Ruth M. McCoy, Complainant,v.Ken L. Salazar, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 3, 2009
0120080955 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 3, 2009)

0120080955

08-03-2009

Ruth M. McCoy, Complainant, v. Ken L. Salazar, Secretary, Department of the Interior, Agency.


Ruth M. McCoy,

Complainant,

v.

Ken L. Salazar,

Secretary,

Department of the Interior,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120080955

Hearing No. 430-2006-00031X

Agency No. FNP-2005-0033

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the November

19, 2007 agency decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S. � 2000e

et seq. The agency's decision implemented the September 26, 2007 decision

of the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) who found no discrimination.

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked as

a Business Community Liaison at the agency's Oconaluftee Job Corps Center

(OJCC) in Cherokee, NC. In her complaint, complainant alleged that:

1. The agency discriminated against her on the bases of national origin

(Native American) and sex (female) when: (a) on August 26, 2004, she

became aware of allegations accusing her of professional misconduct

involving Job Corps students; and (b) on November 3, 2004, she was denied

the opportunity to attend a Regional Managers Meeting.

2. The agency retaliated against her and/or subjected her to harassment

on the basis of reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when: (a)

on July 28, 2005, management denied her request to attend the Student

Government Association (SGA) Leadership Conference; and (b) on July 26,

2005, she became aware that management made derogatory comments about

her work performance.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with

a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of her right

to request a hearing before an AJ. Complainant requested a hearing.

Over complainant's objection, the AJ issued a decision without a hearing

(summary judgment).

In his decision, the AJ found that the agency had not discriminated

against complainant. Regarding claims 1(a) and 1(b), the AJ found that

although complainant established that she was a member of a protected

group, she had not submitted sufficient comparative evidence to

support an inference of discrimination based on national origin or sex.

She therefore failed to prove a prima facie case. Assuming, arguendo,

that complainant established a prima facie case, the AJ found that the

agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions, and that complainant failed to prove that these reasons were

pretext for prohibited discrimination. Regarding claims 2(a) and 2(b),

the AJ found the agency's actions did not create an environment that

could reasonably be considered hostile or abusive, and therefore the

actions did not rise to the level of actionable harassment.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without

a hearing when the AJ finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, complainant must satisfy

the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must

initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that complainant

was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

A complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing

that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware

of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, she was subjected to adverse

treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected

activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Department of the Air

Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 25, 2000).

The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with where the agency has

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct.

See United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460

U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983).

We find that the AJ's grant of summary judgment was proper because there

exists no genuine issue of material fact. Assuming, without deciding,

that complainant has established a prima facie case, complainant has

nonetheless failed to show that the agency's articulated reasons for

its actions were pretext for unlawful discrimination. Regarding claim

1(a), the record reveals that the agency conducted an investigation of

complainant after co-workers sent an anonymous letter to agency management

alleging that complainant had engaged in unprofessional conduct, including

alcohol use with minors, at the 2004 SGA Leadership Conference. There is

no evidence that the agency management caused the allegations to be

made by the co-workers or that the allegations, which were ultimately

proven meritless, were made for prohibited reasons. Regarding claim

1(b), the record reveals that the Regional Managers meeting would have

been occurring while the internal investigation was still underway and

management appeared to have concerns about complainant representing the

OJCC at a regional meeting. Although complainant argues on appeal that

agency management had received the outcome of the investigation on or

around October 13, 2004, the record reflects that the final report of

the investigation was not disseminated to management until November 2,

2004, when the regional meeting had already begun.

Regarding claim 2(a), complainant argues that she was discriminated

against based on reprisal for prior protected EEO activity. Here,

the agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

not sending complainant to the August 2005 SGA Leadership Conference.

Management selected the SGA Coordinator to attend the conference, who had

consistently worked with the students and the SGA and who had previously

attended a number of SGA conferences. Management believed her to be

better qualified to attend than complainant. Further, complainant had

only attended the previous year's SGA Leadership Conference as a stand-in

for her superior. Agency officials also stated that they wanted to avoid

a repeat of the events at the previous year's conference which had led to

the investigation of complainant. The record also reveals that attending

the conference was not part of complainant's job title or job description.

It was within the discretion of management to decide which employee to

send to the conference, so long as the exercise of discretion was not

based on prohibited discrimination.

Regarding claim 2(b), complainant stated that one of the reasons

management provided for not choosing her to attend the 2005 SGA

Leadership Conference was that complainant's work-based learning program

was suffering, and that the OJCC needed her on site during the time of

the conference to discuss ways to improve it. Complainant disputes the

fact that her program or her work were suffering. The Commission has

repeatedly found that remarks or comments unaccompanied by a concrete

agency action are not a direct and personal deprivation sufficient to

render an individual aggrieved for the purposes of Title VII. See Backo

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960227 (June 10,

1996); Henry v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05940695

(February 9, 1995).

To the extent that complainant is claiming a hostile work environment,

the Commission notes that unless the conduct is severe, a single

incident or group of isolated incidents will not be regarded as a claim

of discriminatory harassment. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510

U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Complainant has not shown that she was subjected to

an environment where the agency's actions were so severe and pervasive

that it altered the conditions of her employment. Also, the agency

has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the tangible

employment actions in which it engaged.

Accordingly, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 3, 2009

__________________

Date

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0120080955

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120080955