0120090386
06-10-2010
Robert K. Neher, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.
Robert K. Neher,
Complainant,
v.
Eric K. Shinseki,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120090386
Hearing No. 541-2007-00147X
Agency No. 2003-0741-2006102763
DECISION
On October 28, 2008, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's October
30, 2008 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
621 et seq. The appeal is deemed timely and is accepted pursuant to 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS
the agency's final order.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked as
an Information Technology Specialist at the agency's Health Administration
Center in Denver, Colorado. On July 30, 2006, complainant filed an EEO
complaint alleging that he was discriminated against on the bases of age
(58) and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:
1. On July 5, 2006 and July 21, 2006, he was denied the Voluntary
Separation Incentive (Buyout) and the Voluntary Early Retirement (VERA)
and
2. On or around, September 12, 2006, October 9, 2006 and November 7,
2006, he was denied a promotion to one of the Information Technology
Specialist positions.
Complainant further alleged that he was discriminated against in reprisal
for prior protected EEO activity when:
3. On or around August 2, 2006, he received a Written Counseling from
his supervisor (S1) regarding email distribution misuse;
4. On or around August 16, 2006, complainant was dropped from an email
distribution group;
5. In July 2006, he was denied equity in salary, awards, and training
opportunities;
6. In July 2006, he was required to complete training of younger
co-workers prior to his leave being approved;
7. On October 26, 2006, he received a Fully Successful rating on his
2006 performance appraisal and was denied an award;
8. On October 26, 2006, there was disparate use of the "Team Track"
software by S1;
9. On December 15, 2006, complainant's second-level supervisor (S2) sent
an email regarding alleged errors made by complainant in program routine;
10. On or around, January 9, 2007, complainant's third-level supervisor
(S3) selected an employee graded at GS-13 to temporarily be assigned
to the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) team pending complainant's
retirement;
11. In January 2007, he was ordered to provide training to his supervisor
and younger co-workers prior to his retirement and;
12. On January 20, 2007, he was forced to retire (accept the VERA).
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely
requested a hearing. On August 21, 2007, complainant asked that ten
additional dismissed allegations be considered. Over the agency's
objections, the AJ reinstated some of the dismissed claims. The restored
claims are as follows:
Complainant alleged that he was subjected to discrimination on the basis
of age when:
13. On June 15, 2006, S2 made false statements about complainant in an
email addressed to several co-workers.
Complainant also alleged that he was subjected to discrimination in
reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:
14. On July 7, 2006, S2 modified and deleted files complainant needed;
15. On July 11, 2006, complainant received an email from a co-worker,
although she is not his supervisor;
16. On July 18, 2006, complainant reported that there were round pellet
marks on his wife's office window and;
17. Complainant heard a co-worker comment that someone had filed an EEO
complaint against S2 and S1 and later coworkers joked about filing an
EEO complaint and getting millions of dollars.
Over complainant's objections, the AJ granted the agency's November 7,
2007 motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without
a hearing on September 30, 2008. As to claim (1), the AJ found that
complainant was unable to raise an inference of age discrimination or
reprisal because the evidence of record is clear that the agency did not
initially adopt a VERA plan and no employees received a voluntary early
retirement. Further, in October 2006, when all Information Technology
employees were transferred from the Health Administration Center to
the Office of Information and Technology (which did have a VERA plan),
complainant promptly accepted early retirement. As to claim (2), the
AJ determined that complainant had not established a prima facie case of
discrimination, but even if he had, the agency had articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, the agency
convened a five-person selection panel, the panel members independently
graded the candidates, and complainant received the lowest score. The AJ
found that complainant presented no evidence establishing pretext.
As to claim (3), management conducted an investigation into an email
complainant sent to approximately 22 people discussing possible fraud
by a third-party vendor and determined that his actions violated
agency policies. The AJ found that complainant failed to produce
evidence of pretext to rebut management's reasons for the counseling.
As to claim (4), the AJ determined that there was nothing in the record
indicating that complainant's removal from the email distribution group
was anything more than a mistake. Given that complainant failed to show
any detrimental consequences from the temporary removal, the AJ found
that he failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal.
As to claim (5), the AJ determined that aside from complainant's
speculation, there was no evidence that complainant was denied equity in
salary, awards, or training. As to claims (6) and (11), the AJ found
that the record established that complainant was not required to train
his replacements before his leave was approved and complainant has not
shown how he was aggrieved by management's legitimate desire to have him
train his supervisor and co-workers for continuity of service. Further,
a reasonable person would not have been deterred from pursuing EEO
activity by being asked to train his colleagues prior to his retirement.
Regarding claim (7), the record demonstrates that the majority of
complainant's co-workers also received Fully Successful ratings and
complainant has not proffered evidence which would suggest that the
agency's reasons for giving him a Fully Successful rating were pretext
for age discrimination or retaliation.
In regards to claim (8), complainant's co-workers asserted that
management routinely made changes in the software based on the needs of
the agency and complainant admits that he has no evidence that his peers
were treated differently. Consequently, the AJ found that complainant
failed to proffer evidence that established that he was subjected to
disparate use of the TeamTrack software. As to claim (9), the AJ found
that the record established that complainant's co-workers stated that
it was common for everyone involved with a program to receive emails
regarding errors in the program. As such, complainant failed to raise
an inference of reprisal.
As to claim (10), complainant alleged that since his replacement was
as GS-13, he should have been a GS-13. The AJ determined that evidence
of record indicates that complainant's replacement did not have as many
high-priority assignments as other employees and was in a better position
to do multiple jobs until complainant's position could be permanently
filled at the GS-12 level. Thus, complainant failed to proffer evidence
of age discrimination or reprisal regarding his temporary replacement.
As to claim (12), the AJ found that since complainant failed to establish
a prima facie case of age or reprisal-based discrimination he therefore
had not been constructively discharged.
Regarding claim (13), the AJ found that the email in question was
unremarkable and commonplace and would not deter a reasonable person from
pursuing EEO activity. As to claim (14), even if complainant's supervisor
modified or deleted the files, there was no indication complainant was
harmed or that a reasonable person would be deterred from participating
in the EEO process. As to claim (15), there was no evidence that the
co-worker had any knowledge of complainant's EEO activity or acted at
the behest of management.
Regarding claim (16), the AJ found that there was no evidence that
any agency employee had anything to do with the incident or that the
incident was anything other than random vandalism. The agency reported
the incident to the landlord and it was the landlord's decision whether
or not to replace the window. The AJ noted that the true complainant
for this incident would be complainant's wife however there was no
evidence that she had filed a claim of associational reprisal. Finally,
as to claim (17), the AJ found that complainant admitted that he told
his co-workers that he had filed a complaint against S1, but contends
he never told anyone about his other complaints. Aside from his own
speculation, complainant produced no evidence that management was the
source of the information.
Accordingly, the AJ determined that complainant failed to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the agency subjected him to
discrimination based on age or in reprisal for his prior protected EEO
activity. The agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the
AJ's finding that complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to
discrimination as alleged.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, complainant asserts that the AJ ignored many of his arguments
including that his wife's window was shot in retaliation for his EEO
activity, that he had to train his supervisor, co-workers, and his
replacement before he retired, and that his position was under-graded.
Complainant requests that we reverse the final order. The agency requests
that we affirm the final order as complainant has offered no evidentiary
basis for overturning the AJ's decision or the final order.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and
factual conclusions, and the agency's final order adopting them, de novo.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from
an agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see
also EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999)
(providing that an administrative judge's "decision to issue a decision
without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)] will be reviewed
de novo"). This essentially means that we should look at this case
with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate)
or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and agency's, factual conclusions and
legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional
discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal
employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9,
� VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that
the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and
legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC
"review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including
any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its
decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its
interpretation of the law").
We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have
issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's
regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when
he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary
judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing
a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context
of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a
decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the
record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty
v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).
Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding
a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling
is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without
a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed
material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and
(4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary.
According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary
judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the
opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the
administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of
discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision
without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that
an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after
receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).
Here, we find that the AJ properly issued a decision without a hearing
as the record was adequately developed and no genuine issue of material
fact is in dispute. See Petty v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal
No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).
Disparate Treatment
In general, disparate treatment claims, such as the matter before us,
are examined under a tripartite analysis whereby a complainant must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that,
if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination,
i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse
employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-804 (1973); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978);
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000)
(applying the analytical framework described in McDonnell Douglas to an
ADEA disparate treatment claim). The burden then shifts to the agency
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981). If the agency is successful, the burden reverts back to the
complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
the agency's reasons were a pretext for discrimination. At all times,
complainant retains the burden of persuasion, and it is his/her obligation
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on
the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 715-716 (1983).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the
first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima
facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel
action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third
step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether
complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
In the instant case, the agency has articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, as to claim
(1), complainant's supervisor (S1) asserts that no one in the Health
Administration Center was offered a buyout or VERA in July 2006,
therefore it was not possible for complainant to have been denied either
of those options. Report of Investigation (ROI), S1's Aff. at 9. As to
claim (2), complainant's second-level supervisor (S2) affirms that the
positions were announced, the selection panel interviewed and scored the
candidates, and the top two scoring candidates were extended offers.
ROI, S2's Aff. at 25. When one of the selectees declined the offer,
the next-highest scoring candidate was selected. Id. As to claim
(3), S1 states that complainant sent an email including sensitive
information regarding a third-party company to individuals within the
agency who did not need to know that information. ROI, S1's Aff. at 12.
S1 affirms that after conducting an investigation, it was discovered that
complainant had violated agency policies regarding email distribution
misuse and protection of sensitive information. Id. at 14. S1 adds
that a written counseling was issued based on the premise that it was
not a disciplinary action. Id.
As to claim (4), S1 asserts that he did not remove complainant from
the email distribution list and if complainant did not receive emails
regarding a project, it was because he was not involved with the project
at that particular stage. ROI, S1's Aff. at 30-32. Regarding claim
(5), complainant alleges that in or around July 2006, four individuals
were hired as Information Technology Specialists who were not veterans,
had no previous government experience, were not trained, but were paid a
higher salary because they were younger than him. S2 states that those
employees were offered positions at the GS-l2 salary level however, they
negotiated higher with management for a higher step. ROI, S2's Aff. at 9.
S2 notes that each employee had additional specialized knowledge which
complainant did not have. Id. at 9-10.
As to claim (6), the record reveals that complainant was not asked
to train co-workers before his leave was approved, but it was agency
procedure for every employee to ensure that their backup was trained
before going on leave to ensure there was adequate coverage. ROI, S2's
Aff. at 12. As to claim (7), S1 avows that complainant received a rating
of Fully Successful rather than Exceptional because he did not meet the
criteria listed for Exceptional. ROI, S1's Aff. at 47-48. S1 adds that
he asked customers about the level of service they received and of the
feedback he received, some of it was not good regarding complainant.
Id. at 49. Further, there were instances where complainant was not
courteous to customers and had conflicts. Id. at 49-50. Additionally,
the record reveals that complainant's co-workers believed that
complainant's work product had errors and was sloppy.
As to claim (8), complainant alleges that S1 did not notify him when
project due dates were changed in the Team Track software and he was
rated lower as a result. S1 affirms that every time he changed a
project deadline, he notified the employee both verbally and in the
Team Track system. ROI, S1's Aff. at 55. Additionally, the system
itself is the system of record as it automatically notifies the employee
assigned to a project any time a change is made in the system. Id. at 55.
Regarding claim (9), S1 avows that S2 sent complainant an email regarding
routine errors that needed to be corrected in a program complainant coded.
ROI, S1's Aff. at 64-65. S1 adds that if S2 had a problem with another
employee, he would have addressed it with that employee only as it
would have been inappropriate to discuss it in front of other employees.
Id. at 65. The record reveals that other employees stated that it was
common for everyone involved with a program to receive emails from S2
to fix problems in their programs.
In regards to claim (10), S2 asserts that complainant's replacement (CR)
was hired as a GS-13 because he possessed more specialized experience.
ROI, S2's Aff. at 18. S2 adds that complainant was more of a maintainer
of the EDI system while CR could redesign or rewrite programs. Id.
S2 states that CR was moved over to the EDI team for coverage and
performed his higher-level duties along with the maintenance duties.
Id. at 18-19. S3 adds that if complainant believed his duties were
under-graded, he could have requested a desk audit. ROI, S3's Aff. at
37. S3 affirms that the agency will be filling complainant's position
permanently at the GS-12 level. Id. 37-38. As to claim (11), S1 affirms
that complainant's position description explicitly states that he is
required to cross-train or transfer knowledge to his co-workers and peers
regardless of their position. ROI, S1's Aff. at 71. S1 asserts that this
was required of everyone and is necessary for continuity. Id. at 71-72.
Restored Claims (Claims 13-17)
Regarding claim (13), S2 states that the email in question was a
technical conversation to try to determine why the code did not perform
as it should. ROI, S2's Aff2. at 1. He asserts that complainant wrote
the code that they were researching so he was asked questions about
the code. Id. He affirms that these types of emails are sent everyday
to maintain the computer system so it functions well. Id. As to claim
(14), S2 states that complainant modified a utility script to add "back up
and delete" code. ROI, S2's Aff2. at 1. When it was discovered that the
modified script did not archive and delete files properly, complainant's
version of the files were archived and renamed, not deleted. Id. at 2.
In regards to claim (15), the co-worker in question (CW) asserts that
she monitors the system and when she gets a complaint from a user, she
investigates it to try to determine the source of the problem. ROI,
CW's Aff. at 1. She adds that if she contacted complainant regarding
a problem, it was simply to fix the problem. Id.
As to claim (16), the Director of the Health Administration Center asserts
that he reported the vandalism to the landlord and it was the landlord's
decision whether or not to replace the glass. ROI, Director's Aff. at 1.
He adds that he did not call the police because he had no evidence or
indication that a crime had been committed. Id. Finally, as to claim
(17), S2 and S1 deny discussing complainant's complaint with other
employees. ROI, S2's Aff2. at 2; ROI, S1's Aff2. at 3. Further, S1
states that if co-workers knew about the case, it is likely they learned
of it from complainant who discussed it frequently in the workplace.
ROI, S2's Aff. at 3. Complainant admits having discussed portions of
his EEO complaint with co-workers. See ROI, Exh. RD6.
Because the agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for the alleged discriminatory event, complainant now bears the burden
of establishing that the agency's stated reasons are merely a pretext
for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC
Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this by
showing that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason. Id.
(citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)). We find
that aside from complainant's bare assertions, the record is devoid
of any persuasive evidence that discrimination was a factor in any of
the agency's actions. At all times the ultimate burden of persuasion
remains with complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that the agency's reasons were not the real reasons, and that the agency
acted on the basis of discriminatory animus. Complainant failed to carry
this burden. Accordingly, we find that complainant has failed to show
that he was discriminated against or retaliated against as alleged.
Constructive Discharge (Claim 12)
We note that a fair reading of claim (12) reveals that complainant
alleges that he was constructively discharged when he accepted the VERA.
Constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately renders
an employee's working conditions so intolerable that the individual is
forced to retire from his position. Constructive discharge only occurs
when the agency's actions were taken with the intention of forcing the
employee to retire. The Commission has established three elements which
complainant must prove to substantiate a claim of constructive discharge:
1) a reasonable person in complainant's position would have found the
working conditions intolerable; 2) the conduct causing the intolerable
working conditions is an EEO violation; and 3) complainant's resignation
was caused by the intolerable working conditions. See Taylor v. Army
and Air Force Exchange Service, EEOC Request No. 05900630 (July 20,
1990); see also Perricone v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request
No. 05900135 (June 11, 1990). S1 affirms that complainant was not forced
to accept the VERA, rather eligible employees were offered the option
to retire early by the Office of Information and Technology. ROI, S1's
Aff. at 77-78. There is no evidence in the record that complainant was
subjected to intolerable working conditions which arose out of conduct
which constituted prohibited discrimination on the basis of age or
in reprisal for his prior protected activity. Therefore, complainant
has failed to establish that his acceptance of the VERA amounted to a
constructive discharge based on discriminatory animus.
CONCLUSION
After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration
of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to affirm the agency's final order,
because the Administrative Judge's issuance of a decision without a
hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does
not establish that discrimination occurred.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1208)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time
limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 10, 2010________________
Date
2
0120090386
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
0120090386