Sander Operating Company III, LLC, d/b/a KGW-TV

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Dec 20, 2016

19-CA-148474 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 20, 2016)

JD(SF)–48–16
Portland, OR
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
TEGNA, INC. d/b/a KGW-TV1
and Case 19–CA–148474
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 48, AFL–CIO
Carolyn McConnell, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Henry E. Farber and John Hodges-Howell, Esqs.
(Davis Wright Tremaine LLP), for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARA-LOUISE ANZALONE, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case on March 8-
10, 2016, in Portland, Oregon. Based on a charge (as amended) filed by the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 48, AFL–CIO (Local 48, the Union or Charging Party)
in the above-captioned case, the Regional Director for Region 19 issued a complaint on
November 30, 2015 (the complaint). The General Counsel alleges that Respondent Tegna, Inc.
d/b/a KGW-TV (Tegna or Respondent) refused to provide certain information requested by the
Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
At trial, all parties were afforded the right to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to
present any relevant documentary evidence, to argue their respective legal positions orally, and
to file post-hearing briefs. On April 21, 2016, posthearing briefs were filed by the General
Counsel and Respondent and have been carefully considered. Accordingly, based upon the

1 The complaint in this matter named “Sander Operating Company III LLC d/b/a KGW-TV” as
Respondent. At trial, however, the parties stipulated that Tegna, Inc. is the correct legal name of
Respondent and further stipulated to jurisdiction, service of the charge and the legal responsibility of
Tegna for any unfair labor practices found in this proceeding.
JD(SF)–48–16
2
entire record herein, including the posthearing briefs and my observation of the credibility of the
witnesses, I make the following
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
5
A. Jurisdiction
At all times material herein, Respondent, a Delaware corporation with an office and place of
business located in Portland, Oregon (the “facility”), where it has been engaged in the business
of operating television stations that, inter alia, advertise goods sold nationally and subscribe to 10
national wire services. During the 12-month period immediately preceding the issuance of the
instant complaint, Respondent, in the normal course and conduct of its business operations,
derived gross revenues in excess of $100,000 and purchased and received at the facility goods
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Oregon. Respondent is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act. It is 15
alleged, Respondent admits and I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects commerce and that the National Labor
Relations Board (the Board) has jurisdiction of this case, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act.20
B. Respondent’s Motion to Reopen the Record
On September 16, 2016, Respondent filed a motion to reopen the record for the purpose of
introducing evidence that the parties, following the close of hearing, reached a non-Board 25
resolution of the underlying unfair labor practices and ratified a successor collective bargaining
agreement, thereby obviating the Union’s need for the requested information at issue here. Both
Local 48 and the General Counsel oppose Respondent’s motion, asserting that no such
agreement was reached. Essentially, the parties disagree whether, following the close of hearing,
the Union agreed to withdraw the unfair labor allegations before me. 30
The General Counsel further asserts that Respondent’s motion is procedurally flawed in that
the evidence Respondent would seek to offer in a reopened proceeding does not qualify as
“newly discovered evidence” under the Board’s standard. I agree. The Board has consistently
held that, pursuant to § 102.48(d)(1) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, evidence warranting 35
reopening the record must have been capable of being presented at the original hearing. Rush
University Medical Center, 362 NLRB No. 23, slip op. at 1 n.2 (2015) (denying request to
reopen record for election petitions that did not exist at the time of the hearing), enfd. 833 F.3d
202 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also Allis-Chalmers Corp., 286 NLRB 219, 219 n.1 (1987) (denying
“the motion [to reopen] as it proffers evidence concerning an alleged event that occurred after 40
the close of the hearing”). Because the evidence at issue here did not exist at the time of the
hearing, it does not provide a basis for reopening the record. APL Logistics, Inc., 341 NLRB
994, 994 n.2 (2004), enfd. 142 Fed.Appx. 869 (6th Cir. 2005).
JD(SF)–48–16
3
Moreover, even assuming that the evidence here otherwise met the requirements of
§ 102.48(d)(1), Respondent’s motion is additionally flawed in that Respondent has failed, as
required by that provision, to demonstrate that its proffered new evidence would mandate a
different result in this case. Fitel/Lucent Technologies, Inc., 326 NLRB 46, 46 n.1 (1998);
Opportunity Homes, Inc., 315 NLRB 1210, 1210 n.5 (1994), enfd. 101 F.3d 1515 (6th Cir. 5
1996); NLRB v. Johnson’s Industrial Caterers, 478 F.2d 1208, 1209 (6th Cir. 1973). The Board
recently applied this principle to an information request case; denying a motion to receive
evidence that the parties had, posthearing, reached a collective-bargaining agreement, the Board
explained that
10
[t]he fact that the Union chose to bargain in the absence of complete
information and that the parties were able to conclude a successor
collective-bargaining agreement does not mean that the information would
not have been useful to the Union in bargaining or rebut the presumption
of relevance.15

Mckensie-Willamette Medical Center., 362 NLRB No. 20, slip op. at 1 (2015) (citations
omitted). Indeed, the “most that can be inferred” from such a sequence of events is that the
union, instead of waiting to receive the requested relevant information, chose a “contract in
hand.” Id. (citing White Farm Equipment Co., 242 NLRB 1373, 1374 (1979); NLRB v. Yawman 20
& Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951)), enfd. 650 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
Accordingly, Respondent’s motion to reopen is denied, based on its failure to meet the
Board’s test for newly discovered evidence.
25
C. Background Facts
For decades, Charging Party has represented the directors, maintenance technicians and
broadcast operators at KGW-TV, a television station in Portland, Oregon (the bargaining unit).
Prior to 2013, KGW-TV (KGW or the station) was owned and operated by a subsidiary of Belo 30
Corporation (Belo). On December 23, 2013, Gannett Corp. (Gannett) acquired Belo’s television
stations; because regulatory requirements barred Gannett from owning the broadcast license for
KGW, that license was transferred to Sander Operating Company III, LLC (Sander). Sander
then entered into an agreement under which Gannett Corp. would operate KGW, including
employing the bargaining unit employees. Gannett continued to recognize the Union as the 35
representative of the bargaining unit and adopted the collective bargaining agreement then in
effect. That contract, however, expired on July 31, 2014. (Tr. 28; Jt. Exh. 1, 17) 2
Beginning on June 26, 2014,3 Union representatives met with representatives of the station to
bargain a new contract; over the course of the next 14 months, they met for bargaining on ten 40
days. During this period, however, Gannett spun off its publishing business and (effective
June 27, 2015) transferred operational responsibility for its television stations to Respondent

2 Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript; “GC Exh. __” for General
Counsel’s Exhibit; “R. Exh. __” for Respondent’s Exhibit; “Jt. Exh. ___” for Joint Exhibit; “GC Br. at
__” for the General Counsel’s posthearing brief and “R. Br. at __” for Respondent’s posthearing brief.
3 Unless otherwise noted, dates herein refer to the year 2014.
JD(SF)–48–16
4
Tegna, which (effective December 3, 2015) acquired the Sander entity and the KGW broadcast
license. Throughout this reorganization, the bargaining unit employees remained employees of
Respondent, which continued to recognize the Union as their exclusive bargaining
representative. Id.
5
Local 48’s bargaining team throughout the negotiations consisted of international
representative Virgil Hamilton, business agent Donna Hammond (Hammond) and counsel John
Bishop (Bishop); Bishop took the lead role early on. Representing Gannett – and then
Respondent – were KGW executives Caryn Lilley (Lilley) and David Boyd, as well as director
of labor relations and in-house employment counsel Timothy Fair (Fair), who was the station’s 10
principal spokesperson. Fair initially introduced himself as representing Gannett, but also stated
that the proposals he was making came from KGW. (Tr. 29–31, 90–91, 249–250, 374–375; GC
Exh. 2 at 10, 17; R. Exh. 6 at 10)
The parties’ first substantive bargaining session was held on July 16, and the parties 15
exchanged initial proposals at that time. Before presenting the station’s proposal, Fair made a
lengthy statement (between 20-30 minutes) to provide “context” for the proposal. Introducing
himself as having previously worked in the newspaper business, he said that industry had been
too “nonchalant” and was therefore caught “off guard” by changing technology, found it “too
late to react” and suffered significantly as a result. Fair then noted that, one day earlier, a news 20
item had announced that the newspaper reporter job was “becoming extinct.” The broadcast
industry, he said, was “at that crossroads that newspapers faced in the 90s,” and faced
competition for advertising dollars from multiple new media outlets such as Google, AT&T,
Apple and Yahoo. (Tr. 111–112, 484–490)
25
Consumers, Fair continued, were getting information from many sources outside broadcast
television such that the amount of advertising dollars being allocated to these new forms of
media had drastically increased. “This may seem like a broken record to you all,” he stated, “but
this time it’s real.” He then presented statistics on consumers in the age cohort labeled as
“millennial,” whom he claimed commanded $1.3 trillion in consumer spending; they were 30
“brand loyal,” he said, not to network television but rather to new media sources such as
Amazon, Apple, Samsung, Netflix and Facebook. Despite this gloomy assessment, Fair did not
assert that KGW’s own advertising revenue was actually declining; as Bishop admitted,
Respondent’s negotiating team never during the negotiations “made accusations or assertions in
bargaining about declining advertising.” (Tr. 112, 491)35
Fair then turned to Respondent’s proposal, which he had yet to provide, saying that it was
“designed to allow [Respondent] more flexibility to deal with the changing marketplace,” build
brand loyalty with millennials and allow the station “unlimited and unrestricted access to
content.” Specifically, he said, Respondent needed to be able to assign the Union’s traditional 40
bargaining unit work to “anyone . . . regardless of their union designation.” These changes, he
said, were necessary for Respondent to “compete in a quickly changing media market.” As an
example, Fair referred to an incident in which a KGW manager had resorted to performing
bargaining unit work in order to ensure the station reported a news story that broke when no unit
member was available. (Tr. 49–50, 111, 389–390; GC Exh. 2, R. Exh. 12)45
JD(SF)–48–16
5
After concluding his remarks, Fair handed over Respondent’s initial bargaining proposal (the
July 16 proposal), which stated:
1. Delete current jurisdiction and replace with non-exclusive jurisdiction language
and to further amend contract throughout to conform to a non-exclusive5
jurisdiction operation.
2. Amend subcontracting to remove any restrictions.
3. Amend and insert in Section 3.3 [which provided for Respondent to give the
Union notice of its intention to use temporary employees] “Upon request” so that
“Upon request the Union shall be provided... [with such notice].”10
4. Eliminate Broadcaster Operator 1 & 2 classifications and pay scales; replace with
new classification “Broadcast Technician” and new pay scale.
5. Delete section 17.3 [which guaranteed overtime pay in excess of that required by
the Fair Labor Standards Act] so that all overtime (1.5x) is paid after 40-hours
worked in a workweek and amend contract throughout to conform (17.3, 17.4, 15
17.5, 17.6 and 22.3).
6. Delete Article XXVII, “Successors and Assigns.”
7. Term- to be negotiated.
(Jt. Exh. 2) Upon reviewing the proposal, the Union negotiating team took a caucus and, 20
determining that what Respondent was proposing was “drastic” and “dramatic,”4 decided that the
best course would be to respond at the next bargaining session, already scheduled for July 30-31.
(GC Exh. 2 at 7; Tr. 44, 50–53, 385–86)
D. The Union’s July 30 Information Request and Respondent’s Response25
When the parties met on July 30, Local 48’s Hamilton presented Fair with a 7-page written
request for information, stating that the Union was willing to “talk through” the individual items,
but ultimately wanted Respondent’s answers in writing. (Jt. Exh. 4; Tr. 55, 75) The General
Counsel alleges that Respondent failed to respond to 7 of these requests (the July 30 requests), 30
and each such allegation is discussed below. The July 30 requests fall into three categories:
(a) requests concerning Respondent’s stated need for competitive advantage in the marketplace;
(b) requests regarding specific Respondent bargaining proposals (on exclusive jurisdiction,
subcontracting, temporary employees, overtime and successorship); and (c) requests for
information about Respondent’s corporate ownership and recent restructuring. 35
What follows is a recitation of the parties’ communications regarding the individual requests
organized by category. It is useful to note that, with certain exceptions, each request was
handled in a similar pattern consisting of: a July 30 written information request by the Union →
a preliminary, oral response given by lead negotiator Fair at the bargaining table on July 30 and 40
31→ a written response by Fair on August 29 → a November 28 clarification and re-request by
the Union.

4 Contrary to the General Counsel’s characterization, I do not read Bishop’s testimony as indicating
that Fair himself described the changes as “drastic.”
JD(SF)–48–16
6
1. Requests related to claimed competitive disadvantage
a. July 30 Request
Request 2 of the Union’s July 20 request, titled, “Broadcast Trends,” reads as follows:5
During our July 16, 2014, bargaining session, Mr. Fair explained described
various trends in the U.S. broadcast and mobile media market. The union is
interested in understanding how these trends are manifested in the national media
market and in Portland area media market and how they affect KGW operations. 10
In order to bargain over these issues, the Union would like to review any and all
data, reports, analyses, communications and other documents concerning:
(a) KGW market share, ratings, and any other indicia of viewership from October
24, 2011 through the present;515
(b) KGW revenue from October 24, 2011 through the present;
(c) KGW expenses from October 24, 2011 through the present;
(d) Reports, analyses, data, or other documents concerning competition from
other media outlets such as Google, Amazon, YouTube, Netflix, Hulu, and
others from October 24, 2011 through the present, both nationally and in 20
Portland; and
(e) Reports, analyses, data, or other documents concerning changes in advertising
placement and revenue for television stations, including KGW, from October
24, 2011 through the present.
25
(Jt. Exh. 4)
As Bishop testified, the Union understood Fair’s July 16 opening remarks to have been
offered as a justification—based on the “need to compete”—for multiple aspects of
Respondent’s proposal, including those addressing exclusive jurisdiction and subcontracting. 30
Request 2, he explained, was the Union’s attempt to ‘fact check’ Fair’s claims regarding the
threat of increased competition from other media outlets, as well as to ascertain what effect such
competition was having on Respondent’s revenue and expenses. (Tr. 58–60)
b. Respondent’s preliminary, oral response35
Upon being presented with the July 30 request, Fair remarked that Respondent had not
expressed an inability to pay and that its proposals were “not the result of a drastic financial
situation.” (Tr. 76; GC Exh. 2) After Respondent’s negotiating team caucused for
approximately an hour, Fair stated that he had reviewed the information request and would 40
further “study it and respond.” Reserving the right to respond to some requests verbally, he
opined that the parties might not get to an agreement at the table, but that Respondent did not
intend to withdraw its proposal. Hamilton responded that the Union was willing to negotiate, but

5 As Bishop explained, October 24, 2011 was selected because it was the effective date of the parties’
collective-bargaining agreement set to expire the day following the July 30 request. (Tr. 60)
JD(SF)–48–16
7
needed the requested information and did not foresee getting to impasse. (Tr. 90–91, 438; GC
Exh. 2, R. Exh. 6, 11)
The following day, when the parties reconvened for bargaining, Fair suggested they review
the information request together, noting that Respondent was “working on” certain requests and 5
required some clarifications. Fair then specifically addressed the Union’s request for the
station’s market share and ratings, as well as revenue and expenses (Requests 2(a)-(c)), stating
that it sought “confidential financial information.” According to Fair, he told the Union that the
station’s ratings were confidential because they were “financial in nature” and “not information
that we otherwise shared with . . . third parties or the public.” (Tr. 473) Admittedly, however, 10
Fair did not offer to bargain over an accommodation (such as a nondisclosure agreement) to
Respondent’s asserted confidentiality concerns. (Tr. 473, 501–502)
Fair then said that Respondent had some documents to share with the Union. In response to
the Union’s request for reports and analyses regarding competition from new media outlets and 15
changes in advertising revenue (Requests 2(d) and (e)), Fair provided a 36-page scholarly paper
entitled, “The New Network Compact: Consumers Are in Charge,”6 adding that he had
“additional information” that he would provide later. He then stated that Respondent had no
specific report or analysis regarding new media competition or how it affected KGW’s
advertising revenues. Reiterating this, he remarked, “the answer is none—there is no KGW 20
document.” (Jt. Exh. 8, GC Exh. 2; Tr. 79–80)
c. Respondent’s August 29 written response
On August 29, Fair supplemented his oral responses with a 2-page letter, attaching three 25
additional documents focused on the media market for millennials: a demographic study, a
business journal and an industry report. (See Jt. Exh. 9–12) With respect to the Union’s request
regarding the station’s market share and ratings, as well as revenue and expenses (Requests
2(a)-(c)), Fair stated that he had already responded orally, adding:
30
KGW reiterates that at no time has it maintained that any of its
proposals were based on or arising out of an “inability to pay.”
Therefore the Union is not entitled to review private and
confidential financial information of the company; therefore, KGW
will not provide the requested financial information.35
(Jt. Exh. 9)

6 This paper posits that a new regulatory structure is necessary for the evolving communications
market within the United States, based in part on market data comparing traditional television mediums to
those utilized by “cord cutters” (i.e., consumers who rely exclusively on wireless devices). The paper’s
analysis is not focused on the Portland market or on competition from specific new media outlets, such as
those Fair had mentioned in his opening remarks (i.e., Facebook, Yahoo, etc.). (Jt. Exh. 8)
JD(SF)–48–16
8
d. The Union’s November 18 clarification
On November 18, Local 48’s attorney, Noah Barish, responded in writing to Fair’s August
29 letter. Regarding the Union’s request for KGW’s market share and ratings, as well as revenue
and expenses (Requests 2(a)-(c)), Barish stated that, separate from any inability-to-pay claim, 5
Respondent was obligated to produce the requested information to substantiate its “claims that it
suffers or will suffer a competitive disadvantage as compared to other media providers and/or
advertisers in the industry.” (Jt. Exh. 15) Regarding the Union’s request for reports and
analyses regarding competition from new media outlets and changes in advertising revenue
(Requests 2(d) and (e)), Barish noted that Respondent had failed to provide information focused 10
on the Portland market or KGW itself; such information, he stated, was required for the Union to
determine whether, as Respondent claimed, its proposals were necessary to address a real or
threatened decline in advertising revenue due to competition from digital media. Id. Respondent
provided no additional documents following receipt of Barish’s letter.
15
2. Requests regarding specific bargaining proposals
a. The July 30 request
As noted, several of the Union’s July 30 requests referred to specific portions of 20
Respondent’s July 16 proposal and stated that the requested information was necessary for the
Union to bargain over Respondent’s specific demands. These included the following requests
and corresponding explanations of relevance:
July 16 Proposal July 30 Request Item Stated Relevance
1. Non-exclusive
jurisdiction
3(a) Any documents, analyses, or communications
concerning potential KGW’s plans to assign work
currently done by bargaining unit members to
individuals outside of the bargaining unit
3(b) Job descriptions and current wages of all KGW
employees to whom KGW may assign work currently
done by bargaining unit members, if a non-exclusive
jurisdiction operation were implemented
“The union is
concerned about the
effect of non-
exclusive
jurisdiction on the
future wages, hours,
and working
conditions of
bargaining unit
members.”
2. Remove
restrictions on
subcontracting
4(a) Any written agreements between KGW and any
other entity for subcontracted work from October 24,
2011 through the present
4(b) All documents concerning the customer, calendar
period, and dollar volume of any subcontracted work
from October 24, 2011 through the present
4(c) Any documents, analyses, or communications
concerning KGW's future plans to subcontract work
currently done by members of the bargaining unit
“The union is
concerned about the
effect of
subcontracting on
the future wages,
hours, and working
conditions of
bargaining unit
members.”
3. Limit notice of
temporary
employees to
“upon request”
5(a) A list of all individuals who have been hired as
temporary employees from October 24, 2011 through
the present, the date of hire, the rate of pay,
classification, the date of termination and the reason for
hiring.
“The union is
concerned about the
circumstances under
which temporary
employees are
JD(SF)–48–16
9
5(b) A copy of any company policies or procedures with
respect to the hiring of temporary employees
hired.”
5. Delete
contractual
overtime pay
7(a) An accounting of all overtime paid to all bargaining
unit members from October 24, 2011 through the
present, with breakdowns showing the number of hours
of overtime worked, the number of overtime hours paid,
and the amount of overtime pay for each bargaining unit
member, as well as whether each instance of overtime
occurred during regular days off, holidays, or regular
work days
“The union is
concerned about the
effect of this
proposed change on
the wages, hours,
and working
conditions of
bargaining unit
member[s].”
6. Delete
successorship
provision
9(a) Copies of any reports from consultants, investment
advisors, certified public accounts or others concerning
any possible sale, takeover, or restructuring of KGW
9(b) Copies of any correspondence with [sic] concern
the possibility of restructuring, sale, or takeover of
KGW
“The union is
concerned about the
effect of this
proposed change on
the wages, hours,
and working
conditions of
bargaining unit
members, should
KGW be sold, taken
over, or restructured
in the future.”
As Bishop testified, each requested category of documents was necessary for the Union to
evaluate the potential scope and/or effect of a Respondent proposal, as well as to test the veracity
of Fair’s claims on July 30 that each proposal was necessary to maintain Respondent’s
competitiveness in a changing media market. (Tr. 60-65) 5
b. Respondent’s preliminary, oral response
During the July 30–31 negotiations, Fair verbally addressed each of the above-described
requests, but provided no documents. Regarding the Union’s request for documents regarding 10
Respondent’s plan to assign bargaining unit work outside the unit (Request 3), Fair responded
that, “as to KGW,” no responsive documents existed. He further stated that, because there were
no current plans to reassign bargaining unit work, Respondent could not identify the individuals
to whom such work might be reassigned. In response to the Union’s request for documents
related to actual or planned subcontracting (Request 4), Fair stated that no responsive documents 15
existed and that the station had no current subcontracts. By Fair’s admission, however, this
response was based on his own determination that this request was overbroad and should have
been limited to the subcontracting of “IBEW’s exclusive work.” (GC Exh. 2; R. Exh. 12; Tr. 84,
475)
20
Regarding the Union’s request for information regarding temporary employees (Request 5),
Fair responded that, informed the Union that no written policy existed regarding the use of
temporary employees, adding that, during the last 3 years, the station had employed 3 temporary
employees, including a program manager and a receptionist. (He did not indicate, as requested,
why these workers were hired, their rate of pay or their position classifications). Fair stated that 25
Respondent was “working on” Local 48’s request for an accounting for overtime paid under the
JD(SF)–48–16
10
current contract (Request 7(a)), but then Lilly added that, due to a technological problem,
Respondent might not be able to provide such information. Regarding the Union’s request for
documents related to a possible sale of the station (Request 9), Fair said there were no
responsive documents and no current plans to sell KGW. (GC Exh. 2; Tr. 84–85, 433)
5
c. Respondent’s August 29 written response
With respect to Requests 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9, Fair’s August 29 letter simply referred back to his
oral responses, with one exception: in response to the Union’s request for overtime figures
(Request 7(a)), he attached to his email a spreadsheet that Bishop was unable to open. Later, on 10
October 10, Respondent provided the Union with the spreadsheet, which listed overtime paid by
pay period during a subset of the requested time period, but did not break down the overtime
amounts as requested by the Union in order to evaluate the impact of Respondent’s proposal to
eliminate contractual overtime pay. According to Fair, this was all the responsive information
the station was able to compile. Also on October 10, Respondent provided the Union with 15
proposed language on non-exclusive jurisdiction. (J. Exh. 13, 14; Tr. 98, 101–106, 440)
d. The Union’s November 18 clarification
In his November 18 response to Fair, Local 48’s counsel, Barish, re-requested documents 20
relating to Respondent’s plans to assign bargaining unit work outside the unit and job
descriptions for employees to whom Respondent might assign such work (Request 3).
Acknowledging that Fair had indicated in negotiations on July 30 that KGW had no such plans,
Barish requested an update, “as plans might have developed” since that time. (Jt. Exh. 15)
25
With respect to Fair’s statement, in response to the Union’s request in Request 4, Barish
clarified that Local 48 was seeking current and past subcontracts (and related documents) for
KGW broadly, not just for the subcontracting of bargaining unit work. Such documents, he
asserted, were necessary for the Union to “test KGW’s assertion that its purported lack of
flexibility in subcontracting with respect to IBEW Local 48 places it at a competitive 30
disadvantage,” as well as to determine the necessity and effect of Respondent’s proposed lifting
of subcontracting restrictions. Id. Regarding the request for information regarding Respondent’s
use of temporary employees (Request 5), Barish stated that the Union was still waiting for a full
response; he also indicated that the overtime spreadsheet Respondent had provided (in response
to Request 7(a)) was incomplete and renewed that request. (Jt. Exh. 15; Tr. 102)35
By his letter, Barish also renewed the Union’s request for information regarding a possible
sale, takeover or restructuring of the station (Request 9), noting that several months had passed
since Fair’s verbal response during the July 30–31 bargaining session. Id.
40
JD(SF)–48–16
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3. Requests regarding corporate ownership, operation
of KGW and the effects of the corporate restructuring
a. The July 30 request
5
The Union’s July 30 request also included a request for documents relating to the station’s
ownership and operation (Request 8). Citing a concern over the effect of the recent change in
ownership and corporate restructuring on “future wages, hours, and working conditions of
bargaining unit members,” Local 48 stated it required the following information to engage in
bargaining:10
(a) A copy of any documents concerning the contracting relationship between
KGW and Sander Media;
(b) A copy of any documents concerning Gannett’s operation of KGW through
Sander Media or other intermediary entities;15
(c) A copy of the bylaws and articles of incorporation for Gannett, Sander Media,
and KGW;
(d) A list of the current shareholders for Gannett, Sander Media, and KGW
showing the amount of shares and class of shares owned;
(e) Copies of any reports from consultants, investment advisors, certified public20
accounts [sic] or others concerning the value of KGW, Sander Media, and
Gannett and the effects of the 2013 corporate sale and restructuring;
(f) Copies of all correspondence concerning the effects of the corporate sale and
restructuring involving Gannett, Sander Media, and KGW;
(g) Copies of minutes of the board of directors of Gannett, Sander Media, and 25
KGW from since the date of the corporate sale and restructuring;
(h) Minutes of all shareholder meetings for Gannett, Sander Media, and KGW
from since the date of the corporate sale and restructuring; and
(i) Copies of all filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as
any state agency regulating corporate affairs, concerning Gannett, Sander 30
Media, and KGW since the date of the corporate sale and restructuring.
Bishop testified as to the Union’s rationale for requesting these documents. As he explained
it, the items sought were generally necessary for the Union to understand which entity was now
operating KGW. He also testified that the Union “basically assumed” that Respondent’s 35
proposals were the result of recent corporate restructuring, which may have involved some
consultants or advisors suggesting that the proposed changes were necessary. With respect to the
Union’s request for a list of shareholders for the three entities (Request 8(d), above), Bishop
testified that the Union was interested in determining who actually owned and controlled the
station, in keeping with its “overriding goal to get a better understanding of who was running the 40
operations at KGW.” Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other regulatory filings
(Request 8(i)), he testified, were necessary, Bishop testified, to get “accurate information” to
verify Respondent’s other responses. These proffered explanations of relevance, however, were
not imparted—at least not initially —to Respondent. (Tr. 65–68, 73–75)
45
JD(SF)–48–16
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b. Respondent’s preliminary, oral response
During the July 30–31 negotiation session, Fair directly addressed Request 8 and the
relationship between Gannett, Sander and KGW. Promising more detailed information in the
future, he explained that, based on regulatory requirements, the station’s broadcast license had 5
been transferred to Sander in connection with the merger. Neither this, he told the Union, nor the
fact that he—a Tegna executive— was negotiating with the Union on KGW’s behalf, changed
the fact the day-to-day management was still in the hands of KGW’s own management. (GC
Exh. 2)
10
In response to Request 8(i) (which requested SEC and other agency filings), Fair stated that
the request was too broad and overly burdensome and referred the Union to “Yahoo! Finance,” a
website that provides financial news, data and commentary, including stock quotes, press
releases and certain financial reports, including SEC filings.7 He also provided the Union with
hard copies of the station’s FCC license,8 Gannett’s SEC Form 10-Q for the first and second 15
quarters of 2014 and the Form 8-K disclosing the closing of the Gannett-Belo merger and
accompanying restructuring whereby the operating licenses for Belo’s television stations
(including KGW) were transferred to Sander. (GC Exh. 2; R. Exh. 12; Jt. Exh. 5, 6, 7; Tr. 81–
82, 424–429, 431–433)
20
Fair also addressed the Union’s request for shareholder information (Request 8(d), above),
demanding an explanation of its relevance and stating that, in any event, it would be impossible
for Respondent to provide such a list for Gannett, a large, publically traded company. (Gannett’s
major shareholders, he said, could be found on the Yahoo! Finance website). With respect to the
Union’s request for Gannett shareholder meeting minutes (Request 8(h)), Fair appears to have 25
responded that these minutes were available to shareholders only. He then explained that Sander
Media and KGW were not corporate entities and therefore had no shareholders. Regarding the
Union’s request for documents reflecting the “value” of KGW, Sander and Gannett (Request
8(e)), Fair informed the Union that “the value of KGW is confidential” and they were not
entitled to such information. Regarding Request 8(f), which requested “correspondence 30
regarding the effects of the corporate sale and restructuring involving Gannett, Sander and
KGW,” Fair asked the Union to clarify the “effects” to which it referred. (Tr. 429–430)
c. Respondent’s August 29 written response
35
In his August 29 letter, Fair essentially recapped his response to Request 8, but provided no
further documents. Reiterating his confidentiality objection to documents concerning the
“value” of KGW, Gannett and Sander Media and the “effects” of the 2013 transaction (Request
8(e)), he added that Respondent was making no claim of inability to pay. Regarding the Union’s
request for board of directors and shareholders meeting minutes (Requests 8(g) and (h)), Fair 40
responded that KGW had no such minutes of its own and that he was not aware of any board of
directors or shareholders for Sanders. Id. Regarding the Union’s request regarding “effects” of
the recent corporate sale and restructuring (Request 8(f)), Fair again requested clarification as to

7 See www.finance.yahoo.com.
8 I credit Fair’s specific recollection that he provided this document during negotiations, which was
corroborated by Barish’s written confirmation on November 18. (Tr. 427; Jt. Exh. 15)
JD(SF)–48–16
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what documents Local 48 was seeking, and reiterating that “KGW’s General Manager continues
to guide and make business decisions on behalf of KGW” and that “KGW’s business will
continue to operate under the direction of the KGW General Manager as it did under ‘Sander
Operating Co.’ and will do under ‘Sander Media.’” (Jt. Exh. 9)
5
d. The Union’s November 18 clarification
By his November 18 letter, Barish addressed Fair’s request that Local 48 clarify Request 8(f)
(requesting correspondence regarding the “effects” of the restructuring), stating that the Union
should be permitted to investigate whether “business advantages and/or disadvantages” caused 10
by the corporate restructuring (as opposed to by the parties’ existing contract language) were in
fact responsible for Respondent’s proposals. The request, he stated, was therefore seeking
analyses of “the business advantages and/or disadvantages caused by the corporate sale and
restructuring, as well as any business projections concerning KGW’s competitive position in its
markets.” Id.15

E. The Union’s November 18 Information Request and Respondent’s Response
As noted, Barish, by his November 18 letter, made new information requests, three of which
the General Counsel alleges went unlawfully unanswered by Respondent. They are each 20
described below:
1. Competitor and advertiser information
Barish set forth a new and expansive request for information regarding KGW’s performance 25
in selling advertising under the parties’ last contract (Request 11). According to Bishop,
bargaining unit members of Local 48’s negotiating team had expressed the view that KGW’s
viewership was strong and ratings were up; the Union therefore concluded that, before acceding
to Respondent’s contractual demands, it should seek substantiation of Fair’s claims that “the sky
was falling.” The Union, as Bishop explained, also wanted to ascertain whether the parties’ 30
current contractual language was placing the station at a disadvantage with respect to its
competitors and having an actual impact on its advertising sales. The requested information
included:
(a) A list of media content providers that KGW views as its primary competitors;35
(b) A complete description of KGW’s advertising pricing structure so the Union
may compare the station’s advertising prices to those of competitors;
(c) A list of KGW’s current advertisers so the Union may contact them to
determine if they have or will consider purchasing advertising from a different
provider;40
(d) A list of all of KGW advertisers who have ceased buying advertising from
KGW since October 24, 2011, so the Union may contact them and determine
why they stopped purchasing advertising from the station;
(e) A list of all KGW advertising prospects since October 24, 2011, that the
station contacted concerning purchasing advertising but that ultimately did not 45
choose to purchase advertising, so the Union may contact them and determine
why they chose not to purchase advertising from KGW;
JD(SF)–48–16
14
(f) All documents, reports, and analyses concerning the station’s ratings,
television viewership and web and/or mobile readership/viewership since
October 24, 2011;
(g) Viewer/consumer comments and complaints received by the station since
October 24, 2011, concerning its programming and service; and5
(h) Advertiser comments and complaints received by the station since October 24,
2011, concerning its programming and service.
(Jt. Exh. 15 at 5; Tr. 111–113)
10
2. Work assignment information
Barish also included a new request (Request 13) based on Respondent’s stated desire to
eliminate the Union’s exclusive work jurisdiction. This item sought information regarding KGW
employees represented by the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving 15
Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts (IATSE):
(a) Documents concerning all changes in job responsibilities for members
represented by IATSE since October 24, 2011, including but not limited to
changes in responsibilities concerning operation of news trucks; and20
(b) Documents concerning IATSE members’ training and qualifications for
operation of new trucks.
As Bishop explained, the parties during bargaining had discussed the fact that bargaining unit
members already had “overlapping duties” with those of IATSE-represented station employees, 25
proof of which the Union believed would undermine Respondent’s claimed need for greater
flexibility in assigning work. (Jt. Exh. 15; Tr. 113–114)
3. Specific instances of subcontracting
30
Barish’s November 18 letter also included a request (Request 14) regarding two individuals
that the Union believed (based on reports from bargaining unit members) had worked as
subcontractors of Respondent. Specifically, this item requested “[a]ll documents concerning the
job title, job responsibilities, pay, benefits, and hours” for these two individuals, in each case
during the time period when the Union believed they had performed as subcontractors. (Jt. Exh.35
15 at 6; Tr. 114–115)
4. Respondent’s November 20 verbal response
It is undisputed that Respondent did not provide any documents (or any written response) to 40
the Union’s November 18 requests. On November 20, the parties met for bargaining, and Bishop
and Fair engaged in a “spirited debate” about the requests. Fair accused the Union making
requests to stall discussions of Respondent’s proposal; Respondent, he said, had satisfied its
obligation to respond to any good-faith requests for relevant information. He then asked Bishop
to identify what was “important” in the November 18 request; if the Union would “prioritize 45
JD(SF)–48–16
15
something,” he suggested, “maybe” Respondent could provide information sufficient to allow
the parties to bargain over Respondent’s proposal. (Tr. 450–451)
Bishop refused, stating that the Union wanted all of the requested information, to which Fair
responded, “are you refusing to negotiate further until we’ve given you answers to that 5
information request?” Bishop denied this, stating that the Union needed substantiation of
Respondent’s claims regarding its need to be more competitive in order to formulate effective
counterproposals. According to Bishop, Fair immediately denied that Respondent’s proposal
had “anything to do with gaining competitive advantage or being at a competitive disadvantage”;
Respondent, he said, simply “want[ed] to be relevant in the media marketplace.” (Tr. 115–117, 10
452–453)9
The parties then discussed Respondent’s proposal to eliminate work jurisdiction.10 When
several bargaining unit members of the Union’s negotiating committee questioned how this
proposal would make the station more competitive, Lilly said there was a finite amount of 15
advertising dollars in the market and Respondent needed flexibility to go after them. The
Union’s team then suggested that the station already had a successful website it could use to
compete in the new media market, and suggested that Respondent could grow this part of the
business, to which Lilly responded, “we don’t have the budget for that.” Bishop jumped in,
saying that this sounded like it might be an issue of ability to pay, but Fair pushed back, saying it 20
was not about an inability to pay. (Tr. 118–119)
5. The parties’ additional discussions regarding the Union’s requests
On December 4, the parties met again for bargaining. When reminded by the Union about its 25
information requests, Fair stated, “we’re not going to open our books, you know, to you; that’s
not going to happen.” On January 6, 2015, when the parties met again, Bishop asked about the
November 18 request. Fair did not seem to recall the request and Bishop had to show him a
copy, after which Respondent’s negotiating team caucused for approximately an hour. Upon
returning, Fair stated that he had looked at the request but that it would not be “useful” for him to 30
review it line-by-line, and the parties should just discuss it instead. This attempt at discussion
quickly devolved, with Fair stating that the Union would never be satisfied with Respondent’s
answers, so there was no point in giving any response. Local 48’s latest request for information,
he stated, was a “red herring.” The meeting concluded with Bishop requesting that Fair identify
his preferred means of communication (i.e., letter, email, telephone), because Respondent 35
appeared to be ignoring the Union’s written information requests and Fair responding that he was
open to many forms of communication. (Tr. 125, 128–129, 131; GC Exh. 2)
It is undisputed that, following the parties’ January 6, 2015 session, Respondent provided no
further response to any of the Union’s information requests. (Tr. 115, 128, 132–134, 137–138)40

9 Fair, for his part, did not deny recharacterizing Respondent’s motivation from a concern over
competitiveness to one over relevance.
10 The discussion described in this paragraph is based on Bishop’s credible testimony, which was
corroborated by his notes and went unrebutted by either Fair or Lilly.
JD(SF)–48–16
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Credibility
The key aspects of my factual findings above incorporate the credibility determinations 5
I have made after carefully considering the record in its entirety. I based my credibility
resolutions on consideration of a witness’ opportunity to be familiar with the subjects covered by
the testimony given; established or admitted facts; the impact of bias on the witness’ testimony;
the quality of the witness’ recollection; testimonial consistency; the presence or absence of
corroboration; the strength of rebuttal evidence, if any; the weight of the evidence and witness 10
demeanor while testifying. Credibility findings need not be all-or-nothing propositions, and it is
common for a fact finder to credit some, but not all, of a witness’ testimony. Daikichi Sushi, 335
NLRB 622, 622 (2001). My credibility findings are generally incorporated into the findings of
fact set forth above.
15
I did not find the testimony of either lead negotiator, Fair or Bishop, to be especially reliable;
my impression was that both men at times editorialized in their descriptions of events at the
bargaining table. On the whole, however, I have tended to credit Bishop, who testified without
reliance on his bargaining notes and appeared to make a good effort to answer questions fully
and honestly. Fair, on the other hand, was observably nervous on cross examination and often 20
appeared to dissemble when questioned about significant matters, such as what he meant to
impart by his comparison to the economic downturn in the newspaper industry. (See Tr. 487–
490) As noted, infra, on various occasions, Fair also failed to rebut specific, potentially
damaging testimony given by Bishop. See LSF Transportation, Inc., 330 NLRB 1054, 1063
n.11 (2000), enfd. 282 F.3d 972 (2002); Asarco Inc., 316 NLRB 636, 640 n.15 (1995), modified 25
on other grounds 86 F.3d 1401 (5th Cir. 1996).
B. The Parties’ Positions
As noted, the General Counsel argues that the demonstrated relevance of each of the Union’s 30
information requests was based on its need to: (a) evaluate and respond to specific Respondent
bargaining proposals; (b) understand the recent corporate restructuring and its effects; and/or
(c) assess Respondent’s claimed lack of competitiveness as a rationale for its proposals as a
whole. Respondent argues that it provided all nonconfidential information for which the Union
demonstrated a basis of relevance, that it never made representations regarding its inability to 35
pay contractual wages and benefits that would that would otherwise obligate it to provide
financial information, and that the Union’s requests were made in bad faith in order to delay
bargaining with an eye towards staving off an impasse declaration.
JD(SF)–48–16
17
C. The Applicable Law
An employer’s duty to bargain includes a general duty to provide information needed by the
bargaining representative to assess claims made by the employer relevant to contract
negotiations. “The objective of the disclosure obligation is to enable the parties to perform their 5
statutory function responsibly and ‘to promote an intelligent resolution of issues at an early stage
and without industrial strife.’” Clemson Bros., 290 NLRB 944, 944 n.5 (1988). Following an
appropriate request, and limited only by considerations of relevancy, the obligation arises from
the operation of the Act itself. Ellsworth Sheet Metal, 224 NLRB 1506 (1976). “The refusal of
an employer to provide a bargaining agent with information relevant to the Union’s task of 10
representing its constituency is a per se violation of the Act without regard to the employer’s
subjective good or bad faith.” Piggly Wiggly Midwest, LLC, 357 NLRB 2344, 2355 (2012)
(citing Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 220 NLRB 189, 191 (1975); Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 237
NLRB 747, 751 (1978), enfd. 603 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1979)).
15
Generally, information pertaining to terms and conditions of employees within the bargaining
unit is presumptively relevant. CVS Albany, LLC, 364 NLRB No. 122, slip op. at 2 (2016).
Where, by contrast, a union seeks information that does not concern the terms or conditions
within the bargaining unit, such as financial information or information regarding competitors,
there is no presumption of relevancy, and the “probable or potential relevance of the information 20
must be shown.” Caldwell Mfg. Co., 346 NLRB 1159, 1166 (2006) (citations omitted).
“Depending on the circumstances and reasons for the union’s interest, information that is not
presumptively relevant may have ‘an even more fundamental relevance than that considered
presumptively relevant.’” Boeing Co., 364 NLRB No. 24, slip op. at 10 (2016) (citing
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 25
928 (1969)).
The burden to show relevance is “not exceptionally heavy,” Leland Stanford Junior
University, 262 NLRB 136, 139 (1982), enfd. 715 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1983), and the Board
employs “a broad, discovery-type of standard.” Shoppers Food Warehouse Corp., 315 NLRB 30
258, 259 (1994). Ultimately, the question is whether there is a “probability that the desired
information [is] relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its statutory
duties and responsibilities.” NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). The
relevance of requested information may be established by the non-requesting party’s statements
and bargaining proposals themselves; it is well established that the duty to bargain “includes a 35
general duty to provide information needed by the bargaining representative to assess claims
made by the employer relevant to contract negotiations.” Caldwell Mfg. Co., 346 NLRB 1159,
1159–1160 (2006). As the Supreme Court has explicated, where a party asserts a position
without providing for a means of verification of the same, “[t]his is not collective bargaining.”
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956) (quoting Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 NLRB 40
837, 842–843 (1936)).
An employer that relies on its alleged “noncompetitiveness” to justify its proposals also
makes relevant information that would assist the union in formulating counterproposals. Under
such circumstances, the Board has explained, the Union is entitled to information that might 45
permit it to “generate alternatives to wage and benefit concessions through which the
JD(SF)–48–16
18
[r]espondent could become more competitive, such as by increasing or reducing costs in other
areas. CalMat Co., 331 NLRB 1084, 1096–1097 (2002); see also National Extrusion & Mfg.
Co., 357 NLRB 127, 128 (2011) (where employer “premised its demand for substantial wage
concessions on its asserted competitive disadvantage in the workplace,” it was obligated to
provide requested information regarding current and former customers, job quotes, outsourcing, 5
pricing structure, market studies and competitors); Caldwell Mfg., supra at 1160 (finding relevant
union’s request for detailed information involving costs, productivity, and competitor
performance where employer asserted that concessions were necessary in order to make a less
competitive facility viable and to become more competitive in the industry); E. I. du Pont & Co.,
276 NLRB 335, 336 (1985) (finding relevant production cost and competitor data where 10
employer proposed a major restructuring of production jobs).
A somewhat different situation is presented where an employer supports its bargaining
position by claiming not a concern about remaining competitive but remaining financially viable
without concessions from the union; this has been traditionally referred to as “pleading poverty.” 15
An employer claiming to be in such a situation must disclose financial information to
substantiate its claim, which may include financial statements disclosing its revenue and
expenses. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., supra at 152–153. This principle is not limited to situations
in which the employer claims actual insolvency; it may also apply where an employer relies on
past and ongoing financial losses to justify its bargaining position. Cowin & Co., 277 NLRB 802 20
(1985). What has remained elusive for decades is a method of identifying what asserted degree
and imminence of financial distress triggers an employer’s obligation to ‘open its books.’
In this regard, the Board has – for the past 25 years – attempted to distinguish an employer’s
claim of inability to afford wages and benefits during the life of the contract being negotiated, 25
from claims that concessions are necessary to avoid placing it at a competitive disadvantage at
some (undisclosed) point in the future. The latter type of claim, the Board has held, will not
alone trigger a duty to disclose requested substantiating financial information. Nielsen
Lithographing Co., 305 NLRB 697 (1991), affd. sub nom. GCIU Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d
1168 (7th Cir. 1992).11 Recently, however, the Board acknowledged that the concepts of 30
“‘competitive disadvantage’ and ‘inability to pay,’ although different, are neither mutually
exclusive nor separated by a sharp dividing line.” Wayron, 364 NLRB No. 160, slip op. at 6
(2016). Thus, under certain circumstances, even absent express assertions of an inability to pay,
an employer’s statements amount to an effective assertion that “economic problems have led to
an inability to pay or will do so during the life of the contract being negotiated.” Id. (citing 35
Nielsen, 305 NLRB at 700). Thus, an employer that claims it cannot “remain competitive” while

11 This distinction between these two situations has been characterized as a difference between an
expressed inability to pay versus an unwillingness to do so; in deciding whether to strike or accede to the
employer’s proposals, it is argued, a union must understand which of these two situations it faces. See
generally Management’s Duty to Back Up Competitive Disadvantage Claims, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 675
(1994).
JD(SF)–48–16
19
paying what the union is demanding has been found to have made the equivalent of an inability-
to-pay claim, where it makes other statements indicating looming economic peril.12
Indeed, the Board has long held that no “magic words” are required to find that an employer
is claiming an inability to pay; this means that an employer whose overall conduct and 5
statements reasonably suggest an inability to pay cannot avoid financial disclosure merely by
scrubbing their talking points of references to financial hardship or playing “word games” by
making “carefully phrased assertions” regarding competitive disadvantage. Wayron, supra at 5.13
Instead, the Board will evaluate an employer’s claims within their overall context, including its
statements and actions, drawn from both credited testimony and the bargaining notes, in order to 10
determine whether the union would reasonably have understood that the employer was asserting
an inability to meet the union’s demands during the life of the contract being negotiated. Id. at 4,
6 (citing Nielsen, supra).
D. Respondent Failed to Provide Certain Relevant15
Information in Violation of Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
As set forth below, I find that, with the exception of Request 8, Respondent failed to provide
the information requested by the Union, in violation of the Act. What follows is an analysis, by
category, of each of the Union’s requests, as well as an assessment of Respondent’s asserted 20
affirmative defenses:
1. Requests related to claimed competitive disadvantage and competitor/advertiser data
(Requests 2 and 11)
25
I find that Requests 2 and 11 sought relevant information, and that, in each case, Respondent
has failed to offer any valid defense to its failure to respond to these requests.
At the outset of the parties’ negotiations, Fair presented – in fairly dramatic fashion – the
specter of new media competition as the primary, if not sole, rationale for the concessions it 30
sought from the Union. He spoke not in generalities, but of specific new media competitors
(Google, Amazon, etc.) who enjoyed the brand loyalty of the coveted millennial market, and then
held out this state of affairs as compelling that the Union abandon, inter alia, its exclusive work
jurisdiction. Considering the “end times” tone of his presentation, it is hardly surprising that the
Union sought information about the station’s new, formidable competitors. See Request 2(d). It 35

12 In Stanley Building Specialties Co., for example, the employer’s bargaining representative told the
union, “if we gave any more, at this time, that I didn’t see how we could remain competitive”; the
employer had previously told the union that it was “not making money” and “if we can’t make it here, one
of these days they will be closing the doors, because we have been losing money long enough.” 166
NLRB 984, 985 (1967). Under such circumstances, the Board found, the respondent’s claim that it was
unable to pay more than it was offering and remain competitive was, “in effect, a plea of inability to pay”
rendering its refusal to furnish financial information a violation of § 8(a)(5). Id. at 986 & n.5 (citations
omitted).
13 As the Board succinctly stated, “. . . good-faith bargaining in the context of financial hardship does
not follow the rules of the game ‘Password,’ such that the Respondent wins if it effectively circles around
a key word or phrase, successfully describing it without actually uttering it.” Wayron, supra, slip op. at 7.
JD(SF)–48–16
20
is likewise unremarkable that, when in response Respondent provided only academic and/or
industry publications and claimed to have no information pertinent to KGW itself, the Union
called its bluff with its November 18 follow-up request (Request 11), specifically seeking
documents regarding: (a) the station’s competitors, as well as KGW’s own advertising pricing
structure; (b) the station’s past and present advertisers (for the stated purpose of contacting them 5
about their interest in KGW versus other media outlets); and (c) feedback from the station’s
advertisers and viewers on the station’s programming and service. Tellingly, Respondent’s sole
response to this new request was Fair’s attempt to walk back his original remarks and claim that
Respondent was concerned not about competitiveness, but simply desired to “remain relevant.”
10
Based on the credible record evidence, I find that the documents sought by Requests 2(d)
and 11 regarding KGW’s competitors were made relevant by Fair’s opening remarks in
bargaining, as well as his insistence (at least until presented with the November 18 request) that
competition from new media was to blame for the substantial concessions Respondent sought.
See Caldwell, supra at 1169 (union entitled to information in respondent’s possession regarding 15
competitors, competitor’s products and competitor’s selling prices, given respondent’s claims
that its proposals were justified by a need to become more competitive); CalMat, supra at 1096–
1097 (employer’s claim that proposal was justified by its non-competitiveness entitles union to
information the employer has regarding competitors’ wages, benefits, productivity, prices, and
labor and material costs); E. I. du Pont & Co., supra at 335–336 (employer’s claim that proposal 20
was justified by need to “improve productivity” and “strengthen competitiveness at the plant”
entitled to union to “known comparative per unit costs at other plants operated by …
competitors”).
Likewise, to the extent that Fair suggested that Respondent’s proposals aimed to enhance 25
KGW’s ability to compete for advertising dollars, he put in play the question of whether a real
threat existed that could be measured in falling ratings and/or advertisers dropping the station. It
was sensible, under such circumstances, for Local 48 to seek to verify Respondent’s concerns, as
well as to investigate non-contractual causes for any loss of customers. See National Extrusion,
357 NLRB at 157. This is especially so considering how tenuous a connection Fair had drawn 30
between Respondent’s demanded contractual changes and its quest for competitiveness (or
alternately, “relevance”). In support of its claim that bargaining unit employees must forgo
contractual overtime pay and exclusive work jurisdiction, while accepting potentially unlimited
subcontracting and use of temporary workers in an effort to provide the station with more access
to content, Respondent offered a single example of a manager performing bargaining unit work 35
in order to cover breaking news. Certainly the Union was entitled to probe further Respondent’s
rationale for its demands.
The remaining portions of Local 48’s Request 2 sought information regarding KGW’s own
market share, ratings, revenue and expenses; these documents, according to Bishop, were 40
necessary to determine whether the new media competition Fair warned of was a ruse or a real
threat and, if the latter, how imminent a threat in terms of impact on Respondent’s finances. I
find that Fair made this information relevant by his comments at the bargaining table and in
particular, his prefatory remarks on July 16. In this regard, I reject Respondent’s contention that
Fair merely signaled a desire to make preemptive “adjustments for the future” based on the 45
“oncoming problem that KGW saw” that was unrelated to Respondent’s past or current
JD(SF)–48–16
21
performance. (R. Br. at 41) Fair did not limit his remarks to prognostication; he presented the
millennials’ brand loyalty as a current problem that was worsening. Despite Fair’s managing to
avoid invoking any “magic words,” every other aspect of his presentation suggested that the
KGW’s market share was currently being depleted by the “drastically increased” advertising
dollars being allocated to its competitors; as he put it, “this time it’s real.”14 5
By alluding to the decline of the newsprint industry and the extinction of its jobs, Fair
imparted a sense of urgency and impending crisis in terms of broadcast television in general, but
also managed to sow confusion about KGW’s own competitive position and the imminence of
the danger it faced. Instead of providing a straight-forward appraisal of the financial situation 10
KGW faced, Fair posited the allegorical “Chelsea” and told the Union it was at a “crossroads,”
(i.e., a point at which a critical decision—carrying far-reaching consequences—must be made).15
By presenting Respondent’s demands in this portentous but fact-free manner, Fair played coy
with the critical information necessary for Local 48 to make a reasonable assessment as to
whether Respondent was asserting an inability to meet the requirements of the parties’ expired 15
contract during the next contract’s term.16 This is exactly the gamesmanship the Board has
warned of in cases such as this. See Wayron, supra at 7. Under these circumstances, I find that
the remaining (i.e., non-competitor related) portions of the Union’s Request 2 sought
information that meets the Board’s standard for relevance.
20
I further reject Respondent’s claims that its asserted confidentiality interests privileged it to
ignore Requests 2 and 11. The Board recognizes that an employer’s claim of confidentiality
must be balanced against the requesting union’s need for the information as it acts as the
representative of its employee-members. Midwest Division – MMC, LLC, 362 NLRB No. 193,
slip op. at 3 (2015) (citing Kaleida Health, Inc., 356 NLRB 1373, 1378–1379 (2011) and Detroit 25
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. at 318–319). In order to trigger this balancing test, however, an
employer must first timely raise and prove that it has a legitimate confidentiality claim, Detroit
Newspaper Agency, 317 NLRB at 1072–1074. “Legitimate and substantial confidentiality and
privacy claims will be upheld, but blanket claims of confidentiality will not.” Pennsylvania
Power Co., 301 NLRB 1104, 1105 (1991) (footnote omitted); see also National Extrusion., supra 30
at 157 n.31 (finding respondent violated the Act where it failed to establish that names of current
or past customers were confidential).
Even assuming that Fair’s references to confidential financial and ratings information were
sufficient to establish the confidentiality of certain requested documents, this triggered an 35
obligation on Respondent’s part to bargain an accommodation over its concerns, which
Respondent indisputably failed to do. In the absence of any evidence of the Union failing to
respect such accommodations, Respondent’s failure to test the Union’s willingness to safeguard

14 It is true that Fair, obviously a skilled attorney, took care to avoid mentioning revenue losses and
insisted that financial inability was not at issue; this, however, was cast into doubt by non-attorney Lilly’s
slip indicating that Respondent had in fact considered specific budgetary issues in its analysis of the new
media competition concerns behind its proposals.
15 See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/crossroads.
16 It is telling, in this regard, that Respondent in its initial proposal indicated its intent to renegotiate
the very term of contract. (See Jt. Exh. 2)
JD(SF)–48–16
22
Respondent’s data demonstrates that it merely “raised confidentiality concerns as a reason to say
no.” National Extrusion, supra at 158; see also Reiss Viking, 312 NLRB 622, 622 n.4 (1993).
For the reasons expressed, the items sought by Requests 2 and 11 of the Union’s requests
for information letter must be produced, and Respondent’s failure to furnish this information 5
constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
2. Requests regarding specific bargaining proposals
(Requests 3-5, 7, 9, 13 and 14)
10
I find that each of the Union’s requests that it explicitly linked to specific Respondent
bargaining proposals (Requests 3-5, 7, 9, 13 and 14), sought relevant information, and that, in
each case, Respondent has failed to offer any valid defense to its failure to respond.
As a preliminary matter, I find that certain of this requested information—specifically, the 15
documents regarding payment of overtime wages (Request 7)—was presumptively relevant.
See, e.g., Cerro Wire & Cable Co., 337 NLRB No. 63 (2002) (not reported in Board volumes)
(overtime hours worked by bargaining unit employees for past 3 years presumptively relevant).
In fact, the only document provided in response to this entire group of requests was a chart
showing overtime paid over a portion of the requested time period, albeit missing the specific 20
information sought: a breakdown of overtime by type that would reveal the financial impact of
Respondent’s proposal to eliminate overtime pay. Essentially, Respondent was asking the Union
to give up contractually guaranteed wages without disclosing what actual dollar amount was at
stake.17
25
The remaining information requests that the Union linked to specific Respondent proposals
(Requests 3-5, 9, 13 and 14), while not presumptively relevant, meet the Board’s standard for
relevance as set forth supra. In this regard, I credit Bishop’s testimony that these requests were
made directly in response to Respondent’s specific bargaining proposals and sought information
necessary for the Union to meaningfully consider—and respond to—such proposals. 30
Respondent’s proposal to delete a standard “successors and assigns” clause from the parties’
contract, for example, would certainly take on added significance were the Union to learn of
documented steps taken by Respondent towards selling or restructuring KGW. (See Request 9)
Likewise, presented with a proposal to remove all contractual restrictions on Respondent’s
ability to assign bargaining unit work outside the unit, it was only logical—in order to formulate 35
a counterproposal—for the Union to seek documents that would shed light on Respondent’s
current ability to assign work (Request 13), as well as Respondent’s economic rationale for its
proposal, including labor costs and qualifications of those to whom the work could potentially be
assigned. (Request 3) In each case, the information sought is directly relevant to the Union’s
40

17 I found Fair’s claim that he believed Respondent had no such records to be wholly implausible.
JD(SF)–48–16
23
assessment of Respondent’s specific proposals and formulation of its own bargaining position as
it related to the concessions Respondent sought.18
As noted, much of the information Respondent did provide took the form of Fair’s verbal
representations. While there is no per se requirement that an information request be satisfied in 5
writing, providing information in a manner that actually impedes the process of bargaining is
insufficient. United Aircraft Corp., 192 NLRB 382, 389 (1971) (citing Lasko Metal Product,
Inc., 148 NLRB 976, 979 (1964)). Despite demanding sweeping changes to the parties’ contract,
Respondent—by Fair—played coy about its rationale for, and expected economic impact of,
these proposed changes. In this regard, Fair frequently hedged and qualified his verbal 10
responses, rendering them incomplete and therefore inadequate, as evidenced by the fact that the
Union was forced to renew these requests.19 Proposing the Respondent retain an unfettered right
to assign work away from unit employees, Fair fudged his answer to the Union’s requests on the
subject, stating that there were no “current plans” to do so and therefore it would be impossible
to identify those to whom it might assign such work. (Request 3) Months later, after 15
Respondent had actually proposed specific, non-jurisdictional language, it refused to respond to
the Union’s November 18 request (Request 13) for an update on its plans for work assignments.
Likewise, despite demanding the removal of successorship language, Respondent failed to
respond in any way to the Union’s request for documents relating to a potential sale or takeover
of the station (Request 9) as renewed by the Union on November 18. Based on the record as a 20
whole, it appears that Respondent’s conduct, including Fair’s hedging and word play, was
calculated not to supply the data requested, but rather to provide “limited information designed
to fashion conclusions for the [u]nion.” Wehr Constructors, Inc., 315 NLRB 867, 876 (1994).
Respondent argues that the Union had no valid motive for its requests and therefore acted in 25
bad faith. I disagree. “[T]he presumption is that the union acts in good faith when it requests
information from an employer until the contrary is shown.” Hawkins Construction Co., 285
NLRB 1313, 1314 (1987), enf. denied on other grounds 857 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1988);
International Paper Co., 319 NLRB 1253, 1266 (1995) enf. denied on other grounds 115 F.3d
1045 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The requirement of good faith “is met if at least one reason for the 30
demand can be justified.” Hawkins Construction, supra at 1314. Nor will a union requesting an
update of previously requested information be found to have engaged in bad faith. Watkins
Contracting, Inc., 335 NLRB 222 (2001). Here, not only were the Union’s requests directed at
specific Respondent bargaining proposals, they were made early in bargaining and not in the face

18 The same rationale applies to the Union’s requests (Requests 4, 5 and 14, respectively) regarding
the financial impact of Respondent’s proposals on subcontracting and use of temporary employees. West
Penn Power Co., 346 NLRB 425 (2006) (information regarding extent of employer’s subcontracting
relevant and necessary for union to determine its negotiating position on subcontracting); St. George
Warehouse, Inc., 341 NLRB 904 (2004) (information regarding employer’s use of temporary workers
relevant and necessary in view of union’s concern over employer’s erosion of unit work by use of such
workers), enfd. 420 F.3d 294 (2005).
19 For example, in response to the Union’s request about plans to assign bargaining unit work outside
the Union (Request 3), Fair (who identified himself as Gannett and then Tegna’s representative) stated,
“as to KGW,” there were no such plans. Likewise, with respect to subcontracting (Request 4), Fair
declared that no subcontracting was occurring and then qualified that his answer was limited to
subcontracting of the Union’s exclusive work.
JD(SF)–48–16
24
of a looming impasse declaration. Compare ACF Industries, LLC, 347 NLRB 1040 (2006)
(finding information request purely tactical where it followed extensive bargaining and the
union’s rejection of the employer’s final offer). I therefore find that Respondent has failed to
provide that any of the Union’s request were made in bad faith.20
5
For the reasons expressed, the items sought by Requests 3-5, 7, 9, 13 and 14 of the Union’s
requests for information must be produced, and Respondent’s failure to furnish this information
constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
3. Requests regarding corporate ownership, operation of KGW10
and the effects of the corporate restructuring (Request 8)
I find no merit to the General Counsel’s allegations regarding the Union’s Request 8,
seeking various documents related to KGW’s recent change in ownership and operational
responsibility. Such information is not presumptively relevant, and therefore the Union must 15
demonstrate its relevance. I find that, to the extent that the Union sought information meeting
the Board’s relevance standard, Respondent satisfied its obligation to disclose such information.
The Union’s original request for documents related to the recent corporate restructuring
sought a wide swath of documents ranging from board of directors meeting minutes to all 20
documents relating to the “effects” of the transaction. Of course, it is well established that a
request seeking voluminous documents, without more, will not be considered to have been made
in bad faith. Mission Foods, 345 NLRB 788 (2005). Moreover, faced with new station
ownership and a new bargaining partner (Fair) who demanded deep concessions in the name of
management “flexibility,” Local 48 had a legitimate interest in understanding Respondent’s role 25
in managing the station. I find, however, that Respondent provided information sufficient to
satisfy these inquiries.
By his remarks on July 30–31, Fair assured the Union that day-to-day operations would
remain in the hands of KGW managers. He also provided sufficient publically available 30
documents for the Union to ‘unpack’ the admittedly complex (and largely regulatory driven)
transaction that had occurred. Thus, while the Union legitimately sought to understand the
nature of the recent restructuring, once Fair had provided an oral explanation supplemented by
publicly available SEC filings, the remaining documents the Union sought (including articles of
incorporation and bylaws, the identity of Respondent’s shareholders and minutes for board of 35
directors and shareholders meetings) became superfluous and Respondent’s obligation to provide
responsive information was satisfied.
The General Counsel argues that, following Fair’s remarks on July 30-31 regarding the
corporate transaction and his provision of SEC filings, the Union nonetheless required the items 40
sought by its Request 8 in order to vet its theory that the change in ownership, and not
competition from new media outlets, was responsible for Respondent’s proposals. Based on the

20 I find Respondent’s reliance on the Board’s United Parcel Service (Teamsters Local 373) decision
misplaced, in that the Board in that case explicitly declined to rely on the administrative law judge’s
conclusion that the requesting union had acted in bad faith. See 362 NLRB No. 22, slip op. at 3 & n.12
(2015).
JD(SF)–48–16
25
credible record evidence, I cannot agree. As a preliminary matter, the Union waited 4 months to
offer this explanation of relevance to Respondent. Moreover, as Bishop admitted, the rationale
was itself based an assumption that Respondent, having taken over management of the station,
had been advised to seek the concessions at issue. Nor is there any evidence that the Union was
concerned that the admittedly complex series of acquisitions, mergers and spinoffs between 5
Belo, Sanders Media, Gannett and Tegna in any way implicated the scope of the Union’s
bargaining role or represented an effort to avoid bargaining on behalf of the unit employees.
Instead, the Union offered “at best . . . a hypothetical theory” about the relationship between
Respondent’s restructuring and its proposals insufficient to support its need for the array of
documents sought by Request 8. Sheraton Hartford Hotel, 289 NLRB 463, 464 (1985) (mere 10
suspicion alone does not suffice to support a request for non-presumptively relevant
information).
Under the circumstances, I find that the Union has not established that the information sought
by Request 8 —beyond the scope of the information Respondent in fact provided—was 15
necessary for, and relevant to, the Union’s performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the bargaining unit employees.21 For the reasons expressed, I
recommend dismissal of the General Counsel’s allegations regarding the information sought by
Request 8.
20
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Tegna, Inc. is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.25
2. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 48, AFL–CIO is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act with Section 9(a) status under the
Act.
30
3. The following employees of Respondent constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act (the unit):
All technicians and engineers employed in Respondent’s KGW-TV
television engineering department, excluding all other employees, 35
guards, supervisors, and professional employees as defined in the
National Labor Relations Act.
4. At all material times, Respondent has recognized the Union as the designated
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees.40

21 Of course, this does not excuse Respondent’s failure to provide the remaining information sought
by the Union. See Excel Rehabilitation & Health Center, 336 NLRB No. 10, slip op. at 2 n.1 (2001) (not
reported in Board volumes).
JD(SF)–48–16
26
5. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to
supply the following information to the Union:
(a) Data reports, analysis, communications, and other documents, since October 24,
2011, concerning:5
(i) KGW’s market share, ratings, and viewership;
(ii) KGW’s revenue;
(iii) KGW’s expenses;
(iv) Competition from other media outlets such as Google, Amazon, etc., in
Portland, Oregon, and nationally; and10
(v) Changes in advertising placement and revenue for television stations
including KGW;
(b) Documents, analyses, or communications concerning plans to assign unit work to
non-unit individuals;
(c) The job descriptions and current wage rates of employees to whom such work 15
would be assigned if Respondent’s non-exclusive jurisdiction proposal were
implemented;
(d) Written agreements between KGW and other entities for subcontracted work
since October 24, 2011;
(e) Documents about customer, calendar period, and dollar volume of subcontract 20
work since October 24, 2011;
(f) Documents, analysis, and communications concerning any plans to subcontract
unit work;
(g) A list of all individuals who have been hired as temporary employees since
October 24, 2014, including date of hire, rate of pay, classification, date of 25
termination, and reason for hiring;
(h) A copy of company policies and procedures for hiring temporary employees;
(i) An accounting of all overtime paid to all unit employees since October 24, 2011,
with breakdowns showing the number of overtime hours worked and paid, the
amount of overtime pay, and whether the overtime occurred on regular days off, 30
holidays, or regular work days;
(j) Reports from consultants, investment advisors, certified public accounts or others
concerning the possible sale, takeover, or restructuring of KGW;
(k) Correspondence about the possible sale, takeover, or restructuring of KGW;
(l) A list of media content providers that Respondent views as KGW’s primary 35
competitors;
(m) A description of KGW’s advertising pricing structure so the Union may compare
KGW’s advertising prices to those of competitors;
(n) A list of KGW’s current advertisers so the Union may contact them to determine
if they have or will consider purchasing advertising from a different provider;40
(o) A list of all of KGW’s advertisers who have ceased buying advertising from
KGW since October 24, 2011, so the Union may contact them and determine why
they stopped purchasing advertising from KGW;
(p) A list of all KGW’s advertising prospects since October 24, 2011, that KGW
contacted concerning purchasing advertising but that ultimately did not choose to 45
JD(SF)–48–16
27
purchase advertising, so the Union may contact them and determine why they
chose not to purchase advertising from KGW;
(q) All documents, reports, and analyses concerning KGW’s ratings, television
viewership and web and/or mobile readership/viewership since October 24, 2011;
(r) Viewer/consumer comments and complaints received since October 24, 2011, 5
concerning KGW’s programming and service;
(s) Advertiser comments and complaints received since October 24, 2011,
concerning KGW’s programming and service;
(t) Documents concerning all changes in job responsibilities for members
represented by IATSE since October 24, 2011, including but not limited to10
changes in responsibilities concerning operation of KGW news trucks;
(u) Documents concerning IATSE members’ training and qualifications for operation
of KGW news trucks; and
(v) Documents concerning job title, responsibilities, pay, benefits, and hours for
employees Dave Tinkham (from January 1, 2011 to the date of the Union’s 15
request) and John Morgan (from January 1, 2008 to the date of the Union’s
request).
6. The unfair labor practices, described above, affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.20
III. REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it
must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate 25
the policies of the Act. Specifically, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to supply the
requested information, set forth above, to the Union. Insofar as Respondent contends that
supplying the Union with financial, market share, ratings or viewership information would
compromise the confidentiality of proprietary information, Respondent shall furnish such
requested information subject to bargaining in good faith regarding the conditions under which 30
the information may be furnished, so that access is provided in a manner consistent with
monitoring appropriate safeguards protective of the Respondent’s confidentiality concerns.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended22
35

22 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(SF)–48–16
28
IV. ORDER
The Respondent, Tegna, Inc. d/b/a KGW-TV, Portland, Oregon, its officers, agents, successors
and assigns, shall
5
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to timely and completely supply information to the Union
that is relevant and necessary to the Union’s performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit (the unit):10
All technicians and engineers employed in Respondent’s KGW-TV
television engineering department, excluding all other employees,
guards, supervisors, and professional employees as defined in the
National Labor Relations Act. 15
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.20
(a) Furnish to the Union, upon request, the following information subject to
bargaining in good faith concerning the conditions under which any financial, market share,
ratings or viewership information may be supplied such that access is provided in a manner
consistent with maintaining appropriate safeguards protective of the Respondent’s legitimate 25
confidentiality interests:
i. Data reports, analysis, communications, and other documents, since
October 24, 2011, concerning:
(a) KGW’s market share, ratings, and viewership;30
(b) KGW’s revenue;
(c) KGW’s expenses;
(d) Competition from other media outlets such as Google, Amazon, etc., in
Portland, Oregon, and nationally; and
(e) Changes in advertising placement and revenue for television stations 35
including KGW;
ii. Documents, analyses, or communications concerning plans to assign unit work to
non-unit individuals;
iii. The job descriptions and current wage rates of employees to whom such work
would be assigned if Respondent’s non-exclusive jurisdiction proposal were 40
implemented;
iv. Written agreements between KGW and other entities for subcontracted work
since October 24, 2011;
v. Documents about customer, calendar period, and dollar volume of subcontract
work since October 24, 2011;45
JD(SF)–48–16
29
vi. Documents, analysis, and communications concerning any plans to subcontract
unit work;
vii. A list of all individuals who have been hired as temporary employees since
October 24, 2014, including date of hire, rate of pay, classification, date of
termination, and reason for hiring;5
viii. A copy of company policies and procedures for hiring temporary employees;
ix. An accounting of all overtime paid to all unit employees since October 24, 2011,
with breakdowns showing the number of overtime hours worked and paid, the
amount of overtime pay, and whether the overtime occurred on regular days off,
holidays, or regular work days;10
x. Reports from consultants, investment advisors, certified public accounts or others
concerning the possible sale, takeover, or restructuring of KGW;
xi. Correspondence about the possible sale, takeover, or restructuring of KGW;
xii. A list of media content providers that Respondent views as KGW’s primary
competitors;15
xiii. A description of KGW’s advertising pricing structure so the Union may compare
KGW’s advertising prices to those of competitors;
xiv. A list of KGW’s current advertisers so the Union may contact them to determine
if they have or will consider purchasing advertising from a different provider;
xv. A list of all of KGW’s advertisers who have ceased buying advertising from 20
KGW since October 24, 2011, so the Union may contact them and determine why
they stopped purchasing advertising from KGW;
xvi. A list of all KGW’s advertising prospects since October 24, 2011, that KGW
contacted concerning purchasing advertising but that ultimately did not choose to
purchase advertising, so the Union may contact them and determine why they 25
chose not to purchase advertising from KGW;
xvii. All documents, reports, and analyses concerning KGW’s ratings, television
viewership and web and/or mobile readership/viewership since October 24, 2011;
xviii. Viewer/consumer comments and complaints received since October 24, 2011,
concerning KGW’s programming and service; 30
xix. Advertiser comments and complaints received since October 24, 2011,
concerning KGW’s programming and service;
xx. Documents concerning all changes in job responsibilities for members
represented by IATSE since October 24, 2011, including but not limited to
changes in responsibilities concerning operation of KGW news trucks; 35
xxi. Documents concerning IATSE members’ training and qualifications for operation
of KGW news trucks; and
xxii. Documents concerning job title, responsibilities, pay, benefits, and hours for
employees Dave Tinkham (from January 1, 2011 to the date of the Union’s
request) and John Morgan (from January 1, 2008 to the date of the Union’s 40
request).
JD(SF)–48–16
30
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Portland, Oregon job
location copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”23 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, after being signed by Respondent’s authorized
representative, shall be posted by Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. 5
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings,
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current
employees and former employees employed by Respondent at any time since January 30, 2014.10
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for
Region 19 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
15
It is further ordered that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
specifically found.
20
Dated: Washington, D.C. December 20, 2016
Mara-Louise Anzalone
Administrative Law Judge25

23 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefits and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to timely and completely supply information to the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 48, AFL–CIO (the Union) that is relevant and
necessary to its performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
its employees in the following appropriate unit:
All technicians and engineers employed in KGW-TV’s television
engineering department, excluding all other employees, guards,
supervisors, and professional employees as defined in the National
Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL furnish to the Union, in a timely and complete manner, the following information:
(a) Data reports, analysis, communications, and other documents, since
October 24, 2011, concerning:
(i) KGW’s market share, ratings, and viewership;
(ii) KGW’s revenue;
(iii) KGW’s expenses;
(iv) Competition from other media outlets such as Google, Amazon, etc., in
Portland, Oregon, and nationally; and
(v) Changes in advertising placement and revenue for television stations
including KGW;
(b) Documents, analyses, or communications concerning plans to assign Unit work to
non-Unit individuals;
(c) The job descriptions and current wage rates of employees to whom such work would
be assigned if Respondent’s non-exclusive jurisdiction proposal were implemented;
(d) Written agreements between KGW and other entities for subcontracted work since
October 24, 2011;
(e) Documents about customer, calendar period, and dollar volume of subcontract work
since October 24, 2011;
(f) Documents, analysis, and communications concerning any plans to subcontract Unit
work;
(g) A list of all individuals who have been hired as temporary employees since October
24, 2014, including date of hire, rate of pay, classification, date of termination, and
reason for hiring;
(h) A copy of company policies and procedures for hiring temporary employees;
(i) An accounting of all overtime paid to all Unit employees since October 24, 2011,
with breakdowns showing the number of overtime hours worked and paid, the
amount of overtime pay, and whether the overtime occurred on regular days off,
holidays, or regular work days;
(j) Reports from consultants, investment advisors, certified public accounts or others
concerning the possible sale, takeover, or restructuring of KGW;
(k) Correspondence about the possible sale, takeover, or restructuring of KGW;
(l) A list of media content providers that Respondent views as KGW’s primary
competitors;
(m) A description of KGW’s advertising pricing structure so the Union may compare
KGW’s advertising prices to those of competitors;
(n) A list of KGW’s current advertisers so the Union may contact them to determine if
they have or will consider purchasing advertising from a different provider;
(o) A list of all of KGW’s advertisers who have ceased buying advertising from KGW
since October 24, 2011, so the Union may contact them and determine why they
stopped purchasing advertising from KGW;
(p) A list of all KGW’s advertising prospects since October 24, 2011, that KGW
contacted concerning purchasing advertising but that ultimately did not choose to
purchase advertising, so the Union may contact them and determine why they chose
not to purchase advertising from KGW;
(q) All documents, reports, and analyses concerning KGW’s ratings, television
viewership and web and/or mobile readership/viewership since October 24, 2011;
(r) Viewer/consumer comments and complaints received since October 24, 2011,
concerning KGW’s programming and service;
(s) Advertiser comments and complaints received since October 24, 2011, concerning
KGW’s programming and service;
(t) Documents concerning all changes in job responsibilities for members represented by
IATSE since October 24, 2011, including but not limited to changes in
responsibilities concerning operation of KGW news trucks;
(u) Documents concerning IATSE members’ training and qualifications for operation of
KGW news trucks; and
(v) Documents concerning job title, responsibilities, pay, benefits, and hours for
employees Dave Tinkham (from January 1, 2011 to the date of the request) and John
Morgan (from January 1, 2008 to the date of the request), who were employed as
subcontractors after retiring from Unit positions.
TEGNA, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
915 2nd Avenue, Federal Building, Room 2948
Seattle, Washington 98174-1078
Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
206-220-6300.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/19-CA-148474 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 206-220-6284.