Sangtae Ahn et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 27, 20202018006817 (P.T.A.B. May. 27, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/847,643 09/08/2015 Sangtae Ahn 281758-2 7381 61604 7590 05/27/2020 GE Healthcare, IP Department 9900 W. Innovation Drive Mail Code RP2131 Wauwatosa, WI 53226 EXAMINER LEE, SHUN K ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2884 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/27/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): GEHealthcare@anaqua.com HCTechnologies@ge.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte SANGTAE AHN, et al. _________ Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 Technology Center 2800 ____________ Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, N. WHITNEY WILSON, and BRIAN D. RANGE, Administrative Patent Judges. HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–12 and 23–26. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. The Appellant identifies General Electric Company as the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 3). Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claimed subject matter relates to “tomographic imaging for medical applications” (Appeal Br. 5). Claim 1, reproduced below (with emphases on certain disputed limitations) is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for enhanced imaging of a subject of interest using a hybrid positron emission tomography (PET)/magnetic resonance (MR) imaging system, the hybrid PET/MR imaging system comprising a first imaging device for producing emission projection data corresponding to the subject of interest, a second imaging device for providing second source scan data corresponding to the subject of interest, said second imaging device different from said first imaging device, and a computer coupled to the first and second imaging devices, the computer comprising a processor and a memory in communication with the processor, the method comprising: programming the processor with program instructions to perform functions as follows receiving emission projection data from the first imaging device and second source scan data from the second imaging device: reconstructing second source images based on the second source scan data; generating a prior map based on the second source images: generating a prior weight map, comprising: generating a confidence map based on the second source images; and generating a prior weight map that is spatially varying based on the confidence map; constructing a penalty function that Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 3 calculates voxel-wise differences between the prior map and a given image; transforms each voxel-wise difference by using a potential function; and calculates a weighted sum of the transformed voxel- wise differences where weights for the weighted sum are based on the prior weight map; reconstructing an emission image and an attenuation map, comprising: iteratively updating the emission image based on the attenuation map and the emission projection data; iteratively updating the attenuation map based on the emission image and the emission projection data by using the penalty function; obtaining a final attenuation map; and generating a final emission image. Independent Claim 23 is directed to a similar method that incorporates the disputed limitations of claim 1, above.2 2 The Appeal Brief original Claims Appendix filed 2/09/2018 contains an incorrect version of the claims on Appeal, which was corrected in the Response to Notification of Non-Compliant Brief filed 2/23/2018. Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 4 REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Schweizer et al. (“Schweizer”) US 2011/0158497 A1 June 30, 2011 Zhang et al. (“Zhang”) US 2012/0070057 A1 Mar. 22, 2012 Keereman et al. (“Keereman”) US 2012/0076378 A1 Mar. 29, 2012 John Nuyts et al., Simultaneous Maximum A Posteriori Reconstruction of Attenuation and Activity Distributions from Emission Sonograms, IEEE Transactions on Medical Imaging, Vol. 18, No. 5 (May 1999), pp. 393–403 (“Nuytz”). REJECTIONS Claims 1–12 and 23–26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to judicially-excepted subject matter without significantly more. Claims 1–4, 6–11, and 23–26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schweizer in view of Nuyts. Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schweizer, Nuyts, and Keereman. Claim 12 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schweizer, Nuyts, and Zhang. Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 5 OPINION The rejection of claims 1–12, 23–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for claiming patent-ineligible subject matter. PRINCIPLES OF LAW A. Section 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 6 mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 7 abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. Pursuant to applicable statute and precedential decisions and consistent with the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and 3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df). Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 8 (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. 101 ANALYSIS Appellant argued all the claims as a group (Appeal Br. 10–13). We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and the remaining claims 2–12 and 23–26 de facto stand or fall with claim 1 (noting independent claim 23 is not separately argued from claim 1). Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). 4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 9 The 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019), hereinafter “2019 Revised Guidance,” supersedes the earlier guidance that was in effect at the time the Appeal Brief was filed. Id. at 51 (“Eligibility–related guidance issued prior to the Ninth Edition, R– 08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should not be relied upon.”). Accordingly, our analysis will not address the sufficiency of the Examiner’s rejection against the Office’s previous guidance. Rather, our analysis will comport with statute and precedential decisions and will follow the analytical structure set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance. Claim 1 covers a “method” and is thus statutory subject matter for which a patent may be obtained.5 This is not in dispute. As discussed earlier, § 101, however, “contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). In that regard, notwithstanding that claim 1 covers statutory subject matter, the Examiner has raised a question of patent eligibility on the ground that claim 1 (as well as the similar method claim 23) is directed to an abstract idea. 5 This discussion corresponds to Step 1 of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance which requires determining whether a “claim is to a statutory category.” 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53; see also id. at 53–54 (“consider[] whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. 101”). Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 10 Alice step one – the “directed to” inquiry According to Alice step one, “[w]e must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). The Revised Guidance lays out three types of abstract ideas: mathematical concepts, methods of organizing human activity, and mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. See also Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims to a ‘‘process of organizing information through mathematical correlations’’ are directed to an abstract idea); Intellectual Ventures LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (‘‘[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.’’) The Examiner determined that the claims recite limitations corresponding to a mathematical algorithm (Final Act. 3). The Examiner contends that the steps of “generating a confidence map,” “generating a prior weight map,” “constructing a penalty function,” and “reconstructing an emission image and an attenuation map” based on the penalty function are directed to a mathematical algorithm (Final Act. 2–3). The Examiner contends that the method of claim 1, merely performing the functions of “obtaining emission projection and scan data” and “converting the obtained Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 11 emission projection and scan data into attenuation and emission data,” is directed to the abstract idea without significantly more (Ans. 2–3). Appellant contends that the claims do not merely recite an abstract idea, and instead “improve an existing technological process of reconstructing an emission image and an attenuation map” (Appeal Br. 11) by providing “more flexibility and robustness that previously proposed PET/MR image processing techniques (Appeal Br. 13, citing Spec. ¶ 13). Accordingly, there is a dispute over whether the invention, because of its alleged improvement to the existing state of the art, recites patent eligible subject matter. The Abstract Idea6 (Step 2A, Prong One) Claim 1 recites a method for use with data generated by a hybrid PET/MR imaging system that programs a computer processor with instructions to perform a series of steps. The method steps recited in representative claim 1 subsequently carried out by that processor, individually and collectively, describe either mathematical concepts or mental processes; that is, “receiving” emission projection data and second source scan data, “reconstructing” second source images based on this information, “generating” a prior map, “generating” a prior weight map, “constructing” a penalty function using differences between the prior map and an image, “reconstructing” an emission image and “generating” the final emission image (Appeal Br., Claim Appx. 19). 6 This corresponds to Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. Step 2A determines “whether a claim is ‘directed to’ a judicial exception,” such as an abstract idea. 2019 Revised Guidance 53. Step 2A is a two prong inquiry. Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 12 The court has held that abstract ideas include the concepts of collecting data, analyzing the data, and reporting the results of the collection and analysis, including when limited to particular content. See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (identifying the abstract idea of collecting, displaying, and manipulating data); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims directed to a “process of organizing information through mathematical correlations” are directed to an abstract idea). While claim 1 does recite the data as a specific type of PET/MR data, it does not recite an affirmative step of actually taking an image. The Specification describes an embodiment where a storage repository stores “acquired data, reconstructed images and/or information derived therefrom” (Spec. ¶ 22), making it clear that the method can be done on previously stored data. Therefore, the “receiving” steps are not narrowed to taking an image at the time of the method but are akin to making observations and evaluations that can be performed in the human mind (e.g., looking at a PET image printed out or displayed on an electronic screen, or physically receiving a copy of the data) and thus are matters that fall within the “[M]ental processes” enumerated grouping of abstract ideas, both as to each Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 13 claim limitation and the claim as a whole.7 Alternately, receiving data from an image source is insignificant extra-solution activity (i.e., data gathering). See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.31; see also MPEP § 2106.05(g). Cf. Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (agreeing with the Board that printing and downloading generated menus are insignificant post-solution activities). The generating, constructing, and reconstructing concepts are akin to mathematical concepts, including mathematical relationships and calculations. Generating image data, weighted maps, or penalty functions, as well as constructing or reconstructing images based on the algorithm constitutes performing mathematical calculations, as the Examiner determines (Final Act. 2–3, Ans. 2–3). Therefore, we have reviewed the record and are unpersuaded as to reversible error in the Examiner’s characterization of what claim 1 recites. 7 This corresponds to Prong One [“Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception”] (b) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised Guidance. “To determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong One, examiners are now to: . . . (b) determine whether the identified limitation(s) falls within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in Section 1 of the [2019 Revised 101 Guidance].” Id. at 54. This case implicates subject matter grouping “(a)” and “(c)”: (a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations; (c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion). Id. at 52. Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 14 Practical Application (Step 2A, Prong Two) Having concluded that claims 1 and 23 each recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea (Step 2A, Prong One), we next consider whether the claim recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (Step 2A, Prong Two). 8 Here, it is clear from the Specification (including the claim language) that the claims focus on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or a technical field. The Specification’s description of the problem and solution shows that any advance over the prior art by the claimed invention is in utilizing a generic computer processor to conduct manipulation of emission projection data using information from an additional MR image, not on any improvement in computer functionality itself. The Specification attributes no special meaning to “receiving,” “generating,” “constructing,” and “reconstructing” steps with respect to an improvement in computer functionality. Appellant’s argument that this 8 This corresponds to Prong Two (“If the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception, Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a Practical Application”) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. “A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id. One consideration, implicated here, that is “indicative that an additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the exception into a practical application” (id. at 55) (footnote omitted) as if “[a]n additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field” (id.). Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 15 invention is a technical improvement relies on a single sentence in the Specification, that the invention provides “more flexibility and robustness that previously proposed PET/MR image processing techniques (Appeal Br. 13, citing Spec. ¶ 13), but does not provide specific arguments regarding how the flexibility and robustness results from the invention as claimed. It is true that specific asserted improvements in, for example, computer capabilities, when claimed, can render claimed subject matter not directed to an abstract idea. Cf. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“When looked at as a whole, claim 1 is directed to a patentable, technological improvement over the existing, manual 3–D animation techniques.”). But merely improving an abstract idea does not prevent it from still being an abstract idea. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”) Therefore, after careful review, there is insufficient evidence in the record before us that the claimed subject matter reflects any such improvement in technology. Last, the application to a certain field – a method “using a hybrid PET/MR imaging system”– does not do more than generally link the use of a judicial exception to a particular technological environment. This does not render the idea non-abstract, however, since “the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant post solution activity.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–12 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92). Accordingly, within the meaning of the 2019 Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 16 Revised Guidance, we find there is no integration into a practical application. Therefore, because claim 1 (as well as claim 23) recites a judicial exception and does not recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, the claim is directed to a judicial exception.9 We have considered all the Appellant’s arguments challenging the Examiner’s determination under step one of the Alice framework and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the record supports the Examiner’s determination that claims 1–12 and 23–26 are directed to an abstract idea (i.e. ineligible subject matter). 9 The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335–36. Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 17 Alice step two – Does the Claim Provide an Inventive Concept?10 Step two is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012)). As part of this step, we also look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56. In that regard, the Examiner asserts that the steps of obtaining data or generating an image after manipulating the data are well understood, routine, and conventional steps which do not amount to significantly more than receiving data and generating an image from that data (Final Act. 2–3). The examiner goes on to cite, in the rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103, the use of PET and MR data being used together in a computer with a memory and a processor, as shown by Schweizer (Final Act. 5). Further, the Examiner states that the limitation reciting the method step of “programming the 10 This corresponds to Step 2B of the 2019 Revised Guidance page 56 (“[I]f a claim has been determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, examiners should then evaluate the additional elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to determine whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).”). Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 18 processor with program instructions to perform functions” is merely an instruction to implement an abstract idea on a computer (Final Act. 18). We agree with the Examiner. Consistent with precedential law, we addressed Appellant’s argument as to purported specific asserted improvements in technology under step one of the Alice framework. See Ancora, 908 F.3d at 1347 (“We have several times held claims to pass muster under Alice step one when sufficiently focused on such improvements.”). Such an argument can also challenge a determination under step two of the Alice framework. See buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1354–55. “[R]ecent Federal Circuit jurisprudence has indicated that eligible subject matter can often be identified either at the first or the second step of the Alice/Mayo [framework].” 2019 Revised Guidance at 53. We are not persuaded that claim 1 or claim 23 presents an element or combination of elements indicative of a specific asserted improvement in technological capabilities, thereby rendering the claimed subject matter sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon using a generic computer device to perform the abstract idea of manipulating image data from two image sources with an algorithm in order to create a final emission image. We have reviewed the Specification and, as explained above, we can find no suggestion of any technical improvements associated with the performance of the recited steps. The Specification is focused on enhancing an image of a subject of interest (as recited in each of claims 1 and 23), not on enhancing a processor in a computer. The application of an abstract idea on a computer, like the programming of a processor to perform the Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 19 method steps of claim 1 and claim 23, does not integrate abstract ideas into a patent eligible concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[M]ere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it’ is not enough for patent eligibility.” (citation and internal quotation omitted)). Rather than focusing on said computer or processor, the Specification focuses on receiving emission projection data and second source scan data, reconstructing second source images based on this information, generating a prior map, generating a prior weight map, constructing a penalty function using differences between the prior map and an image, reconstructing an emission image and generating the final emission image (see, e.g., Spec. Figure 3–5), the “processor” (as recited in claim 1) acting merely as a conduit for practicing that method. Cf. In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 612 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Put differently, the telephone unit itself is merely a conduit for the abstract idea of classifying an image and storing the image based on its classification”). For the reasons discussed above, we are unpersuaded that the record supports interpreting the steps recited in the claim as yielding any improvement in technology. Looking to the additional elements of the hybrid PET/MR imaging system, the computer, the memory, and the processor of claim 1, we ask if they are, as the Examiner asserted, simply “conventional elements” (Final Act. 2). While “[t]he patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact,” “[w]hen there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the claim element or claimed combination is well-understood, Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 20 routine, [and] conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field” the question of patent eligibility taking into account well-understood, routine and conventional elements can be decided as an issue of law. Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1365, 1368 (quoting Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 890 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“A factual allegation or dispute should not automatically take the determination out of the court’s hands; rather, there needs to be justification for why additional evidence must be considered—the default being a legal determination.”). As demonstrated by the Specification, a computer processor was well- known (Spec. ¶ 20, “general purpose computer processors” can be used), and the recited steps they perform ask nothing more of them than to use them for their commonly–associated information–processing functions. Much like the “data storage unit” and “computer, coupled to said storage unit” in the claims of Alice (U.S. Patent 7,149,720, claim 1), “the claims here do [not do] more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [. . .] on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. See also Bancorp Servs., 687 F.3d at 1278 (“[T]he use of a computer in an otherwise patent-ineligible process for no more than its most basic function—making calculations or computations—fails to circumvent the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas and mental processes.”). Further, a hybrid PET/MR imaging system, recited as the source of the image data in claim 1 (and claim 23), was well understood, routine and Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 21 conventional in the art, as the Examiner has demonstrated11. Cited references found by the Examiner include Schweizer (¶ 14, describing the advantage of PET/MR to “enhance image reconstruction of the latter”), Keereman, (¶ 2, “a new generation of medical imaging scanners is currently being developed, which combines the high sensitivity of functional imaging by positron emission tomography (PET) with the wide range of imaging … of magnetic resonance (MR)”), and Zhang (¶ 8, “some imaging systems combine a PET scanner with a magnetic resonance (MR) scanner”). Therefore, we find clear support demonstrating that the PET/MR itself, is a component that is well-understood, routine and conventional. On the record before us, Appellant has not shown that the claims on appeal add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional, when the claim limitations are considered both individually and as an ordered combination. We conclude that no error has been committed in the determination under Alice step two that claim 1 does not include an element or combination of elements circumscribing the patent-ineligible concept it is directed to so as to transform the concept into an inventive application. 11 We note that the Examiner’s Final Action from which this appeal is taken is dated September 28, 2017, while the decision in Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) issued in February of 2018. Further, the Examiner’s Answer is dated April 19, 2018, the same day that the PTO issued the Memorandum titled “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.).” Therefore, the Examiner did not have the opportunity to apply the Berkheimer decision to this case. Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 22 Accordingly, because we are not persuaded as to reversible error in the determinations that representative claim 1, as well as independent claim 23 and dependent claims 2–12, 24–26 are directed to an abstract idea and do not present an “inventive concept,” we sustain the Examiner’s conclusion that they are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter for being judicially- excepted from 35 U.S.C. § 101. The rejection of claims 1–12 and 23–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schweizer and Nuyts. Upon consideration of the evidence of record and each of Appellant’s contentions as set forth in the Appeal Brief, as well as the Reply Brief, we determine that Appellant has not demonstrated reversible error in the Examiner’s rejections (e.g., generally Ans.). In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of requiring Appellant(s) to identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s rejection.). We sustain the § 103 rejections for the reasons expressed by the Examiner in the Final Office Action of September 28, 2017 and the Answer. We add the following primarily for emphasis. Appellant relies upon the same argument for claims 1 and 23 (Appeal Br. 15, 16). There is no dispute that Schweizer teaches a method for enhanced imaging of a subject of interest using a hybrid PET/MR (position emission tomography/magnetic resonance) imaging system, including the step of programming a processor to receive emission data and utilize that data, a prior weight map, and an attenuation map to generate a final emission image Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 23 (Final Act. 5–7). Appellant’s main contention is that Nuyts does not teach using priors to construct a penalty function and cannot remedy the deficiency of Schweizer (Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 13). Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of reversible error for reasons presented by the Examiner (Ans. 3–4). The Examiner asserts that the disputed limitation of “constructing a penalty function that” performs certain steps is taught by Nuyts, since the steps of the penalty function (in summary, that it calculates voxel wise differences between the prior map and a given image, transforms those differences using a potential function and calculates the weighted sum of those differences with weights based on the prior weight map) encompass the teaching of Nuyts (Final Act. 4–8), despite Nuyts not reciting the words “penalty function” (Final Act. 19). The Examiner points out that “weights . . .are based on the prior weight map” are based on a “function f of the prior weight map wherein f may be any function” (Ans. 3, relying on Spec. ¶ 48; see also Spec. ¶ 47). Specifically, the Examiner relies upon Equation (22) of Nuyts, which calculates the difference between a priori expected attenuation coefficients of neighboring pixels, ( - ), to teach a weighted sum of pixel differences (Final Act. 19). The relied upon Equation (22) incorporates a potential function (either (23) or (24)) acting upon ( - ), and is further incorporated into Equation (27), weighted with the coefficient (Ans. 3, citing the resulting equation parenthetically). The Examiner further asserts that the use of this a priori data (data formed beforehand) is utilizing a prior weight map, Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 24 since Nuyts teaches using this prior knowledge to guide the reconstruction algorithm “toward a meaningful solution” (Ans. 3–4, citing Nuyts at p. 395). Appellant does not provide sufficient information or persuasive arguments why the Examiner’s understanding of the calculation and transformation steps of the claimed penalty function do not encompass the algorithm of Nuyts. While there might be, as Appellant argues, “no mention in Nuyts that these priors can be used to construct a penalty function” (Appeal Br. 16), the Examiner has made a prima facie case that the algorithm of Nuyts performs all the steps recited in the claim as performed by the penalty function, regardless of the terminology used, de facto teaching a penalty function. Appellant argues that, e.g., Nuyts teaches that the “gradient of the posterior is the sum of the gradients of the prior and the likelihood” (Appeal Br. 16), but this and similar statements in the brief do not adequately rebut the Examiner’s finding that Nuyts teaches the calculating and transforming steps that comprise the penalty function. There is no requirement that the prior art must recite verbatim the steps of the method in order to teach them. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264–65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (A reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in this art would have reasonably been expected to draw therefrom). Appellant has not directed us to any specific definitions in the Specification or adequately explained why the Examiner’s interpretation of calculating voxel-wise differences, transforming them using a potential function, or calculating a weighted sum of those differences based on the prior weight map are either incorrect or Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 25 unreasonably broad. Thus, Appellant has not shown reversible error in the Examiner’s obviousness determination based on the applied prior art. Appellant relies upon the same arguments made for claim 1 for claim 23 (Appeal Br. 13–16) and for separately rejected claims 5 and 12 (Appeal Br. 16–18). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1 and 23, as well as all claims dependent thereon. CONCLUSION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1–12 and 23–26 is affirmed. More specifically: The rejection of claims 1–12 and 23–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as attempting to claim judicially-excepted subject matter is affirmed. The rejection of claims 1–12 and 23–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the references cited is affirmed. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–12, 23–26 § 101 Eligibility 1–12, 23–26 1–4, 6–11, 23–26 § 103 Schweizer, Nuyts 1–4, 6–11, 23–26 5 § 103 Schweizer, Nuyts, Keereman 5 12 § 103 Schweizer, Nuyts, Zhang 12 Appeal 2018-006817 Application 14/847,643 26 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation