Roseburg Forest Products Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 9, 2000

331 N.L.R.B. 999 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS CO. 999
Roseburg Forest Products Co. and Western Council
of Industrial Workers. Case 36–CA–7722
August 9, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND BRAME
Based on a charge filed January 12, 1996, by Western
Council of Industrial Workers (the Union), the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a
complaint January 7, 1997, against Roseburg Forest Prod-
ucts Co. (the Respondent), alleging that it violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by
refusing to provide the Union with requested information.
The Respondent filed a timely answer admitting in part
and denying in part the allegations of the complaint and
raising affirmative defenses.
On March 24, 1997, the Respondent, the Union, and
the General Counsel filed with the Board a stipulation of
facts and a motion to transfer this case to the Board. The
parties agreed that the charge, the complaint, the answer
to the complaint, and the stipulation, including attached
exhibits, shall constitute the entire record in this proceed-
ing and that no other testimony is necessary or desired.
The parties further waived a hearing before an adminis-
trative law judge and the issuance of an administrative
law judge's decision. On July 17, 1997, the Board ap-
proved the stipulation and transferred the proceeding to
the Board for issuance of a Decision and Order. The
General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Union each
filed briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
On the entire record and the briefs, the Board makes
the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a Delaware corporation, with its
principal place of business and office in Roseburg, Ore-
gon, is engaged in the business of wood products manu-
facturing. During the 12-month period preceding the
filing of the complaint, the Respondent, in conducting its
business operations, had gross sales of goods and ser-
vices valued in excess of $500,000. Further, during the
same time period, the Respondent sold and shipped
goods or provided services of a total value in excess of
$50,000 from its facilities within the State of Oregon, to
customers outside the State of Oregon, or sold and
shipped goods or provided services to customers within
the State, which customers were themselves engaged in
interstate commerce by other than indirect means. We
find that the Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act, and that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Stipulated Facts
On about December 10, 1992, the Respondent and the
Union, by its Local 2949, entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement (the contract) with a June 1, 1996
expiration date. The Union and the Respondent have
since entered into a successor collective-bargaining
agreement which is in full force and effect.
At all material times, Robert K. Wilson held the posi-
tion of director of industrial relations for the Respondent
and has been a supervisor within the meaning of Section
2(11) of the Act and an agent of the Respondent within
the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act. At all times
material, Nelson D. Atkin II has been an attorney repre-
senting the Respondent and an agent of the Respondent
within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.
At all material times, Roger Bissonnette has been the
business agent for the Union’s Local 2949. At all mate-
rial times, Michael T. Garone has been an attorney repre-
senting the Union.
The Respondent operates a plywood plant, commonly
referred to as Plywood No. 1, in Dillard, Oregon, that is
covered by the Contract. On about March 15, 1995,1 the
Respondent posted a bid sheet at Plywood No. 1 for two
open jobs in the hardwood veneer sorter (helper) classifi-
cation on day shift. Pursuant to article 8 of the contract,
job openings in this classification are to be posted in the
plant for 3 working days before being filled. The bids
are to be considered jointly by the Respondent and the
Union as to the employees’ length of service and capabil-
ity.
The hardwood veneer sorter (helper) job is a highly
sought after job among the employees of Plywood No. 1
because it is not a physically demanding job and it oper-
ates on a straight dayshift basis. The majority of the
other jobs in Plywood No. 1 operate on a rotating shift
basis. Approximately 30 employees from Plywood No. 1
(there are approximately 300 employees plantwide)
signed the bid sheet for the two openings. The senior
bidders were C. O. Jefferson, with a seniority date of
May 6, 1963, and Robert Cofer, with a seniority date of
July 14, 1963. Three other employees had approximately
30 years seniority.2 Numerous employees with 20 or so
years of seniority signed the bid sheet, including Gary
Booze, whose seniority date is July 5, 1973. Approxi-
mately 10 bidders had greater seniority than Booze.3
At the end of March, the Respondent awarded the two
open hardwood veneer sorter (helper) jobs to C. O. Jef-
ferson, the senior bidder, and to Gary Booze. On about

1 All dates hereafter are in 1995, unless specified otherwise.
2 These employees are Louis Reinhart, George Tarrant, and Jim Wil-
son.
3 The parties agree, for purposes limited exclusively to this case, that
all of the bidders who signed the bid sheet were capable of performing
the job of hardwood veneer sorter (helper).
331 NLRB No. 124
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1000
March 31, a grievance was filed by the Union alleging a
seniority violation.
On about April 14, the Union and the Respondent met
at step II of the grievance procedure to discuss the griev-
ance. The union spokesman, Roger Bissonnette, advised
the Respondent that the Union disagreed with its place-
ment of a less senior person (Booze) in the hardwood
veneer sorter (helper) classification. The Union advised
the Respondent that the position was a straight dayshift
job and that it takes about 30 years seniority to get the
job. The Respondent’s spokesman, Bob Wilson, told the
Union that it placed Gary Booze in the job pursuant to
his doctor’s recommendation and in an attempt to ac-
commodate Booze’s disability according to what the
Respondent believed was its responsibility under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).4 The Union
asked if the Respondent had attempted to make other
accommodations for Booze.
The second step meeting on the grievance was contin-
ued until May 24. At this time, union spokesman Bis-
sonnette advised the Respondent of the Union’s position
that the Respondent could have made other accommoda-
tions for Booze on his regular bid job rather than placing
him in a position which takes almost 30 years of senior-
ity to obtain through the bid system. The Employer’s
spokesman, Bob Wilson, restated the Respondent’s posi-
tion that its actions in accommodating Booze were
proper under the ADA. The Union indicated that it
would process the grievance to the third step of the con-
tractual grievance procedure.
A third step grievance meeting was held on June 28.5
The Union again argued that, instead of violating the
seniority provisions of the contract, the Respondent
could have made other accommodations for Booze. The
Union suggested as a possible accommodation assigning
Booze to place putty on the ends of veneer, a job Booze
had previously been assigned. The Respondent rejected
this suggestion, claiming that it was not a full-time job.
The Respondent again argued that the accommodations
that it had made for Booze were made pursuant to his
doctor’s recommendations and in accordance with the
ADA. The Respondent acknowledged that its actions in
placing Booze in the position were in conflict with the
Contract. The Union indicated that it would process the
grievance further.
Under the contract, if a grievance is not resolved at the
third step, the Union can either engage in economic ac-
tion and/or bring an action for breach of contract in a
court of competent jurisdiction. To date, the Union has
taken neither action.
The Respondent never disclosed to the Union the na-
ture of Booze’s disability or physical condition during

4 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
5 Western Council Staff Representative Ken Devasier assisted Bis-
sonnette as the union spokesman at this meeting.
any step of the grievance procedure, nor did it disclose to
the Union the contents of any medical records or the sub-
stance of Booze’s doctor’s opinions or conclusions.
On about July 25, the Union’s attorney, Michael T.
Garone, telephoned the Respondent’s attorney, Nelson
D. Atkin II, to discuss the grievance. Garone asked At-
kin for information concerning Booze’s physical condi-
tion and disability. Garone told Atkin that the Union
needed to know the specifics of Booze’s medical condi-
tion in order to determine whether the Respondent’s ac-
commodation of him was necessary and, further, to as-
sess the Union’s position concerning the grievance.
There was general discussion concerning the require-
ments of the ADA and the confidentiality of medical
information. Atkin did not divulge the information re-
quested by the Union during this conversation, but
agreed to get back to the Union with the Respondent’s
formal position in writing.
On about July 31 Atkin advised the Union by letter
that the Respondent, relying on the ADA, was refusing to
comply with the Union’s request to release information
concerning Booze's medical condition. Atkin indicated
that if the Union obtained a written authorization to re-
lease medical information from Booze, the Respondent
would release the information to the Union.
On September 21 the Union filed an unfair labor prac-
tice charge in Case 36–CA–7654, alleging that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
refusing to provide the requested information. On about
October 30 Booze executed a written release authorizing
the Respondent to divulge to the Union his entire per-
sonnel file, including any medical information it con-
tained. The Union sent this release to the Respondent on
about November 10. As a result of receiving this release
from Booze, the Union withdrew the unfair labor prac-
tice charge in Case 36–CA–7654 on about December 7.
During the period between October 30 and December 21,
the Respondent did not divulge any medical information
concerning Booze to the Union. On about December 21,
Booze notified the Union and the Respondent that he had
decided to rescind the permission he had previously
given for release of his medical information.
During the first week of January 1996, Garone and At-
kin again spoke by telephone concerning the grievance
and Booze’s rescission of the release. Garone restated
the Union’s request for and need for information regard-
ing Booze’s medical condition and the Respondent’s
accommodation decision. Atkin reiterated the Respon-
dent’s refusal to provide the requested information pur-
suant to the ADA. On January 12, 1996, the Union filed
its charge in this case alleging that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to provide the
Union with the requested information.
If called to testify as a witness, Roger Bissonnette
would testify that the information requested by the Union
concerning Booze’s medical condition is necessary for
ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS CO. 1001
the following reasons: (a) to enable the Union to repre-
sent its members as their exclusive collective-bargaining
agent regarding the contractual seniority provisions as
they relate to the alleged need to accommodate disabled
employees; (b) to enable the Union to determine if there
is some other accommodation that could be made for
Booze’s asserted disability; and (c) to enable the Union
to determine whether to take economic and/or legal ac-
tion concerning the grievance. The Respondent, despite
its answer to the complaint, has stipulated that it would
not call any witnesses to contradict this testimony.6
The Union has given the Respondent assurances that
the Union would, upon receiving medical information
concerning an employee for which accommodation was
being sought, take all reasonable and necessary precau-
tionary steps to ensure that only those with a “need to
know” the information (for example, high-level Union
decisionmakers, the Union’s attorneys, union medical or
vocational consultants) would receive the information
which would otherwise be kept confidential.
On November 1, 1996, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EE0C) issued an Opinion con-
cerning this NLRB case which addressed the issue of
how to resolve the potential conflict between the ADA
confidentiality requirements pertaining to medical infor-
mation, and a union’s right to obtain certain information
necessary to collective bargaining.7
The Union does not have any alternative access to any
medical information concerning Booze which would
have assisted it in: (1) determining what functional limi-
tations exist to warrant an accommodation; or (2) deter-
mining if some other accommodation which does not
require a breach of contract is feasible. The nature of
Booze’s disability is not readily apparent.
B. The Parties’ Contentions
The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) by refusing to provide information that is
relevant to and necessary for the processing of griev-
ances or the administration of the collective-bargaining
agreement.
The Respondent argues that the ADA requires it to
keep employee medical records confidential and that
therefore it is precluded by federal law from disclosing
the requested information to the Union. The General
Counsel and the Union argue, inter alia, that the agency
responsible for applying the ADA, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, has already rejected the
Respondent's argument that it is precluded from disclos-
ing the requested information.

6 The Respondent’s answer denies the complaint allegation that the
information requested by the Union is necessary for, and relevant to,
the Union’s performance of its duties as exclusive collective-bargaining
representative.
7 This opinion letter is reported in its entirety at the Fair Empl. Prac.
Man. (BNA) No. 8, at 405:7527, and is discussed, infra. The letter will
hereinafter be referred to as the “EEOC letter.”
C. Discussion
An employer is obligated by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
to supply requested information that is potentially rele-
vant and will be of use to the union in fulfilling its re-
sponsibilities as exclusive bargaining representative.
NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–436
(1967). The standard for relevancy of the information
sought by a union is a liberal, discovery-type standard,
requiring that the information merely have some bearing
on the issue between the parties, not that it be dispositive.
Id. at 437 and fn. 6. A union’s interest in the requested
information, however, will not always predominate over
other legitimate interests, such as an employer’s need to
keep the information confidential. Detroit Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314 (1979). As the Board stated in
Pennsylvania Power Co., 301 NLRB 1104, 1105–1106
(1991):
[I]n dealing with union requests for relevant, but assert-
edly confidential information, the Board is required to
balance a union’s need for the information against any
“legitimate and substantial” confidentiality interests es-
tablished by the employer. The appropriate accommo-
dation necessarily depends on the particular circum-
stances of each case. The party asserting confidential-
ity has the burden of proof. Legitimate and substantial
confidentiality and privacy claims will be upheld, but
blanket claims of confidentiality will not. Further, a
party refusing to supply information on confidentiality
grounds has a duty to seek an accommodation. Thus,
when a union is entitled to information concerning
which an employer can legitimately claim a partial con-
fidentiality interest, the employer must bargain toward
an accommodation between the union’s information
needs and the employer’s justified interests. [Footnotes
omitted.]
Applying these principles, we find that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing since July
31, 1995, to provide the Union with the requested infor-
mation concerning Booze’s medical condition and the
Respondent's accommodation of his disability. There
can be no doubt that the information sought by the Union
is relevant and necessary for it to process the grievance it
filed alleging that the Respondent violated the seniority
provisions of the parties’ collective-bargaining agree-
ment by awarding the hardwood veneer sorter (helper)
job to Booze. Thus, the stipulated record establishes that
the Union had three separate needs for the requested in-
formation: (1) to enable the Union to represent employ-
ees adequately regarding the contractual seniority provi-
sions as they relate to the alleged need to accommodate
disabled employees; (2) to enable the Union to determine
if there is some other possible accommodation of
Booze’s alleged disability; and (3) to enable the Union to
determine whether to take economic and/or legal action
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1002
concerning the grievance.8 In addition, the parties have
stipulated that the nature of Booze’s disability is not
readily apparent and that the Union has no alternative
access to any medical information concerning Booze’s
alleged disability. In sum, the record clearly shows that
the Union cannot evaluate the merits of the grievance it
filed without the requested information.
In light of the Union’s request for relevant and neces-
sary information, the Respondent was “required either to
provide the information promptly . . . or to attempt to
accommodate its confidentiality concerns and the Un-
ion’s need for the information.” GTE Southwest Inc.,
329 NLRB 563 (1999) (footnote omitted). Here, the
Respondent did neither, and we find that it thereby vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Id.
In so finding, we reject the Respondent’s contention that
the ADA flatly prohibits it from disclosing the requested
information to the Union. In this connection, we rely on
the EEOC’s opinion letter addressing the specific facts of
this case. The letter is signed by the EEOC’s legal counsel
and states that it “has been reviewed and approved by the
Commission.” (EEOC letter at 405:7530.) The EEOC
phrased the issue before it as follows: “Does the ADA
permit an employer to provide medical information about
an employee’s disability to a union in order for the union
to assess a grievance challenging the employer’s provision
of a reasonable accommodation to the employee which
conflicts with the seniority provisions of the [collective-
bargaining agreement]?” (EEOC letter at 405:7528.)
In its analysis of this issue, the EEOC explained that,
under Title I of the ADA, it is unlawful for a “covered
entity” not to make a reasonable accommodation to
known physical or mental limitations of otherwise quali-
fied employees, unless there is undue hardship.9 Title I
defines “covered entity” to include both employers and
unions.10 Therefore, in the opinion of the EEOC, “a un-
ion, in its role as designated exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of the collective workforce, has a reasonable
accommodation obligation under the ADA.” (EEOC
letter at 405:7528; footnote omitted.)
In addition, the opinion letter states that “[w]ith limited
exceptions, Title I of the ADA obligates all covered enti-
ties to keep confidential any medical information ob-
tained about . . . employees. Medical information in-
cludes specific information about an individual’s disabil-
ity and related functional limitations, as well as general
statements that an individual has a disability or that an
ADA reasonable accommodation has been provided for a
particular individual.” (EEOC letter at 405:7529–7530;
footnotes omitted.)
Thus, under the EEOC’s analysis, both an employer and
a union, as “covered entities,” are subject to the ADA’s

8 The Respondent, despite its answer to the complaint (see fn. 6, su-
pra), has not presented any countervailing evidence.
9 42 U.S. § 12112(a) and (b)(5)(A); 29 CFR. § 1630.9.
10 42 U.S. § 12112(2); 29 CFR. § 1630.2.
confidentiality requirements. However, the EEOC also
states that medical information necessary to the reasonable
accommodation process may be shared between an em-
ployer and a union in order to enable them to meet their
reasonable accommodation obligations to a particular in-
dividual. The EEOC reasons as follows:
In the unique setting of the unionized workplace, when
an employer seeks to provide an accommodation that
conflicts with collectively bargained seniority rules, the
ADA reasonable accommodation obligation of the em-
ployer and of the union, as bargaining representative,
are intertwined. The union and employer both partici-
pate in making the reasonable accommodation deter-
mination regarding a particular individual. It is the
[EEOC]’s position that, where no other reasonable ac-
commodation exists, the employer and union are jointly
obligated to negotiate with each other to provide a vari-
ance if it will not impose undue hardship. [Footnote
omitted.]
Accordingly, . . . an employer and a union may
share with each other and use medical information
necessary to enable them to make reasonable ac-
commodation determinations consistent with the
ADA. [Footnote omitted.] When the need for an
accommodation is not obvious, the employer and un-
ion may share reasonable documentation of the need
for accommodation . . . .13 Such information may
only be shared with individuals with a need to know
the information who are decision-makers or neces-
sary consultants regarding the accommodation.
[Footnote omitted.]
__________________________
13 The information an employer may share with a union is strictly
limited to that which is necessary for the union to fulfill its role in
the accommodation process. Necessary information often will
not encompass the entire contents of an employee’s medical file.
[EEOC letter at 405:7529.]
Clearly, the EEOC has determined that the ADA does
not preclude an employer from disclosing to the union
information concerning an employee’s disability and his
need for accommodation. Indeed, regarding the particu-
lar facts of this case, the EEOC specified:
[I]n this case, to make the reasonable accommodation
determination, the ADA permits the Employer to give
the Union medical information in the Employer’s pos-
session that is necessary to the accommodation process.
If the need for accommodation is not obvious, the Em-
ployer may share documentation showing that [Gary
Booze] has an ADA-covered disability, and stating the
related functional limitations that necessitate the ac-
commodation. Medical information may only be
shared with individuals with a need to know the infor-
mation who are decision-makers or necessary consult-
ants regarding the accommodation.
[EEOC letter at 405:7530.]
ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS CO. 1003
The EEOC has the responsibility of interpreting and
enforcing the ADA. As a matter of comity, we shall de-
fer to its opinion that the “ADA permits an employer to
give a union, in its role as bargaining unit representative,
medical information necessary to the ADA reasonable
accommodation process to enable the employer and un-
ion to make reasonable accommodation determinations
consistent with the ADA.” (EEOC letter at 405:7527.)
See PCC Structurals, Inc., 330 NLRB 868 (2000) (Board
guided by EEOC’s interpretation of ADA’s require-
ments), and OXY USA, Inc., 329 NLRB 208 (1999) (de-
ferral to Department of Justice’s interpretation of Section
302 of the Act). We can discern no basis for disregard-
ing the EEOC’s authoritative analysis of the ADA, espe-
cially as it pertains to the facts of this case. Furthermore,
we find that the EEOC’s interpretation strikes the appro-
priate balance between the confidentiality requirements
of the ADA and the Union’s right to relevant information
under the NLRA.
Applying the framework set forth in the EEOC’s opin-
ion letter, we find that the ADA “permits” the Respon-
dent to provide the Union with Booze’s medical informa-
tion, but the “information [the Respondent] may share
with [the Union] is strictly limited to that which is neces-
sary for [the Union] to fulfill its role in the accommoda-
tion process. Necessary information often will not en-
compass the entire contents of an employee’s medical
file.” In other words, only that medical information con-
cerning Booze that the Union truly needs may be dis-
closed to it. All other medical information must be kept
confidential by the Respondent. Within this framework,
there appears to be much for the parties to bargain about,
and they are in the best position to determine how to ar-
rive at a mutually acceptable accommodation of their
respective interests.11
In these circumstances, we will not order the Respon-
dent to furnish the requested information immediately.
In similar cases, the Board has held that the appropriate
remedy is to give the parties an opportunity to bargain in
good faith regarding the conditions under which the un-
ion’s need for relevant information could be satisfied
with appropriate safeguards protective of the Respon-
dent’s legitimate confidentiality concerns. See, e.g.,
GTE Southwest, supra, and cases there cited. We find
that approach appropriate here as well.
Under this approach, we recognize that if the Respon-
dent and the Union are unable to reach agreement on a
method of protecting their respective interests, the parties
may be back before us again. If there is a question as to
whether the parties have bargained in good faith, we
shall make that determination. If need be, we shall bal-

11 Topics for negotiations could include clarifying the somewhat im-
precise nature of the Union’s request and identifying the specific in-
formation that would be sufficient to satisfy the Union’s three articu-
lated needs, within the parameters set by the ADA, as defined in the
EEOC’s opinion letter.
ance the Union’s right of access to relevant information
against the Respondent’s confidentiality concerns, in
accordance with the principles set forth in Detroit Edi-
son, supra. However, we believe that first allowing the
parties an opportunity to resolve their differences best
effectuates the Act’s policy of maintaining industrial
peace through the resolution of workplace disputes by
collective bargaining.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Roseburg Forest Products Co., Roseburg,
Oregon, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing or failing to bargain in good faith with
Western Council of Industrial Workers as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the bargaining
unit employees by refusing or failing to furnish the Un-
ion information relevant to the processing of grievances
or the administration of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment. The bargaining unit is:
All production, maintenance and transportation em-
ployees and all temporary and part-time employees
who perform work within the bargaining unit at the Re-
spondent’s Douglas and Lane County, Oregon sawmill,
plywood, veneer, particleboard, and chip plants, ex-
cluding office and clerical employees, and guards, su-
pervisors, quality and production control, technical and
professional employees as defined in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain collectively in good faith with
the Union regarding the Union’s July 25, 1995 request
for information concerning Gary Booze’s medical condi-
tion and the accommodation of his disability, and there-
after comply with the terms of any agreement reached
through such bargaining.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Dillard, Oregon, copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”12 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 36,
after being signed by the Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1004
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall du-
plicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed
by the Respondent at any time since July 31, 1995.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with
Western Council of Industrial Workers as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of our bargaining
unit by refusing to furnish the Union with information
relevant to the processing of grievances or the admini-
stration of the collective-bargaining agreement. The bar-
gaining unit is:
All production, maintenance and transportation em-
ployees and all temporary and part-time employees
who perform work within the bargaining unit at the
Employer’s Douglas and Lane County, Oregon saw-
mill, plywood, veneer, particleboard, and chip plants,
excluding office and clerical employees, and guards,
supervisors, quality and production control, technical
and professional employees as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively in good faith
with the Union regarding its July 25, 1995 request for
information concerning Gary Booze’s medical condition
and the accommodation of his disability, and thereafter
comply with the terms of any agreement reached through
such bargaining.
ROSEBURG FOREST PRODUCTS CO.