Sans Souci RestaurantDownload PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsApr 3, 1978235 N.L.R.B. 604 (N.L.R.B. 1978) Copy Citation DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 726 Seventeenth Inc., t/a Sans Souci Restaurant and Local 25, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 5-CA-8604 and 5-CA-8656 April 3, 1978 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND TRUESDALE On November 25, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Michael O. Miller issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, the General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Charging Party filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings,2 and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. 3 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, 726 Seventeenth Inc., t/a San Souci Restaurant, Washington, D.C., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. Respondent has requested oral argument. This request is hereby denied as the record, the exceptions, and the briefs adequately present the issues and positions of the parties. 2 Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibili- ty unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 3 We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that a bargaining order is warranted here to remedy the unfair labor practices committed by Respondent. However, in accordance with our decision in Trading Port, Inc., 219 NLRB 298 (1975). our remedy will require Respondent to bargain with the Union as of April 27, 1977, the date the Union made its initial 235 NLRB No. 89 demand for recognition. See also Drug Package Company, Inc., 228 NLRB 108 (1977). Without passing on the rationale underlying the decision in Trading Port, supra, Member Truesdale would order Respondent to bargain as of April 27, 1977, the date or. which the Union, with a card majority, initially requested recognition from Respondent which was refused. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MICHAEL O. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge: Upon charges filed on May 6 and 31, 1977, by Local 25, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, AFL-CIO (herein the Union), a complaint issued by the Regional Director for Region 5 of the National Labor Relations Board (herein the Board) on June 27, and thereafter amended and consolidated on July 18, and at hearing, and timely filed answers by 726 Seventeenth Inc., t/a Sans Souci Restau- rant (herein Respondent),' a hearing was held on August 31 and September 1, 1977, in Washington, D.C. At issue was whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by interrogating and threatening employees concerning their union activities, by discharging Charles LeMorzellec and Antonio Machado, and by reducing the wages of William Nolan. Further at issue was whether Respondent, by the foregoing conduct and its refusal to bargain collectively with the Union, rendered a free election impossible and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Respondent denied the commission of any unfair labor practices and maintained that a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit had not knowingly designated the Union as collective-bargaining representa- tive. In the alternative, it contended that the unfair labor practices, if any, were not sufficiently serious to warrant the issuance of a bargaining order. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally. Briefs, which have been carefully considered, were filed by all parties. Upon the entire record, including my careful observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS AND THE UNION'S LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS-PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Respondent, a District of Columbia corporation, is engaged in the operation of a restaurant in Washington, D.C. Jurisdiction is not in issue. I find and conclude that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The name of the Respondent appears as amended at hearing. 604 SANS SOUCI RESTAURANT I find and conclude that the Union is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Bernard Gorland is Respondent's president and, for 14 years, has been responsible for its day-to-day operation. His maitre d', a statutory supervisor, is Paul DeLisle. At the time at issue, Respondent had 30 employees, 27 of whom were the dining room and kitchen employees the Union sought to represent. Union organizational activities among Respondent's employees began in April 1977.2 Employees Charles Le Morzellec, a waiter, and William Nolan, a handyman, lead the activity, passing out union authorization cards. By April 18, they had secured signed cards from 18 of the 27 unit employees. Both Le Morzellec and Nolan spoke to DeLisle about the Union; Le Morzellec told Delisle that he favored the Union and the benefits he believed he could derive from it. Nolan, who was questioned by DeLisle about the Union, professed ignorance.3 B. The Response to the Union Activity Gorland learned of the union activity on April 21. He held a meeting with the dining room employees, after work, on Saturday night, April 23. This was the first such meeting held in Gorland's 14 years at Sans Souci. Gorland told the assembled waiters and busboys that anyone could speak, without fear of reprisals. He expressed his dislike for the Union, commenting that it was "like a cancer," which he did not need at his age. He spoke of the money the dining room employees were able to make. According to the credibly offered testimony of Le Morzellec, Gorland told the employees that "he didn't want a union and if the union were to come then possibly we might have extra waiters .... It was straight and clear that there would be extra waiters if we had a union." 4 Gorland asked the employees what they hoped to gain from unionization. LeMorzellec and Antonio Machado, another waiter, were the only ones to respond. They referred to dental insurance and other benefits, such as split shifts. Respondent's dining room employees derive the greatest portion of their earnings from gratuities which are pooled and divided among those employees. An increase in the number of employees sharing in that pool would, of course, decrease each individual share. Thus, Gorland's statement that he would hire additional waiters in the event of unionization, was a threat of reduced income, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.5 General Counsel's complaint alleges that at this meeting Gorland disparaged the employees because of their union membership and support, in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Other than Gorland's reference to the union as a "cancer," 2 All dates hereinafter are 1977 unless otherwise specified. 3 The complaint does not allege this questioning to be unlawful interrogation. DeLisle did not testify. 4 Gorland admitted that he told the employees that they were making more money than similar employees in other area restaurants in part because the restaurant did not use captains or extra busboys. He told them. he said, that he could have used captains or more busboys or loaded the there is no evidence of what might be deemed disparage- ment. Gorland's "cancer" statement, while indicative of union animus, was his lawfully held and expressed opinion; it did not rise to the level of a violation of the Act and I recommend that this allegation be dismissed. On that same Saturday, Gorland had called William Nolan into his office and asked him what was going on. Nolan said he did not know. Gorland then asked him whether he liked his job and pressed him for what he knew about the Union. Nolan professed ignorance. Gorland and Nolan argued about Nolan's failure to tell Gorland about the union activity and Gorland accused Nolan of having "stuck a knife in his back." On April 25, prompted basically by the union situation, Gorland called each employee into his office in the kitchen, where he spoke to them individually. He testified: I asked them to do me a favor if they did not like to work for the Sans Souci and quit. It was a free country. They could do anything they wanted to and if they did not like working there, they could leave. LeMorzellec testified credibly and without contradiction that when called into Gorland's office Gorland referred to him as a union man and told him that it might be better for him to look for another job. Waiter Alain Wampouille was told that, if he did not like the way Gorland was running things, he might as well give Gorland 2 weeks' notice and find another job. Employee Jackie Gorrisen was asked if he knew about the union cards and whether he had signed one. Similarly, Ronald Nash was asked whether he knew of something going on concerning the Union; he admitted that he did. William Nolan was again called into Gorland's office and told, without explanation, that his workweek and pay would be cut back from the 6-day-per-week basis on which he had been working for many years to a 5-day- per-week schedule. General Counsel contended that, by the foregoing conversations, Respondent unlawfully interrogated its em- ployees. I agree. As the Board stated, in P.B. and S. Chemical Co., 224 NLRB 1, 2 (1976): [T]he basic premise in situations involving the ques- tioning of employees by their employer about union activities is that such questions are inherently coercive by their very nature. In the instant case, there were no circumstances present which might have justified some limited inquiry into the union activities; rather, the circumstances were heavy with animus. Employees were questioned in locus of authority, by Respondent's president, and antiunion statements were made. The employees were not told of any justification for the questioning or given any assurances of their freedom from reprisal should they choose to answer or to refrain from answering Respondent's questions. Cf. Johnnie's floor with waiters, but had not done so. This, he explained to them, was "a fact of ife." Noting Gorland's admissions and the comparative demeanors of these witnesses, I find LeMorzellec's recollection of this statement to be the more accurate. 5 The statement, as related by Gorland. that he could take such action, but had not done so in the past, was still an implied threat, hardly less coercive as he descnbed it than as LeMorzellec related it. 605 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Poultry Co. and John Bishop Poultry Co., Successor, 146 NLRB 770 (1964), enforcement denied 344 F.2d 617 (C.A. 8, 1965). See also Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 633 (Bulk Haulers, Inc.), 509 F.2d 490 (C.A.D.C., 1974). I further agree with General Counsel's contention that Gorland's suggestion that the employees who favored the Union seek employment elsewhere constituted an implied threat of discharge. Little else can be inferred from such a suggestion. See Rabco Metal Products, Inc., 221 NLRB 1230, 1233 (1975). Moreover, these statements, and Gor- land's "knife in the back" remark to Nolan, convey to the employees a message that the employer equates employee union activity, protected by statute, with employee disaf- fection and disloyalty. The Board has held that such statements tend to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of those statutory rights, and violate Section 8(a)(1). Oscar Enterprises, Inc., 214 NLRB 823 (1974).6 On April 26, Gorland instructed DeLisle to poll the employees to determine the Union's strength and learn whether his earlier activities had brought some of them to his side. DeLisle instructed employees to write on a slip of paper whether they wanted the Union or not, and to deposit those slips in a bowl. Few, if any, of the employees complied with the request. LeMorzellec told DeLisle that he did not intend to comply. Later that same evening, Gorland called LeMorzellec into his office and told him that if, by 11 p.m., he did not have their ballots both LeMorzellec and Tony (Antonio Machado) would be working 3 days per week. Respondent's attempt to further determine its employees' union sympathies, or to force an expression of antiunion sympathies, through this poll, following so closely on its other coercive conduct, together with the threat of a reduced workweek in order to compel participation in the poll, clearly had a tendency to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. This conduct, I find, violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. At the end of his shift on April 26, LeMorzellec asked DeLisle what schedule he would be working on the following day. DeLisle referred him to Gorland. Gorland told him that he was discharged. Shortly thereafter, Gorland came back to LeMorzellec and told him "that there was no use to look for any job in town, that no matter where I would go, he would call them and tell them that I was a union man." At about the same time, Gorland also discharged Machado. Gorland testified that he discharged LeMorzellec and Machado, not because of their union activities, but because they had failed to comply with a request he had made of them to provide him with a list of the benefits being offered by the Union. He sought the list, he said, so that he could either accept or reject the requests, and he discharged them because they had ignored him. Whether Respondent discharged LeMorzellec and Ma- chado for refusing his request for information regarding the Union's promised benefits or, more generally, for their 6 This issue, I find, was fairly encompassed within the complaint allegations and, in any event, was fully litigated. I In reaching this credibility resolution, I have considered Gorland's admission of conduct clearly violative of the Act, Brown's admission that union activities, as the timing, animus, LeMorzellec's leadership role in the organizational activities, and Gor- land's postdischarge statement to LeMorzellec would indicate, those discharges violated Section 8(af3) of the Act. Employees are protected both in their union activity and in their refusal to circumvent the Union and bargain directly with their employer. I further find that Gorland's threat to blacklist LeMorzellec with other area restaurants violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On the following evening, April 27, on the suggestion of a prominent labor lawyer who, fortuitously, was dining at Sans Souci, Gorland called both LeMorzellec and Macha- do. He offered them immediate reinstatement and ac- knowledged to them that he had been told that their discharges were unfair labor practices. They returned to work on the next day. Gorland testified that the employees were told that they would be paid for the day they lost; they had not, at the time of this hearing, received those lost earnings. About 11 p.m., on April 27, Ronald Richardson, execu- tive secretary-treasurer of the Union, and Robert Ades, counsel to the Union, went to the restaurant and met with Gorland. At that time, they had 17 signed authorization cards and offered them to Gorland. He did not look at them. They requested that he sign an agreement for a card check and recognition, which he refused. Gorland told them that his attorney, retained earlier that day, had advised him that he should request an election under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Board. The union representatives rejected this request, informing Gorland that, in their opinion, his unlawful conduct precluded the holding of a free and fair election. They threatened to strike on the following day unless Gorland agreed to recognize the Union. Richardson telephoned Gorland's attorney and then he and Ades left the restaurant. Richardson returned to Sans Souci on the following morning, April 28. He offered Gorland another opportuni- ty to sign the recognition agreement. When Gorland refused, he pulled the employees out on strike. At the outset of the strike, there was boisterous conduct by the pickets, chanting, verbal encouragement of potential customers to honor the picket line, and verbal abuse of some of those who chose to cross the line. There was also press coverage of the strike. On the first day, at the suggestion of a member of the press, the parties agreed to an immediate election, to be conducted by a reporter. On advice of counsel, Gorland subsequently refused to partici- pate and insisted on an National Labor Relation Boare election. One of those striking employees whom Gorland de- scribed as making the most offensive remarks to the restaurant's clientele, including predictions of adverse effects on their health if they ate there, was James Brown. Brown admitted chanting and calling customers scabs, but denied telling them that the food would make them sick or that he hoped it would. I credit Gorland. 7 Gorland spoke to Brown several times while on the picket line. Some of shouting at customers was the purpose of the picket line, Brown's omission of any reference to the picket line incidents from the affidavit he gave the Board in May, and their comparative demeanors. 606 SANS SOUCI RESTAURANT these conversations were obvious bantering; others might be considered more serious. On one occasion, Gorland told Brown, "[I If I were 25 years younger, I would close his ugly fat mouth." Brown related a similar remark, made subse- quently. According to Brown, he asked Gorland whether it was because of his picketing that Gorland made this statement and Gorland told him, "No," that it was because of Brown's "big mouth." In the context of the picket line, the remarks being made there, their disturbing effect on Gorland and his clientele, and the tentative nature of the alleged threat- "If I were 25 years younger," a proposition impossible of fulfill- ment-I do not deem Gorland's statement to have been a real threat or one that an employee would reasonably have perceived as such. Accordingly, I recommend that the allegation that these statements by Gorland violated Section 8(a)(1) be dismissed. During the strike, Respondent prepared a letter which Gorland distributed to the employees. He believed that all employees received it; however, he did not personally give it to each of them. The record reflects that not all of the employees actually received it. The letter was only in English, although many of the employees were not literate in that language. In that letter, Gorland stated, inter alia: When I found out about the (union) campaign, I expressed my strong objection to the Union. The Union now claims that I have committed unfair labor prac- tices. I cannot comment on that except to say I have no intention of doing anything wrong. However, I do want to tell you my strong feeling that you do have the right to engage or not to engage in Union activity if you chose. I will not threaten you if you engage in Union activity. I will not interrogate you about your Union activity or interest in the Union. I will not discriminate against any of you because of your Union activity; and I will not in any manner interfere or coerce you in the exercise of your rights under the law. This is my firm commitment. The letter discussed the picket line and the Union's refusal to agree to a National Labor Relations Board conducted election. It stated: "Why are they afraid to let you vote? It would rather try to force us to bargain with it by having you go out on strike. Do you want to destroy the Sans Souci?" It discussed an employer's right to continue operations with replacements, which it stated it was reluctant to do, and questioned what the employees would live on during the strike. It solicited the employees to ask the Union to take down the picket signs and agree to a National Labor Relations Board election. The employees returned to work shortly thereafter. The Union, however, has continued to maintain a picket line at the restaurant. William Nolan was Respondent's most senior employee, having begun at the Sans Souci in 1962. He was hourly paid and, each week since 1971, had received an additional $10, in cash, from the bookkeeper. He signed a petty cash slip for this money each week. Since returning to work from the strike he has received his regular wages, but has not received this weekly $10 payment. Gorland, who testified that the $10 per week that Nolan had received came from his pocket rather than from petty cash, admitted that he ceased giving Nolan this money since Nolan returned from the strike. He did so, he testified, "Not necessarily because he went out on strike," but because they had had a very close relationship- like father and son he described it- and Gorland believed that "as good as I had been to him" he "should. .. have had the decency to come to me and let me know what was happening." Respondent's brief concedes that the payment was terminated because Gorland felt that their special relationship was gone and that Nolan had been disloyal to him. Gorland further testified that he had frequently given gifts to Nolan, including clothing and cigarettes, and had underwritten some of his medical expenses. Respondent contends that, like the clothing and cigarettes, the weekly $10 payment was a gift, and not part of Nolan's wages. It therefore contends that termination of that weekly pay- ment did not violate the Act. I must reject Respondent's contention and, in agreement with the assertion of the General Counsel, find this change in Nolan's remuneration to be unlawful. It is clear that this payment, uniformly and regularly paid, unrelated to the financial condition of the employer or to any special need by or favors performed by the employee, became part of the employee's wage struc- ture. See Gas Machinery Company, 221 NLRB 862 (1975); N. LR.B. v. Wonder State Manufacturing Company, 344 F.2d 210 (C.A. 8, 1965). It is equally clear that reduction of an employee's wages because of his union activity, or because the employer deemed him disloyal for failing to report that union activity, discourages such union activity. It thus violates Section 8(aX3), as discrimination in a term or condition of employment. On the evening of August 15, Gorland spoke with LeMorzellec as LeMorzellec was leaving work. It had been a poor day, from the standpoint of the tips earned, and Gorland asked LeMorzellec what he had made. He told LeMorzellec that he was not threatening or intimidating him and pointed out that "this whole situation could go on for months and months before it was settled...." Gorland said that both the restaurant and the waiters were being hurt and asked whether the waiters had as much money to live on as he had to remain open. He told LeMorzellec that "[h ]e had no intention of signing with the union," and asked what they expected to gain by maintain- ing the picket line. He suggested that it would be best if they could get together and get rid of it. The foregoing testimony by LeMorzellec is uncontradicted. General Counsel alleged that by the foregoing conduct Respondent threatened employees with reduction of in- come and loss of employment unless the picketing ended and the dispute was resolved. I do not see such threats in Gorland's remarks. However, his statement that he had no intention of signing with the Union tended to impress on employees the futility of their continued support for the Union. Such a statement interferes with employee exercise of their statutory rights. Red Barn System, Inc., 224 NLRB 1586 (1976); American Medical Insurance Company, Inc., 224 NLRB 1321 (1976). As this incident was fully litigated and was clearly related to the allegations of the complaint, 607 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by this conduct. C. The Refusal To Bargain I. The unit The following unit, as stipulated by the parties, is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining: All employees of the Sans Souci Restaurant at its Washington, D.C. location, excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. As of April 27, there were 27 employees in this unit. 2. Demand and refusal The record is clear that on April 27, and again on April 28, the Union demanded recognition and bargaining. It is equally clear that Respondent rejected that demand and insisted upon a National Labor Relations Board election. 3. The Union's majority status When Richardson presented the Union's demand to Gorland, he possessed 17 signed authorization cards. 8 The cards were clear and unambiguous designations of the Union as collective-bargaining agent. Respondent, however, contended that some of the cards were not valid because they were printed in English only; four of the employees (Carrero, Zapata, Mendez, and Zorro) were not sufficiently fluent in English to testify without the aid of a Spanish-speaking interpreter; and, therefore, the employ- ees could not have known the purpose of the cards which they signed. The use of single language authorization cards was compared to the Board's practices requiring bilingual notices and ballots where necessary in Board-conducted elections. The comparison of the election situation to the reliance on authorization cards does not require rejection of English language cards signed by foreign language speaking em- ployees. There is a presumption that a person will not sign something he does not understand. There is no presump- tion that an employee will read and understand a notice or even a ballot. Moreover, the cards are frequently, as here, distributed by fellow employees who can explain their meaning. A further distinguishing factor is that the election situation is totally within the Board's control. The card signing situation is not. In the instant case, the Spanish-speaking employees were further aided in their understanding of the cards by a pamphlet, in both English and Spanish, which was given out with each card. That pamphlet made clear the purposes to which the card may be put. I Richardson so testified credibly. Respondent sought to establish the possibility that two cards, those of Varre and Mendez, were signed subsequent to the demand. Both employees testified to their belief that they signed prior to the start of the strike. If they did so, the timing of events herein would establish that they were signed before the demand. Consider- ing their testimony in conjunction with Richardson's, and with the timing of the organizational activity, I find that these cards were timely signed. As to these specific employees, I must conclude that there was no evidence that they were misled as to the purposes of the cards or that they did not have an opportunity to understand the nature of what they signed. Thus, in addition to their receipt of the pamphlets, I note that Zorro read the card, that Zapata was fluent enough in English to respond to some questions and to fill out virtually the entire card, and that all four employees were told and understood that the purpose of the card was to secure additional benefits. While such an explanation is an oversimplification, additional benefits is what unionism is about. Finally, Respondent contended that Varre's card was invalid because Nolan told him that everyone in the restaurant had to sign a card. However, he read the card and understood that it was "for the union." Nash was told that he was signing the card to see if there were enough employees to see if they "could do a little something about it." Nash, an English-speaking employee, received and read the brochure and was told about seeking increased bene- fits. Campbell, who was also English-speaking, testified that he was told to fill out the card if he was interested in talking to a union representative. He read the card and discussed it with other members of his family before signing it. Nothing which was told any of these employees rendered the cards they signed invalid. See Toltec Metals, Inc., 201 NLRB 952 (1973). Based on the foregoing, I conclude that at the time of the demand, the Union possessed 17 valid union authorization cards, a clear majority of the unit employees. N.LR.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Cumberland Shoe, 144 NLRB 1268 (1963). 4. Whether a bargaining order is warranted I have found that Respondent violated the Act by threats of discharge, blacklisting, reduced earnings and shortened workweeks, interrogations, an attempted poll, statements equating union activity and support with disloyalty, and other statements indicating that selection of a union representative would be futile. I have further found that Respondent discriminatorily discharged two employees and reduced the wages of a third. The question is whether such conduct must be remedied by mandating a bargaining order. The Supreme Court stated in N.LR.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969): [We ] approve the Board's use of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election processes. The Board's authority to issue such-an order on a lesser showing of employer misconduct is appro- priate . . . where there is also a showing that at one point the union had a majority; in such a case, of course, effectuating ascertainable employee free choice Respondent further pointed out that someone, other than the signatories, dated the cards of Varre and Mendez. While the better practice, of course, is for a signatory to date his own document, it is not uncommon for people to forget to perform such ministerial tasks. Where, as here, other evidence establishes the timely signing of the card, the fact that someone else dated that card does not render it invalid. 608 SANS SOUCI RESTAURANT becomes as important a goal as deterring employer misbehavior. .... If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election . . . by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should issue. Applying these standards to Respondent's conduct, I must conclude that the possibility of insuring a fair election is, at best, slight. See E. S. Merriman & Sons, 219 NLRB 972 (1975), where, as here, there was interrogation, threats, polling of employees, and discriminatory terminations. See also Gibson Products Company, 185 NLRB 362 (1970). In reaching this conclusion, I have considered Respondent's reinstatement of LeMorzellec and Machado and its at- tempted recantation of the unfair practices. However, I deem these to have insufficiently cleared the air so as to permit a free and fair election. Neither LeMorzellec nor Machado were paid for the day which they lost; that loss was not insubstantial and cannot help but have a lingering effect on the employees. The letter distributed by Gorland only imperfectly assured the employees of their rights; it presented its assurances in the context of continuing opposition to the Union and projections of adverse consequences to the employees if the strike in progress were to continue. Moreover, the letter was in English only and did not reach all employees. In this regard, Respon- dent here did less than the employer in E. S. Merriman, supra, who posted a National Labor Relations Board preelection notice, advising employees of their statutory rights, and personally advised employees of their statutory rights. The Board, in that case, held that those efforts did not neutralize the effect of the unfair labor practices. Finally, unlike the employer in E. S. Merriman, supra, Respondent did not cease its unfair labor practices with the publication of its attempted recantation. Almost immedi- ately thereafter, when the employees returned to work, William Nolan, Respondent's most senior employee, suf- fered a discriminatory reduction in his wages, for his "disloyalty," a discrimination which continued at least until the date of the hearing. Such an action speaks more clearly of the employer's attitude toward his employees' exercise of statutory rights than any printed or verbal assurances. So too does the statement made to LeMorzel- lec, as late as August 15, that Gorland had no intention of signing with the Union. Therefore, based upon all of the foregoing, I find that a bargaining order is warranted as the possibility of a free and fair election being conducted with the application of less stringent remedies is slight, and that Respondent has, by the foregoing conduct, violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. All employees of the Sans Souci Restaurant at its Washington, D.C., location, excluding office clerical em- ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 2. At all times relevant herein, the Union has been and is now the exclusive representative of the employees in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 3. By interrogating and attempting to poll employees concerning their union activities; by threatening employees with reduced earnings, shortened workweeks, and dis- charge; by threatening employees with interference with their efforts to seek employment elsewhere; by telling employees that Respondent considered them disloyal because of their support for the Union; and by telling employees that their support of the Union would be futile, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced said employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By discharging Charles LeMorzellec and Antonio Machado, and by reducing the wages of William Nolan, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 5. By refusing to bargain with the Union on and after April 23, 1977 (the date on which it embarked on its course of unlawful conduct), Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices not specifically found herein. 7. The unfair labor practices enumerated above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY As Respondent has been found to have engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent discriminatorily dis- charged Charles LeMorzellec and Antonio Machado and subsequently reinstated them, but without backpay, I shall recommend that Respondent be required to make them whole for any loss of earnings, including gratuities, they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. And, having found that Respondent discriminatorily reduced the wages of William Nolan, I shall recommend that it be required to reinstate the supplementary payment he had received each week and to make him whole for any loss of earnings he suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. The backpay provided herein shall be comput- ed, with interest, in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). 9 Having found that Respondent has been obligated since April 23, 1977, to bargain with the Union, I shall recom- mend that it be required to recognize and bargain with the Union, upon request. I See, generally, Isis Plumbing d Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). 609 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent's unlawful activities, including discriminato- ry discharges and wage reductions, make appropriate an order requiring Respondent to cease and desist from in any manner impinging upon the statutory rights of employees. N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532 (C.A. 4, 1941); Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc., 220 NLRB 982 (1975). The Charging Party, contending that Respondent's de- fense was frivolous, sought litigation expenses and attor- neys' fees. While I have found for the General Counsel on most of the complaint's allegations, I cannot consider Respondent's defense frivolous. Accordingly, I must reject this request. Hecks, Inc., 215 NLRB 765 (1974). Neither do I deem the other extraordinary remedies requested, includ- ing mailing of the notice to the homes of the presently employed employees, and reading of the notice by Gor- land, to be warranted herein. Finally, Respondent will be ordered to post notices indicating compliance with the requirements of this Order. It will be left for the compliance stage of this proceeding to determine in what languages these notices must be pub- lished so that all employees will be fully apprised of their statutory rights. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER '0 The Respondent, 726 Seventeenth Inc., t/a Sans Souci Restaurant, Washington, D.C., its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating or attempting to poll its employees concerning their union activities, sympathies, or support. (b) Threatening employees with discharge, reduced earn- ings, shortened workweeks, or interference with their efforts to seek employment elsewhere, because of their union activities. (c) Telling employees that it considered support for the Union to be disloyalty to the employer. (d) Telling employees that support for the Union would be futile. (e) Discriminating against employees because of their union activities by discharging them or by reducing their wages. (f) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local 25, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, AFL-CIO. (g) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Reinstitute the weekly supplementary payment to William Nolan and make William Nolan, Charles LeMor- zellec, and Antonia Machado whole for the loss of earnings they suffered by reason of the discrimination against them, with interest, in the manner described in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Upon request, recognize and bargain with Local 25, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit described above, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a written, signed agreement. (c) Post at its place of business in Washington, D.C., copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being duly signed by Respon- dent's representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are custom- arily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security records, timecards, person- nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to determine the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) No'tify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. '0 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. IL In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Act gives all employees these rights: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help unions To bargain collectively through a representa- tive of their choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any or all of these things. WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with, restrains, or coerces employees with respect to these rights. WE WILL NOT question or poll our employees concerning their union membership, activities, or sup- port. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with discharge, reduced earnings or reduced workweeks, or interfer- ence with their efforts to secure other employment, because of their union activities. 610 SANS SOUCI RESTAURANT WE WILL NOT tell our employees that we believe that they are disloyal to us if they engage in union activities or support the Union. WE WILL NOT tell our employees that engaging in union activities would be futile because we would never sign a contract with the Union. WE WILL NOT discriminate against our employees because of their union activities or support by discharg- ing them or by reducing their wages. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL reinstitute the weekly supplement to Wil- liam Nolan's pay and WE WILL make William Nolan, Charles LeMorzellec, and Antonio Machado whole for any loss of earning the may have suffered because of the discrimination against them. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Local 25, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, AFL- CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a written, signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All employees of the Sans Souci Restaurant, in Washington, D.C., excluding office clerical em- ployees, guards, and supervisors, as defined in the Act. 726 SEVENTEENTH INC., T/A SANS SOUCI RESTAURANT 611 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation