Salt Life, LLC

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 3, 2017

No. 86480092 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 3, 2017)

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: August 3, 2017

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Salt Life, LLC
_____

Serial No. 86480092
_____

Jason A. Pittman of Dority & Manning P.A.,
for Salt Life, LLC.
Nakia D. Henry, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 117,
Hellen Bryan Johnson, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Quinn, Lykos and Heasley,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Heasley, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Salt Life, LLC (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark SALT LIFE (in standard characters) for “health spa services for health and
wellness of the body and spirit” in International Class 44.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), on the ground

1 Application Serial No. 86480092 was filed on December 15, 2014, based upon Applicant’s
allegation of a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
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that the word SALT is deceptive because it falsely indicates that Applicant’s health
spas feature salt therapy. The Examining Attorney has also refused registration
under Section 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a), on the ground that Applicant failed to
disclaim the word SALT, which is merely descriptive of salt therapy.
After the Trademark Examining Attorney made the refusals final, Applicant
appealed to this Board. We reverse the refusals to register.
I. Deceptiveness
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is an absolute bar to registration of a mark that
“Consists of or comprises . . . deceptive . . . matter. . . .” In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d
773, 8 USPQ2d 1259, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A deceptive mark cannot be registered
on the Principal or Supplemental Register; neither acquired distinctiveness nor a
disclaimer of the deceptive matter can make it registrable. In re White Jasmine LLC,
106 USPQ2d 1385, 1391 (TTAB 2013). See A. LaLonde, “You Aren’t Going to Believe
This! Deception, Misdescription and Materiality in Trademark Law” 102 TRADEMARK
REPORTER 883, 901 (May-June 2012). For these reasons, a finding that matter is
deceptive under Section 2(a) is “more damning” than a finding of deceptive
misdescriptiveness under Section 2(e)(1). W. D. Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg.
Co., 146 USPQ 313, 318 (TTAB 1965), aff’d, 377 F.2d 1001, 153 USPQ 749 (CCPA
1967) cited in K. Germain, “Trademark Registration Under Sections 2(a) and 2(e) of
the Lanham Act: The Deception Decision,” 66 Trademark Reporter 97, 98-99 (1976).

A mark consists of or comprises deceptive matter if:
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(1) the matter is misdescriptive of the character, quality,
function, composition or use of the goods or services;
(2) prospective purchasers would be likely to believe that the
misdescription actually describes the goods or services; and
(3) the misdescription would be likely to affect a significant portion of the
relevant consumers’ decision to purchase the goods or services.
In re Budge Mfg. Co., 8 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Tapco Int’l Corp., 122 USPQ2d 1369,
1371 (TTAB 2017). A mark is deceptive even if only a portion of the mark is deceptive.
See White Jasmine, 106 USPQ2d at 1391 (“It is well established that a mark may be
found deceptive on the basis of a single deceptive term that is embedded in a larger
mark”); Am. Speech-Language-Hearing Ass’n v. Nat’l Hearing Aid Society, 224 USPQ
798, 808 (TTAB 1984). The Examining Attorney has the initial burden of putting
forth a prima facie case that a proposed mark falls under this three-part test, In re
E5 LLC, 103 USPQ2d 1578, 1579 (TTAB 2012).
Analysis
We examine the three parts of the test in turn.
A. Whether the applied-for mark consists of or contains a term that
misdescribes the character, quality, function, composition, or use of
the services.
The Examining Attorney maintains that: The term “SALT” in Applicant’s mark is
misdescriptive of the character, quality, function, composition or use of its services
because it would indicate to consumers that Applicant’s “health spa services for
health and wellness of the body and spirit,” feature salt and/or salt based therapy,
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when in fact they do not.2 In support of this interpretation, the Examining Attorney
points to a number of Internet articles and advertisements of this form of therapy.
An article in About.com reports, “Salt therapy is a modern variation of the Eastern
European tradition of spending time in natural salt caves for health. … Many people
believe that salt therapy benefits asthmatics, cystic fibrosis patients, and a host of
other respiratory and skin ailment sufferers.”3 Salt Spas offer their services, e.g.:

4

2 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 4. “Applicant’s services do not contain salt, as is
evident from Applicant’s recitation of services and Applicant’s website.” Examining
Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 5; see also 6 TTABVUE 7.
3 Spas_About.com/od/SpaHistoryAndCulture/a/Salt-Therapy 3/26/2015, March 26, 2015
Office Action pp. 14-15. All citations to the TSDR are to the .pdf format.

4 WilliamsburgSaltSpa.com 3/26/2015, March 26, 2015 Office Action p. 9.
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5
It is Applicant’s position, however, that it has already used its SALT LIFE mark
in connection with a variety of goods and services―mainly beach apparel and
accessories―to suggest an active seaside lifestyle. Witness its website 6:

5 CirceOfAlexandria.com/salt-thearapy, 3/26/2015 March 26, 2015 Office Action p. 21.
6 Applicant’s brief p. 14, 4 TTABVUE 15; SaltLife.com, Sept. 28, 2015 Response to
Office Action p. 6.
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7

According to Applicant, SALT LIFE branded products are marketed on several
online retail stores, such as Dick’s Sporting Goods:

7 SaltLife.com, Sept. 28, 2015 Response to Office Action p. 8.

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8
From this use of the mark, Applicant infers that “[a]ssuming arguendo, that any
misdescriptive significance exists, the significance has been overcome because of the
fame of [Applicant’s] mark and the long use and registration of the same for numerous
and diverse categories of goods and services.”9 Hence, it concludes, the SALT LIFE
mark is at most suggestive, and “creates doubt as to whether ‘salt’ is a significant
feature or characteristic of the services.”10
For a term to misdescribe goods or services under the first factor, “the term must

8 Sept. 28, 2015 Response to Office Action p. 10.
9 Applicant’s brief p. 6, 4 TTABVUE 7.
10 Applicant’s brief p. 6, 10, 4 TTABVUE 7, 11.
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be merely descriptive, rather than suggestive, of a significant aspect of the goods or
services which the goods or services plausibly possess but in fact do not.” In re Hinton,
116 USPQ2d 1051, 1052 (TTAB 2015) (quoting In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 63
USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (TTAB 2002)). In this case, we find that SALT in SALT LIFE is
at most suggestive. It suggests life in the ocean’s salt air, consonant with Applicant’s
advertising. The ambience of a salt room is not inconsistent with this suggestive
commercial impression. A Wall Street Journal article, made of record by the
Examining Attorney, carries both interpretations: “Sink into a chair, relax and
breathe in the salt air. You aren’t at the beach, but rather in one of a growing number
of indoor salt rooms whose owners say small salt particles can soothe respiratory and
skin conditions. … While most of us associate salt air with the beach, from a medical
standpoint, the experience is designed to mimic salt caves, which have long been
considered therapeutic in Eastern Europe.”11 Another article, in Organic Spa
Magazine, notes that “Salt therapy is similar to spending time in the salty sea air,
which offers many more benefits than just relaxation on the beach.”12
Applicant’s interpretation of the mark is connotative of a salty seaside ambience;
the Examining Attorney’s interpretation is more literal, denoting salt used for
therapy. A similar case in which a mark posed a variety of possible meanings arose
in In re Perfect Fit Industries, Inc., 223 USPQ 92, 93 (TTAB 1984) where the applicant

11 WSJ.com 11/10/2015, Nov. 10 2015 Office Action p. 13.
12 OrganicSpaMagazine.com/benefits-of-salt-therapy/ 11/10/2015, Nov. 10, 2015 Office Action
p. 8.

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manufactured textile products such as pillow covers, bed spreads and comforters
under the mark COTTAGE CRAFTS. The examining attorney in that case regarded
COTTAGE CRAFTS as synonymous with “cottage industry,” a term used to describe
a type of business in which products are handmade by workers in their homes, and
therefore maintained that the mark misdescribed the applicant’s goods, which were
mass produced in a factory. The Board held, however:
The Examining Attorney’s argument fails because the first part of the
test cannot be met. The mark makes no misrepresentation about the goods.
The matter sought to be registered neither describes nor misdescribes
them. It is merely suggestive of them, and as such is not barred by Section
2(e) of the Act. …

The Examining Attorney’s [evidence] has not, however, convinced us that
the term sought to be registered, “COTTAGE CRAFTS,” is synonymous
with “cottage industry.”

Id. at 93.

Here, as there, we are not convinced that SALT LIFE is synonymous with “salt
therapy.” The mark instead suggests, as Applicant intends, a lifestyle evocative of the
seaside. Even though Perfect Fit Industries involved a refusal under Section 2(e) for
deceptive misdescriptiveness, the first two prongs of the test for deceptive marks
under Section 2(a) are identical to the entire test for deceptively misdescriptive marks
under Section 2(e)(1) ― the difference being the third, materiality factor. In re Quady
Winery Inc., 221 USPQ 1213, 1214 (TTAB 1984); A. LaLonde, “You Aren’t Going to
Believe This! Deception, Misdescription and Materiality in Trademark Law” 102
Trademark Reporter 883, 899 (May-June 2012). So the principles in Perfect Fit
Serial No. 86480092
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Industries apply here. In this case, as in that, the record evidence does not impel us
to read into the mark SALT LIFE a more literal meaning than it suggests.13
For these reasons, we find that the first part of the test has not been met. The
mark does not consist of or comprise misdescriptive matter. For the sake of
completeness, though, we address the remaining two factors.
B. Whether prospective purchasers would be likely to believe that the
misdescription actually describes the services.

Applicant maintains that salt therapy is not a significant feature or characteristic
of health spa services. Citing the evidence on which the Examining Attorney relies,
Applicant argues that salt therapy is usually offered in dedicated “salt rooms” that
are operated as specialized businesses.14 For example, the About.com article
submitted by the Examining Attorney states that “Usually you can only find salt
therapy at specialized businesses. … Not many real spas offer true salt therapy.”15
Applicant states “[T]o the extent salt is even present in or used in health spa services,
its presence and use is infrequent, incidental and insignificant in the United
States.”16 Hence, it concludes, the relevant public is unlikely to believe that the term

13 In reaching this conclusion, we do not accord any weight to Applicant’s claim that its mark
is famous due to its long use and registration for various products or services. A claim that a
mark has acquired distinctiveness cannot obviate a Section 2(a) deceptiveness refusal. In re
Tapco Int’l, 122 USPQ2d at 1371; Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP)
§ 1203.02 (April 2017). Moreover, Applicant has introduced no evidence of record indicating
the length of time or extent to which it has used its SALT LIFE mark in commerce, nor has
it placed its other registrations for that mark in evidence. Thus, we give this claim no
consideration.
14 Applicant’s brief p. 7, 4 TTABVUE 8.
15 Spas_About.com/od/SpaHistoryAndCulture/a/Salt-Therapy, 3/26/2015, March 26, 2015
Office Action p. 15.
16 Applicant’s brief p. 7, 4 TTABVUE 8.
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SALT in its SALT LIFE mark actually describes Applicant’s services.
The Examining Attorney maintains, however, that prospective purchasers would
be likely to believe that SALT actually describes a feature of Applicant’s spa services
because salt therapy is a growing, increasingly popular industry, offered by health
spas and salt rooms that offer spa services.17 For example:
• Organic Spa Magazine reports that “Taking wellness to another level,
halotherapy―a.k.a salt therapy― remains a top spa trend….” “There are close
to 200 salt rooms or beds in the U.S. Some facilities offer massage and other
treatments in the rooms so you can literally ‘recharge’ from two treatments in
one.”18
• The Wall Street Journal reports that “Across the U.S., salt rooms have been
popping up in cities such as New York Orlando, Naples, Fla., Boulder, Colo.,
Chicago and Los Angeles.”19
• The Herald News of Westport, Massachusetts reports that “Salt has become
trendy as a form of both pampering and healing and is popping up as salt rooms
and salt caves in salons and spas all over the country and beyond.”20
• Salt therapy is offered as one of many spa treatments at the New Age Health
Spa:

17 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 5-7.
18 OrganicSpaMagazine.com/benefits-of-salt-therapy/ 11/10/2015, Nov. 10, 2015 Office Action
pp. 8-10.
19 WSJ.com 11/10/2015, Nov. 10, 2015 Office Action p. 13.
20 TheHeraldNews.com 6/6/2016, June 6, 2016 Office Action at pp. 38-39.
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21
Hence, Applicant’s contention that salt therapy is limited to specialized salt
rooms, with an insignificant presence in health spas, is negated by the record
evidence indicating that salt therapy is being offered increasingly across the country,
along with other spa services, such as body wraps or massages.
The issue is not the frequency with which the services are offered, though; it is the
ambiguity of the term SALT LIFE. As we have seen, the term suggests a variety of
meanings, and the true issue is whether reasonably prudent prospective purchasers
of health spa services would be likely to believe that SALT LIFE actually describes
salt therapy services. See In re Hinton, 116 USPQ2d at 1052 (citing R. J. Reynolds

21 NewAgeHealthSpa.com/treatments 11/10/2015, Nov. 10, 2015 Office Action pp. 4-6.
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Tobacco Co. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 226 USPQ 169, 179 (TTAB 1985))
(applying reasonably prudent consumer test).
We are not convinced that they would, given that even cursory curiosity on the
part of those consumers would dispel any potential deception. For example, in In re
Econoheat, Inc., 218 USPQ 381 (TTAB 1983), where the applicant offered electric
space heaters under the mark SOLAR QUARTZ, the Board found that “[r]easonably
prudent purchasers and the reasonably prudent public encountering applicant’s
heaters which are obviously electrically powered heaters designed to be plugged into
an ordinary electrical outlet are not going to be deceived into believing that the
heaters are solar-operated.” Id. at 383. See also Northwestern Golf Co. v. Acushnet
Co., 226 USPQ 240, 243 (TTAB 1985) (“In any event, it is very difficult to see how
purchasers could be deceived by the mark [POWER-STEP for golf clubs] into
believing that the [golf club] shaft has but one step when even a quick glance at the
golf club will reveal that it has a multi-step shaft construction, and purchasers are
not likely to purchase golf clubs without looking at them first.”). We are aware that
potential customers may encounter the mark SALT LIFE before they encounter the
services. See TMEP § 1203.02(f)(ii). But we are also aware that health spa customers,
being reasonably prudent, will, more likely than not, inquire into the services being
offered by a health spa before making an appointment.
Thus, as in Econoheat and Acushnet, supra, we find that reasonably prudent
consumers are unlikely to believe that SALT LIFE actually denotes Applicant’s
provision of salt therapy services in its health spas.
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C. Whether the misdescription is likely to affect the purchasing
decisions of a significant portion of relevant consumers.

The third part of the test is materiality: “The evidence also must suffice to indicate
that the misdescriptive quality or characteristic would affect the purchasing decision
of a significant portion of the relevant consumers.” TMEP § 1203.02(d)(i) (citing In re
Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 90 USPQ2d 1489, 1493 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); In re
Tapco, 122 USPQ2d at 1375; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 14
cmt. c (1995). This part may be satisfied by circumstantial evidence, In re Miracle
Tuesday LLC, 695 F.3d 1339, 104 USPQ2d 1330, 1334 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2012), such as
evidence that the misdescription would make the product or service more appealing
or desirable to prospective purchasers. In re White Jasmine, 106 USPQ2d at 1392.
With respect to materiality, Applicant argues that its use of the term SALT is not
likely to affect consumer decisions to purchase its services. Once again, it points out,
the evidence submitted by the Examining Attorney shows that the claimed health
benefits of salt therapy are not generally recognized or acknowledged in the United
States.22 For instance, the About.com article notes that “As with most alternative
therapies, salt therapy is also criticized as not being scientifically proven as
beneficial.”23 And the Wall Street Journal article notes that “Scientific evidence in
English-language publications is scant and some doctors urge caution for

22 Applicant’s brief p. 12, 4 TTABVUE 13.
23 Spas_About.com/od/SpaHistoryAndCulture/a/Salt-Therapy, 3/26/2015, March 26, 2015
Office Action pp. 14-15.
Serial No. 86480092
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asthmatics.”24 Absent evidence of health benefits, Applicant concludes, the record
evidence does not show that the term SALT as used in SALT LIFE would affect the
purchasing decisions of a significant portion of relevant consumers.
But as the Examining Attorney notes, the therapeutic health benefits of salt
therapy have been widely touted, and the relevant public evidently believes in those
therapeutic benefits, judging from the growing popularity of salt treatment and its
repeat customers.25 TMEP § 1203.02(d)(i) (“The evidence must establish a belief that
the feature or characteristic provides a health benefit.”).
The problem with the Examining Attorney’s position on materiality is that salt
therapy is only one of many therapies and treatments customarily offered at health
spas. It is offered, for example, among a long list of treatments offered by the New
Age Health Spa:

24 WSJ.com 11/10/2015, Nov. 10 2015 Office Action p. 13.
25 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 7-10.
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Serial No. 86480092
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26
Spa customers can choose from a range of treatments based on their personal
preferences. Some may choose the mud wrap, others may choose the healing stone
therapy, and still others may choose the salt therapy. All the treatments carry
putative health benefits, but ultimately, their appeal or desirability depends on the
customers’ personal preferences. It is settled that consumers’ mere personal
preferences cannot establish materiality. TMEP § 1203.02(d)(ii) (“For example,
SPEARMINT for gum, LAVENDER for dish soap, and BLUE for bicycles refer to
flavor, scent, and color features that, in those contexts, most likely reflect mere
personal preferences which would not be considered material for purposes of a
deceptiveness refusal.”).

26 NewAgeHealthSpa.com/treatments 11/10/2015, Nov. 10, 2015 Office Action p. 4-6.

Serial No. 86480092
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Hence, even if SALT LIFE misdescribed Applicant’s health spa services, and even
if its potential purchasers believed that the term indicated the provision of salt
therapy treatment, there is simply insufficient evidence that that would materially
affect the purchasing decision of a significant portion of the relevant consumers. For
all these reasons, we find that Applicant’s proposed SALT LIFE mark is not deceptive
under Section 2(a). 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
II. Disclaimer Requirement

The Examining Attorney’s Section 2(a) deceptiveness refusal rests on the
fundamental premise that Applicant’s spa services do not contain salt. As the
Examining Attorney states in her brief: “Applicant’s spa services do not contain salt,
as is evident from Applicant’s recitation of services and Applicant’s website.”27
Customarily, a Section 2(a) refusal of this sort may be accompanied by a refusal under
Section 2(e)(1) on the ground of deceptive misdescriptiveness―a ground that may be
established by proof of the first two elements, misdescriptiveness and deceptiveness,
without the third element of materiality. See, e.g., In re E5, 103 USPQ2d at 1578-79;
In re White Jasmine, 106 USPQ2d at 1394; TMEP § 1203.02(c).
Yet in this case, the second basis for refusal―incongruously―is that “SALT” must
be disclaimed because it is merely descriptive of Applicant’s services.28 When
Applicant noted the inconsistency in this position,29 the Examining Attorney

27 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 5, 7.
28 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 21 et seq.
29 Applicant’s brief p. 13, 4 TTABVUE 14.
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responded that TMEP Section 1203.02(e)(ii) permits it,30 providing in pertinent part:
if an Office action is otherwise necessary to make substantive refusals or
requirements that cannot be satisfied by examiner’s amendment, the
examining attorney must:
Issue a refusal under §2(e)(1) as descriptive (or a requirement for a
disclaimer, if appropriate, i.e., if the term at issue is not part of a unitary
expression), based on the presumption that the goods/services possess the
feature or characteristic; and
Issue a requirement that the applicant amend the identification to include
the feature or characteristic (if believable and material)….

In the first Office Action, the Examining Attorney, relying on the evidence of salt
therapy to which we have referred above, stated “The applicant has applied for ‘health
spa services for health and wellness of the body and spirit’ and therefore this wording
merely describes spa services that likely involve salt treatments.”31 That Office Action
accordingly required that “Applicant must specify whether the wording ‘salt’ has any
significance in the spa services field trade or industry or as applied to the goods and/or
services described in the application, or if such wording is a ‘term of art’ within
applicant’s industry. See 37 C.F.R. § 2.61(b)….”32 Applicant responded that
“Applicant is unaware of any significance of the term SALT within the spa services
field. SALT appearing in the mark has no significance nor is it a term of art in the
relevant trade or industry or as used in connection with the goods/services/collective

30 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 20.
31 March 26, 2015 Office Action p. 1.
32 March 26, 2015 Office Action p. 2.
Serial No. 86480092
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membership organization listed in the application, or any geographical
significance.”33 Upon receiving this response, the Examining Attorney indicated that
“The significance inquiry is satisfied,”34 but evidently harbored reservations, stating
in her brief that this “amorphous response” was “not construed as an outright denial
of significance.”35 Ultimately, though, in a telephone conference with the Examining
Attorney, Applicant’s attorney confirmed that it would not offer salt therapy. According
to the Examining Attorney, “This statement is an unequivocal statement of denial that
the services will not include salt. It is noted that this telephone conference occurred
after the filing of the appellant’s brief.”36 She nonetheless maintained the refusal
based Applicant’s unwillingness to disclaim SALT as merely descriptive of its
services. Applicant insists that SALT LIFE is unitary, indicating a seaside ambience,
and that no disclaimer is required.37 See TMEP § 1213.05 (if mark is unitary,
disclaimer of nondistinctive portion must not be required).
Analysis
Section 6(a) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a), provides that “The Director
may require the applicant to disclaim an unregistrable component of a mark

33 Sept. 28, 2015 Response to Office Action p. 4-5.
34 Nov. 10, 2015 Office Action p. 1.
35 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 20-21.
36 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 20 n.6. Ordinarily a telephone conference would be
made of record via a Note to the File, TMEP §§ 709.04, 709.05, but since this telephone conference
took place after Applicant filed its brief, the Examining Attorney made the conversation of record
by mentioning it in her brief. Applicant did not file a Reply brief disputing this account of their
conversation.
37 Applicant’s brief p. 14, 4 TTABVUE 15.
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otherwise registrable.” Merely descriptive terms are unregistrable under Trademark
Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1), and are therefore subject to disclaimer if
the mark is otherwise registrable. E.g., In re Omaha National Corp., 819 F.2d 1117,
2 USPQ2d 1859 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re RiseSmart, Inc., 104 USPQ2d 1931, 1934
(TTAB 2012). Descriptiveness must be determined in relation to the goods or services
for which registration is sought. Id. at 1933. “[I]t is enough that the term describes
one significant attribute, function or property of the goods or services.” In re
Highlights for Children, Inc., 118 USPQ2d 1268, 1270 (TTAB 2016).
In this case, it has been established that the term SALT does not describe a
significant component of Applicant’s services, yet the refusal remains.38 This seeming
incongruity may possibly be explained by the breadth of Applicant’s identification of
services. As the Examining Attorney puts it, “The applicant has applied for ‘health
spa services for health and wellness of the body and spirit’ and therefore this wording
merely describes spa services that likely involve salt treatments. … [T]he disclaimer
is warranted as the mark describes a significant feature or characteristic of the
claimed health spa services based upon the previously attached evidence that
demonstrates that there are multiple health spas that offer salt therapy and or stand-
alone salt rooms used in the health spa industry.”39 In other words, even though
Applicant has renounced any intention to offer salt therapy, the Examining Attorney
maintains, in essence, that its broad identification of services, “health spa services

38 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 20 n.6.
39 Examining Attorney’s brief, 6 TTABVUE 22, 25.
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for health and wellness of the body and spirit,” categorically encompasses the growing
industry of salt therapy services.
The record evidence does not establish, however, that prospective purchasers
encountering Applicant’s mark would immediately assume that its spa purveyed salt
therapy services. This case is similar to In re Registry Hotel Corp., 216 USPQ 1104
(TTAB 1983), in which the applicant sought to register “LA CHAMPAGNE” for
restaurant services. The term “LA CHAMPAGNE” was found to be suggestive of
French cuisine in general, rather than descriptive of a particular sparkling wine
made available (although not specially featured) by that applicant as part of its
restaurant services. Id.; cited in In re Universal Package Corp., 222 USPQ 344, 346
(TTAB 1984). Here, as in Registry Hotel, we find that “SALT,” as used in the unitary
mark SALT LIFE, is suggestive of a seaside ambience, rather than descriptive of a
particular kind of therapy that Applicant does not offer. See TMEP § 1213.05. The
more pertinent provision of the TMEP provides: “If the applicant responds that the
goods/services do not possess the feature or characteristic, the examining attorney
must withdraw the §2(e)(1) descriptiveness refusal (or disclaimer requirement)….”
TMEP § 1203.02(e)(ii).
For these reasons, we find that that the SALT in Applicant’s mark SALT LIFE is
not merely descriptive, and a disclaimer is not required under Section 6(a).
Decision: The refusals to register Applicant’s mark SALT LIFE are reversed.