Russell Kingston

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 21, 1947

74 N.L.R.B. 1484 (N.L.R.B. 1947)

In the Matter of RUSSELL KINGSTON and INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS
OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION No. 15, C. I. O.
Case No. 18-C-1317.-Decided August 21,1947
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On December 18, 1946, Trial Examiner Peter F. Ward issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the respondent, Russell Kingston, had engaged in and was engaging
in unfair labor practices and recommending that he cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy
of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner
also found that the respondent had not engaged in certain unfair
labor practices and recommended dismissal of the compalint as to
them. Thereafter, the respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and brief filed by the respondent,
and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the Trial Ex-
aminer's findings, conclusions, and recommendations, with the excep-
tions noted below :
The Trial Examiner found that the respondent, by refusing to bar-
gain collectively with the Union on and after July 30, 1946, violated
Section 8 (5) of the Act. We do not agree.
As fully described in the Intermediate Report, on July 30, 1946,
at the first and only conference between the parties, the Union claimed
to represent a majority of the employees in question and sought to
negotiate a contract. The respondent, for certain stated reasons,
questioned the Union's majority status and requested the Union to
submit proof in support of its claim. After some discussion, bath
parties agreed to be bound by the results of an immediate "on the spot"
election, to be held under their joint auspicies. Because of their in-
ability to agree on the eligibility of certain employees to participate
in the election, no election was ever held. By letter to the respondent
74 N. L. R. B., No. 243.
1484
RUSSELL KINGSTON 1485,
dated August 6, 1946, the Union again asserted its majority claim and
requested a meeting for bargaining negotiations. The respondent
promptly replied that "if and when you prove to me that you repre-
sent a majority of our employees, I will be glad to negotiate with you.',-
The Union failed to respond, and no further meetings between the
parties took place.
In these circumstances, we find no reason to believe that the re-
spondent acted other than in good faith in questioning the Union's.
majority representation and in refusing to bargain until the Union
furnished evidence of its majority status. At no time during the period
it was seeking recognition did the Union offer any cogent evidence to
support its claim.' Notwithstanding, the respondent endeavored to
cooperate with the Union to secure mutually satisfactory evidence of
the employees' desire for collective bargaining through the Union,
by agreeing to the Union's proposal for an immediate informal elec-
tion. That no election was ever conducted, in accordance with the-
proposal, may be attributed only to an honest disagreement of the-
parties as to certain eligibility questions.
We are unable to agree with the Trial Examiner that the respond-
ent's subsequent conduct evinced a lack of good faith in refusing to,
bargain with the Union. While the respondent's poll of its employees
on August 26, 1946, as to their desire for representation by the Union 2-
-was violative of Section 8 (1) of the Act-and we so find, as did the
Trial Examiner-' it fails to establish that prior thereto the respondent
did not have an honest doubt as to the Union's majority status. Nor-
do we agree with the Trial Examiner that the respondent's explanation
to his employees of the purpose of the poll may be reasonably con-
strued, in the circumstances here present, as an implied threat of
"loss of their employment if they did not abandon the Union." The
respondent merely stated, in effect, that before actually fixing and
submitting bids for certain lumber it wanted to know whether the
employees "wanted, a Union in the Mill." We perceive no threat of
economic reprisal in this statement, especially when viewed in the light
"The Thal Examiner found that a majority of the employees , excluding those whose
eligibility was questioned , wore union buttons in the plant , front which the respondent
could have ascertained the Union's majority status The Union, however, dealing with
the respondent, did not rely upon this button showing; and even if the respondent had
fortuitously observed that a majoilty wore buttons, we believe that the respondent could
in good faith have requested other proof of majoirty status.
2 The ballot afforded the employees an opportunity to vote for or against "union organi-
zation " It is clear, however, that the Union was the only organization at the plant and
that the poll was taken to determine whether or not the employees desired representation
by the Union In these circumstances , we, unlike the Trial Examiner , attach no signifi-
cance to the failure of the ballot to mention the Union by name.
3 See, Matter of Maurice Eanet and Ben Rich, et at, 74 N. L . R. B. 809, and Matter, of
Okey Hosiery Company, Incorporated , 22 N. L. R. B. 792.
d
1486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the respondent's contemporaneous statement that the employees
should "vote just exactly the way they thought."
Upon the entire record"in the case, we find, contrary to the Trial
Examiner, that the respondent did not refuse to bargain collectively
with the Union. within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act.4 We
-shall, accordingly, dismiss that allegation of the complaint.
ORDER
Gpon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
,of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the respondent, Russell Kingston, Stam-
baugh, Michigan, and his agents, successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing
his employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist International Woodworkers of
America, Local Union No. 15, C. I. 0., or any other labor organization,
-to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective
.bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, by holding elections
-among his employees for the purpose of ascertaining their desires with
respect to union representation, or by any like or related acts.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will.
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post immediately at the respondent's mill in Stambaugh, Mich-
igan, copies of the notice attached hereto, marked Appendix "A."
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
the Eighteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respond-
ent or his representative, be posted by the respondent immediately
upon receipt thereof, and maintained by him for sixty (60) consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees customarily are posted. - Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
.defaced, or covered by other material ;
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
the respondent has taken to'comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that
the respondent violated Sections 8 (3) and 8 (5) of the Act, be, and
it hereby is, dismissed.
h See Matter of Clem D Johnson. d/b/a Roanoke Public Warehouse, 72 N L R B 1281
5In the event this Order is enforced by decree of a Circuit Court of Appeals, there shall
'be inserted, before the words "A DECISION AND ORDER," the words "A DECREE OF
,THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING "
b
RUSSELL KINGSTON
APPENDIX "A"
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
1487
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist International Woodworkers of
America, Local Union, No. 15, C. I. 0., or any other labor or-
ganization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, by holding elections among our employees for the purpose
of ascertaining their desires with respect to union representation,
or by any like or related acts.
RUSSELL KINGSTON,
Employer.
Dated ------------------------- By -----------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Mr. Stanley D Kane, for the Board.
Mr. Earle Johnson, of Ironwood , Mich., for the Union
Mr. Stanley E. Eastman , of Marinette , Wis., for the respondent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon an amended charge duly filed on September 24, 1946, by International
Woodworkers of America, Local Union No. 15, affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations
Board, herein called the Board, by its Regional Director for the Eighteenth
Region (Minneapolis, Minnesota), issued its complaint dated September 30, 1946,
against'Russell Kingston, Stambaugh, Michigan, herein called the respondent,'
alleging that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5) and Section 2 (6) and
(7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat 449, herein called the Act.
Copies of the complaint, the charge, and notice of hearing thereon were duly
served upon the respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint, as amended at the
hearing, alleged in substance that the respondent: (1) on or about August 6,
1946,2 and at all times thereafter, refused to bargain collectively with the Union
The respondent is, at times herein, referred to as Kingston
2 Unless otherwise specified , all events referred to herein occurred in 1946.
755420-48-vol 74-95
1488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate unit; (2)
between on or about June 25 and July 5, refused to pay Francis Cagel the minimuni
wage paid to production employees at the mill ; (3) on July 5, refused to pay
said Cagel a certain bonus paid to other employees ; ( 4) between July 29 and
September 11, discharged eight named employees ,' and thereafter refused to,
reinstate them because of their union membership and activity ; ( 5) since July
25 committed certain acts of interference , and did advise , urge , and warn its
employees against affiliation with or activities on behalf of the Union , threatened
them with economic loss , threatened to close the mill if the employees joined or
assisted the Union , and on August 26 conducted a poll of the employees for the
purpose of determining their union affiliation and to dissuade them from joining
or assisting the Union ; and (6 ) by the acts described above, interfered with,
restrained , and coerced his employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act. On October 17, respondent filed an answer in which he
admitted the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint , but denied that he had
engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged.
Pursliant to notice a hearing was held at Ironwood , Michigan , on October 17,
1946 , before Peter F Ward, the undersigned Trial Examiner duly designated by
the Chief Trial Examiner . The Board and the respondent were represented by
counsel and the Union was represented by its president, and all parties participated
in the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross -examine
witnesses , and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties.
At the close of the hearing counsel for the Board moved to conform the pleadings
to the proof in respect to formal matters. The motion was granted without
objection . While the parties were afforded an opportunity to argue orally before
and file briefs or proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law with the under-
signed, none of the parties availed themselves of either opportunity.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Russell Kingston, the respondent, operates a saw mill in Stambaugh, Michigan,
where he is engaged in the production and manufacture of lumber and wood
products. For the 12 months' period from October 1945 to October 1946, respondent
sold and transported to consumers and users located in States other than the
State of Michigan through the channels of interstate commerce more than 1,800,000
board feet of lumber. Such sales and shipments to users located outside the
State of Michigan were in excess of 40 percent of the entire production of the mill.
The respondent admits that he is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Woodworkers of America, Local No. 15, affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, is a labor organization admitting to membership em-
ployees of the respondent.
8 Discharged employees and dates of discharge are as follows :
Everett Baumgartner___ July 29, 1946 Phillip Parent -------- Aug. 5, 1946
Ivar Trybon___________ July 31, 1946 Clement Harris -------- Aug. 6, 1946
Frank Kempa_________ Aug. 3, 1946 William Burke_________ Aug. 5, 1946
Clayton Peterson------- Aug. 5, 1946 Mike Myers----------- Sept. 11, 1946
RUSSELL KINGSTON
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain collectively
1. The appropriate unit
1489
The complaint alleges , the respondent admits, and the undersigned finds that
all of the production and maintenance employees of the respondent , employed at
his mill in Stambaugh , Michigan, excluding supervisory and office employees, at
all times material herein constituted and now constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of
the Act
2. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit; the refusal
to bargain collectively ; interference, restraint, and coercion
The complaint alleges that on or about July 31, 1946, a majority of the employees
in the appropriate unit designated the Union as their representative for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining with the respondent. The respondent's answer
"denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief" as to such allegation,
and, "as to such matters puts the Union to its proof." The complaint further
alleges that the respondent, on or about August 6, 1946 and thereafter, refused
to bargain with the Union. Respondent's answer admits refusal to bargain,
but alleges in effect that the Union failed to furnish proof of its alleged majority.
(a) Sequence of events
On July 30, Earle Johnson, president of the Union, accompanied by the Union's
Business Agent, called on Kingston on behalf of the Union. Johnson informed
Kingston that the Union represented a majority of the employees in the mill and
requested that they proceed to "negotiate a contract." Kingston replied that be
did not "think" that the Union represented a majority of his employees and told
him "why."' Johnson and Kingston then discussed the holding of an election
with the result that Johnson proposed holding "an election right'then and there."
Kingston objected to such action contending that it would be unfair to a number
of his "regular" employees to hold an election at that time "because'so many of
them were off haying," and because he had so many "temporary" employees.
Kingston, however, proposed that he lay off the "temporary men" and that they
then conduct an election. Johnson refused to consider this proposal and the-
conference of July 30 concluded.'
Under date of August 6, Johnson wrote Kingston as follows:
DEAR MR. KINGSTON :
We are writing to confirm our conversation with you on July 30 at which,
time Mr. Ed. Evans, Business Agent of Local 15 and the writer visited you
at your office.
You will recall that at that time we informed you that our organization
represented a majority of your employees, and we requested you to bargain,
with the Union.
' Kingston , in his testimony , did not detail the reasons he assigned to Johnson for be-
lieving that the Union did not represent a majority of the employees
5 These findings are based upon Kingston 's credited and uncontradicted testimony_
Johnson appeared as a representative for the Union and was also called as a witness by
the Board . He was not questioned concerning the events of July 30.
1490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This time we desire to repeat that we represent a majority of your em-
ployees and would like to arrange a meeting with you for the purpose of
negotiating a contract for the employees in your saw mill.
Would you kindly suggest a date when it would be convenient for you to
meet with representatives of the Union for the purpose of bargaining as we
requested when we visited you on July 30.
Under date of August 8, Kingston replied to Johnson 's letter as follows :
DEAR MR. JOHNSON : -
Reference is made to your letter of August 6th, 1946 by which you request
that I name a place of meeting with you for the purpose of negotiating a
contract for the employees of this saw mill, the majority of whom you claim
as members of your organization.
If and when you prove to me that you represent a majority of our em-
ployees I will be glad to negotiate with you.
Insofar as the record discloses, the Union made no reply to Kingston's letter
of August 8, nor were there any further meetings between representatives of the
Union and the respondent.
Under date of July 31, the Union filed a petition for investigation and certifica-
tion with the Board's Regional Office. The record is silent as to what, if any,
action was taken on the petition. Kingston, when asked if he had received
notice of the filing of the petition, stated that he could not recall having received
any such notice, but added,
Of course, I knew that the Union was seeking to represent the employees.
Between July 31 and August 5, the respondent terminated the employment of
six mill employees," all of whom the respondent contends were "temporary men"
and as such were ineligible for inclusion in the appropriate unit. Five of the
six employees so terminated had joined the Union and one had not.
During the hearing the Union introduced 20 union membership cards' in evi-
dence, 19 of which appeared to bear original signatures, and one of which bore
a printed signature.' Seventeen of the cards bore the signatures of employees
whose names appeared on the pay roll for July 30. The pay roll for the period
0 These employees , with their occupation , hiring and termination dates are as follows :
'Name Occupation Date hired
Date teimi-
natea
Clement Harris_______________________ tail sawyer ___________________-__- July 30__- July 31
Ivar Trybon -------------------------- general---------------------------- Tuly 12____ August 1.
Frank Kempa________________________ lumberloader _____________________ July 19_-__ August 2.
Clayton Peterson_____________________ wood piler------------------------ July 26_-__ August 5.
Frank Brahant__________ _______ ---- general--------- ------------------ July 30___- August 3.
Phillip Parent_____ __________________ wood piler------------------------ July 30-___ August 5.
-Harris was injured on July 31 After being under a doctor's care lie reported back to work on
August 6 He was then instructed to return a week later. He returned on August 12 and was then
advised that the respondent had no further work for him
All cards bore the signature of Employee Francis Cagle as a witness. Cagle credibly
testified, without contradiction, and the undersigned finds, that all employees who
joined the Union received a union button which they thereafter wore while on the job.
8 This was the card of Dominac Signoren who is still on the respondent's pay roll. The
respondent did not question the authenticity of this or of any of the cards One card bore
the signature of an employee who was on the July 30 pay roll, but who did not join the
Union until July 31. This card has not been considered
RUSSELL KINGSTON 1491
from July 15 to 31 in evidence, discloses that as of July 30,° there were 29 pro-
duction and maintenance workers employed at the mill'0
The record contains no evidence describing the respondent's mill operations in
detail, nor does it indicate the category, number, or detailed duties of employees
which go to make up the normal complement of employees necessary for regular
or usual operations. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to definitely
determine who, if any, of the six discharged employees, referred to above, were
temporary employees.11 Assuming arguendo, that the six discharged employees
were not entitled to be included in the appropriate unit, their exclusion from the
list of 29 employees on the pay roll on July 30, and hence from the unit, would
leave 23 employees in the appropriate unit. Since 5 of the employees so included
belong to the Union, their exclusion from the Union's total of 17 members would
leave the Union with 12 members or a majority in the appropriate unit.
The undersigned accordingly finds, upon the basis of the foregoing and the
-entire record, that the Union was, on July 30, 1946, the duly designated repre-
sentative of a majority of the employees in the unit heretofore found to be
appropriate, and that by virtue of Section 9 (a) of the Act, was, on July 30, 1946,
the exclusive representative of all the employees in said unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours and other condi-
tions of employment.
As to its refusal to bargain, Kingston admitted that he had refused to bargain
with the Union, but stated that he refused because he entertained a doubt as to
the Union's majority status. As found above, the employees who joined the Union
openly and continuously wore union buttons on the job where they could no doubt
have been counted'' Kingston, or his supervisors, who appear to have done most
of the hiring, knew which of the employees they considered to be "temporary"
ones, thus it was but a matter of computation for Kingston or his supervisors to
determine the facts, and learn that even with the "temporary" 13 employees
excluded from the unit, the Union would still represent a majority of the
employees in the appropriate unit. On the foregoing and the record, the under-
signed is convinced and finds that the respondent noted or became aware of all
employees who wore union buttons on the job, and was therefore able to determine
that the Union represented a majority of his employees 14
9 The other two cards not considered herein are those of Alfred Mattinson , who was
employed on July 26 and 27 only ; and the card of Everett Baumgartner, who joined the
Union on July 29, the day on which he was both hired and discharged. While the com-
plaint alleges that Baumgartner was discriminatorily discharged , the undersigned finds
below that such discharge was not in violation of the Act.
to Three employees who were temporarily absent on July 30 are included in this total.
u It would appear that the respondent required the services of at least two temporary
employees to replace five regular employees who took time off in July to put up hay. Only
three of the five employees were off at the same time, however, and no replacement was
needed for one of the five employees , whose duties as night watchman were assumed by
Foreman Gayhart.
12 As soon as the employees joined the Union they openly displayed their buttons ; they
joined on the following dates : 1 on July 24, 1 on July 25, 1 on July 26 , 11 on July 27, 2
on July 28 and 1 on July 30.
13 The respondent did not contend that any of the employees , other than the six employees
discharged as aforesaid , were "temporary" employees.
14 As found in Section III B, below , Kingston was confronted with a charge of unfair
labor practices as a result of his discharge of Cagle on January 29 , which was disposed
of on June 19, by the way of an informal agreement. Although such informal settlement
of the matter carried no presumption that Cagle 's discharge as in violation of the Act,
Kingston ' s connection with the Cagle case would undoubtedly cause him to take notice of
the fact that Cagle and other employees wore union buttons.
1492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) The respondent-conducted election
On or about August 26, Kingston informed Superintendent Berg that he wanted
the employees sent to the millwright's office as he wished to talk to them. When
the employees had assembled, Kingston informed them that he was about to make
bids for timber that was up for sale in the "National Forest" (the source of all
timber processed by the respondent) ; that before making any bids he wanted to
know whether or not the employees "wanted a union in the mill" ; that he had
prepared ballots" which could be voted "yes" or "no"-"for the Union or against
the Union" ; 15 and that they should go to the mill office, mark their ballots in
secret, fold and put them in a cigar box provided for that purpose. After the
employees had voted and left the office the ballots were counted by Kingston and
Bookkeeper Bell. Kingston then reported to the employees that the counted
ballots disclosed 18 votes against and 6 votes for the Union. He then expressed
his appreciation for their confidence in his "fair mindedness"
Kingston testified that after the ballots were counted and there were 18 men
against the Union and 6 men for the Union, he
naturally took it from that (the vote) that the men generally were satisfied
with the wages and bonus arrangement we were working under and I could
continue to operate as I had in the past and bid on timber as I had in the
past and so guided myself accordingly and bid in another piece of timber
for our operations.
Kingston testified that he held the above-described election because the Union
bad failed to submit proof of its majority, and inasmuch as it was advisable
for him to know in advance of his making bids on timber and future operations
of the mill whether he would have to operate under a contract with the Union,
it was necessary for him to take a poll of the employees to determine whether they
desired a union at the mill.
It should be noted, however, that he did not give the employees a chance to
vote for or against the "Union," but asked them to vote for or against "union
organization," a term broad enough to include all unions and he thereby em-
phasized his opposition to any union. The holding of the election in the manner
and under the circumstances above described constituted an implied threat to
the employees that if they did not vote against union organization Kingston
would not bid on timber and there would be a consequent decline in employment.
Such illegal action on the part of the respondent certainly tended to destroy the
Union's majority. The mere holding of the election even without the threat
constituted an interference with the rights of the employees under the Act.
Under such circumstances as here disclosed, 'An employer cannot be heard to
15 The complaint alleges, in substance, that the respondent on or about August 26 in
violation of the Act, conducted a poll of his employees for the purpose of determining their
union affiliations and in order to dissuade them from joining or assisting the Union.
Respondent 's answer admitted that he conducted such a poll , but denies that lie did so for
the purpose of discouraging membership in the Union . The answer affirmatively alleges
that since the Union had failed to offer proof that it had been designated by a majority of
the employees as their bargaining representative, the respondent , "in order to ascertain
that fact conducted a free and uninfluenced poll of his employees."
16 The ballots read as follows :
Kingston mill
Union organization
For Against
RUSSELL KINGSTON 1493
say that he entertains an honest doubt as to the Union's majority status where
he conducts a campaign to destroy that majority." 17
From the above and the entire record it appears that on and after July 30,
1946, the Union, to the knowledge of the respondent, represented a majority of
his employees in an appropriate unit; that the respondent, notwithstanding such
knowledge, and after expressing a doubt as to the Union's majority undertook
to destroy such majority by holding an election under circumstances and con-
ditions which threatened his employees with loss of their employment if they
did not abandon their union affiliation. It is so found. By on July 30, 1946,
and thereafter, refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
representative of his employees in an appropriate unit, the respondent interfered
with, restrained, and coerced his employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act.
B. The alleged discrimination against Francis Cagle
The complaint alleges that respondent discriminated against Cagle by refusing
to pay him the minimum wage paid to the production employees between June
25, 1946, and July 5, 1946; and that on or about July 5, respondent refused to
pay Cagle a bonus paid other employees for the reason that he joined and assisted
the Union and engaged in concerted activities on its behalf.
Cagle was first employed in the mill on December 3, 1945. On December 7, 1945,
Kingston took charge of the mill as Special Administrator of his deceased father's
estate. Kingston discharged Cagle on January 29, 1946. As a result of such
discharge, charges were filed with the Board on Cagle's behalf. The matter
was noticed to come on for hearing before a Trial Examiner for the Board at
Iron River, Michigan, on June 19, 1946
On the day set for hearing the parties conferred informally with the result
that an agreement was reached between them making it unnecessary that a formal
hearing be held before the Trial Examiner.
The informal agreement reached as aforesaid, provided, inter alga:
That the employer (Kingston) will offer to Francis Cagle immediate and
full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position of em-
ployment without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed . . .
At the time Cagle was discharged as aforesaid, the minimum wage rate for
production employees was 60 cents per hour. At the time he returned to work
on June 25, the minimum wage scale for production employees was 70 cents an
hour. For the first 2 pay periods after his return, Cagle was paid the 60 cent
per hour rate. He asked both Foreman Gayhart and Superintendent Berg what
the "lower rate was." Gayhart stated that he "understood" the rate to be 70
cents per hour, while Berg stated that the rate "was" 70 cents an hour. Cagle
then took the matter up with Kingston, who told him in substance that inasmuch
as Cagle was getting the 60 cent rate when discharged, and since Kingston had
agreed to reinstate him to his "former" position, Cagle would be paid at the
'T Matter of Consolidated Machine Tool Corporation, 67 N. L. R. B. 737, where it was
held that an employer 's refusal to recognize or otherwise bargain with the Union until
its majority was so established in an election , after having engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices directed toward the disposition of the Union ' s majority status, constituted a refusal
to bargain in violation of Section 8 (5) of the Act; and see also In the Matter of L. B.
Hartz Stores, 71 N L. R. B 848, 19 L. R R. M. 1056.
1494 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
former rate. However, commencing with the third pay-period after his reinstate-
ment, Cagle was paid the minimum rate of 70 cents per hour 18
Although some 20 out of 32 production employees had received a bonus on or
about July 1, none was paid to Cagle. In this connection Kingston testified that
lie determined who was to get the bonus
Oh, in a very arbitrary manner. I knew how the men worked, of their inter-
est in their jobs, how long they had been there, and on their attendance, and
then I just selected the men I thought deserved to receive bonuses and gave
them one;
and that inasmuch as Cagle had done nothing to earn any of the money "that
would be paid to him for a bonus," he decided not to pay him one.
Contentions ; conclusions
Respondent contends in effect, that since he had reinstated Cagle to a job in
the mill and paid him at the rate he was receiving when discharged, he had fully
complied with his agreement to reinstate him. As to the non-payment of a
bonus to Cagle, Kingston contended that since Cagle was not actually employed
during the time the money that was used in payment of bonuses was earned, he
was not entitled to share in such bonuses.
The informal agreement above referred to did not constitute an admission by
Kingston that he had engaged in unfair labor practices, and although the agree-
ment provided for the remedy which normally flows from the commission of un-
fair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (3) of the Act, there is no evidence
in the record that Cagle's discharge by the respondent on January 29, 1946, was
a discriminatory one under the Act, nor is there any evidence in the record that
Cagle had engaged in any union activities at the respondent's mill prior to on
or about July 24, 1946. Kingston testified without contradiction, and the under-
signed finds, that in deciding to make a settlement of Cagle's case he concluded
that it would be "cheaper" to pay Cagle than to fight the case. The record will
not sustain a finding that Cagle retained his status as an employee between
January 29 and June 25
In view of the foregoing and the entire record, the undersigned concludes and
finds that by refusing, between June 25 and July 5, to pay Cagle the minimum
wage scale for.production employees and by refusing on or about July 5 to pay a
bonus to Cagle, the respondent has not discriminated in regard to Cagle's hire or
tenure of employment in violation of Section 8 (3) of the Act. It will be recom-
mended below that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it so alleges.
C. The alleged discriminatory discharges
The complaint alleges, inter alga, that the respondent discriminatorily dis-
charged Ivar Trybon, Frank Kempa and Clement Harris. The respondent con-
tends that these three employees were among six temporary employees," the
discharge of whom has been referred to above.
Ivar Trybon
Trybon was employed by the respondent on or about July 12. During his
employment he piled lumber and slabs and for a time worked with another em-
18 Kingston explained this fact by stating that Cagle's work had improved sufficiently
to justify the "raise."
18 Clayton Peterson and Phillip Parent were included in this group. Neither appeared
at the hearing and the complaint was dismissed as to them without prejudice.
RUSSELL KINGSTON 1495
ployee on the carriage. At the solicitation of Cagle, he joined the Union on July
27 and thereafter wore his union button on the job. On July 29, Superintendent
Berg asked him to take over the tail sawyer's job which he refused to do because
he had worked on that job before, did not like it and considered it dangerous.
He was then continued at a job of loading lumber until his discharge on
August 1.
Contention ; conclusions
Counsel for the Board contends, in effect, that Trybon was discharged because
of his union membership and activities. The respondent contends that he was
discharged because he was a temporary employee for whom he had no further
work.
The record discloses that at the time of his discharge there were seven em-
ployees on the pay roll with less seniority than Trybon. Of these seven employees,
five were discharged within 4 days after Trybon was discharged, and two of the
seven were retained on the job. Since the record contains insufficient evidence
from which it may be determined just what the respondent's normal complement
of employees was, it is not possible to determine with certainty whether Trybon
was or was not "a temporary" employee. The undisputed testimony discloses
that he refused an assignment to a tail sawyer's job and was continued at loading
lumber until, as contended by the respondent, there was no further work available
for him There is no evidence that there was in fact other or further work for
him to do at the time of his discharge or that he was more capable of performing
the work of the two employees, with less seniority, who were retained on the pay
roll. From all the evidence the undersigned concludes and finds that the record
will not support a finding that Trybon was discharged because of his union mem-
bership or activity. It is so found. It will be recommended below'that the coin-
plaint be dismissed insofar as it so alleges.
Frank Kempa
Kempa was employed by the respondent on July 22, as the result of having
been told by a friend that they needed additional men at the mill He went
to the mill and was hired by Superintendent Berg, at which time he was not
advised one way or another as to whether the position would be temporary2° On
July 27, at the solicitation of Cagle, Kempa joined the Union and received a union
button which he wore on the job On August 2,T1 Berg informed Kempa that
there was no more work for him at that time and laid him off Berg told Kempa
that later on the respondent would need help and for Kempa "to come around."
Some 3 weeks later Kempa returned to the mill where he saw Berg who then
informed him that a carriage rider's job might be available later. During the
hearing, Berg testified that Kempa had been requested, by letter, to return to
work on October 21, 1946
Contentions ; conclusions
Counsel for the Board contends, in effect, that Kempa was discharged because
of his union membership and activity. The respondent contends on the contrary
20 Berg's testimony to the effect that he told Kempa that the job was to be a temporary
one is not credited by the undersigned
21 While the complaint alleged , and the parties assumed, that Kempa had been discharged
on August 3, the pay-roll record discloses that the discharge occurred on August 2 and
has been used as the basis of this finding.
22 The hearing was held on October 17
1496 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that Kempa was laid off because there was no other work for him and that he
was to be called back, as he was, when work became available.
The record discloses that in addition to piling or loading lumber Kempa, on
occasion, drove a truck. The record further discloses on August 5 the respondent
hired D. Ehlinger as a "truck driver." The record does not indicate what the
duties of a regular truck driver were or whether Kempa was qualified to fill
the position of a full-time truck driver, nor was there any contention made to
such effect.
On the basis of the above, the record will not support a finding that Kempa was
not a temporary employee or that he was discharged because of his union member-
ship and activity. It is so found. It will be recommended that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it so alleges.
Clement Harris
Harris was employed by the respondent on July 30, and on July 31, at the
solicitation of Cagle, he joined the Union and received a union button which he
thereafter wore on the job. He worked on July 30 and 31 as a tail sawyer. During
July 31 he accidentally injured a finger but continued to work throughout the day.
On the following day he found that as a result of the injury his hand was "too
sore" to return to work. He telephoned the mill and talked with the timekeeper
who advised him to get "a doctor's orders" with the result that Harris reported
to the doctor at 11 o'clock on the morning of August 1 and had his injury dressed.
He visited the doctor a number of times between August 1 and 3. On the latter
date the doctor advised him that he would be able to return to work on August 5.
On August 5, however, his hand still bothered him so he reported to work on
Tuesday, August 6, at which time he spoke to Superintendent Berg, who informed
him that they "were pretty well filled up" and that he should return in 1 week.
Harris returned to the mill on Monday, August 12, at which time Berg informed
him that he had "nothing at all for him."
Contentions ; conclusions
Counsel for the Board contends that Harris was discharged for his union
activity while the respondent contends that Harris was discharged because he
was a temporary employee for whom there was no further work.
As in the cases of Trybon and Kempa , the record contains no evidence from
which it may be determined with certainty whether Harris was or was not in
fact a temporary employee . Although Harris testified that he worked as a tail
sawyer on July 30 and 31, the record does not disclose whether or not he was
experienced as a tail sawyer. On August 12 , the same clay that Harris was
informed that there was no further work for him, the respondent hired Edwin
Matson as a "trimmer man" 23 and no explanation was given as to why Harris
was not assigned to this job . There was no contention that Harris could have
filled the position . From all the evidence , the undersigned concludes that the
record will not support a finding that Harris was discharged because of his union
membership or activity . It is so found . It will be recommended below that
the complaint be dismissed insofar as it so alleges.
Everett Baumgartner
Baumgartner had been employed at the mill for a period of about 2 years some-
time prior to 1946 at a time when the mill was owned and operated by Henry
28 A trimmer man performed the same functions as a tail sawyer.
RUSSELL KINGSTON 1497
Kingston, the respondent Kingston's father. During such prior employment
Baumgartner and Kingston, Sr., had a dispute concerning some $17 claimed by
the former to be due him as wages. Baumgartner's employment was terminated
at that time as a result of the completion of work then in progress and not as a
result of the wage dispute. His claim of $17 was not paid.
On July 29, Baumgartner was hired by Foreman Gayhart as a truck driver and
was immediately assigned to work. During the noon hour, at the solicitation of
Cagle, he joined the Union, procured and put on a union button. He worked at
his truck job until quitting time that day. He was then met by Gayhart who
informed him that, pursuant to instructions from Kingston, he was laid off
"for a couple of days." Gayhart further informed him that Kingston had said
there were "too many men standing around," and that "we will call you."
Baumgartner had not been called back to work at the time of the hearing.
Contentions ; conclusions
Kingston contended that Baumgartner had been hired without his knowl-
edge ; 24 that he saw him about "an hour or two" after he had been hired ; that
he then recalled hearing that his father had had trouble with Baumgartner and
that the latter had threatened to "whip" his father ; that after conferring with
George Bell, bookkeeper, Bell confirmed Kingston's recollection to the extent
that Kingston, Sr., and Baumgartner did have trouble on "a matter of money" ;
and that he then instructed Gayhart to lay Baumgartner off that night.
The record discloses that during the 3-day period between July 24 and 27, 15
employees joined the Union and began wearing their union buttons on the job.
None of such 15 employees were discharged on the day they joined the Union "
The Union did not demand recognition or a bargaining conference until July 30
and there is no evidence that Kingston knew prior to July 30 that such demand
Would be made on that day.
Counsel for the Board, in effect contends, that the record discloses that Baum-
gartner was discharged for union membership and that any reference to state-
ments made by Kingston, Sr , may not be considered since the latter is deceased.
Baumgartner, however, admitted that he and Kingston, Sr., did have a dispute
over wages. The undersigned credits Kingston's testimony. to the effect that he
recalled hearing that Baumgartner and his father had some trouble and the
undersigned also credits Bell's testimony that lie had confirmed Kingston's
recollection concerning such trouble. It would be more or less natural for
Kingston to have harbored resentment against any employee whom he believed
may have unfairly dealt with his father. Although such employee may have
been in the right in his contentions, his discharge for such reason is not a violation
of the Act. The record will not support a finding that Baumgartner was dis-
charged on July 29, 1946, because of his union membership or activity. It is so
found. It will be recommended below that the complaint be dismissed insofar
as it so alleges.
William Burke
Burke, a school boy who was 17 years old at the time of the hearing, was
first employed at the mill by the respondent's father as a part-time worker during
2; No contention is made, however, that Gayhart was without authority to hire or that
it was necessary that Kingston be consulted in advance of such hiring.
2' Bell had been employed as a bookkeeper by Kingston, Sr
26 The record, however, discloses that Alfred Martinson, who had worked on July 26 and
27 only, had joined the Union on July 27. Martinson's termination was not alleged as a
discriminatory one and the record does not indicate whether he was terminated by the
respondent or quit of his own accord.
1498 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1944 and 1945. He was hired by the respondent on June 23, 1946, and returned
to the mill as a carriage rider. On July 28, at the solicitation of Cagle, Burke
joined the Union and thereafter wore a union button on the job. On the morning
of August 13 before starting time at the mill, Burke went to the millwright's office
to get warm, after which he went to seek John Serena, head sawyer, whom he
normally assisted in installing saws on carriages before the mill got under way for
the day's run, and found that the saws had already been installed. He was then
met by Berg who asked him if he did not know that it was part of his job to
help change the saw. Burke replied in the affirmative, and when Berg inquired
why he had not helped change the saws on that morning, Burke replied that he
was cold and had gone to the millwright's room to get warm.
During the noon lunch period, Burke went into town to attend to some shopping
and returned to the mill and found that the saws had already been installed for
the afternoon run. He was again met by Berg who told him that he had been
waiting for Burke to put the saws on and since he was not there to do it he
should go to the office and get his time.
Burke testified that both on the mousing and at noon of that day he had
arrived at the mill in plenty of time to have helped install the saws before starting
time at the mill. This testimony was not specifically denied, but Burke's admis-
sion that he had gone to the millwright's office to get warm in the morning and
that he had occasion to go to town to do shopping during his lunch hour would
indicate that he did not report on either occasion as early as he normally did or
was required to do.
Contentions ; conclusions
Respondent contends and Berg testified that the millwright had told him for
"several days in a row" that Burke had refused to help change the saws," and
from the evidence in the record the undersigned cannot find that Burke did not
refuse to cooperate with the head sawyer on August 13. Although counsel for the
Board, in effect contends, that Burke was discharged because of his union mem-
bership and activities, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support
this contention. Insofar as the record discloses, Burke engaged in no union
activities other than the act of joining it. The record will not support a finding
that Burke was discharged because of his union membership or activity. It is
so found. It will be recommended below that the complaint be dismissed insofar
as it so alleges. -
Mike Myers
Myers was first employed at the mill in August 1943 by Henry Kingston, the
respondent 's predecessor in ownership of the mill. Myers worked as a "setter"
and it is undisputed that he is an expert setter. At the solicitation of Cagle, he
joined the Union on July 27 and thereafter wore his union button on the job.
The record discloses that he was absent from work on frequent occasions. When
these absences occurred it was necessary to replace him with a sawyer who
could perform Myers' setter job and put the millwright to work at the sawyer's
job. The men who were required to change their jobs as a result of Myers' ab-
sence complained , with the result that Myers was warned to improve his at-
tendance record or he would be laid off.
27 The millwright was not called as a witness and it was not shown that he was
unavailable.
RUSSELL KINGSTON 1499
From July 16 to 31,28 inclusive, Myers was absent 7 full days and 4 half days.
From August 7 to August 15 he worked full time. He remained away from
work on September 9 and 10 When he returned on the following day, September
11, he was laid off by Berg with the statement, "I have to lay you off you lose
too much time."
On the evening of September 13, respondent sent Employee George Woods to
Myers' home with a message to the effect that the respondent wanted Myers "to
come back to work in the morning (September 14)." Myers told Woods that if
the respondent wanted him to return to work to "tell Art (Superintendent Berg)
to come up here and talk to me himself." Myers did not report back to work
as a result of this request.
Contentions; conclusions
Myers contended that his absence was "sometimes" due to "chronic ear
trouble," and that his discharge resulted from his union membership and activity.
Kingston contended that he was laid off temporarily in an effort to induce a
better attendance record on his part.
The record discloses that Myers joined the Union on July 27 and thereafter
wore his union button and became a member of a two man grievance committee.
There was no evidence that the grievance committee ever attempted to function.
On the above and the record the undersigned is convinced and finds that Myers
was laid off on September 11, 1946, in an attempt, on the part of the respondent,
to induce him to improve his attendance record, and that the offer of reinstate-
ment made to Myers on September 13 was a bona Aide one and that by the lay-off
of September 11, the respondent has not discriminated as to his hire and tenure
of employment in violation of the Act. It is so found. It will be recommended
below that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it so alleges.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the respondent described in Section I, above,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and ob-
structing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
v. THE REMEDY
Since, it has been found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices, it will be recommended that he cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having
been found that the respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the
Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, it
will be recommended that the respondent upon request bargain collectively with
the Union.
Because of the basis of respondent's refusal to bargain, as indicated in the
facts found, and because of the absence of any evidence that danger of other
unfair labor practices is to be anticipated from respondent's conduct in the
past, the undersigned will not recommend that respondent cease and desist from
21 The record does not contain the pay roll for the period from July 1 to July 15. Myers,
however, admitted that he was off his fob on July 5 and 6,, and as to whether he was off the
job on July 12, 13 and 15 he stated, "I don't know."
1500 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the commission of any other unfair labor practice. Nevertheless, in order to
effectuate the policies of the Act, the undersigned will recommend that re-
spondent cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from in
any manner interfering with the efforts of the Union to bargain collectively
with him Z"
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and the entire record in the case,
the undersigned makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Woodworkers of America, Local Union No. 15, CIO, is a labor
organization, within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All of the respondent's production and maintenance employees, excluding
supervisory and office employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
3. International Woodworkers of America, Local Union No. 15, CIO, was on
July 30, 1946, and has been, at all times thereafter, the exclusive representative
of all of the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing on July 30, 1946, and at all times thereafter, to bargain collec-
tively with International Woodworkers of America, Local Union No. 15, CIO,
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid unit, the respond-
ent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning
of Section 8 (5) of the Act.
5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing his employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of
the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
7. By refusing to pay Francis Cagle the minimum wage from June 25 to
July 5, 1946, or by on July 5, 1946, refusing to pay said Cagle a bonus, and by
discharging Everett Baumgartner, Mike Myers, William Burke, Ivar Trybon,
Frank Kempa, and Clement Harris, the respondent has not violated the provi-
sions of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
undersigned recommends that the respondent, Russell Kingston, his agents,
successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Woodworkers of
America, Local Union No. 15, CIO, as the exclusive representative of all his
employees within the aforesaid appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment ;
(b) Holding elections among his employees to determine their union senti-
ments or threatening such employees with loss of employment if they vote in
favor of union organization ;
(c) Engaging in any other acts in any manner interfering with the efforts
of International Woodworkers of America, Local Union No. 15, CIO, to negotiate
29 See N . L. R. B. v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U. S. 426.
RUSSELL KINGSTON 1501
for or represent the employees as the exclusive bargaining agent in the aforesaid
unit.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the undersigned finds will effec-
tuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with International Woodworkers of
America, Local Union No. 15, CIO, as the exclusive representative of all his
employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement ;
(b) Post at the respondent's mill in Stambaugh, Michigan, copies of the notice
attached hereto and marked "Appendix A." Copies of the said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region, shall, after being
duly signed by the respondent's representative, be posted by the respondent im-
mediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by him for sixty (60) consecu-
tive days thereafter in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
respondent to insure that the said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material ;
(c) File with the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region on or before
ten (10) days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report, a report in writing
setting forth in detail the manner and form in which the respondent has com-
plied with the foregoing recommendations.
It is further recommended that the complaint insofar as it alleges that the
respondent has violated the prov sions of Section 8 (3) of the Act in regard to
Francis Cagle and by discharging Everett Baumgartner, Mike Myers, William
Burke, Ivar Trybon, Frank Kempa, and Clement Harris, be dismissed
It is further recommended that unless on or before ten (10) days from the
receipt of this Intermediate Report the respondent notifies said Regional Direc-
tor in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the respondent to take
the action aforesaid.
As provided in Section 203 39 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board, Series 4, effective September 11, 1946, any party or
counsel for the Board may, within fifteen (15) days from the date of service of
the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 203 38 of said
Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Rochambeau Building, Washing-
ton 25, D. C, an original and four copies of a statement in writing setting forth
such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record
or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies
upon, together with the original and four copies of a brief in support thereof;
and any party or counsel for the Board may, within the same period, file an
original and four copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report Im-
mediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the
party or counsel for the Board filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon
each of the other parties and shall file a copy with the Regional Director. Proof
of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be promptly
made as required by Section 203 65. As further provided in said Section 203.39,
should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request
therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the
date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board.
PETER F. WARD,
Trial Examiner.
Dated December 18, 1946.
1502 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, I hereby notify my employees that :
I WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with International Woodwork-
ers of America , Local Union No. 15 , CIO, as the exclusive representative
of all employees in the bargaining unit described herein with respect to
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment , or other conditions of employ-
ment, and if any agreement is reached , embody such understanding in a
signed agreement . The bargaining unit is :
All production and maintenance employees of the undersigned , employed
at his mill at Stambaugh , Michigan , excluding supervisory and office
employees.
I WILL NOT hold elections among my employees to determine their union
sentiments or threaten them with loss of employment if they vote in favor
of union organization.
I WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the above-named
Union to bargain with me or refuse to bargain with said Union as the
exclusive representative of all my employees in the above -described appro-
priate unit.
RussELL KINGSTON,
Employer.
Dated ------------------------ By ----------------------------------------
(Repiesentative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.