Robert N. Ghantous, Jr., Petitioner,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 22, 2002
03A10094 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 22, 2002)

03A10094

02-22-2002

Robert N. Ghantous, Jr., Petitioner, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Robert N. Ghantous, Jr. v. United States Postal Service

03A10094

02-22-02

.

Robert N. Ghantous, Jr.,

Petitioner,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Petition No. 03A10094

MSPB No. CH-0752-00-0640-I-1

DECISION

On August 2, 2001, Robert N. Ghantous, Jr. (petitioner) filed a petition

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) asking for

review of the April 26, 2001 Merit Systems Protection Board's (MSPB)

final decision on his case. The Commission docketed the petition

as EEOC Petition No. 03A10094. Petitioner alleged that the agency

discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin (Lebanese)

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The petition is governed by the

provisions of EEOC Regulations, 29 C.F.R. � 1614.303 et seq. The MSPB

affirmed the United States Postal Service (agency) action, which found

no discrimination as alleged by petitioner. For the reasons that follow,

the Commission concurs with the decision of the MSPB.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that petitioner was a Supervisor in the Distribution

Operations Branch at the agency's Cincinnati Processing and Distribution

Center. It is undisputed that petitioner stopped reporting to work after

January 24, 2000. On February 24, 2000, the agency sent the petitioner

a letter instructing him to contact his supervisor. Petitioner failed

to respond. Thereafter, on April 25, 2000, the agency issued a notice

proposing to remove petitioner from his employment, effective June 10,

2000. The agency proposed his removal charging him with an unscheduled

absence from January 24 to March 8, and with absence without leave (AWOL)

from March 8 to April 25, 2000. The record shows that the agency received

a letter dated June 2, 2000 from the Drug and Alcohol Resolutions,

Inc. informing the agency that petitioner was incarcerated from January

27, 2000 to May 8, 2000 and transferred to the Hamilton County Sheriff's

Office on that date. The letter indicated that he was charged with �Being

Under the Influence� (DUI). He was removed on a charge of unauthorized

leave and AWOL on June 6, 2000.

Believing that he was a victim of discrimination, on June 13, 2000,

petitioner filed an appeal to the MSPB. After holding a hearing, the MSPB

administrative judge (AJ) affirmed the agency's action in terminating

petitioner's employment. She found that petitioner stopped working on

January 24, 2000. He did not take leave under the Family and Medical Leave

Act of 1993 (FMLA), and he exhausted his available leave. Petitioner

does not dispute that he did not return to work, but said that his wife

contacted the agency. The AJ found that the agency received no medical

documentation sufficient to support petitioner's absence and he was not

in an inpatient treatment program during the period of time charged in

this appeal, as he contends. The AJ considered the contentions but found

that petitioner was in a minimum security jail and that he had no earned

leave available to cover his absence from March 8 to April 25, 2000.<1>

On petition to the Commission, petitioner submits that he should be

excused because he was in a substance abuse treatment program and not

incarcerated. In response, the agency requests that the Commission concur

with the MSPB's decision that the agency did not discriminate against

petitioner. The agency also requests that the petition be rejected.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission must determine whether the decision of the MSPB with

respect to the allegation of discrimination based on national origin

(Lebanese) constitutes a correct interpretation of the applicable law,

regulation or policy directive and is supported by evidence in the record

as a whole. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.305(c). To prevail in a disparate treatment

claim such as this, petitioner must satisfy the three-part evidentiary

scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). He must generally establish a prima facie case

by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action

under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination.

Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).

The AJ found that petitioner is Lebanese and it is undisputed that

petitioner was qualified to do the essential functions of his employment

when he was terminated. The AJ concluded, however, that petitioner

failed to identify the ethnic identity of any of the other comparative

employees. Further, she found that the other employees were not similarly

situated since none had been incarcerated for six months or charged with

unauthorized absence for a period of three months.

The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however,

since the agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory

reasons for its conduct. See United States Postal Service Board of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997).

The agency stated that he was removed for just cause and the efficiency

of the service after petitioner was absent from duty for three months,

had a past disciplinary record of a Letter of Warning for inappropriate

remarks to a subordinate employee, and because he was in a supervisory

position. The AJ concluded that the penalty of removal was within the

tolerable bounds of reasonableness and will promote the efficiency of

the service.

To ultimately prevail, petitioner must prove, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that the agency's explanation is a pretext for

discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133,

120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519

(1993); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

256 (1981); and Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request

No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997).

We agree with the AJ that a three-month absence from work without

communication with or response to inquiries from one's superiors is

misconduct for which any employee would reasonably be held accountable.

In this case, we find that petitioner failed to demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's proffered reason was a

pretext for discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based upon a thorough review of the record and for the foregoing reasons,

it is the decision of the Commission to CONCUR with the final decision

of the MSPB finding no discrimination and upholding the removal. The

Commission finds that the MSPB's decision constitutes a correct

interpretation of the laws, rules, regulations and policies governing

this matter and is supported by the evidence in the record as a whole.

PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (W0900)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court,

based on the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, within

thirty (30) calendar days of the date that you receive this decision.

If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the

complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,

identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___02-22-02____________

Date

1The record reflects that while incarcerated, petitioner received

treatment for substance abuse.