Roger C. Tudor, Complainant,v.Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, (Internal Revenue Service), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 18, 2010
0120090983 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 18, 2010)

0120090983

06-18-2010

Roger C. Tudor, Complainant, v. Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, Department of the Treasury, (Internal Revenue Service), Agency.


Roger C. Tudor,

Complainant,

v.

Timothy F. Geithner,

Secretary,

Department of the Treasury,

(Internal Revenue Service),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120090983

Hearing No. 450-2008-00193X

Agency No. EEODFS070888F

DECISION

On December 12, 2008, Complainant filed an appeal from the agency's

November 10, 2008 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42

U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is deemed

timely and is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the

following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) properly issued a decision

without a hearing.

2. Whether the AJ properly determined that Complainant was not subjected

to unlawful discrimination as alleged.

3. Whether the AJ properly to dismissed claims (2) and (3) of

Complainant's complaint.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a Supervisory Special Agent with the Internal Revenue Service,

Criminal Investigations in Dallas, Texas. However, due to allegations of

misconduct, Complainant had been performing restricted duties as a Lead

Tech Agent for the previous 18 months. Complainant had prior EEO activity

related to an EEO complaint he filed on February 8, 2006.1 On June 26

2007, the Agency issued Complainant a notice of a proposed reduction of

pay and grade due to allegations of misconduct. Also on June 26, 2007,

the Agency denied Complainant's request to attend the National Technical

Investigations Association training (NATIA) training. This training was

for Tech Agents, and only one Tech Agent was sent to the training from

the Agency during the relevant time period. Complainant had previously

attended two NATIA conferences in 2006. The NATIA training conference

provided state of the art equipment and training relevant to the Tech

Agent position. Subsequently, the Agency sent Complainant a November 27,

2007, letter that indicated that he was to be demoted in grade and pay

effective December 9, 2007.

Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that he was discriminated

against on the basis reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:

1. On June 26, 2007, the Agency denied him the opportunity to attend

NATIA training;

2. On June 26, 2007, the Agency issued him a letter of proposed adverse

action for demotion to a Investigative Analyst Position (GS-12); and

3. Effective December 9, 2007, the Agency demoted him from the position

of Supervisory Criminal Investigator to the position of Investigative

Analyst (GS 12).

Complainant initially filed a Formal Complaint regarding claims (1)

and (2) on August 20, 2007. On January 23, 2008, Complainant amended

his complaint to include claim (3). However, prior to amending his

complainant, on January 8, 2008, Complainant filed an appeal to the Merit

Systems Protection Board (MSPB)2 regarding claim (3). Subsequently, the

Agency issued a March 11, 2008 letter of Partial Dismissal to Complainant

in which it dismissed claims (2) and (3) on procedural grounds,3 but

accepted claim (1) for investigation.

At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a

hearing before an AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ

assigned to the case determined sua sponte that the complaint did not

warrant a hearing and over Complainant's objections, issued a decision

without a hearing on October 21, 2008. The Agency subsequently issued

a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove

that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.

Regarding claim (1), the AJ found that the Agency demonstrated legitimate

nondiscriminatory reasons for actions. In particular, the AJ found that

the Agency did not approve Complainant's request to attend training

because he was on temporary assignment, and the Agency was contemplating

disciplining him. In this regard, the AJ noted that this would have

resulted in Complainant being reassigned to other duties for which the

training would not have been relevant. The AJ also found that Complainant

presented no evidence of pretext.

Also, the AJ dismissed claims (2) and (3) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.107(a)(4) due to the fact that Complainant filed an appeal to the

MSPB.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant has not submitted a brief on appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and

factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them, de novo.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from

an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see

also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999)

(providing that an administrative judge's "decision to issue a decision

without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed

de novo"). This essentially means that we should look at this case

with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate)

or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and agency's, factual conclusions and

legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional

discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal

employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9,

� VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that

the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and

legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC

"review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including

any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its

decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its

interpretation of the law").

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when

he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29

C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary

judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive

legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists

no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,

a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine

whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of

the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and

all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding

a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling

is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without

a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed

material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and

(4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary.

According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary

judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the

opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition."

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the

administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount

of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision

without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an

administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving

an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing). We find that

the AJ properly issued a decision without a hearing because Complainant

failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact or credibility

existed.

Claim (1)

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or

she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will

vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

Assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of

discrimination based on retaliation, the Agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its actions. Namely,

the Agency did not send Complainant to the NATIA training because

there was a likelihood that he would not be in the Lead Tech Agent

position after the training. The record reflects that the Agency was

contemplating disciplining Complainant at the time, which would have

resulted in Complainant being assigned to other duties not pertinent

to the training. Upon review, we concur with the AJ's determination

that Complainant failed to provide any evidence of pretext in the

record. Furthermore, we find that the record is devoid of any evidence

that the Agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus towards

Complainant's prior protected activity.

Claims (2) and (3)

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(5) provides, in part, that the

agency shall dismiss a complaint that alleges that a proposal to take

a personnel action, or other preliminary step to taking a personnel

action, is discriminatory. Here, Complainant claimed discrimination

when he was issued a letter of proposed adverse action for demotion to

a lower position. The record clearly indicated that this notice was a

preliminary action to the personnel action of demotion. In general, when

a complaint is filed on a proposed action and the agency subsequently

proceeds with the action, the action is considered to have merged with

the proposal. Siegel v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05960568 (October 10, 1997); Charles v. Department of the Treasury,

EEOC Request No. 05910190 (February 25, 1991). As such, claim (2) merged

with claim (3) and became part of the demotion action.

Complainant filed a mixed case appeal with the MSPB regarding the demotion

action before he amended his EEO complaint. As a result the matter is

being adjudicated outside the EEO complaint process. An aggrieved person

may initially file a mixed case complaint with an agency or may file a

mixed case appeal directly with the MSPB, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. � 1201.151,

but a person cannot file both. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.302(b). EEOC Regulation 29

C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(4) provides that an agency shall dismiss a complaint

where the Complainant has raised the matter in an appeal to the MSPB. The

record indicates that, on January 8, 2008, Complainant filed a MSPB appeal

with regard to the allegedly discriminatory demotion. The demotion is now

before the MSPB pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.302(b). Since Complainant

has elected to pursue the matter through the MSPB process, we concur

with the AJ that claims (2) and (3) should be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Summary judgment was appropriate in this case because no genuine issue of

material fact is in dispute. Complainant also failed to present evidence

that any of the Agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus

towards his previous EEO activity. We discern no basis to disturb the

AJ's decision. Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, the

Agency's final order is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___6/18/10_______________

Date

1 In his prior EEO complaint, Complainant alleged unlawful discrimination

based on his race and age.

2 MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-08-0172-1-1

3 The Agency dismissed claims (2) and (3) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.107(a)(4) on the grounds that he filed an appeal to the

MSPB. Regarding claim (3), the Agency found that his MSPB appeal predated

his January 23, 2008 amendment to his EEO complainant. Also, the Agency

found that claim (2) merged into claim (3).

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0120090983

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120090983