RICHMOND, Thomas R.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 22, 202014775082 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 22, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/775,082 09/11/2015 Thomas R Richmond DOORK-P3915.2 5728 21259 7590 05/22/2020 J. MARK HOLLAND AND ASSOCIATES J. Mark Holland 19800 MACARTHUR BLVD SUITE 300 IRVINE, CA 92612 EXAMINER CHU, KATHERINE J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3671 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/22/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): OFFICE@JMHLAW.COM mholland@jmhlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte THOMAS R. RICHMOND Appeal 2019-006266 Application 14/775,082 Technology Center 3600 Before DANIEL S. SONG, JEREMY M. PLENZLER, and LEE L. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, and 5–9. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real parties in interest as Thomas Richmond and Doorking, Inc. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-006266 Application 14/775,082 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to “devices for helping to prevent vehicular barrier gate arms from lowering in certain situations (such as if an obstruction such as a person is present), while not impacting the primary operation and function of the barrier arm.” Spec. 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter. 1. Apparatus for vehicular access control, including: an access control arm sized and positioned to move between a default closed position (that bars passage by a vehicle) and a temporary open position (that permits passage by a vehicle); a sensor system for differentiating between a vehicular and non-vehicular interruption, said system including: a photo-beam sensor that is active at least during motion of the control arm from the open position to the closed position; and a vehicle sensor positioned and configured to determine whether said interruption of the photo-beam sensor has been caused by a vehicle, and (a) upon determining said interruption to be a vehicular interruption, said vehicle sensor signals the control arm to continue its motion from the open position to the closed position, and (b) upon determining said interruption to be a non-vehicular interruption, said sensor system causes the control arm to stop its motion from the open position to the closed position. Appeal Br. 15 (Claims App.). Appeal 2019-006266 Application 14/775,082 3 REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Jankovsky US 7,481,598 B2 Jan. 27, 2009 Polyakov US 2003/0222789 A1 Dec. 4, 2003 Rihl US 2009/0244889 A1 Oct. 1, 2009 Pepperl SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FOR DOORS, GATES AND ELEVATORS, PEPPERL+FUCHS Appellant does not dispute that Pepperl qualifies as prior art. See Appeal Br. REJECTIONS I. Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite. II. Claims 1 and 2 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Pepperl and Jankovsky. III. Claims 1, 2, 5, and 7–9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Pepperl and Polyakov. IV. Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Pepperl, Polyakov, and Rihl. OPINION Rejection I–Indefiniteness (Claim 9) In determining that claim 9 is indefinite, the Examiner poses the questions, “[w]hat does ‘logic’ mean? Computer logic exhibited in the form of an algorithm? Or a gate operator watching the sensor readings and using his/her own logic to open or close the gate?” Final Act. 2. Appeal 2019-006266 Application 14/775,082 4 Appellant does not address the rejection of claim 9. See Appeal Br. Accordingly, we summarily sustain this rejection.2 Rejection II–Pepperl and Jankovsky (Claims 1 and 2) The Examiner finds that Pepperl discloses many of the elements recited in claim 1, including a sensor system for differentiating between a vehicular and non-vehicular interruption, but does not “disclose that upon an interruption caused by a vehicle, said vehicle sensor signals the control arm to continue its motion from the open position to the closed position.” Final Act. 3. To address this deficiency, the Examiner finds Jankovsky teaches (i) a fail-safe mode that allows a user to escape a telescoping arm, thus preventing collision with the user, and (ii) a fail-secure mode that prevents users from entering a secure area upon detection of an unauthorized user. Final Act. 3–4 (citing Pepperl 2–3). The Examiner determines that because “Jankovsky teaches that the barrier can operate in failsafe mode to prevent collision with the user, much like Pepperl’s operation, and also that the barrier can operate in fail-secure mode to close no matter what to prevent unauthorized users from entry,” it would have been obvious “to modify Pepperl’s control in view of Jankovsky’s disclosure so that it operates in failsafe mode if a person is detected and that it operates in fail-secure mode if a vehicle is detected.” Id. at 4. 2 The Examiner’s Answer states “[e]very ground of rejection set forth in the Office action dated 7/25/2018 from which the appeal is taken is being maintained by the examiner except for the grounds of rejection (if any) listed under the subheading ‘WITHDRAWN REJECTIONS.’” Ans. 3. The Examiner’s Answer does not list any rejections as being withdrawn. See Ans. Appeal 2019-006266 Application 14/775,082 5 Appellant first argues: Among other things, neither reference discloses or suggests “a sensor system for differentiating between a vehicular and non- vehicular interruption, . . . including . . . a vehicle sensor positioned and configured to determine whether said interruption of the photo-beam sensor has been caused by a vehicle, and upon determining said interruption to be a vehicular interruption, said vehicle sensor signals the control arm to continue its motion from the open position to the closed position.” Appeal Br. 8. This argument does not identify Examiner error because the Examiner cites no single reference as disclosing all of the elements of claim 1 quoted by Appellant, and, instead, relies on a combination of Pepperl and Jankovsky to do so. See Final Act. 3–4. The Examiner provides a statement of reasoning as to why the combination would have been obvious, and Appellant’s argument above does not address this combination and reasoning. Appellant next argues Pepperl “does NOT disclose or suggest a sensor which is capable of signaling a gate control arm to continue its downward motion (during its motion from the open to closed position) if an (unauthorized) vehicle is present, and Jankovsky does not make up for the shortcomings of Pepperl in that regard.” Appeal Br. 9. Specifically, Appellant asserts, “nowhere in Jankovsky is there any mention of his telescoping arm continuing its motion from the open/retracted to closed/extended position in order to slam into and prevent an unauthorized vehicle from gaining access.” Id. In response, the Examiner reiterates that Jankovsky discloses both a fail-safe mode and a fail-secure mode. Ans. 4. The Examiner explains, “in Appeal 2019-006266 Application 14/775,082 6 fail-safe mode, the barrier opens/retracts to prevent a collision with the user, and in fail-secure mode, in order to exclude an unauthorized user from entering the secure area, the barrier must close into/onto the unauthorized user. The barrier must do that because Jankovsky does not present any other way to exclude an unauthorized user.” Id. In reply, Appellant argues that in “Jankovsky’s fail-secure mode, Jankovsky does not differentiate between a vehicle and non-vehicle (i.e., a person) interruption. Instead, Jankovsky’s telescoping arm would collide with a ‘user’ regardless of if that user was a person/non-vehicle or vehicle.” Reply Br. 8 (emphasis omitted). Appellant goes on to assert “Jankovsky certainly doesn’t appreciate Appellant’s logic for differentiating between a vehicular and non-vehicular interruption and merely has two modes for either preventing collision (fail-safe) or excluding entry (fail-secure) of a user, regardless of whether that user is a vehicle or a person.” Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted). Appellant’s argument does not point out any error in the Examiner’s finding (based on a comparison of Jankovsky’s fail-safe mode to Jankovsky’s fail-secure mode) that the fail-secure mode of Jankovsky closes the barrier in the event of detection of an unauthorized user. Indeed, in the Reply Brief, after focusing on whether Jankovsky discloses differentiating between a vehicular and non-vehicular interruption, Appellant appears to concede this point. See Reply Br. 8. “Instead, Jankovsky’s telescoping arm would collide with a ‘user’ regardless of if that user was a person/non- vehicle or vehicle.” Id. Nor does Appellant’s argument that Jankovsky does not distinguish between a vehicle and non-vehicle apprise us of Examiner error. In this Appeal 2019-006266 Application 14/775,082 7 regard, the Examiner relies on Pepperl, not Jankovsky, to teach “sensor intelligence [that] allows detection of direction and differentiation between people and vehicles.” Final Act. 3. Thus, Appellant’s argument on this point does not address the rejection as set forth in the Final Office Action. We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments in support of the patentability of claim 1, but find them unavailing. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1. Claim 2 falls with claim 1 inasmuch as Appellant makes no separate argument in support of the patentability of claim 2. See Appeal Br. 8–10. Rejection III–Pepperl and Polyakov (Claims 1, 2, 5, and 7–9) Appellant argues for the patentability of the claims subject to Rejection III, i.e., claims 1, 2, 5, and 7–9, as a group. Appeal Br. 12. We select claim 1 as representative of the group, and claims 2, 5, and 7–9 stand or fall with claim 1. The Examiner makes substantially the same findings regarding the disclosure of Pepperl as were made in Rejection II. See Final Act. 3–5. The Examiner relies on Polyakov to teach “a vehicle gate/barrier with technology that is able to determine whether a vehicle is authorized or not, and further that if the vehicle is unauthorized, the actuator closes the gate, moves the barrier to prevent passage of the vehicle.” Id. at 5 (citing Polyakov ¶ 13). The Examiner determines it would have been obvious “to modify Pepperl’s system to close the gate/barrier arm for a vehicle interruption in the case of an unauthorized vehicle.” Id. Appellant contends Polyakov’s mere mention that an actuator may be a barrier or gate is not sufficient to show that it would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill to combine Polyakov’s image capturing device Appeal 2019-006266 Application 14/775,082 8 with Pepperl’s gate in order to achieve Appellant’s claimed inventions, which differentiate between a vehicular and non- vehicular interruption and have further sensors/logic which close the control arm upon detection of an unauthorized vehicle. Appeal Br. 11–12. Thus, Appellant argues that Polyakov fails to differentiate between interruptions by vehicles and interruptions by non- vehicles. Appellant reiterates this argument on pages 10–11 of the Reply Brief. The Examiner relies on Pepperl, not Polyakov, to teach differentiation between vehicular and non-vehicular interruptions. See Final Act. 4. Thus, Appellant’s argument that Polyakov fails to disclose this feature is not commensurate with Rejection III. Accordingly, Appellant does not apprise us of Examiner error. We sustain the rejection of claim 1 as unpatentable over Pepperl and Polyakov. Claims 2, 5, and 7–9 fall with claim 1. Rejection IV–Pepperl, Polyakov, and Rihl (Claim 6) Appellant does not make arguments for the patentability of claim 6 aside from those discussed above regarding claim 1. See Appeal Br. 12. Accordingly, for the same reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 6. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed. Appeal 2019-006266 Application 14/775,082 9 DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 9 112, second paragraph Indefiniteness 9 1, 2 103(a) Pepperl, Jankovsky 1, 2 1, 2, 5, 7–9 103(a) Pepperl, Polyakov 1, 2, 5, 7–9 6 103(a) Pepperl, Polyakov, Rihl 6 Overall Outcome 1, 2, 5–9 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation