01972426
03-22-1999
Ronney D. James, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Areas) Agency.
Ronney D. James v. United States Postal Service
01972426
March 22, 1999
Ronney D. James, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01972426
) Agency No. 1-H-329-2005-93
William J. Henderson, ) Hearing No. 150-95-8369X
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
(S.E./S.W. Areas) )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
Appellant timely appealed the agency's final decision that it had
not discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et. seq., and � 501
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,
29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. In his complaint, appellant alleged that the
agency discriminated against him on the bases of race (Black), reprisal
(prior EEO activity), and physical disability (back and right leg medical
condition) when, his request for eighty hours of sick leave (leave)
was disapproved. The Commission accepts this appeal in accordance with
EEOC Order No. 960.001.
Following an investigation of this complaint, appellant requested
a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
administrative judge (AJ). A hearing was conducted on June 26, 1996.
On October 28, 1996, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision (RD) finding
no discrimination.
The AJ found that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination based on race. Appellant did not show that he was
treated differently than a similarly situated employee outside of his
protected class. Additionally, the AJ found that appellant established
a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination. With respect to race
discrimination, assuming that appellant had established a prima facie
case, the AJ found that appellant failed to establish that the agency's
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions were pretextual.
Irrespective of appellant's establishment of a prima facie case of
reprisal, the AJ also found that appellant failed to establish that the
agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions were
pretextual.
The agency argued that it disapproved appellant's request for sick leave
in August 1993, because: (1) appellant failed to request leave from
his supervisor in advance, or provide any type of explanation prior to
his absence, and (2) the medical documentation appellant submitted to
support his request for leave was insufficient. Furthermore, the agency
clarified that either of these reasons were sufficient to disapprove
appellant's request for leave, and in the instant case, appellant failed
to meet either requirement. However, appellant argued that the agency's
reasons were not credible, because he did advise his Tour 3 supervisor,
prior to departing, that he needed at least one week of leave to travel
to Maryland for his appointment with his physician. The AJ found this
argument unpersuasive, because it did not suffice to meet appellant's
notification obligation to the agency. Specifically, the AJ found that
appellant knew at the time he notified his Tour 3 supervisor that he was
to begin work on Tour 1 immediately, with only one more day on Tour 3.
Additionally, the AJ found that appellant knew that when he failed to
appear on August 1, 1993, for work as scheduled on Tour 1, that his
leave had not been approved, nor could it have been approved by his Tour
3 supervisor. The AJ determined that appellant's knowledge that he was
required to receive authorization from his Tour I supervisor (T1S1) was
further evidenced by his submission of his August 3, 1993 leave request,
and subsequent medical documentation, to his Tour I supervisor.
On appeal, appellant argues that he did notify the Tour I managerial staff
prior to his departure, when on July 29, 1993, his request for sick leave
for 48 hours was signed by another Tour I supervisor (T1S2). Appellant
contends that T1S2 was his supervisor when T1S1 was not scheduled to work,
and T1S1 was not scheduled to work the day T1S2 signed appellant's request
for sick leave. However, we find appellant's notification to his Tour I
supervisors insufficient notification. Appellant still failed to provide
an explanation for his request for sick leave prior to his absence, and
failed to meet the agency's other requirements for requesting sick leave.
Regarding appellant's submission of acceptable medical documentation
required by the agency to accompany his request for leave, the AJ found
that the documents presented by appellant did not conform to the agency's
definition of "acceptable" medical documentation, and therefore were
justifiably disapproved. Specifically, the AJ found that appellant
failed to provide information regarding the nature of his injury, or as
to why he could not perform his duties for the two weeks for which he
requested sick leave. Moreover, the AJ found that once appellant provided
subsequent medical documentation that noted a diagnosis and prognosis,
the agency approved appellant's request, and restored his leave.
With respect to appellant's disability, the AJ found that appellant
failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.
Specifically, appellant failed to establish that he was a "qualified"
individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. Jasany
v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
The AJ found that appellant did not show that, on the dates for which he
requested leave, that he had a disability which substantially limited any
major life activity. Also, the record did not reveal that appellant
suffered from such disability at that time. Furthermore, the AJ
determined that appellant failed to provide any information regarding
the extent or permanency of his physical disability, or of the need for
continued medical treatment for his disability. Although, appellant
argued that due to his disability he could only travel by airplane, and
could not exercise on a bicycle, the AJ found that these limitations did
not rise to the level of disability protected by the Rehabilitation Act.
Additionally, the AJ found that appellant did not prove that he was, in
anyway, disabled with respect to his ability to care for himself or work.
Assuming that appellant had established a prima facie case of disability
discrimination, the AJ found that appellant failed to establish that
the agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions were
pretextual, for the same reasons discussed in detail above with respect
to race and reprisal discrimination. On January 2, 1997, the agency
issued a final decision, adopting the AJ's finding of no discrimination.
It is from this decision that appellant now appeals.
After a careful review of the entire record, including contentions
on appeal, and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in
this decision, the Commission finds that the AJ's recommended decision
sets forth the relevant facts, and properly analyzes the appropriate
regulations, policies, and laws applicable to appellant's complaint
as a disparate treatment claim. Therefore, the Commission discerns no
basis to disturb the AJ's finding of no discrimination. Accordingly,
it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
AFFIRM the agency's final decision finding no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,
YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE
OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS
OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
March 22, 1999
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations