Sandra Williams, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W Areas), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 25, 2000
01a00816 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 25, 2000)

01a00816

04-25-2000

Sandra Williams, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W Areas), Agency.


Sandra Williams, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01A00816

v. ) Agency No. 1G-772-0005-99

) Hearing No. 330-99-8246X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(S.E./S.W Areas), )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final decision

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The appeal is

accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified

at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). Complainant alleges she was discriminated

against on the basis of sex (female), when, on September 12, 1998, she

was discharged from the agency for failure to attain a passing score

necessary to qualify for the Small Parcel and Bundle Sorter.

The record reveals that complainant, formerly a probationary Small Parcel

and Bundle Sorter Clerk, at the agency's North Houston Mail Facility,

Houston, Texas, filed a formal EEO complaint with the agency on November

23, 1998, alleging that the agency had discriminated against her as

referenced above. At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant

received a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision

without a hearing, finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of sex discrimination. In her complaint, complainant maintained that in

May 1997, a male comparative was issued a notice of removal for failure

to qualify, but he was later reinstated into the position, whereas she

was not. In her decision, the AJ found that complainant and the male

comparative were not similarly situated since the male comparative was

not a probationary employee. In light of this, the AJ noted that the

comparative had been entitled to union representation, which successfully

negotiated his reinstatement. In addition, the AJ found that other

male employees were removed for failing to qualify for their positions.

As such, the AJ determined that factors other than sex were the reasons

for the disparity in treatment between complainant and the named male

comparative employee. Specifically, the Plant Manager testified that

the named male comparative was reinstated due to a procedural defect in

the removal notice.

The AJ further concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that complainant was

removed from her position in light of her failure to qualify for the job.

Additionally, the AJ found that complainant did not establish that more

likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask

unlawful discrimination.

The agency's final decision implemented the AJ's decision. On appeal,

complainant contends that the AJ erred when she issued a recommended

decision without a hearing. She also submits another letter of removal

issued to the male comparative employee in January 1997, which was not

contained in the investigative file. She claims the January 1997 removal

notice was not acted upon, whereas her notice of removal was implemented.

Complainant argues that males are given extra time to qualify for the

positions, but females are not.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure

set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary

Judgment is proper when �material facts are not in genuine dispute.� 64

Fed. Reg. 37, 644, 37, 657(1999)(to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)). Only a dispute over facts that are truly

material to the outcome of the case should preclude summary judgment.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, and not irrelevant or unnecessary disputes, will preclude the entry

of summary judgment). For example, when a complainant is unable to

set forth facts necessary to establish one essential element of a prima

facie case, a dispute over facts necessary to prove another element of

the case would not be material to the outcome. Celotex v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). EEOC MD-110, at 7-15 November 9, 1999.

The Commission will apply a de novo standard of review when it reviews

an AJ's decision to issue a decision without a hearing pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). See, EEOC MD-110, at 9-16.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced the

appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note that complainant

failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions were motivated

by discriminatory animus toward complainant's sex. Despite complainant's

arguments to the contrary, we find the record reveals complainant was

afforded additional time to qualify for the position, but she failed to

ultimately qualify. We do not find complainant's submission on appeal

is evidence that would establish a genuine issue of material fact.

We discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a

careful review of the record, including complainant's contentions on

appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically

addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S1199)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

April 25, 2000

Date

Carlton

M.

Hadden,

Acting

Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 On November 9, 1999, revised

regulations governing the EEOC's federal sector complaint process

went into effect. These regulations apply to all federal sector

EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative process.

Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations found

at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.