Rohlik, Michael Lawrence. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 12, 2020

2019002047 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 12, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/312,299 06/23/2014 Michael Lawrence Rohlik M74811 1010US.1 (0002.4) 8612
26158 7590 11/12/2020
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
ATTN: IP DOCKETING
P.O. BOX 7037
ATLANTA, GA 30357-0037
EXAMINER
BARRERA, JUAN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3752
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/12/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MICHAEL LAWRENCE ROHLIK,
KENNETH ALAN HUBBARD, and JOHN EMMETT BEVINS

Appeal 2019-002047
Application 14/312,299
Technology Center 3700
Before DANIEL S. SONG, JILL D. HILL, and JEREMY M. PLENZLER,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HILL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8, 12–15, 17, and 24–292. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as McWane, Inc.
Appeal Br. 1.
2 Claims 18–23 were withdrawn from consideration. Claims 9–11 and 16
were canceled. Final Act. 2.
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BACKGROUND
Independent claims 1 (method) and 12 (system) are pending and not
withdrawn. Independent claim 1, reproduced below, illustrates the claimed
invention.
1. A method for testing a vehicle fire suppression
system, the method comprising:
testing, via processing circuitry, each of a plurality of
components of the vehicle fire suppression system; and
providing test results for each of the plurality of
components,
wherein the plurality of components comprises one or
more status indicator lights, a shutdown relay configured to
disable vehicle operation in event of a fire, a power supply
system, at least one fire detection sensor, an audible alarm, and
an extinguishing agent container, and
wherein testing each of the plurality of components of the
vehicle fire suppression system includes:
testing operation of each of the one or more status
indicator lights;
engaging the shutdown relay;
testing the power supply system;
testing the at least one fire detection sensor;
triggering the audible alarm; and
testing pressurization of the extinguishing agent
container.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Lloyd US 5,950,150 Sept. 7, 1999
Rini US 2010/0320021 A1 Dec. 23, 2010
Turaev US 2013/0299203 A1 Nov. 14, 2013
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REJECTION
Claims 1–8, 12–15, 17, and 24–29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Turaev, Lloyd, and Rini. Final Act. 2.
OPINION
The Examiner finds, inter alia, that Turaev discloses a vehicle
suppression system, but not a method for testing components of the vehicle
suppression system. Final Act. 2–3. The Examiner finds, however, that
Lloyd discloses a method for testing a vehicle suppression system that
includes testing each component of a fire suppression system having sensors,
and providing test results for each of the components. Id. at 3 (citing Lloyd
11:25–29 (“the on-site portion 10 consists of one or more sensors that sense
one or more parameters of one or more components of a fire protection
system pertinent to operational criteria compliance verification”); 13:3–10
(data is recorded and tested)). The Examiner also finds that Lloyd discloses
the tested suppression system components including status indicator lights
(control panel indicia), a power supply system (driver 48), a fire detection
sensor (sensing one or more parameters like temperature, fire or smoke), an
audible alarm, and an extinguishing agent container (water tanks). Id.
(citing Lloyd 5:20–31, 8:8–24, 14:39–48, 16:63–17:4). The Examiner
continues that Lloyd further discloses testing each of the plurality of
components, including testing operation of status indicator lights, testing the
power supply system, testing detection sensors, triggering the audible alarm,
and testing pressurization of the extinguishing agent container. Id. at 3–4.
The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to modify Turaev
to incorporate Lloyd’s testing method to provide Turaev’s “vehicle fire
suppression system with a method to test, diagnose and provide results . . . to
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automatically verify operational criteria to inform the user of the status of
the system (see abstract).” Id. at 4.
Appellant argues claims 1–8, 12–15, 17, and 24–29 as a group.
Appeal Br. 6. We select independent method claim 1 as representative.
Claims 2–8, 12–15, 17, and 24–29 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in finding that Lloyd
discloses processing circuitry triggering an audible alarm and testing the
status indicator light(s), a power supply system, and fire detection sensors.
Appeal Br. 4. According to Appellant, while Lloyd discloses verifying
compliance of a fire/life safety system by sensing various system parameters
“during testing to determine if testing requirements are satisfied,” Lloyd
“does not itself test components of the fire/life safety system” or explicitly
“disclose that its system senses parameters during testing of each of
indicator light(s), power supply system or fire detection sensor(s), or triggers
an audible alarm.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Appellant addresses and
summarizes each section of Lloyd’s text cited by the Examiner, explaining
how each section fails to disclose testing the claimed components of Lloyd’s
fire suppression system. Id. at 4–6.
The Examiner responds that Lloyd’s sensing of parameters to verify
system compliance with safety codes “requires testing of the components
claimed by Appellant.” Ans. 12. According to the Examiner, the operation,
maintenance, and testing of Lloyd’s fire suppression system components are
“established by predetermined operational criteria, such as industry
standards and fire safety codes,” such that the compliance verification
disclosed in Lloyd includes testing of fire suppression system components
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when required. Id. at 13. Regarding testing of fire detection sensors
specifically, the Examiner finds that “[L]loyd is testing the sensors by
sensing them for operational criteria.” Id. Regarding testing by triggering
the audible alarm and testing status indicator lights, the Examiner finds that
Lloyd’s sensor 116 “senses the fire protection system’s alarm device . . . to
insure [sic, ensure] that quarterly testing requirements of NFPA . . . [are]
performed on schedule.” Ans. 13–14. The Examiner contends that NFPA
requires testing of fire alarms for visual and audible features, such that
Lloyd’s sensor 116 would be understood by a skilled artisan to test the visual
and audible alarm features. Id. Regarding testing the power supply system
specifically, the Examiner finds that “[t]he claims do not specify what kind
of power supply,” and Lloyd’s diesel driven pump is a power supply that is
tested by its “exhaust thermocouple 54 sens[ing] the operational status of the
pump.” Id. at 14.
Appellant replies that, while Lloyd senses parameters during testing to
determine if testing requirements are satisfied, Lloyd “does not itself test
components of the fire/life safety system[,] . . . [n]or does Lloyd specifically
disclose that its system senses parameters during testing of each of indicator
light(s), power supply system or fire detection sensor(s), or triggers an
audible alarm.” Reply Br. 2. According to Appellant, while Lloyd discloses
a “system for operational criteria compliance of fire/life safety systems and
components,” it does not “mention operational status or testing operational
status of components of a fire safety system, much less that its system tests
operational status for components of a fire safety system.” Id. Appellant
again addresses and summarizes each section of text cited by the Examiner,
explaining how each section fails to disclose testing the claimed components
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of the fire suppression system. Id. at 2–5. Regarding the Examiner’s
assertion that Lloyd’s sensor 116 “senses the fire protection system’s alarm
device . . . to insure that quarterly testing requirements of NFPA . . . [are]
performed on schedule,” and NFPA requires testing of fire alarms for visual
and audible features (Ans. 13–14), Appellant argues that “Lloyd does not
disclose or describe NFPA 72 Chapter 14, nor is NFPA 72 Chapter 14 of
record or cited” in the pending rejection. Reply Br. 5 (emphasis omitted).
We are not persuaded that the Examiner’s findings regarding the
disclosure of Lloyd contain error. Lloyd discloses a method for verifying
operational criteria compliance for components of a fire/life safety system
whose testing is established by predetermined operational criteria. Lloyd,
Abstract. Sensors sense parameters of, or resultant indicators of, one or
more of the fire/life safety system components to verify compliance thereof.
See id. According to Lloyd, the National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) developed industry standards for, inter alia, testing fire protection
systems. Lloyd 2:3–8. NFPA Standard 25 regulates such testing and
includes, inter alia, testing the pump and the alarm device. See id. at 2:19–
52.
Lloyd discloses that fire detection/alarm system test requirements “are
as diverse as the systems themselves,” and “vary depending on system
configuration.” Lloyd 6:5–9, 50–53. Lloyd “pulls together each [fire/life
safety system’s] operational requirements into an integrated fire/life safety
operational criteria compliance . . . method that can verify the state of
readiness of the entire fire/life safety system, as well as the degree of its
code compliance.” Id. at 9:6–11. Such operation criteria compliance
includes fire/life safety system components whose testing is established by
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industry standards and codes. Id. at 10:64–11:2. A portion 10 of the system
includes sensors (see, e.g., the sensors listed at 15:14–23 and 16:3–13) that
sense parameters of the components pertinent to operational criteria
compliance. Id. at 11:26–29. For example, an exhaust thermocouple 54
senses heat from a diesel exhaust stack 52 to verify the operation of diesel
driver 48. Id. at 14:22–26. In addition, sensors 80, 82 detect battery current
or voltage “indicative of whether batteries 70 and 72 have enough remaining
capacity to start the diesel driver 48.” Id. at 14:64–67. According to Lloyd,
its sensors “provide information necessary to determine the existence of
problem conditions . . . . Examples of these are sensors 80 and 82, which
may indicate that both the main battery and reserve battery sets have
insufficient remaining voltage to provide start up of the diesel driver.” Id. at
15:59–67. Lloyd also includes a sensor 116 that “senses the fire protection
system’s alarm device . . . to insure that quarterly testing requirements of
NFPA to exercise this device [are] performed on schedule.” Id. at 16:63–
17:1. “[H]eat or smoke sensors 138 are provided in several zones within
each floor,” and can be monitored as a “primary method in which the
preaction system is tripped. Id. at 18:29–33.
Lloyd’s Figures 22, 23, 24, and 25 illustrate an exemplary “fire/life
safety operational criteria compliance verification report.” Lloyd 10:32–33.
As can be seen, the report indicates that alarm testing (Figure 24) and power
testing (Figure 25) was performed. Thus, whether or not Lloyd’s system
performs the testing, it discloses such testing, i.e., a method, being
performed as part of a fire/life safety testing system.
Thus, when considered a whole, Lloyd teaches that fire
detection/alarm systems and their various components, including sensors,
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are employed, tested, and monitored throughout such systems to ensure that
any required industry standard or code testing is performed and compliance
thereto verified. Thus, the premise of the Appellant’s arguments as to lack
of disclosure in Lloyd as to testing is unpersuasive. We agree with the
Examiner that it would have been obvious to a skilled artisan to verify
operation through testing of the system of Turaev in view of the fire/life
safety verification of Lloyd’s method.
For these reasons, we discern no error in the Examiner’s rejection, and
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection.
CONCLUSION
We sustain the pending obviousness rejection.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis  Affirmed Reversed
1–8, 12–
15, 17, 24–
29
103 Turaev, Lloyd, Rini 1–8, 12–
15, 17, 24–
29

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED