SAP America, Inc.v.Versata Software, Inc.

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 11, 2013

09253427 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 11, 2013)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 70
571-272-7822 Entered: June 11, 2013

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

SAP AMERICA, INC.
Petitioner,

v.

VERSATA DEVELOPMENT GROUP, INC.
Patent Owner.
____________

Case CBM2012-00001 (MPT)
Patent 6,553,350
____________

Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, MICHAEL P. TIERNEY, and RAMA G. ELLURU,
Administrative Patent Judges.

TIERNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.

FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
37 C.F.R. § 42.73

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2
SAP filed a petition seeking a covered business method patent review of
Versata’s 6,553,350 (’350) patent pursuant to section 18 of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (AIA).
1
An oral hearing was held on April 17, 2013. This
decision is a final written decision under 35 U.S.C. § 328(a) as to the patentability
of the challenged claims. Based on the record presented, we hold that Versata’s
’350 claims 17, and 26-29 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

I. Background
In 2007, Versata sued SAP for infringement of the ’350 patent. The case
proceeded to trial and a jury found infringement by SAP and awarded damages.
Ex. 2039 (Jury Verdict). The district court denied SAP’s post trial motion
challenging the infringement verdict, but held a new trial on damages. In the
second trial, the jury awarded lost-profits and reasonable royalty damages.
The district court upheld those awards. Patent Owner Preliminary Response 7
(“Prel. Resp.”), Paper 29.
Both parties appealed the district court’s final judgment to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit on October 11, 2011. Versata Software, Inc. v.
SAP America, Inc., Nos. 2012-1029, -1049. Of note, SAP did not appeal the
district court’s claim construction, and the validity of the ’350 patent was not an
issue on appeal. Prel. Resp. 8. The Federal Circuit affirmed the jury’s
infringement verdict and damages award but vacated and remanded a permanent
injunction as overbroad. Versata Software Inc. v. SAP America Inc., 106 USPQ2d
1649 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
SAP filed a petition with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“Office”) on September 16, 2012, challenging claims 17 and 26-29 of the

1
Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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3
’350 patent as unpatentable for failing to comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, and
112, 1
st
and 2
nd
paragraphs. Petition (“Pet.”), Paper 1. Versata filed a patent
owner preliminary response opposing the institution of the review. On
January 9, 2013, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) granted the petition
and instituted the trial proceeding. The Board concluded that SAP demonstrated
that claims 17 and 26-29 were more likely than not unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101 and 102, but denied the petition as to 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1
st
and 2
nd

paragraphs. Decision on Institution of a Covered Business Method Patent Review
(“Decision”), Paper 36.
SAP requested that the trial be expedited with respect to the patentability of
Versata’s claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Motion, Paper 40. Versata opposed the
request, alleging that bifurcating the § 101 and § 102 issues had the potential to
prolong the proceeding and increase costs, contrary to the purposes of the AIA.
Opposition, Paper 42. SAP, however, agreed to forgo its challenge on the ground
of unpatentability under § 102, if the Board were to enter the requested expedited
schedule. Renewed Request, Paper 44. In light of SAP’s agreement to forgo the
§ 102 challenge, the Board granted SAP’s request to expedite the trial schedule.
Decision Conduct of the Proceeding, Paper 45.
Versata filed a patent owner response to the petition, contending that the
challenged claims are patentable under § 101 and that the Board had employed an
incorrect claim construction standard in construing the ’350 patent claims.
Response (“PO Resp.”), Paper 51. SAP’s reply to the patent owner response
maintained that the claims are unpatentable and that the Board had construed the
claims properly. “Pet. Reply,” Paper 58.
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Both parties requested an oral hearing. See 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(10) and 37
C.F.R. § 42.70(a). A hearing was held on April 17, 2013, a transcript of which
appears in the record. Record of Oral Hearing, Paper 66.

II. Versata’s ’350 Patent
2

Versata’s ’350 patent is directed to a method and apparatus for pricing
products and services. Ex. 1001, ’350 patent, 3:9-13. The central concept of the
’350 patent involves hierarchies and the hierarchal arrangement of data. Ex. 1005,
¶ 20.
The ’350 patent states that its “invention operates under the paradigm of
WHO (the purchasing organization) is buying WHAT (the product).” The ’350
patent, 3:24-25. An example of the WHO/WHAT paradigm is depicted in Figure 1
of the ’350 patent below:

2
This background section appears also in the Decision, 3-5.
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According to the ’350 patent, the WHO/WHAT paradigm was known in the prior
art. Id., Fig. 1, 4:16-18. The ’350 patent, however, states that prior art pricing
tables for WHO/WHAT (customer/products) required large tables of data. Id.,
1:52-59.
The ’350 patent invention is said to improve upon the prior art and reduce
the need for large tables of data by arranging customers into a hierarchy of
customer groups and products into a hierarchy of product groups. Id., 3:24-27, 41-
42. Specifically, in the ’350 patent, WHO is defined by creating an organizational
hierarchy of organizational groups, where each group represents a characteristic of
the organizational group. Id. An example of an arrangement of an organization
customer group is depicted below in Fig. 4A of the ’350 patent:

Similarly, a product group hierarchy for products (WHAT) is also defined. Id.,
Fig. 4B, 4:26-28. Pricing information is then associated with the customer and
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product groups. Id., 8:17-25. As such, special pricing adjustments may be defined
as applying to all members of a specific customer group or a specific product
group. Id., 3:26-49.

III. Analysis
SAP contends that the ’350 claims 17 and 26-29 are unpatentable because
the claims are abstract and not statutory subject matter for a patent under 35 U.S.C.
§101. Pet. 16-21. Specifically, SAP states that Versata’s claims are directed to the
abstract ideas of arranging customer and product hierarchies and calculating a
product price.
Versata contends that the Board should conclude that the ’350 claims are not
abstract, but instead are patent-eligible under § 101. Versata maintains that each of
the claims, considered as a whole, is directed to a specific, practical and
advantageous way to determine a product price. PO Resp. 1. According to
Versata, both SAP’s petition and the Board’s Decision on Institution, failed to
consider the claims as a whole and address each of their recited limitations, such as
storing, retrieving, and sorting. PO Resp. 16-51. Additionally, Versata contends
that the Board should not have applied the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard for claim construction in this proceeding and, therefore, the Board’s claim
construction in the Decision instituting trial was in error. PO Resp. 51-67. Versata
states that the correct claim construction was that used by the district court, which
further supports the patent eligibility of Versata’s challenged claims. PO Resp. 61-
67.
SAP, as petitioner, bears the ultimate burden of proof that Versata’s claims
are unpatentable under § 101. To place SAP’s and Versata’s contentions in
context, we begin our analysis by first discussing our construction of the
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7
challenged claims. Bancorp Serv., LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 687
F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t will ordinarily be desirable—and often
necessary— to resolve claim construction disputes prior to a § 101 analysis, for the
determination of patent eligibility requires a full understanding of the basic
character of the claimed subject matter.”).

A. Claim Construction: The Broadest Reasonable Interpretation Standard
The Board’s Decision on Institution construed the challenged claims using
the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) standard. Decision 6. SAP
contends that the Board’s use of BRI was appropriate under the AIA statutes and
rules. Pet. Reply 14-15. Versata disagrees and contends that the Board’s use of
such a standard “was in error.” PO Resp. 61.

1. A Century of BRI at the Office
Versata states that claim construction is a question of law and that claim
terms should be accorded only one definition: that which is based on a district
court interpretation standard. PO Resp. 62. There are, however, two claim
construction standards: the Office’s BRI construction and the district court
standard set forth in Phillips v. AWH.
3
The difference in standards generally arises
from the ability of an applicant or patent owner in Office proceedings to amend
their claims, and the fact that there is no presumption of validity before the Office.
4

Through the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the Office is

3
415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(en banc).
4
Whereas a patent is presumed “valid” unless overcome by clear and convincing
evidence before a district court, a petitioner’s burden before the Office is limited to
proving “unpatentability” by a preponderance of the evidence. Compare 35 U.S.C.
§ 282(a) and § 326(e).
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8
able to encourage inventors to amend their claims to remove uncertainties and over
breadth of claim scope.
For at least a century, the Office has encouraged clear and unambiguous
claim drafting by utilizing the broadest reasonable interpretation. For example, a
1906 Commissioner of Patent’s Decision held that there is no better method of
construing claims before the Office. Specifically, this early decision explains the
rationale for BRI as follows:
No better method of construing claims is perceived than to give them
in each case the broadest interpretation which they will support
without straining the language in which they are couched. This
method would seemingly give more uniform and satisfactory results
than are obtained by methods largely in vogue – such, for example, as
that of importing limitations from the specification according to the
exigencies of the particular situation in which the claim may stand at a
given moment. The method suggested also seems to have the
advantage according in its results with the probable intentions of the
inventor at the time when the claim is drawn. In presenting claims to
the Office the object constantly sought is breadth. Where a limited
meaning is intended when a claim is drawn, what possible objection
can there be to imposing that meaning unmistakably upon the claim
by its express terms? That a claim which does not carry its true
meaning on its face misleads those affected by the patent instead of
guiding them to its true scope is alone sufficient reason why the
Patent Office should refuse to recognize proposed limitations of
claims which have not been clearly expressed therein.
Podlesak and Podlesak v. McInnerney, 123(2) O.G. 1989, 1990 (Dec. Com. Pat.
1906, emphasis added). This standard of claim construction and its rationale have
been upheld consistently by the Federal courts, including both the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) and the Federal Circuit. For instance, in
1932, the CCPA stated that:
After a patent has issued, and it no longer is possible for the patentee
to control the phraseology of his claims, the courts will so interpret
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9
them, if possible, as to protect him; but there is no reason, as we many
times have observed, why an applicant in the Patent Office should not
draw his claims to cover his actual invention only. For this reason, we
have uniformly ruled that claims will be given the broadest
interpretation of which they reasonably are susceptible. This rule is a
reasonable one and tends not only to protect the real invention but to
prevent needless litigation after the patent has issued.

In re Horton, 54 F.2d 961, 964-65 (CCPA 1932) quoting In re Carr, 297 F. 542,
543-44 (C.A.D.C. 1924); see also, In re Kebrich, 201 F.2d 951 954 (CCPA 1953)
(stating that consideration of patentability requires use of broadest reasonable
interpretation); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1405-05 (CCPA 1969) (holding that
the broadest reasonable interpretation is appropriate where party may amend the
claims to obtain protection commensurate with the inventor’s actual contribution to
the art).
The use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard applies to
pre-issuance as well as post-issuance proceedings before the Office such as reissue
and reexamination proceedings. Both the CCPA and the Federal Circuit have
recognized that BRI serves an important public interest and that a key factor in its
use is that patent owners before the Office are provided an opportunity to amend
their claims and obtain appropriate coverage for their inventions with express
claim language. See, e.g., In re Reuter, 670 F.2d 1015 (CCPA 1981) (holding that
broadest reasonable interpretation is applicable in reissue proceedings); In re
Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that broadest reasonable
interpretation is applicable in reexamination proceeding).
The new AIA reviews before the Office, like reissue and reexamination
proceedings, provide patent owners with an opportunity to amend their claims.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 326(d). Thus, the recognized public interest that supports the
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10
use of the broadest reasonable interpretation during reissues and reexaminations
applies also to the new AIA post grant reviews. Specifically, as the cited
authorities recognize, claims serve an important notice function.
5
The use of the
broadest reasonable interpretation encourages patent owners to remove ambiguities
and to narrow their claims by amendment, such that the inventor’s contribution to
the art is expressed in clear, precise and unambiguous terms.
6
Hence, consistent
with the settled expectations of the past century, the Office has extended the use of
the broadest reasonable interpretation to the new AIA reviews.

2. The Office’s Adoption of BRI
Under the rulemaking authority provided for in the AIA, the Office, through
notice and comment rulemaking, adopted the use of the broadest reasonable
interpretation for all the new reviews. Thus, in covered business method patent
reviews, this claim construction standard is required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b),
which reads as follows:
(b) A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in
which it appears.
Versata contends that the Office, in promulgating this rule, exceeded its
rulemaking authority provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2). PO Resp. 62. Versata’s
contention is unavailing, for it presumes that no other statutory authority exists for

5
See also, White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1886) (“The claim is a statutory
requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define
precisely what his invention is; and is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of
the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.”).
6
A patent owner may not amend an expired patent. In such situations, the Board
will construe the claims by giving more weight to the prosecution history than
provided for under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard.
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this standard of claim construction other than the Office’s rulemaking authority
under 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2). As discussed in the following sections, the AIA has
provided the Office with new statutory and rulemaking authority, particularly with
respect to post grant reviews, including covered business method patent reviews.
See, e.g., Title 35, Chapter 32.
7

a. Post Grant Rulemaking Authority Under the AIA
To understand the Office’s expanded rulemaking authority, it is necessary to
explore the evolution of the administrative inter partes reexamination process that
was previously available for the review of issued patents. As will be seen, this
evolution reveals Congress’ desire to develop a viable inter partes administrative
system for patent review coupled with the necessary rulemaking discretion to
establish and govern such an administrative system.
Congress established the inter partes reexamination as part of the American
Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (“AIPA”), Pub. L. 106–113 §§ 4001-4808, 113
Stat. 1536 § 1501A et seq. (1999), (then codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 311-318, superseded by inter partes review, §§ 311-319). Inter partes
reexamination was created to provide third parties an opportunity to participate in
patent challenges before the Office. 145 Cong. Rec. S26983, S26984 (daily ed.
Oct. 27, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch). The AIPA did not provide rulemaking
powers specifically directed to inter partes reexamination. Accordingly, in order
to regulate the conduct of the inter partes reexamination proceedings, the Office
issued final rules on December 7, 2000 “under the authority given to the

7
For additional views further characterizing the AIA and rulemaking authority
under the Act, see Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 595, 662-73
(2012).
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Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks by 35 U.S.C. 2(b)(2).” Rules to
Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. Reg. 76756,
76772 (Dec. 7, 2000).
Prior to the AIA, 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) was said to be the “broadest of the
Office’s rulemaking powers.” Stevens v. Tamai, 366 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (citing Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1527 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). This
section provides that the Office may govern the conduct of the proceedings before
it. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A). The Federal Circuit has held that “[t]o comply with
section 2(b)(2)(A), a Patent Office rule must be ‘procedural’ –i.e., it must ‘govern
the conduct of the proceedings in the Office.’” Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536
F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008). According to the Federal Circuit, a rule is
substantive when it “effects a change in existing law or policy” which affects
individual rights and obligations. Id. at 1336.
Prior to the enactment of the AIA, several attempts were made by Congress
to reform patent law. For example, Congress introduced, but failed to pass, the
Patent Reform Act of 2007 and the Patent Reform Act of 2009. These acts
included a post grant review procedure that included the following rulemaking
provision:
§ 326. Conduct of post-grant review proceedings
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Director shall prescribe regulations, in
accordance with section 2(b)(2)—
(1) establishing and governing post-grant review proceedings
under this chapter and their relationship to other proceedings
under this title;
The Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145 110
th
Cong. (2007) and the Patent Reform
Act of 2009, S. 515 111
th
Cong. (2009). As explained in the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s Report on the Patent Reform Act of 2009, while the committee
recognized the importance of removing disincentives to current administrative
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processes, the reviews were not to be used as tools for harassment and the Office
was to address these potential abuses using its expanded procedural authority.
S. Rep. No. 111-18, at 18 (2009). These predecessors of the AIA, however, would
have limited the Office’s new rulemaking authority to that provided in
section 2(b)(2).
With the passage of the AIA, Congress sought to provide a viable alternative
to challenging patents in district court litigation,
8
and therefore, replaced inter
partes reexamination with new adjudicative review proceedings. As part of this
transformation, Congress bestowed new rulemaking authority on the Office to
establish and govern the new reviews and the relationship of the reviews to other
proceedings under title 35. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(4) and 326(a)(4). In
particular, the section 2(b)(2) restriction that appeared in the 2007 and 2009 bills
was removed. As recognized in the AIA legislative history, Congress granted the
Office rulemaking discretion to change existing examination policies such that the
new review proceedings would be more adjudicative in nature.
9
This grant of AIA

8
See, for example, the Summary of the Manager’s Amendment adding section 18
to the AIA, which states:
Recent court decisions, culminating in last year’s Supreme Court
decision in Bilski v. Kappos, have sharply pulled back on the
patenting of business methods, emphasizing that these “inventions”
are too abstract to be patentable. In the intervening years, however,
PTO was forced to issue a large number of business-method patents,
many or possibly all of which are no longer valid. The Schumer
proceeding offers a relatively cheap alternative to civil litigation for
challenging these patents, and will reduce the burden on the courts of
dealing with the backwash of invalid business-method patents.
157 Cong. Rec. S1367 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011).
9
See Senator Kyl’s statement that:
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14
post grant rulemaking authority is consistent with the recognition that the Office’s
establishment of a viable alternative for challenging patents required further
rulemaking discretion than had been provided previously.
While granting the Office broad rulemaking authority, Congress sought to
guide the Office’s establishment of the new proceedings by providing certain
minimum requirements. For example, in establishing the new proceedings the
Office was required to promulgate rules setting forth the standards to institute a
review, as well as standards and procedures for discovery and motions to amend
claims. 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(2), (5), and (9). Thus, the plain language of the AIA
statutes provides the Office with authority exceeding that of merely setting forth
“procedures.”
As the Supreme Court has observed, “[Congress] does not . . . hide elephants
in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). It is
apparent from the plain language of the AIA that Congress has granted the Office
new and expanded rulemaking authority to ensure the success of the new reviews.

b. Promulgation of Rule 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b)
The AIA was enacted into law on September 16, 2011. Pub. L. 112–29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011). Prior to its enactment, then Director Kappos requested that the
public provide comments to the Office regarding implementation of the AIA,
including the new patent reviews. Numerous comments were filed in response to
this request, including comments from intellectual property organizations, law

In the present bill, section 316(a)(4) gives the Office discretion in
prescribing regulations governing the new proceeding. The Office has
made clear that it will use this discretion to convert inter partes into an
adjudicative proceeding.
157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011).
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firms, companies, and individuals.
10

On February 10, 2012, the Office published a notice of proposed rulemaking
concerning the Office’s implementation of the transitional program for covered
business method patent reviews. See Changes to Implement Transitional Program
for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 7080 (Feb. 10, 2012).
11
In this
notice, the Office proposed adding 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b), which is directed to the
broadest reasonable interpretation. As explained in the notice:
This proposed rule would be consistent with longstanding established
principles of claim construction before the Office. See, e.g., In re Am.
Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re
Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 7082. The notice further explains that the patent owner’s ability to amend
claims to avoid prior art distinguishes the Office proceedings from those of district
court’s. Id. Additionally, the notice identified the relevant statutory authority for
the rules as including, among other things, 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-326 and 329. Id. at
7094.
The Office received numerous comments on the rules,
12
and on
August 14, 2012, the Office issued its final rules. See, e.g., Changes to Implement
Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and Transitional
Program for Covered Business Method Patents; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48680
(August 14, 2012). The final rules adopted 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b) as set forth in

10
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/aia_implementation.jsp
11
The Office also provided notices of rulemaking for a consolidated set of rules
relating to Board trial practice, specific rules for inter partes review, post grant
review, derivations, definitions for covered business method patent reviews and a
practice guide. See 77 Fed. Reg. 48734 (Aug. 14, 2012).
12
Public comments on the AIA rules may be viewed at:
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/comments.jsp
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the proposed rule above and identified the statutory basis for the adoption of the
rule, how it was supported by the legislative history,
13
and how the rule was
consistent with the settled expectations arising from Federal Circuit precedent
where a party is afforded an opportunity to amend claims. Id. at 48693. For
example, as to the authority for 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b), the final rules explained
how the Office was required to enter final written decisions on patentability, 35
U.S.C. § 328, how the Office was required to set standards for instituting the
proceedings and for amending claims, 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(2) and (9), and that the
Office was required to promulgate rules establishing and governing the proceeding
and the relationship of the proceeding to other proceedings, 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(4).
Id. at 48697-98.
During rulemaking, the Office received comments for and against the
adoption of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard.
14
In response to

13
Senator Kyl stated:
This [district court] information should help the Office understand and
construe the key claims of a patent. It should also allow the Office to
identify inconsistent statements made about claim scope--for example,
cases where a patent owner successfully advocated a claim scope in
district court that is broader than the “broadest reasonable
construction” that he now urges in an inter partes review.
157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011)(emphasis added). See also, San
Huan New Materials High Tech, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 1347, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The legislative history shows that Congress was fully aware of
the agency regulations and practices at the time of legislating in their area, and
absent some special circumstance the failure to change or refer to existing practices
is reasonably viewed as ratification thereof.”).
14
See, e.g., Comments of Verizon, et al., at 8 (April 9, 2012)(The Office should
“confirm that challenged claims will be given their broadest reasonable
construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”), and
Comments of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America at 12
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17
comments received, the Office explained in the final rules its consideration of the
comments and provided detailed reasons for the adoption of the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard. Id. at 48697-48699. For example, the Office
interpreted the requirement to determine patentability as requiring the use of the
broadest reasonable interpretation, as opposed to the district court standard of
construing to preserve validity. Additionally, the responses to comments noted
that, unlike district court adjudicative proceedings, patent owners are afforded an
opportunity to amend their claims during the Office reviews. By encouraging
patent owners to eliminate ambiguity through amendment, the use of the broadest
reasonable interpretation standard encourages clarity in claim language, which
serves the important public notice function.
Further, the responses noted that inconsistent results would become a major
issue if the Office adopted a standard of claim construction other than the broadest
reasonable interpretation for post grant reviews. Specifically, as in the present case
where SAP has requested reexamination of the ’350 patent in addition to this
proceeding, the AIA contemplates that there will be multiple proceedings in the
Office, and thus requires the Office to establish rules concerning the relationships
between the various proceedings. Major difficulties would arise where the Office
is handling multiple proceedings with different claim construction standards, as it
could produce confusing results, which would be unhelpful to patentees,
applicants, the public, and the system.
Versata’s contention that the Office is limited to 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) does
not take into account the policy reasons for the use of the broadest reasonable
interpretation or the well-settled expectations resulting from decades of case law

(April 10, 2012)(The Office should “adopt a claim construction approach similar to
that used by courts.”).
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18
supporting the Office’s reliance on the standard to ensure clear and precise claim
language.
We have reviewed Versata’s other contentions regarding the need to adopt
the district court’s claim construction, but find them equally unavailing. For
example, Versata contends that stare decisis requires the Board to apply the district
court’s claim construction. Pat. Opp., 65. We disagree as appeals from this
proceeding are exclusively to the Federal Circuit rather than to district courts.
See also, In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1295-98 (Fed. Cir.
2007). Versata also contends that the Board is not bound to apply the “BRI
standard in every instance” and cites to 37 C.F.R. § 42.5. Pat. Opp., 64-65. While
37 C.F.R. § 42.5(b) allows the Board to waive or suspend a requirement under part
42, the discussion section of the rules make clear that this rule is intended to
address procedural requirements, e.g., waiving page limits, to permit the resolution
of issues in a uniform and efficient manner. 77 Fed. Reg. 48612, 48616
(Aug. 14, 2012).
Clear, precise and unambiguous claims are as important now as they were a
century ago.
15
Clarity in claim scope is of the utmost importance because the
claims set forth all to which the patentee is entitled while apprising the public of
what is still open to them. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891); Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002).

15
See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent
Notice and Remedies with Competition (2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf and Comments of the
Coalition for Patent Fairness, in response to the Request for Comments on
Preparation of Patent Applications, available at:
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/qualapp-
a_patent_coalition_20130415.pdf .
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Accordingly, we agree with SAP and hold that the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard is the one correct standard for post grant reviews.

3. Construction of Versata’s Claims
The Board’s decision to institute identified four claim terms for which
construction was sought by the parties: “sorting the pricing information,” “the
pricing information that is less restrictive,” “pricing type(s),” and “pricing
information.” Decision 7. As discussed in the decision, the terms were given the
following meanings:
Decision to Institute - Claim Construction
Sorting the pricing information
Pricing information is ordered either before
or after the information is retrieved.
Decision 8-11.
The pricing information that is less
restrictive
Information that is less specifically
applicable to a product, a purchasing
organization, an organizational group or a
product group. Decision 11.
Pricing types and pricing
adjustments
Class or category of pricing adjustments.
Decision 12-14.
Pricing information
Information related to pricing. The
definition comprises both price adjustments
and denormalized price adjustments.
Decision 15-17.

Generally, Versata contends that, to the extent the Board’s construction
differs from that of the district court, the Board should have applied the district
court’s claim interpretation as this interpretation was “advocated by both SAP and
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Versata.”
16
PO Resp. 52. SAP, however, contends that Versata’s disagreements
with the Board’s constructions are “unfounded.” In particular, SAP states that
Versata fails to justify the application of its narrower litigation definitions or to
explain how the preferred embodiments of Versata’s specification overrides the
Board’s construction based on the doctrine of claim differentiation. Reply 16-17.
For this decision, we will construe each of the claim terms identified by the parties
in turn.

a. Sorting the Pricing Information
The term “sorting the pricing information” appears only in the following
limitation of claim 17 (emphasis added):
sorting the pricing information according to the pricing types, the
product, the purchasing organization, the hierarchy of product groups,
and the hierarchy of organizational groups;
This step is recited after a “retrieving pricing information” step, but before an
“eliminating less restrictive pricing information” step.
The Board’s decision to institute adopted the district court’s construction of
the term “sorting the pricing information.” Decision 8-9. Neither party disputes
this construction. The parties, however, disagree as to when the pricing
information is sorted. Decision 9, PO Resp. 52-61 and Reply 16-17.
In instituting the review, the Board held that the plain language of claim 17
did not require that the information be retrieved first and sorted. This was in
contrast to Versata claim 1, which requires “sorting the retrieved information.”

16
Versata’s opposition omits the fact that it urged the district court not to construe
the claims as limited to preferred embodiments, a construction that it now seeks the
Board to adopt. Decision 14 (citing District Court Memorandum Opinion and
Order Regarding Claim Construction, Versata v. SAP, No. 07-cv-00153, slip op. at
7-9) (May 19, 2009) (Ex. 1012).
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Further, the Board credited the testimony of SAP’s expert,
17
Dr. Siegel, who
testified that sorting the pricing information in the context of the ’350 patent
encompassed sorting either before or after the information is retrieved. Decision 9-
11.
Versata contends that claim 17 requires “sorting” after “retrieving.” PO
Resp. 52-61. According to Versata, the intrinsic and extrinsic record
demonstrates that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood that
“the pricing information” referred to in the sorting step of claim 17 pertains to the
“retrieved applicable pricing information.” PO Resp. 53. Versata states that “any
other interpretation would not be reasonable,” as it is “generally the case that data
stored in a data source must be retrieved from the data source before the data can
be sorted.” Id. at 53-54. Versata relies upon the testimony of its expert, Dr.
Liebich, to support its construction. PO Resp. 53-54 (citing Ex. 2091, ¶¶ 123-128).
We agree with SAP that claim 17 does not itself impose a temporal
limitation on when the pricing information is sorted. As SAP contends, Versata’s
arguments and expert testimony as to what is “generally” the case do not
demonstrate that Versata sought to limit claim 17 in the way that claim 1 expressly
was limited. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (holding that similar language did not require separate and consecutive
performance of various steps).
Versata contends that the specification demonstrates that sorting must occur
after retrieval. PO Resp. 55-57. We agree with Versata that Figure 15B of the
’350 patent describes the use of the method where the sorting step occurs after

17
The field of the invention is computerized financial systems. See, e.g., Ex. 1005,
¶ 16. A person of ordinary skill in the art would have at least a bachelor’s degree
in computer science and experience developing computerized financial systems.
Id., ¶ 18.
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retrieving all pricing adjustments. Id., and Ex. 1001, Fig. 15b, 4:62, 18:53-54 and
19:4-43. Yet, the ’350 patent states explicitly that numerous specific details are set
forth in the description, but that it would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the
art that the present invention could be practiced without the specific details.
Ex. 1001, 4:67-5:5. SAP’s expert, Dr. Siegel, testifies that one of ordinary skill in
the art would have understood that claim 17 “does not imply or require a temporal
limitation forcing the sorting to occur after the retrieving.” Ex. 1005, ¶ 98.
Versata’s expert, Dr. Liebich, testifies that “it is generally the case that data stored
in a data source must first be retrieved from the data source before the data can be
sorted.” Ex. 2091, ¶ 126 (emphasis added). Based upon the record presented, we
find that one of ordinary skill in the art reading the ’350 specification would have
understood that retrieving then sorting was the preferred, but not the only, method
of carrying out the invention. Accordingly, we hold that the ’350 patent
specification does not require retrieving then sorting.
We are not persuaded by Versata’s arguments regarding extrinsic evidential
support for its construction of sorting after retrieval. Specifically, the cited district
court expert testimony does not dictate that sorting follows retrieving.
18
Ex. 1018,
81-82.
We credit the testimony of SAP’s expert, Dr. Siegel, and conclude that claim
17 does not require a temporal limitation forcing the sorting to occur after
retrieving.

18
Versata’s patent owner opposition cites to Ex. 2006 and 2064 as support for its
proposition. PO Resp. 57-58. The cited portions of the Ex. 2006 trial transcript,
however, do not correspond to the testimony of the experts in question.
Additionally, the citation to Ex. 2064 trial transcript merely discusses Dr. Boyd’s
understanding of the Trilogy System and not the ’350 patent.
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b. The Pricing Information That Is Less Restrictive
In instituting this review, we adopted the district court’s construction that
“the pricing information that is less restrictive” means information that is “less
specifically applicable to a product, a purchasing organization, an organizational
group or a product group.” Neither party alleges error in this construction.

c. Pricing Types and Pricing Adjustments and Pricing
Information

The Board’s decision to institute construed the terms “pricing types” and
“pricing adjustments” as meaning a class or category of pricing adjustments.
Decision 12-14. The decision further defined the term “information related to
pricing” as comprising both price adjustments and denormalized price adjustments.
Decision 15-17. The Board’s construction differed from that of the district court in
that the Board did not limit the claims to denormalized pricing adjustments where
denormalized numbers are determined at run time. Id.
Versata urged the district court to construe these claim terms broadly and not
limit the claims to preferred embodiments but, before this panel, urges that the
district court’s narrow construction be adopted. PO Resp. 61-65. SAP contends
that the Board’s construction was correct and that Versata has failed to justify
application of the narrower litigation definition under BRI, or explain how a
preferred embodiment could override the Board’s construction based on claim
differentiation. Reply 17. We agree with SAP and, for the reasons provided
above, we employ the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims and adopt
the claim constructions for the terms pricing types, pricing adjustments, and
pricing information that are set forth in the decision to institute.

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d. Data Source
The term “data source” appears in Versata independent claims 17, 27
and 29. For example, the term data source is used in claim 17 in the following
limitation:
storing pricing information in a data source, wherein the pricing
information is associated, with (i) a pricing type, (ii) the
organizational groups, and (iii) the product groups;
Versata contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
understood the term “data source” to mean a conventional or unconventional
computer database. PO Resp. 27-28. Versata states that such a construction of the
term is consistent with how the term was discussed in the ’350 specification. Id. at
28. SAP disagrees, citing the specification’s statement that “although the invention
is discussed in terms of a ‘database,’ the invention can be implemented using any
data source that may be different from a conventional database.” Reply 7 (citing
Ex. 1001, 10:58-61).
We construe the term “data source” in claim 17 as requiring the use of a
computer storage medium as the ’350 patent defines the field of the invention as
“computer-based” pricing of products. However, even if we are incorrect, it would
not alter our § 101 analysis, i.e., the claim is unpatentable whether we adopt
Versata or SAP’s construction.

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B. Versata’s Claims are Unpatentable Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
SAP challenges claims 17 and 26-29 as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101
stating that the claims are directed to an unpatentable abstract idea. Pet. 16.
Versata disagrees and maintains that its claims are directed to a specific, practical,
and advantageous way to determine a product price using hierarchical groups of
customers and products. PO Resp. 13-49.

1. § 101 Subject Matter Eligibility
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the test for patent eligibility under
§ 101 is not amenable to bright-line categorical rules. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010). Further, the Federal Circuit has recognized that it has been especially
difficult to apply § 101 properly in the context of computer-implemented
inventions. CLS Bank Int’l V. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 106 USPQ2d 1696, 1700
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
Our analysis begins with the statute. There are four broadly stated
categories of patent-eligible subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures,
and compositions of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101. In addition, there are three
judicially created exceptions to these four categories: laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
A brief review is provided below of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on § 101
for these exceptions.
An abstract idea or law of nature itself is not patentable. To be patentable,
a claim must do more than simply state the law of nature or abstract idea and add
the words “apply it.” Mayo Collaboration Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. Yet, an application of a law of
nature or abstract idea to a known structure or process may be deserving of patent
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protection. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). The key question is,
therefore, whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe the law of
nature or abstract idea. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297. A claim is not patent-eligible
where it merely recites a law of nature and adds additional steps that merely reflect
routine, conventional activity of those who work in the field. Id. at 1298. Further,
the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment’ or adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.’” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at
3230 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92).
In Benson, the Supreme Court considered a patent application that was
directed to the programmed conversion of numerical information in general
purpose digital computers. In particular, the Court considered two claims, with
one, claim 8 reading as follows:
8. The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form
into binary which comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift
register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until
there is a binary ‘1’ in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary ‘1’ in said second position of said
register,
(4) adding a binary ‘1’ to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a ‘1’ to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in
preparation for a succeeding binary ‘1’ in the second position of said
register.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 73-74. The Court in analyzing the claims, noted that a general
purpose computer is one that is “designed to perform operations under many
different programs.” Id. at 65. Although claim 8 recited computer hardware
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(“shift register”), the Court nevertheless determined that the method sought to be
patented involved ordinary arithmetic steps that could be performed without the
use of a computer or carried out in “existing computers long in use, no new
machinery being necessary.” Id. at 68. The Court determined that the claims had
no substantial practical application except in connection with a digital computer.
The Court concluded that the claims sought to “pre-empt the mathematical formula
and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.” Id. at 71-72.
Accordingly, the claims were held unpatentable under § 101.
In Mayo, the Supreme Court addressed the law of nature exception in
considering claims covering medical diagnostic methods. The Court reaffirmed
that patent eligibility should not depend simply on the draftsman’s art, without
reference to the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for natural
laws and abstract ideas. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1294 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584, 593 (1978)). The Court also stated that if a law of nature is not patentable,
then neither is a process reciting that law of nature absent additional features
demonstrating that the process is “more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the law of nature itself.” Id. at 1297. The Court further recognized
that purely “conventional or obvious” limitations are “normally not sufficient to
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a
law.” Id. at 1298. The Court expressed concern that there is a danger when a
patented process amounts to no more than instruction to apply the natural law, or
otherwise forecloses more further invention than the underlying discovery could
reasonably justify. Id. at 1301. The claimed processes in Mayo were held
unpatentable under § 101 as the Court determined they did not do more than apply
the natural law. Id. at 1294.

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2. Versata Claims 17 and 26-29 are Unpatentably Abstract
Versata’s challenged claims are in substance directed to an apparatus and
method for determining a price, i.e., a method of calculating, the method being
implemented on computer hardware. Claims 17 and 26-29 are reproduced in the
attached Appendix. Generally, claim 17 is directed to a method of determining
price, claim 27 is a computer-implemented method of determining a price, and
claims 26 and 28 are computer-readable storage media comprising computer
instructions to implement the methods of claims 17 and 28. Similarly, while claim
29 is directed to an “apparatus” for determining a price, the apparatus includes
computer program instructions capable of performing the same method steps that
are recited in claim 27.
SAP contends that Versata’s claims are unpatentable under § 101 as they are
centered on abstract ideas. Pet. 17. SAP states the abstract nature of the claims is
demonstrated by the fact that the method steps can be performed in the human
mind or by a human using a pencil and paper. Id. at 18. SAP further states that the
claims merely recite “abstract ideas with nothing more than ‘well-understood,
routine, conventional activity’ added.” Id., citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
Versata disagrees with SAP’s characterization of the claims. According to
Versata, the claims recite statutory processes and machines under § 101 and the
claims do not “preempt” any abstract idea. In particular, Versata states that the
determination of whether its claims are directed to patent-eligible subject matter
under § 101 requires an analysis of all the elements or steps in the claimed process.
See, e.g., PO Resp. 14-15.
We agree with SAP that each of challenged claims involves the use of an
abstract idea: determining a price using organizational and product group
hierarchies, which are akin to management organizational charts. The concept of
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organizational hierarchies for products and customers is abstract as it represents a
“disembodied concept,” a basic building block of human ingenuity. Similarly,
determining a price is also abstract as it is essentially a method of calculating.
Standing alone, an abstract idea does not represent patent-eligible subject matter.
Accordingly, we must further analyze Versata’s claims to determine whether they
incorporate sufficient meaningful limitations to ensure that the claims are more
than just an abstract idea and not just a mere drafting effort designed to
monopolize the abstract idea itself. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.

a. Versata’s Claims Have No Substantial Practical
Application Except in Connection with a Computer

Versata contends that its claims cannot be performed manually or mentally.
See, e.g., PO Resp. 33. According to Versata, the claims require the use of a
computer because the claims recite computer hardware and the use of computer
instructions. Id. Yet, claims do not become patentable under § 101 simply for
reciting a computer element. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
Versata’s expert, Dr. Liebich, testifies that there is no doubt that the claims
require implementation on a computer. Ex. 2091, ¶¶ 68, 81, 90, 100, and 103.
Dr. Liebich’s testimony is predicated on the fact that the claims recite computer
hardware limitations. Id. During cross-examination, Dr. Liebich confirmed that
the process steps themselves could be performed by pen and paper. Liebich
Transcript, Ex. 1033, 119:4 – 143:10, Ex. 1029, and Ex. 1031. Based on the record
presented, we conclude that while the challenged claims are drafted to include
computer hardware limitations, the underlying process that is implemented on such
hardware could also be performed via pen and paper.
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Dr. Liebich testifies that from a practical standpoint the invention “would
have no purpose if it were attempted to be performed mentally or with pencil and
papers – i.e., outside a computer.” Id. at ¶ 69. The mere recitation of computer
implementation or hardware in combination with an abstract idea, however, is not
itself a significant, meaningful limitation on the scope of the claims. Specifically,
as apparent from Benson, implementation on a general purpose computer is not a
meaningful limitation where there was “no substantial practical application except
in connection with a digital computer.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 68 and 71-72.
Thus, we analyze whether the claimed invention is carried out using existing
computers long in use. Id.

b. General Purpose Computer Hardware and Programming
Are Used to Implement the Claimed Method Steps

The claimed invention of the ’350 patent requires only routine computer
hardware and programming. The ’350 patent states that its invention may be
implemented in any type of computer system or programming or processing
environment. Ex. 1001, 5:55-58; Siegel Dep. Tr. Ex. 2090, 107:12-19.
For example, the ’350 patent states that the invention’s method and apparatus
allow prices to be determined on a laptop computer. Id. at 3:20-23. Accordingly,
the ’350 patent makes clear that its contribution to the arts lies not in the type of
computing device or processing environment employed. This is consistent with
the fact that the ’350 specification lacks specificity as to the hardware aspects of
the invention. Thus, as with the “shift register” in Benson, the recitation of generic
general purpose computer hardware (processor, memory, storage) in the challenged
claims represents routine, well-understood conventional hardware that fails to
narrow the claims relative to the abstract idea. Benson, 409 U.S. at 65 (“The
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general-purpose computer is designed to perform operations under many different
programs.”).
Next, we look to the claims to determine whether they recite additional
meaningful limitations beyond the basic abstract idea of determining a price using
customer and product hierarchies on a general purpose computer.

c. Versata’s Claims Merely Add Insignificant,
Conventional and Routine Steps that are Implicit in the
Abstract Idea Itself

To be patent-eligible a claim reciting an abstract idea must add more than
just insignificant, conventional or routine steps to the idea lest the claim effectively
cover the abstract idea itself. Cf., Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. Thus, the claims must
include meaningful limitations beyond the abstract idea itself.
SAP contends that Versata’s claims do not add anything beyond routine,
conventional activities to the unpatentable abstract concepts. Pet. 18. The abstract
nature of the claims is said to be confirmed by the fact that the claimed data
arrangements and pricing calculations can be performed manually. Id.
Versata contends that patent eligibility must be evaluated considering each
of the claim elements in combination, and that the challenged claims include
specific separate and distinct steps that are not general or abstract in any way. See,
e.g., PO Resp., 15. For example, Versata states that SAP has failed “to address the
storing, retrieving, sorting, eliminating and determining steps required by claim 17
and their interrelations with one another and with the arranging steps.” Id. at 16.
The parties’ experts disagree as to whether the appended steps are merely
routine, conventional steps or reflect meaningful limitations. Dr. Siegel, SAP’s
expert, testifies that besides the abstract ideas, the claims merely recite routine,
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conventional activities. Ex. 1005, ¶ 49.
19
In contrast, Dr. Liebich, Versata’s
expert, testifies that the SAP R/3 pricing technology available at the time of the
invention did not practice the combination of steps (storing, retrieving, sorting,
eliminating, and determining) recited in the claims. Ex. 2091, ¶ 62. Dr. Liebich
further testifies that he was not aware of any pricing technology in the marketplace
at that time that performed the combination of steps. Id.
Patent eligibility is distinct from the question of whether or not the claims
recite subject matter that was not in the marketplace at the time of the invention.
Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 (“[Section 101] does not involve the familiar issues of
novelty and obviousness that routinely arise under §§ 102 and 103.”).
20

We agree with SAP that Versata and Dr. Liebich fail to establish that the
additional “specific” steps that are appended to the abstract idea provide
meaningful limitations. The contention that the combination of the abstract idea
and the specific steps represents an improvement in marketplace technology does
not demonstrate that the additional steps are anything other than conventional,
routine steps that are a consequence of implementing the abstract idea.
Specifically, the Court in Flook held that a claim for an “improved” method is

19
Versata contends that Dr. Siegel failed to address the specific steps recited in
claim 17. PO Resp. 17. Dr. Siegel’s cross-examination testimony demonstrates
that he considered the specific steps in preparing his declaration. Ex. 2090, e.g.,
76:18 – 95:19. Additionally, nowhere does Versata identify specific, credible
evidence to demonstrate that Dr. Siegel believed the additional steps to be anything
other than conventional, routine steps that would commonly be used to implement
the abstract idea.
20
Additionally, although the issue is now withdrawn from consideration, the Board
determined that, more likely than not, Versata’s claims lack novelty over the prior
art R/3 2.2C product documentation, documentation that Dr. Liebich does not
address when concluding that the additional steps were not in “practice.” See, e.g.,
Decision 39; Ex. 2091, ¶ 62.
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unpatentable where, putting the abstract formula to the side, there was no
“inventive concept” in the claimed application of the formula. Flook, 437 U.S. at
594-595, n.18.
21
Accordingly, even if the abstract idea and “specific” steps
represent a marketplace improvement, the claims are not patent-eligible where the
appended steps lack meaningful limitations that prevent the claim as a whole from
covering the practical applications of the abstract idea.
Versata contends that there are many ways to practice the abstract concept of
determining a price through arranging customer and product data hierarchies that
fall outside the scope of the claims. PO Resp. 26-27. Yet, the fact that the claims
could be drafted differently does not demonstrate that the additional limitations are
meaningful. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 (“A competent draftsman could attach some
form of post-solution activity to almost any mathematical formula . . . .”), 593
(allowing determination of patent-eligibility to depend on draftsman’s art would
not serve the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for abstract
ideas).
We credit the testimony of Dr. Siegel over that of Dr. Liebich and find that
the additionally claimed steps of storing, retrieving, sorting, eliminating and
receiving are well-known, routine, and conventional steps. See, e.g., Ex. 1005,
¶¶ 44-49, Appendix C. This is consistent with Versata’s acknowledgment that the
claims “in fact cover the ‘capability’ to execute a pricing procedure using
hierarchical accesses to hierarchical arrangements of customer . . . and product . . .
data.” Versata Federal Circuit Appeal Brief, Ex. 1011, 11.

21
Versata’s allegation that the claimed invention represents an improvement in the
art is not consistent with the evidence of record. The challenged claims are not
commensurate with the alleged improvements. For example, while Versata
contends that its invention provides technological benefits for database tables and
queries, its claims do not require the use of a database. See Pet. Reply 5-6.
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We conclude that Versata’s claims do not add meaningful limitations
beyond the recited abstract idea and, in practical effect, preempt the abstract idea.

IV. Additional Matters
Versata filed a motion to seal Versata exhibit 2086, which is a unredacted
copy of Dr. Siegel’s deposition. Motion to Seal, Paper 55. Certain portions of Dr.
Siegel’s deposition include information designated “Confidential-Attorneys’ Eyes
Only Material” by SAP. We have reviewed exhibit 2086 and agree that good
cause exists to grant the motion. 37 C.F.R. § 42.14. Accordingly, Versata exhibit
2086 shall remain sealed in its entirety.
Versata requested that the Board stay the currently pending reexamination of
the ’350 patent. In light of our final written decision, we decline to stay the
reexamination.

V. Conclusion
This is a final written decision of the Board under 35 U.S.C. § 328(a). We
hold Versata’s claims 17, and 26-29 to be unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §101.
Specifically, the claims recite unpatentable abstract ideas and the claims do not
provide enough significant meaningful limitations to transform these abstract ideas
into patent-eligible applications of these abstractions.

VI. Order
In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:
ORDERED that claims 17 and 26-29 of the ’350 patent are CANCELLED
as unpatentable;
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FURTHER ORDERED that the Board’s determination on claim
construction is binding on the patent owner in the reexamination;
FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this decision is to be placed in the
reexamination file; and
FURTHER ORDERED that Versata exhibit 2086 shall remain sealed in its
entirety.

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PETITIONER:

Erika Arner
Finnegan, Henderson
Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP
SAP-PGR@finnegan.com

and

J. Steven Baughman
Ropes & Gray, LLP
Steven.baughman@ropesgray.com

PATENT OWNER:

Nancy Linck
Martin Zoltick
Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & Manbeck, PC
nlinck@rfem.com
mzoltick@rfem.com

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Claims Appendix

Versata ’350 claims 17, and 26-29 read as follows:

17. A method for determining a price of a product offered to a purchasing
organization comprising:
arranging a hierarchy of organizational groups comprising a plurality of
branches such that an organizational group below a higher organizational group in
each of the branches is a subset of the higher organizational group;
arranging a hierarchy of product groups comprising a plurality of branches
such that a product group below a higher product group in each of the branches in
a subset of the higher product group;
storing pricing information in a data source, wherein the pricing information
is associated, with (i) a pricing type, (ii) the organizational groups, and (iii) the
product groups;
retrieving applicable pricing information corresponding to the product, the
purchasing organization, each product group above the product group in each
branch of the hierarchy of product groups in which the product is a member, and
each organizational group above the purchasing organization in each branch of the
hierarchy of organizational groups in which the purchasing organization is a
member;
sorting the pricing information according to the pricing types, the product,
the purchasing organization, the hierarchy of product groups, and the hierarchy of
organizational groups;
eliminating any of the pricing information that is less restrictive; and
determining the product price using the sorted pricing information.

26. A computer readable storage media comprising: computer instructions to
implement the method of claim 17.

27. A computer implemented method for determining a price of a product
offered to a purchasing organization comprising:
retrieving from a data source pricing information that is (i) applicable to the
purchasing organization and (ii) from one or more identified organizational groups,
within a hierarchy of organizational groups, of which the purchasing organization
is a member;
retrieving from the data source pricing information that is (i) applicable to
the product and (ii) from one or more identified product groups, within a hierarchy
of product groups, of which the product is a member; and
Case CBM2012-00001
Patent 6,553,350

38
receiving the price of the product determined using pricing information
applicable to the one or more identified organizational groups and the one or more
identified product groups according to the hierarchy of product groups and the
hierarchy of organizational groups.

28. A computer readable storage media comprising: computer instructions to
implement the method of claim 27.

29. An apparatus for determining a price of a product offered to a purchasing
organization comprising:
a processor;
a memory coupled to the processor,
wherein the memory includes
computer program instructions capable of:
retrieving from a data source pricing information that is (i) applicable to the
purchasing organization and (ii) from one or more identified organizational groups,
within a hierarchy of organizational groups, of which the purchasing organization
is a member;
retrieving from the data source pricing information that is (i) applicable to
the product and (ii) from one or more identified product groups, within a hierarchy
of product groups, of which the product is a member; and
receiving the price of the product determined using pricing information
applicable to the one or more identified organizational groups and the one or more
identified product groups according to the hierarchy of product groups and the
hierarchy of organizational groups.