Robert Ramseyer

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 13, 2019

14565096 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 13, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/565,096 12/09/2014 Robert Ramseyer 226436-366545 4909
44200 7590 08/13/2019
HONIGMAN LLP
650 Trade Centre Way
Suite 200
Kalamazoo, MI 49002-0402
EXAMINER
FAN, HONGMIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2686
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/13/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte ROBERT RAMSEYER1
____________________

Appeal 2018-006212
Application 14/565,096
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, RAMA G. ELLURU, and
JOHN R. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judges.

STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is B & G Technologies,
LLC. See App. Br. 2.
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Application 14/565,096
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
19–43. Claims 1–18 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.2
THE INVENTION
The claims are directed to a vehicle information collection system and
module therefor. Spec., Title. Claim 19, reproduced below with a disputed
limitation emphasized in italics, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
19. A method for managing vehicle check in at an automotive
service center and identifying a procedure to retrieve specific
information including vehicle identification data and odometer
data related to one or more unknown vehicles at the automotive
service center, the method comprising the steps of:
connecting a device to the diagnostic port of one of the one
or more unknown vehicles;
downloading the vehicle identification data and odometer
data from the one of the one or more unknown vehicles, wherein
the procedure to retrieve the specific information including the
vehicle identification data and the odometer data is unknown to
the device prior to the connecting step and is automatically
identified during the connecting step by the device;
transferring the vehicle identification data and odometer
data from the device to a work station, wherein the work station
include a database;
programmatically populating the vehicle identification
data and odometer data into the database;
retrieving information based on one or both of the vehicle
identification data and the odometer data at the workstation; and

2 We refer to the Specification, filed December 9, 2014 (“Spec.”); Final
Office Action, mailed February 17, 2017 (“Final Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed
December 15, 2017 (“App. Br.”); Examiner’s Answer, mailed March 30,
2018 (“Ans.”); and Reply Brief, filed May 30, 2018 (“Reply Br.”).
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Application 14/565,096
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displaying the automatically-retrieved information on one
or both of a computer and a paper printout.

REFERENCES
The following prior art is relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the
claims on appeal:
Harrington et al.
Stefan et al.
Chung
Tefft et al.
Oesterling
Lowrey et al.
US 2004/0249557 A1
US 2005/0090941 A1
US 2005/0150952 A1
US 2005/0182537 A1
US 2008/0027605 A1
US 2012/0053759 A1
Dec. 9, 2004
Apr. 28, 2005
July 14, 2005
Aug. 18, 2005
Jan. 31, 2008
Mar. 1, 2012

REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 19, 24–30, 33–36, and 39–43 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Harrington and Tefft. Final
Act. 2–7.
Claims 20–22 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Harrington, Tefft, and Oesterling. Final Act. 8–9.
Claim 23 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Harrington, Tefft, and Stefan. Final Act. 9–10.
Claims 31, 37, and 38 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Harrington, Tefft, and Lowrey. Final
Act. 10–12.
Claim 32 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Harrington, Tefft, and Chung. Final Act. 12–13.
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ANALYSIS
Appellant’s contentions are persuasive of Examiner error in
connection with the rejection of independent claims 19, 24, and 34, but are
unpersuasive in connection with the rejection of independent claims 25, 30,
36 and 39. Except as indicated below, in connection with the rejections of
claims 25–33, 36, and 39–43, we adopt as our own (1) the findings and
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken (Final Act. 2–16) and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the
Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (Ans. 2–8) and
concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the
following for emphasis.

Claim Construction
Appellant contends the Examiner misconstrues claim 19 by
interpreting the disputed limitation to require only identification of an
unknown vehicle rather than an identification of “an unknown procedure to
retrieve specific information about such an unknown vehicle.” App. Br. 9.
That is, Appellant argues the disputed limitation should be read as wherein
the procedure to retrieve the specific information [(the specific information
including the vehicle identification data and the odometer data)] is unknown
to the device prior to the connecting step and [the procedure to retrieve the
specific information] is automatically identified during the connecting step
by the device. Thus, Appellant argues the subject of the clause is the
procedure used to retrieve the specific information, not the information or
the individual components of that information. See id. The Examiner
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responds, finding the argued identifying action is recited only in the
preamble of the claim, not in the body, and “nowhere in the body of claim 19
[is there] an unknown procedure.” Ans. 3. Appellant replies, disputing the
Examiner’s interpretation and directing attention to the Specification
disclosing automatic identification of a vehicle-specific protocol from
among a plurality of protocols stored in a database. Reply. Br. 2.
We agree with Appellant. The disputed limitation uses the singular
verb form “is” in describing what is unknown. If the subject of the clause,
i.e., what was unknown, was the vehicle identification data and the odometer
data, then the proper verb form would be the plural “are” rather than the
singular “is.” The “specific information” language is understood to identify
or characterize the procedure consistent with the corresponding recitation
appearing in the preamble of claim 19, i.e., a procedure that is used to
retrieve specific information. Thus, we conclude claim 19 requires the
procedure for retrieving vehicle identification and odometer data be
unknown prior to connecting to the diagnostic port.

Prior Art
Appellant contends
even if Harrington discloses an unknown identification of a
vehicle, Harrington does not, in any manner, disclose that a
procedure to retrieve specific information about such an
unknown vehicle is unknown to the device prior to connecting
the device to the diagnostic port of the unknown vehicle. Put
another way, an unknown vehicle is not an unknown procedure
to retrieve specific information about such an unknown vehicle.
App. Br. 9.
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The Examiner responds, finding “[n]owhere in the body of the claim
19 refers back to ‘identifying an unknown procedure.’” Ans. 6. The
Examiner further finds “the [S]pecification does not disclose ‘identifying an
unknown procedure’ either, therefore, it is unclear how to ‘identify[] an
unknown procedure.’” Ans. 6.
Appellant replies, contending
not only does claim 19 recite that an unknown procedure is
identified, claim 19 specifically recites that “the procedure . . . is
automatically identified during the connecting step by the
device.” (emphasis added [in original]). Moreover, the
[S]pecification clearly describes that “after insertion of the
handheld device 114 into the diagnostic port 116 at step 120, the
diagnostic tool 114, which preferably includes a processor of
some sort, identifies the protocol to communicate with the
vehicle at step 122[.]” [See] App. No. 14/565,096 at Paragraph
[0052] and Figure 4.
Reply Br. 2. Addressing the Examiner’s finding that the Specification fails
to disclose identifying an unknown procedure, Appellant directs attention to
disclosure found at paragraph 61 of the Specification.
Appellant’s contention is persuasive of reversible Examiner error. As
discussed above, claim 19 is construed to require a procedure that is
(i) unknown to a device connected to a diagnostic port of a vehicle and
(ii) automatically identified during the connecting step by the device. We
find no corresponding disclosure in Harrington nor does the Examiner allege
as much. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of independent claim
19 nor of claims 20–23, 37, and 38 that depend therefrom. Independent
claim 24 recites a similar limitation, i.e., “wherein the specific method to
access the vehicle identification data and the odometer data are [sic.]
unknown to the device prior to this connection step and is automatically
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identified by the device.” Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of
independent claim 24. Likewise, independent claim 34 includes similar
language, i.e., “wherein the procedure to acquire the vehicle specific
information is unknown to the tool prior to the step for acquiring the vehicle
specific information and wherein the procedure is automatically identified
during connecting the tool to the vehicle.” Accordingly, we do not sustain
the rejection of independent claim 34 or that of claim 35 that depends
therefrom.
Appellant contends “[i]ndependent Claims 24, 25, 30, 34, 36, and 39
include elements similar to those described above with respect to
independent Claim 19 and are therefore respectfully submitted as being in
condition for allowance for at least the same reasons.” App. Br. 11.
However, we are unable to identify sufficiently similar language in claims
25, 30, 36, and 39 reciting the argued elements. Claim 25 merely requires
“determining a protocol to retrieve the vehicle odometer information”, not
that the protocol be unknown by the device connected to the vehicle’s
diagnostic port. Claim 30 recites “identifying a procedure from the
predetermined procedures that handshakes with a procedure specific to the
vehicle such that the information collection means can automatically obtain
the information without manual input.” Again, there is no requirement that
the procedure be unknown by the claimed circuit. Claim 36 merely requires
“a signal translator coupled to the connector that, without user intervention,
automatically communicates with the vehicle in at least one protocol” and “a
software controlled by the processor that is programmed with an algorithm
to determine odometer data without manual input.” Claim 36 does not
require the protocol be unknown. Likewise, claim 39 only requires
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“determining protocol parameters to retrieve the vehicle odometer data.”
Thus, Appellant’s contentions in connection with independent claims 25, 30,
36, and 39 are not commensurate in scope with those claims and, therefore,
are unpersuasive of reversible Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of independent claims 25, 30, 36, and 39 together with the
rejections of dependent claims 26–29, 31–33, and 40–43 that are not argued
separately with particularity.

DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 19–24, 34, 35, 37,
and 38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 25–33, 36, and 39–
43 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART