Rolf K.,1 Complainant,v.Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 27, 2018
0120181389 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 27, 2018)

0120181389

09-27-2018

Rolf K.,1 Complainant, v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.


U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

Rolf K.,1

Complainant,

v.

Nancy A. Berryhill,

Acting Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120181389

Hearing No. 420-2016-00265X

Agency No. ATL160124SSA

DECISION

On March 16, 2018, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(a), from the Agency's February 13, 2018, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether Complainant was discriminated against based on race (black), age (40+), sex (male), or reprisal (prior EEO activity) when he received a Performance Assessment and Communication System (PACS) rating of "successful contribution" for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015; and (2) in January 2016, he was not selected for one of two Claims Representative positions.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Benefit Authorizer GS-9 at the Agency's Division 1, Module 4 facility in Birmingham, Alabama. Regarding Claim 1, the record reflects that the Agency used the PACS to evaluate employees. The system is a three-level appraisal system, rating employees as "(1) not successful, (3) successful contribution; or (5) outstanding. The record reflects that Complainant had a change in supervisor during the rating period. The record reflects that the individual members of the staff responsible for rating Complainant were unaware of his prior EEO activity.

The staff members denied that Complainant's appraisal was lowered. Until his evaluation in 2015, Complainant had never received a PACS appraisal higher than the 4.5 average he received in FY 2015. The record reflects that the staff members took into account incidents during the rating period in which Complainant had a series of disagreements with a Benefit Authorizer trainee. The trainee reported that she did not feel comfortable in her interactions with Complainant.2 Complainant's supervisor determined that Complainant did not provide a justification to warrant a rating of "Outstanding." Complainant was evaluated at the level of "Successful Contribution."

Regarding Claim 2, the record reflects that the Agency utilized a selection process that rated each applicant for the two (2) positions sought. A panel of three (3) managers reviewed each application individually and collectively. The applicants were scored and ranked on a matrix. The Complainant's total rating was lower than the selectees. The three members of the panel denied that Complainant's protected categories were considered in the selections. The members of the panel stated that they were unaware of Complainant's prior EEO complaint or his other protected categories.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's February 6, 2017, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on January 18, 2018. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant and the Agency both filed briefs. Complainant, among other things, maintains that the evidence of record is insufficient to warrant summary judgment. The Agency argues that Complainant failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons articulated for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, � VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

Upon review of the record, we find that there are no genuine issues of material fact presented here. The record has been adequately developed, Complainant was given ample notice of the Agency's motion for a decision without a hearing, he was given a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, he was given the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and he was given the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. We find that, even assuming all facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in his favor, as explained below. Therefore, we find that the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802: Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 450 U.S. 248. 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

Assuming, arguendo, Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, age, sex and reprisal, we find that the Agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions as set forth above. While Complainant argues that the evidence presented by the Agency is insufficient to warrant summary judgment, Complainant had an opportunity to conduct discovery and set forth any admissible evidence that demonstrates that the reasons presented by the Agency were pretext for discrimination. While Complainant in his brief on appeal maintains that he was discriminated against, and that there are issues he feels remain open and need to be addressed, he has not presented evidence that would prove by a preponderance that the Agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Accordingly, we find no persuasive evidence of pretext or discrimination on the part of the Agency.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0617)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__9/27/18________________

Date

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

2 Complainant had also been suspended earlier during the rating period. The Agency stated that it did not rely on that suspension in deciding Complainant's performance rating, however.

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