Richard P. Sheehan, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 13, 2009
0120091633 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 13, 2009)

0120091633

07-13-2009

Richard P. Sheehan, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Richard P. Sheehan,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120091633

Agency No. 6X000004908

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the agency's

decision dated January 22, 2009, dismissing his complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

621 et seq. In his complaint, complainant alleged that he was subjected

to discrimination on the bases of race (Caucasian), sex (male), age

(61 years at time of incident), and reprisal for prior protected EEO

activity under a statute that was unspecified in the record when:

1. On August 25, 2008, complainant was not selected as a Contract EEO

Investigator.

The agency dismissed the claim for failure to state a claim on the grounds

that complainant is a contractor and not a federal employee or applicant

for federal employment. On appeal, complainant argues that the agency

should be viewed as a joint employer and as a "staffing firm."

The regulation set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1) provides, in

relevant part, that an agency shall dismiss a complaint that fails to

state a claim. An agency shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved

employee or applicant for employment who believes that he or she has been

discriminated against by that agency because of race, color, religion,

sex, national origin, age or disabling condition. 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.103,

.106(a).

The Commission must first determine whether the complainant was an

agency employee or applicant for employment within the meaning of

Section 717(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an amended,

42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) et. seq. The Commission has applied the common

law of agency test to determine whether an individual is an agency

employee under Title VII. See Ma v. Department of Health and Human

Services, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01962389 & 01962390 (May 29, 1998) (citing

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992).

Specifically, the Commission will look to the following non-exhaustive

list of factors: (1) the extent of the employer's right to control the

means and manner of the worker's performance; (2) the kind of occupation,

with reference to whether the work usually is done under the direction

of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervision; (3) the

skill required in the particular occupation; (4) whether the "employer"

or the individual furnishes the equipment used and the place of work;

(5) the length of time the individual has worked; (6) the method of

payment, whether by time or by the job; (7) the manner in which the

work relationship is terminated, i.e., by one or both parties, with or

without notice and explanation; (8) whether annual leave is afforded; (9)

whether the work is an integral part of the business of the "employer";

(10) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (11) whether

the "employer" pays social security taxes; and (12) the intention of the

parties. See Ma, supra. In Ma, the Commission noted that the common-law

test contains, "no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied

to find the answer...[A]ll of the incidents of the relationship must be

assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive." Id.

Furthermore, under the Commission's Enforcement Guidance: Application of

EEO Laws to Contingent Workers Placed by Temporary Employment Agencies

and Other Staffing Firms, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (December 3, 1997)

(hereinafter referred to as the "Guidance") (available at www.eeoc.gov.),

we have also recognized that a "joint employment" relationship may exist

where both the agency and the "staffing firm" may be deemed employers.

Similar to the analysis set forth above, a determination of joint

employment requires an assessment of the comparative amount and type

of control the "staffing firm, and the agency each maintain over

complainant's work. Thus, a federal agency will qualify as a joint

employer of an individual if it has the requisite means and manner of

control over the individual's work under the Ma criteria, whether or not

the individual is on the federal payroll. See Guidance, supra at 11.

The FAD noted the following: individuals selected for the Contract

Investigator positions would be home-based independent contractors located

throughout the country; Investigators would be paid on a "per case"

basis; Investigators would provide their own workspace and essential

equipment; taxes and benefits, including health benefits and leave, were

the responsibility of the Contractor; and the Contractor would not be

eligible to participate in the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance or

Health Insurance programs. These facts are confirmed by the Solicitation

Notice advertising the positions as well as by the Statement of Work and

Ordering Agreement "which govern the relationship between the individuals

selected for the contracting opportunity," Agency's Appellate Brief,

p. 2, and the agency. In addition, the Solicitation Notice revealed that

there was no guarantee of work or of the number of cases assigned. See

Complaint File. Complainant does not deny these facts.

Complainant on appeal cites Chamberlain v. Department of the Army,

EEOC Appeal No. 0120061315 (June 26, 2006) to support his contention

that the agency should be viewed as a joint employer. However the

facts in Chamberlain differ from the present case. In Chamberlain, the

agency "provided training, supervision, workspace and equipment, and

maintained careful records of complainant's work hours and absences."

Id. In addition agency management conducted verbal counseling with

the complainant, negotiated alternative hours in order to accommodate

her needs, and disciplined her when her attendance record was deemed

unsatisfactory." See id. Because of these and other actions, we

found that the agency "exercise[d] . . . supervisory authority over the

complainant." Id. Such factors, however, do not apply to the Contract

Investigator position at issue herein.

Based on the legal standards and criteria set for herein, we find that

complainant has not met his burden of establishing that the agency

exercised sufficient control over the complainant's position to qualify

as the employer or joint employer of complainant. See generally, Baker

v. Department of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A45313 (March 16, 2006).

Accordingly, we find that the agency's dismissal was appropriate and we

AFFIRM the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M1208)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,

Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request

to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail

within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 13, 2009

__________________

Date

2

0120091633

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

4

0120091633