Ridgeview Industries

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 25, 2009

353 N.L.R.B. 1096 (N.L.R.B. 2009)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
353 NLRB No. 119
1096
Ridgeview Industries, Inc. and International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL–
CIO and Glenn Gentz. Cases 7–CA–50170, 7–
CA–50260, 7–CA–50383, 7–CA–50887, and 7–
CA–50281
March 25, 2009
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBER SCHAUMBER
On October 27, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Mark
D. Rubin issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent
filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board1 has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,2 and conclusions3 and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified.4

1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Liebman and Member Schaumber constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
It is unclear whether the Respondent has excepted to the judge’s
finding that it violated Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act by imposing a job jeop-
ardy agreement on employee Dave Smith. We note, however, that to
the extent that the Respondent may have done so, its exceptions regard-
ing Smith were based solely on the judge’s credibility resolutions.
There were no exceptions to the judge’s findings that the Respon-
dent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) by reprimanding employee Ben
Balczak on January 26, 2007, and suspending him on February 2, 2007,
and by restricting Smith’s movement within its plants on January 16
and 24, 2007. There were no exceptions to the judge’s findings that the
Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by: creating the impression of surveil-
lance; restricting employee movement in its plants; promulgating,
maintaining, or enforcing rules prohibiting the posting of materials
containing union/nonunion arguments or information on employee
bulletin boards, or removing such postings; promulgating, maintaining,
or enforcing rules prohibiting employees from engaging in behavior
designed to create discord or lack of harmony, or unauthorized solicita-
tion of funds or distribution of literature on the Respondent’s property;
and soliciting employees to report on the union activities of other em-
ployees and implicitly threatening to discipline employees engaged in
such activities. There were also no exceptions to the judge’s findings
that the Respondent did not unlawfully solicit grievances and implicitly
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Ridge-
view Industries, Inc., Walker, Michigan, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set
forth in the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraphs 2(a) and (b) and
reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly.
“(a) Rescind the rule prohibiting employees from post-
ing materials containing union/nonunion arguments or
information on employee bulletin boards, and notify em-

promise remedies in a February 21, 2007 letter to employees, and that it
did not unlawfully assign Balczak to press operator duties on February
8, 2007.
3 Applying Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), the judge found that
the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) by reprimanding Balczak
and Glenn Gentz, by discharging Gentz, and by imposing a job jeop-
ardy agreement on Smith. In adopting the judge’s finding that Gentz’
discharge was unlawful, we rely particularly on the evidence of dispa-
rate treatment, i.e., that Gentz’ discharge was disparate to discipline the
Respondent imposed on other employees for similar conduct. Member
Schaumber finds it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s other reasons for
finding the violation.
To establish a violation under Wright Line, the General Counsel
bears the burden of showing that union animus was a motivating or
substantial factor for the adverse employment action. The elements
commonly required to support such a showing are union or protected
concerted activity by the employee, employer knowledge of that activ-
ity, and union animus on the part of the employer. See, e.g.,
Consolidated Bus Transit, 350 NLRB 1064, 1065 (2007); Desert
Springs Hospital Medical Center, 352 NLRB 112 (2008). Member
Schaumber notes that the Board and the circuit courts of appeal have
variously described the evidentiary elements of the General Counsel’s
initial burden of proof under Wright Line, sometimes adding as an
independent fourth element the necessity for there to be a causal nexus
between the union animus and the adverse employment action. See,
e.g., American Gardens Management Co., 338 NLRB 644, 645 (2002).
As stated in Shearer’s Foods, 340 NLRB 1093, 1094 fn. 4 (2003), since
Wright Line is a causation standard, Member Schaumber agrees with
this addition to the formulation. In this case, he finds a causal nexus
between the Respondent’s union animus and the reprimands and/or
discharges of the discriminatees.
Member Schaumber does not rely on any implication in the judge’s
decision that the Respondent’s public statements in opposition to the
union campaign necessarily evidenced “antiunion animus.” Opposition
to unionization is not unlawful. See, e.g., ATC/Forsythe & Associates,
341 NLRB 501, 502 fn. 5 (2004). Instead, Member Schaumber relies
on the Respondent’s numerous 8(a)(1) violations as evidence of ani-
mus. Chairman Liebman agrees that the evidence on which Member
Schaumber relies is sufficient to establish that the Respondent acted
with an unlawful motive with respect to its violations of Sec. 8(a)(3).
She concurs with the judge’s grounds for finding antiunion animus, and
she observes that the Respondent’s exceptions do not, in any case,
appear to challenge this finding.
4 We shall modify the judge’s proposed Order to require immediate
rescission or modification of the Respondent’s unlawful rules. We
shall also revise the notice to reflect the violations found.
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1097
ployees in writing that this has been done and that the
rule is no longer in force.
“(b) Rescind the overly broad rules prohibiting em-
ployees from engaging in behavior designed to create
discord or lack of harmony, or unauthorized soliciting of
funds or distributing literature on company property, and
notify employees in writing that this has been done and
that the rules are no longer in force.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT create the impression among our em-
ployees that their union activities are under surveillance.
WE WILL NOT impose new restrictions on employee
movement in our plants in response to employee union
activity.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily promulgate, maintain,
or enforce rules prohibiting employees from posting no-
tices, letters, or other nonthreatening materials pertaining
to union or protected concerted activities on the plant
bulletin boards that are available for other employee
uses.
WE WILL NOT promulgate, maintain, or enforce rules
against employees (1) engaging in behavior designed to
create discord or lack of harmony, or (2) soliciting during
nonworktime such as breaks or before or after their
shifts, or (3) distributing literature in nonwork areas dur-
ing nonworktimes.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to report to manage-
ment the union activities of other employees, or threaten
to discipline employees engaged in the activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge employees, or issue discipli-
nary warnings, reprimands, suspensions, job jeopardy
agreements, or other forms of discipline, or restrict
movement in our plants because of employees’ union
activities, or because we suspected that they engaged in
such activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their Section 7 rights, or discriminate against them in
order to discourage membership in a union, or activities
on behalf of a union.
WE WILL rescind the rule prohibiting employees from
posting materials containing union/nonunion arguments
or information on employee bulletin boards, and WE WILL
notify employees in writing that this has been done and
that the rule is no longer in force.
WE WILL rescind the overly broad rules prohibiting
employees from engaging in behavior designed to create
discord or lack of harmony, or unauthorized soliciting of
funds or distributing literature on company property, and
WE WILL notify employees in writing that this has been
done and that the rules are no longer in force.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the order,
offer Glenn Gentz full reinstatement to his former posi-
tion or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or
any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Glenn Gentz, Ben Balczak, and Dave
Smith whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits
resulting from our discrimination against them, less any
interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL reimburse Dave Smith for out-of-pocket
costs he incurred as a result of our discriminatory impo-
sition of a job jeopardy agreement, with interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this order,
rescind the unlawful disciplinary warnings and suspen-
sion issued to Ben Balczak, the unlawful job jeopardy
agreement imposed on Dave Smith, and the unlawful
disciplinary warning and discharge of Glenn Gentz, re-
move any references to such in our files, and WE WILL,
within 3 days thereafter, notify Balczak, Smith, and
Gentz in writing that this has been done, and that the
discipline will not be used against them in any way.
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES, INC.
Colleen J. Carol, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Jeffrey J. Fraser, Esq. and Kelley E. Stoppels, Esq. (Varnum,
Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett), of Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan, for the Respondent.
Kenneth Bieber, of Grand Rapids, Michigan, for the Charging
Party.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1098
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MARK D. RUBIN, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried in Grand Rapids, Michigan, on April 23, and June 3–6,
2008, based on charges and amended charges filed by Interna-
tional Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL–CIO (the Charg-
ing Party Union or the Union) on February 22, June 13, April 4,
May 17 and 22, June 18, and November 28, 2007, and January
10, 2008, and by Glenn Gentz (Charging Party Gentz) on April
13 and May 22, 2007.
The Regional Director’s consolidated amended complaint,
dated February 28, 2008, alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) by issuing written reprimands/warnings and a 3-
day disciplinary suspension to Ben Balczak, by changing
Balczak’s work assignment to press operator duties, by issuing
a written reprimand/warning to Charging Party Gentz, by dis-
charging Gentz, and by requiring that Dave Smith enter a “Job
Jeopardy Agreement (JJA).”
The complaint further alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) by creating the impression that its employees’
union activities were under surveillance, by imposing restric-
tions on employee movement, by prohibiting an employee from
discussing terms and conditions of employment with another
employee, by prohibiting postings as to “union/nonunion” ar-
guments on employee bulletin boards and removing such post-
ings, by maintaining rules in its employee manual prohibiting
certain conduct asserted as protected by Section 7, by soliciting
employee grievances with an implied promise of remedy, by
soliciting employees to report to management as to the union
activities of other employees and threatening discipline for such
activities, and by threatening employees with discharge for
engaging in activities in support of the Union. The Respondent
asserts that its actions alleged as violating Section 8(a)(3) were
engaged in for legitimate reasons unrelated to the Union or
union activities, and that none of its actions, alleged as viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1), interfered with, coerced, or restrained
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
At the trial, the parties were afforded a full opportunity to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, to adduce competent,
relevant, and material evidence, to argue their positions orally,
and to file posttrial briefs. Based on the entire record, including
my observation of witness demeanor, and after considering the
briefs of the Respondent and the General Counsel, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent maintains corporate offices and a factory in
Walker, Michigan (Northridge plant), and a second factory in
Walker (Three Mile plant).1 At these facilities, the Respondent
is engaged in the manufacture, nonretail sale, and distribution

1 The complaint pleads, and the answer admits, that the plants are lo-
cated in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Record testimony is to the effect that
the plants are located in nearby Walker, Michigan.
of metal stampings, metal components, weldments, and assem-
blies for the automotive, furniture, and other industries, and in
the course of such during the calendar year ending December
31, 2006, a representative period, sold and shipped products
valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points located outside
the State of Michigan.2 I, thus, find that the Respondent is
now, and has been at all times material, an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
I find, and it is admitted, that the Union is, and has been at
all times material, a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.3
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Respondent
The Respondent operates two plants in Walker, Michigan,
outside Grand Rapids, and a plant in Huntsville, Alabama, not
involved in this litigation. About 200 production, shipping, and
office employees work at the Northridge plant, which also
serves as the Respondent’s headquarters. The Respondent’s top
managers are housed in Northridge offices, including owner
and President Dave Nykamp, Vice President of Operations
Doug Dykstra, Human Resource Manager Terri Yeomans, and
Northridge Plant Manager Ron VanderLaan. Plant Manager
Paul MacLaren oversees the Respondent’s 150 employees at
the Three Mile plant, located about 3 miles from Northridge.
Human Resources Generalist Brian Hirdes, reporting to Yeo-
mans, maintains an office at Three Mile, and handles personnel
functions there. Supervisor Fred Thomas supervises the ship-
ping department at both facilities, and Nykamp and Yeomans
occasionally visit Three Mile. Neither facility’s employees are
represented by a union. Absent other specific reference, the
facts found herein reference Three Mile.
The Respondent’s Disciplinary Policies
The Respondent’s disciplinary policy is essentially set forth
in its employee handbook,4 under a section entitled, “Corrective
Action Policy.” The handbook, unchanged from about 2006 to
2008, and in effect at all times material hereto, describes the
disciplinary system as progressive and notes that the Respon-
dent may skip one or more steps up to termination, depending
on the circumstances and seriousness of the offense. The pro-
gressive discipline steps are as follows: first offense—verbal
reprimand, documentation to personnel file that the conversa-
tion took place, and employee signature required; second of-
fense—written reprimand, copy to personnel file, employee
signature required; third offense—written reprimand, copy to
personnel file, employee signature required, suspension for up
to 3 days without pay; and fourth offense—written reprimand,
copy to personnel file, employee signature required, and dis-
charge. In addition to the formal steps of the progressive disci-
pline policy, supervisors have the authority to verbally mention

2 Based on the parties’ pleadings.
3 Respondent so stipulated.
4 GC Exh. 2 is the version of the handbook that was in effect at all
times material hereto.
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1099
a problem to an employee with a note to the file. Such a “pre-
verbal” discussion is not considered a step in the progressive
discipline policy, although it could lead to a first-step warning
in case of a repeat violation.
Also in addition to the steps listed in its progressive disci-
pline policy, the Respondent utilizes a “job jeopardy agree-
ment” (JJA) procedure which Yeomans described as a “last-
chance agreement where the person is told what the issues with
their performance or behavior are and then specific recommen-
dations are made, typically counseling that they’re asked to
attend to help rectify the situation.” Employees who are party
to a JJA are subject to discharge unless they fulfill its terms.
The Respondent utilizes JJAs for a variety of offenses including
drug/alcohol test failures and attitude problems. Yeomans testi-
fied that JJAs are part of the Respondent’s disciplinary policy
and are typically used in lieu of the third offense step, as set
forth above.
The employee handbook also contains a section entitled,
“Employee Conduct in the Workplace,” which sets forth spe-
cific examples of prohibited conduct which are subject to the
Respondent’s disciplinary policy, up to discharge. Two of the
prohibitions are as follows: “Malicious gossip and/or spreading
rumors; engaging in behavior designed to create discord or lack
of harmony,” and “Unauthorized soliciting of funds or distrib-
uting literature on company property.”
Other Policies
The Respondent’s owner, Nykamp, regularly schedules
“Donuts with Dave” meetings with employees. The Respon-
dent schedules a date and time. Employees sign up to partici-
pate. At the meetings, the Respondent provides refreshments
and employees are permitted to ask questions of Nykamp on
various issues. Issues have included various programs of the
Respondent, including the attendance program. Nykamp has
been holding these meetings since about 2003.5 Alleged dis-
criminatee Dave Smith testified that employees are free to bring
up any work-related subject at these meetings. Smith testified,
“Somebody else may have talked to him about we need a new
vending service and this is why. You could just talk about
anything work related, improvements, the way people could
improve or the way the company could improve.” Smith testi-
fied that the meetings were a “two-way thing,” with employees
making suggestions and Nykamp responding.
Union Organizational Activity
During October 2006, shipping employee Dave Smith and
material handler Ben Balczak began talking about the possibil-
ity of acquiring union representation.6 In November, Smith
contacted the Charging Union, which resulted in a meeting with
UAW organizer Ken Bieber in early December, a meeting also
attended by Balczak and employee Bryan Bowman. A plan
was formulated that the initial support for the Union would be
demonstrated by Smith and Bryan Bowman, and that Balczak

5 Nykamp testified that he has been holding “Donuts with Dave”
meetings for about 5 years.
6 Other employees involved in such conversations during that period
were Bryan Bowman, Ray Schoonmaker, Jack Johnson, and Ron
McNab.
would stay behind the scenes to gauge the strength of employee
support for the Union.
Subsequent to the meeting, Smith and Balczak spoke to other
employees, including Glenn Gentz, in an attempt to gauge em-
ployee interest in a union, and to gather information helpful
during an organization drive. After January 1, 2007, Smith,
Balczak, and Bowman began wearing UAW insignia to work.
Smith wore a UAW T-shirt to work every Thursday (payday),
and a UAW pin other days. About February 15, at various
times, Smith stood on the sidewalk by both plants and distrib-
uted union literature to employees at shift change. Balczak
wore a UAW pin on his shirt beginning in late January or early
February, and called other employees at home to promote the
Union. Sometime in February 2007, Gentz asked Greg
Penland, his former supervisor, what Penland thought about the
Union and Penland responded that Nykamp did a lot for the
employees and asked why would they want a union.7
In mid-December 2006, Human Resources Manager Yeo-
mans noticed Three Mile employees Dave Weerstra and Ray
Trujillo in the Northridge plant and asked them why they were
there. One of them responded that they were going to a union
organizing meeting. Yeomans contacted Plant Managers
MacLaren and VanderLaan told them about the conversation,
and added that it was “the first time I’ve heard the union word
mentioned at Ridgeview, so just keep your ears open.”
Yeomans also told owner Nykamp that there were “people
encouraging union activity or union sign-up,” and specifically
mentioned the names Dave Smith and Ben Balczak.8 Subse-
quently, Yeomans and Nykamp would speak when there were
union activities or conversations. At the hearing, Nykamp testi-
fied that “we would discuss examples, again, of Dave Smith
talked to so-and-so, or we have a flyer.” The names of Smith
and Balczak came up when the Respondent’s managers dis-
cussed the latest union activity.9 Nykamp testified that employ-
ees told him that Balczak and Smith were trying to organize a
union and that more than 100 employees talked to him about
union activity in January 2007, and then again in February.
Among other items, some of these employees reported to
Nykamp the names of other employees who approached them
about the Union. Because Nykamp’s testimony as to how
many employees spoke to him about the Union is an estimate,
and is without substantiation as to the actual number, I find
only that numerous employees spoke to him about the Union.
Responses to Organizational Campaign
The Respondent distributes its employee newsletter, “News-
break,” each payday to employees with their paychecks. It
generally includes articles prepared by the human relations
department dealing with new employees, birthdays, events,
benefits, and the like. The January 24, 2007 “Newsbreak” dis-
tributed to employees contained a letter to employees from
Dave Nykamp, signed “Dave,” and prepared by Nykamp, to-
gether with Yeomans, and with advice from the Respondent’s
attorney.10

7 The parties stipulated to Penland’s 2(11) status.
8 Nykamp’s testimony.
9 VanderLaan’s testimony.
10 Nykamp’s testimony.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1100
The letter began, “I recently learned that several individuals
are encouraging others to consider a union at RVI. I am writing
to you to share my opinion about unions.” The letter continued
with a discussion of Nykamp’s negative perceptions of the
impact a union would have on the Respondent’s business and
concluded as follows: “RVI recognizes that employees have
the right to join or not join a union. I believe each of you have
the responsibility to decide for yourselves whether a union
would serve our best interests. In case after case, union-
employer relationships have proven to be adversarial and
marked by conflict. Such an environment undermines em-
ployee participation and cooperation in the workplace, and
limits a company’s ability to compete. I strongly believe that
union representation does not serve the best interests of the
company or its employees.”
Nykamp’s letter also stated that if employees voted a union
in, it was possible that, in bargaining, they would lose “many of
our current benefits/perks.” The letter specifically mentions the
employee library as one of those benefits, among others.
About a week after the Nykamp letter was distributed, the
Respondent held its regular quarterly employee meetings.
Three Mile first-shift employees and some office employees
attended the meeting in the recreation area of the Three Mile
plant. Using a PowerPoint presentation illustrating union rep-
resented plants that had closed, Nykamp spoke to the assem-
bled employees about his negative views of unions, that they’ve
never needed a union before, and had been able to resolve any
problems without a union.11
Most of the quarterly meeting was taken up with Nykamp’s
discussion of unions, so that much of what is normally dis-
cussed at quarterly meetings, such as performance measurables
and the state of the business, was not touched on. As a result,
the Respondent held a departmental employee meeting in mid-
February so that the normal topics missed at the quarterly meet-
ings could be discussed.
The departmental meeting, attended by first-shift hourly em-
ployees, lasted about 15 minutes, and was conducted in the
recreation area, with the Respondent’s vice president, Doug
Dykstra, speaking, and HR Manager Yeomans present. For
much of the meeting Dykstra discussed certain rules in the
Respondent’s employee handbook, including policies against
gossip and the unauthorized distribution of materials and solici-
tation. Dykstra told employees that the penalty for violations
would be up to termination.12
During the meeting, Dykstra used a PowerPoint presentation
which displayed page 31 from the employee handbook entitled,
“Employee Conduct in the Workplace.” The page included the
following as violations: “Malicious gossip and/or spreading
rumors, engaging in behavior designed to create discord or lack
of harmony,” and “Unauthorized soliciting of funds or distrib-
uting literature on company property.” The penalty provided
for violations of the rules is as follows: “RVI imposes the ap-
propriate corrective action (up to and including discharge),
given the facts and circumstances of a particular situation.”

11 Credited testimony of Smith.
12 Both Smith and Yeomans testified as to this meeting. Their testi-
mony does not materially differ.
On February 21, 2007, the Respondent distributed another
Nykamp letter to employees, with their paychecks. The letter
began, “In the January quarterly meetings, I discussed union
organizing efforts at Ridgeview and my personal feeling that
union representation is not the answer to resolving our issues or
concerns at Ridgeview. I know that union efforts persist and I
am aware that the United Auto Workers (UAW) held informa-
tional meetings for our employees over the past week. I con-
tinue to believe strongly that union representation will nega-
tively impact our communications, our efforts to resolve prob-
lems together, and our ability to compete in a very challenging
industry. I remain open to talking about this issue with any
individual or group. I am eager to learn and understand the
issues and to work toward an acceptable resolution. Please be
willing to call me directly and ask for an opportunity to meet.”
In the letter, Nykamp discusses union authorization cards as
follows: “Throughout this process, you have the right to stand
up for yourself and Ridgeview. If you don’t want to sign a
card, tell the person asking you that you have no interest in
signing a card. If you feel pressured, coerced or harassed to
sign a card, please report the issue. We enforce our policy
prohibiting harassment of any kind.”
Anonymous Flyer
In late January/early February 2007, an anonymous flyer or
letter was posted and distributed at various places in the plant,
and placed in MacLaren’s office mailbox. The flyer, referred
to in the record as the “list,” states, verbatim: “PLEASE
THANK THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE FOR THEIR GREAT
CONCERN FOR OUR WELFARE BY SUGGESTING A
UNION BE BROUGHT INTO OUR LIVES. DAVE SMITH,
GLENN GENTZ, BOB BONNEVILLE, MIKE SEGERS, BEN
BALCZAK, GLEN OCKERT, JACK JOHNSON [sic], JERRY
CONALES, BRYAN BOWMAN AND ANY OTHERS THAT
ARE NOT NAMED” [caps contained in original, type size
approximates the original].
MacLaren told Dykstra about the list the day he received it
and forwarded it to Yeomans. Dykstra asked MacLaren which
employees were named on the list and MacLaren told him.13
MacLaren discussed the flyer and the union activities with his
production supervisory staff, including John Deering, Sherri
Gray, Corey Falk, and Bob Dalloway. MacLaren asked his
production supervisors “if they have heard anybody on the floor
disgruntled with Ridgeview, if anything’s going on that I need
to be aware of . . . .”14
Shortly after seeing the list, MacLaren spoke with some em-
ployees named on the list. He told Smith that a list had been
posted with his name on it and he wanted Smith to know that
the list had been removed and destroyed.15 MacLaren told
Balczak that the Respondent was investigating the list posting.
Balczak told MacLaren that he thought management was re-
sponsible because certain names on the list with unusual spell-
ings were spelled correctly. MacLaren apologized to Gentz as
to his name being on the list. MacLaren told Bonnville that a

13 MacLaren’s testimony.
14 MacLaren’s testimony.
15 Smith’s testimony.
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1101
list had been posted with employees’ names, that MacLaren
was talking to people involved to let them know that the Re-
spondent was aware of it, was going to “look into it and find
out what was going on.” Bonnville responded that his name
was on the list, that he didn’t know how it got there, that it
didn’t belong there, that he had never spoken with a union rep-
resentative, that he had never attended a union meeting, and
was not involved in any way. Other than speculation by wit-
nesses, there is no definitive or substantive evidence in the
record as to who actually produced or distributed the list.
Michael Segers, employed at Three Mile for about 8 years as
an automatic press operator and named on the list, saw a copy
of the list at Bonnville’s workstation, although the posted list
had been removed before his 6 a.m. shift had started. At about
7 a.m., Segers asked Human Resources Generalist Hirdes
“What’s going on with the list?” Segers told Hirdes that he
knew nothing about a union. Hirdes responded that he was
going to look into it, and would get back to Segers. Segers then
approached MacLaren and asked him about the list. MacLaren
responded that he didn’t know anything about it, was looking
into it, and would get back to Segers. Segers did not hear back
from either Hirdes or MacLaren by the end of his shift. After
work, Segers called Yeomans and then Nykamp, but was told
they were both out of town. Segers then called Dykstra, and
left a message requesting a meeting to discuss the list.
Within the next 2 days, at work, Dykstra told Segers that he
was ready to meet with him. Segers requested that Bonnville
be allowed to attend the meeting and Dykstra agreed. Bonn-
ville and Segers then met with Dykstra and MacLaren in
MacLaren’s office.
Segers said they wanted to know who created the list, and
why their names were on it.16 Dykstra said, “You obviously
were seen attending union meetings or talking up the union.”
Segers responded that he was not even aware of any union
meetings and that he hadn’t attended any. Segers mentioned an
antiunion letter written by another employee and left at his
workstation, and said, “This kind of stuff left at my workstation
purposely for me, this is distracting.” Dykstra responded that
“[t]here’s been a lot of distractions. We have to get back to
what we do. It looks like people are just angry because either
we are pushing back or others are pushing back.” Dykstra
added that “if people are not happy at Ridgeview, that maybe
we should see what we can do to see that they’re not working

16 The finding of facts in respect to what occurred during this meet-
ing is based on an amalgam of the testimony of Segers and Bonnville.
Their testimony is not identical or inconsistent. Segers testified mostly
about the portions of the meeting where he interacted with Dykstra,
while Bonnville testified mostly about the portions of the meeting in
which he exchanged conversation with Dykstra. Based on their testi-
monial demeanor, apparent recall of events, level of detail in their
testimony, and willingness to answer the questions of both counsel,
they both appeared to be credible witnesses. Dykstra did not testify.
MacLaren’s testimony did not include the level of detail testified to by
both Bonnville and Segers. While he did not testify as to some of the
comments made by Dykstra, which Bonnville and Segers testified to,
he did not deny them either. Finally, both Segers and Bonnville are
current employees who would not receive any direct benefit from the
instant litigation. Both factors support their credibility.
here or something” and that “people were going to have to earn
back the trust.” Segers asked why he had to earn back the trust
and mentioned his years of employment with the Respondent
and a commendation he had earned. Dykstra responded that
“people were going to be on a tight leash” and that “we have to
get back to business.”
During the course of the meeting, Bonnville stated that he
was unaware of any unions, hadn’t attended any meetings, and
his name did not belong on the list. Dykstra responded that he
would like to believe that but couldn’t, and that he’d seen a list
of 35 to 38 people that had been attending union meetings.
Bonnville said that he hadn’t attended any union meetings.
Dykstra responded that he hadn’t really seen the list, but had
heard about it. Bonnville said that the Respondent owed it to
the people named on the list to investigate the list and put a stop
to it. Dykstra responded that if the whole situation was “pay-
back” for something that happened 4 years ago, they needed to
get over it.17 At some point during the meeting, Dykstra asked
Bonnville and Segers whether they were part of the Union.18
Employee Posting of Letters and Response
Near the same date that the list was posted, employee Rob
Twa posted a letter on an employee bulletin board opposing a
union. The letter began, “Management of this company is not
allowed to share their views on the union issue, BUT I CAN!
If you think that a union is going to make your life at RVI bet-
ter, maybe you should go ask the people at other union shops
how they like their jobs.” The letter concluded, “If you don’t
like it here, then LEAVE! Chances are pretty good that we
didn’t like you anyway. If you want to have everything your
way then go work for BURGER KING!” (Emphasis in origi-
nal.) In addition to Twa, other employees signed the letter.
About the day after the Twa letter was posted, employee Bob
Keeler posted a letter supportive of the Union on an employee
bulletin board. Keeler’s letter began, “The management of this
company is a lot smarter than you are. That is why they don’t
share their view on this union issue. You Mr. Twa on the other
hand stand up and get in peoples faces and tell them if they
don’t like it here to leave; and that they are a threat to your
financial security.”
Shortly after the Keeler letter posted, HR Manager Yeomans
instructed Hirdes to remove the letters from the employee bul-
letin board. Yeomans testified that while there were no face-to-
face confrontations between Twa and Keeler, she concluded
that the content of the letters was “starting to get nasty.” Yeo-
mans denied that the letters were removed because they con-
tained “union arguments,” and asserted that they were removed

17 An apparent reference to Bonnville’s prior demotion from a sala-
ried to an hourly job.
18 MacLaren so testified in response to a question from the Respon-
dent’s counsel. The Respondent’s counsel asked, “Did Doug Dykstra
ask them whether they were part of the union?” MacLaren answered,
“As I think about it now, he did ask them that question.” Dykstra did
not testify. Neither Bonnville nor Segers testified that Dykstra asked
such an explicit question when asked what occurred during the meet-
ing, but they were not asked specifically whether or not Dykstra asked
such a specific question and did not deny that he did such. Under these
circumstances, I find that MacLaren’s testimony as to this to be reliable
as he would have no incentive to be untruthful here.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1102
because “we don’t want verbal assaults on people going up on
our bulletin boards.” There is no evidence that the exchange of
posted letters led to arguments or fights about the union issue.
When the letters were removed, a memo signed by Yeomans
was posted on the bulletin boards at both plants. The memo
contained the following: “Effective immediately (2/2/07),
Ridgeview will not allow the bulletin boards to be used as a
format for union/nonunion arguments. Any material that is
adversarial in nature from either viewpoint will be removed.
Please contact any member of the HR team for approval to
place items on the bulletin boards. It’s time to get our focus
back to making quality parts and meeting the needs of our cus-
tomers.” The entire memo, except for Yeomans name and title,
was printed in capital letters, and the final sentence was also
bolded. The Respondent has never rescinded the memo or the
policy stated therein.
The bulletin boards at both plants serve the same general
purposes, and employees at both plants had previously been
allowed to freely post their cards or information, without prior
management approval and without content restriction. While
the union-related back and forth letters were only posted at the
Three Mile plant, the memo restricting bulletin board use was
posted at both plants. Neither Twa nor Keeler was disciplined
in regard to the letters they posted.
Ben Balczak
Ben Balczak is employed by the Respondent as a hi-lo op-
erator at the Three Mile plant.19 Press operators fill gondolas
(containers) with parts they have produced, and hi-lo operators,
such as Balczak, roam the plant picking up full gondolas and
replacing them with empty gondolas, and also bringing various
supplies to the press operators. In performing these duties, the
hi-lo operator job is a somewhat mobile position within the
plant. Prior to early 2008, when Balczak was assigned to the
east end of the plant, Balczak’s job entailed servicing 10
presses from one side of the plant to the other.
Balczak, January 26, 2007 Level II Written
Reprimand/Warning
On January 26, 2007, 2 days after the first Nykamp letter to
employees, Balczak was driving his hi-lo in the south room
area of Three Mile, near the workstation of leadperson Andrea
Olescewski. Balczak asked Olescewski to walk up to his hi-lo,
intending to tell her a joke involving an assertedly humorous
reference to an antiunion argument made by Nykamp.
Olescewski refused, telling Balczak that she was busy. After
Olescewski refused Balczak’s second request, he dismounted
from his hi-lo and walked to her workstation. Balczak asked
her what she was “looking for on these parts.” Balczak then
said to her, “If you ever get to Greenville, you’re welcome to
use my library card.” Balczak testified that this was meant as a
joking reference to Nykamp’s missive in which he mentioned
the possibility of losing benefits if the union effort was success-
ful, including use of the Respondent’s library.
Olescewski answered that she didn’t like what the Union
stood for and that she’d never been in favor of a union.

19 Balczak is classified as a “material handler,” but operates a hi-lo
truck.
Balczak responded that what bothered him about being an em-
ployee in the State of Michigan was that “you are an at-will
employee and you signed an at-will contract and they need no
reason to fire you.” That was the end of the discussion. The
entire conversation took about 2 minutes, with Olescewski
working the entire time. Balczak testified that he had no prod-
uct on his hi-lo that he was delivering to Olescewski, nor had
he delivered product that would have taken him by her work-
station, but that he was driving by her area because he “wanted
to pass a little humor onto her.” When asked on cross-
examination why he cared whether Olescewski heard the joke,
Balczak testified, “I told a lot of people at the plant the same
thing I had told her, and a lot of people laughed.”
Later that same morning, Balczak received a disciplinary
warning from his immediate supervisor, John Deering. Balczak
reported to the automatic production supervisor’s office, where
he met with Deering and Olescewski’s supervisor, Sherry Gray.
Deering handed Balczak a two-page level II written discipli-
nary action.20 The first page of the warning described
Balczak’s actions earlier that morning vis-à-vis Olescewski,
and contained the following: “Ben [sic] actions are clear viola-
tions of appropriate employee conduct outlined in the RVI Em-
ployee Handbook (please see attached copy),” and “Should
future incidents of this nature occur, they would result in fur-
ther disciplinary action.” The second page of the warning con-
sisted of page 31 of the Respondent’s employee handbook, the
section outlining the Respondent’s employee conduct and dis-
ciplinary policy, with three asserted violations of the Respon-
dent’s policy highlighted.
Deering read the first page of the warning to Balczak, and
read the highlighted portions of the second page. The high-
lighted portions read to Balczak are as follows: “malicious
gossip and/or spreading rumors; engaging in behavior designed
to create discord or lack of harmony;” “deliberate idling, loiter-
ing, inattention to duty, or leaving workstation without permis-
sion;” and “interfering with others in the performance of their
jobs or causing a slow-down of production.” Balczak signed
the warning, and admitted the incident with Olescewski as de-
scribed in the warning, but called the discipline “not right.”
While Deering signed the disciplinary warning and handled the
disciplinary meeting with Balczak, he did not witness the inci-
dent that led to the discipline. Human Resources Generalist
Hirdes made the decision to discipline Balczak.21 Deering
testified, in general as to idling offenses, that “if they’re idling
and they’re there for a minute, I’m probably not going to write
them up.” “But if they’re there for five and ten, then yeah, I’m
going to do something.”
Balczak, February 2, 2007 Level III 3-day Suspension
On February 2, 2007, at about 7 a.m., Balczak and hi-lo
driver Huy Pham were near each other on their hi-los. Balczak
asked Pham to meet with him by the scrap hopper machines.
The two of them met there by themselves, and Balczak handed

20 The reprimand refers to a written warning received by Balczak
“for similar behavior” in August 2005. That is, apparently, the reason
the discipline was written at the second step. The prior discipline oc-
curred prior to the union activity involved herein.
21 Deering’s uncontroverted testimony.
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1103
Pham some union materials he had printed from the internet.
Pham started to read the materials, and told Balczak that she
didn’t want “nothing to do with this.” Pham handed the mate-
rials back to Balczak. Balczak told Pham that if she didn’t
want to read the materials while she was on her hi-lo, she
should take it to the bathroom and read it there so she wouldn’t
get caught, but that Balczak needed the materials back that day.
Pham responded, “I don’t want nothing to do with this.” Pham
then left, with the entire conversation taking about 2 minutes.22
Later that day, Deering, under instructions from Plant Man-
ager MacLaren, brought Balczak to MacLaren’s office. Deer-
ing left, leaving Balczak with MacLaren and Yeomans.
MacLaren imposed a level III 3-day suspension on Balczak,
and read the first page of the two-page written disciplinary
notice to him. Included in what MacLaren read was the “man-
agement comments” section as follows: “On 2/2/07, at ap-
proximately 7:30 a.m., Ben approached Huy Pham and asked
her to meet him at the West End scrap hoppers. Ben handed a
document to Huy and asked her to read it. Huy reported the
first line said “do not believe anything Dave Dykamp [sic] said
in the quarterly meetings.”
The second page of the disciplinary notice consisted of page
31 of the Respondent’s employee handbook, the section entitled
“Employee Conduct in the Workplace.” Highlighted were the
following sections: “Deliberate idling, loitering, inattention to
duty, or leaving workstation without permission”; “Interfering
with others in the performance of their jobs or causing a slow-
down of production”; and “Unauthorized soliciting of funds or
distributing literature on company property.” MacLaren told
Balczak that the reason the discipline consisted of a level III
suspension was based on the employee handbook, and that his
violations were highlighted (circled).23 Balczak signed the
disciplinary notice, upon MacLaren’s request. Balczak asked if

22 From the credited and uncontroverted testimony of Balczak. Huy
Pham did not testify.
23 Testimony varied as to whether some of the disciplinary docu-
ments were highlighted or circled, or both. The copy of page two of
Balczak’s 3-day suspension, introduced as an exhibit, had the relevant
sections both highlighted and circled.
MacLaren’s testimony as to whether the second page of the discipli-
nary document was highlighted or circled when he handed it to Balczak
is inconsistent and not credible. When first asked about the highlight-
ing, MacLaren testified that he didn’t recall highlighting the document,
didn’t remember doing it himself, and didn’t recall if the asserted viola-
tions were circled when he showed the document to Balczak. But
MacLaren also testified that when he pointed out the second page to
Balczak, he told Balczak, “the reason this is a level three, 3-day sus-
pension, is based on our handbook employee conduct in the workplace
which was attached, and that was circled and pointed out what he had
done.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, MacLaren testified that he didn’t
remember whether page two contained circling when he showed the
document to Balczak, and on the other hand he testified that he told
Balczak that his violations of rules were circled. Balczak testified that
the copy of the disciplinary document introduced as evidence, and
containing the circling, is an accurate copy of what MacLaren gave to
him. Based on their testimonial demeanor, MacLaren’s noted inconsis-
tency of testimony, and the improbability that Balczak would have
circled the violations on his own, I credited Balczak that the document
contained the circling or highlighting when MacLaren presented it to
him.
he could retrieve his belongings from his hi-lo. MacLaren re-
sponded that he could, but MacLaren would go with him.
Upon reaching the Balczak’s hi-lo on the plant floor,
Balczak asked MacLaren if he could use the hi-lo radio to call
fellow hi-lo driver Brian Bowman, whom he carpooled with, to
let him know that he was leaving and Bowman would have to
find another ride. With MacLaren listening, Balczak told
Bowman, on the radio, that he had been suspended for 3 days
and Bowman would have to find his own ride home. Bowman
responded that Balczak had to be kidding. Upon Bowman’s
comment, MacLaren told Balczak to end the conversation.
MacLaren then accompanied Balczak out of the plant, after
stopping at Balczak’s locker.
When Balczak returned to work on February 8 from the 3-
day suspension, MacLaren and Deering met him by the time-
clock, and took him to the production supervisor’s office.
MacLaren talked about Balczak having a strong work ethic and
it being unusual that he had two disciplinary warnings in a short
period of time, and mentioned that he didn’t want “you guys”
to say anything to Pham going forward.24 Balczak told
MacLaren and Deering that “[i]f you want to keep an eye on
me, let me hang coils,”25 and also suggested that he had not
performed his “janitor of the day” duties the prior week, and he
could do that.26 Deering assigned Balczak temporarily to jani-
torial duties, while he and MacLaren discussed what job to
assign Balczak to.
After lunchbreak on February 8, Deering told Balczak that
the Respondent was going to start training Balczak on a press.
Balczak had never worked on a press before. He was then
trained for 1-1/2 days and assigned to the 150 Minster press.27
Most of the Respondent’s production employees are organ-
ized into three employee cells. Each cell operates two presses.
Generally, two of the cell members operate presses and the

24 Balczak testified as to the strong work ethic comment, and
MacLaren testified as to the Pham comment. Balczak neither testified
to nor specifically denied the Pham comment, and MacLaren neither
testified to nor specifically denied the work ethic comment. Based on
the context of the conversation, I credit both, and find that MacLaren
made both comments.
25 A material handler who hangs coils, operates a crane, and hangs
raw material on the mandrels for the automatic presses.
26 This is Balczak’s credited testimony. In their testimony,
MacLaren and Deering remembered it differently. MacLaren testified
that Balczak requested to be placed on a press. Deering testified that
Balczak asked to be taken off the hi-lo, but did not indicate where he
wanted to work. In general, based on his demonstrated memory, testi-
monial demeanor, and his willingness to answer questions of all coun-
sel, Balczak is a credible witness, and I so find. To certain questions,
Balczak displayed a hesitancy in answering. However, in my close
observation of his testimonial demeanor, it appeared that such was
caused by the nervousness of being on a witness stand, rather than by
any intention to deceive. Here, Balczak’s recollection is explicit and
his answers on direct and cross-examination consistent. Contrariwise,
Deering’s testimony does not support MacLaren’s recollection that
Balczak asked to be placed on a press.
27 The 150 Minster press, is a 150-ton automatic press, the smallest
of the Respondent’s automatic presses. The manual presses require the
operator to physically grab a part, put it into the press to reform it.
With automatic presses, the material is automatically fed through the
press, which stamps out the parts.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1104
third serves as a material handler. The cell members have the
ability to decide among themselves which members will per-
form which functions. The press operator is basically a station-
ary job, while the material handlers, including hi-lo operation,
are mobile throughout the plant. The sense of the testimony is
that wire hanging is part of the material handler function.
Balczak, March 22, 2007 Level I Reprimand
Balczak received a level I oral reprimand/warning from
Deering on March 22, 2007. The warning was memorialized in
a written disciplinary action form signed by Deering and
Hirdes. The management comment section on the form was
completed as follows: “On 2/19/07 you ran part numbers
56154/5 in the 150M Northridge started to use these parts on
3/20/07 and found that they were mixed. They have sorted one
half of a gon28 of 17,000 pcs and found several 56154 in the
container of 56155. In the future while running right and left
hand parts you need to pay close attention to insure that parts
do not get mixed.” In plainer language, the discipline was for,
assertedly, mixing left and right side automotive parts.
The process utilized at Three Mile for moving and auditing
parts after production is as follows: The press operator pro-
duces parts which are placed into a gondola container. When a
gondola is filled, it is picked up by a hi-lo operator, who re-
places the filled gondola with an empty one. Both the hi-lo
operator and the press operator complete an audit label29 con-
taining information as to the item manufactured, press operator,
hi-lo operator, and other information. The hi-lo operator scans
the label barcode into inventory, adding information identifying
the hi-lo operator. The parts then move into a particular storage
aisle, depending on where they are headed to next. Some of the
parts are sent to Northridge for additional or secondary manu-
facturing. Some of the parts are placed into storage to await
shipping to a customer.
The label, introduced at the hearing, an audit label from the
gondola upon which Balczak received the disciplinary warning,
did not contain Balczak’s, or any other, operator number.30 The
label is dated March 19 and, thus, conforms to the audit of the
assertedly mixed parts rather than to the original production of
the parts. As to the asserted mixed parts, Deering received a
phone call from an unidentified employee31 in the quality con-
trol department at Northridge, informing Deering that they were
attempting welding operations on a certain batch of parts from
Three Mile, but because the parts were mixed it was affecting
their operations. Deering told the Northridge quality control
employee to return the parts to Three Mile for sorting.32 When

28 The record includes references to this container as a “gon” or
“gondola.” It is used by the Respondent as a container for manufac-
tured parts. I utilized “gondola” throughout to refer to this container.
29 The press operator and the hi-lo operator both perform a “label to
part” audit to ensure that the label correctly describes the parts in the
gondola.
30 The label introduced at the hearing had been removed from the
gondola by Balczak.
31 Deering testified that he did not remember the quality control em-
ployee who called him.
32 Testimony varied as to whether it was normal practice to return
mixed parts to Three Mile rather than performing the re-sort at North-
the parts returned to Three Mile, Deering told Balczak to re-sort
the parts, and gave Balczak the reprimand. Upon re-sorting,
Balczak found no mixed parts, and so informed Deering.
Balczak, March 23, 2007 Level II Written
Reprimand/Warning
The following day, March 23, Balczak received another dis-
ciplinary action from the Respondent, this one a level II written
reprimand/warning for assertedly mislabeling a gondola of
parts. Deering, in his office, with Hirdes present, handed the
warning to Balczak, and told him that parts were incorrectly
labeled. The disciplinary action memo states that on March 22,
Balczak mislabeled right side parts as left side and that there
were also mixed parts.
Balczak testified while he signed the disciplinary warning,
he did not agree that he had, in fact, either mislabeled or mixed
the parts. Deering testified that he didn’t know whether he had
the label which contained the asserted mislabeling with him at
the time he imposed discipline on Balczak, and that the label
introduced at the hearing, as being on the gondola filled by
Balczak on March 22, did not include the identification of the
press operator, apparently because it was re-labeled at North-
ridge. When asked on cross-examination whether Deering
showed him the mislabeling, Balczak answered, “—I believe
so.” (The dashes are contained in the transcript of the testi-
mony.) With Deering not remembering whether he had the
label with him when disciplining Balczak and with the lack of
certainty implicit in Balczak’s answer on cross-examination, I
decline to make a finding as to whether Deering actually
showed Balczak the asserted mislabeling.
The record contains no evidence that Balczak actually com-
mitted the asserted mislabeling or mixing of parts on March 22,
for which the March 23 discipline was imposed, other than the
hearsay testimony contained in the written disciplinary action
memo given to Balczak by Deering. The “management com-
ments” on the disciplinary memo are as follows:
On 3/22/07 Northridge found one skid of 78254 labeled as
78255, and one skid of 78255 labeled as 78254. On 3/20/07
you ran these parts out of the 150M where you applied the la-
bels. It is standard practice that all operators perform a part to
label audit before applying labels to containers, assuring our
customers received correctly labeled parts. Ben, you need to
perform a part to label audit every time before placing labels
on containers to help RVI meet our customer’s expectation of
100% proper labels. In addition to being mislabeled, employ-
ees at Northridge found several 78254 mixed in with the
78255. You need to pay close attention while running these
parts to eliminate this problem. This mislabel incident in con-
junction with the quality issue on 2/19/07 concerning mixed
parts, is the reason for the written reprimand. Any further is-
sues of this nature will result in further disciplinary action.

ridge. The sum of the testimony is that the practice was not typical, but
neither was it unusual, depending on circumstances.
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1105
While both Deering and Balczak testified that they signed the
disciplinary memo, there is no specific evidence as to who
wrote the management comment section.
The Respondent’s labeling procedure is as follows: a super-
visor makes a set of left-side and right-side labels; the supervi-
sor places the labels next to the container where the parts are
running; the press operator performs a part to label check and
then calls for a hi-lo operator; the hi-lo driver then performs a
part to label check, scans the parts, and takes them away.
Gentz, February 21, 2007 Level I Oral
Reprimand/Warning
Glenn Gentz was employed by the Respondent as a material
handler at Three Mile from 1993 until his discharge on March
27, 2007. Although Gentz was classified as a material handler,
he performed the function of hi-lo truckdriver and, within the
Respondent’s cell concept of employee organization, he also
“hung coils,” helped set up dies, and assisted press operators
with operational problems. Gentz spent about 90 percent of his
worktime performing material handling (hi-lo operation) and
hanging coils.
Gentz testified that he learned of the union organizational at-
tempt from Balczak and spoke to other employees about the
Union “probably a couple of times a day.33 Gentz’ name ap-
peared on the late January/early February 2007 posted list of
asserted employee union supporters. MacLaren and Gentz
spoke right after the list was posted. Gentz testified that
MacLaren apologized about the posting, and Gentz responded
that people “have been hurt due to this kind of you know stuff
going on in shops.” MacLaren testified that Gentz told him that
he knew his name was on the list, but he was “kind of on the
fence about this.” Neither witness denied the other’s testimony.
Based on witness demeanor and context, I find that the testi-
mony of both is credible as to those parts of the conversation
they remembered and testified to. Thus, I find that the com-
ments testified to by both were made during the conversation.
About February 19, 2007, Gentz stopped his hi-lo to help
troubleshoot a slippage problem that a press operator was hav-
ing.34 The operator told Gentz he was having a problem with
the press feeder system. Gentz walked to the back of the press
to observe and “grabbed my bag of potato chips to go along
with me.” Supervisor Deering noticed Gentz standing by the
press eating the chips. Deering approached Gentz and told him
that the 404 press, which had been down, was now running and
Gentz should be over there checking parts. Gentz replied that
he didn’t hear anybody call for him, and that the press had been
down for 1-1/2 days.35 Gentz had been at the press for about 15
minutes when approached by Deering.

33 Gentz testified that he learned of the union attempt from Balczak,
about 6 months before he was discharged on March 27, 2007. Gentz
did not specify in his testimony when his asserted conversations about
the Union with other employees took place.
34 Part of his duties in the cell concept.
35 While Deering testified that he did not say anything to Gentz at
the time, the disciplinary action memo states that, in fact, Deering at the
time of the incident, asked Gentz “to get involved.” Gentz, who I find
to be a reliable witness based on his testimonial demeanor and quality
A day or 2 later, Deering called Gentz into the supervisor’s
office and handed Gentz a disciplinary action memo dated Feb-
ruary 21, containing a level I oral reprimand/warning. The
disciplinary warning, written in the first person, is signed by
Deering. The comment section asserts that Deering “had nu-
merous complaints of you not performing all duties of your
job,” and that “[o]n Monday 2/19/07 I witnessed you eat-
ing/idling behind the 301M while the 404M was down, at
which time I verbally asked you to get involved.”
Deering read the discipline notice to Gentz in its entirety.
Gentz told Deering that he was monitoring the feed on the
press. Deering responded that “may be possible . . . but there
are still other incidents that we want to correct, and that’s why
we’re going forth with this document.” Gentz refused to sign
the warning, telling Deering that he didn’t believe it (that other
employees had complained about him). Gentz left the office
and as he was walking away said in a loud voice towards Deer-
ing and MacLaren “and you wonder why people want a union.”
Deering and MacLaren were about 25 feet away from Gentz
when he made the comment.36 Deering did not respond.
As to the asserted numerous complaints, Deering testified he
had received complaints from the operator of the 1000-ton
press and the operator of the 1001-ton press. When asked on
direct examination for the names of those operators, Deering
testified, “Probably maybe a Jim Erhorn, Jose Casera.” Such
hedging in answer to the question of the Respondent’s counsel,
together with the absence of any other evidence in support of
such complaints, lends doubt to whether there were, in fact, any
such complaints.
Gentz, March 27, 2007 Discharge
Jose Calderon, employed by the Respondent at Three Mile,
operates a 400 Minster press. For a time on Tuesday, March
23, 2007, he assisted press operator Juhar Birhanu at Birhanu’s
300 Minster press. Gentz was operating his hi-lo in the area of
the 300 Minster, driving down the aisle. As Calderon com-
pleted assisting Birhanu he backed into the aisle,37 to return to
his press. Birhanu grabbed Calderon’s shoulder and told
Calderon to “be careful.” As Calderon looked up, he saw
Gentz on his hi-lo, about a foot or 2 away.38 Gentz had not

of recollection, gave sufficient detail as to the conversation with Deer-
ing to make it likely that it occurred, and I so conclude.
36 Gentz, Balczak, and employee Michael Segers all testified simi-
larly, but not identically, as to Gentz’ comment. Segers’ is the most
detailed testimony both as to the comment and as to the location of
Gentz and Deering when the comment was made. As Segers was an
impressive witness, based on his testimonial demeanor, strength of
recollections, and the noncombative manner of his testimony, I chose to
credit his version. However, Deering denied hearing the asserted
comment made by Gentz. As Segers’ credited testimony indicates that
Deering was about 25 feet away from Gentz when he made the com-
ment in a somewhat noisy plant, I cannot conclude that Deering, in fact,
heard Gentz.
37 Hirdes testified that Calderon told him he was “backing up,” when
Calderon described the incident to Hirdes during the Respondent’s
investigation.
38 Calderon and Gentz both testified as to this incident. While their
testimony differs in some aspects, it is similar in most. Where the
testimony differs, I credit Calderon, who impressed me with his testi-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1106
sounded the hi-lo horn, and Calderon could not hear the ap-
proach of the hi-lo because of the plant noise level.
Gentz stopped the hi-lo and dropped its forks on the floor,
making a loud noise. Calderon didn’t hear the forks drop, but
was startled by the presence of the hi-lo. Calderon, upset be-
cause he believed Gentz was not operating the hi-lo in a safe
manner, walked closer to Gentz and asked in a raised voice,
“Glenn, please next time can you play the horn?” Gentz re-
sponded in a raised voice that it was not a “corner”39 and
Calderon should watch where he was walking. Calderon then
walked past Gentz, still on his hi-lo, on his way to the restroom.
Calderon credibly testified that as he was walking to the rest-
room he was still upset with Gentz and with Gentz’ verbal re-
sponse. Calderon turned, walked back to Gentz, stopped 1 to 2
feet away, and said to Gentz, “I’m going to ask you one more
time, can you please play the horn next time. I don’t have eyes
in the back of my head.”
As Calderon spoke, Gentz, still on the hi-lo, grabbed the col-
lar of Calderon’s shirt with two fingers40 and pulled Gentz a
little closer, about 6 inches away. Then Gentz repeated that it
was not a corner, and let go of Calderon. Calderon testified
that Gentz’ voice was “low, but very strong.” Calderon then
walked away. During the entire incident, Gentz remained on
the hi-lo, and did not poke or push Calderon, or make threats to
him.41
Neither Calderon nor Gentz reported the incident to man-
agement, but Calderon did mention it to fellow employee Al-
berto Davila, who told MacLaren during lunchbreak that there
was an incident with Calderon and Gentz, and that Calderon
almost got hit by a hi-lo. MacLaren immediately asked HR
Representative Hirdes to investigate the incident.
At about this time, Calderon’s supervisor, Sherri Gray, asked
Calderon about the incident. Calderon told Gray his version of
what happened. According to Calderon, Gray then went inside
her office to speak to somebody else. Gray then told Calderon
to go back to work.
Hirdes testified that after MacLaren told him to investigate
the incident, he called Calderon into his office, and just the two
of them met. Calderon testified that MacLaren was also present
and that the meeting took place in MacLaren’s office.42 Hirdes
describes his investigatory interview as being just between
himself and Calderon. MacLaren testified that he was not pre-

monial demeanor, and willingness to answer the questions of all coun-
sel in a noncombative manner. Further, unlike Gentz, he has no direct
stake in the outcome of the litigation.
39 Right angle “corner” where aisles meet.
40 Gentz testified that he grabbed Calderon’s shirt sleeve. Calderon
testified it was his shirt collar. I chose to credit Calderon for the rea-
sons set forth above, but note that the interchange was quick and it’s
not unusual that two people testifying about the same incident remem-
ber it slightly differently.
41 Calderon’s testimony. Calderon testified that while Gentz issued
no threats to him, he believed Gentz threatened him by the tone of his
voice.
42 From the testimony of MacLaren and Hirdes, it appears that the
first time he was called by management about the Gentz incident, he
met only Hirdes, and the second time he met with Hirdes and
MacLaren.
sent during the interview. Calderon testified that not only was
MacLaren present, but he began the interview by telling
Calderon that something happened this morning, and asking
what had happened. Calderon repeated his version of what
happened. After Calderon was excused to go back to work,
Hirdes typed a statement based on Calderon’s version, for him
to sign, which Calderon did the following day.
About 15 minutes later, Hirdes spoke with Juhar Birhanu, the
press operator whom Calderon had been helping just before the
incident with Gentz. Hirdes asked what happened, took notes,
typed out a statement based on the notes, asked Birhanu to read
and sign the statement, and Birhanu signed the statement. In
sum, the statement that Birhanu signed for Hirdes states as
follows in respect to the incident: that Calderon backed up and
Birhanu yelled “hi-lo”; that Calderon told Gentz to “Honk your
horn by the press”; that Gentz replied to Calderon, “[Y]ou
watch where you are going”; that “a little later” Birhanu saw
Calderon walk up to Gentz (who was on the hi-lo); that Gentz
“grabbed Jose by the shirt and say something about not honking
the horn by the press and you better watch it.”
After interviewing Calderon and Birhanu, and before speak-
ing to Gentz, Hirdes told MacLaren that the situation was
“pretty serious,”43 and that Calderon claimed he was almost hit
by a hi-lo driven by Gentz, that Calderon felt threatened and
that there was a witness who saw the whole thing. At
MacLaren’s instructions, Calderon, and then Birhanu, individu-
ally, were brought to MacLaren’s office to repeat their stories
to MacLaren and Hirdes.
After the Respondent’s supervisors had solicited Calderon’s
version of the incident three times and Birhanu’s twice,
MacLaren and Hirdes decided to interview Gentz. Either later
in the afternoon after the interviews with Calderon and Bir-
hanu, or the next morning, Gentz was called into a supervisor’s
office and met with MacLaren and Hirdes.44 Hirdes and
MacLaren questioned Gentz, and Hirdes took notes. Gentz was
asked if he knew what the meeting was about, and responded
by asking, “[A] hi-lo incident?” Hirdes told Gentz that he’d be
writing down what Gentz said and in fact, later, after the meet-
ing produced a written statement, based on the interview, which
Gentz signed.
Hirdes asked Gentz what happened by the 300 Minster press.
Gentz said45 that he was slowly driving his hi-lo down the aisle
by the 300 Minster press, that Calderon stepped out in front of
the hi-lo, that Gentz had stopped his hi-lo and let the forks drop
on the ground and make a clanking noise so that Calderon
would know he was there, that Calderon turned to Gentz and
yelled, “[Y]ou honk your horn,” that Gentz yelled back, “[Y]ou
look where you’re going,” that the hi-lo was about 2 to 3 feet

43 MacLaren’s testimony.
44 Hirdes and MacLaren testified that MacLaren was present. Gentz
testified that the meeting was with only Hirdes, but also said, “[I]t
might have been just Brian.” While I generally credit Gentz, here, in
view of Gentz’ expressed uncertainty, the testimony of Hirdes and
MacLaren is more reliable.
45 MacLaren testified that he asked the question, and that Gentz ini-
tially answered that “nothing” had happened. Neither Hirdes nor Gentz
testified that Gentz so answered. I do not credit MacLaren as to this.
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1107
from Calderon, that Gentz did not speak to Calderon after the
incident, and that Birhanu witnessed the incident.46
While Hirdes testified that he asked Gentz whether he re-
membered anything else and that Gentz answered that he did
not, and MacLaren testified that he asked Gentz twice to tell
him everything that happened with Calderon and Gentz told
him that nothing else happened, the statement that Hirdes pre-
pared for Gentz based on Hirdes notes of the interview, and
detailed in other respects, does not contain such a declarative
response by Gentz. In other words, it would have been easy
and natural for Hirdes to put a sentence in the statement he
prepared for Gentz to the effect that the statement contains
everything that Gentz knew about the incident, but he did not.
Based on such, I decline to find that Hirdes or MacLaren asked
whether Gentz remembered anything else or that Gentz an-
swered that he did not.47 In any case, Gentz was not asked, and
did not volunteer, whether he touched Calderon during the
incident. However, MacLaren did specifically ask Gentz if any
words were exchanged between himself and Calderon.48
After interviewing Gentz, MacLaren and Hirdes discussed
the findings of the investigation. MacLaren testified, “I sit
down behind closed doors with Brian Hirdes, and based on
what Jose [Calderon] had told me, the witness of Juhar [Bir-
hanu], I am enforcing the policies that Ridgeview has, and be-
cause an employee of mine was physically either intimidated or
threatened, I called [Human Resources Manager] Terri Yeo-
mans and made a recommendation that Mr. Gentz be termi-
nated.” MacLaren also testified that before making the recom-
mendation he did not review Gentz’ personnel file, was not
aware of any other discipline against Gentz for violence or
threats, did not consider any lesser form of discipline, and that
other than the incident with Calderon, Gentz was a satisfactory
employee.
Hirdes also participated in the call to Yeomans and also rec-
ommended that Gentz be discharged. Hirdes testified, “I told
Terri [Yeomans] that we had an eyewitness account of Glenn
grabbing Jose Calderon by the shirt. I said that Juhar saw him
grab him. And I said that Glenn [Gentz] did not admit to grab-
bing him.” Hirdes testified that he further told Yeomans that
“given that there was physical contact and threatening behavior
on the floor in front of other employees, I recommend that we
terminate him based on that, what I found out in the facts.”
Yeomans responded to the recommendations of MacLaren and
Hirdes by telling them that because Gentz is a “very long term

46 Gentz, Hirdes, and MacLaren all offered slightly different versions
of the interview. I, essentially, chose to credit the version contained in
the statement signed by Gentz and prepared by Hirdes based on his
interview notes. The statement was prepared and signed close in time
to the interview, and based on the testimony of both Hirdes and Gentz it
appears both credible and largely consistent with the recollections of
the participants.
47 Even if I had found to the contrary, it would not have changed the
conclusions herein.
48 Testimony of MacLaren in response to question of the Respon-
dent’s counsel:
Q. And did you happen to ask him if any words were ex-
changed between himself and Mr. Calderon?
A. Yes, I did.
employee at Ridgeview” she didn’t want to go forward with
anything until she could discuss the situation with the Respon-
dent’s owner, Nykamp, and he either “blessed it or didn’t.”49
Nykamp was out of the office, and not scheduled to return until
the following Monday or Tuesday. HR Manager Yeomans
testified that she did not remember Gentz having any prior
disciplinary issues for arguing with or threatening other em-
ployees, or any other disciplinary issues for personal involve-
ment with another employee.
On Tuesday, March 27, after Yeomans consulted with
Nykamp, Gentz was called into a meeting with Yeomans and
MacLaren. MacLaren told Gentz that “based on the thorough
investigation with the incident between you and Jose Calderon
and we have a witness, physical intimidation or threatening is
not allowed in this plant, therefore we need to part ways.”
Gentz asked what “part ways” meant. MacLaren responded
that it meant that the Respondent was terminating his employ-
ment effective that day. Gentz asked if Nykamp knew about
the discharge, and then said that his wife was sick and son be-
ing sent to Iraq. MacLaren responded that they were still dis-
charging him.
MacLaren told Gentz that Calderon claimed that Gentz
grabbed his shirt and pulled him forward. Gentz said that he
did, in fact, grab Calderon’s shirt. MacLaren asked why Gentz
hadn’t told him that when Gentz spoke earlier with Hirdes and
MacLaren. Gentz said he didn’t think it was a “big deal.”
MacLaren responded that it was a “huge deal.” Gentz asked if
he could show MacLaren what he did, and MacLaren agreed.
Gentz then grabbed the collar of MacLaren’s T-shirt with two
fingers and lightly pulled it. Gentz said that he knew that was
wrong, so he took his hands off Calderon immediately.
MacLaren did not change the discharge decision, and Hirdes
escorted Gentz off the Respondent’s property. Yeomans testi-
fied that an additional reason for discharging Gentz was be-
cause he lied during the investigation, referring to the fact that
Gentz did not mention touching Calderon to Hirdes, during the
Respondent’s investigation of the incident.
Smith, Movement in Plant
David Smith was initially employed by the Respondent in
July 1997, left the employment in October 1999, and was again
employed by the Respondent from July 2000 until his voluntary
departure on February 19, 2008. Smith worked at Three Mile
as a shipping and receiving clerk, operating a hi-lo, until he
transferred to the Northridge facility in August 2007, where he
was employed as a secondary operator. His organizational
activities on behalf of the Union are detailed above. Nykamp
testified he was personally aware of Smith’s union activities by
January 2007.
In mid-January 2007, Smith was driving his hi-lo in the
Three Mile plant, and noticed press operator Glen Ockert
standing by his press, with the press not operating. Smith asked
if the press was broken. Ockert responded that his supervisor
told him to take a break because he was operating the job him-
self. They chatted for less than a minute when supervisor
Sherri Gray walked up to them and asked whether Ockert’s

49 MacLaren’s testimony.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1108
press should be running. Ockert responded, “No,” and Gray
walked away. At that, Smith left, telling Ockert that Gray
looked “kind of mad,” and he better leave.
When Smith reported to work the next day, Smith’s supervi-
sor, Fred Thomas, called him into his office and told Smith that
he was going to tell everybody at the daily meeting, but he was
going to tell Smith first, that “[y]ou need to stay in your own
department.” Thomas did not further explain his directive.
Later that day, at the departmental daily meeting, Thomas told
the assembled workers, “I told Dave already and I’m going to
tell the rest of you, you need to stay in your own department.”50
The Respondent had no such previous policy restricting em-
ployee movement in the plant.51
About a week later, Smith was assigned for 2 days to work at
Northridge to replace an absent shipping and receiving em-
ployee. Returning from the 20-minute daily break,52 Smith
engaged in a brief discussion, lasting seconds, with fellow em-
ployee Mary Barr, as they were walking across the plant. As
they were walking, Plant Manager VanderLaan waived Barr to
come to him. Barr walked over to VanderLaan and Smith re-
turned to work.
About 20 minutes later, Smith was approached by the Re-
spondent’s vice president, Doug Dykstra, and the Respondent’s
shipping department manager, Jim Bagley. Dykstra said to
Smith that someone told him that Smith was walking up and
down the plant’s aisles talking to people. Smith denied that
was true, that he went to lunch with everyone else, that he came
back from lunch with everyone else, and that he went immedi-
ately back to work. Dykstra repeated that someone said Smith
was walking up and down the aisles talking to people. Smith
again told Dykstra this wasn’t true. Dykstra replied that some-
one’s lying, and he would probably be back to see Smith, and
then left.
The following morning, Supervisor Thomas53 called Smith
into his office and told him that he had told him at Three Mile
that he needed to stay in his own department, and he needed to
tell him to stay in his own department here at Northridge also.
Smith, January 4, 2008 Job Jeopardy Agreement
and Threat to Discharge
Shortly after Smith’s transfer to Northridge in August 2007,
he continued talking about the Union with fellow employees,
and also initiated a discussion about the Union with the North-
ridge plant manager, Ron VanderLaan, in VanderLaan’s office.
Smith told VanderLaan that there were issues with how em-
ployees were being treated by the Respondent, that employees
had made attempts to resolve the issues to no avail, and he
wanted VanderLaan to know that “we will continue our union
organizing efforts.” Smith pointed out the attendance program
as a particular problem area. VanderLaan asked Smith if he
would be willing to meet with the Respondent’s owner,
Nykamp, to discuss shipping department issues. Smith agreed,

50 Smith’s testimony. Thomas did not testify.
51 Testimony of Smith and Gentz.
52 Respondent’s employees received one break a day, 20 minutes,
that was utilized as a lunchbreak.
53 Thomas supervises the shipping departments of both plants, on all
shifts.
with the caveat that he could bring with him a Three Mile ship-
ping department employee who is familiar with shipping issues.
Within a week, in late August or early September 2007, the
meeting took place with Smith, Nykamp, VanderLaan, and
Three Mile shipping department employee Jeff Westfall. Smith
and Westfall complained about Shipping Department Supervi-
sor Fred Thomas. Smith also complained about the attendance
point system, shift hours, that disciplinary writeups received by
employees Glen Ockert and Tammy Weerstra were unfair, and
that employees who came to talk to Nykamp were fired.
Nykamp said he would look into the writeups, that he wasn’t
aware of them, and that it wasn’t true that he fired people who
came to see him.54 The meeting lasted about 45 minutes.
Nykamp testified that at the time of the meeting he was aware
that Smith was preparing a letter or newsletter about union
issues that stated that if employees came to talk to Nykamp
they would be fired. Nykamp testified that he was aware of the
letter because Smith had given a copy of it to VanderLaan and
Smith’s name was on it.55
About a week later, Nykamp stopped by Smith’s machine
and said he wanted to follow up their meeting, that he wanted
Smith to know that he didn’t find either of the writeups in per-
sonnel files, but he was on his way to Three Mile to talk to
“them.” Smith said he didn’t understand why Ockert and
Weerstra would lie about receiving the writeups, “but if they’re
not there, they’re not there.” Nykamp said the was going to
talk to “them” that day. The next day, Balczak told Smith that
he had seen Nykamp on the Three Mile shop floor, but that he
was told by Weerstra and Ockert that Nykamp hadn’t spoken to
them.
In late December 2007, Smith approached VanderLaan on
the shop floor and told him that he owed him an apology, that
he had been avoiding VanderLaan, but his frustrations were
with Nykamp, not VanderLaan. VanderLaan asked why Smith
was frustrated. Smith replied that it was because Nykamp was
a two-faced liar. VanderLaan asked why Smith thought that.
Smith responded that Nykamp was supposed to investigate the
disciplinary actions involving Weerstra and Ockert and he
never did, and that he didn’t believe anything Nykamp says.
VanderLaan asked what made Smith think that Nykamp hadn’t
spoken to them. Smith replied that he had looked into the situa-
tions personally and Nykamp never talked to them.56

54 Smith, Nykamp, and VanderLaan all testified about this meeting.
Smith’s testimonial demeanor, including his responsiveness to ques-
tions of all counsel, was impressive. There is no allegation involving
his quitting the Respondent’s employ, so his possible financial benefit
as a result of the litigation is minimal. Much of the testimony as to this
meeting is not in direct conflict and my findings relied on the testimony
of all three. However, because of the greater level of detail in some of
Smith’s testimony and his testimonial demeanor, I credited such in
areas of conflict or where detail was lacking in other testimony.
55 Nykamp testified about Smith’s letter. He testified that he didn’t
know whether he would call it a union newsletter, but it was about
union issues.
56 Findings based on VanderLaan’s testimony. VanderLaan and
Smith are both generally credible witnesses based on their testimonial
demeanor, strength of recollections, and willingness to answer ques-
tions of all counsel. Here, their versions of the conversation are not in
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1109
VanderLaan reported the conversation to Nykamp, and
Nykamp and VanderLaan decided to have a meeting with
Smith.57 Nykamp testified that he decided to have a meeting
with Smith to “understand why he was saying I was lying to
him and why he’s telling people that.” On Thursday, January
3, 2008, VanderLaan asked Smith into his office, where the two
of them engaged in small talk for a few minutes. A few min-
utes later, Nykamp also entered the office.
Nykamp said, “I heard you called me a liar. Is that what
you’re telling people?” Smith responded, “No, not yet. But
you did lie to me. You told me you were going to talk to these
people, you were there, you never talked to them, you lied to
me.” Nykamp replied that the writeups were not in their files.
Smith testified that he told Smith that he had just read Ockert’s
writeup, even though in reality he had never seen such a
writeup. Nykamp then leaned across the round table they were
all seated at and said to Smith in a raised voice, “Then show it
to me.” Nykamp told Smith that if he wasn’t happy there, why
didn’t he leave.58 At some point during the meeting, Smith
talked about why the employees needed a union, and accused
Nykamp of treating union supporters differently from other
employees.59
At the end of the meeting, Smith said that the conversation
was “going nowhere,” and he headed towards the door to leave.
As Smith was leaving, Nykamp said to Smith, “[I]t sounds like
you’re not happy here, and you need to make a decision. Either
stay here and be unhappy, or go someplace and be happy.”60
Smith responded, “I am quitting; I’m working on my exit strat-
egy right now.” Smith then left the office.61
During the meeting, Smith’s voice was louder than
Nykamp’s testimonial voice, but Smith was not “screaming,”
nor did he make threats, use profanity, or say anything about

great conflict, but VanderLaan’s testimony is much more detailed and
reflective of a better memory of the conversation.
57 VanderLaan testified that the idea for a meeting with Smith was
his, and that he invited Nykamp to attend.
58 On cross-examination, Nykamp denied that he asked Smith why
he didn’t quit. He testified that he told Smith that if he wasn’t happy,
maybe he should be doing something else. Regardless, the words have
the same or similar meaning. Either it was a rhetorical or sarcastic
question, or a suggestion.
59 VanderLaan initially testified that Smith accused Nykamp of
treating union supporters differently. Later, VanderLaan clarified his
testimony to indicate that while Smith didn’t use the terms “union
supporters” or “organizing,” he did talk about what the union organiz-
ers were trying to accomplish and then stated that “they” weren’t being
treated fairly by the Respondent. From VanderLaan’s testimony, it’s
clear that Smith was referring to union supporters, and was so under-
stood. VanderLaan testified, “He was definitely—I think he was refer-
ring to the union.”
60 VanderLaan’s testimony.
61 Smith, Nykamp, and VanderLaan all testified as to this discussion.
The three versions agreed to much of what occurred, but none of the
versions included everything testified to by the other two witnesses.
VanderLaan testified that Smith talked about things which VanderLaan
couldn’t remember at the time of his testimony. My findings are based
on the testimony of all three. Certain findings are based on the testi-
mony of Smith, not directly contradicted by Nykamp or VanderLaan,
and/or my conclusion that, based on my assessment of testimonial
demeanor and logical context, Smith is a generally credible witness.
hurting anybody or hurting himself.62 Nykamp also testified
that his own voice was “louder” during the meeting. Vander-
Laan testified that at times during the meeting Smith appeared
nervous, his hands were shaking, his face red, and pupils di-
lated. When asked about Smith’s gestures during the meeting,
VanderLaan testified that he thought they showed frustration,
and were not threatening.
Following the meeting, Smith returned to work for about 5
minutes, and then, upset over the meeting, decided to leave
work for the rest of the day. He received permission from his
supervisor, and left. Smith returned to work on Monday, Janu-
ary 7.
Also after the meeting, VanderLaan and Nykamp met with
Yeomans and discussed their perceptions of the meeting. Van-
derLaan told Yeomans about his observations of Smith’s nerv-
ousness and agitation, and that his biggest concern was Smith’s
comment about an “exit strategy,” that he was concerned about
what this meant. Nykamp told Yeomans that he was also con-
cerned about the “exit strategy” comment, and wondered what
was meant by “exit strategy” and whether it could be a refer-
ence to workplace violence.63 Yeomans suggested they put
Smith on a job jeopardy agreement (JJA) that would require
him to attend counseling so there could be an assessment as to
whether there was a threat. Nykamp and VanderLaan agreed.
Prior to recommending the JJA and after learning of the “exit
strategy” comment, Yeomans did not review Smith’s personnel
file or attempt to further investigate the incident by, for exam-
ple, taking a statement from Smith. Yeomans testified that no
employee had reported to her that they were frightened by
Smith, and Smith’s supervisor had not reported any threats by
Smith to others. The Respondent made no effort at the time, or
subsequently, to ascertain from Smith what he meant by his exit
strategy comment.64
When Smith returned to work on January 7, he was called
into a meeting in a conference room, with VanderLaan and
Yeomans. At his request, Smith was allowed to bring fellow
employee Ray Trujillo with him. Yeomans read the JJA to
Smith and asked him to sign. Smith signed and added the
words “signed under threat of termination.” Yeomans told
Smith that to avoid discharge he didn’t need to sign the docu-
ment, but simply live up to its terms in respect to seeing a
counselor at Morningstar Health, and following any recom-
mendations they make.
The JJA required Smith to attend a counseling session at
Morningstar Health, to comply with any recommendations
made by Morningstar Health, and to only return to work on
January 8, if Morningstar Health agreed that he was ready to
return. The JJA also provided for discharge if the Respondent

62 Nykamp’s testimony.
63 Yeomans testified that VanderLaan said that Smith was “speaking
in tongues,” and “babbling.” VanderLaan’s testimony does not support
this. VanderLaan testified that Smith was “chattering,” but testified
that the “chattering” was as to comments Nykamp made at the Respon-
dent’s quarterly meeting. Nothing in VanderLaan’s testimony supports
the idea that Smith was speaking in tongues or “chattering about vari-
ous random and seemingly disconnected topics,” as the Respondent
asserts in its counsel’s brief.
64 Yeomans’ testimony.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1110
determined that Smith failed to meet and maintain the require-
ments of the agreement. Finally, the JJA provided that the
Respondent would pay for up to five sessions at Morningstar
Health, but that Smith would be responsible “for all other costs
of treatment, if deemed necessary.”
Smith complied with the JJA, attended a session at Morning-
star Health on January 7, was cleared to return to work, and
returned on January 8. Morningstar referred Smith to Pine Rest
Counseling for additional sessions. Smith attended at least two
sessions at Pine Rest, which were covered by his health insur-
ance except for a $54 copay the first time and $34 the second.
Smith fulfilled the terms of the JJA, and then voluntarily quit
his job with the Respondent in February.65
Analysis and Conclusions
Alleged Impression of Surveillance
Complaint paragraph 7 alleges that the Respondent’s news-
letter of January 24, 2007, created the impression of surveil-
lance, and violated Section 8(a)(1). I found that the Respon-
dent’s January 24, 2007 “Newsbreak” was distributed to em-
ployees, and contained a letter from Nykamp which, among
other things, stated, “I recently learned that several individuals
are encouraging others to consider a Union at RVI.”
“The test for determining whether an employer has created
an impression of surveillance is whether the employee would
reasonably assume from the statement that their union activities
had been placed under surveillance.” Flexsteel Industries, 311
NLRB 257 (1993). Employees should be free to engage in
union activities and express their sympathies without fearing
that management is “peering over their shoulders.” The stan-
dard is an objective one, based on the perspective of a reason-
able employee. Evidence of actual surveillance is not a neces-
sary ingredient to proving such a violation. Flexsteel, supra.
Here, the Respondent admits the facts asserted as a violation,
but, citing Bridgestone Firestone South Carolina, 350 NLRB
526 (2007), argues in its brief that Nykamp simply informed
employees in the newsletter what he had been told by numerous
employees, that is that some employees were engaged in union
activity and that such is not a violation. In fact, I found that a
number of employees had discussed the Union with Nykamp
prior to, or about the time, of the newsletter.
Bridgestone, however, is inanalogous in a crucial respect,
that is, that the employer therein specifically mentioned in its
missive that it learned about the union activity from informa-
tion provided to it by employees and thanked employees for
providing the information. Here, Nykamp’s letter to employees
simply informs them that he has learned “that several individu-
als are encouraging others to consider a union . . .,” and men-
tions nothing about the source of such information, leaving to
employees to speculate as to how the Respondent obtained the
information. Indeed, in Bridgestone, supra at 527, the Board
specifically held that “merely informing employees that their
coworkers have volunteered information about ongoing union
activities does not create an impression of surveillance, particu-

65 There are no complaint allegations as to Smith’s leaving employ-
ment with the Respondent.
larly in the absence of evidence that management solicited that
information.”
Here, as the Respondent informed employees it had learned
of the union activities of certain individuals, but did not inform
employees of a legitimate source for the information, it left it to
their speculation and, thus, employees could reasonably assume
their union activities were under surveillance. See Park N Fly,
Inc., 349 NLRB 132, 133 (2007). Under these circumstances, I
conclude that the circulation of Nykamp’s letter with the news-
letter violated Section 8(a)(1), as alleged in the complaint.
Employee Movement in the Plant
Complaint paragraph 8 pleads that on January 16, 2007, at
Three Mile, and on January 24, 2007, at Northridge, the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by imposing restrictions on
employee movement in the plants, in response to union activi-
ties. I found that on three occasions on two dates in January
2007, supervisors instructed specifically Smith, and other ship-
ping department employees, to remain in their department dur-
ing the workday, and that this policy did not exist prior to those
occasions. As found above, by that time the Respondent was
aware of the union organizational activity, and Smith was pub-
licly acknowledging his participation by wearing union insignia
at work.
Here, the Respondent’s institution of a new policy limiting
the movement of shipping department employees following the
inception of union organizational activities interferes with,
coerces, and restrains employees in their exercise of Section 7
rights, as alleged in the complaint. See FiveCap, Inc., 332
NLRB 943 (2000). Although not alleged in the complaint as an
8(a)(3) violation, and not discussed in the General Counsel’s
brief in the context of such a violation, I have also considered
whether, under a Wright Line analysis, the Respondent’s ac-
tions in specifically limiting Smith’s movement additionally
violated Section 8(a)(3), and conclude that it does.66
Thus, I found that Smith was active in union organizing, that
the Respondent was aware of Smith’s union activity and, based
on the findings of other violations herein and the public com-
ments of Nykamp to employees, the Respondent displayed and
maintained animus towards the Union and the union activities
of its employees. The Respondent has presented no evidence
that it would have instituted movement restrictions on Smith,
notwithstanding the union activities. Accordingly, I find that
the Respondent’s actions on two dates in January 2007, about
January 16 and 24,67 specifically restricting the movements of
Smith at both Three Mile and at Northridge, violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act. Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 324 NLRB 72
fn. 2 (1997).

66 The factual issue was fully litigated at trial. Under these circum-
stances, there is no prejudice to the Respondent in also considering
whether the same actions also violated Sec. 8(a)(3). The Respondent
did not address the complaint allegation as pled, in its brief.
67 These dates are pled in the complaint. Smith’s testimony doesn’t
establish exact dates for the movement restrictions, other than the first
occurred in mid-January 2007, and the second about a week later.
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1111
Restricting Employee Bulletin Board Use
Complaint paragraph 10 alleges that about February 2, 2007,
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by promulgating a new
rule prohibiting employee usage of employee bulletin boards
for posting arguments as to the Union, and removed such post-
ings from the bulletin board.
I found that in late January/early February 2007, a prounion
and, then, an antiunion letter were posted on a Three Mile em-
ployee bulletin board, and that shortly thereafter, on February
2, the Respondent removed the letters from the bulletin board
and replaced them with a memo announcing a new policy as to
employee posting on the board. The new policy, set forth in the
memo, specifically disallowed posting of “union/nonunion
arguments,” stated that adversarial material from either view-
point would be removed, and required the prior approval of
management. Previously, the Respondent had allowed employ-
ees to post materials of their choice on the employee bulletin
boards and did not require permission to do such.
The Respondent, in its brief, citing Register-Guard, 351
NLRB 1110 (2007), argues that it did not violate the Act as
alleged in that the Respondent’s new bulletin board restrictions
were narrowly tailored to deal with its perception that the
prounion and antiunion posted letters had become disparaging
and personal, and that the restrictions applied equally to proun-
ion and antiunion postings. The General Counsel, citing Fix-
tures Mfg. Corp., 332 NLRB 565 (2000), maintains that inas-
much as the new restrictions allowed postings as to virtually
any other subject matter, their prohibition of postings as to
union arguments violated the Section 7 rights of employees.
On this issue, the General Counsel did not weigh in on the im-
port of Register-Guard.
The Board, in Register-Guard, supra, a case factually dealing
with employee use of an employer’s email system for Section 7
purposes and where the employer had instituted a rule that the
email system was not to be used to solicit or proselytize for
commercial ventures, religious or political causes, outside or-
ganizations, or other nonjob-related solicitations, adopted the
rationale set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Fleming Co., 349
F.3d 968, 975 (2003), and held that the rule did not violate the
Act, unless it was discriminatorily applied. The Board ruled,
apropos of the instant case, “we find no basis in this case to
refrain from applying the settled principle that, absent discrimi-
nation, employees have no statutory right to use an employer’s
equipment or media for Section 7 communications.” The
Board dismissed the 8(a)(1) allegation as follows: “As the
[rule] on its face does not discriminate against Section 7 activ-
ity, we find that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1)
by maintaining the [rule].” Extrapolating to the instant case,
the question remaining is whether the Respondent’s rule, ban-
ning all argument as to the Union, prounion, and antiunion, is
discriminatory on its face.
In applying the Board’s holdings and reasoning in Register-
Guard, I conclude that, in fact, the Respondent’s imposed bul-
letin board restriction violates Section 8(a)(1) because it is dis-
criminatory on its face. In Register-Guard, the Board set forth
this guideline for analysis of the legality of such rules: “. . . in
order to be unlawful, discrimination must be along Section 7
lines. In other words, unlawful discrimination consists of dispa-
rate treatment of activities or communications of a similar char-
acter because of their union or other Section 7 protected status.”
Section 7 protects employee activities in support of a union,
but also includes the right to refrain from such activity. See
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 335 NLRB 1066 (2001).
Employees have a Section 7 right to support or oppose the ad-
vent of a union, if they so wish. The Respondent’s rule, here,
precludes both, at least in respect to bulletin board postings.
While the Respondent maintains in its brief, that it promulgated
the new rule simply to stop postings which contained personal
attacks and disparagement, it didn’t preclude such posts in the
rule, or limit the rule to any postings which contained such
matter, or even mention such matter in the rule, but explicitly
directed the rule to postings containing “arguments” in favor or
opposed to the Union.68 By its language, the rule does not ex-
plicitly ban postings which contain personal disparagement, but
simply bans posts containing arguments for against unions. As
such, the rule treats Section 7 protected posts differently from
any other, and is inherently disparate.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent’s imposition of
the new bulletin board restrictions at both plants violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), as does the Respondent’s removal of such postings
pursuant to the rule, as alleged in the complaint. As the Board
said in Fixtures Mfg. Corp., supra at fn. 3, a case cited by the
General Counsel, “The fact that prounion and antiunion materi-
als were banned does not warrant a contrary result. The impor-
tant fact is that Sec. 7 material [pro and con] was banned, and
other material was permitted.”
Rules in Employee Conduct Manual as Violations
Complaint paragraph 11(a) alleges that the Respondent’s
rule, contained in its employee manual, that prohibits employ-
ees form “engaging in behavior designed to create discord or
lack of harmony” violates Section 8(a)(1). I found that the
Respondent’s employee handbook in effect at all times material
herein and since at least October 2004, contained the following
as prohibited conduct: “Malicious gossip and/or spreading
rumors; engaging in behavior designed to create discord or lack
of harmony.” The complaint only alleges as a violation the
portion following the semicolon.
The General Counsel argues in its brief that the rule here is
overbroad, that given a reasonable reading the rule could be
interpreted to prohibit protected activity in that employee union
activity, pro and con, had arguably created “discord” at the
plant, and that it, thus, violates Section 8(a)(1). The General
Counsel’s brief analogizes the instant rule to the Board decision
in Southern Maryland Hospital, 293 NLRB 1209 (1989), where
the Board held that a rule prohibiting “derogatory attacks” to be
unlawfully overbroad. The Respondent maintains in its brief
that its rule does not interfere with Section 7 rights because its
“language is sufficiently vague and ambiguous that it is not
clear that any reasonable employee would understand that this
rule prohibits protected activity.”

68 Indeed, Yeomans testified that if it was so inclined, there were
other rules in its employee handbook that it could have enforced that
could be used to dealing with the posting of personal attacks on the
bulletin boards.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1112
The Board has held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1)
when it maintains a work rule that by reasonable interpretation
tends to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998). “If
the rule does not explicitly restrict activity protected by Section
7, the violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the fol-
lowing: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language
to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in
response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.” Lutheran Heritage
Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 647 (2004). Further, the
Board instructs that in determining the legality of the rule, it
must be given a reasonable reading, particular phrases should
not be read in isolation, and there should not be a presumption
of improper interference with employee rights. Lafayette Park
Hotel, supra at 825, 827.
The General Counsel does not, and could not, argue that the
rule explicitly restricts Section 7 activity. Absent such explic-
itness, I next examine the circumstances, as instructed in Lu-
theran Heritage Village-Livonia, to determine whether there
was a showing of any of the three factors mentioned above. In
fact, the rule at issue was utilized as a partial basis to discipline
Balczak for his sarcastic remark to another employee vis-à-vis
Nykamp’s earlier antiunion argument. As found, that rule was
highlighted in disciplinary notices given to Balczak, and
MacLaren told Balczak that his rule violations were highlighted
(or circled). Balczak’s conversation or attempt at a conversa-
tion with a fellow employee was clearly protected in that
Balczak’s comments were directed at Nykamp’s earlier anti-
union propaganda. Thus, inasmuch as the rule has been applied
to restrict Section 7 rights, I conclude that it tends to chill the
exercise of Section 7 rights, and violates Section 8(a)(1).69
Complaint paragraph 11(b) alleges that the Respondent’s
rule prohibiting “unauthorized soliciting of funds or distributing
literature on company property” violates Section 8(a)(1). I
found that the Respondent’s employee handbook set forth the
following as prohibited conduct and prescribed discipline for
violation: “Unauthorized soliciting of funds or distributing
literature on company property.”
Counsel for the General Counsel, citing Our Way, Inc., 268
NLRB 394 (1983), argues, in her brief, that the Respondent’s
solicitation/distribution rule is facially overbroad and presump-
tively unlawful in that it prohibits employees from engaging in
solicitation during nonworking time and contains no language
“indicating to employees that they are free to distribute materi-
als or otherwise solicit while they are on breaks or on their own
time.” The Respondent mentions, but does not argue, this issue
in its brief. I found that the disputed rule was maintained and
enforced by the Respondent, and I specifically found that the
Respondent imposed discipline on Balczak, at least partially for
a violation of the rule.

69 But cf. Aerodex, Inc., 149 NLRB 192,199 (1964), where a dis-
charge was found to violate Sec. 8(a)(3) despite the employee’s viola-
tion of a rule that prohibited the creation of discord or lack of harmony.
While the discharge was found unlawful, there was no allegation and
no decision on the legality of the rule.
The governing principle here is that a rule is presumptively
invalid if it prohibits solicitation on the employees’ own time.
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). I agree
with counsel for the General Counsel’s argument that the Re-
spondent’s solicitation/distribution rule, which by its terms
prohibits any “unauthorized” solicitation or distribution on the
Respondent’s property without limitation as to time, is overly
broad in that the plain meaning of the rule would preclude such
protected Section 7 activity even during an employee’s non-
working time such as breaktime or before and after work. In-
asmuch as a reasonable interpretation of the rule tends to chill
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, I conclude
that said rule violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged.
Lafayette Park Hotel, supra.
Nykamp’s February 21, 2007 Letter to Employees
Complaint paragraph 12(a) alleges that Nykamp’s February
21 letter to employees solicited grievances and impliedly prom-
ised remedies, in response to union activity. I found that the
opening paragraph of Nykamp’s February 21 letter distributed
to employees contained the following: “I continue to strongly
believe that union representation will negatively impact our
communications, our efforts to resolve problems together, and
our ability to compete in a very challenging industry. I remain
open to talking about this issue with any individual or group. I
am eager to learn and understand the issues and to work toward
an acceptable resolution. Please be willing to call me directly
. . . and ask for an opportunity to meet.”
Counsel for the General Counsel’s brief does not argue
which specific words or sentences of Nykamp’s February 21
letter actually solicit grievances or imply a promise of remedy,
but only states as follows in respect to solicitation: “. . .
Nykamp communicated to the employees via the newsletter,
specifically soliciting employees to approach him about a par-
ticular topic—the union.” The Respondent’s brief argues, es-
sentially, that the Respondent has a past practice and that given
such, “no employee could construe this language as an explicit
or implicit promise to remedy solicited grievances.” It’s not
clear which specific part of the letter “this language” refers to.
The principles relevant to deciding the validity of solicitation
of grievances allegations are well established, and have been
summarized by the Board as follows: “Absent a previous prac-
tice of doing so . . . the solicitation of grievances during an
organizational campaign accompanied by a promise, expressed
or implied, to remedy such grievances violates the Act. [I]t is
the promise, expressed or implied, to remedy the grievances
that constitutes the essence of the violation. [T]he solicitation
of grievances in the midst of a union campaign inherently con-
stitutes an implied promise to remedy the grievances. Further-
more, the fact an employer’s representative does not make a
commitment to specifically take corrective action does not
abrogate the anticipation of improved conditions expectable for
the employees involved. [T]he inference that an employer is
going to remedy the same when it solicits grievances in a
preelection setting is a rebuttable one.” Laboratory Corp. of
America Holdings, 333 NLRB 284 (2001).
Further, an employer who has had a past practice and policy
of soliciting employee grievances may continue to do so during
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1113
an organizational campaign. See, e.g., Lasco Industries, 217
NLRB 527, 531 (1975). It is well established, however, that an
employer cannot rely on past practice to justify solicitation of
employee grievances if the employer significantly alters its past
manner and methods of solicitation during the union campaign.
House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 308 NLRB 568, citing
Carbonneau Industries, 228 NLRB 597, 598 (1977).
Here, counsel for the General Counsel, in her brief, concedes
that the Respondent has, prior to union activity, allowed “em-
ployees to bring workplace issues to its attention, through a
system called ‘Doughnuts with Dave,’ wherein employees have
breakfast with Nykamp and talk about work issues, and perhaps
through one on one meetings or conversations with Nykamp.”
Counsel for the General Counsel further argues, however, that
the newsletter is a different medium from the Donuts with Dave
meetings, and that the newsletter invited employees “to ap-
proach him about a particular topic—the union.”
The General Counsel’s argument is not persuasive, here. For
years the Respondent has regularly held the Donuts for Dave
meetings for the specific purpose of allowing interested em-
ployees to bring up whatever work related issues they wished,
including suggestions for the workplace. Nykamp listened to
the suggestions and gave responses. Nykamp’s missive in the
newsletter simply invited employees to continue to do the same
thing, albeit without donuts. Further, the wording of the “invi-
tation” in the newsletter is somewhat ambiguous. It says that
Nykamp “remains open to talking about this issue . . . .” But
the only issue mentioned earlier in the letter is the issue of un-
ion representation, not grievances as to workplace conditions.
Under these circumstances, I conclude that the somewhat
ambiguous invitation contained in Nykamp’s letter of February
21, essentially repeats a practice that the Respondent has en-
gaged in for years, that is to provide a method for employees to
periodically meet with Nykamp and bring up whatever work-
place concerns they wish to. It is well established that an em-
ployer with a past practice of soliciting employee grievances
through an open door or similar-type policy may continue such
a policy during a union’s organizational campaign. Wal-Mart
Stores, 340 NLRB 637, 640 (2003). That’s what Nykamp’s
invitation consisted of, and I conclude that such did not violate
Section 8(a)(1) as alleged.
Complaint paragraph 12(b) alleges that Nykamp, in the same
letter of February 21, “solicited employees to report to man-
agement the union activities of coworkers and threatened to
discipline employees engaged in those activities.” I found that
Nykamp’s letter contained the following: “If you don’t want to
sign a card, tell the person asking you that you have no interest
in signing a card. If you feel pressured, coerced or harassed to
sign a card, please report the issue. We enforce our policy
prohibiting harassment of any kind.”
Counsel for the General Counsel argues that the quoted pas-
sage violates Section 8(a)(1) in that it conveys to employees
that the Respondent “was interested only in finding out and
enforcing its harassment policy against employees . . . who
attempted to secure union authorization cards,” and that “an
employee could reasonably have believed that the Respondent
was interested in the identity of those employee who were pass-
ing out cards and not in uniformly addressing harassment.”
The Respondent maintains that the quoted passage encouraged
employees to report any unlawful harassment, and “no reason-
able employee would interpret Nykamp’s statement about re-
porting coercion or harassment to be a solicitation to report
union activities,” or “a threat to discipline employee engaging
in protected concerted activity.” The Respondent does not
argue that there were any specific occurrences of harassment or
coercion, prounion or antiunion, which led to the passage in
Nykamp’s letter.
The Board, in considering 8(a)(1) allegations involving an
employer’s appeal to employees to report instances of being
solicited to sign authorization cards, “has frequently found
unlawful employers’ statements that employees who harass or
pressure other employees in the course of union solicitations
should be reported to management, who will discipline the
offending individuals or otherwise take care of the problem.”
Tawas Industries, 336 NLRB 318, 322 (2001). Such state-
ments violate Section 8(a)(1) “because they have the potential
dual effect of encouraging employees to identify union sup-
porters based on the employees’ subjective view of harassment
and discouraging employees from engaging in protected activi-
ties” (footnoted citation omitted), id. But, when the appeal
explicitly only seeks reports of unprotected activity, there is no
violation. Champion Home Builders Co., 350 NLRB 788, 789
(2007).
In Champion, supra, the Board emphasized that in Tawas,
supra, where it found a violation, the employer’s missive fo-
cused on words like “coercion,” words that lent themselves to
subjective interpretation by employees, as opposed to less sub-
jective terms such as “interference with plant production,” or
threats of harm or job loss used by the employer in Champion,
where the Board found no violation. In dismissing the allega-
tion in Champion, the Board further relied on the employer’s
explicit affirmation in the message that it would respect the
right of employees to solicit and argue for the union.
Here, the Respondent asked employees to report if they “feel
pressured, coerced or harassed . . . .” These are words that lend
themselves to subjective interpretation akin to the words in
Tawas. Nykamp’s letter containing the words repeats his anti-
union views and is part of the Respondent’s campaign against
the Union. There is nothing in the letter akin to the explicit
affirmation of Section 7 rights in Champion. The words al-
leged as Section 8(a)(1), in the midst of a letter conveying
Nykamp’s opposition to the Union, would reasonably inter-
preted by employees to be a request to report union activities to
the Respondent. The Respondent distributed Nykamp’s letter
in direct response to union activity and there is no evidence that
any employee, prounion or otherwise, had engaged in such
coercion or harassment. See New Haven Register, 346 NLRB
1131 fn. 2 (2006). Under these circumstances, I conclude that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) as alleged in paragraph
12(b) of the complaint.
Ben Balczak
Complaint paragraph 14 alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) by imposing on Ben Balczak written repri-
mand/warnings on January 26 and March 22 and 27, 2007, by
imposing a level III written reprimand/warning and 3-day sus-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1114
pension on February 2, 2007, and by assigning Balczak to press
operator duties on February 8, 2007. Complaint paragraph 9
alleges that the January 26 reprimand/warning also independ-
ently violated Section 8(a)(1), as the discipline prohibited
Balczak “from discussing terms and conditions of employment
with another employee.”
I found that Balczak was active in the union organizing at-
tempt including initially talking about obtaining union repre-
sentation with fellow employee Dave Smith in October 2006,
meeting with a UAW organizer in December 2006 and subse-
quently speaking to other employees about the Union including
calling them at home, and wearing a union pin to work begin-
ning in late January or early February 2007. I further found
that Balczak’s name was included in the late January, early
February 2007 anonymous flyer posted in the plant naming
union activists, and that Nykamp, VanderLaan, and other su-
pervisors learned that Balczak was a union organizing activist.
While the record does not establish an exact date on, or by,
which Nykamp or other managers learned of Balczak’s union
activity, I find that it occurred sometime in January 2007, prior
to January 24, the date that Nykamp’s signed antiunion news-
letter was distributed to employees by the Respondent. Thus,
Nykamp testified that he had about a hundred conversations in
January with employees, during some of which employees
specifically named other employees who spoke to them about
the Union. The January 24 newsletter acknowledged such.
Since Balczak was one of the prime organizers, I find that
Nykamp and, hence, the Respondent, learned of Balczak’s ac-
tivity at least by January 24.70
January 26, 2007 Reprimand
Complaint paragraph 14(a) alleges that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) by imposing a written reprimand on
Balczak on January 26, 2007. I found that on January 26, the
Respondent imposed a level II disciplinary warning on Balczak
as a result of a 2-minute conversation Balczak initiated with
fellow employee Andrea Olescewski during which they ex-
changed views of the Union, Balczak pro and the other partici-
pant anti, and that the Respondent informed Balczak that the
discipline was imposed, in part, because he violated the Re-
spondent’s rule against “engaging in behavior designed to cre-
ate discord or lack of harmony,” a rule that I concluded violated
Section 8(a)(1).
Counsel for the General Counsel, citing Saia Motor Freight
Line, Inc., 333 NLRB 784 (2001), argues that because Balczak
was disciplined for violating a rule, which itself violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), the application of the rule is, de facto, a violation
of Section 8(a)(3), and that the imposition of the discipline also
violates Section 8(a)(3) under a Wright Line71 analysis. The
Respondent contends in its brief that at the time of the disci-
pline, the supervisor who imposed the discipline, Deering,
lacked knowledge of Balczak’s union activity, that there is
insufficient evidence of animus, and that the Respondent would

70 Nykamp knew of Balczak’s union activity, and therefore the Re-
spondent knew. State Plaza Hotel, 347 NLRB 755, 756 (2006).
71 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
have disciplined Balczak for idling, even absent his union ac-
tivity.
Inasmuch as I found Balczak was engaged in union activity
during the incident for which he was disciplined, I conclude
that the Respondent’s imposition of discipline on January 26
violates Section 8(a)(3) as alleged in paragraph 14(a) of the
complaint. A Wright Line analysis is not necessary to reach
this conclusion. Register Guard, supra at 1120 (2007). Fur-
ther, inasmuch as I already have concluded that the rule under
which Balczak was disciplined violates Section 8(a)(1), I also
conclude that Balczak’s discipline violated Section 8(a)(3).
The Respondent contends that Balczak was disciplined for
“idling,” but there is no evidence in the record that the Respon-
dent prohibited brief conversations between employees during
the workday. Indeed, the Respondent, in its brief, concedes
that “[i]t is not uncommon for employees to have brief conver-
sations on the floor.” Deering testified that a minute of “idling”
would probably not provoke him to issue discipline, but that he
might if it lasted 5 or 10 minutes. I found that Balczak’s con-
versation lasted about 2 minutes.
Even applying Wright Line, I conclude that Balczak’s disci-
pline violated Section 8(a)(3). Thus, I found that Balczak en-
gaged in union activity, the Respondent was aware of such,72
and the Respondent displayed animus by Nykamp’s repeated
written expression to employees of his opposition to the Union,
and the other violations of the Act found herein. I further con-
clude that Balczak’s conversation was within the Respondent’s
policy and practice of allowing brief conversations, and was not
something for which the Respondent would normally have
imposed discipline, except for the ongoing organizational activ-
ity.73
Finally, counsel for the General Counsel maintains in her
brief that the portion of Balczak’s disciplinary writeup threaten-
ing further disciplinary action for “any future incidents of this
nature” violates Section 8(a)(1) because “it can only be sur-
mised that it was further union activity that was [being] prohib-
ited.” Inasmuch as I have already found both the rule and the
discipline to be in violation of the Act, and will order appropri-
ate remedies, any additional findings and remedies would be
duplicative. I, thus, decline to find this additional violation as
to the same discipline, as alleged in complaint paragraph 9.
February 2, 3-Day Suspension
Complaint paragraph 15(a) alleges that on February 2, 2007,
the Respondent imposed a level III written reprimand/3-day
suspension on Balczak in violation of Section 8(a)(3). I found
that on February 2, at Balczak’s request, Balczak and employee
Huy Pham met on the plant floor by the scrap hopper machines,

72 The Respondent contends, in brief, that the supervisor who im-
posed the discipline, Deering, was unaware of Balczak’s union activity.
Deering testified that the decision to impose discipline was made by
Human Resources Generalist Hirdes, not by himself.
73 The Respondent introduced evidence of other instances where it
disciplined employees for idling. None of them appear to be analogous
to the Balczak incident in which an employee engaged in a 2-minute
conversation with a fellow employee. Record testimony indicates that
such brief conversations between employees are the rule, not the excep-
tion for which discipline is imposed.
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1115
that Balczak attempted to hand Pham some union-printed mate-
rials which Pham declined, that Balczak told Pham she could
read the materials in the bathroom, that Pham declined and told
Balczak she didn’t want anything to do with “this,” and that the
entire conversation took about 2 minutes. I further found that
later that same day MacLaren, with Yeomans present, imposed
a level III 3-day suspension on Balczak for the incident with
Pham, told Balczak that the discipline was based on the em-
ployee handbook and that his violations were circled (high-
lighted), and that among the highlighted violations was the
following: “Unauthorized soliciting of funds or distributing
literature on company property.”
Counsel for the General Counsel, in her brief, argues that be-
cause Balczak was suspended for violating an illegal no solici-
tation/distribution rule, the discipline violated Section 8(a)(3),
and that, in the alternative, applying a Wright Line analysis, the
discipline would violate Section 8(a)(3). The Respondent gen-
erally maintained that Balczak was disciplined for idling, other
employees have been disciplined for idling before and after the
inception of union organizational activity, and that the Respon-
dent utilized its progressive discipline policy in imposing the
suspension.
Because the Respondent imposed the suspension on Balczak,
at least in part, because he assertedly violated the Respondent’s
no solicitation/distribution rule, a rule which I concluded vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1), I conclude that said discipline violates
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. “Any disciplinary action taken pur-
suant to an unlawful no-solicitation rule is . . . unlawful, analo-
gous to the ‘fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree’ metaphor often used in
criminal law.” Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc., supra at 785
(citations omitted).
Further, I agree with counsel for the General Counsel that
even applying a Wright Line analysis, the result would be the
same. Thus, I found that Balczak engaged in union activity, the
Respondent was aware of such at the time it imposed discipline,
the Respondent has demonstrated its antiunion animus as dis-
cussed herein, and that, therefore, the burden switches to the
Respondent to demonstrate it would have suspended Balczak
notwithstanding his union activity. For the reasons discussed
above in respect to Balczak, the Respondent failed to meet this
burden.
February 8, Assignment to Press Operator Duties
Complaint paragraph 15(b) alleges that on February 8, 2007,
the Respondent, in violation of Section 8(a)(3), assigned
Balczak to press operator duties. I found that upon returning to
work on February 8 from the 3-day suspension, Balczak told
MacLaren and Deering that if they wanted to keep an eye on
him, to reassign him to the job of “hanging coils.” Balczak’s
request followed MacLaren’s comment that he didn’t want
“you guys”74 to say anything to Pham going forward.75 Coun-

74 There is insufficient evidence in the record from which I could
conclude to whom the “you guys” referred to, except that it, at least,
included Balczak. Obviously, it could have been a reference to union
supporters, to Balczak’s friends, or to some other grouping.
75 Based on the context, I find the instruction to not say anything to
Pham to be in the sense of not retaliating against her for apparently
reporting her conversation with Balczak to the Respondent, rather than
sel for the General Counsel, citing Nortech Waste, 336 NLRB
554 (2001), and other cases, argues that while employers have
the general right to assign the duties and jobs of employees, the
Wright Line analysis should be applied, that sufficient evidence
of union activity, knowledge, and animus, has been presented
shifting the burden to the Respondent, and that the Respondent
failed to meet that burden. The Respondent maintains that
Balczak was moved at his own request and, thus, would have
been moved notwithstanding union activity.
Here, the Respondent has the more persuasive argument.
Balczak’s request to be reassigned to “hanging wire” followed
MacLaren’s instruction to not contact Pham about her apparent
complaint to management about her conversation with
MacLaren and, logically, was a response to that instruction. In
other words, Balczak, concerned about being disciplined again,
suggested that he be placed on a job where he would not likely
be accused of approaching Pham. Even though Balczak sug-
gested he be reassigned to wire hanging, there is no dispute that
his request initiated his reassignment by the Respondent, albeit
to operating a press. While counsel for the General Counsel, in
her brief, suggested that Balczak’s request was “semi-
sarcastic,” I find no support for such in his testimony. Thus,
while I conclude that counsel for the General Counsel has met
her initial Wright Line burden, I further conclude that the Re-
spondent has demonstrated that it acted on a request initiated by
Balczak, and would have reassigned him notwithstanding his
union activity.76
March 22 Reprimand
Complaint paragraph 14(b) alleges that the Respondent on
March 22, 2007, imposed a written reprimand on Balczak, in
violation of Section 8(a)(3). I found that on March 22 Deering
imposed a level I reprimand on Balczak, memorialized in a
disciplinary action document signed by Deering and Hirdes,
which asserted that on February 19, Balczak produced certain
parts, that when the Northridge plant began to use the parts on
March 20, it was discovered the parts were mixed, and that
Balczak needed to pay closer attention. I also found that when
Balczak re-sorted the parts, pursuant to Deering’s instructions,
he found no mixed parts and reported such to Deering. The
only evidence supporting the assertion upon which the disci-
pline was based, that Balczak produced mixed parts, is the
hearsay testimony of Deering to the effect that an unidentified
employee in the Northridge quality control department so in-
formed Deering on the phone.
As to this allegation, the counsel for the General Counsel
contends that she met her Wright Line burden and demon-

not to talk to her about the Union. There is no allegation that such
instruction violated Sec. 8(a)(1).
76 Counsel for the General Counsel also argues that it’s not likely
that Balczak requested reassignment to a press, because that is some-
thing he could have accomplished within the cell, without seeking
permission from management. While reassignment within a cell is
within the purview of the cell’s members, such reassignment could
include press operation, wire hanging, or material handling. Regardless
of whether Balczak specifically requested reassignment to operating a
press as the Respondent contends, or wire hanging as I found, the fact
remains that he requested reassignment, and that his request precipi-
tated his reassignment.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1116
strated that Balczak’s union activity was the Respondent’s mo-
tivation, and that the Respondent failed to meet its resultant
burden of establishing that it would have disciplined Balczak
absent union activity. The Respondent maintains that it prop-
erly disciplined Balczak for mixing parts, an offense for which
it has frequently disciplined other employees.
Under Wright Line, to demonstrate a violation of Section
8(a)(3), the General Counsel is required to show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that animus against protected conduct
was a motivating factor in the employer’s action. Once this
showing has been made, the burden shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that the same action would have taken place even
in the absence of the protected conduct. “To sustain his initial
burden, the General Counsel must show: (1) that the employee
was engaged in protected activity; (2) that the employer was
aware of the activity; and (3) that the activity was a substantial
or motivating factor for the employer’s action. Motive may be
demonstrated by circumstantial evidence as well as direct evi-
dence and is a factual issue which the expertise of the Board is
peculiarly suited to determine.” Naomi Knitting Plant, 328
NLRB 1279 (1999) (citations omitted).
Here, as found, Balczak was a prime union activist. By late
January, early February 2007, Balczak regularly wore a union
pin to the plant each payday. At about the same time, the list
was posted in the plant naming Balczak, among others, as a
union activist.77 Nykamp had hundreds of conversations with
employees in January and February, during some of which the
employees named union activists. Further, the Respondent was
aware of the February 2 incident for which I concluded the
Respondent illegally suspended Balczak for attempting to pro-
vide union literature to Pham. Finally, based on the Respon-
dent’s various violations of the Act found herein, and its other
expressions of antiunion sentiment including Nykamp’s mis-
sives to employees, there is ample evidence from which to con-
clude that the Respondent displayed antiunion animus. Thus, I
conclude that the General Counsel has sustained its Wright Line
burden.
I further conclude that the Respondent has failed to meet its
resultant burden. The only evidence produced by the Respon-
dent in support of its decision to discipline Balczak for the as-
serted mixed parts offense is the testimony by Deering of a
phone call with an unnamed employee in quality control to the
effect that there were mixed parts. There was no other evi-
dence that, in fact, Balczak caused mixed parts to be placed in a
gondola. The quality control employee did not testify and
Deering’s testimony included nothing about observing the
mixed parts. To the contrary, Balczak credibly testified that
when he re-sorted the parts he observed no mixed parts, and so
informed Deering.78 The Respondent’s quality audit log, a

77 I reject the Respondent’s argument in its brief, that the Respondent
didn’t rely on the anonymously posted listed for information as to the
identities of union activists. The findings herein as to Dykstra’s com-
ments to Segers and Bonnville about the list, demonstrate that the Re-
spondent did not disregard the information in the list as to who the
union activists were.
78 Deering testified that he wasn’t sure whether Balczak told him that
there were no mixed parts or a handful. Balczak testified that Deering
asked him whether he found any mixed parts, that he told Deering he
document utilized by the Respondent in its business to record
such and similar errors, contains no specific entry for mixed
parts on or near the date of March 20. Finally, Deering testified
that he didn’t know, and was never informed, as to how many
alleged mixed parts there were.
The failure of the Respondent to produce a modicum of
credible evidence in support of its assertion that formed the
basis of its discipline of Balczak is a factor that I have weighed
in reaching my conclusion that the Respondent has not met its
burden and that the discipline was pretextual. See, for example,
the Board’s findings in Signature Flight Support, 333 NLRB
1250, 1251 (2001), where the employer failed to produce credi-
ble evidence to support the asserted basis for discipline.
Further, while the record contains evidence of disciplinary
warnings imposed on other employees for mixed parts or label-
ing errors, in at least one of those instances Deering, who testi-
fied that he can exercise discretion in deciding whether or not
to impose discipline, decided to simply write a note to the file
rather than impose discipline on an employee who mislabeled
parts because “[y]ou have had no other issues of this nature
currently in your file.”79 Deering’s discretion is borne out by
the testimony of press operator Segers to the effect that when
he made a labeling mistake, Deering simply spoke to him about
it, but did not impose discipline.80 Deering further testified that
he had no personal knowledge that Balczak had ever operated a
press before his then current assignment and that Balczak had
operated the press for less than 2 weeks when the asserted mis-
take occurred. Under these circumstances, having concluded
that the General Counsel has met its Wright Line burden, that
the Respondent has fallen short, and that the evidence demon-
strates that the basis for Balczak’s discipline is pretextual, I
conclude that the discipline violates Section 8(a)(3) of the Act
as alleged.
March 23 Reprimand
Complaint paragraph 14(c) alleges that on March 27, 2007,81
the Respondent, imposed a written reprimand on Balczak, in
violation of Section 8(a)(3). I found that on March 23, Deer-
ing, with Hirdes present, gave a level II disciplinary action
memo to Balczak that stated that on March 22 Balczak misla-
beled right side parts as left side and that there also were mixed
parts. Balczak signed the disciplinary memo, but testified that
he did not agree that he had either mislabeled or mixed the
parts. The discipline was imposed at level II because of the
prior level I discipline imposed on March 22. Both counsel for
the General Counsel and the Respondent, repeat essentially the
same arguments made as to the March 22 discipline allegation.
As concluded in respect to the March 22 reprimand, and for
the same reasons, the General Counsel has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that animus against Balczak’s
union activity was the Respondent’s motivation for the March

had not, and that Deering “acted very surprised.” Deering was uncer-
tain in his testimony. Balczak’s testimony was detailed and explicit. I
credit Balczak.
79 R. Exh. 20.
80 Segers’ credited testimony.
81 The complaint pleads the discipline occurred about March 27.
The evidence demonstrates that the correct date is March 23.
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1117
23 discipline. Thus, I’ve concluded that Balczak participated in
union activity, the Respondent knew that, and the Respondent
has displayed animus in respect to the activity.
I further conclude, essentially for the same reason as in re-
spect to the March 22 discipline, that the Respondent has failed
to demonstrate that it would have imposed discipline on
Balczak on March 23, even absent union activity. Thus, almost
no evidence, beyond the accusation and imposition of disci-
pline, was presented to support the Respondent’s assertion that
Balczak mislabeled and mixed parts.
Under Wright Line, once the General Counsel has met his
initial burden, the Respondent must persuade that it would have
imposed the discipline notwithstanding the union activity. At a
minimum, here, that evidence should include something dem-
onstrating that the violation for which discipline was imposed,
actually occurred. Yet the record contains little, if anything,
from which I could make such a conclusion. Accordingly, I
conclude that the Respondent has failed to meet its burden to
demonstrate that Balczak would have been disciplined even
absent his union activity, and that the Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) as alleged in paragraph 14(c) of the complaint.82
Glenn Gentz
I found that Gentz was employed by the Respondent at Three
Mile from 1993 until his discharge on March 27, 2007. Gentz,
as opposed to Balczak and Smith, was minimally involved in
union organizational activity, including speaking to fellow
employees about the Union “a couple of times a day.” The
record contains no detail as to these conversations such as who
specifically he spoke to, where the conversations took place,
what was said, or when the conversations began. Nevertheless,
I also found that Gentz’ name was included in the list of as-
serted union activists posted in the plant in late January/early
February 2007.
February 21 Reprimand
Complaint paragraph 16 alleges that the Respondent, on Feb-
ruary 21, 2007, imposed a level I reprimand on Gentz assert-
edly for an incident that occurred on February 19. I found that
on February 19 Gentz, a hi-lo operator, was assisting a press
operator with a problem at a time when the operation he had
been working on was down, had walked to the back of the press
to observe its operation with a potato chip bag in hand, was
approached by Deering who told him that he should be check-
ing parts on a different press, and responded to Deering that the
other press had been down. I found that when Deering handed
Gentz the disciplinary memo, Gentz explained he had been
monitoring the press feed, and that Deering responded that
while that could be possible, he was going forward with the
discipline because there were other problems he wanted to cor-
rect, apparently referring to asserted complaints form other
employees as to Gentz, which I found there was no evidence to
support.
Counsel for the General Counsel argues in her brief that
Gentz was involved in union activity which the Respondent
was aware of or suspected because of the posting of the list,

82 Except that the discipline and violation occurred on March 23
rather than March 27 as alleged in the complaint.
that the basis of the discipline was unsupported by evidence,
and that the discipline was pretextual. The Respondent, in its
brief, maintains that Gentz was disciplined for cause, that Deer-
ing observed Gentz idling during the February 19 incident and
had received reports of such from other employees, and that, in
any case, the Respondent was unaware of Gentz’ union activity,
if any.
I agree with the Respondent that there is insufficient evi-
dence from which to conclude that the Respondent had specific
knowledge of Gentz’ minimal union activity of talking to other
employees about the union issue. But, I further conclude, as
maintained by the counsel for the General Counsel, that the
Respondent, in fact, perceived that Gentz was a union sup-
porter, based on the posting of the asserted supporter list in late
January or early February and the Respondent’s reaction to the
posting. As the Board has held, “In establishing that an em-
ployer’s opposition to union activity was a motivating factor in
an employer’s decision to discharge an employee, it is . . . im-
material that the employee was not in fact engaging in union
activity as long as that was the employer’s perception and the
employer was motivated to act based on that perception.” Day-
ton Hudson Department Store Co., 324 NLRB 33, 35 (1997)
(emphasis contained in original).
While the Respondent argues that the list was posted anony-
mously, and was not, and could not be, utilized by the Respon-
dent to discern which employees were union activists, the
words of Vice President Manufacturing Dykstra to employees
Segers and Bonnville, in discussing their complaints about the
posting of the list, belie the Respondent’s defense. Thus, when
Segers demanded of Dykstra to know why his name was in-
cluded on the list, Dykstra replied, “You obviously were seen
attending union meetings or talking up the union.” Dykstra
added that if people weren’t happy there, maybe the Respon-
dent should see that they’re not working there, and that people
were going to have to earn back the Respondent’s trust. Fur-
ther, in response to Bonnville’s complaint about the list,
Dykstra at first told him that he’d seen a list of 35 to 38 em-
ployees who had attended union meetings. Rather than disre-
garding the names posted on the list, Dykstra’s comments dem-
onstrated that the Respondent took the list, and the names con-
tained therein, seriously.83
Applying Wright Line to this allegation, I conclude that the
Respondent perceived that Gentz was involved in union activ-
ity, that, for reasons discussed above, the General Counsel has
demonstrated the Respondent’s displayed animus towards the
Union, and that, thus, the General Counsel has met his initial
burden. I further conclude that the Respondent has not met its
resultant burden of demonstrating that the discipline would
have been imposed even absent its perception that Gentz was a
union activist.
Thus, Deering testified that the discipline was initiated be-
cause he observed Gentz standing by a press and “[a]t the time
I believe[d] he was idling.” But when Deering presented the
disciplinary warning to Gentz, and was informed by Gentz that,
in fact, he wasn’t idling but was assisting the press operator,

83 Human Resources Generalist Hirdes also testified that he believed
those named on the list were in favor of the Union.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1118
Deering, acknowledged Gentz’ response, but nevertheless went
through with the discipline, assertedly based on reports from
other employees concerning Gentz’ work.
Deering’s testimony that “At the time [that he observed
Gentz] I believe[d] he was idling” (emphasis supplied) implies
that he accepted Gentz’ explanation that he was assisting the
press operator. Indeed, there is no evidence to dispute Gentz’
credible testimony that he was not, in fact, idling, but was as-
sisting the press operator by observing the operation of a mal-
functioning machine. As noted earlier, in view of the lack of
supporting evidence and Deering’s inability on the stand to
name the allegedly complaining employees, I do not credit
Deering’s testimony that other employees complained about
Gentz. Under these circumstances, with there being no credible
basis for the Respondent’s discipline of Gentz, I conclude that
the Respondent has failed to meet its burden, and that the disci-
pline was pretextual. Accordingly, I conclude that the imposi-
tion of the reprimand on Gentz violated Section 8(a)(3) as al-
leged in paragraph 16 of the complaint.
March 27 Discharge
Complaint paragraph 17 alleges that on March 27, 2007, the
Respondent discharged Gentz in violation of Section 8(a)(3).
Counsel for the General Counsel argues that she has met her
Wright Line burden for the reasons set forth above as to Gentz’
February 21 discipline, and that because the evidence demon-
strates that the discharge was pretextual, the Respondent has
failed to carry its burden that it would have discharged Gentz
absent union activity. The Respondent maintains that the Gen-
eral Counsel failed to meet his initial burden because Gentz’
union activity, if any, was minimal, because there is insufficient
evidence that the Respondent had knowledge of Gentz’ union
activity, and because animus was not proved. The Respondent
also maintains that even if it’s found that the General Counsel
met his burden, the Respondent has demonstrated that it would
have discharged Gentz notwithstanding his union activity.
For the reasons set forth above, including Gentz’ name ap-
pearing on the posted list, and the Respondent’s reaction to the
list as illustrated by Dykstra’s comments, I conclude that the
Respondent perceived that Gentz was a union activist. Whether
or not Gentz engaged in union activity, or the extent thereof, is
immaterial because the Respondent perceived Gentz as an ac-
tivist. Dayton Hudson Dept. Store Co., supra at 35. As further
discussed above, I also conclude, based on Nykamp’s com-
ments in the Respondent’s newsletters and the various other
violations found herein, that the Respondent maintained animus
towards union activity. Thus, I agree with the counsel for the
General Counsel, that she has met her initial Wright Line bur-
den.
I further conclude that the Respondent has failed to meet its
burden of demonstrating that it would have discharged Gentz
even absent its perception of his union support because the
evidence is compelling that Gentz’ discharge was pretextual.
Gentz was employed by the Respondent for about 14 years and,
according to Yeomans, had no prior disciplinary record for
threatening behavior or issues with other employees. Yeomans
testified that she didn’t bother to look at Gentz’ personnel file
after the incident was reported to her.
Objectively viewing the evidence the Respondent itself gath-
ered in its investigation, the initial incident with Calderon was,
at worst, a 50/50 proposition, with both apparently and ap-
proximately equally at fault (Gentz could have sounded his
horn; Calderon could have watched where he was walking).
The resulting incident also showed equal parts of blame;
Calderon should not have returned to the scene to make addi-
tional sarcastic comments to Gentz, and Gentz should not have
touched Calderon. Gentz engaged in no threats, pokes, or other
physical acts against Calderon (nor did Calderon against
Gentz).
Further, while the Respondent’s counsel asserts in his brief
that “RVI disciplined Gentz for violating the Workplace Vio-
lence Policy,” and MacLaren testified that he told Gentz he was
being discharged for “physical intimidation or threatening,”
Yeomans testified that he was also discharged because he lied
about the incident, and that the lie consisted of not mentioning
to Hirdes and MacLaren, during the investigation, that he had
touched Calderon. The Respondent does not contend, in its
brief, that Gentz was discharged for any reason other than the
incident with Calderon, although it does state the Respondent’s
belief that Gentz was not truthful because he did not mention
that he touched Calderon.
I am not persuaded that Gentz lied to the Respondent during
its investigation of the incident, or that such presented a legiti-
mate basis, or additional basis, for its decision to discharge
Gentz. Hirdes and MacLaren, in their investigation of the inci-
dent, simply asked Gentz what happened and never asked
Gentz whether he touched Calderon. The first time the Re-
spondent made the assertion to Gentz that to touched Calderon,
at the discharge interview, Gentz immediately admitted physi-
cal contact with Calderon.
The Respondent argues that neither Hirdes nor MacLaren
specifically asked Gentz whether he touched Calderon because
the Respondent’s normal investigative practice is not to ask
specific questions, just general questions such as “what hap-
pened?” or “did anything else happen?” Yet MacLaren testi-
fied that he specifically asked Gentz during the interview
whether any words were exchanged between Gentz and
Calderon. Based on the asking of the specific question, and the
concomitant failure to ask the more relevant specific question
of whether there was any physical contact between the two, it
appears that the Respondent was more interested in construct-
ing a pretext for discharge, rather than an objective investiga-
tion of what occurred. Further evidence of this intent includes
the logistics of the investigation, i.e., multiple solicitations of
versions of the incident from Calderon and Birhanu before
Gentz was even contacted.
Finally, the evidence of the Respondent’s past practice in
dealing with incidents of violence or work conflict in the work-
place, does not show a pattern that would place the treatment of
Gentz within the norm as is argued by the Respondent, but
instead tends to show disparate treatment. The Respondent cites
eight examples of employees suspended solely for inappropri-
ate or threatening language, and in one case discharged for
“less egregious behavior,” involving a verbal altercation “when
management could not verify that any physical confrontation
occurred.” But none of those cited instances is analogous to the
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1119
Gentz discharge. The discharge cited by the Respondent in-
volved an employee who had been repeatedly previously disci-
plined for workplace behavior problems, prior to discharge.
Gentz had no such previous discipline. None of the other nine
instances of discipline cited by the Respondent involved dis-
charge.
Counsel for the General Counsel, in her brief, cites evidence
of previous discipline imposed on various employees as exam-
ples of the asserted disparate treatment of Gentz. These include
a level II written reprimand that the Respondent imposed on
Martha Hernandez on January 25, 2008, for an altercation with
another employee that involved pushing, a level III 3-day sus-
pension up to 3 days imposed on employee Phil Harrington on
May 3, 2007, for threatening another employee with a beating,
a level III 1-day suspension imposed on employee Craig East-
man on July 19, 2004, for physical contact with and inappropri-
ate language to another employee, and a level III 3-day suspen-
sion imposed on employee Mike Long on October 24, 2007, for
threatening to harm other employees and himself in circum-
stances where he had made similar threats in the past.
Two of the four incidents cited by the General Counsel in-
volve altercations that included physical contact and inappro-
priate language. The other two involved direct threats of physi-
cal harm to other employees. All of these incidents seem more
severe than the Gentz-Calderon confrontation during which
Gentz pulled on Calderon’s shirt and there were no threats of
violence or improper language. The Respondent argues in its
counsel’s brief that incidents that occurred before Yeomans
was hired as HR manager in October 2004, should not be used
for comparison to Gentz’ discharge. But the incidents cited
above all occurred after Yeomans was hired, except for the
Eastman discipline, which was initiated by HR Generalist
Hirdes, a principal player in the Gentz discharge.
The Eastman disciplinary action form, generated by Hirdes,
states that the Respondent imposed a 1-day suspension and
demotion on Eastman and specifies the following in the man-
agement comment section, “You used inappropriate language
and made physical contact with a coworker which is clearly
unacceptable behavior.” The Respondent maintains, in its
brief, that the Eastman discipline is distinguishable because
both employees involved were disciplined, that Eastman admit-
ted he pushed the other employee, did not try to conceal what
occurred, and apologized to the other employee.
The Eastman occurrence factually resembles the
Gentz/Calderon confrontation in that it involved a low level of
physical contact, but the Respondent’s disciplinary memo to
Eastman also asserts that he used inappropriate language, which
is absent in the Gentz incident. I find that the Eastman inci-
dent, for which he received a 1-day suspension and demotion,
to be approximately comparable to, if not more severe than, the
Gentz/Calderon incident, for which Gentz was discharged. As
discussed above, I do not find that Gentz lied to the Respondent
about the incident. I also find the other incidents cited by the
counsel for the General Counsel, and discussed above, to be
approximately comparable to the Gentz incident, but for which
the Respondent imposed discipline less severe than discharge.
Such disparate treatment is a factor to be considered in deciding
unlawful motivation. Robert Orr/Sysco Food Services, 343
NLRB 1183, 1184 (2004). Based on the above, I conclude that
the Respondent has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating
that it would have discharged Gentz even absent its perception
of his union activity. Accordingly, I conclude that the Respon-
dent’s discharge of Gentz violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as
alleged in complaint paragraph 17.
Smith, Job Jeopardy Agreement and
Threat to Discharge
Complaint paragraph 18 alleges that on January 7, 2008, the
Respondent required Dave Smith to enter into a job jeopardy
agreement (JJA) in violation of Section 8(a)(3), and that the
JJA required that Smith attend counseling sessions, that he
comply with any recommendations of the counseling agency,
that he be off work on January 7, 2008, and that he be responsi-
ble for any costs associated with counseling sessions. The JJA
provided that if the Respondent determined that Smith failed to
meet and maintain the JJAs requirements, his employment
would be terminated.
Complaint paragraph 13 alleges that about January 3, 2007,
Nykamp threatened employees with discharge because of their
activities on behalf of the Union. This allegation alludes to
Nykamp’s asserted invitation to Smith to quit his employment
with the Respondent. As to this issue, I found that at the Feb-
ruary 3 meeting, Nykamp told Smith, “It sounds like you’re not
happy here, and you need to make a decision. Either stay here
and be unhappy, or go someplace else and be happy.”
I found that Smith had been employed by the Respondent
since July 1997, except for a 9-month period beginning in July
2000. I further found that Smith was a prime union activist,
that he originated contact with the Union, that Smith talked to
other employees in support of the Union including calls to their
homes, that he wore a UAW T-shirt to work each payday and a
UAW pin other days, that he distributed union literature to
employees at shift break from the sidewalks by the Three Mile
and Northridge plants, that he was cautioned twice by man-
agement to stay in his own department,84 that Yeomans told
Nykamp that Smith and Balczak were encouraging union sign-
up, and that shortly after he transferred to the Northridge plant
in August 2007, he told Plant Manager VanderLaan that “we
will continue our union organizing efforts.”
Counsel for the General Counsel contends that under a
Wright Line analysis, she has demonstrated that Smith partici-
pated in union activity, that the Respondent was aware of such,
that the Respondent’s animus was demonstrated by the various
other illegal actions engaged in as part of its campaign against
union organization, and that the Respondent has failed to show
that it would have placed Smith on the JJA absent his union
activity. The General Counsel further argues that because
Smith was discussing issues involving union activity during the
January 3 meeting with Nykamp and VanderLaan, and was
disciplined for the discussion, the discipline violated Section
8(a)(3).
Further, citing American Steel Erectors, 339 NLRB 1315
(2003), the General Counsel maintains that because the Re-
spondent imposed the discipline for Smith’s actions in the

84 Which I concluded violated the Act.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1120
course of protected activity, the appropriate test for a violation
should be whether Smith’s actions or words during the discus-
sion were so severe or egregious as to remove them from the
Act’s protection. Finally, citing Bell Burglar Alarms, Inc., 245
NLRB 990 (1979), counsel for the General Counsel posits that
in the circumstances here, an invitation to quit constitutes an
implied threat of discharge for union activity.
Contrariwise, the Respondent argues that the General Coun-
sel has failed to prove animus, that the Respondent has demon-
strated that Smith was placed on the JJA because of his words
and actions not involving the Union, and that the Respondent
has met its burden of showing that it would have placed Smith
on the JJA even absent his union activity. The Respondent
further maintains that Nykamp did not threaten Smith during
the January 3 meeting, that Nykamp’s words did not constitute
a threat and Smith did not feel threatened, and that whatever
Nykamp said to Smith related to Smith’s accusation that
Nykamp was a liar, not to union activity.
Initially, I conclude that the subject matter of the January 3
meeting attended by Smith, at VanderLaan’s instruction, and by
VanderLaan and Nykamp, directly and indirectly involved
Smith’s union and associated activity, and that the meeting
arose out of such activity. The genesis of the January 3 meet-
ing was the earlier meeting in late August or early September
2007, to which Smith was invited after telling VanderLaan that
there were unresolved issues and that union organizing activi-
ties would be continuing. The January 3 meeting was gener-
ated because Nykamp was upset that Smith referred to Nykamp
as being a liar. But, Smith called Nykamp a liar because Smith
believed that Nykamp had failed to follow through on assur-
ances made at the earlier meeting in respect to Smith’s com-
plaint as to the discipline of two employees, a complaint raised
in the context of why employees wanted a Union.
The January 3 meeting, thus, arose out of a prior meeting in
August/September during which union or protected activity was
discussed, a subsequent discussion between Smith and Nykamp
as to Nykamp’s followup to the earlier meeting, and Smith’s
“liar” comment to VanderLaan concerning Nykamp’s follow-
up. At the January 3 meeting, Smith talked about why employ-
ees needed a union and his view that Nykamp treated union
supporters differently. Smith did not use the “liar” epithet at
this meeting.
The common thread to all of these events involved Smith’s
actions in furtherance of union organization, including telling
VanderLaan that there were still problems and he was going to
continue with union organization, telling Nykamp what the
problems were including the discipline of two employees, com-
plaining about Nykamp’s perceived failure to follow up as to
the discipline, and accusing Nykamp of treating union support-
ers differently. Section 7 activity was integral to all of these
meetings, and carried with it its normal protection.
I agree with the General Counsel that Nykamp’s invitation to
Smith, a prime union activist, to the effect that if he wasn’t
happy there, he should find another job, constituted a threat of
discharge, and I agree that in the context of the protected activi-
ties discussed above, the threat was directed at those activities.
The Respondent’s argument, in its brief, that “no reasonable
person could construe” Nykamp’s invitation to be a threat is not
persuasive and, indeed, the Board has viewed such statements
to be a threat of discharge. See Bell Burglar Alarms, Inc., su-
pra at 990, where the Board interpreted a similar invitation
from an employer’s owner as conveying a threat of discharge.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in complaint paragraph 13.
The Respondent’s argument that “Nykamp’s comments to
Dave Smith were specifically related to Dave Smith calling
Dave Nykamp a liar,” and unrelated to any union activity, is
simply not borne out by the evidence and the context. As found
above, the entire context of both meetings involved the union
organizational attempt. More specifically, at the January 3
meeting, where Nykamp’s comments occurred, Smith told
Nykamp why the employees wanted a union and accused
Nykamp of treating union supporters differently. The evidence
is persuasive that rather than simply being a response to the
“liar” epithet, which was not used at the January 3 meeting,
Nykamp’s invitation for Smith to work somewhere else was
generated by Nykamp’s frustration at Smith’s continuing union
activity and associated complaints to Nykamp.
Finally, I reject the Respondent’s assertion in its brief that
implies that because “Smith did not feel threatened during this
meeting,” Nykamp’s comment cannot be construed as a threat.
The Board does not judge the legality of such comments based
on the subjective reaction of the recipient. “The legality of an
employer’s conduct does not turn on whether the employee
feels threatened.” Bell Burglar Alarms, Inc., supra at 990.
Accordingly, I conclude that Nykamp’s invitation to Smith to
look for work elsewhere constituted a threat to discharge, and
violated Section 8(a)(a1), as alleged in complaint paragraph 13.
See also, Hoytuck Corp., 285 NLRB 904 (1987).
I further conclude that the Respondent’s imposition of the
JJA on Smith violated Section 8(a)(3) because the Respondent
imposed the JJA based on Smith’s words and actions during the
course of Smith’s protected activity during the January 3 meet-
ing, which were part of the res gestae of union activity. Noth-
ing that Smith said or did at the meeting was so egregious as to
remove the mantle of protected activity. Thus, Smith did not
use the epithet “liar” during the January 3 meeting, and the
Respondent does not assert, or argue in its brief, that he was
placed on the JJA for such. Instead, the Respondent maintains
that Smith’s usage of the phrase “exit strategy” combined with
his actions during and immediately after the meeting removed
Smith’s actions from Section 7 protection, and led the Respon-
dent to become fearful of Smith’s behavior and to place him on
the JJA.
The Respondent, in its counsel’s brief, citing Tenneco Pack-
aging, Inc., 337 NLRB 898 (2002), argues that it did not violate
Section 8(a)(3) by imposing the JJA on Smith, because it acted
over concern as to Smith’s usage of the “exit strategy” phrase
and Smith’s “incoherent statements, gestures, red face and di-
lated pupils.” I note that Tenneco involved a Wright Line
analysis in which the Board affirmed the judge’s conclusion
that the General Counsel failed to show that union activity was
a motivating factor, and the employer established that it would
have taken the same action even in the absence of union activ-
ity. In reaching his conclusions, the administrative law judge
wrote as follows:
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1121
I have resolved the question of whether Respondent acted in
good faith or out of animus towards union organizational ef-
forts on the basis of the factual record before me. That record
includes testimonial evidence relating to McClain’s behavior,
evidence establishing an emergency involuntary admission of
McClain to the Charter Rivers Behavioral Health Systems fa-
cility located in Lee County, South Carolina, and an Order of
a Probate Court finding, inter alia, that McClain was mentally
ill and that there “is a likelihood of serious harm to himself or
others.”
The administrative law judge, further, found that the employee
involved had a past history of anger, anger management prob-
lems, and unusual actions in the plant.
Here, there is no evidence that Smith had a history of vio-
lence in the plant, anger management problems, threats to oth-
ers, or a history of irrational behavior. Instead, the Respondent
relies on Smith’s “exit strategy” comment and his reddened
face, dilated pupils, and gestures during the January 3 meeting.
The Respondent, in its counsel’s brief, also asserts that Smith,
“began chattering about various random and seemingly discon-
nected topics, became increasingly agitated, and refused to look
at either Dave Nykamp or Ron VanderLaan.”
Upon a careful review of the evidence as to Smith’s behavior
and words at the January 3 meeting, I conclude that there was
minimal objective evidence from which the Respondent could
conclude that Smith presented a danger to others or to himself.
I found that, in fact, Smith was not speaking in tongues or ran-
domly “chattering.” Further, the fact that Smith’s face may
have reddened or that his pupils dilated may simply have been
an indication that the meeting was somewhat tense or that
Smith was nervous in a somewhat confrontational meeting with
the Respondent’s owner. In sum, I do not find that Smith’s
words and conduct, viewed objectively, rose to a level that was
threatening. Further, when considered along with factors such
as there being no evidence that Smith had any history of vio-
lence, or threats, or similar behavior, and the animus displayed
by the Respondent against union activity, including its prior
actions limiting Smith’s movements within the plant(s), I con-
clude that the Respondent was motivated to place Smith on the
JJA by his role in union organizing, and not by his actions and
words on January 3, which were merely a pretext. Neither
Smith’s words or actions, or both, rose to a level of egregious-
ness or severity so as to remove the Act’s protection from his
conduct.
The above analysis finding a violation is based on my con-
clusion that Smith’s actions and words on January 3 were part
of the res gestae of protected activity and that he was disci-
plined therefor. However, even applying a Wright Line analy-
sis, I would come to the same conclusion. Thus, Smith was a
prime union activist, the Respondent had knowledge of such,
and had previously displayed its animus to union organizational
activity in general and to Smith’s in particular. For the reasons
discussed above, including the pretextual nature of the asserted
reasons, the Respondent failed to show it would have placed
Smith on the JJA even absent his union activity.85 Thus, under
Wright Line, I would also conclude that the Respondent’s im-
position of the JJA on Smith violated Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Glenn Gentz on March 27, 2007, and im-
posing on Gentz on February 21, 2007, a written repri-
mand/warning, by imposing a Job Jeopardy Agreement (JJA)
on Dave Smith on January 7, 2008, and by placing restrictions
on Smith’s movements within plants on January 16 and 24,
2007, and by issuing written reprimands/warnings to Ben
Balczak on January 26 and March 22 and 23, 2007, and a writ-
ten reprimand/warning and 3-day suspension on February 2,
2007, the Respondent has been discriminating in regard to the
hire or tenure or terms and conditions of employment of its
employees, thereby discouraging membership in a labor or-
ganization in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
4. By the following actions on the dates set forth below, the
Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:
(a) On January 24, 2007, created the impression among its
employees that their union activities were under surveillance.
(b) On January 16 and 24, 2007, placed restrictions on em-
ployee movements in its plants in response to employees’ union
activities.
(c) On February 2, 2007, promulgated a rule prohibiting the
usage of employee bulletin boards at Three Mile and North-
ridge for posting “union/nonunion arguments,” and removed
said materials from the Three Mile bulletin board.
(d) Since on or about August 22, 2006, maintained an em-
ployee manual containing rules that prohibited employees from:
(1) Engaging in behavior designed to create discord or lack
of harmony.
(2) Unauthorized soliciting of funds or distributing literature
on the Respondent’s property.
(e) On February 21, 2007, solicited employees to report to
management the union activities of fellow employees and im-
pliedly threatened to discipline employees engaged in those
activities.
(f) On January 3, 2008, threatened employees with discharge
because of their activities on behalf of the Union.
5. The unfair labor practices set out above in paragraphs 3
and 4, affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.

85 The Respondent introduced evidence of five other JJAs that it has
applied to employees since 2002. The circumstances are as follows: a
supervisor who excessively visited internet chat rooms on the job;
alcohol and drug policy violation; repeated confrontations with other
employees; and confrontational/disruptive behavior and insubordina-
tion. None of the circumstances described in those JJAs are analogous
to Smith’s case.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1122
6. The Respondent, in no manner other than that specifically
found herein, including any other manner alleged in the com-
plaint, has violated the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, it will be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and from
any like or related conduct. Having found that the Respondent
discharged Glenn Gentz in violation of Section 8(a)(3), it will
be ordered to offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his
former position of employment or, if that position is no longer
available, to a substantially equivalent one without prejudice to
his seniority or any other rights or privileges he may have pre-
viously enjoyed and make him whole for any loss of earnings
and benefits he may have suffered by reason of the Respon-
dent’s discrimination against him. Backpay will be computed
in accordance with the Board’s decision in F. W. Woolworth
Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in New
Horizons for Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). Further the
Respondent will be ordered to remove from its files any refer-
ences to the unlawful discharge and notify Gentz that it has
done so and will not use the discharge against him in any way.
Having found that the Respondent imposed a Job Jeopardy
Agreement (JJA) on Dave Smith and a 3-day suspension on
Ben Balczak, both in violation of Section 8(a)(3), it will be
ordered to make them whole for any loss of earnings and bene-
fits they may have suffered and medical expenses Smith may
have paid by reason of the Respondent’s discrimination against
them, and to remove from its files any references to the imposi-
tion of the Job Jeopardy Agreement (JJA) on Smith and sus-
pension on Balczak, and notify them that it has done so and that
it will not use the discipline against them in any way. Backpay
shall be computed as set forth above.
Having found that the Respondent imposed written repri-
mands/warnings in violation of Section 8(a)(3) on Ben Balczak
and Glenn Gentz, it will be ordered to remove any references to
the discipline from its files, notify Balczak and Gentz that it has
done so, and that it will not use the written reprimands/warn-
ings against them.
It will also be ordered that the Respondent post a remedial
notice.
On these findings and conclusions of law, and on the entire
record, I issue the following recommended86
ORDER
The Respondent, Ridgeview Industries, Inc., Walker, Michi-
gan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Creating the impression among its employees that their
union activities are under surveillance.
(b) Imposing restrictions on employee movement in the plant
in response to employees’ union activities.

86 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the Board shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, adopt the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(c) Promulgating, maintaining or enforcing rules prohibiting
the posting of materials containing union/nonunion arguments
or information on employee bulletin boards, or removing such
materials from the bulletin boards.
(d) Promulgating, maintaining, or enforcing rules that pro-
hibit employees from engaging in behavior designed to create
discord or lack of harmony, or unauthorized soliciting of funds
or distributing literature on company property.
(e) Soliciting employees to report to management the union
activities of coworkers and threatening to discipline employees
engaged in those activities.
(f) Discharging, or otherwise imposing discipline on em-
ployees because of their actual or suspected participation in
union activities.
(g) In any like or related manner restraining, coercing, or in-
terfering with employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights, or discriminating against them in order to discourage
membership in a labor organization.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer full re-
instatement to Glenn Gentz to his former job, or if that job no
longer exists, offer him a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority and other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed.
(b) Make whole Glenn Gentz, Ben Balczak, and Dave Smith
for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result
of the discrimination against them, and Smith for any medical
expenses he paid as a result of the discrimination against him.
Backpay is to be computed as set forth in the remedy section of
this decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the discharge and disciplinary warn-
ings/reprimands set forth above of Glenn Gentz, the Job Jeop-
ardy Agreement (JJA) imposed on Dave Smith, and the suspen-
sion and disciplinary warnings/reprimands set forth above of
Ben Balczak, and notify each of them in writing within 3 days
thereafter that this has been done and that evidence of the
unlawful actions will not be used against them.
(d) Preserve, and within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Re-
gional Director, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records, and reports, and all other
records, including electronic copy of the records if stored in
electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Three Mile and Northridge facilities copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”87 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be

87 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
RIDGEVIEW INDUSTRIES 1123
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
materials. In the event that, during the pendency of the pro-
ceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in this proceeding, the Respondent shall dupli-
cate and mail, at its expense, copies of the notice to all employ-
ees and former employees of the Respondent at any time since
August 22, 2006.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.