Rhodes St. Clair Buick, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 20, 1979

242 N.L.R.B. 1320 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Rhodes St. Clair Buick, Inc. and Local Lodge 2639 of
the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO. Case 9-CA-12403
June 20, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND MURPHY
On March 7, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Almira Abbot Stevenson issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt her recommended Order, as modified herein.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified be-
low, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Rhodes
St. Clair Buick, Inc., Charleston, West Virginia, shall
take the action set forth in the said recommended
Order, as so modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a):
"(a) Upon request, bargain collectively in good
faith concerning wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment with Local Lodge 2639 of
the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive rep-
resentative of the above-described appropriate unit
and, if an understanding is reached, embody such un-
derstanding in a signed agreement. Regard the Union
as exclusive agent as if the initial year of certification
has been extended for an additional year from the
commencement of bargaining pursuant hereto."
I we construe Respondent's exceptions as containing exceptions to certain
credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's
established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions
with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the rel-
evant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry
Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951).
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing her
findings.
2 We shall amend the Administrative Law Judge's recommended bargain-
ing order to require that any understanding reached be embodied in a signed
agreement.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively in
good faith concerning wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment with Local
Lodge 2639 of the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,
as the exclusive representative of our employees
in the following appropriate unit:
All service department and parts department
employees, including mechanics, body per-
sons, painters, combination persons, service
writers, parts persons, counter persons, parts
delivery persons, lube persons, washers, pol-
ishers, car jockeys, new and used car prepara-
tion persons, porters, dispatchers and plant
clerical employees; excluding all office clerical
employees, salesmen, service managers, parts
managers, body shop managers, watch per-
sons, guards and supervisors as defined in the
Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Sec-
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively in
good faith concerning wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment witi' Local
Lodge 2639 of the International Associ{.:on of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,
as the exclusive representative of the appropriate
unit described above and, if an understanding is
reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement. WE WILL also regard the Union as
exclusive agent as if the initial year of certifica-
tion has been extended for an additional year
from the commencement of bargaining.
RHODES ST. CLAIR BUICK, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ALMIRA ABBOT STEVENSON, Administrative L.aw Judge:
This case was heard in Charleston, West Virginia, Septem-
ber 25. 1978. The charge was filed and served on Respon-
dent April 10, 1978; the complaint was issued May 22.
1978. and duly answered by Respondent.
242 NLRB No. 181
1320
RHODES ST. CLAIR BUICK
This issue is whether or not Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, by refusing to bargain in good faith with the
Union. For the reasons fully set forth below, I conclude
that Respondent so violated the Act.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and upon full consideration of
the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is a West Virginia corporation engaged
in the retail sale and servicing of automobiles at its Charles-
ton, West Virginia, facility. During the past 12 months Re-
spondent received gross revenues in excess of S500,000 and
purchased and received goods valued in excess of S50,000
which were shipped to it directly from outside West Vir-
ginia. I conclude that Respondent is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce
and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Charging Party Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Ill. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts'
The Union was certified by the Board on August 31,
1977, as the exclusive representative of Respondent's
Charleston, West Virginia, employees in the following unit,
which I find appropriate:
All service department and parts department em-
ployees, including mechanics, body persons, paint-
ers, combination persons, service writers, parts per-
sons, counter persons, parts delivery persons, lube
persons, washers, polishers, car jockeys, new and
used car preparation persons, porters, dispatchers
and plant clerical employees; excluding all office
clerical employees, salesmen, service managers, parts
managers, body shop managers, watch persons,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
On September 2, 1977, the Union addressed a letter to
Respondent's vice president and admitted supervisor and
agent, Gene St. Clair, requesting . meeting at an early date
to begin negotiations. On September 15, St. Clair responded
that he intended to contact his attorneys to secure a conve-
nient date for a meeting. On October 18 the Union again
requested that negotiations begin, suggesting October 24 as
I In resolving credibility issues I have accepted some but not all of the
testimony of most witnesses. *Nlothing is more common in all kinds of
judicial decisions than to believe some and not all" of what a witnes says.
N.L.R.B. v. Universal Camera Corporation, 179 F.2d 749, 754 (2d Cir. 1950).
the date for the first meeting of the parties, promising to
present a complete contract proposal at the first session,
and requesting certain information about current employee
wages and benefits. St. Clair responded on October 20 that
the suggested date of October 24 was not convenient be-
cause of prior commitments, and informed the Union he
could meet on three dates in November-the Ist, 16th, and
17th-all other dates being impossible because of prior
commitments. Two days later, on October 26, St. Clair con-
firmed the first meeting date and time as November , 1977,
at 1:30 p.m. and requested that meetings be limited to 1-1/2
hours. Respondent retained Fred Sachs of Roanoke, Vir-
ginia. to represent it in negotiations, and it's suggested
meeting time and duration were based on the airline sched-
ules to enable Sachs to fly from Roanoke to Charleston,
where the meetings were held, and back the same day. The
Union's head negotiator was Grand Lodge Representative
Abraham Tosti who was accompanied by International
Representative C. E. Rogers and a committee of Respon-
dent's employees.
The first six negotiating sessions were held at the follow-
ing dates and times:'
11/1/77
12/8/77
1/5/78
1/6/78
1/24/78
2/16/78
1:30-2:50
1:30-4:15
1:42-4:11
1:57-3:48
1:30-4:10
1:30-3:55
As promised, the Union presented a proposed collective-
bargaining agreement at the first meeting November I,
1977. Portions of the proposal were illegible, and the Union
subsequently provided a clean copy with an index. At the
December 8. 1977, session, the parties began going through
the proposal section by section, Respondent accepting, re-
jecting, or suggesting modifications of each, and the parties
tentatively okaying (TOK) some provisions. Respondent's
representatives gave reasons for the position taken on prac-
tically all sections of the proposed contract. After each ses-
sion the Union typed those provisions which had been ten-
tatively okayed, and at the next meeting they were reviewed
and initialed. The Union also upon occasion presented writ-
ten counterproposal sections. Most of the Union's contract
proposal was discussed during these meetings, including a
discussion of some of the Union's economic demands on
February 16, 1978.'
A meeting scheduled for November 23, 1977, was called
off by Sachs when his flight was canceled because of
weather conditions. The union representatives arrived 12
minutes late for the January 5, 1978, meeting and 27 min-
utes late for the January 6, 1978, meeting. It is undisputed
that at practically every session the Union protested the
2 The times of the sessions are based on Sach's testimony. as he had rec-
ords, whereas Tosti's testimony consisted only of generalized estimates. I do
not, however, credit Sachs that the January 6. 1978, meeting was called for
1:30 p.m. instead of a morning hour at the Union's rather than Respondent's
suggestion, as Tost s testimony that Respondent determined the time seems
more likely in all the circumstances. It is undisputed that the parties agreed
to defer economic issues until proposals on all other subjects had been dis-
cussed.
3 Based on Sach's testimony which Tosti failed to flatly deny.
1321
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
scheduling of the meetings and requested they be held more
frequently and remain in session longer; and that Respon-
dent refused to meet more frequently because of St. Clair's
other business commitments. On January 11, 1978, Tosti
addressed a letter to St. Clair putting these protests in writ-
ing and requesting at least two meetings a week of at least 6
hours each commencing January 30, 1978.
During the period covered by the first six meetings, Re-
spondent informed the Union, at the first meeting, that it
was assembling the information regarding employee wages
and benefits requested in the Union's October 18, 1977,
letter and would provide the information at a later date; it
addressed a letter to the Union dated December 15, 1977,
supplying some of the information; the Union complained
that fringe-benefit information was incomplete, no informa-
tion had been supplied with respect to wage rates of indi-
vidual employees, and some seniority dates did not appear
to be correct; at the January 24, 1978, negotiating session,
St. Clair said an employee was gathering the additional in-
formation requested: in a letter dated February 21, 1978,
Respondent supplied more detailed information, which still
did not include individual employee pay rates and which
the Union contended contained incorrect seniority dates
and vacation information.
By the end of the February 16, 1978, meeting, the parties
had tentatively okayed provisions dealing with the follow-
ing subjects: recognition; probationary period; notification
of steward when a new employee starts work; recognition
of stewards and union representatives for processing griev-
ances; one steward each for body and service shops; no
discrimination; 5 days' notice or 5 days' pay at Employer's
discretion for all but certain specified discharges, with the
right to grieve; double time for Sunday work; computation
of vacation pay: 30 days advance request for vacation, and
seniority prevails in a conflict between employees as to va-
cation dates; six holidays; computation of holiday pay; ex-
cuses for not working day before and day after holidays;
holidays during workweek counted as days worked for
overtime pay; coffee breaks as in past: three-step grievance
procedure; retention of seniority during I year's absence for
sickness or injury; seniority based on job classifications; 5
days' notice or 5 days' pay for layoff; 4 hours' reporting
pay; adequate sanitary conditions and as required by law;
two bulletin boards; contract binding on assigns; savings
clause; Employer to provide Union and employees with
copies of benefit plans; computation of time spent on jobs
not covered by the manufacturer's manual; Employer to
provide stewards with copy of flat-rate manuals.
The next negotiating session was scheduled for March 9,
1978, at 1:30 p.m.
At the start of business on March 9, Sachs telephoned
Tosti that his flight from Roanoke to Charleston had been
canceled. When Sachs inquired about a future meeting,
Tosti voiced the opinion that the negotiations were merely
an exercise in futility in view of the infrequency of the
meetings and the short time spent in them. Tosti informed
Sachs there had been a union membership meeting the eve-
ning before and the members voted to request the Em-
ployer to draft a complete contract proposal which it felt it
could live with and present it to the Union at a meeting to
be scheduled during the week of March 26 for the members
to vote on.' No future meeting date was agreed to, and
Respondent submitted no contract proposal within the pe-
riod designated by the Union. On April 3, 1978, the em-
ployees struck. No meetings were requested or held during
the strike, and the employees returned to work May 2,
1978.
Grand Lodge Representative Donald Harbron took over
from Tosti as the Union's chief negotiator, and there were
three more negotiating meetings between the parties-June
21, August I. and August 31, 1978.5
The June 21 meeting began at 1:05 p.m. and ended at 2
p.m. Respondent announced it had not prepared a pro-
posed contract because of changed conditions occasioned
by the strike and asked the Union's position on its original
proposals. The Union voiced its adherence to the sections
which had been tentatively okayed and its hope that those
provisions would be embodied in Respondent's proposed
contract and stated it had abandoned its request for a union
shop and dues checkoff. Respondent announced it would
not be prepared with a contract proposal until August 31
which would be the earliest time St. Clair and counsel could
get together to draft a proposal because of the press of
business. At the urging of the Union, Respondent then
agreed to meet August 1, 1978, and present its proposed
contract.
At the August I meeting, St. Clair announced he was
considering merit increases for two or three employees who
he and the supervisors felt were underpaid, and because of
inflation; but he was not prepared to tell the Union the
names of the employees, their classifications, or the amount
of increases under consideration; the Union responded that
this was a matter to be negotiated. Respondent then pre-
sented its proposed contract. The Union representatives
read quickly through it and agreed to study the proposal.
Sachs testified that Respondent's representatives pre-
pared the proposal from scratch, with no consideration
given to provisions theretofore tentatively okayed. The pro-
posal incorporated provisions covering recognition, no dis-
crimination, double time for Sunday work, method of com-
puting vacation and holiday pay, bulletin boards, and
probationary period which appeared to conform substan-
tially with the provisions the parties had previously tenta-
tively okayed on those subjects. All other provisions incor-
porated in Respondent's proposed contract, including
grievance procedure, were different from provisions tenta-
tively okayed on the same subject matters which had been
discussed but upon which no agreement had been reached.
Among these were jury pay, or subjects not alluded to in
prior discussions between the parties, and a prohibition
against posting anything critical "of the Company or of
employees or of others" on the bulletin boards. The pro-
posal provided that all wages and benefits would remain the
same and contained no duration provision.
Sachs explained that the reason no consideration was
given in drafting Respondent's proposed contract to the
4 Based on the credited testimony of Tosti. I do not credit conflicting
testimony of Sachs in view of Tosti's credible denials and the probabilities in
light of the record as a whole.
I The content of these meetings represents an amalgam of the testimonies
given by Harbron and Sachs. Where conflicts occur. I consider Harbron the
more reliable with regard to matters he could recall.
1322
RHODES ST. CLAIR BUICK
tentatively okayed provisions was changed conditions
brought about by the monthlong strike during which there
had been a loss of business, all of which had still not been
recovered at the time of the hearing, and because the Com-
pany was in a stronger position vis-a-vis the Union after the
strike. Sachs conceded that most of the provisions of Re-
spondent's August I contract proposal merely reduced to
writing existing wages and working conditions. The only
additional benefits offered were recognition of the Union,
appointment of one union steward, bulletin boards, a writ-
ten grievance procedure (without arbitration), formal se-
niority and jury-pay systems, bumping rights, advance no-
tice for layoff and overtime, and job posting.6
The last meeting was held August 31, 1978, from 1:15
until 3:10 p.m. St. Clair provided oral information on the
names, classifications, and amounts of wage increases
given. Harbron called Respondent's proposed contract a
travesty, but he said the Union would give it serious consid-
eration if it was of a short-term duration, particularly if for
I year. After a caucus, Respondent proposed a 5-year term.
The Union responded that such a term was too long and
asked about wage reopeners. Respondent refused to agree
to a wage-reopening clause but offered to continue when
possible its current policy of periodically reviewing employ-
ees for merit increases and, after another caucus, proposed
a 4-year term. The union representatives said it was still too
long a term but they would submit the contract to a vote of
their members.
That evening the Union advised Sachs by telephone that
its members voted to reject Respondent's proposed con-
tract. Although Respondent subsequently offered, by letter,
to reduce the term to 3 years, the Union did not respond
and has requested no further meetings. Sachs testified that 3
years is the longest term he has ever obtained for a contract
during the 8 years he has been engaged in negotiating col-
lective-bargaining agreements.
B. Conclusions
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees," and Section 8(d) pro-
vides, "to bargain collectively is the performance of the mu-
tual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the ex-
ecution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or re-
quire the making of a concession." It is now established
that in a case such as this alleging a refusal to bargain
collectively in good faith,
. . .the question is whether it is to be inferred from the
totality of the employer's conduct that he went through the
motions of negotiation as an elaborate pretense with no
sincere desire to reach an agreement if possible, or that it
6 Based on combined testimony of Sachs and employee Billy Hoffman.
bargained in good faith but was unable to arrive at an ac-
ceptable agreement with the union.'
Applying these principles, it is clear that Respondent en-
gaged in dilatory tactics by its insistence, over the Union's
repeated protests, that the negotiating sessions be held in-
frequently and for minimum duration. These tactics were
apparent from the very beginning when Respondent post-
poned the first meeting until 2 months after the certification
and request to bargain and asked that each meeting be lim-
ited to 1-1/2 hours. They were further apparent in Respon-
dent's delay in providing some, and failure to provide other,
information requested by the Union and relevant to the
negotiations.' These delaying tactics continued, in Respon-
dent's refusal to meet but six times within the 6 months
following the certification and but three times within the 3
months following the first meeting after the strike. Al-
though some of the meetings actually lasted longer than the
1-1/2 hours stipulated by Respondent, the parties neverthe-
less spent a total of little more than 12 hours negotiating
during the first 6 months, and little more than approxi-
mately 3 hours during the last 3 months of negotiations.
The duration of the meetings was controlled throughout by
Sachs' flight schedules, to enable him to attend the meetings
and return home the same day. Neither the alleged preoc-
cupation of Respondent's vice president with other business
commitments, expense, nor the busy practice of its repre-
sentative excuses an employer from its bargaining obliga-
tion.9 Nor can an excuse be found in the fact that the union
representatives were a few minutes late arriving at two
meetings where, as here, there is no indication that their
conduct was calculated to thwart or impair the collective-
bargaining process.' That the parties managed to discuss
most of the sections of the Union's proposed contract dur-
ing the first six meetings shows, not that the meetings were
reasonable in frequency and duration as Respondent con-
tends, but that agreement might have been reached in less
time had Respondent been amenable to longer and more
frequent meetings and sincerely desirous of reaching agree-
ment. Accordingly, I conclude that from the inception of
bargaining Respondent refused to meet at reasonable times
and for reasonable periods, thereby engaging in delaying
tactics to evade bargaining and avoid consummating an
agreement with the Union which was the exclusive repre-
sentative of its employees in an appropriate unit, in viola-
tion of Section 8(aX5) and (I) of the Act."
Turning to Respondent's conduct with respect to sub-
stantive issues under negotiation, it seems to me that the
method followed, of examining the sections of the Union's
proposed contract seriatim, would have been a reasonable
way to negotiate if more and longer meetings had been
held. Nor was it unreasonable for Respondent not to sub-
'N.L.R.B v. Reed & Prince Manfactruring Compan. 205 F.2d 131. 134
(Ist Cir. 1953).
s Failure to provide information relevant to negotiations within a reason-
able time is indicative of bad faith and a violation of Sec. 8(aX5). N.L. R.B v.
Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., supra, 135; N. LR.B. v. General Electric Company.
418 F.2d 736, 752 (2d Cir. 1969).
'N.L. R.B. v. Southland Cork Co., 342 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1965); Village
Rambler Sales. Inc., 174 NLRB 247 (1969).
'°See Valle Date Gardens, Inc., 144 NLRB 1544, 1551 (1963).
1" Coronet Casuals, Inc. 207 NLRB 304, 316 1973): General Motors Ar-
ceptance Corporation. 196 NLRB 137, 138 (1972).
1323
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mit any counterproposals in writing during this period in
view of its discussion of each section, its explanation of its
position on each issue, and its acceptance, rejection, or sug-
gestion of modifications of each. In these circumstances I
do not consider Respondent's refusal to agree to an arbitra-
tion clause or union-dues checkoff, or its refusal to accept
the Union's economic proposals, indicative of bad faith.
Moreover, the record does not support the General Coun-
sel's further contention that none of the sections tentatively
agreed to reflected any change in conditions as they existed
before bargaining began. It therefore appears that although
Respondent engaged in hard bargaining during the first six
meetings, its conduct with respect to the substantive issues
was not necessarily inconsistent with the desire ultimately
to resolve its differences with the Union.
However, Respondent's attitude changed dramatically
when the strike was over. With the submission of its pro-
posed contract, Respondent's overall behavior fell into line
with its continuing delaying tactics in scheduling meetings.
Thus, although the Union had invited Respondent to pre-
sent a contract proposal on March 9, 1978, Respondent was
not prepared with such a proposal 3-1/2 months later when
the parties met for the first time after the June 21 strike;
and even then Respondent attempted to delay presenting its
proposal for another 2 months, finally agreeing to present it
on August I only at the Union's insistence. Moreover, de-
spite the Union's plea that the provisions tentatively agreed
to be incorporated in the proposal, Respondent drafted its
submission without regard to such agreements, which had
been arrived at over a period of 6 months' difficult bargain-
ing. The draft would have impaired the employees' right to
criticize the Employer and transfixed most of the working
conditions. It would have frozen wages and fringe benefits
at a time when Respondent was unilaterally granting in-
creases because its employees were underpaid and because
of inflation. Even under Respondent's so-called counterpro-
posal, Respondent would have retained total control over
wage increases. All this was to obtain for a period of 5
years, only gradually reduced to a proposed term of 3 years.
Respondent attributes this offer to changed conditions
brought about by the strike consisting of its loss of business
and its strengthened position vis-a-vis the Union. To the
extent that the loss-of-business rationale implies financial
inability to improve its employees' wages and working con-
ditions, I am not persuaded that Respondent would reason-
ably anticipate any such effect of a I-month strike to con-
tinue for 3 to 5 years. In any event, this rationale is put to
naught by Respondent's own simultaneous conduct in uni-
laterally granting wage increases to its employees. More-
over, although the Union's apparent loss of the strike might
justify Respondent in hardening its bargaining position to
some extent, it did not excuse Respondent from its obliga-
tion to bargain in good faith in a sincere attempt to reach
agreement with the Union. In my opinion, even though Re-
spondent's proposed contract was negotiable, the intent and
effect of such a proposal, put forward almost a year after
the commencement of negotiations, and considered in light
of Respondent's total conduct, was to broaden instead of
narrowing the area of agreement, and was therefore incon-
sistent with a genuine desire to resolve the differences be-
tween the parties.'2 I conclude that by proposing a contract
which abrogated agreements previously reached, impaired
employees' right to criticize the Employer, and froze wages
and working conditions or placed them within the total
control of the Employer for a period of 3 to 5 years, without
reasonable cause, Respondent was further engaging in de-
laying tactics and thereby failing and refusing to bargain in
good faith, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.'
IV. REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and from any like or related
interference with its employees' rights under Section 7 of
the Act and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
As I have found that Respondent has bargained in bad
faith from the inception of negotiations, I recommend that
the certification year be extended for I year after Respon-
dent begins to bargain in good faith."
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDER"
The Respondent, Rhodes St. Clair Buick, Inc., Charles-
ton, West Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith con-
cerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment with Local Lodge 2639 of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive representative in the the following
appropriate unit:
All service department and parts department employ-
ees, including mechanics, body persons, painters, com-
bination persons, service writers, parts persons. counter
persons, parts delivery persons, lube persons, washers,
polishers, car jockeys, new and used car preparation
persons, porters, dispatchers and plant clerical employ-
ees; excluding all office clerical employees, salesmen,
service managers, parts managers, body shop manag-
12 American Seating Co. of Mississippi v. N.L.R.B.. 424 F.2d 106 (5th Cir.
1970); M.F.A. Milling Company, 170 NLRB 1079. 1098 (1968). enfd. 463
F.2d 953 (D.C.Cir. 1972): McCann Steel Company. Inc., 190 NLRB 12
(1971): ShovelSupply Company, Inc., 162 NLRB 460 (1966).
13 N. L. R. B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.. supra; Pine Manor Nursing Home.
Inc.. 230 NLRB 320 (1977), enfd. 578 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1978).
4 See Glomac Plastics. Inc., 234 NLRB 1309 (1978).
'5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings.
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
1324
RHODES ST. CLAIR BUICK
ers, watch persons, guards and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining. or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively in good faith con-
cerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment with Local Lodge 2639 of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive representative of the above-described
appropriate unit. Regard the Union as exclusive agent as if
the initial year of certification has been extended for an
additional year from the commencement of bargaining pur-
suant hereto.
(b) Post at its facility in Charleston, West Virginia, cop-
ies of the attached notice.' 6 Copies of said notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being
duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted
by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.
16 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board."
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