Salant & Salant, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 4, 1950

92 N.L.R.B. 417 (N.L.R.B. 1950)

In the Matter of SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED and AMALGAMATED
CLOTHING WORKERS OF.AMERICA, CIO
Case No. 15M-C-4.Deoided December 4, 1950
DECISION AND ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge and an amended charge duly filed, on November 29,
1946, and May 10, 1948, respectively, by Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, herein called the General Counsel and
the Board, respectively, by the then Acting Regional Director for
the Fifteenth Region (New Orleans, Louisiana), issued his complaint
on June 17, 1948, alleging that Salant & Salant, Incorporated, Union
City, Tennessee, herein called the Respondent, had engaged in, and
was engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (2), and (3) and Section 2 (6) and.
(7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136,
herein called the Act. Copies of the original and amended charges
were served on the Respondent on June 27, 1947, and May 11, 1948,
respectively. Copies of the complaint, together with notice of hearing
thereon, were duly served upon the Respondent, the Union, and the
United Garment Workers' of America, affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor, herein called the AFL.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint, as amended
at the hearing, alleged, in substance, that the Respondent (1) on cer-
tain stated dates discharged, laid off, or suspended 32 named employ-
ees 1 and has since failed and refused to reinstate them because of their
1 Cora May Arnold Bessie Wallace Verlie D. Wright
Robert Lee Brockwell Myrtle Gore James Mullins
Erlie Butler Virginia Green Bertie Mae Williams (Beard>
Montez Adams ( Cappa- Ruth Johnson Dorothy Gardiner Haynes
relli) Mary Merritt Annie Glosson
Anna Conley John Napier, Jr. Rubye James
Truma Dillon Edith Riley Jewell Read
Glen Dora Stanfield Ladle Schmidt Clara Thornton
(Finch) Blanche Smith Catherine Sanders ( White)
Marcia Cunningham Hilda White Vera Hill
Vassie Fox Hallie Houser ( Barker)
Walter Gardner Lona Wolverton
92 NLRB No. 71.
. 417
418 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
membership in and activities in behalf of the Union and because they
engaged in concerted activities with their coworkers for the purposes
of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection; (2)
since about May 1, 1946, through certain of its officers, agents, and
supervisors, engaged in certain stated activities and made certain
statements which acts and statements interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act; and (3) from May 1, 1946, has urged, persuaded,
threatened, and warned its employees to assist, become members of and
to remain members of the AFL, and thereafter has sponsored, pro-
moted, and contributed support to the AFL; and (4). on or about
May 1, 1946, initiated, formed, sponsored, and promoted the AFL and
thereafter has assisted, dominated, contributed to its support, and
interfered with its administration.
On July 19, 1948, the Respondent duly filed an answer admitting
certain allegations of the complaint with respect to its corporate exist-
ence and the nature and extent of the business transacted by it, but
denying that it had engaged in the alleged unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was duly held in Union City, Ten-
nessee, on various dates between July 26, 1948, and February 25, 1949,2
before Howard Myers, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the
Chief Trial Examiner. The Respondent, the General Counsel, and
the AFL were represented by counsel; the Union by representatives.
All parties participated in the hearing and were afforded full oppor-
tunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence pertinent to the issues.
At the opening of the hearing, the motion of the AFL to intervene
was granted by the Trial Examiner without objection. Thereupon,
the AFL moved to dismiss the complaint with respect to the allega-
tions thereof that the Respondent initiated, formed, sponsored,
promoted, assisted, dominated, supported, and interfered with the
administration of the AFL. The motion was denied with leave to
.renew. The AFL then moved to make the complaint "more definite
and certain and to strike certain portions of the complaint." The mo-
tion was denied by the Trial Examiner. An answer was then duly
filed by the AFL, which is in the nature of a general denial of all the
unfair labor practice allegations of the complaint relating to it.
Before the taking of any evidence, counsel for the Respondent made
.several motions to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, or, in the
alternative, to dismiss certain portions thereof. The motions were
denied by the Trial Examiner with leave to renew. At the conclusion
8 On August 4, 1948, the General Counsel moved without objection to adjourn the hearing
without date in order to afford the parties an opportunity to settle the ease. The, motion
was granted . The hearing was reconvened on February 14, 1949.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPO'R!ATED 419
of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, the Respondent made numerous
motions to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, or certain portions
thereof, on the ground of lack of proof. Some of the motions were
granted by the Trial Examiner,' some denied, and decisions on others
were reserved. The Respondent also moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the amended charge was not filed or served within
the time prescribed by Section 1Q (b) of the Act. The Trial Examiner
denied this motion in the Intermediate Report .4
At the conclusion of the taking of the evidence, the Trial Examiner
granted without objection the motion of the General Counsel to con-
form the pleadings to the proof in respect to the correction of mis-
spelled names, places, and the like. Various rulings were made by
the Trial Examiner during the course of the hearing on other motions
and on objections to the admission of evidence. The Board has re-
viewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and, except as hereinafter
indicated, finds that no prejudicial error was committed. With these
exceptions the rulings are hereby affirmed. All parties were afforded
an opportunity to file briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. The Respondent and the AFL have filed briefs with
the Trial Examiner.
On August 9, 1949, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate
Report, copies of which were duly served upon the parties, in which
be found that the Respondent had not engaged in any unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (2), or (3) of the
Act, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
Thereafter, the Union filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and
a supporting brief.
The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions
and brief filed by the Union, and the entire record in the case. Because
of the extent of our disagreement with the findings, conclusions, and
recommended order of the Trial Examiner, we make our own findings,
conclusions, and order, as follows :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Salant & Salant, Incorporated, is a New York corporation having
its principal offices in the City and State of New York. The Respond-
ent is engaged in the manufacture of work shirts and work trousers.
3 The Trial Examiner , without objection , granted the Respondent 's motions to dismiss
the complaint for failure of proof as to Vassie Fox, Ruth Johnson , Edith Riley , and Ludie
Schmidt.
4 We agree with the Trial Examiner 's ruling as we find that the original charge which
was timely filed and served upon the Respondent is a sufficient basis for the complaint
herein . See Cat hey Lumber Company, 86 NLRB 157.
420 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
It operates eight plants in the State of Tennessee, including a: plant
at Union City, Tennessee, which is the one involved in this proceeding.
At the Union City plant the Respondent is engaged, and during all
times material herein was engaged, in the manufacture, sale, and dis-
tribution of men's work shirts. During 1946, the Respondent pur-
chased raw materials valued in excess of $100,000, approximately all
of which were shipped to the said plant from points located outside the
State of Tennessee. During the same year, the Respondent manufac-
tured at its Union City plant work shirts having a value in excess of
$200,000, substantially all of which were shipped from the said plant
to customers located outside the State of Tennessee.
We find that the Respondent, at its Union City, Tennessee, plant, is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, affiliated with the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, and United Garment Workers
of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, are
labor organizations admitting to membership employees of the
Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The background
A previous attempt to organize tlfe Respondent's employees at the
Union City plant was made by the Union in March 1943. The at-
tempt proved abortive because of the Respondent's unfair labor prac-
tices. As found by the Board, in a prior case involving the Union City
plant, the Respondent had engaged in the following unfair labor prac-
tices : Surveillance of union meetings; interrogation of employees; co-
operated with the Anti-Union Citizens' Committee in Union City; dis-
criminatorily discharged'an employee who was a leading member of
the Union in the plant. The Board also found that the Respondent
had engaged in similar and other unfair labor practices in its other
plants in Tennessee.'
The record in this case reveals that in March 1946, at.the request
of James W. Mullins, then an employee of the Respondent, the Union
sent Edward Blair, one of its organizers, to Union City, Tennessee,
for the purpose of organizing the employees of the Respondent's
6 Salant & Salant, Inc., et al., 66 NLRB 24 enfd . as mod. 183 F. 2d 462 ( C. A. 6). For
a more detailed discussion of the Employer ' s labor relations background see our decision in
Salant & Salant, Inc., 92 NLRB 343, involving the Lexington , Tennessee, plant.
.%A;14 NT & SA'LANT, INCORPORATEiD 421
Union City plant. It was during the course of this campaign that
the unfair labor practices which are the subject of the complaint herein
are alleged to have occurred.
During March, Blair held 4 meetings with the employees at Mullins'
home in Martin, Tennessee, a town about 10 miles from Union City.
Blair also held about 10 such meetings at the Union City Hotel during
May, June, and July. Also in June, Blair held 2 or 3 such meetings
in front of the plant during the employees' luncheon periods.
Shortly after the Union started its campaign, the AFL sought to
organize the employees. Rivalry between the two organizations be-
came very heated.. In April 1946 the Union filed with the Board its
petition for investigation and determination of bargaining representa-
tives, pursuant to which a representation hearing was held by the
Board in May 1946. On June 26 the Board issued its Decision and
Direction of Election, finding that all production and maintenance
employees of the Respondent's Union City plant, with certain specified
exceptions, constituted an appropriate unit .6 On July 19, 1946, pur-
suant to the Board's Direction of Election, an election was held. The
Union won. Of the 337 eligible voters, 174 cast their votes for the
Union, 134 for the AFL, and 8 for "no union." No objections were
filed to the conduct of the election and on August 5, 1946, the Union
was certified by the Board as the collective bargaining representative
of the employees in the appropriate unit.
On August 2 the Union wrote the Respondent requesting that the
Respondent set a time and place for a bargaining conference. On
August 12 the Respondent denied the Union's request on the alleged
ground that the Board erred in its decision as to the appropriateness
of the unit. Upon the Respondent's refusal to recognize the Union,
the Union filed an 8 (5 ) charge. The Board passed upon the com-
plaint issued thereon in Salant & Salant, Inc., 74 NLRB 1405, and
found that on August 12, 1946, and at all times thereafter the Re-
spondent had refused to bargain collectively with the Union in viola-
tion of Section 8 (5) of the Act, prior to its amendment. The Re-
spondent, however, refused to comply with the Board's 8 (5) order
until it was enforced by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
in December 1948 (171 F. 2d 292). In January 1949 the Respondent
and the Union began bargaining conferences, the outcome of which
is not disclosed in the record in the present case.
9 Salant & Salant, Inc., 69 NLRB 84. In that proceeding the Respondent took the
position that the employees at its Obion , Tennessee , plant , located some 16 miles from
its Union City plant, should have been included in the unit of its Union City plant
employees and that eight foreladies who assist the head forelady should be included in
the unit. The Board found no merit in either of these contentions.
422 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
B. Supervisory hierarchy
The Respondent's general labor policies with respect to its plants.,
in Tennessee, including its Union City plant, are formulated by its
executive officers in New York City. Robert Salant, the Respondent's
treasurer and director, has, since 1945, been in .charge of its labor and
public relations. At the head of the Union City plant is Superin-
tendent Stone who receives instructions with reference to matters per-
taining to the Union City plant -directly from Arthur Lipshie,
production manager in New York City. Stone's duties as superin-
tendent include the general overseeing of the operations of the plant,
supervision of the supervisory personnel,- and public relations in
Union City. Directly assisting Superintendent Stone in the manage-
ment of the plant is Assistant Superintendent Rogers, who carries
out Stone's instructions and sees that the plant operates properly.
Rogers spends practically all his time on the floor overseeing the
operations. Prior to becoming assistant superintendent, he was
foreman of the cutting department.
The plant is divided into several departments, of which by far the
largest is the sewing department. Head Forelady May Taylor is in
charge of the sewing department. Assisting Taylor in the supervision
of the sewing department are 8 foreladies in charge of its various
sections. Each of these foreladies is responsible for the work of
from 23 to 45 employees, attends periodic meetings of supervisors,
and spends practically all her time overseeing the work of her sub-
ordinates. Although the foreladies have no authority to hire or dis-
charge, they submit reports on the performance of their subordinates
and these reports are relied upon and form the basis, of action taken
by the head forelady. Their wages are generally higher than those
of their subordinates. They were excluded by the Board from the
unit of production and maintenance employees in the prior represen-
tation case? It is found that the foreladies in charge of sections of
the sewing department are supervisors within the meaning of Section
2 (11) of the Act. Other departments in the plant are the-cutting,
finishing, and maintenance departments. They are each headed by
a foreman or forelady who oversees the work in the department and
generally performs supervisory functions.
C. Interference, restraint, and coercion
The General Counsel adduced considerable testimony in support of
the allegation of the complaint that certain of the Respondent's
officials and lesser supervisors had made statements and engaged in
T Salant & Salant, Inc .,. 69 NLRB 84.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 423
activities violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. This testimony,
if credible, amply supports the 8 (a) (1) allegations, unless, of course,
the Respondent is for some reason excused from responsibility for
such conduct of its supervisors. The officials and lesser supervisors
for the most part denied having made the statements or having en-
gaged in the activities attributed to them. The Respondent con-
tended and the Trial Examiner found that during the period covered
by the complaint, the Respondent observed a strict policy of neutral-
ity with respect to the organizational efforts of its employees which
was clearly expressed and made known to the employees in every
reasonable manner. Because of his finding in this respect, the Trial
Examiner did not resolve the conflicts in the testimony related to
the alleged coercive statements and activities of the Respondent's
supervisors, except in the instances where he considered the testimony
material to the issues of alleged discrimination. The Trial Examiner
proceeded on the theory that even if the Respondent's supervisors
engaged in such conduct, their activities were not imputable to the
Respondent as its breach of the Act. As, for reasons hereinafter set
forth in Section III C (2), we disagree with the Trial Examiner's
findings in regard to the Respondent's alleged neutrality policy, we
find it necessary to consider the evidence adduced with respect to
the 8 (a) (1) allegations and to make findings of fact thereon,
resolving where necessary the conflicts in testimony.
In those instances in which the Trial Examiner did resolve the
conflict in testimony he, almost without exception, credited the
testimony of the Respondent's witness.
In accordance with the Board's general policy," we have carefully
considered and weighed these credibility findings, presuming that the
demeanor of the witnesses was one of the factors which influenced the
Trial Examiner to resolve the issues as he did. Demeanor, however,
is but one of the factors to be considered by the trier of facts in resolv-
ing credibility issues. Because the Trial Examiner, but not the Board,
has had the opportunity of observing the witnesses while they testified,
the Board attaches great weight to a Trial Examiner's credibility find-
ings insofar as they are based on demeanor. Nevertheless, we are
constrained to find that the Trial Examiner's determinations as to the
truth or falsity of conflicting testimony in this case are not entirely
reliable. In many instances, more particularly referred to elsewhere
in this opinion, we have reversed the Trial Examiner's resolutions,
finding them contrary to the overwhelming preponderance of the rele-
vant evidence-evidence which we are duty-bound to appraise inde-
pendently. Here, as in a companion case involving the same Respond-
+ See Standard Dry Wall Products , Inc., 91 NLRB 544.
-424 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ent which was recently issued,9 the Trial Examiner's findings as to
credibility, whether or not affected by the witnesses' demeanor, seem
to have been formulated without consideration of objective factors
which we deem greatly significant in ascertaining the trustworthiness
of a witness. Specifically, the Trial Examiner, in making his credi-
bility findings in this case : (1) ignored the Respondent's anti-Union
background and its long history of unfair labor practices designed to
frustrate the organizational efforts of the Union at the Union City
plant, as well as at its other plants in the State of Tennessee, and, more
particularly, the active participation in those unfair labor practices by
Superintendent Stone, Foreladies Taylor and Andrews, and Foreman
Millsap, as found by the Board in the earlier case referred to above;
(2). overlooked the fact that numerous witnesses attributed to the same
supervisor repetitions of similar coercive statements and conduct and
apparently accorded no significance to the fact that out of this abun-
dance of corroborative testimony emerges an integrated pattern, viz, a
plan by the Respondent to discourage membership in the Union and
to encourage membership in the AFL; (3) in some instances, failed to
consider certain significant evidence in the record, while in other in-
stances he relied on the absence of certain evidence which was in fact
contained in the record; and (4) in some instances, overlooked the self-
contradictions and/or the patent inconsistencies in the testimony of
witnesses whom he credited. As the Board stated in the companion
case, where, too, the Board felt obliged to reject extensively the Trial
Examiner's credibility resolutions and his finding of fact dependent.
thereon :
We might have accepted the credibility findings of the Trial
Examiner in this case, were it not for his patent failure to recall
and properly evaluate background facts, corroborative testimony,
and other objective circumstances bearing upon the probable
veracity of each witness in turn. He appears to have judged
each witness in isolation, and appraised each bit of testimony
as if it stood alone. Using this wholly fragmentized approach,
he failed to perceive the integrated pattern which emerges when
the independent and apparently unrehearsed stories of all the
General Counsel's witnesses are dovetailed.
On a reading of the entire record, we find this connected web
of testimony wholly convincing, and doubly so when it is con-
sidered against the background of the Respondent's established
anti-C. I. O. policy.
9 Salant & Salant, Incorporated, 92 NLRB 343.
SATLANT & SALANT , INCORPORATED 425
For convenience of discussion the alleged violations of Section 8
(a) (1) of the Act are grouped in the following categories : (a)
Coercive statements and conduct of Respondent 's officials and lesser
supervisors ; and (b) surveillance of union meetings and union activi-
ties of employees.
1. Coercive statements and conduct of Respondent's officials and
lesser supervisors.
Unless otherwise noted the Trial Examiner did not resolve the con-
flicts in the testimony recited in this section.
a. Superintendent Stone
Superintendent Stone and his assistant, Rogers, were the two top
management representatives of the Respondent in the Union City
plant.
Several employee '%yitnesses called by the General Counsel testified
that during the Union 's organizational campaign Stone questioned
employees about their union buttons which he called their "Pass to
Heaven." Thus, Rena Smothermon testified that in April while she
was at her machine, Stone looked at her button and said : "You think
that will take.you to heaven?" to which she replied : "You can't ever
tell." Hilda White testified that about the same time Stone, while
passing by her machine , queried her in the presence of another em-
ployee and Head Forelady Taylor, as follows : "Hilda, where is your
pass to heaven ?" And when she replied that she had left it at home,
Stone retorted , "I would have thought you would have been the one
to have one." Annie Lofton testified that while going through her
section a few days after the July 19 election Stone asked employees
working there , "What we was wearing [the button]for? Did we all
think they were going to get us to heaven?" Stone admitted that
he had made the remarks about the union buttons attributed to him
by Smothermon and the other employee witnesses named above.
Stone, however, explained that they were "kidding remarks," which
he exchanged with the operators while inspecting work and that his
relationship with employees , particularly with old employees such
as Smothermon, was friendly.
Margaret Speed has been in the Respondent 's employ since the
opening of the Union City plant. About the beginning of May 1946,
while carrying work to her machine, she was stopped by Stone. Ac-
cording to Speed's uncontradicted testimony, the following colloquy
then ensued : "Mr. Stone said , `Margaret ,' and I said : `Yes, Sir.' He
929979-51-vol. 92-29
426 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
says, `How is your friend, Ed Blair?' Ed Blair is CIO organizer,
and I didn't quite catch the name and I said `Who?' He said, `Your
union friend,' I said, `All right.' He said, `Well, you tell your friend
that he doesn't have to snoop around to do these things,' and I told
Mr. Stone that he could tell him himself. He said he didn't have
time or he never sees him. I told him he would soon. So, I went
on my machine and he and Mrs. Taylor stood talking."
Myrtle Thomason, one of the oldest employees in'the Union City
plant, testified, without contradiction, that whenever Respondent's
Production Manager Lipshie came down from New York to inspect
the plant, it was his custom to exchange greetings with her; that about
the time of the election, and after she began to wear her CIO button,
Stone came to her machine and commented upon the failure of Lip-
shie to speak to Thomason during his most recent tour of the factory.
Stone further stated, "I thought if there were two operators up here
that would stick to us, it would be you and Milbra [Hamlin]."
Stone's explanation that the remarks about the union buttons were
"kidding remarks" does not render them permissible under the Act.
The wearing of union buttons by employees is a form of union activ-
ity. It has an important function during a union campaign. It
prompts solidarity among-union members and signifies their member-
ship and determination to accomplish the unionization of the plant.
The employer's interrogation of an employee concerning his union
button is as objectionable as the employer's direct questioning of an
employee concerning his membership in a union, reasons for joining
a union, his voting interests or attendance at union meetings, or any
other aspect of union activities 10 There is no essential difference
between asking an employee why he belongs to the union and why
he is wearing a union button.
Besides invading the area guaranteed to be exclusively the business
and concern of his employees, an employer by questioning employees
concerning their union buttons, their union organizer, or other union
activities or affairs, also interferes with the employees' free exercise
of the rights guaranteed under the Act. Underlying such inquiries
is a veiled expression of hostility toward the Union tending to inter-
fere with the free exercise of the employees' rights under the Act.
They are reasonably led to believe that their employer not only wants
information concerning the union button or union organizer but also
contemplates some form of reprisal once the information is obtained.-
Likewise, Stone's remarks to Thomason, particularly when viewed in
the context of the supervisors' unlawful anti-Union conduct, includ-
io Cf. Dixie Shirt Company , Inc., 79 NLRB 127.
" Cf. Standard -Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 NLRB 1358.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 427
ing Stone's own activities in 1943 found by the Board to constitute
unfair labor practices,12 was intended to convey, and did convey, the
impression that her joining the Union was an act of disloyalty to the
Respondent that was likely to prejudice her standing with the Re-
spondent.
b. Assistant Superintendent Rogers
On December 30, 1946, Harold Bonee applied to Assistant Superin-
tendent Rogers for a job. Bonee had not previously been employed
by the Respondent, nor had he worked before in any shirt factory.
During the interview, Rogers stated to Bonee that "if [he] was go-
ing to work there [he] would have to belong to the AFL," and that
"the CIO had won the election but . . . they was trying to get the.
CIO out and the AFL in." Rogers recommended Bonee to Foreman.
Darcy Kemp, who thereupon hired Bonee as a cloth spreader.,' A few
days later Bonee joined the AFL and signed a petition for a new
election circulated in the plant by AFL adherents 14
James W. Mullins began to work for the Respondent in 1934 or
1935 and, except for the time he spent in the Armed Forces, continued
in the Respondent's employ until his suspension on October 7, 1946.
It was through Mullins' efforts that the Union began to organize the
plant. The first few meetings were held in his home. He became an
acknowledged leader of the Union at the plant and his activities ad-
mittedly were well known to the Respondent. Mullins worked in
Rogers' department before Rogers became assistant superintendent.
In the words of Rogers, they "were good friends, [and] still are."
In June and July Rogers and Mullins had several conversations at
Mullins' table about Mullins' union activities. On one such occasion,
Rogers said, "Why don't you leave that CIO alone?" When Mullins
asked "Why," Rogers replied, "Mr. Salant won't sign a contract with
them . . . [because] he had trouble in Martin with the CIO Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers." Rogers also told Mullins that "they
[the employees] were just wasting their time, fooling with the CIO";
12 See Salant R Salant, Inc., 66 NLRB 24, 64-65, wherein the Board found that Stone's
refusal to provide protection to a union employee against assaults on the plant premises
and his discharge of one of the leaders of the Union constituted unfair labor practices.
13 See Section III, E , infra , where we find that the Respondent's failure to recall Com-
plainant Napier, Jr., to fill the position given to Bonee at that time was discriminatory.
14 These findings are predicated upon the testimony of Bonee, Rogers , and Kemp. Rogers,
however, denied that he had made the remark that Bonee would have to join the AFL
if he were to work in the plant . As found hereinafter , the Respondent had failed to recall
for this vacancy Napier , Jr., a CIO member , because of his membership in the Union and
also rendered the AFL unlawful assistance within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (2).
These findings , coupled with the undenied testimony that Bonee was without any expe-
rience, and that promptly after he was hired he joined the AFL and signed a petition for
a new election , make Rogers ' denial unpersuasive. It is found , therefore , that Rogers
did make the statements and the remarks attributed to him by Bonee.
428 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that Salant would not deal with the CIO but "would sign a contract
with the AFL"; that "they had better leave the CIO alone. Would
be put out of work"; that Mullins would "get fired," if he didn't quit
"fooling" with the CIO.'
c. Head Forelady May Taylor
A number of emplo fee witnesses attributed certain antiunion state-
ments and conduct to Head Forelady Taylor. Since about 1940
Taylor had served as head forelady of the sewing department." In
1946 the sewing department employed between 250 and 300 employees.
Directly assisting Taylor in overseeing the employees of her depart-
ment were 8 foreladies, each of whom was in charge of a section of
the department.
As noted above, tLe Union began its most recent organizing cam-
paign in the Union City plant in March 1946. Among the employees
who at once became very active in behalf of the Union was Cleron
Smith, a "bundle boy" in Taylor's department. In April 1946 Taylor
called Smith into a hospital room in the plant and said : "Buster, as
good friends as your family have always been, now look what you
are trying to do.' You are trying to throw us all out of work. . . .
It looks like you fellows that has been hired in the last few months,
you just want to cause us trouble and tear down what us people have
built all these years in the shop. . . . What is the reason that you
want to get in the Union?" When Smith replied that the employees
wanted more money, Taylor said, "Are you really for it, are you really
for the Union ? Why don't you change your mind about it?" Taylor
added, "This Company has been good to you boys. . . . After you
15 These findings are based upon the testimony of Mullins which we credit . Rogers
testified that he talked to Mullins , with whom he was on friendly terns , in connection
with a complaint he received from Foreladies Taylor and Simmons that Mullins was going
around throughout the plant talking to the girls . At that time , according to Rogers'
testimony, he told Mullins "to remain on the job, otherwise he would have a run -in with
the foreladies and lie might get fired ;" and that Mullins tried to bring up the CIO in
the conversation . Rogers , however, denied that he made the statements attributed to him
by Mullins. Contrary to the Trial Examiner , we do not credit Rogers' version of the
conversation and find that he made the statements attributed to him by Mullins. We
disagree with the Trial Examiner that Rogers was "a forthright and honest witness."
We have refused to credit his denial of the statements attributed to him by Bonee. We
also rejected , as hereinafter appears, his testimony concerning the alleged distribution to
employees of a circular reproducing the notice of June 24, 1946 . While Mullins may have
been , as the Trial Examiner found , not entirely reliable as a witness in other respects.
his testimony with respect to this particular incident is convincing against the background
of the events which occurred at the plant , such as repeated violations of Section 8 (a)
(1) by supervisors and representatives of management . The statements attributed to
Rogers, moreover , are consistent with the entire pattern of Respondent ' s interference with
the organizational activities of its employees.
10 As found by the Board in Salant & Salant, 66 NLRB 24 , 59, enfd . as mod . 183 F. 2d 462
(C. A. 5), Taylor, together with other supervisors , engaged in surveillance of union meet-
ings and activities of the employees.
SALANT & SALAN'T, INCORPORATED 429
went into the service then you come back. We gave you your job
back . .. While you was across the sea I prayed for you, while you
was over there." 17
Margaret Speed was in the Respondent's employ off and on from
the opening of the Union City plant in 1934 until June 28, 1946, when
she voluntarily terminated her employment. At the time of the con-
versations referred to herein she was doing stitching in Taylor's
department. Speed was one of the first employees to join the Union
and became active in its behalf, soliciting membership and otherwise
participating in its activities. She was given two union buttons
and openly wore one of them all the time. In May 1946 Taylor asked
Speed to come into the hospital room, which served mostly as
a conference room, and there questioned her about the Union ; whether
she had solicited employees to sign union cards, and "who [her] leader
was . . . if it wasn't Moon Mullins?" In other conversations Taylor
asked Speed why she didn't join the AFL, and told her that it would
be better for the employees; that "Salant would deal with the AFL,
but he would not deal with the CIO"; that "if they didn't join the
AFL" Salant would close the plant; that "he had money and he
didn't have to operate"; that it -would be worthwhile for her to join
AFL; and asked what her husband, an AFL man, thought of her
joining the CIO. Taylor also asked Speed to.quit -wearing her CIO
button because if she pulled off her button, the rest of the girls would
follow her example.-
During one of the conversations that Head Forelady Taylor. had
with Speed, Taylor asked Speed if she had attended the union meeting
the night before. Speed replied that she did not. Taylor then said
that she knew Speed didn't. Speed asked her how Taylor knew this.
"These findings are based upon the testimony of Smith, whom the Respondent discharged
2 or 3 weeks after the above conversation. Taylor admitted that in April she had a
conversation with Smith in a hospital room in the plant. According to her testimony, a
forelady had complained that Smith refused to do some work she had asked him to do
and Taylor called Smith there in order to reprimand him. Taylor denied that during
this conversation she made the statements attributed to her by Smith. Taylor' s denial,
however, is not credited. The statements attributed to Taylor by Smith are consistent
both with Taylor's own course of conduct, as revealed by the credible testimony of
numerous witnesses , as well as with the entire pattern of Respondent 's interference with
organizational activities of the employees , as reflected by the record. They are also
consistent with Taylor 's prior record of having engaged in unlawful surveillance of a
union meeting at the home of a union protagonist , as found by the Board in Salant &
Salant, 66 NLRB 24. Moreover, as it will appear in Section E herein, we reject in a
number of instances Taylor's explanations as to why the Respondent either discharged,
laid off or failed to recall certain employees because of theinconsistencies .in, and/or
unconvincing nature of such explanations when viewed in the light of other probative
evidence contained in the record.
11 These findings are based upon the testimony of Speed which we credit . Taylor denied
that she made the statements attributed to her by Speed. Taylor's denial, however, is not
credited, for the same reasons we refused to credit her other denials.
430 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Taylor replied that she "checked" on Speed, "she seen to it." :19 In
May, Rena Smothermon, an employee in Andrews' department, ap-
proached Speed's machine and dropped over her shoulder two union
cards signed by employees. Noticing that Forelady Andrews had
observed Smothermon's actions, Speed did not pick up the cards but
left them lying on the table covered by the shirts on which she was
working. Speed then left her machine and went to the rest room.
While she was gone Forelady Andrews went through the shirts on her
table and found the cards. When Speed returned to her machine
Andrews came over to her and returned the cards. Shortly there-
after Head Forelady Taylor called Speed-and Smothermon into her
office and reprimanded them for distributing the cards during work-
ing hours. Speed replied that she didn't pass the cards, that she was
working when Smothermon dropped the cards on her table. After
Smothermon went out of the room Taylor asked Speed why she didn't
bring the cards to her.. She also asked Speed "where the cards were."
Speed replied that she had them. Taylor then asked for the names,
on the cards and Speed refused to reveal them. Taylor said, "she
might as well because Andrews told her the names.20
Annie Autry was in the Respondent's employ from 1942 to August
or September 1946 when she voluntarily quit. She joined the CIO
about the time the organizational drive began. She was issued a
'union button which she wore openly in the plant. About 1 week after
the election Taylor came to her machine and told her that she had
to sign up with the AFL and go to the AFL meetings. The next
morning Arlene Autry, her sister-in-law, handed her an AFL card
and asked her to sign it. She took the card, held it for a week and
then signed it and returned it to Arlene Autry. At the time of her
conversations with Taylor she was wearing a CIO button."
Hilda White was in the Respondent's employ from March 1934
until October 19, 1946, when she was laid off for lack of work. About
19 These findings are based upon the credible testimony of Speed , corroborated by Dillon,
another employee in the same department , who was present during the conversation.
Taylor denied that she had engaged in such conversation . Taylor's denial is not
credited. -
20 These findings are based upon the testimony of Speed, Smothermon, Dillon , Andrews,
and Taylor . Taylor, however , denied that she ever asked Speed to give her either the
cards or the names of the employees who signed them and added that she didn't have
to ask Speed for the names because Andrews gave her these cards and she had returned
them to Andrews . Taylor's denial is not credited . Taylor ' s questioning of Speed is con-
sistent with Taylor's entire course of conduct as reflected by the record . Moreover,
the testimony of Dillon who witnessed the incident and Andrews indicates that, contrary
to Taylor ' s assertions , Andrews did not give her the cards before she returned them to
Speed.
21 These findings are based upon the credible testimony of Annie Autry. Taylor denied
that she had any such conversation with Autry. Taylor's denial, however , is not credited
for the same reasons for which we did not credit her other denials. Arlene Autry was
not called to testify.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 431
a month after the election the following colloquy occurred between
Taylor and White in the presence of employee Newhouse. Taylor
said to White that she had been "aiming" to talk to her about her
union button. White replied that she didn't have one. Taylor said,
"No, but you have been wearing it," and added, "I would like to see
you do something else." 22
Annie Lofton was one of the oldest employees at the Union City
plant in point of service. At the time of the hearing Lofton still
was in the Respondent's employ. She joined the Union 2 or 3 months
before the July 19 election and openly wore her CIO button at the
plant. In March 1948 she was asked by her supervisor, Kindred,
to work overtime from 4 p. in., her regular quitting time, to 5 p. m.
She went to Taylor and in the presence of Forelady Andrews told
her that she could not work until 5 o'clock because she had no way
to get home after 4 o'clock. Taylor "kind of grinned" and said,
"You know I don't want you to walk home . . . but why couldn't
you stay all night with Moon [Mullins] or Buster [Cleron Smith] ? 23
Lofton replied that she didn't think she could do that. Andrews
then said, "Well, maybe they would carry you home then." Lofton
said she didn't think they would do that either. Taylor said, "I don't
want you to work 'til 5 and have to walk home" and also : "Well,
Annie, there is such few of your CIO's in here, I don't see why you
don't get together and put this [Union] out of here." Taylor then
asked Lofton what Mullins told "them" at the dinner that day. Lof-
ton answered that Mullins did not tell "us" anything in particular
aid that Taylor could verify that by consulting Forelady Andrews'
husband who had been there.24
It is found that Head Forelady Taylor questioned employees con-
cerning their union membership and activities; threatened employees
with discharge if they didn't join the AFL; solicited an employee
to stop wearing a union button so that the other employees would
follow her example; urged a union member to abandon the Union;
threatened employees that the Respondent would close the plant if
the Union came in; directed an employee to join the AFL and go to
22 This finding is based upon the credible testimony of white. Taylor denied that she
had such conversation with white. The Trial Examiner credited Taylor's denial. We
disagree for the same reasons for which we did not credit Taylor's other denials.
23 Both Mullins and Cleron Smith were former employees of the Respondent who'were
very active in the Union ' s organizational drive. After their termination they became
organizers for the CIO, and in March 1948 were acting , in that capacity.
24 These findings are based upon the testimony of Lofton , which we credit . Forelady
Taylor denied the statements attributed to her by Lofton . Forelady Andrews, although
called as witness, was not questioned about the incident. Forelady Kindred was called
as a witness , but was not questioned with regard to this incident . Taylor's denial is not
credited for the same reasons we did not credit her other denials.
432 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the AFL meetings ; requested an employee to reveal the names appear-
ing on union membership application cards in her possession.
d. Forelady Hazel Andrews
Forelady Hazel Andrews began working for the Respondent in
June 1939. In 1940 she was promoted to the position of forelady
in the sewing department. In 1.946 she first supervised Section 2, and
then on October 29 assumed the supervision of Section 5 .25
Jewell Read worked in Section 2 under the supervision of Andrews.
In March or April 1946 Andrews told her collar stitchers, Roberts,
King, and Norris, who worked opposite Read, that they would "have
to get on the right side . . . [the AFL] because Mayor Miles [of
Union City] said he would not allow the Union to come into this
plant . . . it belonged to the city and he would not let it work
under CIO" ; that "he would close it down before it did.26
Robert Brockwell worked for the Respondent from November 1942
to October 25, 1946, when he was laid off for lack of work. In May
1946 Andrews told her subordinates that she heard that a "baby shoe
factory would come in this plant" and when one of the employees
observed that "they can make shoes under the CIO as good as [they]
can make shirts" Andrews replied : "Well, there won't be any CIO .. .
Mr. Salant will close down his plant before he will work under
CIO." 27
Several employees testified as to disparate treatment of union mem-
bers by Forelady Andrews. Thus, Brockwell testified that the day
after the election employee Forrester, who was very active in behalf
of, the AFL, discussed union matters with another employee during
working hours in the presence of Andrews who was standing only
4 or 5 feet away but said nothing. Myrtle Gore testified that in
w As noted above, in a prior case involving the Union City plant (Salant f Salant, Inc.,
et at., 66 NLRB 24, 59) the Board found that Andrews, together with Head Forelady
Taylor and Foreman Millsap, had engaged in surveillance of union meetings.
26 This finding is based upon the testimony of Read. Andrews denied making the state-
ments attributed to her. None of the three collar stitchers present during this conversa-
tion was called to testify. The Trial Examiner credited Andrews' denial, because in his
opinion Read's testimony was replete with self-contradictions while Andrews testified in
"a forthright and honest manner. We do not agree. The statements attributed to
Andrews are consistent with with Andrews' own course of conduct, as testified to by a
number of General Counsel's witnesses, as well as with the entire pattern of Respondent's
interference with organizational activities of the employees as reflected by the record.
Andrews, moreover, as found by the Board in the earlier case, Salant d Salant, Inc., et at.,
66 NLRB 24, previously had engaged in unlawful surveillance of a union meeting and
of the home of an employee leader of the Union while a union organizer was visiting him.
We are not aware of, nor did the Trial Examiner point out in his Intermediate Report,
any serious self-contradictions in the testimony.of Read. We are not, therefore, impressed
by Andrews' denial and we credit the testimony of Read.
27 These findings are based upon the credible testimony of Brockwell. Andrews testified,
that she did not remember making such statements.
SALAN & SALANT, LNCORPORATED 433
September Andrews reprimanded her and Hamlin, both of whom
were union members, for talking, whereas AFL members were per-
mitted to talk during working hours. Milbra Hamlin testified that
Forrester solicited her membership for the AFL during working hours
in the presence of Andrews, who was within 10 feet of them but said
nothing about it; and that employee Hudson, whose union affiliation
does not appear in the record, was permitted to walk around the plant
during. working hours and talk to the people. Andrews denied that
she ever heard Forrester talking to Hamlin or to other employees
about union matters during working hours. Andrews' denial, how-
ever, is not convincing in the face of the mutually corroborative testi-
mony of Brockwell, Gore, and Hamlin and'is not credited.
In September of the same year Andrews questioned employee Gore
in the presence of Hamlin and Schmidt as to what occurred at a
union meeting.2s
Forelady Andrews also stated to various employees that the Re
spondent would not deal with the Union but would deal with the AFL.
Thus, Mechanic Walter Gardner, chairman of the Union's negoti-
ating committee, testified that Andrews stated to him during working
hours that "Mr. Salant would not let the CIO come in but he would
the AFL." Myrtle Gore, one of the oldest employees at the plant, and
Bundle Boy_ Schmidt, Jr., testified to the same ef£ect.29 In November
Andrews made a similar statement to Myrtle Thomason. According
to Thomason, Andrews said that "they [the Respondent] will bargain
with the AFL but they will not bargain with the CIO . . . on account
of some personal thing that came up a long time ago between Mr.
Salant and the Union people"; and that "if you and Milbra [Hamlin]
would just join over, you are the oldest operators up there, that would
influence the rest of them." 30
. It is found that Forelady Andrews questioned employee Gore as to
what happened at a union meeting; urged employees to get on "the
right side" meaning the AFL, or switch over from the Union to the
28 This finding is based on the testimony of Gore, which we credit. Andrews admitted
that she had a conversation with Gore about what they did at the union meeting but ex-
plained that the conversation related to the refreshments served at the meeting. Andrews
denied that she made the statement that Salant would close down the plant. Andrews'
denials are not convincing and therefore are not credited.
28 These findings are based upon the testimony of Gardner , Gore, and Schmidt . Andrews
admitted that she told Gardner that she "didn't think" that Salant would deal or sign
a contract with the CIO , but that was only her "personal opinion " and "belief ." Ques-
tioned as to the source of her information or belief, Andrews said that she arrived at
that opinion "because Walter Gardner was just an agitator." Andrews, however, denied
that she ever made the same statement to Schmidt, Jr., or to Gore . Andrews' denials
are not credited.
3o These findings are based upon the credited testimony of Thomason . Andrews' denial
of this statement is not credited.
434 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AFL; threatened employees that the plant would be closed down
either by the Respondent or by the mayor of Union City if the Union
came in; stated to employees that the Respondent would not bargain
with the Union, but would bargain with the AFL,31 and engaged in
disparate treatment of union members.
e. Forelady Virginia Latimer
Forelady Virginia Latimer, 1 of the 2 foreladies in the parts de-
partment, had under her supervision about 50 employees. A number
of employees testified concerning certain-coercive conduct allegedly
engaged in by Latimer. Thus, Algie Cunningham, who worked for
the Respondent from 1936 to February 1947 when she quit to go into
business with her husband, testified that in April 1946 Forelady
Latimer, in her presence, told employee Jones and a group of girls
that "if [they] all joined [a] union, [they] better be sure it is an
AFL." 32 We find that the foregoing statement, appearing in the con-
text of the widespread anti-union activities by the supervisory per-
sonnel, constituted a warning to stay out of the CIO.
A number of other employee witnesses testified that Latimer ac-
corded more favored treatment to members of the AFL than to the
members of the Union. Thus, Louise Ferguson, who worked at the
plant from 1934 to October 1947 when she voluntarily quit, testified
that during the organizational campaign Latimer reprimanded Mil-
bra Hamlin for talking to Ferguson at her machine during Hamlin's
recess hour, whereas Latimer never reprimanded Hamilton and Web-
ster, employees in Ferguson's section and members of the AFL who
frequently talked during working hours.33 Earlie Butler, an employee
in Latimer's section, testified that Latimer overlooked the solicita-
tion by Mechanic Forrester, a well known adherent of the AFL,
• "Andrews ' characterization of such statements as her "personal opinion " does not divest
the statements of their coercive character . Despite the qualifying remarks Andrews was
ostensibly acting within the framework of her authorization , since she engaged in this
activity during working hours and while on duty as supervisor . Andrews' statement more-
over conformed to the pattern of the Respondent's unlawful interference by its other
supervisors . Under such circumstances , it is found that Andrews' statements , though
qualified as her "personal opinion, " were in the circumstances not privileged under Section
8 (c) of the Act . Cf. J. S. Abercrombie Company, 83 NLRB 524, enfd . 180 F. 2d 578
(C. A. 5).
32 This finding is based upon the testimony of Cunningham , which we credit . Cunningham
was an old employee who voluntarily resigned from the Respondent ' s employ. She had
no motive to distort the truth. Moreover , she named an employee who was present during
these conversations but that employee was not called to testify . Although Latimer denied
the statements attributed to her, her denial is not convincing.
as This finding is based upon the testimony of Ferguson , which we credit . Latimer
admitted that she told Hamlin to leave Ferguson alone because Ferguson ' s rest period
was over ; and that she was under instructions not to permit conversations between the
employees who were having rest periods with those who were working . As several
witnesses for the General Counsel testified as to the disparity of treatment by Latimer
of union members, her explanation is not convincing and is not credited.
SAVANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 435
of her membership in the AFL during working hours. Blanche
Smith, also an employee in Latimer's section, testified that one Mc-
Daniel, an AFL adherent, gave a newly hired employee an AFL card
while Latimer was passing by, that Latimer saw it done but merely
smiled and walked away. According to Blanche Smith, Latimer
also did nothing to stop Forrester from soliciting memberships in
behalf of the AFL during working hours in Latimer's section.34
Ruth Smith began to work for the Respondent in January 1943 and
at the time of the hearing was still in the Respondent's employ as
pocket setter in Latimer's department. Smith joined the CIO about
2 months before the election and wore a CIO button. Later in the
year she also joined the AFL. Some time after the July 19 election,
on a Saturday morning, Latimer questioned her in the rest room as
to "why didn't [she] sign an AFL card and get out of the CIO. That
[she] was going to get fired. [She] was going like the rest of them if
she did not change. over; and told her to see Nellie Roper to get an
AFL card to sign." The same morning Roper offered her an AFL
card which Smith didn't take. However, later Smith did take an
AFL card from Selph, an employee who had changed over from the
Union to the AFL. - Later the same morning Smith asked Latimer if
she "couldn't sign a non-union card and get out of all of it" and Lati-
mer replied she couldn't, "that the non-union was out. It was either
CIO or AFL." Smith then asked Latimer if she wouldn't get into
trouble signing two cards. Latimer said she wouldn't. After Smith
signed an AFL card she attended several meetings of the AFL and
then began to "drop off" and eventually quit going because; as she ex-
plained, she just lost interest in it after she went for a while. In No-
velnber or December Latimer asked her "why didn't [she] attend the
[AFL] meetings over there and be faithful to them as [she] did in the
CIO meetings." 35
Walter Gardner, a mechanic who serviced machines, testified that
after the election he had several conversations with Latimer during
34 Latimer denied that she knew that Forrester and McDaniel were soliciting in behalf
of the AFL . For reasons stated above Latimer 's denial is not credited.
" These findings are based upon the testimony of Ruth Smith , which we find convincing.
Neither Nellie Roper nor Selph, named by Smith in her testimony , testified . Latimer
denied that either on a Saturday morning in October of 1946 or at any other time did she
have any such conversations with Smith. The Respondent also adduced in evidence the
original time cards covering the month of October of Ruth Smith , Latimer, Roper, and
Selph , showing that none of them worked in the plant on a Saturday in October of 1946.
However, the record is not clear whether the alleged conversation occurred in October
or merely at some time after the July 19 election . For this reason we find that the
Respondent 's time cards of Ruth Smith , Latimer, Roper , and Selph , showing that none
of them worked on a Saturday morning in October, do not conclusively. establish that
no such conversation occurred at some other time. Nor are we impressed with Latimer's
denial. The statements attributed to her by Smith conform to the pattern of conduct
of the representatives of the management and other supervisory personnel . Smith, further-
more, was a disinterested witness. It Is found that the statements attributed to Latimer
by Smith were in fact made.
436 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
working hours or recess periods and that Latimer told him that "she
knew that the CIO would never come in ; that Mr. Salant wouldn't let
them," but "would bargain with the AFL." 36
Mary Cobb, an employee in the Latimer section, worked for the
Respondent off and on from September 1945 to March 1948, when she
resigned because of illness. She joined the Union in April or May.
1946 and wore her CIO button in the plant every clay. She was laid
,off for 5 days in October 1946 for lack of work and was recalled at
the beginning of November. After her recall she had a conversation
with Latimer at Cobb's machine on Saturday morning in November.
Latimer said, in effect, that the only way Cobb could hold her job was
to join the AFL; that Daniel Webster had AFL cards. Latimer
then walked away and soon returned with an AFL card which she
gave to Cobb. Cobb filled it out and turned it over to Daniel Webster.37
Rubye James, an employee in Latimer's section, testified that about
3 weeks before she was discharged on October 18,1946, Latimer warned
her, Blanche Smith, and Virginia Green, while they were walking
toward their machines one morning, as follows : "You'd better put
those inside of your coat where they can't be seen before you get laid
off," referring to the CIO buttons which they were wearing. Latimer
denied that she made the statement attributed to her by James. The
Trial Examiner credited her denial. Neither Smith nor Green was
questioned about the incident. Since the statement attributed to Lati-
mer conforms in general with the pattern of Latimer's other coercive
conduct found above, Latimer's denial is not credited.
It is found that Forelady Latimer warned employees to stay out
of the Union; engaged in disparate treatment of members of the
Union; questioned an employee as to why she did not join the AFL
and warned her that she would be discharged if she did not "change
over," and otherwise encouraged her to join the AFL; stated to
another employee that the only way she could keep her job was to join
the AFL.
36 These findings are based on the testimony of Gardner which is credited. The state-
ments attributed to Latimer are consistent with the statements attributed to her byo other
witnesses for the General Counsel as well as with the pattern of conduct by the supervisory
personnel, as reflected by the record. Latimer's denial therefore is not credited.
37 These findings are based upon the testimony of Cobb, which we find convincing and
credit. Latimer denied that she made the statements attributed to her by Cobb and
stated that she had never worked on a Saturday morning in November with only one
operator. We do not find Latimer's denial convincing. Latimer's statements to Cobb
are consistent with Latimer's other conduct, as well as the entire pattern of the Respond-
ent's interference with the organizational activities of employees, and particularly with
its policy of favoring the AFL in preference to the Union. Cobb, although a former
member of the CIO, was never active in behalf of the Union and was a disinterested
witness having left the Respondent's employ voluntarily. No time cards were adduced
in evidence in support of Latimer's statement that she had not worked on a Saturday
morning in November.'
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED - 437
f. Jeanette Simmons
Jeanette Simmons shared the supervision of the parts department
with Forelady Latimer. Mary Pierce, an employee under Sinunolls'
supervision who remained in the Responde.nt's employ until October
1947, and Rena Keene, also in Latimer's department, testified that they
were reprimanded by Simmons for talking during working hours,
whereas certain employees who were known AFL adherents and others
who did not belong to either union, engaged in conversations in the
immediate presence of Simmons without being reprimanded.',,
Montez Adams [Capparelli] worked in Simmons' section. In Octo-
ber 1946 Adams was laid off for lack of work and was never recalled..
Adams had several conversations with Simmons both before and after
the election. On one occasion Simmons asked Adams "which [she],
was for, the CIO or AFL." On another occasion Simmons said, If
I were you I wouldn't join the CIO because you aren't going to gain
anything by it. It won't come in the plant." 38
It is found that Forelady Simmons interrogated employees con-
cerning their union sympathies, warned them against joining the
Union, and discriminated against union members and in favor of AFL
members.
g. Leo Kindred
Leo Kindred was forelady in Section 6 and had 23 girls under her
supervision. Her supervisory status is not in dispute. Catherine
Sanders worked at the plant from June 1942 to October 24, 1946, when
she was discharged allegedly for poor work. Sanders testified that,
both before and after the election, she had several conversations with
Kindred, under whose supervision she worked as a buttonhole girl.
In one of these conversations Kindred said to Sanders : "I like you,
and I know you need your job .... I ain't supposed to talk neither
way but . . . when election day comes you be on the right side.", Dur-
ing another conversation, which occurred after the election, Kindred,
in commenting upon the Union's victory in the election, said "Well,
it won't do no good. Mr. Salant will never work under CIO, he will
close it down first." . This latter statement, according to Sanders, was
38 The testimony of Pierce and Keene was mutually corroborative and is credited. Sim -
mons denied that it was her practice to allow those who wore an AFL button to talk
freely among themselves during working hours. However, since the conduct attributed
to Simmons is consistent with the Respondent ' s entire course of conduct of favoring
members of the AFL as against CIO members, Simmons' denial is rejected.
39 The findings in this paragraph are based upon the testimony of Adams. Simmons'
denial that she had made the statements attributed to her is not credited.
438 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
made in the presence of_ employees Taylor and Covington who were
about 2 feet away 4°
Sanders also testified that mechanic Forrester, who serviced ma-
chines, openly solicited AFL membership during working hours, that
he carried the cards in his shirt pocket, that 2 days before the election
Forrester took them out of his pocket, showed them to her, and asked
her to help him to distribute the cards. Kindred was standing a few
feet away "watching" them. Kindred made no effort to stop For-
rester and said nothing.-
Sometime before the election employee Pruitt, during working
hours, passed around a sack to receive contributions for an AFL
bus trip. The sack was passed from machine to machine. Kindred
was standing nearby when the sack was passed across the cuff line.
While apparently there is no definite rule prohibiting the solicitation
of funds during working hours, the record discloses that employees
Read and Speed were reprimanded for extending the distribution of
invitations to a CIO dance beyond the rest period. The two episodes
show and we find that there was a disparity of treatment by super-
visors of the CIO and AFL adherents .42
It is found that Forelady Kindred stated to an employee that the
Respondent would rather close the plant than work under the CIO
and showed her favoritism for the AFL to the prejudice of union
members in the matter of solicitations during working hours.
h. Forelady Estelle Crews
Forelady Estelle Crews supervised all inspectors in the sewing de-
partment and also acted as an extra forelady. She remained in the
Respondent's employ until January 1947 when she resigned. Both
before she became an employee of the Respondent and after she
terminated her employment with the Respondent she belonged to a
union.
Both before and after the July 19 election Crews had frequent
conversations with the inspectors in Section 5 who were discharged
40 The findings in this paragraph are based upon the testimony of Sanders, which we,
contrary to the Trial Examiner, credit despite Kindred's denial . Kindred 's warning that
Sanders be on the "right side" "when election day comes " and the statement that Salant
-would close down the plant rather than to work under the CIO conforms to the pattern
of unlawful conduct engaged in by almost the entire supervisory staff.
41 The findings in this paragraph are based upon the testimony of Sanders , which we
credit. Forrester who, according to the credible testimony of a number of witnesses,
was very active in soliciting memberships for the AFL while he was servicing machines,
did. not testify . Kindred denied that she ever observed Forrester soliciting AFL mem-
berships . For the reasons stated in the preceding footnote , Kindred's denial is rejected.
42 The finding in this paragraph is based upon the testimony of Sanders , which we credit.
Neither - Pruitt nor . Williams was called as a witness . Kindred denied that she ever saw
a sack being passed around in her section to collect money . Kindred's denial is not
credited.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 439
on November 1, 1946, for what we hereinafter find to have been dis-
criminatory reasons. While examining the shirts passed by them,
Crews questioned the inspectors as to whether they belonged to the
Union. Not being certain of their union affiliation, she cautioned
them not to join the CIO but to join the AFL. She further stated
that if they didn't belong to the right union they were going to be
fired; that the Respondent would not let the CIO come in and that
the plant would be closed down and they would be out of a job if
the Union came in 43
In April 1946 Crews initiated a conversation with employee Cleron
Smith, who was very active in behalf of the Union. During this con-
versation Crews made the following remark : "What did you mean
fooling with that old CIO Union? Don't you know that Mr. Salant
will never let that Union come into the shop ?" 44
Shortly after the election Crews stated to Stanfield (Finch), a
sleeve boxer in Section 5, that if she wanted to hold her job she had
better change over to the AFL. Similarly, and about the same time,
Crews observed to Bertie Williams, a buttonhole and button sew op-
erator in Section 5, that she "was surprised at [Williams] wearing
one of those buttons ... [and that she] had better change over
and wear a button of the other kind . . . it is not too late . . . [that]
if she wanted to continue working she had better change over.45
It is found that Forelady Crews interrogated employees concern-
ing their membership in the Union and warned them that if they
4' The findings in this paragraph are based upon the mutually corroborative testimony
of Wallace , Houser , and Thornton , which we credit . The statements and conduct attributed
to Crews follows the familiar pattern of unlawful interference with employees ' freedom
of self-organization by the management and other supervisors . Accordingly , we reject
Crews' denial as untrustworthy . See footnote 74, infra.
94 The findings in this paragraph are based upon the testimony of Cleron Smith, which
we credit . Crews denied that she made the remark attributed to her by Smith . Crews'
denial is not credited for the reasons set forth in the preceding footnote.
15 The findings in this paragraph are based upon the testimony of Williams and Stanfield
which, contrary to the Trial Examiner, we credit. In crediting Crews' denial that she
made the statements attributed to her and finding Crews a "forthright witness," the
Trial Examiner relied upon the following : ( 1) That Crews was a holder of a withdrawal
card of an affiliate of the CIO; (2 ) that Crews did not supervise Williams and Stanfield;
and (3 ) that it does not seem probable that Crews would leave her department, single
these employees out, and make such statements after the Union had won the election
and AFL activities had practically ceased. As to (1) : Crews ' statements to Williams
and Stanfield were in the nature of advice to change over to the AFL . Such advice does
not necessarily imply personal hostility or disloyalty to the CIO , inasmuch as Crews
might have been prompted to give this warning by her knowledge of the Respondent's
true attitude toward union members. Crews ' membership in a CIO affiliate therefore
does not make it improbable that she made these statements . As to ( 2) : While Crews
was not supervising Williams and Stanfield , she, as a supervisor of inspectors in all
sections of the sewing department , had occasion in the course of her work , to visit all
sections and to meet all machine operators . As for ( 3) : The record discloses that a
considerable number 'of supervisors engaged in unlawful conduct both before and after
the election . Moreover , we have found above that similar statements were made by
Crews to other employees.
440 DECISIONS.OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
did not belong to the right union [the AFL], they would be out
of a job, told them that the Respondent would not bargain with the
Union, cautioned them not to join or have anything to do with the
Union, and admonished them to change over to the AFL.
i. Foreman G. E. Millsap
Foreman G. E. Millsap was in charge of the mechanics servicing
the machines in the sewing department. In August and September
of 1946 Millsap had two conversations with Mechanic Gardner, his
subordinate, during working hours. In these conversations Millsap
told Gardner that "he didn't think that Mr. Salant would ever bargain
with CIO but that he was pretty sure that they would with the AFL." °
As we have previously stated, statements of this kind have a
tendency to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the ewer-
-else of their right to be represented by a union of their choice by em-
phasizing the futility of the employees' efforts to organize the plant
through a particular union. The circumstance that the statement
was qualified as "personal opinion" does not nullify its coercive char-
acter or bring it within the protection of Section 8 (c) of the Act.
2. Responsibility of the Respondent for the coercive conduct of its
officials and lesser supervisors
In support of its contention that during the period covered by the
complaint it observed a policy of strict neutrality with respect to
the organizational activities of the employees at the Union City plant,
the Respondent adduced evidence to the effect (a) that on June 24,
1946, it caused to be posted on the plant's bulletin boards a notice
advising employees of their rights under the Act; (b) that sometime
during 1946 and prior to the election of July 19, 1946, it distributed
circulars to its employees similar in nature to the notice above re-
ferred to; and (c) that at the regular meetings of the supervisory
staff held throughout 1946, Superintendent Stone cautioned and in-
structed the supervisors not to interfere with the employees' union
activities.
The So-Called Neutrality Notice.
On June 24, 1946, the Respondent posted upon its bulletin boards at
the plant a notice reading as follows :
46 The findings in this paragraph are made upon the undenied testimony of Gardner,
whom we credit . Millsap who, at the time of the hearing was no longer employed by
the Respondent , did not testify . Millsap , moreover , was one of the supervisors who, as
the Board found in a previous case (Salant & Salanit, Inc., et at ., 66 NLRB 24), engaged
in surveillance of union meetings.
tSALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 441
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
The law gives workers the right to organize for the purpose of
collective bargaining without any interference, restraint or coer-
cion by us. It is our policy to comply strictly with the law.
We have instructed all those in a position of authority in this
plant not to influence you in the matter of unionization. This
includes the superintendent, foremen, foreladies, and all other
supervisors. They have also been instructed not to take part in
or to attend any conferences or meetings for organizational pur-
poses held by any employees.
'No pro-union or anti-union activities or meetings will be per-
mitted during working hours. Lunch hour and recess time are
not part of working hours.
No one has any right to use our name or that of any supervisor
as sponsoring or favoring any particular organization or as
taking sides. If you do not want to join a union, no one has
any right to intimidate or coerce you to join. Neither has any
one any right to do the same if you do want to join.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED.
There were five bulletin boards in the plant : one in the finishing,
department on the first floor, another in the cutting department on the
second floor, and three in the sewing department on the third floor.
Altogether, four copies of the notice were posted on the bulletin boards
throughout the plant : one copy of the notice on each of the first two
floors and two copies on the third 47
The record is not clear, however, as to how long these copies of the
notice remained posted. Except for the testimony of Superintendent
Stone, which will presently be considered, no specific evidence.was
adduced by the Respondent on this issue. Witnesses for the Re-
spondent, who were questioned about the notice, merely testified that
they saw it posted before the election or during 1946. Stone testified
that on July 20, 1946, or the day following the Board election, he
personally removed the "original" from one of the bulletin boards, but
that there was more than one copy posted on each of the bulletin
boards. He did not specify from which bulletin board the original
was removed. Also, at some time prior to the hearing two other
copies of the notice were removed from two other bulletin boards,
although it is not clear exactly when or from which bulletin boards.
94 The findings in this paragraph are based upon the testimony of Superintendent Stone
and Assistant Superintendent Rogers, as well as other witnesses for the Respondent,
which we credit. While all but two of the many employees who were questioned about
,the notice testified that they never saw the notice, their failure to see the notice does not
necessarily establish that it was never posted on the bulletin boards.
929979-51-vol. 92-30
442 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As for the copy which was posted in the finishing department, the
evidence is conflicting as to whether it was removed from the board
sometime in 1946 or whether it remained there until the time of the
hearing.48
No direct explanation was offered by Stone as to why he took down
the original notice the day following the election, but allegedly left
the copies posted on the other bulletin boards. Stone, however, stated
that "he or some of the others" every so often would clean the bulletin
boards off "when [the notices] become obsolete or have no particular
reference to the current time" in order to make room for other material
to go on the board. Another significant piece of evidence to be consid-
ered in ascertaining the period during which the notices were posted
is the fact that all but 2 of some 34 witnesses for the General Counsel
who were questioned about the notice, testified that they saw no such
notice in 1946. Employees MacKeene and Walker testified that they
were told by a union organizer at the union meetings to look for notices
to be posted by the Respondent concerning the election and the rights
of employees and that "naturally" all of them were looking for such
notices. ' Employees Ferguson, Cunningham; Hamlin, Schmidt, Jr.,
and Wherry testified that they were interested in union activities and
would have seen or heard about such a notice if it were posted. This
and other testimony, particularly the testimony of Stone that he had
removed.the "original" notice on July 20, 1946, establishes to our
satisfaction and we find that copies of the notice remained posted on
the bulletin boards only for a limited time, and that all of them were
removed immediately after the July 19 election as "obsolete" or having
"no particular reference to the current time," and that they were again
posted on the bulletin board in the finishing department sometime in
1947.
The Circular Allegedly Distributed to Employees
Assistant Superintendent Rogers testified that prior to the July 19
election he distributed to all employees of the Union City plant a
circular "similar to the notice" of June 24. Rogers was unable to
locate a copy of such circular. Questioned by the Trial Examiner
as to whether it was a "printed circular" Rogers answered in the af-
48 Alice Smith , presser in the finishing department , testified that she used to look at
the bulletin board every time a new notice was posted and that she did not see the
notice on the board until after Christmas of 1947, possibly around February 1948, when
it was put up on the board either by Stone or Rogers . Athela Claybourn and Ruth Crook,
two other witnesses for the General Counsel employed in the finishing department , testified
that they didn 't see the notice in 1946. Claybourn , who at the time of the hearing was
still working in the same department , also testified that the notice had been posted on
the bulletin board in the finishing department sometime after 1946 and, at the time of
the hearing , was still there. Stone , on the other hand, testified that a copy of the,
notice posted in the finishing room on the first floor remained there continuously from
June 24, 1946 , and was still posted at the time of the hearing.
SALANT & -SALANT, INCORPORATED 443
firmative. In reply to another question, Rogers stated that he had
"no idea where-it was printed." Rogers also testified that "it could
have been mimeographed but anyway, it was in a typed form."
Neither Superintendent Stone nor any other witness for the Respond-
ent was questioned either about the issuance or distribution of such
a circular. On the other hand, more than two score witnesses for the
General Counsel testified that they had neither received nor knew
anything about the circular. In view of the vagueness of Rogers'
testimony, our finding herein that Rogers made certain unlawful
statements to employee Bonee; Rogers' inability to produce a copy of
the circular, which he claimed was duplicated in a number sufficient
to accommodate all employees in the plant; and the Respondent's
failure to furnish corroborative evidence on this point in the face
of the uniform denial of the employees who were questioned on the
subject that they ever received such a notice, and upon the entire
record, we find Rogers' testimony concerning thealleged circular
untrustworthy and conclude, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that
no such circular was distributed by Rogers to the employees in 1946.
The Alleged Neutrality Instructions to Supervisors
After he became superintendent of the plant and throughout the
year 1946, Stone held periodic supervisors' meetings to discuss pro-
duction problems. Stone testified that at such meetings held both
before and after the July 19 election, he instructed the supervisory
personnel as to the attitude they should take with respect to union
platters. According to Stone, he told the supervisory personnel "to
be careful and not take part in the union activities; go on about their
work as usual, see that the work went through properly and by all
means keep proper discipline." At a meeting held shortly before the
election Stone allegedly instructed the supervisors to "show no par-
tiality or anything, to show no expression whatever in their actions,"
regardless of -the .outcome of the election. Other witnesses for the
Respondent corroborated Stone's testimony in this respect. Foreman
Kemp also testified without contradition that at one of the meet-
ings Stone also stated that they could express their "own personal
opinion" but that would not be "a reflection of what the. company
thought. 11 49 Stone and Rogers testified that at no time during 1946
(lid they receive a complaint from any employee that a supervisor
had made any antiunion, statement or had interfered with the em-
ployees' union activities. In addition Hazel Hammond, personnel
!4 These findings are. based upon the testimony of Superintendent Stone and other wit-
nesses for the Respondent , as well as upon the testimony, of former Forelady Holland, a
witness for the General Counsel.
444 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
director, testified that one of her duties was to keep up the morale of
the employees, that in connection therewith she listened to-employees'
complaints, and that at no time did any employee advise her that a
supervisor was engaging in antiunion activity.
Conclusion
Implicit in the Respondent's argument that it took steps to safe-
guard the rights of its employees guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act
is the contention that if its supervisors continued to engage in con-
duct proscribed by the Act, after it posted on the plant bulletin
boards a neutrality notice and instructed its supervisors to remain
neutral, such activities may not be imputed to the Respondent. The
Respondent's. contention is, in our opinion, without merit. It is true
that under some circumstances an employer may relieve himself of
responsibility for the coercive conduct of its supervisory personnel
by posting notices and otherwise indicating its policy of noninterfer-
ence with employees' rights to self-organization and actually enforc-
ing such policy.50 However, we are satisfied that under the circum-
stances of the instant case the notice was insufficient to immunize the
Respondent from responsibility for the coercive statements and con-
duct of its supervisors.
In the first place, we do not believe that the notice of June 24, 1946,
was given adequate publication so as to bring to the attention of the
employees the Respondent's purported policy of noninterference in
the union activities of its employees. The mere posting of the notice
for a period of 1 month on the plant's bulletin boards could not, in
our opinion, effectively dissipate the coercive effect of the flagrant.and
widespread antiunion activities of the Respondent's supervisors. The
Respondent used no other mode of informing the employees of its
alleged policy. As we have found, no circular similar in nature to
the notice was distributed to the employees. Nor did the Respondent
call the employees' attention to the Respondent's policy of noninter-
ference in any speeches or in any other oral communications which,
in view of the fact that some of the employees were illiterate, might
have proved to be a more effective medium of publication.5' That
the publication of the notice was inadequate appears also from the
evidence showing that out of some 34 rank-and-file employees, who
50 Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F. 2d 556, 567 ( C. A. 8) ; Arkansas; Missouri
Power Corporation, 68 NLRB 805; Beatrice Foods Company, 84 NLRB 493.
51 Cf. South Carolina Granite Company, 58 NLRB 1448, 1455, where the Board held
that by the mere posting of a neutrality notice on a bulletin board an employer "did. not.
adequately fulfill its obligation to appraise and assure its employees of its neutral position,
or dissipate the coercive effects of the statements of two of its supervisors" where it
appeared that many employees were unable to read.
SA;LANT & SALAIVT, INCORPORATED 445
were questioned about the notice, all but 2 testified that they had
never seen any such notice. On the entire record we find, contrary
to the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent did not give adequate
.notice to the employees of a neutrality policy.
Although the managerial and supervisory personnel had engaged
in coercive conduct before the posting of the notice of June 24,52 the
notice contained no specific repudiation or disavowal of such past
conduct. It is true that the notice referred to the employees' right
to organize without any interference on the part of the Respondent,
-to the Respondent's alleged policy of compliance with the Act.and
However, those declarations, couched in such general language, can-
not be regarded as adequate repudiation of the past coercive conduct.
The notice, therefore, in this respect was insufficient .53
Finally, the notice of June 24 was entirely ineffective to stop the
supervisors and representatives of management from engaging in
further coercive conduct. Despite the notice they continued to engage
in such conduct. Nor was this conduct isolated or limited to minor
supervisors only. As found above, Superintendent Stone, his assist-
ant, Rogers, as well as practically the entire force of lesser supervisory
personnel engaged in such conduct.5M Under such circumstances, we
find that. the notice of June 24 and/or Stone's so-called neutrality
instructions to the supervisors, which, as we find, Stone himself
did not observe, do not constitute a defense to the. unfair labor
practices hereinafter found. An employer is not only under an obli-
gation to remain neutral after posting a neutrality notice but to see
to it that such policy is enforced. He cannot fulfill his duties under
the Act merely by issuing instructions requiring compliance with the
Act. His obligation extends to making any such instructions effec-
tive.55 Here the policy of neutrality enunciated by the Respondent
was honored almost entirely in breach, for the violations of the alleged
policy were committed by practically the entire managerial and super-
12 See Section III, C, 1, supra, where we found that prior to June 24 , 1946, certain
supervisors had engaged in interrogation of employees concerning their union membership
or activities , threatened to close clown the plant if the Union came in, made statements
that the mayor of Union City would not allow the Union to come in but would close the
plant down in such contingency , or that the CIO would not be permitted to come in, etc.
,a Fulton Bay and Cotton Mills, 75 NLRB 883 enfd , as mod . 175 F. 2d 675 (C. A. 5) ; The
Colonial Life Insurance Company of America , 76 NLRB 653 , 664 ; Columbian Carbon Com-
pany, 79 NLRB 62 ; Chicopee Manufacturing Corporation of Georgia , 85 NLRB 1439;
Jaques Pon er Caw Company , 85 NLRB 440.
5' Although there is no evidence that the employees had notified the management of
these infractions of the purported policy of noninterference, the Respondent 's knowledge
thereof can be inferred from the participation of the representatives of the management
in such unlawful interference ; widespread coercive activities of the supervisors ; the
moderate size of the plant ; and, as found hereinafter, the discrimination against a laige
number of employees because of their union membership and activities.
ss The New York Times Company , 26 NLRB 1094 , 1105-1i.
446 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
visory stafe.56 The June 24 notice did not relieve the Respondent of
responsibility for the coercive conduct of its supervisors for still
another reason. After posting the notice of June 24, as hereinafter
found, the Respondent discriminated against employees because of
their union membership and activities. Thus the Respondent itself
nullified the neutrality declarations and made it obvious to the em-
ployees that the notice was intended only as lip service to the Act.
Likewise, and for the same reasons, we find that the instructions to
its supervisory personnel, requiring compliance with the Act, were not
sufficient to relieve the Respondent of responsibility for their coercive
conduct. Its obligation extended to making any such instructions
effective. It is found that the notice to employees of June 24, 1946,
and the instructions to the supervisory personnel did not relieve the
Respondent of responsibility for their coercive conduct.
Conclusion as to Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
We find that the Respondent, by the statements and conduct of its
officials and lesser supervisors detailed in Section III, C, 1, supra,
including, inter alia, (1) the threats to close the plant in the event
the Union was selected as the employees' bargaining representative;
(2) the threats of economic reprisal against union members; (3)
the warnings that the Respondent would not bargain or deal with
the Union; (4) the request that an employee stop wearing a union
button so that other employees would follow her example; 57 (5) the
attempt to elicit from an employees the names appearing on union
membership applications in her possession; (6) the interrogation of
employees concerning their union affiliation, views, and activities;
and (7) the disparity in its treatment of union and AFL adherents
in matters of membership solicitation and other organizational ac-
tivities on company time and property, interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act."'
3. Alleged surveillance of union meetings
In May or June 1946 the Union held 2 or 3 meetings in front of
the plant during the employees' lunch period. About 60 to 70 'em-
ployees attended these meetings. Witnesses for the General Counsel
66 See Section III, C, 1, supra.
"This request we find amounted .. to an instruction or order and not an . expression of
opinion within the meaning of Section 8 ( c) of the Act.
66 Daly Bros . Shoe Co., Inc., 86 NLRB 1282; Goodall Company , 86 NLRB 814 ; Ozark Dam
Constructors, et al., 86 NLRB 520; Standard -Coosa-Thatcher Company, 85 NLRB 1358;
Chicopee Manufacturing Corporation of Georgia, 85 NLRB 1439; John H. Maclin Peanut
Co., Incorporated , 84 NLRB 384.
SALANT & SALANT, INC'ORP'ORATED 447
testified that while the employees were meeting, Head Forelady Tay-
lor and Foreladies Latimer and Andrews were looking out of the
window on the third floor watching what was going on below, and
stayed at the window while the meetings were in progress. Mullins
also testified thtain May 1946 the Union held one meeting in the AFL
hall across the street from the plant and about a hunched feet away.
That the meeting was held after quitting time at 4 p. in., and that
while waiting in front of the AFL hall for the employees to come in,
he observed Taylor standing at the window of the plant watching the
employees going to the meeting. Foreladies Taylor, Latimer, and
Andrews testified that they may have been looking out of the plant
windows upon the group of employees congregated below during
the lunch periods when the union meetings were held, but denied
that they did so for the purposes of surveillance of the Union's meet-
ings or that they made a list of employees who attended the meetings ;
that they were just looking out of the window because they wanted
to; that they could not hear what the employees were talking about
down below; and that some of them still continued to look out of the
windows.
Since the Union chose to hold the meetings in a place clearly visible
from the windows of-the plant where the supervisors had a right to
be standing and since the supervisors' explanation is not unreason-
able, we regard the evidence as insufficient to support a finding that
the said supervisors intentionally kept the union meetings under sur-
veillance.-'9 We shall dismiss the complaint in this respect.
D. Respondent's unlawful assistance of United Garment Workers
of America, AFL
Shortly after the Union began its organizational campaign, the
AFL also started to organize the employees. Both organizations be-
came very active in soliciting employees for membership. The AFL
activities did not cease even after the July 19 election and the certifica-
tion by the Board of the Union as the bargaining agent of the em-
ployees in the Union City plant. Solicitation of employees in behalf
of the AFL continued unabated. In November or December 1946,
the AFL adherents began to circulate a petition for a new election.
The Respondent did not remain neutral during this drive. As found
hereins° representatives of management and supervisory personnel
urged employees to withdraw from the Union and join the AFL;
stated to the employees that the Respondent would not bargain with
60 Cf. Boreva Sportswear, Inc., 73 NLRB 1048, 1059. See also Empire Pencil Company,
86 NLRB 1120.
60 See Section III, C, 1, supra.
448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union but would bargain with the AFL, and that if the Union
won the election the Respondent would close the plant; warned em-
ployees that they would be discharged if they became or remained
members of the Union; stated to new employees and to employees
.who were recalled after a temporary layoff that the only way for
them to keeptheir employment was to become members of the AFL;
overlooked the solicitation of AFL membership and talking by AFL
members on company time and property but reprimanded union
members for the same conduct; and finally, as found hereinafter,
discriminated in regard to"the terms and conditions of employment
of union members by discharging or laying them off. In our opinion
these activities of the Respondent's supervisory staff constituted un-
lawful assistance to the AFL in its contest with the Union.°1
The Respondent argues that, if made, the foregoing statements
and conduct cannot he imputed to the Respondent because of the
notice of June 24 and its neutrality instructions to its supervisors.
For the same reasons Ave have found this contention without merit
as a defense to the 8 (a) (1) allegations, Ave find it is likewise no
defense to the 8 (a) (2) allegations of the complaint.e2 Accordingly,
we find that by the statements and conduct detailed above, the Re-
spondent has unlawfully supported the AFL in violation of Section
8 (a) (2) of the Act.
E. Discriminatory discharges, layoffs, and failure to recall laid-off
employees
The complaint as amended alleges that during the second half of
1946 the Respondent discharged, laid off, or suspended.32 employees e3
and has since failed and refused to reinstate them because of their
union membership and activities. The answer denies that the Re-
spondent unlawfully discriminated against these employees and as-
serts as a defense that the employees were discharged or suspended
for cause or were laid off for lack of work and not recalled either
61 Kropp Forge Company, 68 NLRB 617, enfd. 178 F. 2d 822 (C. A. 7) where an employer
was found to have unlawfully assisted an unaffiliated union by stating that it did not want
either the CIO or the AFL; Fontaine Converting Works, Inc., 77 NLRB 1386, where an
employer by permitting unhampered solicitation of membership in an organization, coop-
erating in securing membership in such organization, and threatening. to discharge em-
ployees for refusing to join it was found to have engaged in unlawful assistance ; James R.
Kearney Corporation, 81 NLRB 26, involving threats of reprisals for joining an outside
union ; Sioux City Brewing Company, 82 NLRB 1061, where the Board found that the
organizational activities of foremen in behalf of a labor organization, coercive statements
of supervisors, and discriminatory discharges constituted unlawful assistance ; Seamprufe,
Incorporated, 82 NLRB 892, where certain foremen's silence or failure to disavow state-
ments made by the adherents of a labor organization was found to be unlawful support
to that union.
62 McHale Manufacturing Company, 67 NLRB 1266, 1275.
11 See footnotes 1 and 3, supra.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 449
because of their poor production records or for other nondiscrimina-
tory reasons.e4
At the hearing, witnesses for the Respondent testified that through-
out the year 1946 and particularly toward the end of that year, the
Respondent experienced a shortage of material which necessitated
curtailment in production and consequently a reduction in its labor
force. Robert Salant, treasurer and director of the Respondent, tes-
tified that during 1946 the Company's payroll was reduced from
approximately 400 employees to about 300 employees. Other evidence
adduced by the Respondent tends to show that the layoffs were due to
lack of work. • While this evidence remains uncontradicted, the record
contains evidence which indicates that the selection of employees for
layoff may well have been made on a discriminatory basis. Thus, the
record shows that of 32 employees discharged or laid off during the
May 20-December 31, 1946, period, at least 25 were union members.65
There is no evidence as to the union affiliation of the remaining 7 em-
ployees who were either discharged or laid off.
Also indicative of discriminatory treatment is the fact that there
were sufficient job vacancies occasioned by normal labor turnover at
the plant during the second half of 1946, to take care of the laid-off
complainants. Thus, Salant testified that the total complement of
employees during the May 20-December 31, 1946, period was reduced
by 70 employees or from 365 employees to 295 and the total number
of separations during the same period amounted to 169. It therefore
appears that by reason of turnover during.this period 99 vacancies
occurred in the various classifications, a number more than sufficient
to take care of the laid-off complainants. Although this evidence is
suggestive of discriminatory motivation, we do not regard it as con-
clusive on the issue. We will. therefore consider each case on its
merits in the light of the entire record.
The record establishes to our satisfaction that it was the Respond-
ent's general practice and policy to recall. a temporarily laid-off em-
ployee when work became available for him without requiring formal
application for reemployment. The existence of such practice is im-
plicit in the answer in which the defense was predicated on the theory
that there was a good reason for not recalling each particular laid-off
84 In September 1948 , following the adjournment of the hearing in this proceeding
for the purpose of affording the parties an opportunity to settle the case, the Respondent
offered, through the U. S. Employment Service, employment to a number of these employees,
which offer was accepted by some and refused by others.
"To the 25 union members , who were thus separated from the payroll , there should be
added 11 individuals who were not included in the list apparently on the theory that
they were laid off temporarily but who were not recalled when work for them became
available. All of these 11 laid-off employees were union members.
450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employee named in the complaint when work for him became avail-
able, because of his misconduct, poor production record, or because
he had secured employment elsewhere. The existence of the policy is
likewise recognized in Respondent's brief to the Trial Examiner.
Thus, in the section entitled "Company's Practices" it sets forth the
exceptions to "the practice or policy of re-calling [laid-off] em-
ployees," such as employment elsewhere, poor production record, re-
fusal to, take another job offered at the time of the layoff, etc. The
record further shows that the Respondent customarily had recalled
laid-off employees without application. The existence of such prac-
tice is also implicit in the testimony of Superintendent Stone, Head
Forelady Taylor, and Forelady Latimer. Therefore, if in a par-
ticular case the evidence should establish that work for a laid-off
complainant became available and the Respondent furnished no ade-
quate explanation for its failure to recall such employee in accordance
with its general practice, we believe it may reasonably be inferred
that the failure to recall was for reasons other than the fact that the
complainant made no application for reemployment.66 Moreover, in
the light of the Respondent's other unfair labor practices a strong
presumption of discriminatory motivation is raised in those cases in
which we find unpersuasive the Respondent's alleged reason for not
recalling a particular laid-off complainant when work became avail-
able for him.
Furthermore, even if the Respondent's professed policy of neu-
trality effectively relieved it of responsibility under Section 8 (a) (1)
for the coercive conduct of its supervisors, the Respondent would
nevertheless be answerable for any discriminatory treatment of its
employees by its supervisors within the meaning of Section 8 (a)
(3) of theActs7
1. Employees discriminatorily discharged
Jewell R. Read worked at the plant from June 1936 until her dis-
charge on September 12, 1946, except for some time off for an opera-
tion and for an interval of 11 weeks when she "voluntarily quit rather
than obey-her forelady's instructions." During her employment she
worked on sleeve boxing, pencil stitching, bar tacking, and prac-
tically every operation in the plant.. She was switched from job to
66 West Oregon Lumber Co ., 20 NLRB 1, 71 ; Jaques Power Saw Company , 85 NLRB 440;
Sewell Manufacturing Co., 72 NLRB 85, 89, enforced as mod. 17 2 F . 2d'459 ( C. A. 5), 23
LRRM 2323.
e' Houston Shipbuilding Corporation , 56 NLRB 1684 , 1686 ; Sioux City Brewing Corpo-
ration, 82 NLRB 1061 where the Board held that the posting of a neutrality notice was
no defense to charges of discrimination against employees because of their union mem-
bership or activities.
1
SALANT & SALANT , INCORPORATED 451
job whenever necessary . At the time of her discharge , she was under
the supervision of Forelady Andrews.
Read joined the Union in March 1 . 946, and was issued union buttons
-which she wore just about every day . She became very active in
behalf of the Union. In May 1946 she attended the hearing held
in the Board 's representation proceeding, but did not testify. After
the election she became a member of the union negotiating committee.
In March 1946 Andrews told her and several other employees that they
-would have to get "on the right side ," that it would be "better" for
them to be AFL because Mayor Miles ( of Union City) would not
-allow the Union to come into the plant because the building was owned
by the city. In May 1946 Head Forelady Taylor told her that the
employees "don't need none of these foreigners coming in here and
telling us what to do." 68
The Respondent alleges, and the Trial Examiner found, that Read
was discharged for cause . Except as noted below , there is no sub-
stantial discrepancy between the 2 versions, of the incident which led
to the discharge. During her rest period, on the day of her discharge,
Read began to distribute some 14 to 16 invitations to a union dance.
Read handed out all the invitations but 2 before the bell rang ending
the rest period . She handed the remaining 2 invitations to employee
Dillon who came to her machine after the bell rang. Taylor, who saw
Read distributing cards during the rest period, said nothing to Read
;until the bell rang and Read was still giving out cards. Taylor came
to Read 's machine and told her in substance that she was not supposed
to do that during working hours. Taylor then walked away. In 5 or
10 minutes , Taylor came up the aisle again. Read then asked Taylor
to come to her machine which Taylor did . According to Read, she
she said to Taylor : "Mrs. Taylor , what do you mean by speaking to
me like that a while ago for something I couldn't help ?" Taylor
said, "Well , you heard what I said. " Read said , "Yes,. I heard what
you said but I want to tell you I think you are the most unfair person
that I have ever hear of . . . You are standing around all over the
plant and watching the AF of L's pass out papers . . . to make up
money for barbecues , but you never see what they do. You always
manage to see what us CIOs do ." Taylor then said , "Do you want
to work or do you not?" To which Read replied , "Well, it don't make
no difference to me whether I do or not if that is the way you feel
about it," whereupon Taylor told Read- to get up and check her card.
Taylor's version of the incident is as follows : Read said, "You are
the meanest , most unreasonable woman I have ever seen." Read then
went on, "bemoaning [Taylor ] of everything she could thing of" and
68 These findings are based upon the testimony of Read, which we credit despite the
denials of Andrews and Taylor. See Section III, C , supra, where we found that Andrews
and Taylor made the statements attributed to them.
452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL- LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
got up. She said, "Jewell, do you want to work?" Read replied,
"You stand around and watch people sign up AF of L cards and CIO
cards and everything else and you never say anything to anybody but
me." She said, "Now, Jewell, you know that isn't true. If you want
to work, you better sit down." But Read "kept on bemeaning me and
used some foul language, and I told her to check her card out." Asked
on the stand if there Were any other reasons why she discharged Read,
Taylor replied that that was the only reason, that she discharged her
for "talking to me like she did, bemeaning me." Taylor added that
she "always liked Jewell. She was a good operator." The Trial Ex-
aminer credited Taylor's version of the incident, and found that Read
was discharged for her conduct and the language she used and that
Read's union affiliation was not a factor in Taylor's determination to
discharge Read.
Assuming that Taylor's version is to be preferred, and this is by no
means certain in view of Taylor's past end present animus against
the Union and her unlawful interference with the employees' right
to self-organization, the question arises as to whether Read's outburst
was not protected by the Act. Stripped of all the verbiage, it was but
a complaint by an employee, active in union affairs, that Taylor was
unfair to the union members. Read said, in effect, "You are the
meanest, most unreasonable woman," because of Taylor's disparate
treatment of the two unions. . This is but a statement in the nature of
grievance, which an employee addressed to her supervisor. Present-
ing a grievance, however, is a form of concerted activity which is
protected by the Act. In presenting their grievances, employees
should be permitted certain freedom of expression and action in order
to make their lawful activity effective." The question therefore al-
ways is whether the employees' conduct was within the bounds of such
permissive action.i° In the instant case, the employee used the ex-
G' Union Screw Products, 78 NLRB 1107. In earlier cases, the Board accorded such
freedom of expression to employees engaged in bargaining negotiations with their employer
(Betteh.er Manufacturing Co., 76 NLRB 526) ; and to those making statements at a union
meeting (Atlantic Towing Company, 75 NLRB 1.169 enforcement denied on rehearing
180 F. 2d 726 (C. A. 5) ; pet. for rehearing denied, 182 F. 2d 625. .
PO In the Bettcher case, supra, the discharges accused the employer of lying during a
bargaining conference and he repeated the same remarks later in a tavern ; in the Atlantic
Towing case, the Board found that the employee's inaccurate statement at the union
meeting accusing the employer of aiding organizational activities of'a rival union was
within permissive bounds of expression. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit denied enforcement on the ground that since the statement charging the
company with violation of the labor law was false, the respondent had the right to
discharge the eniployee who made the statement, irrespective of whether he knew or did
not know that the statement was not false. To the extent that Read's accusation against
Taylor that she had engaged in disparate treatment was true, the Atlantic case is dis-
tinguishable from the present case. In the Union Screw Products case, supra, the employer
discharged an employee who became angry during the discussion of his grievance and
attacked the manager ; we found that the conduct was not privileged. In N. P. Nelson
Iron Works, Inc., 80 NLRB 788, the. Board held privileged employees' criticism of quali-
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 453
pression "you are the meanest, most unreasonable woman" according
to Taylor, if Taylor's version is to be accepted, or "you are a most
unfair person," if Read's version is to be credited. According to
Taylor, Read also "used some foul language" which Read denied
using. She admitted, however, the use of the word "darn." In deter-
mining whether the statement made and the language used by Read
went beybud permissive bounds of expression we accord a decisive
consideration to two facts. One is that the statement was in the
nature of a grievance. The second is that the statement, insofar as it
was accusation of favoritism against Taylor, was not false but true.
We have already found that Taylor and other ; supervisors engaged
in disparate treatment of the two rival unions and rendered substantial
and unlawful assistance to the AFL. The record furthermore is clear
that Read's accusation was made without any malice or intent to
falsify and that Read honestly believed in its correctness. The record
does not show what "foul language" Read had allegedly used.
-Under the circumstances related above, we find that Read was
attempting to discuss a grievance with Taylor, and was therefore
engaged in a form of concerted activity protected by the Act.- We
further find that Read's remarks to Taylor did not exceed the bounds
of permissible expression under the circumstances, and that therefore
by discharging Read because of those remarks, the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act 71
Annie Glosson, Hallie Hauser, Clara Thornton. These three em-
ployees were working as inspectors in Section 5 at the time of their
discharge on November 1, 1946.72 Each of them had been in the Re-
spondent's employ for a substantial period of time varying from 3
to 9 years. The Respondent contends that they were discharged for
cause.
Glosson, Hauser, and Thornton joined the Union in the first half
of 1946.73 Each of them openly wore a union button in the plant.
Forelady Crews, who had supervised work of all inspectors until
shortly before these discharges, had frequent conversations with the
inspectors both before and after the election. As found above, she
interrogated the inspectors about their union membership and activi-
fications and abilities of supervisors as mechanics and a statement to the employer that
the reason the Union conducted the strike vote was none of his "damn business" ; the
statements were made by an employee as a member of the union negotiating committee
during a bargaining conference.
" Cf. Union Screw Products, 78 NLRB 1107.
72 At the time of the hearing Glosson had died. Hauser was also referred to as Hallie
Barker . The complaint as to Bessie Wallace , a fourth inspector discharged at the same
time, was dismissed at the hearing upon the motion of the General Counsel. Wallace
testified at the hearing.
43 Hauser joined the AFL in May 1916 ; in June of the same year she changed over
to the Union.
454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ties as well as about the union membership of other employees. Crews
also made statements during working hours to the effect that those
who didn't belong to the right union would be fired ; that she wished
that those who belonged to the CIO would change over to the AFL
because otherwise they would be fired; that they better join the AFL
and not join the CIO.74
Until a few days before the discharges, Section 5 was supervised by
Floy Holland, who has since resigned. Andrews was assigned to
supervise Section 5 a day or two before the four inspectors were dis-
charged. On that occasion Taylor told Andrews that Section 5 was
producing a lot of bad work and "it's got to be stopped." When
Andrews assumed the supervision of the section on or about October
30, Andrews told the inspectors that she knew they were having a
hard time because the work in the section was bad, but that she wanted
their cooperation in order to straighten the section out and wanted
them to throw out all bad work. The next day, October 31, she
again told the inspectors not to send any bad work to the finishing
department and to be thorough in their inspection.75 At quitting
time on October 31, Andrews told the inspectors not to report to work
at the usual hour the next morning but to report at 9 o'clock.76 When
they came in the next morning at 9 o'clock Andrews showed them a
stack of shirts 77 with crooked labels and said that she was tired of
bad work and was going to let them all check their cards. Andrews
was asked what was the matter with the labels and Andrews replied
that they "weren't exactly straight." Andrews reported the matter
to Taylor and then discharged the four inspectors.
Andrews testified that the day before the discharge Hauser showed
her a shirt with a crooked label; that she told Hauser that she would
stop the bad work; that she told the girls "to be sure and throw out
74 These findings are based upon the testimony of Hauser , Thornton , and Wallace,
which we credit . See Section III, C, supra , where we found that Crews made the state-
ments attributed to her by the inspectors and had engaged in interrogating employees
concerning their union membership and activities . The Trial Examiner failed to resolve
the conflicts of testimony as to whether Foreladies Andrews and Crews did or did not
make certain statements showing their hostility to the Union , on an erroneous assumption
that "it would serve no useful purpose to resolve the conflicts in testimony for, assuming
that they did make them they were admittedly made niany months prior to November 1,
1946 , the day of the discharges ." However, the evidence shows that Crews made her
statements in May, June , July, and October 1946. Other witnesses fixed the time of the
statements attributed to Andrews both before and after the July 19 election , even as late
as November 1946.
75 The findings in this paragraph are based upon the testimony of Andrews, Taylor, and
that of the inspectors , which in part is mutually corroborative.
46 Andrews and Taylor explained that the reason for the instructions was that they
didn't have enough work for the inspectors next morning.
77 There is a disagreement as to the number of shirts with crooked labels that had been
passed by the inspectors . The inspectors maintained that there were only 8 or 10 shirts
which were shown to them by Andrews , whereas Andrews contended that there were
about 6 to 7 dozen of them.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 455
all. [shirts] with crooked labels"; that she went to the label girl who
was a new employee, straightened her out on size 14's, returned to
the inspectors, told them that their work would be better when they
hit size 14 and that in the meantime she still wanted them to throw
out all bad work. Hauser's version, however, differed from that of
Andrews. According to Hauser, on the morning of October 31, she
took one shirt with a crooked label over to Andrews and said that the
labels were coming through crooked. Andrews replied that she
would see about it. Andrews, however, did nothing about it nor did
any other forelady. During the remainder of the day the inspectors
threw out the shirts with crooked labels they "thought wouldn't go"
and took back to the operators about two dozen shirts in all. At no
time, however, did Andrews tell her to throw out all shirts with
crooked labels. Two other inspectors, Thornton and Wallace, cor-
roborated Hauser in this respect. While admitting that Andrews
had warned them not to pass faulty work, they testified that Andrews
never warned them to throw out all the shirts with crooked labels.
The Trial Examiner credited the testimony of Andrews, including
her assertion that she warned the inspectors not to pass shirts with
crooked labels, and found that the Respondent discharged the inspec-
tors because they allowed faulty work to pass after repeated warnings
not to pass faulty work. We disagree both with the Trial Examiner's
credibility findings and his conclusion, because he failed to attach a
due significance to the following evidentiary facts established by the
record : (1) Forelady Andrews' antiunion animus is clearly evi-
denced by her conduct heretofore detailed. (2) We have already re-
fused to credit her testimony on a number of issues. (3) In making
his finding the Trial Examiner proceeded on the erroneous assump-
tion that the inspectors admitted that Andrews issued a specific warn-
ing not to pass shirts with crooked labels-what the inspectors, in
fact, admitted was that Andrews gave a general warning not to pass
faulty work. (4) The discharged inspectors were old and competent
employees. Forelady Holland, who supervised Section 5 before
Andrews, testified that they were "as good inspectors" as in Section
4, "if not better," and Head Forelady Taylor admitted that, they were
as good inspectors as she had in the whole plant. (5) In the regular
course of their work, the inspectors customarily received back for
repair several dozen shirts daily which they had passed through as
good. Taylor was aware of this situation and considered it to be
normal as long as the inspectors ran 150 dozen shirts a day. The in-
spectors in other sections usually got back the same amount. As
Hauser credibly testified "it was just a general routine, that was
expected," "it had been ever since [she] had been working there,"
456 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
i. e., . . . since 1941. The witnesses are also in accord that there
had been no unusual amount of work returned in October 1946 while
the section was supervised by Floy Holland. (6) Passing shirts with
crooked labels, namely, a label sewed in at an angle and not straight
across the shirt, was not of any serious import. Unlike a defect in
sleeving, collars, or in a place where the shirt is sewed together, crooked
labels had never before been regarded as a serious defect in work-
manship. Nobody before was ever discharged for passing a shirt with
a crooked label. (7) Forelady Crews, who had supervised all in-
spectors in the sewing department since March 1946, had never fired
an inspector, nor could she recall the discharge of an inspector prior
thereto. Inspector Thornton, who has been in the Respondent's em-
-ploy since 1941, testified to the same effect.'s .(8) Assuming that
Andrews warned the inspectors not to pass shirts with crooked labels,
the discharge of the four inspectors for such a minor neglect of duty
would seem a very drastic punishment. A crooked label admittedly
is a minor defect. The discharged inspectors were old employees and
as good inspectors as any in the plant. No such drastic action had
been taken against any inspector within, the last 4, to 5 years. (9)
The Respondent's explanation becomes still more incredible when
considered in the light of the fact that Andrews was assigned to Sec-
tion 5 only a day or two before the discharges, and hence had had no
reasonable opportunity to form an independent judgment about the
competency of the four inspectors.
Upon the entire record, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that
the Respondent discharged Inspectors Glosson, Hauser, and Thorn-
ton because of their union membership and activities, thereby violat-
ing Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Discriminatory layoff
Glen Dora Stanfield, also referred to as Glen Dora Finch, worked
at the plant as a sleeve boxer from May 1, 1945, until her layoff on
November 14, 1946. She worked in the parts department under the
supervision of Forelady Simmons. The Respondent contends that
Stanfield was laid off on November 14 for lack of work, and was not
recalled because of her poor production record and because she accepted
employment elsewhere.
Stanfield joined the Union in June 1946 and was issued a button
which she wore in the plant until she was laid off. About a week after
the election Forelady Crews, who was not her supervisor, came to her
78 Superintendent Stone testified that in November 1941, four inspectors were discharged
at the same time. Stone, however, did not specify the reason for their discharge.
1
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 457
machine and told her that if she wanted to hold her job she had better
change to the AFL.79
Stanfield was laid off on November 14, 1946.80 At the time of her
layoff Simmons told Stanfield that they were running short 'of work
and advised Stanfield to keep in touch with her. Simmons gave
Stanfield a layoff slip which stated that she was laid off for lack of
work and was "subject to recall." The slip was prepared and signed
by Simmons.
After her layoff Stanfield telephoned Simmons and Head Forelady
Taylor three or four times to inquire about work and was told that
they didn't have anything for her. Two or three weeks later, and
before the end of 1946, Stanfield accepted employment at Martin Shoe
Company, at Martin, Tennessee. Stanfield was never called back to
work."'
On November 12, 1946, or 2 days before Stanfield's layoff, the Re-
spondent hired one Bonnie Wells as a sleeve boxer. Wells was a
former employee who worked for the Company in 1939 and 1940. As
to the reasons for her employment Taylor testified, "We didn't know
when work would pick up, and we would like to get good operators so
I hired the girl with the thought that maybe work would pick up and
we could call all the girls back." Wells was not laid off on November
14. Wells was put in Simmons' department as sleeve boxer . 112
Stanfield testified that the production norm on the sleeve boxing
operation is 1121/ dozen a day, that her normal production ran from
100 to 125 dozen a day, that she didn't always make her production
because "as quick as [she] would start making good they would take
[her] out of the line where [she] would have to carry [her] work all
day and couldn't make time" ; that she was taken out of the line every
week; and that when she was in the line she always made her produc-
tion. Stanfield denied that her pay was adjusted to the minimum be-
cause she failed to make production. She asserted that her pay al-
ways remained 45 cents an hour and that Stone never talked to her
about her failure to make production.
In support of the Respondent's contention, Simmons testified that
Stanfield was laid off for lack of work; that in selecting employees for
layoff she does not consider the length of their service; that Stanfield
79 See Section III, C, supra, where we found that Crews made the statements attributed
to her by Stanfield.
80 The Respondent laid off Adams , a sleeve boxer in Simmons ' section, on October 17;
Sue Dyer , also a sleeve boxer in Simmons ' section, was laid off a few weeks before November
14. Both of them were members of the Union.
"' Simmons denied that Stanfield called her about returning to work , but admitted that
she never attempted to recall Stanfield to work. Simmons ' denial is not credited.
52 The findings in this paragraph are based upon mutually corrobative testimony of
Stanfield, Simmons , and Taylor , which we credit.
929979-51-vol. 92-31
458 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
did not make production more than 10 or 15' times during her entire
employment as a sleeve boxer; that Stanfield was an indifferent
operator, the quality of her work was poor; that Stone complained to
her (Simmons) several times about Stanfield's poor production rec-
ord; that she spoke to Stanfield about her production every time Stone
complained; and that Stanfield made production when she tried but
she was lazy. Simmons conceded that an operator out of the line can-
not turn out as much production as an employee who is in the line, but
stated that Stanfield was out of the line only when her machine had
broken down and she was working on another machine; that Stanfield
didn't have any more trouble with her machine than anybody else.
Taylor testified that Stanfield was a poor operator; that the quality
and quantity of Stanfield's work was bad ; that she discussed Stanfield
with Simmons; that they knew Stanfield could make production if she
wanted but she wouldn't do it. Stone testified that he spoke to Sim-
mons and Taylor regarding Stanfield's poor production record and
that he also spoke to Stanfield about the matter.
The Trial Examiner credited the testimony of the Respondent's
supervisors and found that Stanfield was laid off for lack of work and
was refused reemployment because of her alleged poor production
record. We disagree both with the Trial Examiner's credibility find-
ings and his conclusion. While the Respondent was laying off sleeve
boxers in Simmons' section allegedly for lack of work (sleeve boxers
Adams, Dyer, and Stanfield, all of whom were union members, were
laid off between October 17 and November 14, 1946), it hired Bonnie
Wells and placed here in Simmons' section 83 only 2 days before Stan-
field's layoff. When Stanfield was laid off on November 14, Wells was
retained. The supervisor's assertion that Stanfield was refusea reem-
ployment in view of her poor production record is inconsistent with
the fact that Stanfield was given a layoff slip which stated that she was
"subject to call." It is extremely unlikely that Simmons would have
issued such a slip if Stanfield's production record was as bad as de-
scribed by Simmons on the stand. Prior to her layoff Stanfield worked
as a sleeve boxer in Simmons' section for about 18 months. If Stan-
field had failed to make production most of the time as it is alleged, it
is not likely that she would have remained in the Respondent's employ
that long. Furthermore, Stanfield was never told either at the time of
her layoff or subsequently when she applied for reinstatement that she
would not be reemployed because of her poor production. Nor can we,
in determining the credibility of the Respondent' s witnesses , Simmons,
Taylor, and Stone, on this issue, ignore our findings herein that they
91 Also sleeve boxers Lucille Thornton and Doris Van Duzer were hired on January 6,
1947, and April 18, 1947, respectively.
SAiLANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 459
were biased against the Union, engaged in conduct proscribed by the
Act, and have not been credited on a number of issues where their testi-
mony was in conflict with that of others.
As for the Respondent's contention that it did not recall Stanfield
because she had obtained employment elsewhere, the record shows that
after Stanfield had been told on three occasions that there was no work
for her, she secured employment at Martin Manufacturing Company,
at Martin, Tennessee, sometime before the end of 1946. As noted
above, the evidence shows that the Respondent's policy of not recalling
a laid-off employee who secured employment elsewhere was limited to
employment in Union City, not elsewhere.
Upon the entire record, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that
the Respondent selected Stanfield for layoff on November 14, 1946, and
thereafter refused to reemploy her because of her union membership
and activities, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
3. Employees discriminatorily refused reinstatement
John Napier, Jr., was hired by the Respondent on July 13, 1945,
as a bundle boy and assigned to the sewing department. About 6
months later he was transferred to the cutting department as a cloth
spreader, where he worked until his layoff on June 14,11946. There
were three or four cloth spreaders in the cutting department. Napier,
Jr., was the youngest cloth spreader in point of service. Napier, Jr.,
joined the Union in March 1946 and in May was issued a union button.
Thereafter he wore the button on his belt in plain view until his layoff.
Napier, Jr., also talked for the Union to his fellow employees in the
plant 84
On June 14, 1946, Napier, Jr., as the youngest cloth spreader in
point of service in his department, was laid off allegedly because of
a shortage of cloth. At the time of the layoff Foreman Kemp told
him in the presence of Assistant Superintendent Rogers that "due to
the lack of work [they] would have to lay him off for a while and
advised him to check with [Kemp] and when [Kemp] had work for
him, [Kemp] would put him back to work." About a week after the
layoff Napier, Jr., obtained a layoff slip which gave as the reason for
his layoff "lack of work." 85 On this record we are not convinced that
69 These findings are based upon the undenied testimony of Napier, Jr ., which we credit.85 These findings are based upon the undenied testimony of Foreman Kemp , which was
substantially corroborated by Napier , Jr., and Rogers . Napier, Jr., also testified that
about an hour after his layoff he went to the place where they kept the cloth to be
spread and noticed there "several bales" or more cloth there that day than there had
been for a week. We do not consider this testimony as inconsistent with the testimony
of Rogers and Kemp that there was a shortage of cloth and that Napier was laid off
because of such shortage . Napier„ Jr., admitted that a bale of cloth might last about
an hour.
460 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the selection of Napier, Jr., for the layoff on June 14, 1946, was dis-
criminatory as alleged in the complaint.
The complaint also alleges that the Respondent discriminatorily
failed and refused to reinstate Napier, Jr., when work for him became
available. The answer denies this allegation and asserts that Napier
"has not been recalled because of his inability to do the work in his
job classification." 86 In support of this contention, Foreman Kemp,
the immediate supervisor of Napier, Jr., tesified that Napier, Jr.,
wasn't a "very good" employee, that "anything you wanted done, you
would have to show him. He couldn't remember very well." On cross-
examination, however, Kemp conceded that Napier, Jr., never caused
him any trouble, that their relations were friendly and that outside
of Napier, Jr.'s, slowness to comprehend, he was a "fair" worker.
That Napier, Jr., was a satisfactory worker appears also from the
fact that the termination slip which was given to Napier, Jr., at the
time of the layoff said nothing about his alleged inability to perform
work in his classification. Indeed, the only reason for his layoff ap-
pearing on the termination slip was "lack of work." Nor did the
Respondent ever contend that Napier, Jr., was laid off for any other
reason but lack of work. To the contrary, at the time of the layoff
Kemp stated to Napier, Jr., in the presence of Superintendent Rogers,
that his layoff was "for a while" only, and that when work for him
became available, Kemp "would put him back to work." It is found,
therefore, that the Respondent's explanation for its failure to recall
Napier, Jr., is not supported by the evidence. ,
That Napier, Jr.'s, limitations as a worker were not the real reason
for his nonrecall appears also from Kemp's own testimony. Ques-
tioned about the reasons for not recalling Napier, Jr., Kemp stated
that he did not recall Napier, Jr., when work for him became avail-
able for two reasons: (1) Napier, Jr., never came back to Kemp and
asked him for a job; and (2) when Kemp hired Bonee as cloth
spreader on December 30, 1946, he considered hiring Napier, Jr., but
rejected the idea "after he found out that [Napier, Jr.] had a job
somewhere else." Neither of the alleged reasons given by Kemp
for the nonrecall of Napier finds any support in the record. As for
Napier's failure to keep in touch with Kemp, the record discloses that
it was the Respondent's general practice and policy to recall a tem-
porarily laid-off employee when work for him became available with-
out an application for reemployment, unless the laid-off employee had
a poor production record, or had secured employment elsewhere in
86 Implicit in this allegation of the answer is the admission that subsequent to the layoff
of Napier, Jr., work for him became available. The record shows that a vacancy in Napier,
Jr.'s classification as cloth spreader occurred sometime around December 30, 1946, when
the Respondent hired one Bonee , a new employee , as a cloth spreader.
SAIANT & SALAN'T, INCORPORATED 461
Union City, or had refused to take another job offered to him at the
time of the layoff. Kemp had ample opportunity to communicate with
Napier, Jr., before he filled the vacancy in his classification, either
through Napier's wife or sister, both of whom were employed by the
Respondent at the time. Indeed, according to his own testimony,
Kemp did make some inquiries about Napier and found that he had
obtained employment elsewhere. When queried as to his reasons
for believing Napier had obtained employment elsewhere, Kemp
could not recall either the name of his informant or the name of
Napier's alleged employer. Nor does the record contain any evidence
that Napier was employed elsewhere on December 30, 1946, when
Kemp hired a new cloth spreader. We are not convinced that Kemp's
reasons for his failure to recall Napier, Jr., on December 30, 1946,
when he hired Bonee, are the true reasons for such nonrecall. It
is found, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Kemp's testimony on
this point is not credible.
Having found that the Respondent's explanation for its failure to
recall Napier, Jr., on December 30, 1946, is not convincing, we turn
now to other evidence in the record which we believe, shows that such
failure was due to discriminatory motives. Napier, Jr., was a mem-
ber of the Union and was active in its behalf, although his activities
seem to have been confined mostly to talking to other employees about
the Union. He wore his union button openly in the shop from
May 1946 to the date of his layoff. Thus, the Respondent must have
been aware that Napier, Jr., was a member of the Union. Heretofore,
we have found that the Respondent through its supervisory staff
interfered with, restrained, and coerced the employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and that the Re-
spondent rendered unlawful assistance to the AFL in violation of
Section 8 (a) (2) of the Act. Under the circumstances we conclude
that it was in pursuance of this policy of discrimination against Union
members that the Respondent decided not to recall Napier, Jr., when
the vacancy occurred. Particularly revealing as to the Respondent's
attitude are the circumstances under which the Respondent hired
Harold Bonee to fill the vacancy in Napier, Jr.'s, classification.
Bonee who, prior to his employment by the Respondent, had never
worked in a shirt factory, applied for employment to Assistant Super-
intendent Rogers. As hereinabove found, Rogers referred Bonee
to Foreman Kemp and said that "if [Bonee] was going to work here
[he] would have to belong to the AFL" and that, although the CIO
had won- the election "they were trying to get the CIO out and the
AFL in." When Bonee went to see Kemp, Kemp hired him, ac-
cording to Kemp's undenied testimony, upon the. recommendation
462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of Rogers. A few days later Bonee joined the AFL and about the
same time signed the petition for a new election which was circulated
in the plant by AFL adherents. Bonee left the Respondent's employ
voluntarily sometime in October 1947.
Upon the entire record we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that
Napier, Jr., was selected for the layoff because there was a shortage
of work in his department. We find, however, that the Respondent
did not recall Napier, Jr., on December 30, 1946, when work for him
became available because of his union membership and activities,
thereby violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Blanche Smith worked at the plant as a pocket buttonhole operator
from July 1, 1944, until her layoff on October 17, 1946. At the time
of her layoff she worked in the parts department under Forelady
Latimer. Smith joined the Union in April 1946 and about a month
later was issued a button which she wore openly in the plant. She
was a member of the Union's negotiating committee. In its answer
the Respondent alleges that Smith was laid off for lack of work, that
upon being laid off she demanded her separation notice although
it was explained to her that this would separate her from the pay-
roll; that she was given her separation notice and she stated that
she could draw more unemployment compensation than she could
make working at the plant; that in view of this attitude Respondent
has not recalled her, and that the Respondent is informed and believes
that she accepted work elsewhere.
Smith was one of three pocket buttonhole operators working under
Latimer at the time of her layoff, the other two being Vivian Toombs
and Virginia Green. On or about October 17 all three were laid off
for lack of work. A few days later Toombs and Green were recalled
to work. Smith was- not. Smith had less seniority than either
.Toombs or Green, 117 both of whom were also members of the Union.
Smith went to the plant to see Latimer about a week after her layoff.
Latimer told her that two operators were all they needed for the
time being and that she would be advised when her services were
needed. Latimer then told Smith to get her separation notice which
she did. The separation notice which is in evidence states that she
.was laid off for lack of work and specifies "temporary" separation.118
Following the layoff of Smith, Doris Bell, buttonhole down front
operator, ran Smith's machine when the two remaining operators,
Green and Toombs, had more work than they could manage. Bell's
assignment to Smith's machine, however, was not permanent but
87 Green was laid off again on November 15 and was never recalled allegedly because of
her disturbing influence in the plant. She is one of the complainants in this case.
88
These findings are based upon the credible testimony of Smith partially corroborated
by Latimer.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 463
lasted only until the workload was reduced. Such assignments were
in accord with the practice existing in the plant not to recall a laid-off
employee for only a day's work, but to assign someone at the plant
to perform the needed operation S9
About 2 months after her layoff, Smith called Taylor on the phone
to inquire about work. Taylor said that work was slow. During
the same telephone conversation Smith asked Taylor how it happened
that Doris Bell was working at her machine. Taylor replied that
she didn't know that anybody was working on her machine adding,
"Just let me tell you something. We are running this place to suit
ourselves." 9° Smith was never recalled. In November or Decem-
ber of 1947 she obtained employment with the Brown Shoe Company
in Union City. At the time of the hearing, she was still working for
that company. Smith had worked at the shoe company about 4
years before. After she obtained employment with the Brown Shoe
Company she did not at any time ask for a job at the plant."'
At the hearing the Respondent contended that Smith was not re-
called when work became available for her,92 because it was the policy
and practice of the Respondent not to recall a laid-off employee who
secured employment at the Brown Shoe Company in Union City."'
The Trial Examiner accepted this explanation and found that
the Respondent's failure to recall Smith when work for her became
available was not discriminatory. We do not agree with the Trial
Examiner's conclusion. Neither Taylor nor Latimer, the only wit-
nesses who were questioned about the matter, testified that Smith had
not been recalled for that reason. The Respondent's contention, there-
fore, is not supported by the evidence. Moreover, the Respondent's
explanation is without merit for another reason. Smith testified with-
out contradiction that she did not obtain employment at the Brown
89 These findings are based upon the testimony of Smith, Green, Calhoun , Taylor, and
Latimer which is in substantial agreement.
90 These findings are based on the testimony of Smith partially corroborated by Taylor.
Taylor, however , testified that during this conversation she explained to Smith that Bell
was a buttonhole down front operator and sometimes when they needed a few extra
pockets they let Doris Bell run them.
81 These findings are based upon the undenied testimony of Smith, which we credit.
0 Implicit in the Respondent 's explanation is the admission that sometime after the
layoff of Smith work became available for her. The record, however , is conclusive on
this point. The list of employees hired by the Respondent after May 1946 shows that
the Respondent hired two pocket buttonhole operators , Margaret Hargrove on November
20, 1946, Ruby Ellison on December 5, 1946 , and three more buttonhole operators during
the next 3 mouths.
90 The other purported reason for the failure to recall Smith, namely , Smith's alleged
attitude in connection with her demand for a permanent separation notice, is too trifling
to require refutation . There was no evidence adduced in support of this contention.
Smith credibly denied that she ever stated to Paessler , clerk in Respondent ' s office, that
she needed a separation notice in order to draw total unemployment compensation instead
of partial benefits. The separation slip, which is in evidence , specifies a temporary
separation.
464 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Shoe Company until about November or December of 1947 , or about
a year after her layoff . The evidence , however, is clear that work for
Smith became available sometime before she obtained employment
with the Brown Shoe Company. Thus, two pocket buttonhole oper-
ators were hired in November-December 1946, and several others
during the first 3 or 4 months of 1947. We therefore reject the
Respondent 's explanation as groundless.
In addition to the Respondent 's failure to furnish a reasonable
explanation for not recalling Smith, other evidence indicates that
the Respondent failed and refused to recall Smith for discriminatory
reasons. Smith was an experienced employee whose competency was
not questioned by the Respondent . It seems clear that the Respond-
ent had knowledge of Smith's membership in the Union as well
as her membership on the Union 's negotiating committee . Foreladies
Taylor and Latimer, Smith 's immediate supervisors , have a long
record of unlawful interference with employees ' rights to self-organi-
zation. Equally flagrant is the Respondent 's own antiunion record.
Upon the entire record, we are convinced , and we find , contrary to
the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent failed to recall Smith on
December 5 , 1946, and thereafter when vacancies in her classification
occurred, because of her union membership and activities, thereby
violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Virginia Green worked as a pocket buttonhole operator at the
plant from 1941 until she. was laid off on November 15, 1946. At
the time of the layoff she worked in the parts department under the
supervision of Virginia Latimer. The answer alleges that Green
was laid off for lack of work on November 15, 1946, and that she was
"not recalled because while employed at the plant, she disturbed the
workers around her by constantly talking and visiting."
Green joined the Union about the middle of April 1946, received
her button about May 1, and wore it openly at the plant at all times.
She was also a member of the Union's negotiating committee repre-
senting the buttonhole and pocket operators in the parts department.
There is no record that the negotiating committee held any meetings
with the Respondent . As a matter of fact , the Respondent refused
in August 1946 to recognize the Board 's certification of the Union
on the ground that the bargaining unit was inappropriate.
On October 17, 1946, Green and two other pocket buttonhole oper-
ators in the parts department , Blanche Smith and Vivian Toombs,
were laid off for lack of work. Several days later Green and Toombs
were recalled , while Smith was not. Thereafter Doris Bell was
assigned to Smith's machine but did not work at it regularly. On
November 15 Green was laid off again after she turned down Taylor's
SALANT & SALAM, INCORPORATED 465
offer on the buttonhole down the front operation in a different depart-
ment. At the time of the layoff the following conversation occurred
between Latimer and Green. Green said to Latimer : "Blanche
[Smith] is laid off and you brought Doris Bell out here and put her
on her machine and helped her work up her own work and we go home.
She is still here. You didn't give her a yellow slip." Latimer replied
that she would have to see Mrs. Taylor about that. Latimer also told
Green that she would be recalled when they got some work. Latimer
said nothing about Green's alleged unsatisfactory conduct. Green
received a yellow separation slip dated November 15, 1946, under the
signatures of Latimer and Taylor. The slip stated that she was
temporarily laid off for "lack of work" and was "subject to call." 94
After her layoff Green telephoned Latimer and Taylor about re-
turning to work. She also saw Taylor in person shortly before Decem-
ber 5, 1946, at which time Taylor told her that the best thing for her
to do was to get a job somewhere else, that Latimer didn't want her
back because she created disturbances among the operators by going
around and talking to them during working hours. Taylor told her
to get a separation notice which she did on December 5, 1946. The
separation notice contains the following statement : "Was first laid
off because of lack of work; her forelady refused to recall her after
realizing that the department operated smoother and with less dis-
turbance without her." se
It is the Respondent's contention that Green was not recalled 96
because she disturbed her fellow workers by her constant talking and
visiting. In support of this contention, Latimer, Green's immediate
supervisor, testified that Green was not called back because she was
disturbing the operators by leaving her machine and talking to them,
that she cautioned Green about that "lots of times," and that Taylor
told her to try to keep Green at her machine. Head Forelady Taylor
testified that Green stayed out on the floor too much, that prior to
the layoff she corrected Green for talking to the operators during
working hours more than once, that she received complaints from the
foreladies in the section about Green's talking and visiting, and that
e4 These findings are based upon the testimony of Green, which we credit, and the
layoff slip which is in evidence . Latimer denied Green's testimony as to the conversation
about Doris Bell and stated that Bell was a buttonhole down the front operator, which
is a different operation from that performed by Green.
^ The findings in this paragraph are based upon the testimony of Taylor and Green
which in part is mutually corroborative. Green denied that the separation slip, which
she took on that day to the U. S. Employment Service, contained the statement set fork
above. Green ' s denial is not credited.
^ Implicit in this contention is the admission that work became available for Green
sometime after her layoff. There is also ample evidence to show that a number of
vacancies occurred in Green's classification after her layoff. See footnote 92, supra.
466 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
she did not recall Green because Latimer asked her not to. Green
admitted that in March 1946 she was asked by her forelady not to talk
during work, but stated that during the 2 or 3 months before her lay-
off she was never reprimanded for being away from her machine. She
testified that Latimer did not tell her at the time of the layoff that
she was being laid off for disturbing other employees or because her
work was unsatisfactory.
The Trial Examiner credited the explanation of Latimer and Taylor
for the layoff and nonrecall of Green and recommended the dismissal
of the complaint as to Green. While we agree that the layoff was
nondiscriminatory, we believe that the Respondent failed and refused
to recall Green for discriminatory reasons.
We are satisfied that the explanation offered by Latimer and Taylor
for not recalling Green was but an afterthought and is not to be
credited. The temporary layoff slip issued to her on November 15
said nothing about Green's objectionable conduct. The slip stated
merely that she was laid off for lack of work and was "subject to call." 91
Green testified without contradiction that at the time of her layoff
Latimer told her that she would be recalled when they got some work
and that nothing was said about her allegedly unsatisfactory conduct.
According to Taylor's own testimony, she offered Green at the time
of her layoff another operation in another section which Green turned
down, an offer which Taylor would have hardly made if Green, in.
fact, was a disturbing influence 98 Likewise, inconsistent with Taylor's
assertion that Green "stayed on the floor too much" is her own ad-
mission that Green was a "good operator ... she made time," that
Green's average production was in excess of her production quota.99
Under these circumstances, and as we have previously found that
neither Latimer nor Taylor were witnesses whose testimony could be
trusted implicitly and because in a number of instances we have refused
to credit their testimony, the Trial Examiner's finding adopting Tay-
lor's and Latimer's explanation with regard to the refusal to recall
Green is reversed.
In view of the failure of the Respondent to provide a reasonable
explanation for the refusal to reemploy Green on or about December
5, 1946, when work for her became available, we are satisfied that
9' This fact acquires particular significance in view of the undenied testimony of Latimer,
who issued the layoff slip, that she was instructed to put on each yellow layoff slip issued
the complete reason for the layoff.
11 Green's refusal to accept this offer is not alleged by the Respondent as a reason for
its failure to recall her.
99 We have held that inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness , credited by the
Trial Examiner , constitute grounds for reversal of the Trial Examiner's credibility finding.
Cf. Security Warehouse and Cold Storage Company, 35 NLRB 857; Eastern Coal Cor-
poration, 79 NLRB 1165.
SATsANr & SALANT , INCORPORAfrED 467
under the circumstances such failure was due to Green's union mem-
bership and activities. Discriminatory motivation is indicated by
Green's union membership and activities, the Respondent's opposition
and hostility to the Union, its unlawful interference with the em-
ployees' right to self-organization , and the antiunion record of Taylor
and Latimer, who were primarily responsible for the refusal to re-
employ Green.100
Upon the entire record we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner,
that the Respondent on or about December 5, 1946, and at all times
thereafter, denied employment to Green because of her union member-
ship and activities, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Hilda White worked at the plant as a pocket setter from March
1934 until her layoff on October 19, 1946. At the time of her layoff,
and for about 3 weeks before, she was working in the parts department
under the supervision of Forelady Latimer. Prior to that she had
worked in Section 2. In October 1948 she was recalled to work and
at the time of the hearing was working at her former job in the parts
department under the supervision of Latimer.101
White joined the Union in March 1946 and was issued a button in
May, which she thereafter wore in the plant until about 2 months after
the election. In addition she solicited three employees to join the
Union. On one occasion shortly after the election, Superintendent
Stone asked her: "Hilda, where is your pass to Heaven?" to which
she replied that she had left it home. Again, about a month after the
Board election, I-lead Forelady Taylor asked about her union button
and when White replied that she didn't have one on, Taylor said,
"But you have been wearing one. I would like to see you do some-
thing else." 1°2
White was laid off on October 19, 1946, together with 5 other pocket
setters, all of whom were union members, allegedly for lack of work.
At the time of the layoff there were 11 pocket setters in the parts de-
partment. The 5 pocket setters who were retained had less seniority
than White and all of them wore AFL buttons. At the time of the
layoff, Latimer told White that she would be called back "when they
got material" and gave her a layoff slip which stated that she was
being laid off for lack of work and "was subject to call." In Novem-
100 The circumstance that the Respondent had previously recalled Green and Toombs,
both of whom were union members, does not militate against the conclusion that the
subsequent refusal to employ Green was prompted by discriminatory motives. Equally
tenable would be the explanation that Green and Toombs were recalled for considerations
of expediency , for in addition to Blanche Smith they were the only pocket buttonhole
operators in Latimer ' s section . Moreover, a few weeks after such recall Green was laid
off once more and this time for good.
101 The offer of reemployment was made on September 28, 1948, through the U. S. Employ-
ment Service.
102 See Section III, C . Supra, where we made these findings.
468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
her 1946 White accepted employment at the Martin Manufacturing
Company-in Martin, Tennessee.103 Of the 6 pocket setters who were
laid off onOctober 19, 3 were eventually recalled, while 2 of those
retained were not working at the time of the hearing.1 1 Latimer
testified that when it came to a choice of laying off pocket setters, she
kept the ones who had regularly worked in her department without
regard to any over-all seniority in the plant and that it was for this
reason that White was included among those who were laid off. Lati-
mer's testimony in this respect was uncontradicted and is credited.
The answer alleges that White "was not recalled because she ac-
cepted employment elsewhere." 105 In support of this contention,
Head Forelady Taylor testified that after work picked up Latimer
inquired about White and found out that she was working somewhere
else, and did not recall White for that reason. Neither Taylor nor
Latimer gave any particulars concerning this inquiry. White, how-
ever, testified without contradiction that in November 1946 she secured
employment With the Martin Manufacturing Company at Martin,
Tennessee. Superintendent 'Stone testified that it Was the general
policy and practice of the Respondent not to recall laid-off employees
who accepted other employment in Union City. Stone did not testify
that it, was the practice of the Respondent not to recall employees who
secured employment outside Union City. Here the record shows
that White obtained employment with a company located in another
city. Moreover, it appears from Stone's own testimony that at about
this time the Martin Manufacturing Company was raiding the Re-
spondent's employees. Nor did Stone make it clear whether this
practice of the Respondent applied to a temporarily laid-off employee,
such as White, who after the issuance of a temporary layoff slip, never
asked for, nor was issued, a separation slip, and thus indicated her
desire to return to the plant when work for her became available loe
We find, therefore, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Taylor's ex-
planation that White was not recalled because of her employment else-
where is not entitled to credence.
In the absence of a reasonable explanation as to why the Respond-
ent did not recall White when work for her became available, and upon
ma The findings in this paragraph are based on the undenied testimony of White which we
credit.
104 These findings are based on the testimony of White, Latimer, and Stone, which is in
substantial agreement and which we credit.
105 The answer does not allege, nor did any of the Respondent's supervisors testify,
that they did not recall White because she failed to apply for reinstatement. Indeed, as
noted above, it was Respondent's practice and policy to recall laid-off employees without
any application for reinstatement. Moreover, White was told that she would be called
back "when they got material" Her layoff slip stated that she was "subject to call"
The office had her address.
100 During the period between November 1946 and April 1947, the Respondent hired 14
girls in White's classification.
SALANT & SALANT, Il̂ ^TCORPORATEfD 469
the entire record we are convinced and find, contrary to the Trial
Examiner, that such failure was discriminatorily motivated.107 Such
motivation is indicated by White's union membership and activities,
the fact that both Stone and Taylor were displeased with her for
wearing a union button; Taylor's remark that she would like White
to do-something else; the fact that White was one of the oldest em-
ployees at the plant whose competence as an operator was never ques-
tioned by the Respondent; and finally, the background of unlawful
conduct on the part of Respondent's management and supervisors.
Upon the entire record, we find as'did the Trial Examiner, that the
evidence fails to establish the allegation of the complaint that White
was laid off because of her union membership and activities. We
find, however, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent
did not recall White when work for her became available because of
her union membership and activities, and thereby violated Section
8 (a) (3), of the Act.
Earlie Butler began working at the plant in July 1943 as a pocket
setter. Thereafter, she performed various operations, including bar
tacking and pencil stitching. At the time of her layoff she had been
doing pencil stitching and bar tacking in the parts department under
the supervision of Latimer. The answer alleges that Butler was laid
off for lack of work on November 1, 1946; that at that time she re-
quested and was given a separation notice even though a temporary
layoff was all that was contemplated ; that the Respondent is informed
that she accepted employment elsewhere and for that reason she has
not been recalled to work at the plant.
Butler joined the Union early in April 1946 and was issued a button
which she wore from sometime in May 1946 until about a week after
the election. She attended most of the union meetings. Butler cred-
ibly testified that in May 1946 Forelady Latimer said to her that she
was "surprised at [Butler] wearing the CIO [button]."
On November 1 Butler and Ellis Calhoun, also a pocket setter, ran
out of work. Calhoun was assigned to sewin'-buttons; Butler, how-
ever, was laid off. Latimer told Butler that she had no work for
Butler and that she would have to lay her off; that she didn't know
how long they would be without work, but Butler would be called
back when there was some work. At that time Latimer gave her a
layoff slip, which stated that Butler was laid off for lack of work and
107 The Respondent also adduced evidence showing that some of the six pocket setters
who were laid off and who were members of the Union were later recalled . This evidence,
however, does not conclusively establish the absence of discriminatory motivation with
respect to white. Thus, Ruth Smith, one of the employees so recalled, was forced to
withdraw from the Union and sign up with the AFL. There is no evidence as to the
circumstances under which the recall of other pocket setters occurred.
470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was "subject to call." On November 12 Butler asked for and received
a permanent separation slip in order to obtain full benefits under
unemployment compensation insurance. In January 1947 she secured
employement at the Union City plant of the Brown Shoe Company.
In September 1948 the Respondent offered Butler reemployment
through the U. S. Employment Service, which she declined. At the
hearing, she stated that she did not want a job at the plant 108
In support of the Respondent's contention that Butler was not
recalled because she received employment elsewhere, Forelady Latimer
testified that there was no other reason for laying off Butler than lack
of work, that when work picked up she inquired of one Webster, the
lady that Butler had lived with, where Butler was and was informed
that she was working at the Brown Shoe Company, whereupon she
abandoned the idea of recalling Butler.109 Latimer could not fix the
time of her conversation with Webster. Respondent adduced evi-
dence indicating that it was the policy and practice of the Respondent
not to recall laid-off employees who secured employment at the Brown
Shoe Company in Union City.
The Trial Examiner credited the testimony of Latimer and con-
cluded that Butler was not recalled because she secured employment
at the shoe factory. We disagree for the following reasons. Butler
testified without contradiction that she secured employment at the
Brown Shoe Company in January 1947. The record, however, shows
that between November 1, 1946, when Butler was laid off, and the
time in. January 1947 when Butler secured other employment, the
Respondent hired the following operators in the classifications for
which Butler was qualified : Betty Gilliland, pencil stitch, on Novem-
ber 18, 1946; Wellyn Greer, pencil stitch, on November 21, 1946;
Evelyn McKinney, pockets on, on November 25, 1946; and Peggy
Coday, bar tack, on December 3,1946110 Thus, it is clear that employ-
ment for Butler had become available sometime before Butler secured
employment at the Brown Shoe Company. No attempt, however,
was made by Latimer to communicate with Butler at that time. We
are satisfied, therefore, that employment at Brown Shoe Company
could not have been the reason for not recalling Butler in November
and December 1946.
In the absence of a reasonable explanation as to why the Respond-
ent did not recall Butler when work for her became available, and
upon the entire record, we are satisfied, contrary to the Trial Exam-
108 The findings in this paragraph are based upon the testimony of Butler and Latimer,
which is in substantial agreement.
30B Thus the Respondent itself did not regard the issuance of the permanent separation
slip to Butler as a reason for not recalling her.
110 This finding is based on the list of employees hired by the Respondent subsequent to
May 20, 1946, prepared by the Respondent and introduced in evidence.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 471
iner, that such failure was discriminatorily motivated: Such motiva-
tion is indicated by Butler's union membership and activities, the
fact that Forelady Latimer was "surprised" at her wearing a union
button, the fact that Butler was an experienced employee, whose
competency was not questioned by the Respondent, and, finally, the
background of the Respondent's opposition to the Union and the anti-
Union animus of the Respondent's supervisors.
Upon the entire record, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner,
that the Respondent failed to recall Butler when work for her became
available because of her union membership and activities, thereby
violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Myrtle Gore worked at the plant from 1937 or 1938 until October
15, 1946, when she was laid off. The answer alleges that Gore was
laid off for lack of work on October 15, 1946, and that thereafter she
was requested to return to work but failed to appear. During her
entire employment she was a collar hanger or collar setter operator.
At the time of her layoff she was working in Section 2 under the
supervision of Forelady Andrews. There were two other collar hang-
ers in Section 2, Ann Conley and Mary Hunt, both junior to her in
point of service and both union members, and eight other collar
hangers in the other four sections.
Gore joined the Union in April 1946, was issued a button and wore
it "several times." She quit wearing it after the election, when the
Respondent began to lay off employees. In September 1946 Fore-
lady Andrews reprimanded her and two other employees for talking
during working hours. All of them were members of the Union. On
the other hand, as found above, Andrews overlooked talking during
working hours by employees who were members of the AFL. Before
the election, Andrews also questioned Gore in the presence of the
same employees as to what they did at union meetings and said that
Salant would never sign a contract with the Union but would rather
close the plant, and that she, Andrews, would not work under the
Union 111
On October 15, 1946, Gore was laid off for lack of work 112 Collar
hanger Conley was put on repairs for a few days and was laid off a
few days later, while Hunt, a third collar hanger in the section who
had less seniority than Gore, was retained and transferred to another
section 113 Also retained were collar hangers in other sections who
had less seniority than Gore. On November 5, 1946, Gore returned to
"'See Section III, C, supra, where we made this finding, crediting Gore and rejecting
Andrews' denial that she made the statements attributed to her.
Gore exceeded her production quota. The Respondent did not question her competency
av collar hanger.
1z Section 2 at the time, while not closed, was not operating as a full section.
472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the plant and at her request was given a permanent separation slip.
After November 5 she did not apply for reemployment because, as
she credibly testified, Andrews told her at the time of her layoff that
she would be recalled when needed. Gore was not. reemployed until
September 1948 when the Respondent offered and she accepted work
through the U. S. Employment Service.
It is the Respondent's contention (a) that Gore was laid off for lack
of work, and (b) that a few weeks after Gore's layoff she was offered
reemployment which she failed to accept.114 In support of this conten-
tion Forelady Andrews testified that Gore was laid off for lack of
work and that "a few weeks after she was laid off" Taylor instructed
her to recall Gore; that she telephoned Gore's home twice but no
one answered the telephone; that she reported that fact to Taylor who
then told her to tell Gore's daughter, Athela Claybourn, to ask her
mother to report for work; that she went to Claybourn, told her about
the telephone calls, and requested Claybourn to tell her mother to come
back to work; and that Gore did not return to the plant in accordance
with her request. Taylor testified that within a month or two after
Gore's layoff, she instructed Andrews to ask Gore to come back to
work, that Andrews reported that she had called Gore on the telephone
but was unable to get her, that she then instructed Andrews to contact
Claybourn, who worked at the plant, and that Andrews reported back
to her that she had talked to Claybourn. Taylor also testified that she
asked Claybourn why her mother did not report for work and that
Claybourn replied that her mother wasn't feeling well and also had
some cleaning that she wanted to finish before she came back to work.
After that conversation, according to Taylor's testimony, she thought
that Gore, was not interested in working at the plant.
Gore denied receiving word through her daughter, who was living
with her at that time, or through anybody else that Taylor wanted
her to report to work. Claybourn, Gore's daughter, also denied that
either Andrews or Taylor asked her to tell her mother to return to
work or said anything about it to her. Nor, according to her testi-
mony, did she ever report to Andrews or Taylor that her mother did
not want to return to work.115 Thus, we have a sharp conflict in testi-
mony as to whether or not Gore was offered reemployment. The Trial
Examiner resolved the conflict in favor of Andrews and Taylor. We
do not agree. In making his credibility finding the Trial Examiner
114 Implicit in the Respondent ' s defense is an admission that work for Gore became avail-
able and that no application for reemployment on Gore ' s part was necessary even though
she secured a permanent separation slip. There is also evidence showing that between
November 1946 and March 12, 1947, the Respondent hired seven or eight collar hangers
or collar setters.
115 Gore 's sister , Louise Roney, also worked at the plant . Taylor lives a block from
Gore's home . Forelady Hammond lives across the street from Gore 's home.
SALANT & ISALANT, INCORPORATED 473
proceeded on an erroneous assumption that Claybourn although called
as a witness was not questioned about the matter. He failed also to
take into consideration the fact that both Andrews and Taylor were
biased against the Union and had previously, as found by the Board,
engaged in unlawful interference with the Respondent's employees'
right to self-organization. He also failed to consider the preponder-
ance of mutually corroborative evidence in this record showing that
they engaged in conduct proscribed by the Act, including discrimina-
tion against certain employees because of their union membership
and activities. Moreover, we have found both of them to be untrust-
worthy witnesses in a number of instances detailed. above. We find,
therefore, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Andrews and Taylor
did not attempt to recall Gore for work either "a few weeks" after her
layoff or at any time thereafter until September 26, 1948.
In the absence of a reasonable explanation as to why the Respond-
ent did not recall Gore until September 28, 1948, and upon the entire
record, we are satisfied, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that such
failure was discriminatorily motivated. Gore was one of the oldest
employees in the plant in point of service. Her competency was not
questioned by the Respondent. Her membership in the Union was
known to the Respondent's supervisors. Her immediate supervisor
stated to her that the Respondent would close the plant rather than
sign a contract with the Union, and that she (the supervisor) would
not work under a union contract.
Upon the entire record we find that the General Counsel failed
to sustain the burden of proof that Gore's layoff was due to dis-
criminatory reasons. However we find, contrary to the Trial Ex-
aminer, that the Respondent failed and refused to recall Gore for
discriminatory reasons in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Sarah Anna Conley worked at the plant as a collar setter, also called
collar hanger, from January 1944 until her layoff on October 30, 1946.
Conley had been working in Section 4, filling the place of an employee
who was on sick leave, but was returned to Section 2 where she was
helping to finish up and repair. When the work in Section 2 was
"practically discontinued," Conley was laid off. The answer alleges
that Conley was laid off on October 30, 1946, that she was offered
work in another section which she refused, and that she has accepted
employment elsewhere.
Conley joined the Union in May 1946 and wore a union button in
the plant. Sometime before the election, Head Forelady Taylor asked
her how the Union was coming along in Section 2, to which she replied
that it was coming along all right. Taylor said, "Well it's a mess;
I don't want any of it in mine."
929979-51-vol. 92 32
474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At the time of her layoff Conley received a yellow layoff slip signed
by Taylor, which stated that she had been laid off for "lack of work"
and was "subject to call." 118 On December 2 the Respondent hired
Lottie Burnett 117 as collar hanger in Section 3. Conley returned to
the plant to inquire about work a few days after the Respondent hired
Burnett 118 She was told by Taylor that there was no work for her.
Conley did not come back again. In January 1948 she went to work
for the Brown Shoe Company.
It is the Respondent's contention that at the time of the layoff Conley
was offered another job, which she refused, and that Conley was not
recalled for that reason118 In support of this contention Head Fore-
lady Taylor testified that when the operations in Section 2 were dis-
continued she offered Conley a job of collar hanger in Section 3 on
Gaucho shirts, the only place then open for a collar hanger, which
Conley refused stating that she "would go home before she would hang
these damn [Gaucho] collars"; that about a month after her layoff
Conley came back to ask for work, that she told Conley on that oc-
casion that she hired Burnett to do the work that she had offered
Conley and that as Conley had refused the only thing they had
for her she concluded that Conley was not interested enough in help-
ing her.- Forelady Andrews testified that she was present during
the conversation between Taylor and Conley at the time of the layoff,
that Taylor offered Conley work in Section 3 on Gaucho collars, and
that Conley stated that she would rather go home than work on
Gaucho shirts.
Conley denied that she had refused to work on Gaucho shirts and
testified that she worked on them as long as they gave her Gauchos.
Without resolving the evident conflict in testimony as to whether
Conley was offered another job at the time of her layoff, we are satis-
fied that, assuming that Conley did refuse, to work on Gauchos, such
refusal was not the real reason for the Respondent's failure to recall
Conley when work for her became available. If, as the Respondent's
witnesses assert, Conley's refusal to accept work on Gauchos was such
116 This finding is based upon the undenied testimony of Conley which we credit.
114 Burnett was a former employee , who had left Respondent 's employ about a year before
Conley 's layoff.
118 While Conley testified that she returned to the plant on November 1, she also testified
that it was after the Respondent hired Burnett . We find that Conley returned to the
plant after December 2, 1946, when Burnett was hired.
119 Another reason alleged in the answer for the nonrecall of Conley is "employment
elsewhere ." This is inconsistent with the Respondent ' s position that Conley was not
reemployed because of her refusal to accept work in another section. Moreover the record
shows that she did not accept employment with the Brown Shoe Company until January
1948, or long after work for her became available.
120 Conley ' s version of this conversation is in substantial agreement with that of Taylor.
According to Conley, she asked Taylor why she rehired Burnett in preference to her and that
Taylor replied , "You didn't want that work when it was offered to you," to which Conley
said, "I didn't tell you that I didn't want it," and that she then left the plant.
SAI.ANT & $ALANT, INCORPORATED 475
a gross breach of loyalty on Conley's part as to disqualify her for re-
employment, it is extremely unlikely that Taylor would have issued
her on October 30 a temporary layoff slip which stated that she was
"subject to call," thereby assuring Conley of 'continuing reemploy-
ment rights. At the time of the layoff Conley had been in the Re-
spondent's employ for almost 3 years. Her competence was not
questioned by the Respondent. Furthermore, despite Taylor's con-
tention that she then.needed a collar hanger in Section 3, Burnett
was not hired for that job until over a month later.
Upon the entire record we find the Respondent refused to recall
Conley when work became available 121 because of her union member-
ship and activities, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Marcia Cunningham began working at the plant in 1944. She
worked about 8 months, quit because of illness, and returned in Feb-
ruary 1946. She was employed in the finishing department as a
shoulder former under the supervision of Adele King. She was laid
off on October 28, 1946. The answer alleges that Cunningham was
laid off for lack of work and was not recalled because of "her abusive
language while she was employed at the plant."
Cunningham joined the Union in April or May 1946, and thereafter
openly wore a union button in the plant. She solicited employees
to join the union.
On October 28, 1946, she was laid off by Assistant Superintendent
Rogers, purportedly for lack of work. Another shoulder former,
Mary Merritt, was laid off at the same time Cunningham received a
layoff slip from Rogers which stated that she was laid off for lack of
work and was "subject to call." Later she was given a separation
notice which stated that she was separated "temporarily" for "lack of
work." In September 1948, she was offered her former job through
the U. S. Employment Service, but could not accept it for personal
reasons. There were about 10 operators doing shoulder forming in her
section. Only Cunningham and Merritt were laid off. The others
were retained. At the time of the layoff the shoulder formers were
working part time for lack of work. All those retained, except
Wheeler and Poole who were AFL members, had more seniority than
Cunningham. The evidence is conflicting as to Wheeler and Poole.
Cunningham testified that they were hired after she had returned to
the plant after her illness and that she taught them shoulder forming.
Assistant Superintendent Rogers, on the other hand, testified that he
had checked the personnel records and found that Wheeler and Poole
were employed before Cunningham was rehired in February 1946.
In We find that work became available for Conley sometime between November 5 and
December 30, 1946, when three collar hangers were hired by the Respondent.
476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Adele King's testimony is in accord with that of Rogers. We credit
the testimony of Rogers and King in this respect.. Cunningham was
never recalled.
Respondent offered no evidence in support of the allegation in the
answer that Cunningham was not recalled because of "her abusive
language at the plant." Nor did it offer any other explanation for its
failure to recall Cunningham when work for her first became available
during the January-March 1947 period when seven shoulder formers
were hired by the Respondent. Cunningham admittedly was laid
off for lack of work and for no other reason. Her separation notice
states that she was separated "temporarily" for lack of work. As an
employee whose competence was not questioned by the Respondent, she
normally would have been recalled to work without any application
on her part when work became available-
Upon the entire record, and particularly in view of the Respondent's
other unfair labor practices, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner,
that the Respondent did not recall Cunningham after work for her
became available in January-March 1947, because of her union mem-
bership and activities, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Montez Adams, also referred to as Montez Capparelli, worked in
the parts department under the supervision of Forelady Simmons
as a sleeve boxer from January 1946 until her layoff on October 17,
1946. The answer states that Adams was laid off for lack of work and
was not recalled because she was not as efficient as others and because
she accepted employment elsewhere.
Adams joined the Union in April 1946, was issued a button and
wore it openly at the plant until she was laid off. She passed out some
union cards before the election. In April 1946 Forelady Simmons
asked Adams if she had joined the Union and stated that employees
would not be benefited by the Union but would lose, and asked her
not to join the Union.122
Adams was laid off by Simmons on October 17, 1946, allegedly for
lack of material. At the time of the layoff there were five sleeve
boxers : Adams, Stanfield, Dyer, McDaniel, and Hazelwood.123 Adams,
Stanfield, and Dyer, all of whom were union members, were laid off
about the same time 124 The laid-off sleeve boxers had less seniority
than McDaniel and Hazelwood who were retained. After her layoff
Adams telephoned Simmons twice and asked when Simmons would
122 See Section III. C,, supra, where we found that Simmons questioned Adams and made
the statement attributed to her.
123 As a matter of fact, Hazelwood was engaged on a different operation, sleeve facing,
as distinguished from sleeve boxing.
124 The record shows that Stanfield was laid off on November 14, 1946, and Dyer was
laid off some time before.
.SALA11IT & SALAiNTT, NCORP:ORATED 477
recall her to work and Simmons "didn't know each time." On Novem-
ber 12, the Respondent hired, as a sleeve boxer, one Bonnie Wells, who
had been working at the plant in 1939 or 1940. Adams secured em-
ployment at the Martin Manufacturing Company, at Martin, Ten-
nessee, on November 12, 1946. In September 1948 the Respondent
offered Adams, through the U. S. Employment Service, employment
on an operation other than sleeve boxing, which she accepted. Adams
worked at the plant until December 1948 when she voluntarily quit.
Adams testified that the production quota on sleeve boxing was 112
dozen per day and that her own average was 70 to 80 dozen. Adams,
however, explained that she didn't make production because she was
working on a side machine and had to get up and walk some distance
to fetch her work, and that Stanfield and Dyer were in the same
situation , whereas the other sleeve boxers stayed in the line all the
time.
In support of the Respondent's position, Simmons testified that
when the time came for a layoff, the best operators were kept, that
is, the ones that made production; that if two operators had the same
ability and were making the same production, then the choice was
made on the basis of seniority; that there was a slackening of work
during October 1946; that Adams never made production; that Mc-
Daniel 125 was retained because she made production and her work
was good. Taylor testified that Adams did not make production as
she was always running around talking to other people during working
hours and that Wells was hired on November 12 because she was a
good operator and had previously been in the Respondent's employ.
The Trial Examiner credited the testimony of the Respondent's
supervisors and found that Adams was selected for the layoff because
of her poor production record. - He also found, apparently on the
assumption that Adams was a poor operator, that there was no dis-
crimination in not recalling Adams at the time Wells was hired. We
do not agree. Adams testified without contradition that Simmons
told her at the time of the layoff that she was being laid off for lack
of material and said nothing about her alleged poor production record
being the reason for her selection for layoff, or that she would not
be recalled for that reason. No separation slip of any kind was issued
to Adams, thus indicating that the separation was not intended to
be permanent. Nor did Simmons tell Adams, when Adams twice
inquired about reemployment, that she would not be reemployed be-
cause of her poor production record. 0
12 This is the same McDaniel heretofore identified as one of the employees who circulated
the petition for a new election.
0
478 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Simmons conceded that an employee out of the line would not
normally be expected to turn out as much production as an employee
who was in line because the former must carry her work instead of
having it "shot" to her. Simmons did not deny that Adams worked
on a side machine. While the Respondent was laying off sleeve boxers
in Simmons' section allegedly for lack of work (sleeve boxers Adams,
Dyer, and Stanfield were laid off during the October 16-November
14 period) the Respondent hired sleeve boxer Bonnie Wells, and
placed her in Simmons' section on November 12, only 2 days before
Stanfield's layoff. Two other sleeve boxers were hired within the next
few months, Thornton on January 6, 1947, and Van Duzen on April
18, 1947. However, none of the three laid-off sleeve boxers, all of
whom were union members, was recalled. In the summer of 1946
Simmons asked Adams "which she was for, the CIO or the AFL,"
stated that Adams would not be benefited by the Union, and asked
her not to join the Union. This incident, as well as the others dis-
cussed in Section III, C, supra, establish Simmons' bias against the
Union. Simmons' antiunion bias together with the prior and con-
temporaneous unfair labor practices engaged in by other supervisors
furnish ample basis for an inference of discrimination in not recalling
Adams when work for her became available.
As to the Respondent's defense that Adams obtained employment
elsewhere, the record shows that on November 12, 1946, following her
two unsuccessful attempts to ascertain from Simmons when she would
be recalled, Adams secured employment with the Martin Manufac-
turing Company at Martin, Tennessee. No evidence was adduced as
to whether the Respondent made inquiry about Adams' whereabouts
when work for her became available or whether the Respondent knew
that Adams had secured such employment in November 1946. Assum-
ing, however, that the Respondent knew of such employment, the
record is clear that under the Respondent's policy and practice,
employment outside Union City normally would not have barred
her recall.
Upon the entire record we find that the evidence fails to sustain
the allegation of the complaint that Adams was laid off discrimina-
torily; we find, however, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the
Respondent failed and refused to recall Adams when work became
available because of her union membership and activities thereby
violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
Walter. Gardner began working at the plant in 1938 and had several
jobs in various departments. He worked as a cloth spreader, bundle
boy, shipping clerk, and, for the year and a half preceding his layoff,
as a junior mechanic.. At the time of his layoff he was working under
S•ALANT & SALANT, TNC0RP0R!ATED 479
the supervision of Foreman Millsap. He was the only junior mechanic
employed at the plant. The answer alleges that Gardner was laid
off for lack of work on October 4, 1946, that he was "junior mechanic"
and experienced mechanics were retained when he was laid off.
Gardner joined the Union in May 1946. He was elected chairman
of the negotiating committee, the other members of the committee
being Lexie Smith, Evastine'Calhoun, Jewel Read, James Mullins,
Eloise Buie, Cleron Smith, Blanche Smith, and Ann Smothermon.
It does not appear that the Union ever informed the Respondent
of the names of the members of the committee since the Respondent
refused to recognize the Board's certification of the Union as the bar-
gaining agent of its employees. The committee had no meetings
with the Respondent. Gardner was issued a union button which he
wore openly in the plant part of the time until about a month after
the election. Gardner and Mullins were observers for the Union at
the July 19, 1946, election, while Vernon Forrester and Walker were
observers for the AFL.
In the middle of August 1946, Foreman Millsap stated to Gardner
on two occasions that he didn't think Mr. Salant would ever bargain
with the Union, but he was pretty sure that he would with the AFL.
Gardner also had several conversations with Foreladies Simmons and
Andrews in the course of which they made similar statements. On
one occasion Head Forelady Taylor expressed her astonishment that
he was so active in behalf of the CIO.126 Forrester, who was senior
mechanic, was active in behalf of the AFL. Forrester was frequently
absent from his work and Foreman Millsap didn't reprimand him
for it. Forrester carried AFL cards with him.
On October 4,1946, Millsap and Superintendent Stone told Gardner
that they didn't have enough work for all the mechanics and wouldn't
need him any more. Gardner asked about Forrester. Stone replied
that Forrester had been with the Company longer than he had.
Stone did not criticize Gardner's work. Gardner received his checks
as well as a separation notice the same day. He left his address and
telephone number. He told Stone that they could reach him by
telephone or through a relative of his wife who was working at the
plant. He did not return to the plant, nor was he ever recalled when
work for him became available. On May 12, 1947, the Respondent
hired a new employee, Paul Russell, as a junior mechanic.
In support of the Respondent's position Stone testified that Gardner
was laid off for lack of work caused by shortage of material, which
120 These findings are based upon the testimony of Gardner , which we credit despite the
denials of Foreladies Simmons and Taylor. See Section III, C, supra, where we found
that the afore-mentioned statements were made to Gardner.
480 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
necessitated curtailment of production and consequently a cut back
in the mechanical force; that Gardner was the only junior mechanic
at the plant; that senior mechanics were kept because it was the policy
to keep the more highly skilled employees when it came to a layoff.
Stone also testified that Gardner never applied for reinstatement
and that Russell was not hired until May 12, 1947. Respondent offered
no explanation for its failure to recall Gardner in May 1947 when it
hired Russell as junior mechanic, although it was the Respondent's
policy and practice to recall an employee who was laid off for lack
of work, unless such employee was not an efficient worker, or in
the meantime had obtained employment elsewhere in Union City.
Gardner was an old and satisfactory employee whose competence
was never questioned by the Respondent, nor had he obtained
employment elsewhere at the time Russell was hired.
The Respondent contends that it was under no obligation to locate
Gardner 7 months after his layoff. We see no merit in this conten-
tion. There was no showing that the Respondent's practice of re-
calling laid-off employees was limited to those employees separated
only a 'short time. The separation slip issued to Gardner indicates
that the Respondent ceased to employ Gardner "temporarily." The
record also shows that several other vacancies in classifications which
Gardner could have filled occurred within a shorter period than 7
months. Before the end of 1.946 three men were hired in classifica-
tions for which Gardner was qualified-cloth spreader, bundle boy,
and shipping clerk. The Respondent did not offer Gardner any of
these positions.
The Respondent knew that Gardner was a member of the Union
and that he acted as an observer for the Union at the July 19 elec-
tion. While there is no direct evidence that the Respondent also
knew that Gardner was chairman of the negotiating committee, such
knowledge on the part of the Respondent under the circumstances
can be reasonably inferred. As Superintendent Stone testified in
connection with Mullins' threat to whip him, ". . . in a place like that,
information gets around and gets to you," it is hard to keep anything
secret in the plant particularly in a "small town." The record indi-
cates that all the members of the negotiating committee with the ex-
ception of Calhoun and Smothermon were either discharged, laid off,
or suspended. Calhoun and Smothermon quit Respondent's employ
before the hearing.127
Upon the entire record, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner,
that the Respondent did not recall Gardner on May 12, 1947, because
127 These findings are based on the testimony of a number of witnesses , for the General
Counsel including Smothermon , Reed, Calhoun , Gardner, Mullins , Blanche Smith, and
others.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 481
of his union membership and activities, thereby violating Section 8
(a) (3) of the Act.
4. Employees allegedly discriminated against
Verlie D. TVright worked at the plant from February 15, 1943, to
May 28, 1946, when he was laid off. At the time of his layoff, and
for several months before, Wright spent most of his time working
as a collar turner, also called collar creaser. He was the only em-
ployee in the plant engaged in that type of work. Another em-
ployee, Luly Hays, trimmed the points of the collars on which Wright
worked. Wright also spent one-fourth to one-third of his time on
pocket pressing. During his employment with the Respondent
Wright worked for a few days in the shipping department and a
few days as bundle boy.
Wright joined the Union in April 1946. He was issued a CIO
button in May and wore it while working in the plant until his lay-
off. He passed out five or six union membership cards outside the
plant.
On May 28, 1946, Wright was laid off because the Respondent dis-
continued making the type of collars which required pressing, the
work Wright had done. Luly Hays was laid off at the same time
and for the same reason. So far as the record shows the Respondent
never resumed the operation on which Wright and Hays were
engaged.12s
In April 1946 Superintendent Stone told Wright about the im-
pending changeover and promised to give him another job because
he had made "a good hand" and because of his knowledge of several
operations. Similarly, Assistant Superintendent Rogers and Fore-
man Millsap assured him that they would find something else for him
to do after the changeover took effect. After his layoff Wright made
several inquiries at the plant about work and was told that there was
no suitable opening for him. On one of these visits to the plant he
asked Stone for a job as bundle boy, which job had been vacated by
Billie Cochran, but Stone replied that he could not give it to him be-
cause Cochran was expected to return shortly. Wright also informed
Stone that the pocket pressers had offered to lay off for a day or a
week in order to give him employment but Stone stated that that
"would not work out." Wright made no inquiries after August 1946.
The record contains no evidence showing that at the time of
Wright's layoff on May 28, 1946, or thereafter there was a job opening
which he could fill.
128 The findings in the preceding three paragraphs are based upon the testimony of
Wright and Superintendent Stone, which we credit.
482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On the above record we are not convinced that the layoff of Wright
on May 28, 1946, was for discriminatory reasons.- The evidence
rather indicates that the layoff was due to the elimination of Wright's
job classification and the absence of any suitable opening for him at
the time of the layoff. Nor are we convinced that the Respondent's
failure to recall Wright after his layoff was discriminatorily moti-
vated. The General Counsel adduced no evidence that a suitable
opening for Wright became available subsequent to his layoff. On
the contrary, there is evidence showing that for business reasons the
Respondent was curtailing its operations and was reducing its payroll
during the second half of 1946. While there is evidence indicating
that during the January-April 1947 period the Respondent hired
three bundle boys and one new employee for its shipping and re-
ceiving department, there is nothing to show that Wright was quali-
fied for these jobs.
Upon the entire record we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that
the proof adduced at the hearing fails to sustain the allegations of
the complaint with respect to Wright. We shall therefore dismiss
the allegation of the complaint with respect to Wright.
Robert Lee Brockwell worked at the plant as a pocket presser from
November 1942 until his layoff on October 25, 1946. The answer al-
leges that Brockwell "was laid off for lack of work" and "has not been
recalled because he was unwilling to do his share of the work while
he was employed at the plant, and his work was not as good as others
in his job classification."
Brockwell joined the Union around the middle of April 1946, openly
wore his union button in the plant from about May 1 until his layoff,
passed out union membership application cards, and attended union
meetings.
On October 25, 1946, Foreman Millsap informed Brockwell that
they would have to lay him off for lack of work. Millsap told him
to leave his telephone number so that when he [Millsap] "gets some
more work, [he] can give [Brockwell] a call." Brockwell replied
that he had no telephone number, but that Millsap could send word
to him through his wife if she were still working for the Respondent.
Millsap agreedl29 At the time of Brockwell's layoff there were two
other pocket pressers working in the cutting department, Marvin
Brooks and Ray Flowers, both of whom were members of the Union
and wore their union buttons at work. Although Flowers began to
work at the plant before Brockwell, he was away from the plant for
120 These findings are based upon the uncontradicted testimony of Brockwell , which we
credit. Milisap did not testify.-
SATANT & SAL'ANT, INC0RP0R!ATEID 483
about a year. Brooks was employed about a year and a half after
Brockwell 13o
There is evidence indicating that in selecting employees for a layoff
the Respondent did not invariably follow the seniority rule. The
skill of an employee was another factor taken into consideration.
Respondent called a number of witnesses who testified that Brock-
well's work was not entirely satisfactory and that he was warned of
this several times before his layoff 131 While Brockwell denied that
his work was unsatisfactory, he admitted that he was criticized on
several occasions for making crooked pockets.
Subsequent to his layoff Brockwell drew unemployment compensa-
tion for 16 weeks. In February 1947 he returned to the plant and
asked Superintendent Stone for work. Stone refused on the ground
that Brockwell had refused to work on "extras" before his layoff.' -12
A few days later Brockwell went to see Personnel Director Hazel
Hammond and told her that he had been refused work. Hammond
then talked to Millsap, who said that he did not want Brockwell be-
cause he was uncooperative and did not want to do his share of press-
ing Gauchos. Hammond also asked Brooks and Flowers if they had
any objection to working with Brockwell and they said they would
rather not because he wasn't very cooperative and didn't like to take
his share of the hard work. After that Hammond told Brockwell of
her conversations with Millsap, Brooks, and Flowers, whereupon
Brockwell left the plant and never returned 133 Upon the above rec-
ord we are not convinced that the selection of Brockwell for the layoff
was due to discriminatory reasons. Two other pocket pressers who
were retained were members of the Union. There was no showing
that Brockwell in addition to his seniority, was equally as efficient
as the two other pressers. Nor are we convinced, on the evidence
130 These findings are based upon the undenied testimony of Brockwell, which we credit.
At the time of the hearing Brooks was still in the Respondent 's employ. Flowers had
voluntarily quit sometime in 1947.
1$1 Thus, Superintendent Stone testified that Brockwell's bad creasing was responsible
for an enormous amount of recuts in Section 2 on pockets . Forelady Andrews , who was
in charge of Section 2, testified that Brockwell would not crease the pockets correctly.
Head Forelady Taylor testified that she corrected Brockwell almost every day. Assistant
Superintendent Rogers testified that Brockwell did some bad work.
133 This finding is based upon the undenied testimony of Brockwell . Stone. who was
questioned about this interview , did not deny that he had refused to reemploy Brockwell
on that ground.
138 These findings are based upon the credible testimony of Hammond , partially cor-
roborated by Brockwell . Brockwell , however, testified that when he related his conversa-
tion with Hammond to Flowers and Brooks, they denied that they had made to Hammond
the statements attributed to them. Neither of these two men, however , was called as
a witness to deny the testimony of Hammond . We find that Flowers and Brooks did
make the statements attributed to them by Hammond.
484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
before us, that the Respondent's refusal to reinstate Brockwell was
discriminatory.
In view of the foregoing and upon the entire record, we find, as did
the Trial Examiner, that the evidence adduced at the hearing does not
sustain the allegation of the complaint that Brockwell was laid off and
thereafter refused reinstatement because of his union membership
and activities.
Lona Wolverton worked in the parts department as pocket setter
from August 6, 1945, until her layoff on June 3, 1946. Virginia Lati-
mer was her immediate supervisor. She joined the Union the second
week in May, was issued a union button the last week in May and
wore it at the plant. She also attended union meetings in 1946. The
answer alleges that Wolverton was "laid off for lack of work on June
3, 1946" and that she was not "recalled because she was an inefficient
operator and while working at the plant she did not make production."
Ten or twelve days before Wolverton was laid off Forelady Lati-
mer said to her that if "she knew [Wolverton] was going to the [union]
meeting she would work her until five o'clock." Union meetings were
held immediately after 4 o'clock, the closing time of the plant. On
the Friday before Wolverton was laid off Latimer came to her machine
and said, "If you wear this button back here Monday, I'll lay you
off," to which Wolverton replied, "Sister, you will have a job." She
wore it back Monday and was laid off that afternoon.' 34 At the time
of her layoff Wolverton was issued a separation slip which stated that
she was laid off permanently for "lack of work."
The Respondent contended at the hearing that Wolverton was
selected for the layoff because of her poor production record and of-
fensive body odor and that she was not recalled for the same reasons.
Both Forelady Latimer and Head Forelady Taylor testified, in sub-
stance, that when the time for the layoff came, Wolverton was selected
because she didn't make production and because her production was
lower than that of the other pocket setters; that they warned Wol-
189 Unlike the Trial Examiner , we do not credit Latimer ' s denial that she made the
statements attributed to her. While it is not readily understandable why Latimer would
single out Wolverton when all the other pocket setters were also union members , Latimer's
antiunion behavior is well established by the record . In Section III, C, herein , we found
that Latimer made similar and just as unprovoked threats to other employees. Thus,
sometime after the July 19 election Latimer asked Ruth Smith , pocket setter in her
department , "why didn ' t [she] sign an AFL card and get out of the CIO. That [she]
was going to be fired . [ She] was going like the rest of them if she didn't change over."
In September Latimer told James, Blanche Smith, and Green , pocket buttons and button-
hole operators in her department , "You had better put those inside your coats where
they can 't be seen before you get laid off," referring to the CIO buttons they were wearing.
Three, weeks later James was discharged. In November she told Mary Cobb, a pocket
buttons operator in her department , who was just recalled from layoff, that the only
way she could bold her job was to join the AFT, and shortly thereafter supplied her with
an AFL card. As found supra, Latimer also made statements to several other employees
constituting unlawful support to the AFL.
SATAN r & -SALANT, INCORPOR!AT'EID 485
verton more than once about her production ; that Wolverton was laid
off and not recalled for yet another reason, namely, because of her of-
fensive body odor. While admitting that she did not make produc-
tion, Wolverton testified that she was not making "any more less than
a lot of others" and that there were several other pocket setters whose
production went below her own actual production.
Although we have found that Latimer threatened Wolverton with
a discharge if she came back wearing her union button, there is other
evidence indicating that she was selected for the layoff and not recalled
thereafter for nondiscriminatory reasons. Wolverton had less sen-
iority than 11 other pocket setters in the parts department. She never
made production, according to her own testimony, even though she
denied that her production was the lowest in the parts department.
The testimony that she had offensive body odor also stands uncontra-
dicted. On this state of the record, we are not prepared to reject the
Respondent's explanation for the layoff and failure to recall.
Upon the entire record, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the
evidence fails to sustain the allegation of the complaint that Wolverton
was laid off and thereafter not reinstated because of her union mem-
bership and activities.
Rubye James first began to work at the plant in April 1943; she
worked only for a short while and quit. She returned to the plant in
January 1945 and worked continuously thereafter until her discharge
on October 17, 1946. James worked in the parts department under
Forelady Latimer and did pocket setting, pocket button sewing, and
stitching down collars. On September 28, 1948, she was recalled to
work through U. S. Employment Service and was given, her former
job. James joined the Union around the first of May 1946 and was
issued buttons which she thereafter wore openly in the plant. She at-
tended two meetings. The answer alleges that James was discharged
for cause on October 17, 1946.
About 3 weeks before James was discharged, Latimer remarked to
James, Blanche Smith, and Virginia Green, as they' were walking
towards their machines one morning before starting work, "giggling
arid snickering" about their buttons, that they had better hide their
buttons by putting them inside their coats before they got laid off.
James replied that she would just leave hers outside.135
On October 17, 1946, James was discharged for failure to make
production. James testified that about 2 or 3 months before her dis-
charge she was changed from one job to another "practically every
day," although she sewed buttons more than anything else; that she
"'See Section III, C , where we have made this finding, crediting James ' testimony and
rejecting Latimer's denial of the statements attributed to her.
486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had difficulty in making production because she was moved around so
much, but that when she was left on button sewing she could make pro-
duction; that she complained to Taylor about being moved around so
much. On cross-examination, however, James admitted that between
January and July 1946 she stayed on setting pockets most of the time
and that during that period she didn't make production on any day;
that between July 1 and October 17, 1946, she never made production
on setting pockets; that during the same period she made production
only five or six times on the button-sewing operation; that Taylor
complained that she and the other operators in her department were
not making production and called their attention to adjustments dur-
ing August, September, and October, 1946. Forelady Latimer contra-
dicted James' direct testimony, asserting that during the period from
January 1 to October 17, 1946, James was assigned to two jobs only-
pocket setting and pocket button sewing; that she did not make pro-
duction on either operation; that prior to the discharge of James she
had warned her two or three times about her production; Head Fore-
lady Taylor testified that James first worked as a pocket setter but
didn't make production so she was assigned to the button sewing opera-
tion in the hope that she would make production on that operation;
that it was the plant's policy to transfer employees from one job' to
another to try to fit them into some job where, they could make produc-
tion; that James was given that opportunity; and that James was dis-
charged only because she did not make production.
On the record before us, particularly in view of James' admission
that during the January 1-October 17,1946, period, she worked on only
two operations, namely, pocket setting and button sewing; that she
never made production on pocket setting, and made production only
five or six times on the button-sewing operation, we are not prepared
to reject the Respondent's explanation that James was discharged be-
cause of her poor production record. While in view of Latimer's im-
plied threat to lay off? James, if she persisted in wearing the union but-
ton, the matter is not wholly free from doubt, we find, as did the Trial
Examiner, that the evidence fails to sustain the allegation of the com-
plaint that James was discharged because of her union affiliation and
activities.
Dorothy Gardiner Haynes, also referred to as Gardiner, started
to work at the plant in February 1946 as a front hemmer or button
stand operator in the parts department, and continued to perform that
operation until her discharge on August 9, 1946. The answer alleges
that Haynes was discharged "for cause."
Haynes joined the Union about May 1946 and was issued a button
about 2 weeks later which she wore to work. She attended one union
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 487
meeting. About 2 or 3 days before the election, Head Forelady Taylor
asked Haynes if she were going to vote for the Union. Haynes re-
plied in the affirmative. Taylor then observed that she should be
careful who she voted for, for "we all wanted to keep our jobs."
Haynes replied that she "would think about it." 136
On August 9 Haynes was discharged. At the time of the discharge
she was told that she was being discharged for failure to make produc-
tion. She was issued a separation notice which stated that she was
discharged for "bad work." In September 1948 Haynes was offered
reemployment through the U. S. Employment Service, which she
declined.
In support of the Respondent's contention Forelady Latimer,
Haynes' immediate supervisor, testified that Haynes was discharged
for bad work, "for what little she did was all bad, most of it"; that the
trouble with her work was "raw seams"; that she talked to Haynes
about that several times; and that Haynes also did not make produc-
tion. Superintendent Stone also testified that prior to the discharge
of Haynes he had been shown some of her defective work and that he
then told Taylor to discharge her. With respect to her production,
Haynes admitted that the production quota for her operation was 260
dozen a day, that she had never made production, that the closest she
came to making production was about 70 dozen short of that figure;
that Latimer had corrected her about bad work and complained about.
her failure to make production.
Upon the record before us, and particularly in view of Haynes'
admission that she did not make production and was criticized by her
superiors, and the fact that she was a new employee and did not engage
in union activity, we are not prepared to reject the explanation of
Haynes' supervisors that she was discharged for poor production.
We&nd, as did the Trial Examiner, that the evidence fails to sustain
the allegation of the complaint that Haynes was discharged and there-
after refused reinstatement because of her union membership and
activities.
Berthie Mae Williams, also known as Beard, worked at the plant as
a buttonhole and button sew operator from October 1, 1945, until her
discharge on September 24, 1946. When she was hired she had no
prior experience as a power machine operator. In May 1946 she was
transferred from the "factory" to the "half section". and was moved
from job to job. She was not assigned to any one section but was an
"extra girl," or extra operator who filled in for absent employees. At
the time of her discharge, she was supervised by Forelady Annie
'88 See Section III, C, where we made this finding crediting the testimony of Haynes
and rejecting Taylor's denial.
488 DECISIONS 'OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
King. The answer alleges that Williams was discharged on Septem-
ber 24, 1946, "for cause."
Williams joined the Union in March 1946 and wore a union button
in the plant after the election and until her discharge. About 1 week
after the election, Forelady Crews told Williams that she was "sur-
prised" to see her wearing a union button, that she "had better change
over and wear the other kind," that it was "not too late even though
the election had been held" and that if she "wanted to continue work-
ing she had better change over." 137
Williams was laid off on September 24 by Annie King, pursuant to
the instructions of Head Forelady Taylor. The next day, she was
issued a permanent separation slip which stated that she was "dis-
charged by management for failure to make any effort to improve
her production, after many attempts to get her to improve." Williams
went to see Taylor who told her that she [Taylor] had to let her go
"because. she wasn't making time regular." Williams explained that
she could not make time because she was transferred so much. She
further testified that that was the first time she was ever told that her
production was not satisfactory.
In support of its contention that Williams was discharged because
of her poor production record, Annie King, Williams' immediate
supervisor, testified that Williams was discharged because she could
not make production and was lax in her job, and that at the time of the
discharge she told Williams that Taylor decided to let her go because
her rejections were high, that is to say, she wasn't making production.
Head Forelady Taylor testified that Williams was discharged because
she never made production either on the buttonhole operation or on
the button sew operation, that she knew about Williams' production
because she had consulted the adjustment sheets every week and then
showed them to the operators who didn't make production, and that
she had to talk to Williams about adjustments on more than one
occasion.
Williams testified that her production was not up to the standard
because she had to do both operations "a lot of the time," that when
she stayed on the machine long enough she made her quota, that she
would stay on a machine in a given section not over a day or two and
then she would be moved somewhere else; that except for about a
month after being hired, she was not criticized by her superiors ; that
while filling in for a girl in Section 3 she made production on the
button sew operation, and that a lot of the time she wouldn't have a
button sew girl and she would do buttonhole and button sew at the
331 See Section III, C , supra, where we made this finding, crediting the testimony or
Williams and rejecting Crews' denial.
SALANT & iSALAIVT, INCORPORATED 489
same time. She denied that King or Taylor had ever told her that
her adjustments were too high.
On the record before us, and particularly in view of the evidence
showing that Williams was a new and comparatively inexperienced
operator, that Williams was not particularly active in behalf of the
Union; her admission that she never made production on button sew
operation; the fact that Taylor's testimony concerning- Williams'
production was corroborated by Annie King, who has not been found
to have engaged in any unlawful conduct, we are not prepared to reject
the explanation of the Respondent's supervisors that Williams was
discharged because of her poor production record. 1311
Upon the entire record we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that
the General Counsel failed to prove his case with regard to the dis-
charge of Williams. .
Catherine Sanders, also referred to in the record as Catherine White,
worked at the plant from July 1942 until October 24, 1946, when she
was discharged. The answer alleges that Sanders was discharged
"for cause." During the entire time she was employed at the plant
she worked on the buttonhole operation in various. sections. At the
time of her discharge she was working in Section 6 under the super-
vision of Forelady Kindred.
Sanders joined the Union in April 1946; was issued a union button
and wore it openly at the plant. About 2 weeks before the election,
Kindred said to her that she knew that Sanders needed her job and
advised Sanders that when the election day comes, be "on the right
side." After the election Kindred stated to Sanders that "Mr. Salant
will never work under the CIO union . he will. close it down
first." 139
On October 24, 1946, Sanders was discharged, allegedly for mak-
ing defective buttonholes. In support of this contention several
witnesses for the Respondent testified that Sanders was discharged
because of her defective work. Their testimony may be summarized
as follows : Forelady Crews, who supervised the work of the inspec-
tors, while examining the shirts that, came out of Sanders' bin,
noticed that they were coming through bad; that some of the button-
holes were not sewed around and others were not in the center or were
not straight; that this was a very serious defect which made -a "second",
shirt. Crews then took an armful of such shirts to Forelady Kindred
and told her they were the shirts done by Sanders. Kindred showed
138 Although we credited Williams' testimony that Forelady Crews urged her to change
over and start wearing the other kind of button, before it was too late, we do not attach
to this remark a decisive importance because Crews was not Williams ' immediate supervisor.
139 See Section III, C, where we made a finding to this effect , crediting the testimony of
Sanders and rejecting Kindred's denial.
929979-51-vol. 92-33
490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the shirts to Taylor and asked Taylor what to do about the bad shirts.
Taylor told her to discharge Sanders. Kindred then took the shirts to
Sanders and told her she would have to discharge her. Foreladies
Kindred and Taylor and. Superintendent Stone testified that they
`earned Sanders about making defective buttonholes on many
occasions, particularly during the last several months of her
employment .140
Sanders testified that immediately prior to her discharge, the usual
procedure of separating her work from that of Williams, another but-
tonhole operator,, was abandoned and all work was dumped together,
hence there was no way of ascertaining whether she or Williams
did the work for which she was blamed. We do not credit Sanders'
testimony. It is in conflict with that of Foreladies Crews and Kin-
dred. It is also inconsistent with Sanders' own testimony that she was
informed that the inspectors on that very morning were instructed
by Stone and Taylor to catch all bad work going through the section.
If that is so, it is not readily understandable why the Respondent
would abandon the normal procedure of separating the work of two
buttonhole operators and thereby making it more difficult to ascertain
which of the operators was responsible for.the bad work. We find,
therefore, that the normal procedure of separating work of the two
buttonhole operators was followed on the date of her discharge. We
find also that the shirts, which Crews brought to Kindred on the day
of Sanders' discharge, were the shirts which were worked by Sanders.
Sanders admitted that she had been cautioned by her supervisors
about her work, but maintained that Kindred corrected her "no more
than she did the other girls." Sanders also admitted that Stone had
cautioned her about her bad work, although "not very many times,"
not over twice during the year of 1946.
Since we have found that the normal procedure of separating the
work of the two buttonhole operators was followed on the date of
the discharge and in view of Sanders' admission that she was warned
by her supervisors about cutting defective buttonholes and not stitch-
ing them around on a number of occasions, we cannot dismiss as un-
reasonable the explanation of Kindred, Taylor, and Stone that the
discharge of Sanders was due to her defective work. Upon the entire
record-we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the evidence fails to
sustain the allegation of the complaint that the discharge of Sanders.
was discriminatory.
Cora Maie Arnold worked at the plant as a cuff stitcher from 1943
until her suspension on October 21, 1946. The answer alleges this was
"'This version of the incident leading to the discharge of Sanders is based upon the
testimony of Supervisors Crews, Kindred, Taylor, and Superintendent Stone.
SAf.ANT & SALANT, IN OORPOR)Afl`ErD 491
a disciplinary suspension of 2 weeks and that at the expiration of this
period she did not return to work.
. Arnold joined the Union in May 1946 and her activities consisted
solely of openly wearing a union button around the plant.
On the Friday morning preceding October 21, 1946, Arnold went to
Kindred, her forelady, and asked if she could be off that afternoon.
According to Arnold, Kindred said that it would be all right but that
Arnold would have to tell Taylor that she was going to be off. Arnold
then went to Taylor and told Taylor that Kindred had said it would
be all right for her to be off. Taylor said, "Well, it looks like we
have got a right smart work on hand ; I don't know." According to
Arnold, Taylor, without further comment, walked off. Arnold
assumed that Taylor did not care whether she remained away that
afternoon. She checked out at noon and did not return to work that
afternoon. Arnold returned to work the following Monday and did
not find her card in the rack. She spoke to Kindred and Taylor about
missing the card and Taylor told her that she was suspended for 2
weeks for staying away without permission. Arnold obtained employ-
ment elsewhere the day following her suspension and did not return to
the plant. In September 1948 the Respondent offered her employment
through the U. S. Employment Service which she accepted.
Kindred's and Taylor's version of the Friday incident is sub-
stantially in accord with that of Arnold except for the following :
Kindred testified that when Arnold asked her for the afternoon off,
she replied that they didn't have anyone to put in her place but that
she could ask Taylor and if Taylor approved it would be all right
with Kindred. Taylor testified that when Arnold asked for per-
mission to get off, she told her they were short of competent girls,
that she didn't have anyone to replace her that afternoon, and there-
fore she couldn't let Arnold go.
Upon the record before us, we are satisfied that Taylor did not give
Arnold permission to take off Friday afternoon. Taylor was positive
that she had told Arnold that she could not grant Arnold's request.
Arnold's own testimony indicates that Taylor did not give her per-
mission to stay away. According to Arnold, `Taylor merely said,
"We have got a right smart work on hand; I don't know." Then she
walked away. The statement might be construed as a denial of Ar-
nold's request. Under the circumstances, Arnold should have defi-
nitely ascertained from Taylor whether she was excused. Arnold
did not do so but took a chance. She proved to be wrong in her
assumption. If, as Taylor maintains, Arnold deliberately disobeyed
her orders, Arnold's suspension was "for cause."
492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In view of the above, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that Arnold
was suspended for 2 weeks because after she had been denied per-
mission to take the afternoon off on October 21, 1946, she neverthe-
less took that afternoon off. We shall dismiss the complaint as to
Arnold.
Vera Hill started to work at the plant in July 1945. At the time
of her layoff, October 21, 1946, she was working as a band stitch op-
erator in the parts department under the supervision of Forelady
Simmons. On August 31, 1946, she was granted a leave of absence be-
cause of poor health, from which she returned on October 21, the day
of her layoff. The answer alleges that Hill was laid off for lack of
work and was not recalled because she was less efficient than other op-
erators, having failed to meet production quotas.
Hill joined the Union in May or June 1946 and was issued a union
button sometime before the July 19 election, which she wore openly
in the plant. Hill also attended union meetings.
When Hill took a leave of absence in August, Simmons told her that
her job would be open when she returned. Simmons did not give
her any kind of leave-of-absence slip. On the same day that she talked
to Simmons she left the plant without talking to any other super-
visor. She did not return to the plant until October 21. A few days
before her return, Hill went to see Simmons at her home and Simmons
told her that the band stitchers were working only a few hours a day
and that inasmuch as Hill had to drive 18 miles from the country to
come to work she would advise her to wait a few days. Simmons also
told Hill that she didn't know if she would have work enough for
her. On October 21, Hill went to the plant.to see Simmons again. On
that day Simmons told her that the work hadn't picked up enough
and that she had no work for her. Subsequent to her layoff, Hill ap-
plied for work several times and was referred to Simmons, who in-
formed her that there was no work for her. On one of these visits
to the plant Hill found that Minnie Brown was working on her ma-
chine. On July 28, 1947, Hill was given a separation notice which
stated that the Respondent "permanently" ceased to employ her. On
September 28, 1948, 'she was offered employment through the U. S.
Employment Service, but was unable to report for work immediately
because she was ill. When she recovered and went,to the plant on
November 8 she found that there was no opening for her at that
time.141 On August 31, when Hill left on leave of absence there were
four band stitchers in her group: Vera Lynn, Currie Denning, Scott,
and Hill. Hill had more seniority than either Lynn or Scott, but less
141 The findings in this paragraph are based upon mutually corroborative testimony of
fill and Simmons which we credit.
SALANT & t5ALANT, INOOR'PiORIA'TE!D 493
seniority than Denning.142 Of the four band stitchers only Denning
and Lynn made production. Hill admitted she never made production.
On October 21, Lynn was still working at the plant. Scott was laid
off on October 29, 1946.143
In support of the Respondent's position, Taylor testified that when
Hill reported for work after her leave of absence no work was avail-
able and that Hill was not recalled when a vacancy occurred because
of Hill's inability to make production 144 Simmons testified that Hill
was a good operator but was slow and could not make production, that
she frequently showed the adjustment sheet to Hill pointing out how
much she was below the production quota and telling her she wished
Hill could make production. Hill's production was lower than that
of the other three band stitchers employed in her section.
Hill admitted that she never made production and that Simmons
on several occasions, while commending her on her work, stated that
she wished Hill could "put out production." Hill testified that only
Denning and Lynn could make production; that she had trouble with
her machine for the last 6 months, that she had trouble in August
1946 getting Forrester to fix her machine; and that 2 or 3 months
after her layoff the Respondent had a new head put on her machine.145.
The evidence indicates that in the fall of 1946 when curtailment
of production became necessary the Respondent selected Hill for lay-
off because her production was lower than that of the other three
band stitchers in her section, and that on October 29, another band
stitcher, Scott, was laid off for lack of work. In view of Hill's admis-
sion that she could not make production, we cannot reject the ex-
planation of Taylor and Simmons that Hill was not recalled when
work for her became available 146 because of her poor production.
Upon the entire record we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that
General Counsel failed to sustain the burden of proving that Hill
was discriminatorily refused reinstatement.
Truma'Dillon was hired as a sew bar machine operator in August
1.944. In January 1946 she was transferred to the parts department
as a top button sew operator on Gaucho shirts and was the only top
button sew operator on Gaucho shirts in the plant. Occasionally,
when the pocket button sew operators got behind in their work, she
141 This finding is based upon undenied testimony of Hill which we credit.
143 This finding is based upon the testimony of Hill and the General Counsel's Exhibit 18
which is list of employees discharged or laid off subsequent to May 20, 1946.
144 The record shows that one Minnie Brown was hired as band stitcher on December 9,
1946.
. 145 Simmons contradicted Hill and stated that Hill did not complain about her machine
more than the other operators.
146 A vacancy in her classification occurred apparently on December 9, 1946, when Minnie
Brown, a former,employee , was hired as band stitcher.
494 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
would be assigned to help them. Dillon joined the Union in March
1946, was issued a button and wore it in the plant from time to time
Luitil she was laid'off on October 29, 1946. The answer alleges that
Dillon was laid off for lack of work and not recalled because she
had accepted employment elsewhere.
On that day Latimer told her that there was no work for her and
that she would be recalled when work became available. Latimer give
her a temporary layoff slip which stated that she was laid off for lack
of work and "is subject to call." She was never recalled. On Novem-
ber 29, 1946, she obtained employment at the Brown Shoe Company
in Union City and has worked there continuously ever since.
In support of the allegation of the discrimination, Dillon testified
that on the day she was laid off she saw two truckloads of Gaucho
fronts on the second floor and that there was as much work to be done
as they had had at any other time. Dillon also testified that Janice
Hatley, an AFL member and a former employee who quit about a
year before, was given her job at the plant after her layoff.
Supervisors Latimer and Taylor testified that Dillon was laid off
on October 29 for lack of work due to a. shortage of material. Latimer
also testified that about 2 months after Dillon's layoff when work
became available she inquired as to the whereabouts of Dillon and
was informed that Dillon was working at the Brown Shoe Company
and that for that reason she did not recall Dillon. Taylor substan-
tially corroborated this testimony. Latimer also explained that the
Union City plant cuts material for the Respondent's plant at Obion,
Tennessee , which made Gaucho shirts exclusively. The record further
indicates that Janice Hatley was hired on August 28, 1946, or about
2 months before Dillon was laid off.
On the record before us we find that the General Counsel failed to
prove his case as to Dillon. The. testimony of Taylor and Latimer
that Dillon was laid off for lack of work stands unimpeached, except
for the testimony of Dillon that she saw two truckloads of Gauchos
on the day of her layoff, and that there was as much work as usual.
Assuming, however, that Dillon was correct in making this observa-
tion, the presence of two trucks of Gauchos does not necessarily indi-
cate that the Respondent had enough work for the next and subse-
quent days. Nor is the fact that Hatley, an AFL member, was
retained and took over her job conclusive evidence that she was laid
off for discriminatory reasons. Hatley was an old employee who was
rehired almost 2 months before Dillon's layoff. Nor is the Respond-
ent's explanation as to why it did not recall Dillon unreasonable. The
Respondent adduced testimony, which remains uncontradicted, that
it was Respondent's policy and practice not to recall laid-off employees
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED. 495
who secured employment at the Brown Shoe Company. The record
shows that Dillon secured such employment on November 29, 1946.
The record further shows that between Dillon's layoff and the date of
her employment at the Brown Shoe Company no new employees were
hired in her classification.
We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the evidence does not
sustain the allegation of the complaint that Dillon was laid off and
thereafter refused reinstatement because of her union membership
and activity.
Mary Merritt worked at the plant from February 10, 1946, until.
her layoff on October 28, 1946, as a shoulder former in the finishing
department under the supervision of Adele King. She was rehired
on March 18, 1947, and stayed with the Respondent until sometime
in June 1947. The answer alleges that Merritt was laid off on October
28, 1946, was recalled on March 18, 1947, and was laid off again
because of her inability to do the job to which she was assigned.
Merritt joined the Union in June 1946, received a union button a
week or two later and wore the button every day until her services
were finally terminated. The first day after the election Adele King
came up to her, flipped her button and asked what that button meant,
to which Merritt replied, "It means I am CIO." 147 After she returned
to work in March 1947, she joined the AFL.
On October. 28, 1946, Merritt was laid off• by Assistant Superin-
tendent Rogers purportedly for lack of work. At the time Merritt
was told that "they" didn't know whether she would be recalled.
Forelady King was sick at the time and was not at the plant on the
day of the layoff. After her layoff, Merritt applied for unemployment
insurance compensation and drew it until sometime in February 1947
when she applied for reemployment. She was rehired by the Re-
spondent in March 1947 and was assigned to cleaning oil spots on
shirts because she was unable to continue to perform the shoulder
forming operation. In June 1947 her services were finally terminated
because she could not do her job properly. In September 1948, she
was offered through the U. S. Employment Service her former job,
shoulder forming, which she refused. She did not look for employ-
ment after June 1947.148
Respondent denied that Merritt was discriminated against because
of her union membership and activities. In support of this denial
Adele King, Merritt's forelady, testified that Merritt was recalled after
her layoff in October and was finally terminated in June 1947 because
147 King denied that she ever flipped Merritt's union button and made the statement at-
tributed to her.
148 These findings are based upon the testimony of Merritt which was in part corroborated
by Foreladies Adele King and Hammond.
496 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOIt RELATIONS BOARD
she could not do her job properly ; that Merritt was assigned to clean-
ing oils, which is a simple operation , because Merritt had stated that
shoulder forming was too difficult for her; that on the day of her sec-
ond layoff Merritt had cleaned only seven shirts in 5 hours whereas
other employees cleaned six to eight dozen shirts in 5 hours; and that
Merritt admitted to her that she could not clean oils more efficiently
because of her poor eyesight .149 Personnel Director Hammond testi-
fied that in September 1948 Merritt refused to take her former job and
asked for something else and that in October 1948 she failed to appear
at the plant for a test for another job.
Upon the entire record, and particularly. in view of the fact that
Merritt was rehired in March 1947 although she refused her shoulder
forming job, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent
did not discriminate against Merritt as alleged in the complaint.
James W. Mullins was first employed in 1934 or 1935 as a cloth
spreader. He remained on that job for about a year and then was
assigned to separating and tying up bundles . He held that job until
he entered the Armed Forces in May 1942. Upon his discharge from
the Armed Services he returned to the plant in December 1945 and was
given his job back. He remained on that job for a month or so and
then was assigned to carrying work upstairs to the sewing room. On
April 19, 1946, he was transferred to the position of pattern marker.
He held that job until October 7, 1946, when he was suspended for 30
days. The answer alleges that Mullins was given a disciplinary sus-
pension of 1 month and , when at the expiration of the said period he
did not report for work, he was suspended from the payroll.
It was through Mullins' efforts that the Union began to organize the
plant. The first few union meetings were held at his home. Mullins
distributed union cards , solicited membership in the Union , and ob-
tained a great many members . He also attended union meetings and
wore a union button at the plant . Mullins . also acted as an observer
for the Union at the July 19 election. After the July election, he was
elected a member of the union negotiating committee . We find, as did
the Trial Examiner , that his union membership and activities were
well known to the Respondent.
Mullins engaged in a number of conversations with Assistant Super-
intendent Rogers. Rogers stated to him that his activities, in behalf
of the Union might lead to his discharge , that he should leave the
CIO alone , that . Salant "won 't" sign a contract with the CIO, and that
the employees therefore were just wasting their time "fooling" with the
149 Merritt testified that the day after her discharge in June 1947, five women were put to
help on that oiling job.
SALANT & sAI:ANT;. INCORPORATED
Union, and that if the employees did not leave the Union alone they
would be put out of work 150.
On October 7, at the end of the shift, Superintendent Stone went to
Mullins' place of work and told him that he had received reports that
Mullins had made certain disparaging remarks about him and for that
reason he,was suspending Mullins for 30 days. Mullins retorted that
Stone would have to prove it. Stone replied that he thought he could,
and that he had already made up his mind to suspend him and that the
suspension stood. Mullins then said that Stone was just listening to
one side and that Mullins, himself, could tell plenty about Stone; that
it appeared that Stone "will be going down the line and fire all the
CIO's." Stone denied such intention. Stone then gave Mullins a
suspension slip. Mullins looked at it and refused to take it. Stone
then said, "Mullins this is your copy. You can do as you please with
it but I don't care to argue the point any further," and started to walk
away. At this point Mullins said to Stone that if that was the way
Stone wanted it he. would "whip" Stone when he got outside.151 Mul-
lins did not return to the plant at the end of his suspension period, nor
did he ever again apply for work in the plant. On October 14, 1945,
he accepted employment with the Union as one of its representatives
at a salary which exceeded his compensation with the Respondent 152
As to his reason for suspending Mullins, 1.13 Stone testified as follows :
That he had been hearing reports from persons whom he considered
reliable that Mullins had been making "disparaging remarks" about
him and had "threatened to whip him"; that Mullins had returned
to the plant after his army service to cause as much disturbance and.
trouble as he could, even though he could earn more money elsewhere;
that Mullins had been "instrumental in recruiting help for the Martin
Manufacturing Company of our present employees and that some
that were off on layoff"; and that "after due reflection" he came to
the.decision to give Mullins a 30-day suspension. Questioned about
the source of his information Stone testified that it was Foreman
Kemp 154 from whom he received reports about' Mullins' making dis-
165 These findings are based upon the testimony of Mullins , which we credit . See Section
III, C, supra, where we made this finding despite Roger ' s denial that he had made the
statements.
161 The Trial Examiner erroneously reported that Mullins testified that he told Stone
he would whip Stone before Stone handed him the suspension slip. Mullins in fact testified
that he didn 't make the remark until after he got the suspension slip.
152 The findings in this paragraph are based on the testimony of Stone, Kemp, and Mullins
which in part wa,, corroborative of each other and which we credit.
163 Kemp testified that Stone did not discuss with him the matter of Mullins' suspension
and that Stone informed him of his intention to suspend Mullins only a few minutes before
the actual suspension.
154 Foreman Kemp testified that prior to Mullins ' suspension he heard rumors to the
effect that Mullins was going to whip Stone ; that he does not recall the names of persons
498 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
paraging remarks and threatening to whip him, and added that it
"was just general talk in the factory rumored along, what I. mean
in a place like that information gets around and gets to you." Stone
did not identify the source of his information about Mullins' alleged
reason for returning to the plant after being discharged from the
service, except to indicate that it too was derived from rumors circu-
lated in the plant.155 Stone testified that it was Hazelwood, shipping
clerk, who informed him about Mullins' recruiting employees for the
Martin Manufacturing Company 156 Stone completed his explanation
by stating that there was no other reason for suspending Mullins,
except those 'referred to above.
Upon the record before us, we find that Stone's explanation for the
suspension of Mullins was the real reason for the suspension. Stone
testified that one of the reasons for the suspension was the reports
he received from Kemp that Mullins was making disparaging re-
marks about him. Kemp corroborated his testimony in this respect.
Mullins admitted that he had said "hard things" about Stone. Mullins
specifically, mentioned that he had stated to his fellow employees at
a meeting held at his house that Stone did not keep his promises and
could not be relied on. Stone's' testimony about receiving reports that
Mullins was going to whip him finds indirect support in Mullins'
own admission that after he had been given a suspension slip he
threatened to whip Stone. Foreman Kemp was positive that he
received such reports prior to Mullins' suspension. While the matter
is not free from doubt, particularly in view of Mullins' leading position
in the Union of which the Respondent had knowledge, we cannot re-
ject Stone's explanation for Mullins' suspension.
Upon the entire record we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the
evidence fails to sustain the allegation of the complaint that the sus-
pension of Mullins for 30 days was for discriminatory reasons.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above,
occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent • de-
from whom he heard these rumors ; that it was "just a rumor floating around" ; and that
he reported them to Stone.
166 Mullins denied making any such statements.
166 Mullins denied that he recruited employees for the Martin Manufacturing Company,
or that he offered them more money to go to work for that Company . Mullins, however,
testified that he told some employees that he would try to get them as much money as
employees were making at Martin Manufacturing Company , and that he showed some
of them vouchers showing earnings of his wife at the Martin Manufacturing Company.
The Trial Examiner found that "Mullins' purpose in exhibiting these stubs was to induce
the employees to leave the Respondent 's employ and obtain jobs at the Martin plant."
Inasmuch as in making this finding the Trial Examiner relied upon uncorroborated hearsay
testimony of Stone and disregarded Mullins' denial that he had any such motive in show-
ing his wife 's vouchers , the Trial Examiner's finding to this effect is reversed.
SAIANT & SA.IANT, INCORPORATED 499
scribed in Section I, above, have a close, intimate and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and
teed to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
We have found that the Respondent discriminated against John
Napier, Jr., Blanche Smith, Virginia Green, Sarah Anna Conley,
Walter Gardner, Jewell Read, Annie Glosson, and Clara Thornton,
either by discharging them or by failing and refusing to reinstate
those of them who were temporarily laid off immediately when work
for them became available, because of their union membership and
activities. We shall, therefore, order the Respondent to offer each of
these employees except Annie Glosson,157 immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his or her former or substantially equivalent position,158 with-
out prejudice to his or her seniority or other rights and privileges,
dismissing if necessary any employees hired in his or her place. We
shall also order the Respondent to make whole each of them for any
loss of pay he or she may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's
discrimination against him or her.
We have also found that the Respondent discriminated against
Hilda White, Earlie Butler, Myrtle Gore, Marcia Cunningham, Montez
Adams, also known as Montez Capparelli, Glen Dora Stanfield, also re-
ferred to in the record as Glen Dora Finch, and Hallie Houser, also
referred to in the record as Hallie Barker, either by discharging them
or laying them off, or by failing and refusing to recall those of them
who were temporarily laid off immediately when employment for them
.became available, because of their union membership and activities.
However, on September 28, 1948, the Respondent offered these em-
ployees through the U. S. Employment Service reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, which was accepted by
some and refused by others. We will not, therefore, order the Re-
154 Sometime prior to the hearing Annie Glosson died. We shall order that the Respondent
make whole her personal representative for any loss of wages by her during the period
from the date of her discharge to the date when she became physically unable to work.
Interstat8' Engineering Corporation, 83 NLRB 126.
158 In accordance with the Board 's consistent interpretation of the term , the expression
"former or substantially equivalent position" is intended to mean "former position wher-
ever possible, but if such position is no longer in existence then to a substantially
equivalent position." See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan,
Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 NLRB 827, 829.
"500 DECISIONS. OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
spondent to offer reinstatement to these employees, but shall order
the Respondent to make whole each of them for any. loss of pay he or
she may have suffered by reason of. the Respondent's discrimination
against him or her.
In accordance with our practice, the period from the date of the
Intermediate Report to the date of the Order herein will be excluded
in computing the amounts of back pay, to which these individuals may
be entitled, because of the Trial Examiner's recommendation that the
complaint be dismissed.
Consistent with the new policy of computing back pay,159 the loss
of pay shall be computed on the basis of each separate calendar quarter
or portion thereof during the period from the Respondent's discrimi-
natory action to the date of a proper offer of reinstatement: The
quarterly periods, hereinafter called "quarters," shall begin with the
first day of January, April, July, and October. Loss of pay shall be
determined by deducting from a sum equal to that which these em-
ployees would normally have earned for each quarter or portion
thereof, their net earnings;'°° if any, in other employment during that
period. Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect upon
the back-pay liability for any other quarter.
We shall also order the Respondent to make available to the Board
upon request, payroll and other records to facilitate the checking of
the amount of back pay due.167
We expressly reserve the right to modify the back-pay and reinstate-
ment provisions, if made necessary by a change of conditions since the
hearing or in the future, and to make such supplements thereto as may
hereafter become necessary in order to define or clarify their applica-
tion to a specific set of circumstances not now apparent 102
We have also found that the Respondent has rendered unlawful
assistance to the AFL. In order to restore the status quo and to free
the employees from the restraint upon their freedom of self-organiza-
tion, we shall order that the Respondent refrain from recognizing or
dealing with said labor organization, unless and until it is certified
by the Board as the collective bargaining representative of the Re-
spondent's employees.
158 F W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289.
161 By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses such as for transportation, room,
and board incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working
elsewhere which would not have been incurred but for the unlawful discrimination and
consequent necessity of seeking employment elsewhere . Crossett Lumber Company, 8
NLRB 440. Monies received for work performed upon Federal, State, county,' mun icipal,
or other work-relief projects shall be considered as earnings . Republic Steel Corpora-
tion v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 7.
181 F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289.
163 West Boylston Mfg. Co. of Alabama, 87 NLRB 808.
SALANT & iSALANT, INCORPORATED 501
The Respondent's unlawful conduct in this case, particularly fol-
lowing its prior unfair labor practices, in our opinion, discloses a
fixed purpose to defeat self-organization and its objectives. Because
of the Respondent's unlawful conduct and its underlying purpose we
are convinced that the unfair labor practices found are persuasively
related to other unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act and that
a danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated from
the course of the Respondent's conduct in the past. The preventive
purpose of the Act will be thwarted unless our order is coextensive
with the threat. In-order, therefore, to make effective the interde-
pendent guarantees of Section 7, to prevent a recurrence of unfair
labor practices, and to minimize strife which burdens and obstructs
commerce and thus to effectuate the policies of the Act, we will order
that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner
upon the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire
record in the case, the Board makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, affiliated with the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, and United Garment Workers
of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employ-
ment of John Napier, Jr., Blanche Smith, Virginia Green, Sarah
Anna Conley, Walter Gardner, Jewell Read, Clara Thornton, Hilda
White, Earlie Butler, Myrtle Gore, Marcia Cunningham, Montez
Adams, also referred to as Montez Capparelli, Glen Dora Stanfield,
also referred to as Glen Dora Finch, Hallie Houser, also referred to as
Hallie Barker, and Annie Glosson, the Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
3 By supporting United Garment Workers of America, affiliated
with the American Federation of Labor, the Respondent has engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (2)
of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in
the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
.5. The foregoing unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
the Act.
502 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
6. The Respondent has not engaged in surveillance of the union
meetings within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
7. The Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act in regard to the hire and
tenure of employment of :
James W. Mullins Cora May Arnold
Truma Dillon Lona Wolverton
Vera Hill Berthie Mae Williams
Rubye James Catherine Sanders
Dorothy Gardiner Haynes Robert Lee Brockwell
Verlie D. Wright Vassie Fox
Bessie Wallace Edith Riley
Ruth Johnson Ludie Schmidt
Mary Merritt
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Salant & Salant, Incor-
porated, Union City, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers of America, CIO, or in any other labor organization, by dis-
charging, laying off, refusing to reemploy, or failing to recall tem-
porarily laid-off employees when work for them becomes available, or
in any other manner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment;
(b) Supporting United Garment Workers of America, affiliated
with the American Federation of Labor, or any other labor organiza-
tion, in organizational activities among the Respondent's employees;
(c) Interrogating employees with respect to their membership in,
and activity in behalf of, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
CIO, or any other labor organization, offering any benefits or threaten-
ing any reprisals in order to persuade employees to favor or disfavor
any labor organization, or in any other manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-
organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers of America, CIO, or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
SAILANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED 503
from any or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section
8 (a) (3) of the Act, all as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to each of the individuals named below immediate and full
employment to his or her former or substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his or her seniority or other rights and privileges,
in the manner set forth above in Section V entitled "The remedy" ;
and make whole these employees in the manner set forth in Section V
for any loss of pay he or, she may have suffered by reason of the Re-
spondent's discrimination against him or her :
John Napier, Jr. Walter Gardner
Blanche Smith Jewell Read
Virginia Green. Clara Thornton
Sarah Anna Conley
(b) Make whole Hilda White, Earlie Butler, Myrtle Gore, Marcia
Cunningham, Montez Adams, also known as Montez Capparelli, Glen
Dora Stanfield,, also referred to in the record as Glen Dora Finch,
Hallie Houser, also referred in the record as Hallie Barker,• in the
manner set forth above in Section V entitled "The remedy," for any
loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's dis-
crimination against them;
(c) Make whole Annie Glosson's personal representative for any
loss of pay Glosson may have suffered by reason of the Respondent's
discrimination against her by payment to him of a sum of money
equal to an amount determined in the manner set forth above in Sec-
tion V entitled "The remedy;"
(d) Upon request make available to the Board, or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, time cards, personnel record and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amounts of.back pay due and the rights
of reinstatement under the terms of this Order;
(e) Refrain from recognizing. or dealing with United Garment
Workers of America, AFL, as the representative of any of its em-
ployees for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employ-
.ir ent, unless and until said organization shall have been certified by
the Board as.the exclusive representative of such employees;
504 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL'. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
{f) Post at its Union City, Tennessee, plant copies of the notice
attached hereto marked Appendix A.16' Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the' Fifteenth Region, shall,
after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted
by the Respondent immediately on receipt thereof, and maintained
by them for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter incon-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employees cus-
tomarily are posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond
ent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material;
I (g) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region (New
Orleans, Louisiana) in writing within ten (10) days from the date
of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint'be,-and it hereby is,
dismissed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent, engaged in unlaw-
ful surveillance or discriminated in regard to the.-hire and tenure
of employment of the following employees :
James W. Mullins Cora May Arnold
Truma Dillon Lona Wolverton
Vera Hill Berthie Mae Williams
Rubye James Catherine Sanders
Dorothy Gardiner Haynes Robert Lee Brockwell
Verlie D. Wright Vassie Fox
Bessie Wallace Edith Riley
Ruth Johnson Ludie Schmidt
Mary Merritt
'CHAIRMAN HERZOG and MEMBER REYNOLDS took no part in the
consideration of the above Decision and Order:
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board;' anti in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Aet,'we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in AMALGAMATED CLOTH'
:ING WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, or in any other labor organiza-
163 In the event that this ' Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be inserted in the notice before the words : "Decision and Order"
the words : "Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing."
'SALANZ` & SALANT, INCORPORATEID 505
tion, by discharging or laying off our employees or by refusing
to reinstate or to recall any of our employees temporarily laid off,
or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to the hire and
tenure of their employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment.
WE WILL offer to the employees named below immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of pay
which each of them may have suffered as the result of the dis-
crimination against him or her.
John Napier, Jr. Walter Gardner
Blanche Smith. Jewell Read
Virginia Green Clara Thornton
Sarah Anna Conley
WE WILL make the employees named below whole for any loss
of pay which each of them may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him or her.
Hilda White Monte"z Adams
Earlie Butler Glen Dora Stanfield
Myrtle Gore Hallie Houser
Marcia Cunningham
WE WILL also make whole the personal representative of Annie
Glosson for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the, discrimina-
tion against Annie Glosson.
WE WILL NOT offer any benefits or threaten any reprisals in
order to persuade employees to favor or disfavor any labor or-
ganization.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees with respect to their mem-
bership in and activity in behalf of AMALGAMATED CLOTHING
WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, or any other labor organization, or
in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or support AMALGAMATED CLOTHING
WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that
such right.may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
929979-51-vol. 92 34
506 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT assist UNITED GARMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA,
affiliated with the AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, by coercing
our employees or by offering them economic benefits to become or
remain members of that labor organization and to refrain from
becoming or remaining members of AMALGAMATED CLOTHING
WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO.
WE WILL NOT recognize the above-mentioned UNITED GARMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL, as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of our employees for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining, unless and until it shall have been certified by the Board
as the representative of our employees.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of the
afore-mentioned union, AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMER-
ICA, CIO, or any other labor organization. We will not discriminate
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment against any employee because of membership in, or
activity on behalf of, any such labor organization.
SALANT & SALANT, INCORPORATED,
Employer.
Dated ------------ By --------------------------------------
-(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted, for 60 consecutive days from the
date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.