply Br. 29–30.
Support for this determination is provided supra under Step 2B.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The rejection of claims 2–11 and 18–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more is proper.
CONCLUSION
The rejection of claims 2–11 and 18–27 is affirmed.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
2–11, 18–27 101 Eligibility 2–11, 18–27

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011).

AFFIRMED

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