Salvatore L. D'Alessandro, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 24, 2001
01983716 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 24, 2001)

01983716

07-24-2001

Salvatore L. D'Alessandro, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Salvatore L. D'Alessandro v. United States Postal Service

01983716

July 24, 2001

.

Salvatore L. D'Alessandro,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01983716

Agency No. 1A-113-0015-97

Hearing No. 160-97-8450X

DECISION

The complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final

decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of

unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and

Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as

amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405. The complainant alleges he was discriminated against

on the bases of his disability and reprisal for prior EEO activity when

on October 30, 1996, management reassigned him to a Rehab Distribution

Clerk position.

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final

decision.

The record reveals that the complainant, a Modified Vehicle Maintenance

Facility (VMF) Mechanic, PS-06, worked at the agency's Staten Island,

New York facility, which had a complement of fifteen employees, three of

which or 20%, including the complainant, were on limited duty. The record

shows that the agency reassigned the complainant and one other limited

duty employee to the Main Post Office within the same facility with

the same hours of work, non-scheduled days, rate of pay and seniority

benefits because there was not enough work within their limitations

to keep them at the VMF. The agency admits that the complainant has

a partial permanent disability which does not allow him to perform the

full duties of his Mechanic position. The complainant does not allege

that the reassignment was not within his medical restrictions.

Without a hearing, an Administrative Judge (AJ), assuming that the

complainant had made a prima facie case of retaliation, found that

the agency had articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for

its reassignment of the complainant. The AJ further found that the

complainant presented no persuasive evidence that the reassignment

was motivated by discriminatory animus based on his prior EEO activity.

Additionally, the AJ found that the complainant was a qualified individual

with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and that the agency

had met its burden to reasonably accommodate the complainant's medical

restrictions. Accordingly, the AJ found that the complainant had not

been discriminated against on the basis of his disability nor had the

agency retaliated against him for his prior EEO activity. The agency's

final decision implemented the AJ's decision.

Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal, and the agency requests

that we affirm its final decision.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court does not

sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non-moving party must

be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of

fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder

could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F. 2D 103,

105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to

affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by

weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.

In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an AJ

may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that

the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that there is

no genuine issue of material fact in this case and that the AJ properly

determined that summary judgment was appropriate. The agency need not

maintain the complainant in a position where there is not enough work

within his medical restrictions. Here, the record shows that the agency

reassigned the complainant to an equivalent position within his medical

restrictions because there was not enough work in the VMF positions

for either the complainant or another employee on light duty who was

also reassigned to the Main Post Office. We note that the complainant

failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions were in

retaliation for the complainant's prior EEO activity or were motivated

by discriminatory animus toward complainant's physical disability.

Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the AJ's decision.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, the agency's response,

and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision,

we AFFIRM the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 24, 2001

__________________

Date