0120110374
03-31-2011
Sabial R. Williams-Mills, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southwest Area), Agency.
Sabial R. Williams-Mills,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southwest Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120110374
Hearing No. 450-2009-00275X
Agency No. 4G-752-0448-08
DECISION
On October 15, 2010, Complainant timely filed an appeal from the
Agency's September 10, 2010, final order concerning her equal employment
opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the
Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented are whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ)
properly issued a decision without a hearing and whether the AJ properly
found that the Agency did not discriminate against Complainant on the
bases of race, color, or sex.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked
as a City Carrier at the Farmers Branch Post Office in Dallas, Texas.
On October 29, 2008, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the
Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American),
sex (female), color (black) when:
1. In a letter dated August 22, 2008, the Agency issued Complainant a
notice of suspension for 14 days for unacceptable performance/failure
to follow instructions and insubordination; and
2. The Agency issued Complainant a notice of removal for unacceptable
performance/failure to follow instruction.
In an investigative affidavit, Complainant stated that she was issued
a notice of suspension because management maintained that she went home
after she screamed that she was not a child at the Manager of Customer
Services. Affidavit A., p. 10. Complainant stated that she believed
that she was discriminated against because there were male employees who
said worse things than she said, including a male letter carrier and a
supervisor who directed profanity at a subordinate.
Complainant stated that she was issued a notice of removal because
management concluded that she worked beyond her eight-hour per day
work restriction. Affidavit A, p. 3. Complainant further stated that
management stated that her medical documentation was outdated, and she
needed to obtain updated medical documentation. Id. Complainant stated
that she was not previously informed that her documentation was outdated
or that she needed to submit updated documentation.
The Manager of Customer Services (African-American female) stated that she
decided to issue Complainant the letter of suspension because Complainant
told her to "go to hell." Affidavit B, p. 2. She further stated that
no other employee has ever told her to go to hell. Id., p. 3.
The Station Manager (African-American male) stated that he concurred
with the decision to issue Complainant the letter of suspension.
Affidavit C, p. 1. The Station Manager stated that he concurred because
of Complainant's insubordination toward her supervisor and because he
had just given Complainant a service talk the day before about using
cell phones on the workroom floor. Id., p. 2. He stated that the
suspension was reduced to seven days pursuant to the grievance process.
Id., p. 4.
The Station Manager further stated that he issued the letter of removal
to Complainant because he witnessed her bring undelivered mail back
to the station after the Supervisor of Customer Service directed her
not to return to the station with undelivered mail. Affidavit C, p. 7.
The Station Manager stated that employees in the station heard Complainant
state before she finished her route that she intended to come back with
undelivered mail. He stated that Complainant then informed him for the
first time that she had an eight-hour work restriction and presented
two year-old documentation for the restriction the next day.
The Supervisor of Customer Services (African-American male) stated that
he issued the letter of removal to Complainant because on November 17,
2008, she failed to follow instructions to deliver all first-class mail,
not to bring any mail back undelivered, and not to delay delivery of
first-class mail. Affidavit D, p. 2. He stated that Complainant told
others that morning that she would bring mail back to the station, and
management could not tell her what to do. He stated that Complainant
brought back approximately 45 minutes of undelivered mail that day.
The Supervisor of Customer Services further stated that Complainant
was also issued the letter of removal because she failed to perform
duties in a safe manner. He stated that he learned that Complainant
had an eight-hour work restriction on November 18, 2008, during the
pre-disciplinary interview. Id. The Supervisor of Customer Services
stated that upon learning of her restriction, he checked her clock
rings and learned that she had worked outside of these restrictions on
several occasions. Id.
The record also contains statements from three of Complainant's
co-workers. Affidavit B, pp. 11-13. In the statements, the co-workers
said that they witnessed Complainant tell the Manager of Customer
Services to go to hell in a loud voice and state that she is not a child,
and is "not going to jump when you say jump." Id.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant
with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to
request a hearing before an AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing.
On December 10, 2010, the Agency moved for a decision without a hearing
in its favor. Complainant did not respond to the Agency's motion.
On August 17, 2010, the AJ issued a decision without a hearing in which
he found that Complainant failed to prove that she was subjected to
unlawful discrimination. The Agency subsequently issued a final order
fully adopting the AJ's finding.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant maintains that she was never asked to obtain
updated documentation regarding her medical restrictions until management
placed her off the clock. Complainant further maintains that management
knew she had restrictions and never asked her to carry mail beyond her
restrictions. "Management says the carrier is the expert on the routes
which means I am aware of what I can do (how much I am able to carry in
a given time)," Complainant maintains on appeal. The Agency requests
that we affirm its final order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and
factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from
an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .");
see also EEOC Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
Chap. 9, � VI.B. (Nov. 9, 1999) (providing that an administrative judge's
"decision to issue a decision without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. �
1614.109(g)] will be reviewed de novo"). This essentially means that we
should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free
to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's,
factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact
of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue
of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated.
See id. at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of
review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to
the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,"
and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of
record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,
and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment
of the record and its interpretation of the law").
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Decision without a Hearing
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249.
The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary
judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine"
if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in
favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988).
A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the
case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence,
issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the
context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider
issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
See Petty v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11,
2003). We find that the AJ properly issued a decision without a hearing
because Complainant failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact
or credibility existed.
Disparate Treatment
Generally, claims of disparate treatment are examined under
the tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for
Experimental Biology. Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). For Complainant to prevail, she must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting
facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of
discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor
in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). For instance,
to establish a prima facie case of reprisal, Complainant must show that
(1) she engaged in protected EEO activity; (2) the Agency was aware of
the protected activity; (3) subsequently, she was subjected to adverse
treatment by the Agency; and (4) a nexus exists between her protected
activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force,
EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).
Once a complainant has established a prima facie case, the burden
of production then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Com. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the Agency is successful, the
burden reverts back to Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that the Agency's reason(s) for its action was a pretext
for discrimination. At all times, Complainant retains the burden
of persuasion, and it is her obligation to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited
reason. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993);
U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16
(1983).
In this case, we assume without so finding that Complainant established
a prima facie case of discrimination as to all bases. Nevertheless,
we find that the Agency provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for the alleged actions, as detailed above.
Complainant contends that she was never asked to obtain updated
documentation regarding her restrictions until management placed her off
the clock. However, management testified that they were not aware of
Complainant's medical restrictions until after she brought undelivered
mail back to the station and informed management that she was restricted
from working over eight hours per day. Complainant did not dispute
below management's assertion that it was not aware of her medical
restrictions until November 18, 2008. Complainant further contends that
five co-workers also had medical restrictions but were not issued letters
of removal. However, Complainant has not shown that these employees
returned mail to the station in contravention of management's direction.
Moreover, unlike Complainant's situation, management stated that they were
aware of the comparative employees' medical restrictions but unaware of
Complainant's restrictions until Complainant failed to delivery assigned
mail in a timely manner. Complainant has not provided any evidence that
refutes the Agency's contention on this matter.
Complainant claims that there were male employees who said worse things
than she said, including a male letter carrier and a supervisor who
directed profanity at a subordinate. However, Complainant failed to
specify precisely what the carrier and supervisor said so that we might
judge whether the comparative employees' comments were comparable to
Complainant's comments. Moreover, Complainant did not deny that she
told the Manager of Customer Services to go to hell. Thus, we find
that Complainant failed to provide any evidence from which it can be
reasonably concluded that the Agency's non-discriminatory explanations
for its actions were pretext for unlawful discrimination. Consequently,
we find that the AJ properly found no discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,
including those not specifically addressed herein, the Commission AFFIRMS
the Agency's final order for the reasons set forth in this decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time
limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 31, 2011
Date
2
01-2011-0374
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
0120110374