01990035
04-25-2000
Ruthann Williams, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Ruthann Williams v. United States Postal Service
01990035
April 25, 2000
Ruthann Williams, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01990035
v. ) Agency No. 4D230129196
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
Complainant timely appealed a final agency decision (FAD) concerning
her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the bases of
race (Black), sex (female), and age (over 60), in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et
seq.; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.<1> Complainant alleges that the agency
discriminated against her when she received a Notice of Removal Letter
on July 3, 1996. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644,
37,659 (1999)(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the following
reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the FAD.
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed
as a window clerk at the agency's Park View Station, Newport News,
VA facility. Complainant alleged that she was inappropriately removed
from the agency following a confrontation with a customer. On June 18,
1996, complainant and a customer argued over a missing package. As a
result, she was removed from the agency. Believing she was a victim
of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling, and subsequently,
she filed a complaint on September 26, 1996.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant filed a grievance
on the removal and requested a hearing by an Administrative Judge
(AJ) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Since an
arbitration hearing was scheduled between the agency and the union,
the agency requested that the AJ hold the hearing in abeyance pending
the arbitration decision. The hearing was then held in abeyance.
On December 31, 1997, the arbitrator issued a decision. The decision
reinstated the complainant and reduced the removal to a long-term
suspension without pay. Following the arbitration decision, complainant
once again requested a hearing before an AJ. On June 3, 1998, complainant
and the agency entered into a Settlement Agreement; however, complainant
petitioned to set aside the Settlement Agreement and to have a hearing.
The AJ set aside the agreement. After the AJ rescheduled the hearing,
complainant withdrew her request for a hearing and asked the agency to
issue a final agency decision.
The FAD concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case
of race, sex, or age discrimination because she presented no evidence that
similarly situated individuals not in her protected classes were treated
differently under similar circumstances. Also, the FAD stated that she
had not shown that age was a determinative factor in her removal or that
the reasons articulated by the agency were a pretext for discrimination.
Complainant does not make any new arguments on appeal. The agency
requests that we affirm its FAD.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In the absence of direct evidence, a claim of discrimination is examined
under the three-part analysis originally enunciated in McDonnell Douglas
Corporation v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (applying the McDonnell Douglas three-part
analysis to age discrimination cases). For complainant to prevail, she
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting
facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of
discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor
in the adverse employment action. Id. at 802; Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the
agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the
ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of
the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Also, in ADEA
cases, the complainant must establish that age was a determinative factor
in the sense that "but for" her age, the complainant would not have been
subjected to the action at issue. See Loeb, supra.
Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses
on whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following
this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington
v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In such cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has
established a prima facie case to whether he has demonstrated by
preponderance of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions
merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).
In this case, the Commission finds that the agency has articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. Specifically, the
agency stated that complainant was terminated for, among other things,
being involved in a rude confrontation with an agency customer, having
a progressive disciplinary problem, not committing to courteous behavior
with future customers, and refusing to transfer to the agency's Hampton,
VA facility as a mail processor.
Because the agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for the alleged discriminatory event, complainant now bears the burden
of establishing that the agency's stated reasons are merely a pretext
for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC
Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this
by showing that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason.
Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
We find that complainant has failed to meet this burden.
The Commission finds that complainant failed to present evidence that
more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons for its actions
were a pretext for discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, we note
that the agency tried to work with complainant's customer service skills
over the years, would have allowed her to stay if she had committed
to good customer service, and offered to transfer her to another unit
with no customer interaction. These actions do not demonstrate a
discriminatory animus.
In addition, the Commission finds that complainant has not shown that,
"but for" her age, she would not have been removed from her job.
According to the record, complainant's customer service record
and inability to acknowledge wrong doing on June 18, 1996 were the
determinative factors in her removal.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence
not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0300)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF
RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred
to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management
Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).
All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must
also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS
THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD
OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND
OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
April 25, 2000
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.