Ruthann Williams, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 25, 2000
01990035 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 25, 2000)

01990035

04-25-2000

Ruthann Williams, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Ruthann Williams v. United States Postal Service

01990035

April 25, 2000

Ruthann Williams, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01990035

v. ) Agency No. 4D230129196

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Complainant timely appealed a final agency decision (FAD) concerning

her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the bases of

race (Black), sex (female), and age (over 60), in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et

seq.; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as

amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.<1> Complainant alleges that the agency

discriminated against her when she received a Notice of Removal Letter

on July 3, 1996. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,

37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the following

reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the FAD.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a window clerk at the agency's Park View Station, Newport News,

VA facility. Complainant alleged that she was inappropriately removed

from the agency following a confrontation with a customer. On June 18,

1996, complainant and a customer argued over a missing package. As a

result, she was removed from the agency. Believing she was a victim

of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling, and subsequently,

she filed a complaint on September 26, 1996.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant filed a grievance

on the removal and requested a hearing by an Administrative Judge

(AJ) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Since an

arbitration hearing was scheduled between the agency and the union,

the agency requested that the AJ hold the hearing in abeyance pending

the arbitration decision. The hearing was then held in abeyance.

On December 31, 1997, the arbitrator issued a decision. The decision

reinstated the complainant and reduced the removal to a long-term

suspension without pay. Following the arbitration decision, complainant

once again requested a hearing before an AJ. On June 3, 1998, complainant

and the agency entered into a Settlement Agreement; however, complainant

petitioned to set aside the Settlement Agreement and to have a hearing.

The AJ set aside the agreement. After the AJ rescheduled the hearing,

complainant withdrew her request for a hearing and asked the agency to

issue a final agency decision.

The FAD concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of race, sex, or age discrimination because she presented no evidence that

similarly situated individuals not in her protected classes were treated

differently under similar circumstances. Also, the FAD stated that she

had not shown that age was a determinative factor in her removal or that

the reasons articulated by the agency were a pretext for discrimination.

Complainant does not make any new arguments on appeal. The agency

requests that we affirm its FAD.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In the absence of direct evidence, a claim of discrimination is examined

under the three-part analysis originally enunciated in McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,

600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (applying the McDonnell Douglas three-part

analysis to age discrimination cases). For complainant to prevail, she

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting

facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of

discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor

in the adverse employment action. Id. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the

agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

action. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the

ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of

the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Also, in ADEA

cases, the complainant must establish that age was a determinative factor

in the sense that "but for" her age, the complainant would not have been

subjected to the action at issue. See Loeb, supra.

Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses

on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following

this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has

established a prima facie case to whether he has demonstrated by

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions

merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States

Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).

In this case, the Commission finds that the agency has articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. Specifically, the

agency stated that complainant was terminated for, among other things,

being involved in a rude confrontation with an agency customer, having

a progressive disciplinary problem, not committing to courteous behavior

with future customers, and refusing to transfer to the agency's Hampton,

VA facility as a mail processor.

Because the agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for the alleged discriminatory event, complainant now bears the burden

of establishing that the agency's stated reasons are merely a pretext

for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC

Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this

by showing that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason.

Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).

We find that complainant has failed to meet this burden.

The Commission finds that complainant failed to present evidence that

more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons for its actions

were a pretext for discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, we note

that the agency tried to work with complainant's customer service skills

over the years, would have allowed her to stay if she had committed

to good customer service, and offered to transfer her to another unit

with no customer interaction. These actions do not demonstrate a

discriminatory animus.

In addition, the Commission finds that complainant has not shown that,

"but for" her age, she would not have been removed from her job.

According to the record, complainant's customer service record

and inability to acknowledge wrong doing on June 18, 1996 were the

determinative factors in her removal.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

April 25, 2000

Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.