Roper Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 3, 1974

213 N.L.R.B. 136 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Roper Corporation, Williamsburg Division and United
Steelworkers of America , AFL-CIO-CLC, Frank
Taylor, and James E. Lambdin . Cases 9-CA-7903,
9-RC-10128, 9-CA-7976, and 9-CA-8104
September 3, 1974
DECISION, ORDER, AND CERTIFICATION
OF REPRESENTATIVE
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On May 30, 1974, Administrative Law Judge Rob-
ert E. Mullin issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, Roper Corporation, Wil-
liamsburg Division, Williamsburg, Kentucky, its offi-
cers, agents , successors , and assigns , shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE
It is hereby certified that a majority of the valid
ballots have been cast for United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO-CLC, and that, pursuant to Sec-
tion 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the foregoing labor organization is the ex-
clusive representative of all the employees in the fol-
lowing appropriate unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment:
All production and maintenance employees of
the Employer at its Williamsburg, Kentucky
plant excluding all office clerical employees, pro-
fessional employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT E. MULLIN, Administrative Law Judge: This con-
solidated proceeding, with all parties represented, was heard
on January 8, 9, and 10 and April 18, 1974, in London,
Kentucky. The complaint in Case 9-CA-7903 was issued on
November 16, 1973, the complaint in Case 9-CA-7976 on
October 31, 1973, and the I complaint in Case 9-CA-8104
on December 18, 1973.2 All of these complaints alleged that
the Respondent had engaged in numerous violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and that it had violated Section 8(a)(3) in the
terminations of Roger Bird, Frank Taylor, and James E.
Lambdin. In answers , duly filed, the Respondent conceded
certain facts with respect to the operation of its business, but
it denied the commission of any unfair labor practices.
In Case 9-RC-10128, upon a representation petition filed
by the Union and a stipulation for certification upon con-
sent election, an election was held on June 29, 1973, among
the production and maintenance employees working at the
Employer's plant in Williamsburg, Kentucky. The tally of
ballots showed that of approximately 73 eligible voters, 73
cast ballots of which 47 were for the Union and 26 were
against . There were no challenged ballots. On July 9, 1973,
the Employer timely filed objections to conduct affecting
the results of the election. On September 21, 1973, the Re-
gional Director, after an investigation, issued a report on
objections wherein he recommended that the Board over-
rule the Employer's objections in their entirety. On October
9, 1973, the Employer filed timely exceptions with respect
to Objections 3 and 5, contending that the election should
be set aside or, in the alternative, that a hearing be held.
On November 16, 1973, the Board issued an order direct-
ing hearing wherein it found that Objection 3 raised materi-
al factual issues regarding the preelection conduct of Frank
Taylor, identified by the Employer as a warehouse foreman.
Accordingly, it ordered that a hearing be held to resolve the
issues raised with respect to Objection 3, including the al-
leged supervisory status of Frank Taylor, and that a report
and recommendations on these issues be prepared on the
basis of the record developed at the hearing.
On December 18, 1973, the Acting Regional Director for
Region 9 issued an order consolidating Case 9-RC-10128
with Cases 9-CA-7903 and 9-CA-7976 for the purpose of
hearing , ruling , and decision by an Administrative Law
Judge.
The original hearing in the above-numbered cases opened
on January 8 and continued through January 10, 1974. On
the latter date, and after both the General Counsel and the
Respondent had rested, the General Counsel moved to a-
mend the complaint to allege that even if Frank Taylor was
found to be a supervisor, his termination constituted a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Respondent opposed
this motion on various grounds. I granted the General
Counsel's motion to amend, but allowed the Respondent 15
1 The charge in Case 9-CA-7903 was filed on July 16, 1973, and the charge
in Case 9-CA-7976 on August 20, 1973.
2 The original charge in Case 9-CA-8104 was filed on October 29, 1973,
and an amended charge was filed on December 3, 1973.
ROPER CORPORATION
days to present a memorandum on its position, whereupon
the hearing was adjourned sine die.
On January 25, 1974, the Respondent submitted its mem-
orandum, along with a number of proposed exhibits. In the
meantime , the Respondent requested the General Counsel
of the Board to direct his representatives in the case to
withdraw their motion to amend the complaint. In a letter
dated February 18, 1974, the General Counsel of the Board
denied this request, but joined with the Respondent in a
motion to reopen the hearing for the purpose of taking
evidence on the issues raised by the amendment of the
complaint. Thereafter, on March 19, 1974, I issued an order
receiving in evidence the documents enumerated in the
Respondent's motion of January 25, 1974, and granting the
motion to reopen the hearing for the purpose of taking
testimony on the issues raised by the amendment of the
complaint as to Frank Taylor. On April 18, 1974, the hear-
ing was reopened for the aforesaid purpose. After the par-
ties were accorded an opportunity to present all relevant
and material evidence, the hearing was closed on that date.
On May 20, 1974, the General Counsel and the Respondent
submitted able and comprehensive briefs. Motions to dis-
miss, made by the Respondent at the close of the hearing
and renewed in its brief, are disposed of as appears hereinaf-
ter.4
Upon the entire record in these cases , including my obser-
vation of the witnesses and their demeanor on the witness
stand, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a Delaware corporation, is engaged in
the manufacture of tractors and shredder baggers at its
plant in Williamsburg, Kentucky, the only one of its facili-
ties involved herein. At this plant during the 12 months
preceding issuance of the complaints, a representative peri-
od, the Respondent had a direct outflow of its products
valued in excess of $50,000 which it sold and shipped in
interstate commerce directly from its place of business in
Williamsburg, Kentucky, to customers located outside the
State of Kentucky. Upon the foregoing facts, the Respon-
dent concedes and the undersigned finds that Roper Corpo-
ration, Williamsburg Division, is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, herein
called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning
of the Act.
3 All documents received in evidence by the order of March 19, 1974, have
been added to the exhibit file. In addition, the order itself , designated ALJ
Exh. 1, has been appended to the exhibit file.
4 On May 20 , 1974, and simultaneously with the submission of its brief, the
Respondent filed a motion to correct the transcript as to the testimony of Lee
Fraser . For reasons that appear later in this Decision (sec. IV . infra) this
motion is granted.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
137
A. The Alleged Interference, Restraint, and Coercion; Find-
ings and Conclusions in Connection Therewith
During the course of the period from May through June
1973 5 when the Union was engaged in its organizational
drive, the Respondent had its supervisors and foremen keep
it informed as to the progress of the campaign. General
Manager Lawrence Brobst testified that before the election
the management believed that on the basis of the informa-
tion and estimates which were secured in this fashion, the
Union would not get more than 24 votes.
Executive Vice President Jamie Gibson, Industrial Rela-
tions Manager Paul Stottsberry, Operations Manager
Charles Lee, General Foreman George Miller, Production
Manager H. G. Randolph, and General Manager Law-
rence Brobst all had a number of conversations with the
employees during this period. The General Counsel alleged
that certain conduct of the above-named management per-
sonnel constituted interference, restraint, and coercion.
These allegations are denied by the Respondent in their
entirety. The evidence as to the incidents in question will
now be considered.
Employee Dessie O. Neeley testified that about 3 weeks
before the election Industrial Relations Manager Stottsber-
ry "asked me if I had heard about the Union and if I had,
how I felt about it.... " Neeley told Stottsberry that she
thought the Union would come into the plant. About a week
before the election and while Neeley was wearing a union
badge, Stottsberry stopped to inquire as to what the badge
meant. When she characterized the organizational symbol
as a "little button that matches my outfit," Stottsberry told
her that she knew little about the subject matter of the
button. Neeley replied that she was learning more about the
subject every day. Neeley was a credible witness and her
testimony was not denied or contradicted by Stottsberry
when he was on the stand.
Employee Ima Jene Harmon testified that about June 21,
Stottsberry asked her how she thought the election would
turn out and that she replied that she was not sure, but that
in any event she was not worried about the outcome. Stotts-
berry, however, declared that he was worried and, accord-
ing to Harmon asked, "if I could see my way clear he would
like for me to be for the company." Harmon's account of
this conversation was credible and it was not denied or
contradicted by Stottsberry.
Employee Robert J. Smith testified that about 2 days
before the election Stottsberry spoke to him about the orga-
nizational campaign twice and that on the first occasion he
told Smith the employees did not need a union and that the
next time he declared "We don't need a Union in the Roper
Corporation." According to Smith, during the first of these
exchanges he told Stottsberry that he was for the Union.
Smith's testimony was credible. When on the stand himself,
Stottsberry made no reference to Smith's testimony.
It was not a violation of the Act for Stottsberry to urge
that Harmon support the Company in the election or to tell
5 All dates that appear hereinafter are for the year 1973 unless specifically
noted otherwise.
138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Smith that the employees did not need a union in the Roper
plant . His comments of that character were no more than
views or opinions which were protected by Section 8(c) of
the Act. On the other hand , it was not permissible for Stotts-
berry to question employee Neeley as to whether she had
heard about the Union and to ask her how she felt about
it or to question employee Harmon as to how she thought
the election would turn out. This latter conduct constituted
a violation of Section 8(a)(1). Tyson and Van, Inc., 176
NLRB 141 (1969); Associated Mills, Inc., 190 NLRB 113
(1971), enfd . 474 F.2d 1351 (C.A. 7, 1973).6
Employee Ima Jene Harmon testified that about a week
before the election Executive Vice President Gibson told
her that "the Union couldn't do anything for us that the
Company couldn 't do. If we would just give the Company
a chance." Harmon further testified that during this same
week she was in Gibson 's office and that while there he
asked her , with reference to the election, "how I thought it
was going to go ." According to Harmon, she declined to
answer on the ground that she had friends on both sides of
the representation controversy. Gibson conceded having
had a conversation with Harmon on both occasions, but he
denied that in the second discussion he had asked her what
she thought would be the outcome of the election . As found
earlier, Harmon was a credible witness. Although it is evi-
dent that Gibson 's comments to the employees were gener-
ally protected expressions of his views , it is my conclusion
that in the second conversation he, in effect, questioned
Harmon as to whether she thought the Union would win the
election.
Employee Robert Vanderpool testified that about 2 days
before the election Vice President Gibson and General
Manager Brobst called him from the paint room where he
was at work . According to Vanderpool, Gibson referred to
the fact that the employee was wearing a union badge and
then said "I see you have a Union button on ... I thought
you was a company man and I said , no, and he said I wish
you would vote no in the election . I wish you would help us
win the election." Gibson acknowledged having had a con-
versation with Vanderpool on this occasion and that it cov-
ered the subject about which the employee testified. He
denied , however , having said that he thought Vanderpool
was a "company man ." Brobst also denied having heard
Gibson use the characterization that the employee attribut-
ed to him . Although Vanderpool was a generally credible
witness it is my conclusion that as to this conversation Gib-
son was the more credible in denying having used the term
in question.
Employee Woodrow Moses testified that the day before
the election Gibson and Brobst visited him at work . Accord-
ing to Moses, they asked him why he was for the Union and
then asked whether he would help them during the election.
Moses testified that he told them why he felt there should
be a union in the plant and Gibson concluded the conversa-
6"... this unjustified questioning of the employees, approximately I
week before the scheduled election, constituted unlawful probing into the
employees' reasons for supporting the Union which tended to interfere with,
restrain, and coerce them in the free exercise of their Section 7 rights."
Associated Mills, Inc., supra; see also : Essex Wire Corpiraton, 188 NLRB 397
(1971), enfd . as to this point 496 F.2d 862 (C.A. 6, 1972).
tion by asking him to reflect on what he and Brobst had
said . Gibson denied having asked Moses why he was for the
Union, but testified that he told the employee that he hoped
he would vote "No." According to Gibson "I said to Woody
we'd certainly appreciate your support in the upcoming
election, if you see your way, we'd appreciate it." In this
instance, Gibson appeared the more credible and his ver-
sion of the conversation with Moses is found to be the more
accurate.
On the basis of the foregoing findings as to Gibson's
discussions with employees shortly before the election it is
apparent that his credited remarks to both employees Van-
derpool and Moses were attempts at persuading these indi-
viduals to the Respondent's point of view, but that, in so
doing, Gibson did not exceed the bounds of protected
speech. On the other hand, he was not free to question
employee Harmon as to whom she thought would win the
election and by Gibson's conduct in this regard, the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1).
Employee Claude Huddleston, a laborer at the plant,
testified that about a week before the election General Man-
ager Brobst came to where he was working and asked what
he thought about the election. According to Huddleston, "I
told him that I knew the Company had sent him and I was
sorry . . . he had to be there because I believe[d] the Union
was coming in...... Huddleston testified that Brobst then
alluded to the fact that Huddleston was one of the older
employees at the plant and concluded the conversation with
a request that Huddleston talk to his coworkers and ask
them to vote against the Union. Brobst acknowledged hav-
ing discussed the election with Huddleston during this peri-
od, but testified that he only told the employee that the
Company would appreciate his support in the forthcoming
election. Huddleston was a persuasive witness, throughout
both direct and cross-examination. Consequently, it is my
conclusion that the conversation with Brobst occurred sub-
stantially as the employee described it. The general
manager's inquiry as to what Huddleston thought about the
election was not protected. In pursuing this line of question-
ing with Huddleston, Brobst's action constituted interfer-
ence, restraint, and coercion within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1). Engineered Steel Products, 188 NLRB 298 (1971)?
Huddleston testified that during the week of the election
Operations Manager Miller told him that he was consider-
ing Huddleston for a foreman's post on the paint line. Ac-
cording to Huddleston, during this conversation Miller
referred to the employees on the paint line who were wear-
ing union badges and declared "the Company is going to get
rid of them...... Huddleston testified that when he asked
Miller how the Company could do that, Miller responded
with the statement that the Company "could put them in as
foremen for 30 days and then fire them." Miller denied that
he had made any of these remarks to Huddleston. The
latter, however, as noted earlier, was a frank and convincing
witness, and it is the conclusion of the undersigned that his
testimony accurately reflected a conversation with Miller
which occurred substantially as he described it. Miller's
7 "Questioning selected employees about their union sympathies without
any legitimate reason therefore and without any assurance against reprisal,
by its very nature tends to inhibit employees in the exercise of the right to
organize ." Engineered Steel Products, supra.
ROPER CORPORATION 139
comments about the Respondent's plans to dismiss those
employees wearing union badges were, of course, coercive
and are now found to have been violative of Section
8(a)(l).8
Employees Robert J. Smith and William Kerr testified
about having attended a union meeting in Corbin, Ken-
tucky, on Sunday, June 10, and thereafter having been ques-
tioned about it by management personnel. According to
Kerr, while at work during the following week, Production
Manager Harold Randolph asked where Kerr had been the
previous Sunday. Kerr responded by telling him that he had
been at what he described only as a "meeting," without
giving any further details. Thereafter, according to Kerr,
Randolph told him "I knew where you were at, but I just
wanted to see if you were lying about it." Kerr was a credi-
ble witness and Randolph was not called to deny or contra-
dict the employee's account of what occurred.
Smith testified that as he was leaving the plant early on
the week of June 11, General Foreman Miller stopped him
to ask where Smith had been the preceding Sunday. Accord-
ing to Smith, when he acknowledged that he had been at a
union meeting, Miller then asked "what could a Union do
for you?" Miller denied having said anything to Smith
about a union. He conceded having questioned Smith as to
where he had been that weekend. According to Miller, how-
ever, this was in connection with arrangements he had made
with Smith to accompany him on the preceding Saturday to
the home of a Doctor Brown, a general practitioner in Wil-
liamsburg, where he and Smith were to remove comb honey
from an apiary maintained by the doctor. Miller described
this as a trip to "rob bees." According to Miller, when Smith
did not appear at the doctor's home on Saturday he ques-
tioned him the following Monday as to where he had been,
and that Smith told him that he was at a union meeting.
Smith credibly testified that he had made no arrangements
with Miller to accompany him on an expedition to "rob
bees." Smith knew the doctor who had the apiary, because
his own wife worked in Doctor Brown's office. Consequent-
ly, it would seem that, if, as Miller testified, Smith had, in
fact, committed himself to help Miller on a Saturday project
at the doctor's home, Smith would not lightly have aban-
doned such a commitment. It was well established that the
union meeting in question was held on a Sunday .9 In the
light of all the foregoing considerations, it is my conclusion
that Smith was the more credible witness and that Miller's
interrogation of the employee occurred as Smith described
it and without any extenuating background such as Miller
sought to interject.
The conduct of both Production Manager Randolph and
General Foreman Miller in interrogating Kerr and Smith as
to their attendance at a union meeting the preceding week-
end constituted interference, restraint, and coercion within
the meaning of the Act and thereby violated Section 8(a)(1).
8 Ray Gant , manager of a Federal housing project in Williamsburg, credi-
bly testified that in December 1973, Miller spoke to him about two residents
whom he characterized as prounion employees at the plant , and suggested
to Gant that they be moved out of the project. However, this incident was
not alleged as a violation of the Act in any of the numerous complaints
involved in this consolidated action.
9 Union Representative Huddock corroborated the testimony of Smith
and Kerr that the first union meeting was held on Sunday , June 10.
Employee Donald Ball testified that about a month be-
fore the election Operations Manager Lee engaged him in
a conversation about the Union. According to Ball: Lee
asked him whether "there was anything I had to do with the
Union" and when Ball gave a noncommittal response, Lee
told him "be careful and not ... get mixed up in it because
... the personnel manager of the American Greeting Card
[plant] were keeping an eye on the union activities [at Rop-
er] and that if I got mixed up in it it might cause me and
my wife and my nephew's job[s] to be in jeopardy." Ball
testified that his wife and his nephew worked at the Ameri-
can Greeting Card plant which was located a short distance
from the Roper factory.
Lee denied that he had questioned Ball about the Union,
but he acknowledged having had a conversation with him
at the time and place described by the employee. According
to Lee, he told Ball that if what he referred to as "this thing"
got in the plant it would "look bad on us" and during the
course of the discussion he reminded Ball that he had
helped Ball's wife, his brother and several other relatives
secure employment by giving them good references. He
denied that he made any explicit reference to the American
Greeting Card plant, but he conceded that all of Ball's
relatives to whom he referred were employed at that factory.
Even if Lee's version of this conversation is accepted it is
evident that Lee made a strong appeal to Ball to help keep
"this thing" out of the Roper plant and that in so doing he
reminded Ball of past favors which he had done for the Ball
family. Based upon the comparative demeanor of these two
witnesses , it is the conclusion of the undersigned that Ball's
account was the more accurate. Consequently, it is now
found that Lee questioned Ball as to whether he had "any-
thing . . . to do with the Union," and then warned the
employee not to "get mixed up in it" with language that
plainly implied that, if Ball did so, his job at Roper's, as well
as the jobs of his wife and relatives at a neighboring plant,
might be in jeopardy. By this course of conduct, Lee plainly
engaged in unlawful interference, restraint, and coercion
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Employee Robert J. Smith testified that about 2 weeks
before the election Operations Manager Lee called him to
his office and questioned him about the Union. According
to Smith, Lee asked "what brought this on?" and thereafter
he told Lee that after working at Roper's for 3 years he had
concluded that the Union would "offer us something better
than you are giving us." This interrogation of an employee
about his union views and sympathies in the office of the
operations manager was coercive and constituted a further
violation of Section 8(a)(1) by the Respondent.
B. The Issues as to Supervisory Status
Frank Taylor was classified as foreman of warehouse and
shipping, and James E. Lambdin as foreman of mainte-
nance . The General Counsel contends that neither was any
more than a leadman. This was disputed by the Respon-
dent, according to whom both Taylor and Lambdin were
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11).
It was undisputed that in November 1971 the Respondent
changed the title of all its leadmen, including Taylor and
Lambdin, to foreman. Jamie Gibson, Respondent' s execu-
140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tive vice president, testified that prior to taking this action
all seven of the leadmen were called to the office of Charles
Lee, the operations manager and informed of their promo-
tion. According to Gibson, at this time he told them that:
(1) they were being given a substantial wage increase to
create a differential between them and their subordinates;
(2) they would have authority to terminate employees; (3)
thereafter they would be more involved in the hiring process
and responsible for evaluating new employees during their
probationary period as to quality of work, absenteeism,
attitude and related matters; (4) they would have authority
to transfer and lay off employees; (5) they would have au-
thority to let employees off to go to a dentist or doctor; (6)
they would be responsible for evaluating the work of em-
ployees under the incentive system that was in effect in the
plant at that time; and (7) they would have to attend fore-
men training sessions.
All of those involved thereupon received substantial pay
increases . Taylor's wage went from $2.20 and hour to $2.85
and Lambdin's from $2.35 to $3 an hour. In a notice to all
employees dated November 15, 1971, and signed by H. G.
Randolph, manager of manufacturing, the Company an-
nounced that all of the leadmen, including Taylor and
Lambdin, were being promoted to the position of foremen.
Operations Manager Lee testified that thereafter the
Company sponsored a 6-week training program which was
given by Somerset College for all foremen and management
personnel and that both Lambdin and Taylor took this
course. Lee further testified that both Lambdin and Taylor
attended the regular weekly meetings for the supervisors
which he had in his office every Monday afternoon. He also
testified that Lambdin attended the monthly dinner meet-
ings to which all supervisory personnel were invited, but
that Taylor, for personal reasons, usually asked to be ex-
cused from these latter conferences. Taylor corroborated
Lee's testimony in this connection.
Neither Lambdin nor Taylor voted in the representation
elections held in 1971 and 1973. At the time of his discharge
in July 1973, Taylor was receiving $3.19 an hour and the
employees in his section were getting $2.34. At the time of
his termination in June 1973, Lambdin was being paid $3.44
an hour and the employees in his section were getting $2.94.
General Manager Brobst estimated that Taylor spent no
more than 5 percent of his time on physical labor during the
course of each working day. Operations Manager Lee put
the estimate somewhat higher and testified that he thought
Taylor was engaged in manual labor about 15 percent of the
time. Lambdin testified that about 99.9 percent of his time
was spent on physical labor. General Manager Brobst, how-
ever, testified that the figure was closer to 25 percent. He
further testified that Lambdin had a tendency to get on a
job and work with the men to a far greater degree than
necessary, and that on several occasions he had admonished
Lambdin that instead of doing a job himself Lambdin was
to rely more on the employees so that he could spend his
time supervising them.
Neither Taylor nor Lambdin had many men to supervise.
There were three regular employees in the warehouse and
shipping department besides Taylor. In maintenance there
were only two regular employees in addition to Lambdin.
However, both departments occasionally had more employ-
ees when the workload was heavy.
Taylor testified that he could not recall being given any
additional responsibilities when his title was changed from
leadman to foreman in 1971. He acknowledged that after
the change he no longer used a timecard except for overtime
and for Saturday work. He testified that Operations Manag-
er Lee advised him during this period that if he had trouble
with any of the employees in the warehouse Taylor should
send them to Lee's office. Although Taylor could not recall
having disciplined anyone, Lee testified that on one occa-
sion in 1972, Taylor had disciplined one Robert Smith. Not-
withstanding the fact that Taylor was called on rebuttal he
was not questioned about this incident. Consequently, Lee's
testimony was undenied.
Employee Jerry Kinder, a witness called by the General
Counsel, described Lambdin as a foreman because "That's
the title the Company gave" him, 10 As had Taylor, Lambdin
testified that he was given no added duties at the time his
title was changed. Lambdin also testified that Operations
Manager Lee instructed him to bring any problems with
employees to Lee's office. According to Lambdin, however,
he never had any problems that had to be referred to Lee.
Although Lambdin generally denied any supervisory re-
sponsibilities he acknowledged that he had the right to re-
port a man for improper work, that he could release an
employee to another department, and that he could sign
purchase orders for maintenance supplies which he secured
at local stores. He also testified that although he normally
had only two employees working with him, that at times the
number of his assistants sometimes ranged as high as four
or five.
It is relevant to a consideration of the authority of those
classified as foremen at the Respondent's plant to consider
the testimony of Donald Ball, a witness called by the Gener-
al Counsel. Thus, Ball, a foreman in the assembly and weld-
ing section, testified that as a foreman he has the authority
to send people home, suspend employees, and grant time
off. This testimony substantially corroborated that of
Respondent's witnesses Gibson, Brobst, and Lee as to the
authority of the foremen."
Section 2(11) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, trans-
fer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge , assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to
10 The quotation is from Kinder's credible testimony.
The General Counsel contends that it is equally relevant that, a week
after Taylor 's dismissal, Charles Siler became his successor in the warehouse
and was told that his job was that of leadman. However, Siler also testified
that Lee told him at the time of his appointment that there was no further
need for a foreman in the warehouse as a consequence of which Siler was
only being given a 10-cent raise to act as leadman. Lee, in turn, testified that
when Taylor was the foreman , Frank Gibson , his superior , visited the ware-
house only once or twice a day . According to Lee, with Siler in charge,
Gibson is required to supervise the warehouse closely and frequently visits
it as often as 15 times a day . When Siler was promoted to leadman his 10-cent
wage increase brought his rate to $2.44. This was in contrast with the $3.19
an hour that Taylor was paid . It is apparent from this fact, as well as the other
findings set forth above , that Taylor's job in the warehouse was substantially
downgraded at the time Siler took over. Consequently , I conclude that the
facts with respect to the post that Siler held are not relevant to a decision as
to the status which Taylor had prior to his termination.
ROPER CORPORATION 141
direct them . . . or effectively to recommend such ac-
tion... .
The courts have long held that the elements of supervision,
as enumerated in the foregoing section, must be considered
in the disjunctive.12 It is evident from the record in this case
that, subsequent to the designation of Taylor and Lambdin
as foremen in 1971, both the Respondent' s management
and the employees regarded them as members of supervi-
sion . Although they had very few employees to supervise
and although they obviously did not exercise all the authori-
ty which Vice President Gibson, as well as Brobst and Lee,
would credit them with having, it is clear that they did have,
and exercised, some supervisory authority. Consequently, in
view of the broad reach of Section 2(11) and the foregoing
findings, it is now found that both Taylor and Lambdin
were supervisors within the meaning of the Act.
C. The Discharges,- Contentions of the Parties; Findings
and Conclusions in Connection Therewith
1. Roger Bird
Bird was hired in May 1971 and worked continuously
thereafter for the Respondent until his discharge on July 9,
1973. At the time of his termination he was working on the
paint line. During the union campaign, Bird signed an au-
thorization card, attended organizational meetings, and, for
some while prior to the election, wore a union badge while
at work in the plant.13
Shortly before the election, Vice President Gibson and
General Manager Brobst visited Bird at his work station.
According to Bird, during this conversation, the plant offi-
cials asked him whether he knew why the employees wanted
a union and in response to this question he told them that
the cause of most of the antipathy toward the Company was
Operations Manager Lee. Bird testified that after explaining
why he felt that Lee had been unfair to him in not assigning
him to work in the paint room, Gibson and Brobst told him
that they had examined his work record "and that I had a
good record and they were proud to have me working there
at Roper." According to Bird, the vice president and general
manager concluded the conversation by telling him that
they hoped that he would make "the right decision" when
he voted. 14
12 "This section is to be interpreted in the disjunctive , N.L.R.B. v. Edward
G. Budd Mfg. Co., 6 Cir., 169 F.2d 571, cert. denied 335 U.S. 908 ... and
the possession of any one of the authorities listed in § 2(11) places the
employee invested with this authority in the supervisory class ." Ohio Power
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 176 F.2d 385, 386-387 (C.A. 6, 1949), cert . denied 338 U.S.
899. See also N. L. R. B. v. Leland-Gifford Company, 200 F.2d 620, 624-626
(C.A. 1, 1952).
13 Bird's testimony about wearing the union badge on the job was corrobo-
rated by Jeannette Davis, a witness called by the Respondent.
14 The quotations in this paragraph are from Bird 's credible testimony.
Both Gibson and Brobst acknowledged that they had a conversation with
Bird at the time and place about which he testified . Brobst testified that he
did not recall that either of them asked Bird why the employees wanted a
union . Gibson testified that during their conversation he sought to assure
Bird that the only reason that Bird was not assigned to the paint room was
related to the fact that the employee had had serious respiratory problems
in the past and the management felt that such an assignment might be
hazardous to Bird's health.
Bird was dismissed on July 9, according to General Coun-
sel, for discriminatory reasons, and according to the Re-
spondent because the employee violated a plant rule
against smoking.
The regular foreman of the paint room and paint line was
Bill Jones. On July 9, Jones was not on duty and General
Foreman George Miller took his place. Miller testified that
shortly after the shift began, he noticed that the paint line
had not begun to move and that no employees were in the
area. According to Miller, he then went to the restroom for
that department where he found employees Bird, Jerry
Kinder, Lester Cox, Charles Frazer, and Woodrow Moses.
Miller testified that the room was filled with smoke and that
after telling the employees to get to work he admonished
them with the statement "If I catch you smoking in here
again I'm going to have to do something about it."
It appears that when the paint line was shut off, employ-
ees such as Bird and his coworkers frequently took their
breaktime in the restroom. It is also evident that many of
the employees, as well as the foreman, Bill Jones, frequently
smoked while there.15
Employees Robert Vanderpool and Lester Cox testified
that on the morning of July 9 they saw Miller in the paint
room several times and that whenever Bird came into the
paint room Miller was close behind. Shortly before noon on
July 9, Miller entered the paint shop as employee Lester Cox
was proceeding toward the restroom. Miller followed Cox
up to the door of that room and as Cox opened the door,
Miller stood at the entrance. Employees Bird and Kinder
were already in the room. According to Cox, at that mo-
ment, Kinder was washing his hands and Bird was standing
idly before the mirror with both hands in his back pockets.
Cox testified that neither Bird nor Kinder was smoking.
Miller testified that when Cox entered the restroom, he
could see Bird through the crack on the hinge side of the
door and that the employee was holding his hands behind
his back and in one he had a cigarette. According to Miller,
he told Bird and Kinder that they had been warned about
smoking at the beginning of the shift and that because of
what he had seen , he was taking both of them to the office.
Before that was done, however, Operations Manager Lee
was summoned to inspect the scene and thereafter both
Miller and Lee called on Brobst to make a report about the
matter. Both of the employees were then brought to Lee's
office where, according to Bird, Lee told him that since he
had broken a plant safety rule he was being terminated.
Throughout these proceedings Bird maintained, as he did at
the present trial, that he had not been smoking at the time
Miller entered the restroom. While insisting that Bird had
a cigarette in his hand, Miller acknowledged that he had not
seen Kinder smoking, although there were cigarette butts on
the floor near where Kinder was sitting. In apparent accep-
tance of Miller's conclusion, Lee told Kinder that he would
not be fired but that he would be written up with a discipli-
nary warning for his personnel file.
Bird testified that when Lee told him that he was being
terminated he, in turn, charged Lee with dismissing him
because he had voted for the Union and that Lee made no
15 See, for example, the testimony of employees Woodrow Moses, Robert
Vanderpool, Lester Cox, and Jerry Kinder.
142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
answer. Lee, however, testified that when the employee
made this allegation he reminded Bird that Kinder had
worn a union button in the same fashion as had Bird, but
that Kinder was not being discharged.
Throughout his testimony Bird denied that he had been
smoking in the restroom at the time Miller came upon the
scene. He freely acknowledged that on other occasions he
had done so, including the day before his discharge. Kinder
also testified that Bird was not smoking at the time Miller
entered the restroom on the day in question. The two em-
ployees were credible witnesses in this regard.
Other than the general admonition about smoking which
Miller voiced to all the employees on his first visit to the
restroom on the morning of July 9, Bird had never been
warned about smoking. The Respondent offered testimony
by Miller and Brobst as to the hazards connected with
employee smoking in the restroom because of its proximity
to the paint mixing area where volatile solvents were used
and stored. General Foreman Miller testified that on the
cafeteria door that leads into the plant there is a sign which
reads "No Smoking beyond this point." This, however, ap-
parently was the only such sign throughout the plant. The
Respondent offered no evidence of other notices or an-
nouncements on the subject. No handbook of plant rules or
a similar guide for employees was offered by the Respon-
dent to establish the existence of a general prohibition on
smoking. As found earlier, there was much credible testimo-
ny by the employees that insofar as there was such a rule
it was more honored in the breach than in the observance
and that not only the employees but the foremen frequently
used the paint shop restroom for smoking. Thus, Bird credi-
bly testified that on various occasions Bill Jones, foreman
of the paint room, came out to the paint line to ask "whose
turn is it to go smoke" whereupon the one whose turn it was
would be permitted to go to the restroom for a smoking
break. According to Bird's credible testimony "practically
everybody in that factory that smokes, I've seem them
smoke in there." 16 From the record it appears that in the
history of the Williamsburg plant Bird was the first employ-
ee to be discharged for smoking.
Bird had worn a union button at work during the election
campaign. Some of the employees whom the Respondent
called in connection with its objections to the election testi-
fied that they had seen Bird wearing the union insignia. 17
Shortly before the election, as found earlier herein, Vice
President Gibson and General Manager Brobst called on
Bird and urged that he make "the right decision" when he
voted. At the same time it was undenied that they told him
that they had examined his record, that it was a good record
and "they were proud to have [Bird] working there at Rop-
er." This was on about June 28 or 29. The Respondent
offered no testimony that anything occurred in the 10 days
thereafter which elapsed prior to Bird's discharge that
would cause the Respondent to reassess Bird's work record.
As found earlier herein, during the week of the election,
General Foreman Miller forecast that "the company is
going to get rid of" the employees on the paint line "that's
16 The Respondent never called Foreman Jones as a witness to refute the
foreoing testimony, which was credible and undenied.17g
See, for example, the testimony of employee Jeannette Davis.
wearing those Union badges.... " Bird was an employee
on the paint line who had worn one of "those Union
badges." The Respondent did not establish that it had ever
before sought rigid enforcement of a ban on smoking which,
until Bird's dismissal had been generally ignored not only
by the employees, but by the foremen as well. In view of the
Respondent's knowledge of Bird' s union sympathies, his
good work record which both Vice President Gibson and
General Manager Brobst had acknowledged just before the
election, his own credible testimony that on the day in ques-
tion he was not smoking, and the abruptness of his dis-
charge, viewed in the light of the Respondent's antipathy to
the Union and most particularly the antiunion attitude of
General Foreman Miller, it is my conclusion that the real
motive for Bird's dismissal was not his alleged violation of
the plant rule on smoking, but his union activity. In termi-
nating him for this reason the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act."
2. James E. Lambdin
Lambdin was discharged by the Respondent on June 7,
allegedly for insubordination. The General Counsel con-
tends that the termination was based on the Respondent's
belief that Lambdin was supporting the Union and, there-
fore, a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The General
Counsel's position was premised on the assumption that
Lambdin was a rank-and-file employee. As found earlier,
however, Lambdin was a supervisor. For that reason, on the
facts present here, he was beyond the protection of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Fullerton Publishing Company
d/b/a Daily News Tribune, 283 F.2d 545, 551 (C.A. 9, 1960);
N. L. R. B. v. Inter-City Advertising Co. of Charlotte, N. C., et
al., 190 F.2d 420, 422 (C.A. 4, 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S.
908; L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corporation v. N.L.R.B.,
163 F.2d 905, 906-908 (C.A.D.C., 1947), cert. denied 333
U.S. 837 (1948). Orr Iron, Inc., 207 NLRB 863 (1947); Da-
vid-Anna Corporation d/b/a Snyder Bros. Sun-Ray Drug, 208
NLRB 628 (1947); Hecks, Inc., 156 NLRB 760, 763-765
(1966). Consequently, and in view of this conclusion, it is
unnecessary to discuss further the allegation in the com-
plaint that Lambdin was discriminatorily terminated.
3. Frank Taylor
Taylor was an employee at the Respondent's plant almost
from the time it opened in 1970. As found earlier he was,
at least from November 1971, foreman of the warehouse
and shipping department. Early in May 1973, and at the
18 In its brief the Respondent urges that the lack of discriminatory motive
in Bird's termination is evident from the fact that other employees on the
paint line wore union buttons and were not discharged. There is no merit to
this argument ; "a discriminatory motive, otherwise established, is not dis-
proved by an employer's proof that it did not weed out all union adherents."
Nachman Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 337 F.2d 421, 422 (C.A. 7, 1964). In Rust Engi-
neering Company v. N.L.RB., 445 F.2d 172, 174 (C.A. 6, 1971) the court
stated : "The punitive layoff of a single dissident may have-and may be
intended to have-an in terrorem effect on others, and the Board need not
wait until a party commits a gross violation before it may find any violation
at all." See also : N.L.R.B. v. Challenge-Cook Brothers of Ohio, Inc., 374 F.2d
147, 152 (C.A. 6, 1967); N.LR.B. v. Puerto Rico Telephone Company, 357 F.2d
919, 920 (C.A. 1, 1966); N.L.R.B. v. W. C. Nabors, d/b/a W. C. Nabors
Company, 196 F.2d 272, 276 (C.A. 5. 1952).
ROPER CORPORATION 143
outset of the election campaign, Vice President Gibson so-
licited Taylor's help in presenting the Respondent's position
on the Union to the employees but the latter declined on the
ground that he felt that he would have to maintain a com-
pletely neutral stance to avoid jeopardizing the reelection of
his son, Jerry Taylor, as judge of the county court for White-
ly County, the jurisdiction in which the Respondent's plant
is located. Both General Manager Brobst and Operations
Manager Lee testified that prior to the election they had no
reason to believe that Taylor had done anything to support
the union cause.
On July 5, Taylor was called to the plant office where all
the management personnel had been assembled by General
Manager Brobst. Vice President Gibson was also present.
There, Brobst told the foremen that the Company had
grounds to believe that some of the management had helped
the Union and, as a result, each one would be asked to take
a polygraph test. Gibson testified that, initially, when this
proposal was made, all of the foremen in the room, includ-
ing Taylor, expressed their assent. Thereafter Gibson and
Brobst began interviewing the foremen. During the interim,
Taylor telephoned an attorney to seek counsel. When his
turn for an interview came, he told Gibson and Brobst that
he had once signed an authorization card, but that he would
not take a polygraph test, since he had talked with his attor-
ney and had been advised that in the State of Kentucky
even an accused murderer did not have to submit to a lie
detector examination. According to Gibson, he told Taylor,
"We want your cooperation in this thing because if you in
any way aided the Union, we are certainly entitled to a new
election." Taylor, however, refused both then and on the
following day to commit himself to taking the test.
On July 11, all foremen in the plant with the exception of
Taylor took the polygraph test. On July 12, Brobst told
Taylor he would have to take the examination, and Taylor
told him he would answer any questions they wanted to ask
him, but that he would not take the lie detector test. Brobst
then asked him to resign and when Taylor refused to do
that, Brobst told him he would be terminated for refusing
to cooperate in the investigation. Taylor was then dis-
charged and given his final paycheck.
In the latter part of July, J. L. Finley, a local insurance
broker and friend of Frank Taylor, contacted Vice Presi-
dent Gibson to ask if there was any way that Taylor could
be reinstated to his position with the Company. As a result
of this request, on about July 26, Gibson and Stottsberry
met at a Holiday Inn in Corbin, Kentucky, with Frank
Taylor, his son, Judge Jerry Taylor, and Finley.
Gibson testified as follows with respect to the meeting:
Finley opened the discussion with a statement that he would
like to see Frank Taylor get his job back. Gibson stated that
Taylor had been terminated for having failed to cooperate
in the company investigation of the election. Taylor then
declared that he had signed an authorization card and
would be willing to sign a statement to the effect. Gibson
acknowledged that he had known about the card signing
since July 5, when Taylor first told him, but said that a
statement merely to that effect could not be enough because
he had information from other employees which indicated
that Taylor was much more involved than that in the elec-
tion campaign.19 Gibson testified that he assured Taylor
that if he made such a disclosure his case would be reconsid-
ered. According to Gibson, the conversation then went off
on a discussion precipitated by a remark of Judge Taylor's
as to why the Company had lost the election. According to
Gibson, Judge Taylor told him that many employees had
been antagonized because they felt that in order to secure
a job at the plant it was necessary to be referred there by
one of the local automobile dealers (whom he named). Gib-
son testified that he disposed of this aspect of their discus-
sion with the statement that, apparently, the Company had
unknowingly found itself in the midst of a local political
squabble. According to Gibson, the meeting concluded
when Frank Taylor made it clear that he would not give a
statement "to the extent that I thought was required.
" 20 Stottsberry testified briefly as to this meeting and,
in general, corroborated Gibson.
The witnesses for the General Counsel presented a sub-
stantially different account of what transpired. Finley testi-
fied that early in the meeting Gibson declared that the
Company was "willing to go to any means . . . to get a new
election down there, short of shooting a man."
According to Finley: Gibson asked Frank Taylor if he
would sign a statement to the effect that he had used his
influence and the influence of his son, Judge Taylor, to help
the Union and to assure a union victory. Gibson, in turn,
asked Judge Taylor if he would sign a pledge of support so
that the Company could be confident that the Union would
not win a second election. According to Finley, Frank Tay-
lor asked what assurance he could have that if such state-
ments were signed he would be reemployed, and Gibson
replied "We will live up to our bargain if you and your son
will live up to yours." Finley testified that the Taylors re-
fused to execute any such documents. According to Finley,
Frank Taylor said that he would not sign any such state-
ment because it was not true that he participated in the
election campaign. Finley testified that Frank Taylor told
Gibson "I will not sign any statement that is not a fact .. .
you are asking me to do something that is not true." Accord-
ing to Finley, when Frank Taylor continued to insist that he
had done nothing for the Union during the representation
campaign that would serve as the basis for any such affida-
vit as the Company desired, Gibson reassured Taylor with
the statement "we don't think you had anything to do with
it [the union victory] but . . . with your son being the county
judge, and [with] your influence you could overturn the
election." 21
Finley's testimony was corroborated by that of Frank
Taylor and Judge Taylor. According to the latter, early in
the meeting he told Gibson that he felt the Company was
using his father as "a guinea pig" and that his father had
been discharged "over nothing." Judge Taylor testified that
Gibson told his father "Frank, we wouldn't have had any
19 At the reopened hearing , Gibson testified that the information to which
he was referring was that secured from the seven employees who testified
earlier in Case 9-RC-10128, viz., John Ball, Paul Creekmore , Helen Frazer,
Laverne Knight, Sam Moses , Lee Parker, and Lola Smith . The testimony of
all those employees is set forth and fully considered in sec. IV, infra.
20 The quotation is from Gibson's testimony.
21 All quotations in the above paragraph are from Finley's testimony.
144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
reason to get rid of you if you had taken a lie detector test
like we asked you to. When you wouldn 't take the lie detec-
tor test that gave us the opportunity to get rid of you.... ..
Judge Taylor testified that his father then started to tell
Gibson about the years of hard work he had given the
Company , but that Gibson almost immediately broke into
the conversation . According to Judge Taylor , at that point:
Gibson raised up out of his seat and he said , damn it,
Frank , we didn 't fire you because you were for the
Union ; haven't you figured out why you were fired and
my dad said , no, I haven 't Jamie [Gibson] . He [Gibson]
said we fired you because you were our only hope in
getting another vote for the Union . . . . you have a
union card and your son being the county judge you
can get another vote on the Union if you will sign an
affidavit to that effect and he also said , Jerry, if you will
sign a statement for another vote , you will help us keep
the Union out through your influence and I said, Ja-
mie, you can go to hell as far as I am concerned.... ..
Finley testified that several days after the meeting Gibson
telephoned him at his home to ask if he could do anything
with Judge Taylor and his father to get them to go along
with the Company in securing a new election . According to
Finley, he told Gibson that he had had no success and that
the Taylors "wouldn ' t sign anything that wasn't true." 22
The following weekend General Manager Brobst, who
had not been present at the conference in the Holiday Inn,
telephoned Finley and arranged to visit the latter at his
home . Brobst testified that the purpose of the meeting was
to ascertain Finley 's reaction to the conference which Gib-
son had had with him 2 days earlier . Finley testified that
before Brobst arrived , he telephoned Judge Taylor to ask
him "if he was going to go along with those fellows and sign
those papers ." According to Finley , Judge Taylor told him
"Absolutely not." Finley testified that , when Brobst arrived,
the company official asked him whether Finley had the
necessary papers for the Taylors to sign on the subject that
was discussed at the Holiday Inn. According to Finley, after
giving a negative response , "I told him there wasn't a
chance . They [the Taylors ] weren't going to sign . . . under
any circumstances." 3
Finley was a thoroughly credible witness on direct exami-
nation . On cross-examination , he was similarly impressive,
notwithstanding a searching interrogation by able counsel
for the Respondent . He was at all times frank and candid
and his answers had the convincing ring of truth. He was
corroborated by both of the Taylors who were similarly
persuasive witnesses . Insofar as there are conflicts between
the testimony of these three witnesses and that of Gibson,
Stottsberry , and Brobst , it is the conclusion of the under-
signed that the testimony of Finley and the Taylors is the
more credible.
Although Gibson asserted that, on the basis of the state-
ments which had been secured from seven employees, the
Respondent had reason to believe that Frank Taylor was
deeply involved in the Union 's campaign , as found later
22 Finley's testimony as to this telephone conversation was credible and
undenied.
herein , the testimony of these same witnesses when given at
the present hearing did not produce any credible evidence
that Taylor had engaged in prounion activity during the
organizational drive. 4 Nevertheless , after the Union won
the election , when Taylor declined to take a polygraph test,
the Respondent discharged him even though Gibson later
acknowledged at his meeting with Finley and the Taylors
"we don 't think you had anything to do with" the Union's
having secured a majority vote . At the same time and in the
same sentence Gibson disclosed the Respondent 's real ob-
jective when he added , "but .. . with your son being the
county judge , and [with] your influence you could overturn
the election ." At the conference held at the motel on July
26, Gibson made it clear that even though Frank Taylor
insisted that he had had no part in the union campaign, if
he gave a statement to the contrary so that the Respondent
could get the results of the first election set aside and if
Judge Taylor would pledge to help defeat the Union in any
subsequent election, the Respondent would reinstate Frank
Taylor. In an effort to assure Frank Taylor that this would
mean not merely nominal reinstatement but steady employ-
ment, Gibson told him at this meeting "we will live up to
our bargain if you will live up to yours." The Taylors, how-
ever , refused to join in the "bargain" that would compel
Frank Taylor to assert falsely that he had engaged in pre-
election activities in order that the Respondent could suc-
ceed in having the election set aside.
In the original complaint , in Case 9-CA-7976, the Gener-
al Counsel alleged that the Respondent 's termination of
Taylor constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
At the conclusion of the original hearing , as noted earlier,
the General Counsel amended the complaint to allege, in
the alternative , that the Respondent 's dismissal of Taylor
and its refusal to reinstate him constituted a violation of
Section 8(a)(1).
Since it has been found that Taylor was not an employee,
but a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, his dismissal
could not have been a violation of Section 8(a)(3). N.L.R.B.
v. Daily News Tribune, supra, and cases cited . Accordingly,
that allegation in the complaint must be dismissed. Whether
the Respondent 's conduct as to Taylor constituted a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1) raises an issue to which we will now
turn.
It cannot be seriously argued that the discharge of Taylor
was intended to maintain the Respondent 's neutrality in the
Board 's election process. The Respondent never made any
pretense of its opposition to the Union and in May had
sought to get Frank Taylor to take an active role in pre-
senting its antiunion views to the employees . The Respon-
dent was determined to upset the Union's victory in the
election and on July 26 Gibson told Finley that to get a new
election the Company was "willing to go to any means . . .
short of shooting a man ." For Taylor to have joined with
the Respondent in its plan for thwarting the employees'
union activities would have violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. The net effect of the Respondent 's treatment of Frank
Taylor when he refused to cooperate with Gibson's design
for securing a new election was "to cause nonsupervisory
employees reasonably to fear that the Respondent would
23 The quotations in the foregoing paragraph are from Finley 's testimony . 24 See sec . IV, infra.
ROPER CORPORATION 145
take similar action against them if they continued to support
the Union." Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 106 NLRB 295,
296 (1953), enfd. 213 F.2d 208, 215-217 (C.A. 5, 1954).
Consequently, I conclude and find that by the Company's
conduct with respect to the termination of Frank Taylor
and thereafter by its refusal to reinstate him!'the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Better Monkey Grip
Company, 115 NLRB 1170, 1171 (1956), enfd. 243 F.2d 836
(C.A. 5, 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 864 (1957); N.L.R.B.
v. Talladega Cotton Factory, inc., 213 F.2d 208,215-217; Oil
City Brass Works, 147 NLRB 627, 629-630 (1964), enfd. 357
F.2d 466 (C.A. 5, 1966); N.L.R.B. v. Vail Manufacturing
Company, 158 F.2d 664,666-667 (C.A. 7, 1947), cert. denied
331 U.S. 835 (1947); and Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 173
NLRB 566, 567, 577 (1968), enfd. 415 F.2d 1375 (C.A. 6,
1969).25
iv. THE REPRESENTATION PROCEEDING
By its order of November 16, 1973, in Case 9-RC-10128,
the Board directed that a hearing be held on the Employer's
Objection 3. This objection read as follows: "One or more
of the Employer's supervisors, without the Employer's
knowledge, supported, assisted, and participated in the
Petitioner's organizational activities which tainted the elec-
tion by interfering with the holding of a fair and impartial
election."
At the hearing in the instant case the Respondent was
accorded an opportunity to present all its witnesses on this
issue . They were examined and cross-examined and thereaf-
ter the General Counsel and the Charging Party were ac-
corded an opportunity to present further testimony.
All of this testimony concerned the activities and conduct
of Frank Taylor in the preelection period. The Respondent
offered testimony as to no other supervisor. My findings
and conclusions are set forth below.
On May 20, 1974, the Respondent filed a motion to cor-
rect the transcript as to the testimony of Lee Parker. Ac-
cording to this motion, the typewritten transcript
erroneously omitted a portion of Parker's testimony which
included statements by Parker that (1) 2 or 3 days before the
election Frank Taylor offered to bet Parker $50 that the
Union would win the election, and (2) Frank Taylor told
him before the election that if Taylor wanted the Union to
win the election he and his son, the county judge, could visit
people and see that the Union won. In support of this mo-
25 In its brief, the Respondent contends that the meeting of July 26 was
for the purpose of negotiating a settlement regarding Taylor's discharge and
that all statements made during the meeting should be held inadmissible,
citing Local 18, Bricklayers, etc. (Union County Building Contractors Associa-
tion), 170 NLRB 8, In. 7 (1968); Brown and Root, inc., et al., 99 NLRB 1031,
In. 2 (1952); and T. H. Burns and R. H. Gillespie, d/b/a Burns and Gillespie,
101 NLRB 1181, In. 9 (1952), reversed on other grounds 207 F.2d 434 (C.A.
8, 1953). There is no merit to this contention . The above-cited cases involve
situations where a Regional Office of the Board was involved in the settle-
ment negotiations which occurred either before, or at, the hearing, and in
which representatives of the General Counsel participated. That was not the
situation presented here , where no members of the Regional Office or repre-
sentatives of the General Counsel were in attendance at the meeting in the
Holiday Inn on July 26. In any event that meeting, rather than being an
attempt at securing a settlement of the conflicting claims of the parties, was
more an occasion where the Respondent sought to secure Taylor 's interfer-
ence with the Board 's processes as the quid pro quo for his reemployment.
tion the Respondent cites the subsequent rebuttal testimony
of Frank Taylor which was offered by the General Counsel
and in which Taylor was questioned as to whether he had
made such statements, as described above, to Parker. In this
latter testimony, Taylor denied that he had made any such
comments.
The Respondent's motion has merit. In addition to the
support provided this motion by the transcript citation as to
the General Counsel's rebuttal of Parker's testimony, I have
checked the notes which I took during Parker's appearance
on the stand and have found that, in substance, they con-
firm that Parker did testify as the Respondent, via its mo-
tion, now asserts. Consequently, as noted at the outset of
this Decision, the motion is granted. A copy of the motion
has been marked Administrative Law Judge's Exhibit 2 and
has been added to the exhibit file.26
Frank Taylor, found earlier herein to be the warehouse
foreman and a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, is
a man in his sixties and has lived his entire life in the
Williamsburg area . His home is located only a short dis-
tance from the Respondent's plant.
Employee Bill Kerr testified that about the last week in
May he talked with Frank Taylor about signing a union
card and that during the discussion Taylor told him that he
would sign a card if Foremen Bill Jones and Robert Hill did
so. Both Jones and Hill were foremen at the same level in
the plant hierarchy as Taylor. Kerr then gave Taylor a card
and the latter signed it. Immediately thereafter Kerr talked
with Jones and Hill about signing a card and both declined.
According to Kerr, the next day he apprised Taylor of his
colleagues ' decision and the latter then asked that Kerr tear
up the authorization which he had signed. Kerr testified that
he complied with this request and shortly thereafter de-
stroyed Taylor's card. Kerr was a credible witness . Taylor
acknowledged having signed a card and corroborated
Kerr's account of how this occurred. He further testified
that both before and after this incident he took no part in
the union campaign at the plant and that he asked no em-
ployee to vote for or against the Union.
Vice President Gibson testified that when the Company
first learned about the initiation of an organizational cam-
paign he spoke to Taylor and asked that he support the
Respondent's opposition to a union victory. According to
Gibson, Taylor told him that his son, Judge Taylor, was
engaged at that time in a campaign for reelection and that
in order not to jeopardize his son's prospects he felt that he
would have to remain completely neutral throughout the
representation drive at the Respondent's plant. Taylor's tes-
timony that he maintained that stance during the period in
question was supported by the testimony of Charles Lee.
The latter, who was the operations manager and personnel
director, testified that prior to the election he knew of noth-
ing that occurred in the plant which would indicate that
Frank Taylor was for the Union. General Manager Brobst
gave testimony to the same effect.
26 The official reporter for this case has an excellent reputation for accura-
cy. At one point in the hearing , however, the reporter stated that he was
having mechanical difficulty with his equipment and a portion of the testimo-
ny of Charles Lee had to be repeated . It appears that a somewhat similar
situation may have arisen for a brief period during Parker's appearance on
the stand and that , inadvertently , the mechanical problem went undetected.
146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In support of its Objection 3 the Respondent called eight
witnesses?" Their testimony will now be considered.
Employee John Ball testified as to an incident which
allegedly occurred shortly before the notice of the election
was posted at the plant. According to Ball: Taylor told him
"they came to me for advice . . . there has been 48 cards
signed . . . I got all the cards signed last year . . . . I had
20 cards and Bill Kerr had 20 cards." Ball testified that in
this same conversation Taylor referred to two other employ-
ees and said that the Company would be surprised to dis-
cover that these individuals had signed cards. On
cross-examination , Ball conceded that Taylor could have
been talking of the union campaign that was conducted at
the plant in 1971. Taylor flatly denied having told anyone
that he had secured any signatures on cards or that he was
participating in the organizational campaign . Ball was not
a credible witness. Neither by his glib recitation on direct
examination of the alleged conversation , or by his halting
and hesitant answers on cross-examination , did he display
any candor or persuasion. Taylor's denials were credible.
Based upon an appraisal of these witnesses , it is my conclu-
sion that the alleged conversation never occurred.
Employee Sam Moses testified that about June 1, Frank
Taylor asked him whether he had signed a union card and
when he replied that the employees did not need the Union,
Taylor suggested that if Moses "should take a notion to
want a card he had one and if [Moses] knew of anyone that
wanted to sign one he had one." Moses further testified that
about 3 days before the election, Taylor questioned him as
to whether he planned to vote for the Union. According to
Moses , he responded by saying that he could not be both-
ered with the election and that after he made this statement,
Taylor declared that although he would not be allowed to
cast a ballot "if he could he would vote for it." 28 Taylor
denied having asked Moses whether Moses had signed a
union card or whether he would vote for the Union and he
denied that he ever told any employee that if permitted to
vote he would support the Union. Moses was another wit-
ness who by his carriage and bearing while on the witness
stand, and most particularly throughout his cross-examina-
tion, demonstrated a great lack of candor. He was an un-
convincing witness . In view of this conclusion as to his
credence, I find that, contrary to Moses, Taylor never made
the statements which Moses attributed to him.
About the middle of June, General Manager Brobst held
a meeting at which he spoke to all the employees about the
forthcoming balloting and told them of the Company's op-
position to the Union. Employee John Ball testified that as
he was leaving the meeting Frank Taylor, who was nearby,
pulled a card out of his pocket and said, "Here is my card."
Employee Laverne Knight testified that after this meeting
and as the employees were leaving the room she heard
Frank Taylor say to someone else that he "wondered if the
cards that [Brobst] talked about were like the one he had in
his pocket.... " 29
Frank Taylor testified that shortly before the meeting
about which Ball and Knight testified,30 he saw a number
of authorization cards laying on the assembly line, and that
he picked one up and had it in his possession at the meeting.
According to Taylor, Brobst told the employees during the
course of his speech that if over 51 percent of the employees
signed cards, the Union could secure bargaining rights with-
out an election, depending on the language that appeared
on the authorization card. Taylor testified that on leaving
the meeting and after hearing Brobst's comments about the
manner in which a union could come into the plant without
an election, he took the card from his pocket and discussed
it with Foreman James Lambdin. Taylor further testified
that immediately thereafter he showed the card to Paul
Stottsberry, the Respondent's industrial relations manager,
to ask him how, in view of the language on the blank card
which he had, the Union could secure bargaining rights
without an election. According to Taylor, Stottsberry was
unable to answer the question and, after taking the card,
promised that he would discuss the matter with Brobst to
secure an answer to Taylor's question. Taylor was complete-
ly credible in his account of what occurred. His testimony
was also, in large measure, corroborated by that of employ-
ee Knight which appears above. Stottsberry appeared as a
witness but was never asked any questions about this inci-
dent by the Respondent. Although Ball testified that Taylor
said "here is my card," Ball conceded that the card which
Taylor held in his hand was unsigned. In view of the fore-
going, it is the conclusion of the undersigned that Taylor's
only remarks about the card were prompted by Brobst's
comments at the meeting and that Taylor did not make the
statement which Ball attributed to him.
Employee Lola Smith testified that the day before the
election one of the employees pinned a paper on Taylor's
shirt which read "Vote Yes" and that when Taylor took it
off he said "I'd better pull that off before Mr. Quade sees
me...... Laverne Quade, the Respondent's purchasing
manager, was nearby. Taylor readily acknowledged that
this incident had occurred when, after a break period, as he
was walking back to work, Pat Connor, one of the employ-
ees, surreptitiously taped the sign to his jacket. Taylor testi-
fied that as soon as he realized what had occurred he
removed the sign and Connor thereupon taped the sign on
the back of a fellow employee. This incident, about which
there was no dispute as to the facts, was plainly on the level
of a harmless shop or factory prank and of no significance
with respect to the conduct of the election.
Paul Creekmore, a brother-in-law of John Ball, and one
who had been promoted to foreman at the time of the
hearing, testified as to a conversation he assertedly heard
about 2 weeks before the election. According to Creekmore,
as he was passing the entrance to the warehouse, he heard
Taylor say to employee Charles Siler "if it got in it would
help you and me both." Creekmore did not hear any more
of the conversation and he readily conceded that he did not
27 That is , the witnesses who were called solely in connection with the 70 Taylor and Ball testified that this meeting occurred about mid-June.
representation issue . These were John Ball , Paul Creekmore , Jeannette Da- Knight testified that it was held early in May. It was obvious , however, that
vis Helen Frazer, Laverne Knight, Sam Moses , Lee Parker, and Lola Smith . all three were referring to the same meeting . Because of the mutually corrob-
The quotations in this paragraph are from Moses' testimony . orative testimony of Taylor and Ball as to the date of the meeting, the
29 The quotation is from Knight's testimony . undersigned concludes that it took place about 2 weeks before the election.
ROPER CORPORATION
know what Taylor and Siler were talking about. Taylor
testified that he could not remember ever having made such
a statement. The Respondent never called Siler as a witness
to corroborate Creekmore. In view of the fact that Creek-
more himself acknowledged that he did not know the sub-
ject of the conversation in which Taylor and Siler were
engaged, there is nothing in this incident on which the Re-
spondent can rely for evidence of irregular preelection con-
duct by Taylor.
Employees Helen Frazer, Laverne Knight, and Lee Par-
ker testified that on several occasions prior to the election
they saw Taylor in the company of a number of well-known
union adherents. According to Frazer, she frequently saw
Taylor talking with employees Bill Kerr, Dessie Neeley,
Lucie Marsee, and Pat Collins. Frazer conceded, however,
that she never heard what was being said in any of these
conversations, that she never heard Taylor mention the or-
ganizational campaign and that she did not know whether
Taylor was for or against the Union. Lee Parker testified
that on a number of occasions before the election he saw
Frank Taylor conversing with employees Jerry Kinder,
Roger Bird, and Bill Kerr. Parker described the latter as
union adherents and testified that he saw Taylor talking
with them in a group near the timeclock. However, Parker
conceded that he did not know what Taylor was talking
about during any of these conversations. He also conceded
that Taylor was a very gregarious person who characteristi-
cally talked with many people in the plant, that Taylor had
done this before the advent of the Union's organizational
drive, and that there was no apparent change in his habits
after the election campaign began. Laverne Knight testified
that about 2 weeks before the election she saw Taylor talk-
ing in a group that included Dessie Neeley, Bill Kerr, and
Lucie Marsee, and that all of the latter were wearing union
buttons.31 She conceded that she was never near enough to
hear any of the conversation and that she did not really
know what was being discussed. Knight also testified that
at this time Taylor did not appear to be making any effort
to hide the fact that he was talking with anyone. Finally,
Knight acknowledged that whereas she assumed that this
group was talking about the Union, this assumption was
nothing more than a guess on her part. In view of the fact
that neither Frazer, Parker, nor Knight was able to offer
any testimony as to what Taylor said on any of those occa-
sions about which they testified, and in view of their fur-
ther testimony about Taylor's well-known penchant for
talking with his coworkers which had been demonstrated
throughout his tenure at the plant, it is the conclusion of
the undersigned that nothing in the testimony of the three
above-named employees tended to support the Respond-
ent's contention that Taylor injected himself into the
Union's campaign during the preelection period.
As noted earlier, Lee Parker also testified that shortly
before the election Frank Taylor offered to bet him $50 that
the Union would win and that some time before the election
Taylor also told Parker that he and his son, the county
judge, could influence the vote so that the Union would win.
Taylor denied that he made any such remarks and his denial
31 On the other hand, Bill Kerr credibly testified on rebuttal that he never
wore a union button at the plant at any time during the preelection period.
147
was credible.
The Respondent presented several witnesses who testified
about alleged union adherents having been seen at Taylor's
home, a residence that was located only a short distance
from the plant. Thus, employee John Ball testified that he
saw Bill Kerr at Taylor's house before the election. On the
other hand, Ball conceded that he had seen Kerr at Taylor's
home on several occasions long before the Union ever ap-
peared on the scene.
Paul Creekmore testified that one evening before the elec-
tion he saw Robert M. Huddock, the union representative,
in the yard at Taylor's residence. This testimony was
thoroughly refuted by Huddock himself. Huddock testified
that he has never visited Taylor's home and that at the time
of the hearing he still did not know where Taylor lived.
According to Huddock, he was in sole charge of conducting
all union meetings held prior to the election and that Taylor
never attended any of them. He further testified that it was
not until about a month after the election that he first met
Taylor when the latter spoke to him about having been
discharged by the Respondent. Creekmore was not a con-
vincing witness , as has been found earlier herein.
Huddock's testimony, on the other hand, was completely
credible. Consequently, it is now found that, contrary to
Creekmore's account, Huddock never visited Taylor's resi-
dence prior to the representation election at the plant.
Lola Smith testified "time and again I seen . . . people
that was for the Union there at Frank's [Taylor' s] house."
Smith did not specify when it was that she saw these alleged
union adherents at Taylor's residence. She was unconvinc-
ing throughout her appearance as a witness . She testified in
a manner that was garrulous and flippant and while on the
stand displayed deep antipathy for both Taylor and his son,
Judge Taylor. Consequently, it is the conclusion of the un-
dersigned that her testimony is worthy of no credence in
assessing the validity of Respondent's objection to the elec-
tion.
John Ball testified that on the afternoon of the election
and subsequent to the time when the ballots had been
counted he drove past Taylor's home and saw several em-
ployees in the driveway there with Taylor. The Respondent
sought to characterize this event as a "victory celebration"
which was being staged at Taylor's residence. Taylor, on the
other hand, readily acknowledged that several employees
were there that afternoon. He testified that prior to the
election he had wagered with employee Merrill Carpenter
and that he had bet Carpenter a case of beer that the Union
would lose the election. According to Taylor, after the elec-
tion tally established that the Union had won, Carpenter
arrived at his house to collect the bet and shortly thereafter
several other employees came to share in Carpenter's win-
nings.
Ball also testified that on the same afternoon and immedi-
ately after the election results became known, he saw Taylor
on the plant parking lot and in the midst of several employ-
ees when employee Bill Kerr walked up to Taylor and said
"We won." However, Ball acknowledged that he did not
hear Taylor say anything on this occasion.
Both of the foregoing incidents, having occurred after the
election, could not have effected the results of that election.
The Respondent urges that they tend to show that Taylor
148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was a union adherent throughout the campaign. This con-
tention, however, is premised on the assumption that the
other evidence offered in support of Objection 3 demon-
strates that Taylor actively supported the Union during its
organizational drive . It is the conclusion of the undersigned
that this contention of the Respondent is not supported by
credible testimony. As has been seen from the evidence
recited earlier and the findings in connection therewith, the
most that the Respondent established was that Taylor, an
older member of the Respondent's work force, was well
known in the community and among the employees , that he
was gregarious by nature , and that he engaged in a great
deal of socializing with his coworkers both during working
hours and thereafter. On the findings set forth above, it is
the conclusion of the undersigned that the Respondent has
failed to prove that Taylor, or any other supervisor, assisted,
supported, or participated in the Union's organizational
activities so as to interfere with the holding of a fair and
impartial election. Accordingly, it is now recommended that
the Respondent's Objection 3 be overruled.32
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce and the
Union is a labor organization , all within the meaning of the
Act.
2. By discharging and refusing to reinstate Frank Taylor
because he refused to cooperate with an attempt by the
Respondent to set aside a representation election , thereby
discouraging nonsupervisory employees in the free exercise
of their statutory rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act,
and discouraging membership in and activities on behalf of
the Union, the Respondent has engaged , and is engaging, in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
3. By discriminatorily discharging Roger Bird, thereby
discouraging protected concerted activity, the Respondent
has engaged , and is engaging, in unfair labor practices with-
in the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By interfering with , restraining , and coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged , and is engaging,
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. The General Counsel has not proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the Respondent interfered with,
restrained, or coerced its employees in the exercise of the
32 One other incident should be mentioned : Employee Jeannette Davis
testified that about 5 days after the election, she was present near the plant
bulletin board when the Employer's objections to the election were posted.
According to Davis, she , and several employees, along with Frank Taylor,
all of whom were nearby, gathered at the board to read the announcement.
Davis testified that at some point she heard employee Dessie Neeley say to
Taylor "they contested the election , now what will we do?" She further
testified that although Taylor said something in response to the question, it
was incomprehensible to her and she could not recall what it was that he said.
This episode has no relevance to the current inquiry into the basis for the
Employer's objections since (a) it occurred subsequent to the election and (b)
no evidence was offered as to what, if anything, Taylor said at the time.
rights safeguarded by the Act, except by the specific acts
and conduct found herein to have been violative.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that the Re-
spondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent's discharge and
refusal to reinstate Frank Taylor interfered with , restrained,
and coerced nonsupervisory employees in the exercise of
their statutory rights. In order to restore to these employees
their full freedom to exercise those rights and thus to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act, it is recommended that the
Respondent be ordered to offer Taylor immediate and full
reinstatement to his former, or a substantially equivalent
position, and make him whole for any loss of earnings he
may have suffered by reason of such discharge by payment
to him of a sum of money equal to the amount he would
have earned from the date of his discharge to the date of the
offer of reinstatement, less earnings during said period, to
be computed in accordance with the formula set out in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), together
with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum to be com-
puted in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating
Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Having found that the Respon-
dent discriminatorily terminated Roger Bird on July 9,
1973, it is recommended that the Respondent be ordered to
offer him immediate and full reinstatement without preju-
dice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make
him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered
from the time of his discharge to the date of the
Respondent's offer of reinstatement. The backpay for Bird
shall be computed in accordance with the Woolworth and
Isis cases cited supra. It will also be recommended that the
Respondent be required to preserve and make available to
the Board, or its agents, on request, payroll and other re-
cords to facilitate the computation of backpay due.
As the unfair labor practices committed by the Respon-
dent are of a character striking at the root of employee
rights safeguarded by the Act, it will be recommended that
the said Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from
infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120
F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941).
Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions and the
entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, there
is issued the following recommended:
ORDER 33
The Respondent, Roper Corporation, Williamsburg Divi-
sion , its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
33 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Section
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
ROPER CORPORATION
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any
employees because of their union or concerted activities.
(b) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing nonsupervi-
sory employees in the exercise of their statutory rights by
discharging and refusing to reinstate supervisory personnel
because they refuse to cooperate with the Respondent in
thwarting the exercise by employees of their organizational
rights.
(c) Coercively, or otherwise unlawfully, interrogating its
employees as to their union sympathies and activities and
threatening employees with the loss of jobs if the Union won
the election.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, or engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid, or to refrain
from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Frank Taylor immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and
make him whole in the manner set forth above in the section
entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Offer Roger Bird immediate and full reinstatement to
his former or substantially equivalent position, without prej-
udice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and make
him whole in the manner set forth above in the section
entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board, or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due, and the right to rein-
statement.
(d) Post at its plant in Williamsburg, Kentucky, copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix." 34 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 9, after being duly signed by an authorized represen-
tative of the Respondent, shall be posted immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that said
notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Decision, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar
as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that Objection 3 filed by the Respon-
dent in Case 9-RC-10128 be overruled.
34 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
149
WE WILL NOT coercively, or otherwise unlawfully, in-
terrogate our employees as to their union sympathies
and activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with loss of jobs
if the Union comes in.
WE WILL NOT discharge, or otherwise discriminate
against any employees because of their union or con-
certed activities.
WE WILL offer Frank Taylor full and immediate rein-
statement to his former job as foreman of warehouse
and shipping , or a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and
privileges previously enjoyed , and make him whole for
any loss of pay suffered as a result of his discharge.
WE WILL offer Roger Bird full and immediate rein-
statement to his former , or a substantially equivalent,
position , without prejudice to any seniority or other
rights and privileges previously enjoyed and make him
whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of his
discharge.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, re-
strain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization , to form, join , or assist United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any
other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, or en-
gage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid, or to refrain from any
or all such activities.
ROPER CORPORATION, WIL-
LIAMSBURG DIVISION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material . Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, Federal Office Building, Room
3003, 550 Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, Telephone
513-684-3625.