Robert A. Leak, Complainant,v.Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 3, 2011
0120092103 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 3, 2011)

0120092103

03-03-2011

Robert A. Leak, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Robert A. Leak,

Complainant,

v.

Eric K. Shinseki,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120092103

Agency No. 2004-0688-2008101290

DECISION

On April 9, 2009, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's March

24, 2009, final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42

U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The Commission

accepts the appeal pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

VACATES the Agency's final decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented are: (1) whether the Agency adequately investigated

Complainant's claim that he was denied a reasonable accommodation when

he was required to request Leave Without Pay (LWOP) to attend his

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) meetings; and (2) whether the

Agency adequately investigated Complainant's claim that management did

not assign female co-workers to work in the "dishroom" and "pots/pans"

as often as him and his male co-workers.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a part-time Food Service Worker (FSW), WG-1, at the Agency's VA

Medical Center (VAMC) in Washington, DC. Complainant's scheduled

tour of duty was from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and he worked twenty

hours per week, although he did not work the same days each week.

Complainant's First Level Supervisor (S1) was the Food Service Foreman.

Complainant's Fourth Level Supervisor (S4) was the Chief, Nutrition and

Food Service Department. Complainant, a Gulf War veteran, attested that

he has suffered from the condition since the 1992, but was not officially

diagnosed with PTSD until June 2007. Complainant's Aff., at 10.

On February 11, 2008, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that

the Agency subjected him to discrimination and harassment on the bases

of race (African-American), sex (male), disability (PTSD), and reprisal

for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII when:

1. On January 3, 2008, S1 required him to request LWOP to attend his

PTSD meetings;

2. On January 16, 2008, S1 denied his request to work extra hours outside

his scheduled tour of duty;

3. On January 16, 2008, S4 required him to request LWOP to attend his

PTSD meetings in the future;

4. On January 29, 2008, S1 required him to work outside his medical

restrictions;

5. During January and February 2008, S1 assigned him and male WG-1 FSWs

more frequently to the "dishroom" and "pots/pans" than female WG-1 FSWs;1

6. On February 18, 2008, S1 removed his name from a sign up sheet for

extra hours; and

7. Beginning in February 2008, S1 assigned him extra work such as cleaning

the utility closet or the walk-in refrigerator.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant

requested a final decision by the Agency.

On November 18, 2008, the Agency's Office of Employment Discrimination

Complaint Adjudication (OEDCA) issued a letter remanding Complainant's

complaint for a supplemental investigation on claims 1, 3, and 5.

Regarding claims 1 and 3, OEDCA found that the EEO Investigator's

fact-finding focused only on disparate treatment and harassment, but

in retrospect the language in Complainant's attachment to his formal

complaint suggested a reasonable accommodation issue.2 Specifically,

OEDCA noted that Complainant should clarify what schedule changes he asked

for and management should be asked whether the accommodation Complainant

requested could reasonably be provided and, if not, why not.3 Regarding

claim 5, OEDCA found that, because Complainant gave no specific dates or

names, management accordingly responded with little more than general

denials and the statement that dishroom duties were normally assigned

to FSWs who were WG-1 rather than WG-2. In addition, OEDCA noted that

there was no summary, digest, or analysis explaining the 60 pages of

assignment schedules in the record. Further, OEDCA stated that if the

schedules reflected that male WG-1 FSWs were assigned to dishroom duties

significantly more often than female WG-1 FSWs were, management needed

to explain the discrepancy, "as specifically, as concretely, and in as

much detail as possible."

After the EEO Investigator completed the supplementary investigation,4

the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b).

The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency

subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

Initially, the Agency noted that Complainant raised three theories of

discrimination: harassment, denial of accommodation, and disparate

treatment. Regarding the harassment theory, the Agency found that

Complainant had alleged nothing that constituted verbal or physical

conduct based on his race, sex, disability, or prior EEO activity.

Regarding the denial of accommodation theory, the Agency found that

Complainant failed to establish that his PTSD had a sufficiently serious

impact on his major life activities as to constitute a disability for

purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. In addition, the Agency found that

Complainant's supervisors were unaware that he had a disability, much

less that he was requesting an accommodation for it. Further, the Agency

found that Complainant failed to establish that he needed the requested

accommodation because the record reflected that he took only three or four

hours of leave to attend PTSD meetings. Regarding the disparate treatment

theory, the Agency first found that Complainant failed to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination on the bases of race, sex, disability,

and reprisal. Next, the Agency found that management had articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Finally, the

Agency found that there was no significant evidence of pretext.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant did not submit a statement or brief in support of his appeal.

In opposition, the Agency requested that we affirm its final decision.

The Agency argued that its final decision clearly and precisely

articulated management's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons and

that, beyond Complainant's conclusory statements, nothing in the

record suggested that management's actions were a pretext for unlawful

discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Standard of Review

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment

Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),

Ch. 9, � VI.A. (Nov. 9, 1999) (explaining that the de novo standard of

review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to

the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,"

and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of

record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,

and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment

of the record and its interpretation of the law").

Adequacy of the Record - Claims 1 and 3 (Reasonable Accommodation)

At the outset, we note that Complainant's denial of accommodation

claim appears to encompass claims 1 and 3. Essentially, Complainant

is alleging that the Agency should have accommodated his disability

by allowing him to attend his PTSD meetings without requiring him to

request LWOP. In his supplemental affidavit, Complainant attested that

he had asked S1 and S4 for a change in schedule so he could attend the

PTSD meetings without being charged leave. Complainant's Suppl Aff.,

at 19. Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make

reasonable accommodation of the known physical and mental limitations

of a qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show

that accommodation would cause undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(o)

and (p).

In order to determine whether Complainant is entitled to a reasonable

accommodation, we must first analyze whether Complainant is a "qualified

individual with a disability" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation

Act. An "individual with a disability" is one who: (1) has a physical

or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded

as having such an impairment.

29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(g). An impairment is substantially limiting when it

prevents an individual from performing a major life activity or when it

significantly restricts the condition, manner, or duration under which

an individual can perform a particular a major life activity.

29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(j). The individual's ability to perform a major life

activity must be restricted as compared to the ability of the average

person in the general population to perform that same activity. Id.

Major life activities limited by mental impairments include, but are not

limited to, learning, thinking, concentrating, interacting with others,

caring for oneself, speaking, performing manual tasks, or working.

EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and

Psychiatric Disabilities, No. 915.002, Question 3 (Mar. 25, 1997).

Sleeping is also a major life activity that may be limited by mental

impairments. Id.

The record contains two pieces of medical documentation regarding

Complainant's PTSD. First, an October 18, 2007, "PTSD INDIVIDUAL NOTE"

from Complainant's Clinical Social Worker (CSW) stated the following:

To Whom It May Concern: This is to verify that [Complainant] is

active in the VAMC PTSD/Trauma program here in the Washington,

VAMC. The group time is every Thursday from 0900 - 1000 and

will be for about nine months. Your support of this veteran is

appreciated. If further clarification is needed I may be reached

at [extension]. Vet has given his verbal permission for the above

to be released. Report of Investigation (ROI), Ex. C-5, at 2.

Second, a March 2, 2008, "PTSD: PCT TREATMENT PLAN" from CSW briefly

outlined that Complainant: (a) had an initial treatment plan; (b)

was being treated by a 13-member Trauma Services Team; (c) did not

pose a risk to himself or to others; (d) was lucid and aware of his

situation; (e) had no restrictions; and (f) was stable enough to handle

intensive outpatient treatment. Id. at 5. In addition, the record

contains affidavit testimony from Complainant about his nightmares,

depression, lack of sleep, loss of appetite, and loss of sociability.

Complainant's Aff., at 10-17.

It is unclear from the foregoing or the remainder of the record, as to

what extent Complainant's PTSD impacts his major life activities. For

example, the record is devoid of any medical documentation indicating how

Complainant is affected by his PTSD. When asked by the EEO Investigator

if he had medical information showing how his life activities are

affected, Complainant responded, "It's in my PTSD statement. I have

my medical records." Id. at 12. The EEO Investigator stated that

she would fax him a medical release because she was "going to need to

have that information as part of the investigation." Id. In addition,

Complainant attested that he had medical documentation relating to his

PTSD from various medical professionals: CSW, his primary care physician,

the psychologist who referred him for PTSD, and the psychiatrist he was

referred to for PTSD. Id. at 16-17. Further, Complainant attested that

management became aware of his PTSD in July 2007 when he submitted the

following medical documentation: (a) paperwork from CSW that he had been

accepted into the treatment program; and (b) a June 2007 assessment and

referral from his psychologist. Id. at 18.

There is no question that Complainant bears the burden of proof in

demonstrating that he is substantially limited in a major life activity

because of his impairment. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 527

U.S. 516, 521-23 (1999). On the other hand, the Agency is charged

with the obligation to develop an adequate investigative record.

The EEO Investigator is required to conduct a thorough investigation,

identifying and obtaining all relevant evidence from all sources

regardless of how it may affect the outcome. EEO MD-110, Ch. 6, VI.D.

Therefore, an EEO Investigator must exhaust those sources of information

likely to support both the positions of Complainant and the Agency. Id.

Although Complainant's testimony reflects that there is a significant

amount of medical documentation related to his PTSD, most of that

documentation is not in the record.5 We note that such documentation

should be readily available, as Complainant attested that his health

care provider is the VAMC and that he had already submitted some of the

medical documentation to management in July 2007.

Finally, as stated above, an agency is required to make reasonable

accommodation of the known physical and mental limitations of a qualified

individual with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation

would cause undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(o) and (p). Upon review

of the record, it is also unclear whether, if Complainant was a qualified

individual with a disability, accommodation would cause undue hardship to

the Agency. In her supplemental affidavit, S4 attested that Complainant

wanted to change his work schedule so that he could come in and work on

a Thursday when he was not scheduled to work. Supplemental Report of

Investigation (SROI), Ex. B2a, at 7-8. When asked by the EEO Investigator

if that could have been possible, S4 attested, "No ... [b]ecause we have

scheduled a certain number of people on each day." Id. at 8. When asked

by the EEO Investigator if there was any other type of arrangement that

could have been done to change Complainant's schedule where he could

have attended his PTSD meetings without being charged any kind of leave,

S4 simply responded, without additional explanation, "No." We note

that this is the only evidence in the record regarding why the Agency

was unable to change Complainant's work schedule because the reasonable

accommodation issue was not explored during the initial fact-finding

investigation and S4 did not provide a supplemental affidavit.

As noted above, the Agency has a duty to develop an impartial and

appropriate factual record upon which to make findings on the claims

raised by the written complaint. An appropriate factual record is one

that allows a reasonable fact finder to draw conclusions as to whether

discrimination occurred. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(b). Based on the

above, we find that the present record lacks the necessary information

upon which to adequately determine if the Agency's actions were lawful

under the Rehabilitation Act. See Carr v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01A43665 (May 18, 2006). Accordingly, we remand these

claims back to the Agency to conduct a supplemental investigation.

Adequacy of the Record - Claim 5

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must

satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant

must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was

subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would

support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary

depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441

U.S. at 804 n.14. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't

of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the Agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).

In its final decision, the Agency found that Complainant failed to

establish a prima facie case on the basis of sex because "[t]he weight of

the evidence is that males were not disproportionately assigned to dish

room/pots and pans duties." Regarding management's response, the Agency

stated, "[S4] and [S1] admitted that more male FSWs than female FSWs were

so assigned, but said that this was because there were significantly more

male than female WG-01 FSWs. This was particularly true for part-timers.

A review of the schedules does not, so far as we can tell, indicate any

significant disproportion in the assignments."

Upon review of the record, we find it to be insufficiently developed

to allow a determination on the merits of this claim. Although the

Agency's final decision stated that the record did not indicate "any

significant disproportion in the assignments," this does not appear to

be the case. The record reflects that, on Complainant's morning shift,

there were approximately two part-time, female WG-1s and nine part-time,

male WG-1s. SROI, Ex. C1, at 1. According to the EEO Investigator's

review of work assignments,6 in January and February 2008, a female WG-1

was assigned to the dishroom or pots and pans on four out of the 60 days.

Id. at 2-3. In contrast, Complainant was assigned to the dishroom or

pots and pans on 35 out of the 60 days. Id. Furthermore, the Agency

noted in its remand letter that if male WG-1 FSWs were assigned to

dish room duties significantly more often than female WG-1 FSWS were,

"management witnesses need to explain the discrepancy, as specifically,

as concretely and in as much detail as possible." Our review of the

supplemental investigation indicates that the EEO Investigator did not

ask S4 any questions about the discrepancy in assignments and that S1,

who was directly responsible for making the assignments, did not provide

an affidavit. Accordingly, we also remand this claim back to the Agency

as part of its supplemental investigation.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal,

including those not specifically addressed herein, we VACATE the Agency's

final decision and REMAND the entire complaint in accordance with the

Order below.7

ORDER

The Agency is ORDERED to take the following actions:

1. The Agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation to develop an

adequate factual record regarding Complainant's denial of reasonable

accommodation claim. The Agency shall obtain all pertinent evidence to

address Complainant's claim including, but not limited to:

a. Medical documentation regarding Complainant's PTSD from his

Clinical Social Worker, primary care physician, the psychologist who

referred him for PTSD, and the psychiatrist he was referred to for PTSD.

The supplemental investigation shall focus on the manner in which the

condition affects Complainant's ability to perform specific major life

activities, including: the frequency and duration of the condition; the

severity of the condition; and the manner and extent to which Complainant

is affected by the condition.

b. Sworn affidavits from S1 and S4 explaining in detail why they

could not accommodate Complainant's request to change his schedule so that

he could attend PTSD meetings without being required to request LWOP.

2. The Agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation to develop an

adequate factual record regarding Complainant's claim that, during January

and February 2008, he and other part-time, male WG-1 FSWs were assigned

more frequently to the "dishroom" and "pots/pans" than part-time female,

WG-1 FSWs. The Agency shall obtain all pertinent evidence to address

Complainant's claim including, but not limited to:

a. Sworn affidavits from S1 and S4 explaining in detail the reason

for the apparent discrepancy in the assignments to males and females on

Complainant's shift.

3. The Agency shall complete its supplemental investigation and

issue a new final decision, together with the appropriate appeal rights,

within ninety (90) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final,

unless the matter is otherwise resolved prior to that time. A copy of

the Agency's new final decision must be sent to the Compliance Officer

as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,

DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant.

If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)

This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant

in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney

with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__3/3/11_______________

Date

1 Complainant alleged discrimination only on the basis of sex with

respect to this claim.

2 OEDCA referred to the following language in the attachment to

Complainant's complaint: "The point that I am trying to make is if I have

to put in leave on my scheduled days to attend (P.T.S.D.) Why I can't

work on my Thursdays off to attend (P.T.S.D.) Work from 7:00a.m. to

9:00a.m. go to (P.T.S.D.) return to work at 10:00a.m. to 11:00a.m. to

complete my 3 hour tour of duty. I asked [S1] why I couldn't work this

schedule on my thursdays off."

3 OEDCA noted that, when S1 and S4 were asked about the LWOP claims during

the initial investigation, they essentially responded that Complainant had

exhausted his accrued leave and could receive LWOP only if he requested

it. OEDCA stated that this was literally true and was not unresponsive to

the questions posed to them, questions seemingly based on the assumption

that the claims were one of disparate treatment and harassment.

4 S1 did not supply an affidavit for the supplement investigation.

In S4's supplemental affidavit taken on December 17, 2008, she informed

the EEO Investigator that S1 would not be available until January 18,

2009.

5 We note that the two pieces of PTSD-related medical documentation in

the record do not provide much information about Complainant's condition

aside from its general existence.

6 The record reflects that, on each shift, three or four employees were

usually assigned to the dishroom and one employee was assigned to pot

and pans. SROI, Ex. C1, at 2-3.

7 Because we determine in this decision that claims 1, 3, and 5 were

not adequately investigated and must be remanded to the Agency for a

supplemental investigation, and in order to avoid fragmentation, we

will not address the Agency's determinations regarding claims 2, 4,

6 and 7 at this time.

??

??

??

??

2

01-2009-2103

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120092103