Robert P. Sweeney, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (New York Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 17, 2007
0120060418 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 17, 2007)

0120060418

09-17-2007

Robert P. Sweeney, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (New York Metro Area), Agency.


Robert P. Sweeney,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(New York Metro Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01200604181

Agency No. 4A-070-0163-04

Hearing No. 170-2005-00287X

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's final order in the above-entitled matter.

Complainant alleged that the agency discriminated against him in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.,

and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., on the bases of sex (male), age

(D.O.B. 7/1/57) and disability (diabetes), when: (1) he was denied his

request for a non-competitive reassignment, as a reasonable accommodation,

to the Postmaster (PM) position in the Augusta, New Jersey Post Office

on or about June 30, 2004; and (2) he was not competitively selected for

the position of PM in the Augusta Post Office on or about July 9, 2004.

For the reasons that follow, the Commission VACATES the agency's final

order and REMANDS the complaint for a supplemental investigation.

The record indicates that complainant was employed by the agency as

a Level EAS-16 PM at the agency's Swan Lake, New York Post Office

("facility 1"). On January 12, 2004, the agency posted a vacancy for

a PM position in the Augusta, New Jersey Post Office ("facility 2").

On that date, complainant requested a reassignment to the PM position

at facility 2 as a reasonable accommodation. Complainant resided in

Pennsylvania, and facility 1 was 45 miles from his home, while facility

2 was located 22 miles from his home. On January 22, 2004, complainant

was notified that the agency's Reasonable Accommodation Committee (RAC)

met to discuss his request for an accommodation to facility 2, but

the request could not be granted as complainant was already performing

the essential functions of the position. Investigative File (IF) at

Exhibit 6. On April 13, 2004, the agency's Manager, Human Resources,

requested that complainant produce medical documentation of his diabetic

condition which would establish a disability under the Rehabilitation Act.

The documentation complainant provided stated that his diabetes was under

"fair control" and did not indicate that any major life activity was

substantially limited. IF at Exhibit 2.

On May 6, 2004, the agency informed complainant that his accommodation

request for a transfer to facility 2 was denied as the medical

documentation was insufficient to establish that he was an individual

with a disability. The agency also found that complainant failed to

demonstrate how his request for a transfer would accommodate his diabetes.

IF at Exhibit 11. Complainant then informed the Manager, Human Resources

that his accommodation request was based on the shorter commuting time to

facility 2, and as such complainant was provided with another opportunity

to submit medical documentation demonstrating that he was an individual

with a disability. IF at Exhibit 14. IF at Exhibit 11. On May 26,

2004, complainant provided medical documentation from a physician, who

stated that "fatigue, drowsiness, frequent urination, dizziness and

sweating" were among the symptoms he might experience every so often

due to his diabetes, and that complainant would benefit if he were

transferred to a Post Office closer to his home. The physician also

stated that a shorter commute would lessen complainant's stress level.

IF at Exhibit 15. On June 30, 2004, the Manager, Human Resources,

informed complainant that he had not provided sufficient medical

documentation to show that his medical condition substantially limited

any major life activities. As such, the Manager stated that she would

advise the selecting official to proceed with the selection for the

PM position at facility 2 based on normal criteria. IF at Exhibit 16.

Complainant then competitively applied for the PM position at facility 2,

but another applicant (female) was selected on July 9, 2004.

Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO

counseling and filed a formal EEO complaint on August 21, 2004.

Subsequently, complainant requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). Pursuant to the agency's Motion for a

decision without a hearing, the AJ granted the agency's Motion and

issued a decision finding no discrimination. In the decision, the AJ

found that there were no genuine issues of material fact, and further

found that complainant failed to establish that he was an individual

with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. As such, the AJ found

that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination. In addition, the AJ found that complainant failed to

establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, as the selectee for

the PM position was only about six (6) months younger than complainant.

Further, the AJ found that even assuming, arguendo, that complainant

established a prima facie case of discrimination based on sex, the agency

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. In so

finding, the AJ noted that complainant's request for a non-competitive

reassignment to facility 2 was denied as the agency determined that

he was not disabled and thus not entitled to the reassignment as an

accommodation. Regarding the competitive non-selection, the AJ found that

the selectee chosen for the PM position at facility 2 was better qualified

based on her interview. Further, the AJ found that complainant failed to

present evidence that the agency's articulated reasons for its actions

were more likely than not a pretext for discrimination based on sex.

The agency's final action implemented the AJ's decision. Complainant has

not made any arguments on appeal addressing the AJ's specific findings.

However, complainant made several comments regarding his diabetes,

specifically: (1) his diabetes causes him to have a schedule of injections

and dietary restrictions; (2) the agency did not engage in the interactive

process regarding his request for reasonable accommodation; (3) the agency

did not change his personnel designation to reflect his diabetes until he

submitted medical documentation; and (4) the agency claimed that he was

not entitled to any accommodation which included testing his blood sugar,

taking insulin injections or glucose tablets during the workday as needed.

The agency has not responded to complainant's appeal.

As an initial matter we note that the Commission's regulations allow

an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that

there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g).

This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure

set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The

U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue

of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's

function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether

there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the

non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can

only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, it is not appropriate

for an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing. In the context of an

administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly issue a decision without

a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately

developed for summary disposition. Petty v. Defense Security Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003); Murphy v. Dept. of the Army,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A04099 (July 11, 2003).

The Commission notes that to prevail in a disparate treatment claim,

complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned

by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating

that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances

that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction

Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be

dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United

States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation

is a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC

Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); and Pavelka v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).

We initially address complainant's allegation that the agency

discriminated against him when it denied his request for a non-competitive

reassignment to the PM position at facility 2, as a reasonable

accommodation for his diabetes. We determine that the instant complaint

is most properly viewed as a claim of denial of a reasonable accommodation

for a diabetic condition. Under the Commission's regulations, an agency

is required to make reasonable accommodation of the known physical and

mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless

the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29

C.F.R. � 1630.2(o) and (p). With respect to complainant's allegation, in

order to determine whether he is entitled to a reasonable accommodation,

we must first analyze whether complainant is an "individual with a

disability" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. An "individual

with a disability" is one who (1) has a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities, (2) has a record

of such impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.

Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,

learning, and working. Sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching are

also recognized as major life activities. See Interpretive Guidance on

Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Appendix to 29 C.F.R. �

1630.2(i); see also Haygood v. United States Postal Service, EEOC

Appeal No. 01976371 (April 25, 2000); Selix v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01970153 (March 16, 2000). An impairment is

substantially limiting when it prevents an individual from performing a

major life activity or when it significantly restricts the condition,

manner or duration under which an individual can perform a major life

activity. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(j). The individual's ability to perform the

major life activity must be restricted as compared to the ability of the

average person in the general population to perform the activity. Id.

In the instant case, we find that the record is undisputed that

complainant has type I diabetes (diabetes mellitus), a permanent

incurable condition in which blood levels of glucose are abnormally

high because the body does not release or use insulin adequately. See

Surprenant v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01996186 (July 26,

2001), request for reconsideration denied Individuals with diabetes

mellitus produce little to no insulin, and thus must regularly inject

it in order to control blood sugar levels. Id. Uncontrolled, or

poorly controlled, diabetes can destroy the kidneys, cause blindness,

and precipitate a variety of cardio-vascular diseases. As such, we find

that due to his diabetes mellitus, complainant has a physical impairment.

In addition, we find that the record does not contain sufficient evidence

to determine whether complainant's diabetes substantially limits a major

life activity.

Based on the medical assessments of complainant's diabetic condition,

as well as his own statements, we find that the record reflects that

he is an insulin-dependent diabetic who suffers many symptoms from his

diabetes. While the record does not reflect that complainant is on an

insulin regimen consisting of pre-meal and bedtime insulin injections

daily, his physician stated that he would benefit from a shorter commute.

Complainant's physician also noted complainant's diabetes led to fatigue,

drowsiness, frequent urination, dizziness and sweating, and that his

stress level would decrease with a shorter commute. Complainant's own

statements indicate that his diabetes causes him to have a schedule

of insulin injections and he must eat at certain times during the day,

leading to the conclusion that he could suffer the effects of his diabetes

during the longer commute to work.

While clearly complainant's diabetes affects his ability to care for

himself and his eating, it is unclear to what extent his condition impacts

these major life activities. The record is devoid of any information

regarding how frequently complainant, in fact, experiences episodes

of dizziness, fatigue and drowsiness, to include the duration of such

episodes. The record also lacks any account of the type of symptoms

complainant experiences during these episodes, nor their frequency or

severity. Although the May 26 2004 medical statement describes several

symptoms of his diabetes and associated complications, the record is

devoid of information detailing the frequency with which complainant

experiences these complications, nor any description of their severity, to

include whether the shorter commute complainant requested would alleviate

or decrease many of the symptoms he may suffer due to his diabetes.

Moreover, outside of complainant's statement that he must adhere to

a regimented eating schedule, the record is completely devoid as to

whether complainant must adhere to a restricted diet and/or a strict

eating schedule, or the measures he must take regarding the medical

consequences, if any, associated with what he eats, how much he eats,

and when he eats. The Commission has found that some individuals

with diabetes mellitus are individuals with disabilities within the

meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, while others are not. In cases

where the Commission has found a substantially limiting impairment, the

diabetes itself has caused debilitating complications; medication has

not successfully controlled the condition; or the regimen involved with

monitoring and controlling the condition itself imposes a substantial

limitation. See Ortiz v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal

No. 01990911 (January 19, 2001), request for reconsideration denied,

EEOC Request No. 05A10357 (May 3, 2002). In cases where the Commission

has not found coverage under the Rehabilitation Act, individuals have

failed to show that the diabetes substantially limits them in a major life

activity. See Medina v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01990709

(February 15, 2000). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that, in

determining whether a claimed disability is substantially limiting, we

must examine the complainant's condition as it exists after corrective or

mitigating measures used to combat the impairment are taken into account.

See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). Therefore, we

must consider the beneficial effects of complainant's diabetes medication

in determining whether his diabetic condition substantially limits him

in a major life activity. We must also consider whether the mitigating

measure itself substantially limits a major life activity.

Finally, we find that the record also lacks any information as to whether

complainant has developed any long-term complications associated with

his diabetes, or whether these complications themselves, if present,

affect a major life activity. We also find that the record lacks

information describing complainant's limitations as they exist after

the use of mitigating measures to combat his diabetes. Specifically,

we find the record contains inadequate information as to the benefits of

a shorter commute, and what the effects of his longer commute would be

on his major life activities, given his diabetes. Therefore, we find

that the record is inadequately developed to determine the effect of

complainant's diabetes on his major life activities. See Carr v. United

States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A43665 (May 18, 2006). We also

find that the record is inadequately developed to determine whether the

reassignment to the Augusta Post Office and shorted commute requested

by complainant would adequately accommodate any disability he suffered

from due to his diabetes.

There is no question but that complainant bears the burden of proof in

demonstrating that he is substantially limited in a major life activity

because of his diabetes. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527

U.S. 516, 521-523 (1999). On the other hand, the agency is charged with

the obligation to develop an adequate investigative record. Specifically,

the requirement that an agency investigate complaints of discrimination

is codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108. The agency has a duty to develop

an impartial and appropriate factual record upon which to make findings

on the claims raised by the written complaint. An appropriate factual

record is one that allows a reasonable fact finder to draw conclusions

as to whether discrimination occurred. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(a). The

investigator is required to conduct a thorough investigation--identifying

and obtaining all relevant evidence from all sources regardless of how

it may affect the outcome. EEOC Management Directive (MD)-110, p. 6-8

(Nov. 9, 1999). Therefore, an investigator must exhaust those sources

of information likely to support the positions of complainant and the

agency. Id.

In particular, in investigating a claim of disability discrimination,

the agency must ensure that the investigator "asks the right questions" of

complainant, ones designed to elicit pertinent evidence on the threshold

issues of: whether complainant has an impairment; whether it affects a

major life activity; and whether it substantially limits a major life

activity.

Here, for the reasons set forth above, we find that the agency failed to

develop an adequate evidentiary record because it contains insufficient

information upon which to determine whether complainant is substantially

limited in a major life activity because of his diabetes. Accordingly,

we VACATE the agency's final order, and we REMAND the complaint back

to the agency to undertake a supplemental investigation as set forth in

the ORDER below.2

ORDER

1. Within ninety (90) calendar days of the date that this decision

becomes final, the agency shall undertake and complete a supplemental

investigation of this complaint, by obtaining affidavits and relevant

documentation on the following as it existed on or about June 30, 2004,

the date of the discriminatory incident at issue:

(A). The extent of complainant's limitations, problems, or restrictions

in the major life activities of eating and caring for oneself that result

from his diabetes. The information obtained should describe any dietary

restrictions, including whether he must eat on a schedule and the medical

consequences of what he eats, when he eats, and how much he eats. The

investigation should also include detailed information about complainant's

regimen for monitoring his blood sugar. If complainant experiences

limitations only under certain circumstances, the agency should find

out what those circumstances are and how often they occur. The agency

shall assess all information obtained to determine whether complainant

is substantially limited in the major life activities of eating or caring

for oneself.

(B.) The extent of complainant's limitations, problems, or

restrictions, if any, in other major life activities that result from

his diabetes. Examples of other major life activities include: Walking,

standing, speaking, breathing, lifting, seeing, hearing, sleeping,

learning, thinking, concentration, controlling bodily waste, bending,

stooping, twisting, reaching, pushing, pulling, and climbing. The

information obtained should include any limitations on how long or

how much complainant can accomplish activities and limitations in the

circumstances or way he can do activities. This information should

include evidence about any complications, such as neurological or other

damage, that complainant has developed as a result of his diabetes. If

complainant experiences limitations only under certain circumstances,

the agency should find out what those circumstances are and how often

they occur. The agency shall assess all information obtained to determine

whether complainant is substantially limited in a major life activity.

(C.) When making the determinations in A and B above, the agency is

directed to ascertain how complainant's use of medications (e.g. insulin),

including any side effects, impacts his limitations, problems, and

restrictions.

2. The agency is directed to ask complainant to produce or provide

access to evidence in support of his contentions regarding his

diabetes and its impact on his major life activities. That evidence

may include documentary evidence, such as doctor's notes or medical

records, or potential witnesses to contact, such as medical personnel,

family members, friends, or co-workers. Complainant shall also provide

documentation regarding the accommodation he requested from the agency,

and the specific effects that the shorter commute to the Augusta Post

Office would have on his ability to manage the symptoms of his diabetes.

(3) The agency shall instruct the investigator to compile the above

information into an investigative report, and transmit it to the agency

within ninety (90) days of the date that this decision becomes final. No

later than thirty (30) days after receiving the report, the agency will

insure that the complainant is in receipt of a copy of the report,

and also provide a copy to the Compliance Officer referenced below.

Upon completion of the investigative report and receipt by complainant,

the agency shall again provide complainant with the opportunity to

request a hearing before an Administrative Judge or have the agency

issue a final decision.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The

agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington,

D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.

If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. ��� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has

the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance

with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29

C.F.R. � 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil

action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated

in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant

files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint,

including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact

on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your

time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

_____9/17/07_____________

Date

1 Due to a new data system, this case has been redesignated with the

above-referenced appeal number.

2 Because of our decision with respect to claim (1), we will defer making

a determination regarding claim (2) at this time.

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01A60566

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120060418

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