San Juan Teachers Association

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Nov 4, 2009

20-CA-034254 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 4, 2009)

JD(SF)–37–09
Carmichael, CA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
SAN JUAN TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
and Case: 20-CA-34254
CALIFORNIA STAFF ORGANIZATION
Shelley Brenner, Atty., NLRB Region 20,
San Francisco, CA, for General Counsel.
Robert L. Rediger, Atty., Rediger, McHugh, & Hubbert,
Sacramento, CA, for Respondent.
Eleanor I. Morton, Atty., Leonard Carder, LLP,
San Francisco, CA, for Charging Party.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
WILLIAM L. SCHMIDT, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this case on June 2 and 3,
2009, at Sacramento, California, pursuant to a Complaint and Notice of Hearing issued by the
Regional Director for Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board). The
Complaint alleges Respondent, San Juan Teachers Association (Respondent or SJTA) violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) by unilaterally reducing the
weekly work hours of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit represented by the
California Staff Organization (CSO or Charging Party). Respondent filed an answer denying
that it engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged and interposing certain affirmative defenses.
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed on behalf of General Counsel, Charging Party, and
Respondent, I make the following
Findings of Fact
Respondent is, and has been at all material times, an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and it would
effectuate the purposes of the Act for the Board to exercise its jurisdiction to
resolve this labor dispute.
Respondent, a labor organization, is an unincorporated association with a place of
business in Carmichael, California, where it represents employees employed by the San Juan
Unified School District. In the course of its business operations during the twelve-month period
ending January 31, 2009, Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000, and
purchased and received at its Carmichael, California, place of business materials or services
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valued in excess of $5,000, which originated from points outside the State of California. Based
on the foregoing, I find that the Board should exercise its statutory jurisdiction to resolve this
labor dispute.
At relevant times, CSO, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act, has been the exclusive collective bargaining representative under Section
9(a) of the Act for the SJTA’s secretarial and clerical employees.
The complaint alleges and the answer admits that CSO is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
At relevant times, Respondent employed the following individuals: 1) Steve Duditch,
president; 2) Tom Alves, executive director; 3) Sandra Galindo, associate executive director;
4) Lucia Guzman, secretary, and 5) Judy Mannis, secretary. All five have been permanently
employed by Respondent throughout the period covered by this proceeding. Guzman and
Mannis began working for Respondent in 1995. Throughout their employment history until
November 2008, they worked a “24/32” schedule, meaning that they alternated working 32
hours one week and 24 hours the next week.
In April 2006, Guzman and Mannis designated the CSO as their agent for collective
bargaining purposes and Respondent voluntarily recognized CSO as the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of its secretarial and clerical employees (the clerical unit) on April 17,
2006. The clerical unit is an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. Since June 20, 2006, Respondent and CSO have met in 12
negotiating sessions attempting to conclude an initial collective bargaining agreement. By the
time of the hearing, the parties had not reached a final agreement.
In September 1998, Respondent executed a Non-Bargaining Unit Beneficiaries
Participation Agreement (NBU Participation Agreement or 1998 Agreement) with
the California Teachers Association Health and Welfare Trust (CTA Trust) that
contained a provision requiring participating employers to enroll all permanent
employees working more than twenty hours per week in the Trust’s benefit plans.
Duditch, on behalf of SJTA, executed a NBU Participation Agreement on September 14,
1998, with the intention of providing Alves and Galindo with certain fringe benefits available
through the CTA Trust so they would be on a par with their counterparts employed by the CTA.
(Jt. Exh. 16)
Section A.1 of the Agreement recites that the California Teachers Association (CTA), the
CSO, and the California Associate Staff (CAS) established the Trust “for certain eligible . . .
employees and employee dependents.” The Agreement provides for participation by certain
other “labor organization employers.” Respondent qualified under the terms of the Agreement
as a “California affiliate of the National Education Association.”1 The CTA Trust provides
insurance for medical, dental, and vision care as well as other incidental forms of coverage.

1 The bottom strip on the SJTA’s stationery also implies that it is a CTA affiliate. The
General Counsel characterized the Trust as a “multi-employer trust.” In fact, the recitals in the
Participation Agreement indicate otherwise and no evidence establishes that participation by
“other labor organization employers” makes them eligible to share in governing the Trust.
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Section B.1.b of the 1998 Agreement obligated SJTA to enroll “all eligible employees in
the Plans selected for coverage, and perform administration services in connection with such
enrollment.” Section B.3.a defines an “eligible employee” as a “permanent employee who is
actively at work a minimum of twenty (20) hours of week (sic) at his or her customary place of
employment, and who complies with the eligibility requirements set forth Exhibit ‘B’” attached to
the 1998 Agreement. The Exhibit B eligibility requirements are twofold; the first requires
eligibility under the chosen insurance plans and the second requires qualification under the
previously mentioned twenty-hour rule. The 1998 Agreement designates covered employees
“beneficiaries.” By its terms, retirees cannot qualify as beneficiaries.2 Agreement Section B.3.c;
Agreement Exhibit B, Section II. 4.
At the time Duditch executed the 1998 Agreement, the SJTA employed the
aforementioned five individuals, to wit, Duditch, Alves, Galindo, who worked full time, and the
two statutory employees, Guzman and Mannis, who worked an alternating schedule in excess
of twenty hours per week.
In the period following the execution of the 1998 Agreement, Respondent
contributed to the CTA Trust to pays for the active fringe benefit plans it provided
to Alves and Galindo, and a retiree health benefit plan for all five individuals
employed by SJTA.
After signing the 1998 Agreement, SJTA only enrolled Alves and Galindo in the CTA
Trust fringe benefit plans. They continued to receive coverage from this source at least up to
the time of the hearing.3 (Jt. Exh. 16, Individual Employee Benefits Election Form - 1998-1999
Plan Year.) Respondent never enrolled Guzman and Mannis in the CTA Trust fringe benefit
plans. Instead, it obtained health insurance coverage for Guzman through a special
arrangement with the San Juan School District. Mannis always elected the health insurance
coverage available to her through her husband’s employer; she has never relied on the SJTA
for her health insurance. Duditch described the insurance Alves and Galindo receive under the
CTA Trust as a “Cadillac” plan, implying that their coverage was superior to that the SJTA
provided for Guzman.
In addition to the contributions made to the CTA Trust on behalf of Alves and Galindo’s
health and other miscellaneous fringe benefits, the SJTA contributed 8% of its payroll to the
Trust to enroll all five employees in the retiree health benefit plan provided by the CTA Trust.
In April 2008, the CTA Trust determined that the SJTA failed to comply with the
terms of the 1998 Agreement over the past nine years by failing to enroll and pay
for active fringe benefits on behalf of all eligible employees.
In late 2007, the CSO negotiators bargaining on behalf of the clerical unit learned from
the employees that SJTA paid the CTA Trust to provide retiree medical benefits for all of its

2 A subsequent edition of the CTA Trust NBU Participation Agreement as well as its
Bargaining Unit Participation Agreement provide for retiree medical benefits. Jt. Exh. 12; R.
Exh. 6. The latter presupposes the existence of a collective bargaining agreement, also
requires coverage for all permanent employees who work at least 20 hours per week, and
contains a very questionable mandatory union membership requirement.
3 The SJTA selected and paid for the following fringe benefits through the CTA Trust for
Alves and Galindo: medical, dental, vision and behavioral health insurance, life insurance,
accidental death and dismemberment insurance, and a salary protection plan.
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employees but only paid it to provide current fringe benefits for its two managerial employees.
Marilyn Arden, one of the CSO negotiators who also had been an alternate trustee for the Trust
since 2000, contacted a CTA Trust representative seeking explanation of the SJTA’s unusual
arrangement with the Trust and learned that the Trust representative was also looking into the
situation.4 (Tr. 60-61)
By a letter dated January 15, 2008, Nathan Hartman, one of the CTA Trust
administrative managers, wrote to SJTA seeking certain specific information. Hartman
predicated his inquiry on SJTA’s practice of paying for the current fringe benefits Alves and
Galindo but also paying for retiree medical benefits on behalf of five employees even though the
1998 Agreement contained no provision for “any contribution to fund the retiree medical
benefits.” Hartman requested that Respondent provide the following information: (1) whether
any of the employees covered by both types of contributions were bargaining unit employees;
(2) the reason Respondent submitted contributions as it had been doing for two employees
while also contributing to the retiree plan on behalf of five employees; and (3) whether
Respondent employed any others for whom it made no contributions. (Jt. Exh. 1)
The SJTA responded in a letter dated January 31, that Mannis prepared and Duditch
signed. That letter explained that the SJTA had been paying the CTA Trust to cover the active
(current) fringe benefits for Executive Director Alves and Associate Executive Director Galindo,
and the retiree medical benefits for all five SJTA employees because “[w]e understood that all
employees working more than 20 hours per week were enrolled in the retiree health plan.5 The
letter stated that there were no other employees for whom SJTA did not make contributions but
it never really answered the bargaining unit question posed by Hartman. Instead, it described
the CSO membership history of Alves, Galindo, Guzman, and Mannis.
In a letter dated April 1, Hannah Sutton, another manager for the CTA Trust
administrator, wrote to Duditch explaining that the SJTA “is reporting incorrectly” to the Trust.
(Jt. Exh. 4) She explained that as the SJTA executed a “non-bargaining unit participation
agreement,” it could only report on non-bargaining unit employees. The SJTA violated the
Agreement, Sutton explained, by remitting payments for retiree benefits on behalf of two
bargaining unit employees. According to Sutton, “[u]nless you sign a bargaining unit
participation agreement you may not contribute on behalf of any bargaining unit employee.”
(Emphasis added) For that reason, Sutton stated that the CTA Trust would no longer accept
payments made on behalf of the unit employees. However, Sutton told Duditch that, if SJTA
signed a bargaining unit participation agreement, it would be obliged to purchase the Trust’s
active fringe benefits for the bargaining unit employees. She also told him that he could apply to
the Trust for a refund of the retiree benefit payments made on behalf of the unit employees and
that he could even cancel SJTA’s participation in the CTA Trust with a timely notice.

4 In other words, Arden would have me believe that her inquiry and the Trust’s realization
after nine years that the SJTA might not be paying all that it should was a mere coincidence. I
do not credit Arden’s claim as to what the CTA Trust representative told her. Instead, I strongly
suspect that the CSO negotiators used the CTA Trust tactically to shortcut bargaining over
health benefits.
5 Apparently, Duditch receives his current fringe benefits from another source altogether.
Although it is of little or no significance, his January 31 letter seems contradictory (compare
paragraph no. 1 with paragraph no. 2) as to whether the SJTA contributed to the Trust on his
behalf for retiree health benefits.
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Duditch responded to Sutton on April 17 attempting to correct certain representations
made in his January 31 letter. Thus, he clarified the earlier answer that arguably implied four of
the SJTA employees were bargaining unit members based on their current or prior CSO
membership. Duditch explained that the correct answer to the first question Hartman posed in
his January 15 letter should have been that none of those for whom SJTA had been submitted
contributions were unit employees. He then went on to state that the SJTA contributed to the
CTA Trust for the “two part-time employees,” i.e., Guzman and Mannis, because they “believe
that they were entitled to claim retiree health benefits” even though they “do not claim the [Trust]
benefit package.” Duditch asked Sutton to clarify for him which of the two participation
agreements (non-bargaining unit or bargaining unit) SJTA should sign so that it “can participate
as an Option two affiliate that only has employees who work for the [SJTA].” Although the
quoted portion of that particular sentence seemed to muddle the situation all over again, he
explained in a subsequent paragraph that if “SJTA must contribute the cost of health plan
benefits for part-time employees regardless of whether there is any collective bargaining
agreement” he wanted to know the rationale and he asked that the SJTA be granted “a waiver
from such a stipulation.” Duditch explained that the SJTA had provided health care benefits to
the part-timers independent of the Trust “for more than twenty years for cost-saving reasons.”
Two weeks later, Sutton acknowledged Duditch’s April 17 letter and explained that she
would get back to him after discussing his questions with legal counsel for the CTA Trust and
“possibly the Trustees.” In a letter dated June 13 (Jt. Exh. 6), Sutton informed Duditch that the
trustees had denied his request for a waiver from the requirement, in effect, that all of the SJTA
employees be covered with active benefits by reason of the twenty-hour rule. She went on to
advise (seemingly contrary to the position taken in her April 1 letter) that the CTA Trust
Participation Agreement Section B 3 a. required SJTA to contribute on behalf of “all eligible
employees” including “the two employees not currently being reported.” Sutton told Duditch that
compliance would be required by August 1 and the cost for the two unit employees would be the
same as what SJTA paid for Alves and Galindo.
Duditch sought reconsideration of his request for a waiver. Although the CTA Trust
rescinded the August 1 compliance deadline, it notified the SJTA in a letter dated October 27
that the trustees had denied the requested waiver and advised that the unit employees had to
be covered or coverage for SJTA’s other employees (Alves and Galindo) would cease as of
January 1, 2009. The letter also advised that if SJTA desired to continue its participation in the
retiree health program, it would “need to sign a new Participation Agreement that calls for such
contributions.” The letter requested that the SJTA respond to the Trust administrators by
December 1 as the Trustees would meet soon thereafter “to finalize this matter.” (Jt. Exh. 9)
To comply with the CTA Trust directive, Respondent reduced the regular work
week of Guzman and Mannis to 19.5 hours effective November 17 in order to
preserve the fringe benefits enjoyed by Alves and Galindo through the CTA Trust.
Respondent’s answer to the complaint admitted that it reduced the weekly work hours of
each unit employee on or about November 17 and that this matter amounted to a mandatory
subject of bargaining. (GC Exh. 1(f): Answer to Complaint para. 1)
The evidence shows likewise. Following receipt of the October 27 ultimatum from the
CTA Trust, the SJTA board of directors met on November 4 and decided to reduce the hours of
Guzman and Mannis so they would not be eligible employees under the terms of the
Participation Agreement. On November 12, Duditch and SJTA vice president Christina Williams
gave Guzman and Mannis each a letter informing them that as of November 17, their work
schedules “will consist of 19.5 hours per work week.” The letter states that the reduction in
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hours “is the result of a decline in work at the office as well as the need for SJTA to avoid having
to pay a premium on your behalf to the [CTA Trust] for duplicative benefits.” The letter goes on
to state that the CTA Trust denied the SJTA’s request for a waiver of the twenty-hour rule and
concluded with the assertion that it was in “both of our interest to maintain the health benefits
you are currently receiving, and SJTA not incurring . . . unnecessary costs by having to remit a
premium on your behalf to the Trust.” (Jt. Exhs. 10 and 11)
That same day Duditch sent the CTA Trust a new NBU Participation Agreement (2008
Agreement) to cover Alves and Galindo along with a letter stating that the “other two part-time
employees in question no longer meet the eligibility requirements for enrollment.” (Jt. Exh. 12)
Conclusion of Law
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by reducing the work week
of Guzman and Mannis without properly notifying the CSO and providing it with
an opportunity to bargain over the reduction in their hours of work.
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. Section 8(d) defines the term
“bargain collectively” as the mutual obligation of the employer and the employee representative
to ‘‘meet . . . and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment.’’ Those matters falling within the scope of Section 8(d) are
mandatory subjects of bargaining. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). An
employer violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by making a “unilateral change in conditions of
employment under negotiation . . . for it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which
frustrates the objectives of § 8(a)(5) much as does a flat refusal.” NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736,
742 (1962). Here, I find Respondent needed only to notify CSO and provide it with an
opportunity to bargain about a proposal to change the employee hours in order to comply with
its obligations to the CTA Trust, a discreet, separable issue independent of the negotiations for
a complete collective bargaining agreement. Stone Container Corp., 313 NLRB 336 (1993).
In its defense, Respondent’s answer affirmatively alleged in its answer to the complaint
that it provided notice to the CSO and an opportunity or it to bargain over the reduction in hours
question; that the CSO “delayed and avoided bargaining” over this subject; and that economic
exigencies compelled Respondent to act promptly to reduce the hours of the unit employees.
(GC Exh. 1(f): Answer to Complaint, First, Second, and Third Affirmative Defenses) SJTA
argued in its post-hearing brief that it notified the CSO that the unit employees hours would be
reduce on several occasions but the union failed to avail itself to the opportunity to bargain
about that subject. Respondent had the burden of proving its affirmative defenses. For reasons
detailed below, I find Respondent failed to meet its burden.
Duditch’s wrote a letter dated July 7 that arguably contains a proper notice and request
to bargain over a proposed change in unit employees’ hours of work, but the evidence
concerning receipt of that letter by the addressee, CSO counsel Eleanor Morton, or any other
CSO agent, is problematic.6 For purposes of receipt, Respondent needed to obtain an

6 In the final paragraph of that letter, Duditch wrote: “I am requesting that the parties meet
during the month of July to discuss this matter and potential solutions. SJTA is contemplating
reducing the hours of the two employees in the bargaining unit to 19.5 per work week effective
August 1, 2008 to meet its business needs and to avoid having to incur the unnecessary cost of
including them in the Trust.” R. Exh. 4.
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admission binding on the CSO or its counsel that the letter had been received, or to produce
evidence sufficient to warrant a presumption of receipt.
Respondent obtained no admission from CSO’s counsel or any other CSO agent that
the July 7 letter had been received in due course. Likewise, Respondent failed to prove facts
sufficient to establish that this letter was ever mailed or faxed to CSO’s counsel so as to give
rise to a presumption of receipt.
Federal common law follows the so-called “mail box rule” which provides that the proper
and timely mailing of a document gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the document has
been received by the addressee in the usual time. Schikore v. Bankamerica Supplemental
Retirement Plan, 269 F3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2001). The evidence in this case does not warrant
a presumption that Morton or any other CSO representative received the July 7 letter. Thus,
Duditch could not recall with any adequate degree of certainty that he mailed or faxed the
letter.7 In addition, Respondent failed to produce a facsimile transmission confirmation for the
letter, an essential prerequisite to invoking a presumption of receipt where the letter is
transmitted by that means. See e.g. Mulder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 855 F.2d
208, 212 (5th Cir. 1988) (return receipt for a letter sent by certified mail required in order to
establish a rebuttable presumption that the document has been received by the addressee.) As
the evidence is insufficient to show the letter was actually mailed or faxed, or to warrant a
presumption of receipt by Morton or the CSO, no burden to rebut receipt arose.8 See Rule 301,
Federal Rules of Evidence. Hence, this letter does not satisfy the notice requirement under
Section 8(a)(5).
In addition, Respondent claims that the CSO’s agents were told orally several times over
the course of its 2008 compliance controversy with the CTA Trust that the reduction in hours of
the unit employees was an option it might have to consider. By failing to request bargaining
after learning of that SJTA was considering the reduction in hours option, Respondent argues
that the CSO, in effect, waived its right to bargain about this subject and, therefore, SJTA did
not violate the Act by implementing this change when it did.
In support, Respondent points to a brief conversation on June 7 when Duditch
purportedly told DePue that “if we don t get the waiver, we have various options and one of the
options will be to reduce the hours of Judy and Lucia.” (Tr. 209)

7 For example, Duditch’s testified as follows on cross-examination by General Counsel:
Q But you have no memory of you personally mailing that letter to Ms. Morton?
A No. I do have a memory though, the memory clearly that it was such an urgent matter for
us that we hired counsel, it was such an urgent matter to get the letter out, it was such an
urgent matter because it was affecting the retirement of Alves and Galindo but, I cannot say I
can remember mailing a letter. I would like to say I can remember it but, I cannot say I
remember putting it in the mail.
Q Okay. And you have no memory of you personally faxing this letter to Eleanor Morton?
A No, I don t.
Tr. 238-39.
8 Morton denied that she saw Duditch’s July 7 letter until counsel for General Counsel
provided a copy to her during the investigation of this charge, long after the employees’ hours
had been reduced. I find it unnecessary to consider her denial. Even if I struck Morton’s
testimony as requested in Respondent’s post-hearing brief, no basis would exist to conclude
that Morton or any other CSO representative received Duditch’s July 7 letter in due course.
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Respondent also points to an October 27 meeting attended by SJTA managers Duditch,
Alves and Galindo, CSO representative DePue, and CTA Trustee Stephens.9 DePue arranged
this meeting so that Stephens, in his capacity as a CTA Trustee, could provide information to
the SJTA officials about the cost that would be involved to cover the two unit employees with the
CTA Trust benefits. This discussion was actually between Stephens and the SJTA officials;
DePue said little if anything during the entire meeting. At the time, the SJTA had not yet learned
that CTA Trust had denied their last waiver request. After Stephens calculated the cost for
covering the two unit employees, Alves purportedly stated that the cost was “problematic” and
that it “would be more strategic for the organization to cut their hours.” Stephens cautioned
against taking that step, suggesting instead that the SJTA might want to consider employee
only-coverage for the unit employees as a means of bringing the SJTA into compliance and
preserving coverage for managers Alves and Galindo. At the end of the meeting, Duditch
explained they had “to take this information back to our Executive Board” because they were not
comfortable with precluding Lucia from covering her dependents (an option Stephens
suggested) and that they “were going to have to take a look at cutting their hours to 19.5 hours.”
I disagree with Respondent’s contention that these verbal exchanges sufficed to put
CSO on notice of the type of change ultimately implemented here so that the CSO, in effect,
waived its right to bargain over the reducing the work hours of the unit employees by failing to
request or engage in bargaining.10 The June 7 exchange amounted to little more than an off-
handed remark that reducing the hours of the unit employees might be one of several options
Respondent would have to consider in order to solve the problem raised by the CTA Trust
investigation. At the October 27 meeting, DePue’s role was essentially that of an on-looker to
the discussion between Stephens in his capacity as a representative of the CTA Trust and
Respondent’s officials about the precise cost of compliance with the CTA Trust’s demand that
SJTA provide coverage for all employees. Respondent’s contention that the October 27
meeting amounted to a bargaining session with the CSO that resulted in an impasse over the
workweek change issue is not supported by the evidence. Duditch’s reference to presenting the
information gained to the SJTA Executive Board for a decision shows that no clear proposal had
yet emerged from the Respondent over which there could be meaningful bargaining. Although
Duditch, Alves, and presumably Galindo all favored the workweek reduction as a solution to
SJTA’s issue with the CTA Trust, Duditch’s own statement at the conclusion of the October 27
meeting made it clear that decision actually rested with the SJTA Executive Board. At no time,
did Respondent notify the CSO about a proposed change after the Executive Board’s meeting.
The NLRB does not require a labor organization to demand negotiations every time an
employer mentions a potential, future change in order to avoid the risk of waiving its right to
bargain under the Katz doctrine. More than general statements about changes that might be
necessary are required. Pan American Grain Co., 343 NLRB 318 (2004), citing with approval
Judge Joan Wieder’s formulation in Gannett Co., 333 NLRB 355 (2001) at 357 that, to be
adequate under the Act, “[t]he prior notice must afford the union with a reasonable opportunity

9 Stephens works for the CTA and is represented by, and belongs to, the CSO. He has held
various positions with the CSO and has long served as a union-appointed Trustee on the CTA
Trust. He had no known involvement with the SJTA-CSO negotiations. Respondent tacitly
acknowledged that Stephens was not acting on behalf of CSO at the October 27 meeting by
arguing that DePue sat idly by without making an attempt to bargain on this occasion.
10 Respondent also cites a verbal exchange between Alves and Ted Bynum, another
Trustee of the CTA Trust in April 2008. However, I find this exchange too vague and remote to
merit consideration as a notice of a proposal to change wages, hours, or working conditions.
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to evaluate the proposals and present counter proposals before implementing [the] change.” An
inchoate and imprecise announcement of the type made here is insufficient to trigger an
obligation to bargain. Oklahoma Fixture Co., 314 NLRB 958, 960 (1994) enf. denied on other
grounds 79 F.3d 1630 (10th Cir. 1996).
No clear formulation occurred here until the SJTA Executive Board chose the reduced
work week option on November 4. Respondent never notified the CSO of that decision.
Instead, Duditch and Williams bypassed the CSO and presented the decision directly to the unit
employees on November 12 as a fait accompli with the explanation that they had been forced to
take this step as a means of meeting the obligations undertaken with the CTA Trust to obtain
fringe benefits for Alves and Galindo. Having concluded that Respondent failed to provide a
proper notice and opportunity for bargaining, it follows that a finding cannot be made that the
CSO delayed and avoided bargaining as Respondent alleged in its answer.
Finally, for two reasons I find Respondent failed to show an economic exigency existed
that would warrant the immediate implementation of the reduced workweek without prior
bargaining. First, Respondent offered no evidence concerning its economic condition. All that
was shown was the belief of the leadership that reducing employee hours made more economic
sense for the SJTA. I find this evidence insufficient to find enough of economic exigency
existed to bypass bargaining. Secondly, Respondent had ample time in which bargain with the
CSO over a proposal to change hours as it had nearly a full month following the November 4
Executive Board meeting before it needed to respond to the CTA Trust’s final ultimatum.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
As Respondent violated the Act by unilaterally reducing the weekly hours of the unit
employees, it will be required to restore the status quo ante. Larry Geweke Ford, 344 NLRB
628 (2005). Accordingly, Respondent will be required to rescind the November 12, 2008,
notices to Guzman and Mannis, and restore their work week to the level that existed prior to the
change implemented on November 17. Respondent will also be required to reimburse the unit
employees for the pay lost by reason of the reduction of their work hours commencing on
November 17. Reimbursements to employees shall be computed as prescribed in Ogle
Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enf’d. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest as
prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).11
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended12

11 The General Counsel requests that the interest award be compounded quarterly instead
of the present practice of awarding simple interest. The Board, as presently constituted, has in
several recent cases declined to change the method for calculating interest. As I am bound by
the Board’s established policy, the request for compound interest is denied.
12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Section
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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ORDER
Respondent, San Juan Teachers Association, its officers, agents, successors, and/or
assigns, jointly and severally, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain with the California Staff Organization (CSO) by
unilaterally reducing the hours of employment of its secretarial and clerical employees
represented by CSO without first providing that labor organization with an appropriate notice
and an opportunity to bargain over changes in their hours of work.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, rescind the change in the weekly
hours of work provided to its secretarial and clerical employees implemented on November 17,
2008, and restore their workweek schedule to that which existed prior to that date.
(b) Reimburse the unit employees for the loss in pay they suffered by reason of the
change in their weekly hours of employment that commenced on November 17, 2008, as
described in The Remedy section of this decision with interest as proscribed by law.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its office facility in Carmichael,
California, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”13 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since November 17, 2008.

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD(SF)–37–09
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(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., November 4, 2009.

William L. Schmidt
Administrative Law Judge
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to
post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain with the California Staff Organization (CSO) as the representative
of the employees employed in the following appropriate unit: All secretarial and clerical employees.
WE WILL NOT change the wages, hours, and terms and condition of employment for the employees in
the above unit without first providing CSO with an appropriate notice of any proposed change and provide
it with an opportunity to bargain over the proposed change.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the NLRB Order, rescind the change in the weekly hours of
work provided for employees in the above unit that we implemented on November 17, 2008, and restore
their workweek schedule to that which existed before that date.
WE WILL reimburse the unit employees for any loss of pay they suffered by reason of the change in their
weekly hours of employment that commenced on November 17, 2008, with interest as proscribed by law.
SAN JUAN TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
(Employer)
Dated: _________________ By: ______________________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations
Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and
remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a
charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may
also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
901 Market Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, California 94103-1735
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
415-356-5130.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 415-356-5139.