Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 2, 2021

2019006039 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/350,853 11/14/2016 Sang-Bum KIM 0201-1751 7690
68103 7590 04/02/2021
Jefferson IP Law, LLP
1130 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 420
Washington, DC 20036
EXAMINER
ANSARI, NAJEEBUDDIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2468
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usdocketing@jeffersonip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SANG-BUM KIM, SOENG-HUN KIM, JAE-HYUK JANG, and
HIMKE VAN DER VELDE
Appeal 2019-006039
Application 15/350,853
Technology Center 2400
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, LARRY J. HUME, and JASON J. CHUNG,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 1–23 are pending, stand rejected, are appealed by Appellant,
and are the subject of our decision under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a).1 See Final Act.
1–2.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Samsung Electronics
Co., Ltd. Appeal Br. 2.
2 We refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”), filed Nov. 14, 2016
(claiming benefit of US 62/255,682, filed Nov. 16, 2015); Appeal Brief
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter, according to Appellant, generally “relates
to communication schemes for combining 5G communication systems with”
Internet of Things (“IoT”) “technology to support higher data transmission
rate[s]” that can be used “in intelligent services (e.g., smart home, smart
building, . . . smart car, . . . healthcare, digital education, retail business, . . .
etc.) based on the 5G communication technology and IoT-related
techniques.” Spec. ¶ 2. Specifically, Appellant’s claims recite user
equipment and methods for transmitting a scheduling request (SR) by a user
device (user equipment (UE)) in a cellular communication system. The
method (process) receives configuration information related to transmission
of the SR from an enhanced node B (eNB), determines a timer value that
prohibits transmission of an SR transmission, determines a number of times
(repetitions) for transmitting a set of SRs based on the received
configuration information, and transmits (repeats transmission of) the set of
SRs based on the determined number of repetitions. The timer for
prohibiting SR transmission begins (starts) at a time of transmitting a first
SR among the set of repeated SRs. See Spec. ¶¶ 12–15; Abstract. Claim 1
(directed to a method), claim 8 (directed to user equipment), and claim 15
(directed to a method) are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method for transmitting a scheduling request
(SR) by a user equipment (UE) in a cellular communication
system, the method comprising:

(“Appeal Br.”), filed Feb. 28, 2019; and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”), filed
Aug. 12, 2019. We also refer to the Examiner’s Final Office Action (“Final
Act.”), mailed Aug. 27, 2018; and Answer (“Ans.”) mailed June 13, 2019.
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receiving configuration information related to
transmission of the SR from an enhanced node B (eNB);
determining a value of a timer for prohibiting an SR
transmission and a number of repetitions based on the received
configuration information; and
transmitting a set of repeated SRs based on the number of
repetitions,
wherein the timer for prohibiting the SR transmission
starts at a time of transmitting a first SR among the set of repeated
SRs.
Appeal Br. 7 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence is:
Name Reference Date
Dinan US 2016/0270114 A1 Sept. 15, 2016
Hwang et al. (“Hwang”) US 2018/0139764 A1 May 17, 20183

REJECTION4
Claims 1–23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Dinan and Hwang. See Final Act. 2–13.

3 Hwang (US 2018/0139764 A1), published May 17, 2018, was filed on May
4, 2016, and claims benefit of US 62/158,548, filed on May 8, 2015.
4 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the present application
has an effective filing date after the AIA’s effective date (March 16, 2013),
this decision refers to 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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ANALYSIS
Appellant argues independent claims 1, 8, and 15 together as a group
and does not separately argue dependent claims 2–7, 9–14, and 16–23. See
Appeal Br. 3–6. We select independent claim 1 as representative of
Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1–23. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner rejects independent claim 1 as being obvious in view of
Dinan and Hwang. See Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 4–8. Specifically, the
Examiner relies on Hwang for the teaching of “determining a number for
repeatedly transmitting the SR based on the repetition number information,”
“repeatedly transmitting the SR based on the repetition number,” and that
“the timer starts at a time of transmitting a first SR among the set of repeated
SRs” in that “Hwang . . . [describes] setting a start position of repetition
transmission of the SR.” Final Act. 4 (citing Hwang ¶¶ 127–130, 136). In
the Answer, the Examiner further explains transmitting SRs and starting the
SR prohibit timer (sr-ProhibitTimer) of Hwang. Ans. 4–7 (citing Hwang
¶¶ 9, 76, 83, 84, 92, 94, 123, 127, 129, 136).
Appellant contends Dinan and Hwang do not teach the disputed
features of claim 1. See Appeal Br. 3–5; Reply Br. 2–3. Specifically,
Appellant contends that the combination of Dinan and Hwang does not teach
or suggest “‘wherein the timer for prohibiting the SR transmission starts at a
time of transmitting a first SR among the set of repeated SRs’ as recited in
claim 1” (Appeal Br. 3 (quoting claim 1)) because “Hwang merely discloses
the existence of the sr-ProhibitTimer,” but none of the Examiner-cited
portions of Hwang “indicate[] when the sr-ProhibitTimer starts” (Appeal
Br. 4) and “[i]n fact, Hwang expressly discloses at paragraph 136 that the
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sr-ProhibitTimer is not applied within an SR bundle” (Appeal Br. 4).
Therefore, according to Appellant, “[b]ased upon this disclosure, it is clear
that the sr-ProhibitTimer cannot start ‘at a time of transmitting a first SR
among the set of repeated SRs’ as recited in the claims” (Appeal Br. 4). See
Appeal Br. 3–5; Reply Br. 2–3 (citing Hwang ¶ 136).
We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2–4) and
(2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 4–
8) in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the findings and
conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we provide the following analysis
for emphasis.
We begin with a discussion of what a service request (sr or SR)
prohibit timer (Hwang’s sr-ProhibitTimer) is and how it relates to the
transmission of service requests. Sr-ProhibitTimers are known entities
described in the fourth generation (4G) mobile long term evolution (LTE)
communication standard, which Appellant references repeatedly in the
Specification (see Spec. ¶¶ 3, 44, 51, 58, 91). An sr-ProhibitTimer simply
prevents the transmission of an SR or bundle of SRs for (within) a time
interval. See Spec. ¶¶ 72, 86, 88, 89; Figs. 5–8. For example, an
sr-ProhibitTime may be equal to one or more SR transmission periods. See
Dinan ¶ 208; Hwang ¶ 80.
Hwang, as cited by the Examiner, describes in detail SR transmission
and an sr-ProhibitTimer. See Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 4–8 (Hwang ¶¶ 9, 76, 83,
84, 92, 94, 123, 127–130, 136). Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, Hwang
does describe when an sr-ProhibitTimer starts. See Hwang ¶¶ 83–84.
Hwang explains that the sr-ProhibitTimer starts when an SR is pending on
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the physical uplink control channel (PUCCH) at the beginning of the SR
transmission—when the SR is triggered a MAC entity operates at each
transmission time interval (TTI) (see Hwang ¶ 47) and instructs a physical
layer to signal the SR on a PUCCH, and starts the sr-ProhibitTimer (see
Hwang 73–84).
Appellant contends that Hwang specifically teaches against starting
the sr-ProhibitTimer at the start of a transmission of a bundle of SRs because
Hwang states that “[t]he sr-ProhibitTimer may not be applied within an SR
bundle.” Hwang ¶ 136. Appellant, however, misconstrues this sentence of
Hwang and ignores the related disclosure in Hwang. The quoted sentence,
when interpreted properly in context, describes an alternate embodiment in
which the time is not applied at all. The sentence does not mean that a timer
cannot or shall not be applied. Rather, the sentence means that one may not
need (desire) to apply the timer. This interpretation is supported by the
following sentence “[a]lternatively, the dr-TransMax or the sr-ProhibitTimer
may be applied based on a parameter including a repetition level or the
repetition number.” Hwang ¶ 136.
Appellant’s contentions regarding Hwang (and Dinan) are unavailing
of Examiner error. Appellant misconstrues the Examiner’s rejection and the
cited teachings of Hwang. Appellant interprets Hwang improperly and too
narrowly, and does not address what Hwang would have at least suggested
to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art in view of the prior art including
Hwang (and the knowledge of such a skilled artisan). Appellant fails to
appreciate that the combination of Hwang and Dinan at least broadly
suggests starting an sr-ProhibitTimer at the same time as transmitting a first
SR in an SR bundle (a set of repeated SRs).
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Thus, Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of representative claim 1. Independent claims 8 and
15 include commensurate limitations. Dependent claims 2–7, 9–14, and 16–
23 depend from and fall with claims 1, 8, and 15, respectively. Therefore,
we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of representative claim 1
and claims 2–23 not separately argued with particularity (supra). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
Appellant has not shown persuasively that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We, therefore, sustain the
Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–23.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–23 103 Dinan, Hwang 1–23
RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED