Richard A. Irvin, Complainant,v.Bill Richardson, Secretary, Department of Energy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 8, 2000
01991867 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 8, 2000)

01991867

09-08-2000

Richard A. Irvin, Complainant, v. Bill Richardson, Secretary, Department of Energy, Agency.


Richard A. Irvin v. Department of Energy

01991867

September 8, 2000

Richard A. Irvin, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01991867

v. ) Agency No. DOE-98-046HQ/PAM

)

Bill Richardson, )

Secretary, )

Department of Energy, )

Agency. )

____________________________________)

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal of a final agency decision concerning

his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of

physical disability (narcolepsy with cataplexy and vision loss), in

violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

791, et seq.<1> Complainant alleges he was discriminated against when:

(1) he was denied a flextime schedule with late arrival; and (2) he was

denied clerical assistance as a reasonable accommodation. The appeal is

accepted pursuant to 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)(to be codified

at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). For the following reasons, the Commission

REVERSES the final agency decision in part.

BACKGROUND

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant

was employed as a Procurement Analyst, GS-1102-14 at the agency's

Washington, D.C. headquarters facility. Complainant alleged that he

had narcolepsy with cataplexy. The condition caused the complainant to

experience excessive and sometimes uncontrollable daytime sleepiness.

Cataplexy resulted in episodes of muscle weakness, sudden loss in muscle

control and total body collapse. As a result of his condition, the

complainant was unable to awaken early in the morning and to meet an

early arrival time. He worked an alternate work schedule with hours

from 8:00a.m. to 5:30 p.m. and alternate Mondays off. At some point

in time not entirely clear from the record, the complainant adjusted

his hours with the consent of his supervisor to 8:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m

as an accommodation to his inability to awaken early. He remained on

the alternate work schedule. The complainant was also allowed to nap

in the Health Unit for two 20-30 minute periods during the work day due

to the daytime drowsiness he experienced.

In 1997, the complainant experienced difficulty arriving to work by 8:30

a.m. He requested his supervisor (S1)(no disability) to make additional

adjustments to his work schedule by allowing him to start work at

9:30, to work later than 6:00 p.m and to remain on a flextime schedule.

S1 refused, stating that he was concerned about being able to verify

that the complainant worked after 6:00 when all other employees and

supervisors had left. S1 offered the complainant the option of going

off of the alternate work schedule and working from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00

p.m. Monday through Friday.

The complainant also contended that he was required to submit medical

documentation whenever he took sick leave even though it was known he

suffered from a chronic condition. If he did not have the documentation

or if he was not under a doctor's care, he was required to take annual

leave.

Regarding the complainant's allegation that he had not been provided with

clerical assistance, the complainant had requested the assistance of a

clerk as an accommodation to his vision problems. His condition consisted

of congenital estropia (muscle loss) in the left eye with significantly

reduced vision brought on by narcolepsy. The condition inhibited his

ability to see handwritten changes of his supervisors to his documents.

S1 agreed to the complainant's request for a clerk to type and incorporate

his supervisors' changes and made his own clerical assistant available

to him. The complainant alleged, however, that the clerk refused to

read or to type for him and that S1 failed to intervene on his behalf

and failed to carry out his agreement to provide the accommodation.

Finally, the complainant contended that supervisors and co-workers made

repeated derogatory statements about his condition which constituted

unlawful harassment.

Believing he was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed a complaint on January 27, 1998.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant requested that

the agency issue a final agency decision. In his request, complainant

indicated that compensatory damages was part of the relief requested

for the alleged discrimination.

The agency concluded that complainant's claim of a disabling condition

was well-documented. Therefore, the agency did not dispute that the

complainant was a qualified person with a disability who was entitled

to some reasonable accommodation. The agency concluded that its

denial of individualized clerical support and an extended work day

were not unreasonable and as such it did not discriminate against

the complainant. The complainant's claims of derogatory remarks by

co-workers and supervisors were found to be unsubstantiated based on

their unrefuted denials that such remarks were made. The agency also

noted that the complainant was granted disability retirement and left

his employment effective August 14, 1998.

On appeal, complainant raised many of the same arguments he stated during

the investigation but also argued that the agency had not shown it would

cause undue hardship to grant his request for extended work hours or for

additional clerical assistance. He also argued that the agency's refusal

to extend his hours for reasons related to safety were not raised before

thereby not allowing him time to respond. He questioned the veracity of

the agency's safety claims as well. The agency requests that we affirm

its final decision.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination,

complainant must show that he is a qualified individual with a disability

and that the agency treated him less favorably than individuals not within

his protected group or it failed to make a reasonable accommodation to

his disability. 29 C.F.R.� 1630.1 et. seq. A qualified individual with

a disability is one who has an impairment which substantially limits a

major life activity but who can perform the essential functions of their

job with or without a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R.� 1630.2(m).

In this case, we find that the complainant has an impairment identified as

narcolepsy with cataplexy and vision loss which substantially limited his

ability to see, to sleep and to stay awake during the day. The medical

records and literature described narcolepsy as a chronic neurological

disorder marked by excessive daytime sleepiness. Cataplexy is considered

a hallmark symptom of narcolepsy, and is characterized as muscle

weakness, or the sudden loss of muscle control and total body collapse.

The complainant's vision loss in the left eye was a childhood condition

which was exacerbated by the effects of narcolepsy.

We also find that the complainant was a qualified individual with a

disability in that he was able to perform the essential functions of his

position from the time the agency was aware of his condition in 1995 to

the time he took sick leave in February 1998.<2> Our finding is based

on the lack of any evidence that the complainant was unable to perform

his job. We also rely on the evidence in the record which indicates

he was rated highly successful in his 1997 performance evaluation and

fully successful in his 1998 performance evaluation. The fact that the

complainant left his employment because of his disability retirement

is not relevant to our finding because it was based on a different

definition of disability. See, EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Effect

of Representations Made in Applications for Benefits on the Determination

of Whether a Person is a �Qualified Individual with a Disability� Under

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, No. 915.002 (2/12/97).

The complainant has cited four reasons why he believes the agency

discriminated against him based on his disability by failing to grant

him reasonable accommodations and by condoning or making derogatory

remarks about his disability. For the reasons described below, we find

the agency failed in some respects to grant reasonable accommodations

but in other respects, the agency acted properly.

First, the complainant claims he was denied a flextime schedule with

late arrival and late departure time. We find that the agency was not

required to grant the complainant both a flextime schedule as well as

late departure times. The agency was willing to grant the complainant

a late arrival time of 9:30 a.m. if he went off of the alternate work

schedule. In this respect, the agency was not required to grant the

exact accommodation requested by the complainant, only an accommodation

which was effective. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable

Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities

Act No. 915.002 (3/1/99) p. 17. The complainant's argument that he should

have been permitted to stay on the alternate work schedule because he

usually had doctor's appointments on his �off� day was not a sufficient

reason to override the agency's suggested accommodation.

Second, the complainant claims he was denied sufficient clerical

help to accommodate his reduced vision caused in part by narcolepsy.

The record reflects that the clerk charged with helping the complainant

admitted she did not type for the complainant, except for envelopes.

Her testimony revealed that S1 did not require her to type documents for

the complainant by her statement that �everyone did their own typing.�

Her statement indicates all too clearly that she was not given any

responsibility to type the complainant's work or that her responsibility

was minimal. The agency makes no showing that such an accommodation would

have imposed an undue hardship. Furthermore, the agency's provision of an

oversized monitor was not enough of an accommodation, by itself, because

it did not assist the complainant in reading the handwritten comments of

his supervisors. Therefore, we find that the agency failed to provide

the complainant with an effective accommodation for his reduced vision

brought on by narcolepsy.

Third, the complainant claims that he was unfairly required to submit

medical documentation for his frequent lateness which was caused by

narcolepsy and that he was required to take annual leave if he did not.

He stated that under the collective bargaining agreement, he was not

required to continuously provide medical documentation when it was

known he suffered from a chronic condition. The record supports the

complainant's claim because S1 concedes he changed a sick leave request

to annual leave and after researching the issue he changed all annual

leave requests to sick leave. Although S1 claimed it only happened once,

we conclude that his own testimony suggests it happened many more times.

Furthermore, the time keeper did not refute the complainant's claim that

she continued to demand medical documentation to support his sick leave

requests for his morning lateness. We find this was unreasonable and

that the complainant should have been granted the use of accrued paid

leave as an accommodation. Id. p. 26.

Lastly, the complainant claims that his co-workers and supervisors made

derogatory statements which created a hostile work environment or which

were otherwise prohibited under the law. From the record we are aware of

three statements - two made by supervisors and one made by a co-worker

which essentially characterized the complainant's inability to awaken

early as being related to drinking and staying out too late. S1 allegedly

cursed at the complainant during an argument about an accommodation and

a higher level supervisor used profanity after receiving information

about the complainant's condition. We find that these three instances,

although inappropriate, were not sufficiently severe and pervasive to

constitute a hostile work environment actionable under the law.

The Commission has found that claims of a few isolated incidents of

alleged harassment usually are not sufficient to state a harassment claim.

See Phillips v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960030

(July 12, 1996); Banks v. Health and Human Services, EEOC Request

No. 05940481 (February 16, 1995). The complainant must show that the

discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work

environment abusive to employees because of a characteristic protected

by statute. Rideout v. Department of the Army, EEOC Request No. 01933866

(November 22, 1995)( citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,

22 (1993)) req. for recons. den. EEOC Request No. 05970995 (May 20, 1999).

We also consider whether the statements were frequent and whether they

unreasonably interfered with an employee's work performance. Harris,

510 U.S. at 23. Applying these criteria, we find that the statements

complained of do not rise to the level of discriminatory harassment.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we REVERSE in part and

AFFIRM in part the agency's final decision.

ORDER

The agency is hereby ORDERED to carry out the following:

1) The issues of compensatory damages, attorney's fees and costs

are REMANDED to the agency. The agency shall conduct a supplemental

investigation of the compensatory damages issue. Complainant,

through counsel, shall submit a request for attorney's fees and costs

in accordance with the Attorney's Fees paragraph set forth below.

No later than sixty (60) days after the agency's receipt of the

attorney's fees statement and supporting affidavit, the agency shall

issue a final agency decision addressing the issues of attorney's fees,

costs, and compensatory damages. The agency shall submit a copy of the

final decision to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below.

The agency will provide or make available, eight (8) hours of training

to S1 and the complainant's second and third level supervisors on

the requirements of employers under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (as

amended) and the associated regulations and guidances available on the

subject of reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at its Headquarters facility in Washington,

D.C., copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the

complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,

the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a

civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior

to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a

civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph

below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407

and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the

underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �

2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)

(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1199)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to

an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the

complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall

be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of

fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS

THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

September 8, 2000

Date Frances M. Hart, Executive Officer,

Executive Secretariat

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time,

the ADA regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints

of disability discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's

website: www.eeoc.gov.

2 The complainant left the agency on disability retirement in August 1998

after being on sick leave beginning in February 1998.