Safeway, Inc.v.Kroy IP Holdings, LLC

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 11, 2014

09412147 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 11, 2014)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 11
Tel: 571-272-7822 Entered: September 11, 2014

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_______________
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_______________
SAFEWAY, INC. and THE KROGER CO.,
Petitioner,
v.
KROY IP HOLDINGS, LLC,
Patent Owner.
_______________

Case IPR2014-00685
Patent 7,054,830 B1
_______________

Before MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK, BARRY L. GROSSMAN, and
JEREMY M. PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judges.

PLENZLER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION
Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
37 C.F.R. § 42.108

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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Safeway, Inc. and The Kroger Co. (collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a
Petition to institute an inter partes review of claims 1 and 19–25 of
U.S. Patent No. 7,054,830 B1 (Ex. 1001, “the ’830 patent”). Paper 1
(“Pet.”). Kroy IP Holdings, LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary
Response. Paper 8 (“Prelim. Resp.”). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 314(a), which provides that an inter partes review may not be instituted
“unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail
with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the
reasons given below, we deny the petition.
B. Related Proceedings
Petitioner indicates that the following co-pending federal district court
cases would be affected by the outcome of this proceeding: Kroy IP
Holdings, LLC v. Safeway, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-800 (E.D. Tex.); Kroy IP
Holdings, LLC v. The Kroger Co., No. 2:13-cv-141 (E.D. Tex.); Kroy IP
Holdings, LLC v. AutoZone, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-888 (E.D. Tex.); Kroy IP
Holdings, LLC v. BJ’s Rests., Inc., No. 2:13-cv-889 (E.D. Tex.); Kroy IP
Holdings, LLC v. Genghis Grill Franchise Concepts, LP, No. 2:13-cv-890
(E.D. Tex.); Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Panera Bread Co., No. 2:13-cv-891
(E.D. Tex.); Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. TGI Friday’s, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-892
(E.D. Tex.); Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-
933 (E.D. Tex.); Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. The Men’s Wearhouse, Inc., No.
2:13-cv-934 (E.D. Tex.); Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v. Ms. Fields Famous
Brands, LLC, No. 2:13-cv-935 (E.D. Tex.); and Kroy IP Holdings, LLC v.
Starbucks Corp., No. 2:13-cv-936 (E.D. Tex.). Pet. 59.
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C. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability and Evidence of Record
Petitioner contends that the challenged claims are unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 based on the following grounds (Pet. 17–58).
References Basis Claims Challenged
Barnett
1
§ 102 1 and 19–22
Barnett § 103 1 and 19–22
Barnett and Powell
2
§ 102 23–25
Narasimhan
3
§ 102 1 and 19–25
Narasimhan § 103 1 and 19–25
Scroggie
4
§ 102 1 and 19–25
Scroggie § 103 1 and 19–25
Petitioner also provides testimony from Warren Lieberman, Ph.D.
(“the Lieberman Declaration”). Ex. 1010.
D. The ’830 Patent
The ’830 patent is directed to incentive programs and fulfillment of
prizes (awards) won in incentive programs. Ex. 1001, 1:23–25. Incentive
programs are described as scratch-and-win games, sweepstakes games,
treasure hunt games, or computer games. Id. at 13:43–44; 14:28–29. A
“prize” is described as being synonymous with an “award,” and

1
U.S. Patent No. 6,321,208 B1, issued Nov. 20, 2001 (Ex. 1004, “Barnett”).
2
U.S. Patent No. 6,237,145 B1, issued May 22, 2001 (Ex. 1005,
“Narasimhan”).
3
U.S. Patent No. 5,806,044, issued Sep. 8, 1998 (Ex. 1006, “Powell”).
4
U.S. Patent No. 5,970,469, issued Oct. 19, 1999 (Ex. 1007, “Scroggie”).
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“encompass[ing] all types of incentives, including merchandise, coupons,
points, cash, services and other forms of incentives.” Id. at 7:44–47.
The ’830 patent explains that a consumer can register on a consumer
site (i.e., website) on a host computer, and subsequently participate in a
sponsor’s incentive program by accessing the consumer site. Id. at 12:22–
24, 15:57–59. When a consumer wins a prize from participation in the
incentive program on the site, an award database is queried to determine the
available geographic locations of the prize won by the consumer. Id. at
21:61–63, 46:30–34. The award database communicates with the retailer’s
inventory system, so that each prize recorded in the award database can be
tied to the inventory of the retailer. Id. at 46:25–30. The host computer
selects the appropriate fulfillment option for the prize, and identifies the
nearest retail location for fulfillment of the prize or, if no location is suitable,
the prize may be mailed to the consumer. Id. at 21:64–22:4. The ’830
patent explains that a card linked to the consumer’s identity is provided to
the consumer after registration, and the card is used to claim the prize at the
retailer. Id. at 22:17–22, 22:36–47.
E. Illustrative Claims
As noted above, Petitioner challenges claims 1 and 19–25. Claims 1
and 19 are independent, with claims 20–25 depending from claim 19. Claim
1 illustrates the claimed subject matter and is reproduced below:
1. A system for incentive program participation and
automated award fulfillment, comprising:
a host computer coupled to a network;
a first database accessible from said host computer;
and
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an automated award fulfillment application program
executed on said host computer for participation in
incentive programs of a plurality of providers in
communication with an inventory management
system associated with each of said plurality of
providers wherein said automated award
fulfillment application program provides sponsor-
selected fulfillment, said automated award
fulfillment application program comprising:
code adapted to provide a sponsor-selected specific
award unit item, said sponsor-selected specific
award unit item being tailored to demographic
and psychographic preferences of a sponsor-
selected consumer user, and
code adapted to provide a sponsor-selected
geographic location for fulfillment.
Id. at 47:11–30.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Claim Construction
In an inter partes review proceeding, claim terms in an unexpired
patent are given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
specification in which they appear and the understanding of others skilled in
the relevant art. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Applying that standard, we interpret
the claim terms of the ’830 patent according to their ordinary and customary
meaning in the context of the patent’s written description. See In re
Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Petitioner and Patent Owner propose constructions for several terms
of the challenged claims. Pet. 8–16; Prelim. Resp. 8–18. We determine that
the only claim term requiring express construction for purposes of this
decision is “inventory management system.”
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Claim 1 recites “an automated award fulfillment application program
. . . in communication with an inventory management system associated with
each of said plurality of providers.” Claim 19 similarly recites “providing
communication with an inventory management system associated with each
of a plurality of providers.” Petitioner proposes that “inventory management
system” be construed to mean a “system to manage award units.” Pet. 13–
15. Patent Owner responds that “Petitioners’ construction is inconsistent
with the claims and the specification because it reads out the word
‘inventory.’” Prelim. Resp. 15. We agree with Patent Owner.
As noted above, the claims recite an “inventory management system.”
Although the specification does not specifically mention the phrase
“inventory management system,” it discusses a retailer’s inventory system.
For example, the specification explains that “award database 204 that is
created by participation by the retailer is also connected via an electronic
data interchange 126 to the retailer’s proprietary inventory system 212” so
that “award database 204 can be automatically updated to reflect the
retailer’s current inventory according to inventory numbers, such as SKUs,
type of inventory, or the like.” Id. at 15:41–47. Thus, the inventory system
reflects the current inventory of an item (e.g., merchandise, coupons, points,
cash, services or other forms of incentives). The plain meaning of
“inventory” is “[t]he quantity of goods and materials on hand.” THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE® DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2011)
(http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/hmdictenglang/inventory/0)
(last accessed Aug. 18, 2014). This is consistent with the disclosure of the
’830 patent discussed above.
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Accordingly, we construe “inventory management system” as
requiring a system that manages the available quantity (i.e., inventory) of an
item.
B. Anticipation by Barnett
Petitioner contends that claims 1 and 19–22 are anticipated by
Barnett. Pet. 18–30. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions for
the reasons discussed below.
1. “inventory management system”
Independent claim 1 recites “an automated award fulfillment
application program . . . in communication with an inventory management
system,” and independent claim 19 recites “providing automated award
fulfillment . . . including providing communication with an inventory
management system.”
Petitioner cites Barnett’s “database 11” as corresponding to an
inventory management system, and contends that “[t]he database manages
coupons and ‘information regarding all coupons’ (e.g., coupons selected or
redeemed).” Id. at 20, 24–25, 27 (citing Ex. 1004, 12:26–32; Ex. 1010 ¶
39). Dr. Lieberman’s testimony alleges that “Barnett’s database is an
inventory management system because it is a system that manages an
inventory of coupons and related information.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 39 (citing Ex.
1004, 12:33–34). Patent Owner responds that the Barnett “database 11 is
not described as containing or providing inventory information associated
with the providers’ products, services or other items associated with coupons
defined in the database.” Prelim. Resp. 28. We agree with Patent Owner.
Barnett describes a system for electronic distribution of coupons and
marketing incentives to a consumer (user). Ex. 1004, 1:6–13. Barnett
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describes database 11 as storing “information . . . regarding the coupon data
selected by the user, the coupon data printed by the user, and the requested
demographic information,” “information from the coupon redemption center
13 regarding the coupons actually redeemed by the user,” and “information
regarding all coupons which are made available by the various coupon
issuers 14 from which it will generate coupon data packages for subsequent
downloading to users.” Id. at 12:27–36. We are not persuaded that Barnett
discloses a system that manages the available quantity of an item, as
required by our construction of “inventory management system.” Although
Barnett describes database 11 as including coupons made available to a user,
there is no disclosure of database 11 having any information regarding the
available quantity (i.e., inventory) of coupons.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Barnett discloses an
“automated award fulfillment application program” in communication with
an “inventory management system,” as required by claims 1 and 19.
2. “sponsor-selected geographic location for fulfillment”
Independent claims 1 and 19 each additionally recite “a sponsor-
selected geographic location for fulfillment.”
Petitioner contends that Barnett discloses this limitation in view of:
(1) Barnett’s discussion of ZIP code-targeted coupon distribution; (2) the
redemption address on the coupon in Barnett’s Figure 3; (3) Barnett’s
discussion of electronically sending coupons to a specific retailer; and
(4) Barnett’s discussion of “store-specific data.” Pet. 23, 26, 28–29 (citing
Ex. 1004, 4:34–37, 9:12–15, 11:39–43; Ex. 1010 ¶ 44). The testimony of
Dr. Lieberman cited by Petitioner simply reiterates Petitioner’s contentions.
See Ex. 1010 ¶ 44; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) (“Expert testimony that
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does not disclose the underlying facts or data on which the opinion is based
is entitled to little or no weight.”). Patent Owner responds that Barnett does
not permit a sponsor to dictate any location for coupon fulfillment. Prelim.
Resp. 27, 29–30. With respect to the redemption address in Barnett’s Figure
3, Patent Owner explains that this address “is a mailing address associated
with the coupon issuer printed on the face of the coupon” and “is
presumably used by the redemption center in its role of coordinating
settlement between the issuer and redeeming retailer.” Id. at 27. We agree
with Patent Owner.
Although Barnett discusses targeting consumers by ZIP code for
coupon distribution, it does not disclose imposing a geographic location
limitation (whether sponsor-selected or otherwise) on where the coupons can
be fulfilled. See Ex. 1004, 4:34–37. Petitioner does not identify any
disclosure in Barnett that a coupon must be redeemed in the consumer’s ZIP
code. A consumer appears to be free to fulfill the coupon at the location of
his or her choice.
Barnett’s discussion of electronically sending coupons to a specific
store is also based on a user selection, rather than a sponsor selection as
alleged by Petitioner. Barnett explains that “the user simply selects the store
he intends on using at that particular time” (id. at 10:42–43) and “[t]he
electronic coupon data could also be routed . . . to a retail store where the
user will be shopping” (id. at 11:39–43). As for Barnett’s discussion of
“store-specific data,” this is directed to data presented to a user regarding a
user-selected store, such as the layout of a specific user-selected store. Id. at
9:12–15, 10:42–43.
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With respect to the redemption address on the coupon in Barnett’s
Figure 3, this appears to be nothing more than the address used by the
redemption center, as Patent Owner contends. See Ex. 1004, 12:19–25,
Fig. 3; Prelim. Resp. 27.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Barnett discloses a
“sponsor-selected geographic location for fulfillment,” as required by claims
1 and 19.
Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that it would
prevail in challenging claims 1 and 19 as anticipated by Barnett because, as
discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that Barnett meets at least two
limitations of those claims. For the same reasons, Petitioner has failed to
establish a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in challenging
dependent claims 20–22 as anticipated by Barnett.
C. Anticipation by Narasimhan
Petitioner contends that claims 1 and 19–25 are anticipated by
Narasimhan. Pet. 35–47. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions
for the reasons discussed below.
1. “inventory management system”
Petitioner contends that Narasimhan’s vendor promotions database
134 corresponds to the required “inventory management system.” Id. at 37,
41, 43–44 (citing Ex. 1005, 2:20–24, 4:34–36, 5:28–30; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 62–63).
The testimony of Dr. Lieberman cited by Petitioner simply reiterates
Petitioner’s contentions. See Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 62–63. Patent Owner responds
that, in Narasimhan, “[t]he vendor database is not described as containing or
providing inventory information associated with providers or their products,
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services or other items associated with promotions defined in the vendor
database.” Prelim. Resp. 38. We agree with Patent Owner.
Narasimhan provides “an interactive promotion system 100 for
accessing and presenting promotions to a user at the user’s remote location
and for generating redeemable electronic coupons based on the promotions.”
Ex. 1005, 3:5–8. None of the portions of Narasimhan pointed to by
Petitioner discloses a system that manages the available quantity of items
(promotions or coupons), as required by our construction of “inventory
management system.” For example, Narasimhan explains that the authored
promotion information preferably resides on a vendor promotions database
134 connected to or associated with the server 108 and is employed to
produce the CD-ROM disk 104.” Id. at 4:34–37. Narasimhan further
discusses “updating promotion information and the like.” Id. at 5:29–31.
Although this discussion addresses a listing of promotions and coupons, it
does not address the available quantity of promotions or coupons.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Narasimhan discloses an
“automated award fulfillment application program” in communication with
an “inventory management system” as required by claims 1 and 19.
2. “sponsor-selected geographic location for fulfillment”
Petitioner contends that Narasimhan’s discussion of promotions being
“location sensitive” discloses the claimed “sponsor-selected geographic
location for fulfillment.” Pet. 39, 42–43, 45 (citing Ex. 1005, 3:21–26,
6:47–49, 8:5–7; Ex. 1010 ¶ 68). Patent Owner responds that Narasimhan
only vaguely states that promotions can be “location sensitive,” but does not
explain what the term means. Prelim. Resp. 38.
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The meaning of “location sensitive” is not clear from the disclosure of
Narasimhan. Although Dr. Lieberman testifies that “‘location sensitive’ . . .
mean[s] that the sponsor – either the sponsor of the individual award or the
sponsor of the incentive program – selects one or more locations for
fulfillment that form the basis of the location sensitivity,” he provides no
support for this opinion other than citing to Narasimhan’s discussion of a
consumer requesting promotions from a specific geographic location and
printable promotion-related information. Ex. 1010 ¶ 68 (citing Ex. 1005,
6:47–49, 8:5–8). Narasimhan provides no details regarding the meaning of
“location sensitive.”
Column 6, lines 47–49 of Narasimhan state that a consumer can “print
out promotion-related information including maps, addresses, telephone
numbers, and the like,” but does not discuss any sponsor-selected limitation
regarding a fulfillment location. The additional portion of Narasimhan cited
by Dr. Lieberman explains that “the user may request a specific type of
promotion and/or indicate that he or she wishes to be presented with
promotions from a specific geographic area.” Ex. 1005, 8:5–7. This also
fails to address any sponsor-imposed limitations regarding a fulfillment
location for the promotion. As Patent Owner suggests, for example,
“location sensitive” simply may mean that offers are distributed to
consumers in a specific location without imposing any limitation on a
fulfillment location. Prelim. Resp. 39.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Narasimhan discloses the
required “sponsor-selected geographic location for fulfillment.”
Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that it would
prevail in challenging claims 1 and 19 as anticipated by Narasimhan
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because, as discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that Narasimhan
meets at least two limitations of those claims. For the same reasons,
Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail
in challenging dependent claims 20–25 as anticipated by Narasimhan.
D. Anticipation by Scroggie
Petitioner contends that claims 1 and 19–25 are anticipated by
Scroggie. Pet. 47–58. We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s contentions for
the reasons discussed below.
1. “inventory management system”
Petitioner cites Scroggie’s discussion of products available for
purchase at a retail store and offers stored on a storage device by
manufacturers and retailers as corresponding to the claimed “inventory
management system” in communication with an “automated award
fulfillment application program.” Id. at 49–50, 53, 55 (citing Ex. 1006,
1:49–52, 2:4–13, 2:42–43, 3:40–46, 11:51–53; Ex. 1010 ¶ 81). Dr.
Lieberman testifies that Scroggie discloses an “inventory management
system” because “the manufacturers and retailers store ‘a variety of offers on
the storage device 306’ and Figure 13 shows ‘supermarkets online incentive
distribution server’ coupled to the ‘ads. and promotions’ storage device
306.” Ex. 1010 ¶ 81 (citing Ex. 1006, 11:51–53, Fig. 15). Patent Owner
responds that Scroggie’s discussion of products available for purchase “is
accessed by a separate consumer shopping list creation application,” rather
than an award fulfillment application. Prelim. Resp. 45. With respect to
storage device 306, Patent Owner contends that the “storage device is an
award database, not a separate inventory management system.” Id.
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Scroggie describes a “shopping list maker,” which allows a consumer
to select a store department and items sold in that department to generate a
shopping list. Ex. 1006, 9:1–11. The additional portions of Scroggie cited
by Petitioner with respect to Scroggie’s discussion of products available for
purchase at a retail store are directed to generating a shopping list for a
consumer. See id. at 2:4–13, 3:40–46. Petitioner offers no explanation as to
how the listing of products available for purchase at a retail store used in the
“shopping list maker” could correspond to an “inventory management
system” in communication with an “automated award fulfillment application
program,” as required by the claims.
As for the offers on storage device 306, Scroggie explains that “[a]
user 308 logs on to the server 300 through the network 304 and selects from
a variety of offers stored on the storage device 306 by manufacturers and
retailers.” Ex. 1006, 11:51–53. This discussion of storage device 306 does
not include storage device 306 containing or managing information
regarding the quantity of offers (or coupons) available. Dr. Lieberman’s
testimony does not address this deficiency.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Scroggie discloses an
“automated award fulfillment application program” in communication with
an “inventory management system” as required by claims 1 and 19.
2. “sponsor-selected geographic location for fulfillment”
Petitioner contends that Scroggie discloses a “sponsor-selected
geographic location for fulfillment” because Scroggie allows the sponsor to
select one or more places for fulfillment based on a user’s ZIP code
(geographic location), and subsequently allows the user to select a specific
location at which to redeem the award. Pet. 51–52, 54, 56 (citing Ex. 1006,
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1:47–55, 3:2–7, 3:22–39, 6:44–47, 6:61–64, 8:34–38; Ex. 1010 ¶ 86). The
testimony of Dr. Lieberman cited by Petitioner simply reiterates Petitioner’s
contentions. See Ex. 1010 ¶ 86. Petitioner also cites Scroggie’s discussion
of supermarket special offers as meeting this limitation. Id. at 54 (citing Ex.
1006, 2:42–43). Patent Owner responds that the consumer, not the sponsor,
controls the location for fulfillment in Scroggie. Prelim. Resp. 46. Patent
Owner contends that, although the system in Scroggie filters out offers that
are not applicable to a consumer’s region, it does not select the fulfillment
location for the offers. Id. at 47. We agree with Patent Owner.
Scroggie describes a system that provides incentives to consumers “in
such a way that they may be redeemed only at a specific retailer selected by
each customer.” Ex. 1006, 1:41–43. Scroggie does not discuss any sponsor-
imposed limitations on where the incentives can be exercised. For example,
Scroggie discusses transmitting offers to consumers based on the consumer’s
ZIP code and the incentive offers being exercisable in the customer’s
geographic region, but the customer ultimately selects where the offer is
redeemed. Id. at 1:51–55, 3:2–7, 3:22–39, 6:44–47, 6:61–64. As for the
discussion of supermarkets providing special offers, Scroggie explains that
information regarding specials at supermarkets in an area determined by a
user’s ZIP code is presented to a user, but “[t]he user selects a supermarket.”
Id. at 8:34–44.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Scroggie discloses a
“sponsor-selected geographic location for fulfillment,” as required by claims
1 and 19.
Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that it would
prevail in challenging claims 1 and 19 as anticipated by Scroggie because, as
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discussed above, Petitioner has not shown that Scroggie meets at least two
limitations of those claims. For the same reasons, Petitioner has failed to
establish a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in challenging
dependent claims 20–25 as anticipated by Scroggie.
E. Obviousness Challenges
Petitioner also challenges claims 1 and 19 as being obvious over
Barnett, Narasimhan, or Scroggie. Pet. 30–31, 47, 58. As Patent Owner
notes, however, these challenges are conclusory, and the Lieberman
Declaration does not provides any meaningful evidence or analysis of
obviousness. Prelim. Resp. 32, 42–43, 55. Although the Petition states that
“[f]or obviousness grounds, Petitioners evaluate the scope and content of the
prior art, any differences between the art and the claims, and the knowledge
of a person of ordinary skill in the art” and “provide a rational underpinning
to support the references’ combination” (Pet. 17–18), no such analysis or
reasoning is provided for any of the obviousness challenges to claims 1 and
19.
For example, with respect to the challenge based on Barnett,
Petitioner simply states that “[e]ven if Barnett did not directly anticipate
those claims, claims 1 and 19–22 are nonetheless obvious based on the
disclosure of Barnett, as detailed in Section VI.A (above) as modified or
combined with Dr. Lieberman’s confirmations as documented in his
declaration.” Pet. 31 (citing Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 36–49). The cited portions of the
Lieberman Declaration, however, address the anticipation challenge based
on Barnett, not the obviousness challenge. Paragraph 50 of the Lieberman
Declaration addresses obviousness based on Barnett, but only states that Dr.
Lieberman considers the limitations of claims 1 and 19 obvious based on his
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personal knowledge. Ex. 1010 ¶ 50. Dr. Lieberman concludes that “should
it be determined that any specific limitation of the claims is not disclosed by
Barnett, it is my opinion that one with ordinary skill in the art would have
understood such a limitation to be an obvious variation from the system
disclosed in Barnett.” Id. The obviousness challenges based on Narasimhan
and Scroggie include similar conclusory allegations of obviousness. See Pet.
47, 58; Ex. 1010 ¶¶ 75, 93. We are not persuaded by these conclusory
statements. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a).
For these reasons, Petitioner’s challenges to claims 1 and 19 as
obvious over Barnett, Narasimhan, or Scroggie do not cure the deficiencies
in the corresponding anticipation challenges discussed above.
Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish a reasonable likelihood
that it would prevail in challenging claims 1 and 19 as obvious over Barnett,
Narasimhan, or Scroggie. For the same reasons, Petitioner has failed to
establish a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in challenging
dependent claims 20–22 as obvious over Barnett, dependent claims 23–25 as
obvious over Barnett and Powell, and dependent claims 20–25 as obvious
over Narasimhan or Scroggie.

III. SUMMARY
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing on any of the challenges to the patentability of
claims 1 and 19–25 of the ʼ830 patent.

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IV. ORDER
For the reasons given, it is
ORDERED that the petition is denied and no trial is instituted.

For PETITIONER:

Marc Kaufman
mskaufman@reedsmith.com

Gerard Donovan
gdonovan@reedsmith.com

For PATENT OWNER:

Mark W. Hetzler
mwhetz@fitcheven.com

Nicholas T. Peters
ntpete@fitcheven.com