Santiago Burgos, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 15, 2005
01a50009 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 15, 2005)

01a50009

03-15-2005

Santiago Burgos, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southeast Area), Agency.


Santiago Burgos v. United States Postal Service

01A50009

March 15, 2005

.

Santiago Burgos,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Southeast Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A50009

Agency No. 1-H-328-0006-03

Hearing No. 150-2003-9674X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal

is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,

the Commission affirms the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Building Equipment Mechanic at

the agency's Orlando, Florida, Post Office facility, filed a formal EEO

complaint on January 15, 2003, alleging that the agency discriminated

against him on the basis of reprisal for prior EEO activity when

he was sent for a fitness for duty (FFD) examination on October 19,

2002, without an explanation. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant received a copy of the investigative report and requested

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a

decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination.

The AJ found that the agency had given complainant an explanation for

sending him to a FFD. Specifically, the AJ found that a Maintenance

Manager noted in the written request for complainant's FFD that

complainant was having problems completing his duties in a timely

manner having been away from his air-conditioned work station for over

50 minutes. He stated that complainant told him that he was resting

because the heat was getting to him. The AJ noted that complainant

was sent to the FFD to determine if he could perform the duties of his

position without being a hazard to himself or to others. The results

of the FFD were that complainant could not perform the duties without

hazard to himself or others. The AJ concluded that the agency provided

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for making complainant take

the FFD and that the agency's action was not motivated by retaliation.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ was biased against him.

Specifically, complainant stated that the agency was not prepared on the

day of the pre-trial hearing and was allowed to have additional time

to prepare its case. Further, at the pre-trial hearing, he asserted

that the AJ questioned his health, cut him and his representative off

in mid-sentence and addressed only the evidence that was submitted by

the agency. Complainant requests that the AJ recuse herself from his

complaint. The agency makes no contentions.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without

a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of

material fact in dispute. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is

patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held

that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that,

given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the

case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather

to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249.

The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary

judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the

non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine"

if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in

favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323

(1986); Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corporation, 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st

Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect

the outcome of a case. Only disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude entry

of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary

will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If a case can only be

resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, the issuance of a decision is

not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ

may properly issue a decision without a hearing only upon a determination

that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition

The record reveals that the Manager of the Maintenance Operations wrote

a memorandum to complainant's supervisor which stated that, on July

26, 2002, the Genie boom that complainant was supposed to be using to

install electrical outlets was sitting unattended. He stated that he saw

complainant's co-worker and then the complainant exit from the equipment

room. He stated that he asked the co-worker how long complainant had

been in the equipment room and he said that he was not sure but that

he had to remove a short length of conduit which was leaning against

the hallway door which may have been to alert anyone sleeping in the

equipment room of someone entering.

Complainant wrote a letter to the Department Manager stating that his

supervisor accused him of sleeping in the equipment room because of

his co-worker's lies. Complainant stated that he was sitting in the

equipment room because he was trying to catch his breath from the extreme

heat they had been experiencing and later noted that he was more than

55 and � years old.

Thereafter on August 13, 2002, the Manager, Maintenance Operations

requested that complainant take a FFD medical examination. The record

reveals that the FFD was approved by the Plant Manager.

The record reveals that complainant was examined by a physician for

his FFD examination. The report found that complainant was unfit for

duty unless he met three conditions. Complainant would need to provide

proof that he was not at risk of a heart attack. If complainant was at

risk of a heart attack, he needed clearance that he could handle the

stress of his duties. Finally, he needed to provide proof that he was

receiving psychiatric counseling. The record reveals that complainant

was cleared to return to work after two months. The supervisor stated

that he had not sent other employees to FFD because of health problems

with the heat because there were no other employees who had complained

about their health because of the heat.

With respect to complainant's claim of retaliation, complainant can

establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference

of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin., EEOC Request

No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal claim, and in

accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas, Hochstadt

v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318, 324

(D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976), and Coffman v. Department

of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473 (November 20, 1997), a

complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that:

(1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware

of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he or she was subjected

to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the

protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Department

of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 25, 2000).

The agency conceded to the investigator that complainant had filed EEO

complaints against his current supervisor. Assuming, arguendo, that

complainant has established a prima facie case of reprisal, we find that

the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for sending

complainant for a FFD. Specifically, the agency stated that complainant

had stated that he could not perform his duties since he needed to

rest because of the heat. Further, the agency stated that complainant

attributed his age to his inability to work. Complainant failed to

rebut the agency's explanation. Further, there is no evidence in the

record to support the conclusion that the legitimate reason proffered

by the agency was a pretext for reprisal.

With respect to complainant's contention that the AJ was biased toward

the agency, it does not, of necessity, follow that the AJ was biased

against complainant because the agency was allowed more time to prepare

their case, the AJ questioned the complainant regarding his health, cut

him and his representative off in mid-sentence, and addressed only the

evidence that was submitted by the agency. In fact, the investigative

report reveals that complainant was provided the chance to provide

evidence but declined to provide an affidavit. Complainant has made

no showing that the AJ would not consider his evidence. Neither the

evidence of record nor complainant's arguments produce a substantial

showing of personal bias. See Roberts v. Morton, 549 F.2d 158, 164

(10th Cir. 1977) (substantial showing of personal bias required to

obtain ruling that hearing was unfair). We are unpersuaded that the

AJ's conduct demonstrated bias against complainant.

Consequently, after a careful review of the record, the Commission finds

that the issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate, as no

genuine dispute of material fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision

properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws. Further, construing the evidence to

be most favorable to complainant, we find that complainant failed to

present evidence that any of the agency's actions were motivated by

reprisal for his prior protected activity. The agency's final order is

hereby AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 15, 2005

______________________________ _________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director Date

Office of Federal Operations