Richard L. Miller, Complainant,v.Ellen Engleman Conners, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 8, 2006
01a44745 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 8, 2006)

01a44745

03-08-2006

Richard L. Miller, Complainant, v. Ellen Engleman Conners, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, Agency.


Richard L. Miller v. National Transportation Safety Board

01A44745

March 8, 2006

.

Richard L. Miller,

Complainant,

v.

Ellen Engleman Conners,

Chairman,

National Transportation Safety Board,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A44745

Agency No. 100-AO-2011

Hearing No. 100-2003-0789X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

For the following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final

order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Financial Management Specialist,

GS-14, assigned to the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, located

in Washington, D.C., filed a formal EEO complaint on March 13, 2002,

alleging that the agency discriminated against him on the bases of sex

(male) and age (D.O.B: 03-24-1949) when:

from April 6, 2000 to September 12, 2001, he was not selected for

five different positions that were advertised on the following vacancy

announcements:

a. WA-TB-029

b. WA01-010

c. WA-TB-1-007

d. WA-TB-1-055

e. WA-TB-1-110

he did not receive a classified position description that describes

the duties of his current position;

in January 2002, he received a performance evaluation of �Excellent�

rather than �Outstanding� for the rating period that ended May 30,

2001; and

he was denied use of office equipment, such as cell phone, laptop,

etc.,

On April 24, 2002, the agency issued a partial dismissal. The agency

accepted for investigation claims (1), (2), and (3). The agency

dismissed claim (4) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107 (a)(2) on the

grounds that the claim was not raised with an EEO Counselor and that

it was not like or related to a matter for which complainant underwent

EEO counseling.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ).

On February 18, 2004, the AJ issued an �Order Defining Claims to be

Adjudicated� affirming the agency's procedural dismissal of claim

(4). In this same order, the AJ also essentially dismissed claim (2)

for failure to state a claim, finding that the absence of an accurate

written position description, is insufficient to render complainant

aggrieved. The AJ further dismissed complainant's non-selections

under vacancy announcements: WA-TB-029; WA01-010; WA-TB-1-007; and

WA-TB-1-055, for untimely EEO Counselor contact. See 29 C.F.R. �

1614.107(a)(2). Specifically, the AJ found that the above non-selections

constitute discrete acts rather than a continuing violation, and that

complainant had an obligation to raise each of these non-selections with

an EEO Counselor within the 45-day time limit. The only non-selection

that remained to be adjudicated was the Operations Manager position that

was advertised under vacancy announcements WA-TB-1-110. The AJ requested

supplemental information on this non-selection, specifically, the AJ

wanted to know whether complainant timely raised this matter with an

EEO counselor. Finally, the AJ specified claim (3) to be adjudicated.

On April 6, 2004, the AJ issued a �Order of Partial Dismissal.� The AJ

dismissed complainant's non-selection claim for the position of Operations

Manager based on untimely EEO Counselor contact. Specifically, the

AJ found that complainant was informed of his non-selection in October

2001, and that the deadline for contacting the EEO Counselor expired in

December 2001. The AJ further found that complainant contacted an EEO

counselor in January 2002.<1>

The AJ issued a decision without a hearing on May 19, 2004, on the

remaining claim: whether the agency discriminated against complainant on

the bases of his sex (male) and age (D.O.B: 3/24/49) when in January 2002,

complainant received a performance evaluation of �Excellent� rather than

�Outstanding� for the rating period that ended May 30, 2001. The AJ

concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of sex

or age discrimination. Specifically, the AJ found that complainant failed

to demonstrate that similarly situated employees, who were either female

or significantly younger than complainant, received a higher performance

appraisal rating than complainant. The AJ also found that complainant

was the only non-supervisory, professional employee for whom complainant's

supervisor (S1) prepared an evaluation during the 2000/2001 rating period.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

Complainant makes no new contentions on appeal, and the agency requests

that we affirm its final order.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Procedural Dismissals

Claim 1

We address first, the untimeliness of complainant's claims of

non-selection. The Supreme Court has held that discrete acts

such as hiring, firing and promotions, that fall outside of the

limitations period are not actionable and no recovery is available.

National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).

Even if the discrete activity is arguably related to other discriminatory

acts that occur within the filing period, they are not actionable if

untimely raised. Id. See also, EEOC Compliance Manual 915.003 Section

2: Threshold Issues, Timeliness 2-IV (Issued May 12, 2000). However,

as the court recognized, Title VII does not bar an employee from using

the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.

Morgan, at 113.

Applying these principles, the Commission affirms the AJ's dismissal of

claim (1) for untimely EEO contact. More specifically, complainant's

claim of discrimination when he was not selected for several positions

concerns discrete acts. Under our regulations, complainant must initiate

EEO contact within 45 days of an alleged discriminatory act. 29 C.F.R. �

1614. 105(a)(1). In this case, complainant initially made contact with an

EEO counselor allegedly on January 2, 2002. The incidents that comprise

each non-selection occurred between April 2000 through October 2001,

when complainant became aware of his non-selection for the last position

for which he applied. Therefore, we find that these allegations were

properly dismissed by the AJ.

Claim (2)

We concur with the AJ's determination that complainant was not aggrieved

when he did not receive a position description until April 22, 2002.

We find no evidence in the record that complainant suffered a direct harm

affecting a term, condition or privilege of employment for which there

is a remedy. See Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request

No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994). Moreover, the record reveals that the

delay was caused by complainant's failure to cooperate in the process.

Specifically, the record shows that the process started in October 2001,

and that management went back and forth for months trying to get feedback

from complainant as to the information to be included in his position

description.

Claim 4

The regulation set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614. 107(a)(2) states, in

pertinent part, that an agency shall dismiss a complaint which raises a

matter that has not been brought to the attention of an EEO Counselor,

and is not like or related to a matter on which the complainant has

received counseling. A later claim is "like or related" to the original

complaint if the later claim or complaint adds to or clarifies the

original complaint and could reasonably been expected to grow out of

the original complaint during the investigation. See Scher v. United

Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05940702 (May 30, 1995). We find

no indication that complainant raised the denial of office equipment

claim with an EEO Counselor prior to the filing of his formal complaint.

Moreover, the denial of office equipment claim does not add to or clarify

the issues raised with the EEO Counselor. Therefore, we agree with the

AJ's decision affirming the agency's dismissal of claim (4).

Accordingly, we affirm the AJ's procedural dismissal of claims (1),

(2), and (4).

Decision Without a Hearing

Claim 3

The Commission's review of a decision without a hearing is de novo,

meaning that it is done without regard to the legal or factual conclusions

of the previous decision maker. EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9

(Section VI) (Revised 1999). The Commission's regulations allow an AJ

to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there

is no genuine issue of material fact . 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 (g). This

regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth

in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme

Court has held that summary judgment is only appropriate where a court

determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards

that apply to the case, there exist no genuine issue of material fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling

on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh

the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues

for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be

believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must

be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact

is �genuine� if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could

find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st

Cir. 1988). A fact is �material� if it has the potential to affect

the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing

conflicting evidence, the issuance of a decision without a hearing

is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without a hearing only

upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for

summary disposition. See Petty v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal

No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).

In general, claims alleging disparate treatment are examined under the

tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). A complainant must first establish a prima facie

case of discrimination. He can do this by establishing that similarly

situated individuals outside of his protected classes were treated more

favorably than he was or by setting forth some other evidence from which

a reasonable fact-finder could draw an inference of discrimination.

See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).

Complainant failed to establish that any similarly situated employee

outside of his protected group was treated more favorably under similar

circumstances. Specifically, complainant failed to establish that either

females or younger employees, received higher performance appraisal

ratings than him. Further, he did not set forth any other evidence

from which we could draw an inference of discrimination. Accordingly,

we conclude that complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case

of sex or age discrimination.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that a decision

without a hearing was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material

fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the

relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,

and laws. Further, construing the evidence to be most favorable to

complainant, we note that complainant failed to present evidence that

any of the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus

toward complainant's protected classes.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 8, 2006

Date

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision

was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify

that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative

(if applicable), and the agency on:

__________________

Date

______________________________

Equal Opportunity Assistan1Complainant alleged that he first contacted

an EEO Counselor on January 2, 2002, and the agency stated that the

contact was on January 14, 2002; however, the AJ determined that it is

irrelevant because even assuming that complainant contacted the EEO

Counselor as early as January 2, 2002, his contact did not meet the

regulatory 45-day time limit.