Rhodes-Holland Chevrolet Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 4, 1964

146 N.L.R.B. 1304 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

1304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain conduct interfering with,
restraining , and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in the Act
and constituting unfair labor practices affecting commerce , I shall recommend that
it cease and desist therefrom , and take certain affirmative action in order to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2 ( 2) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By promises of benefit on November 30 and December 3, 1962, Respondent inter-
fered with, restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. Respondents have not refused to bargain with the Union or otherwise engaged
in unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.)
Rhodes-Holland Chevrolet Co. and Lodge 1049 of the Inter-
national Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO. Case No. 9-CA-
2889. May 4, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On December 24, 1963, Trial Examiner Rosanna A. Blake issued her
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the Act and recommending that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the
attached Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Leedom and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, a-nu:1 recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner.
In finding that Respondent violated its obligation to bargain in
good faith, we, like the Trial Examiner, have not relied solely on the
positions taken by Respondent on substantive contract terms, a factor
which, standing alone, we agree might not have provided sufficient
basis for the violation found, but have considered that factor as simply
146 NLRB No. 156.
RHODES-HOLLAND CHEVROLET CO. 1305
one item in the totality of circumstances reflecting Respondent's bar-
gaining frame of mind. On the basis of respondent's overall course
of conduct we, no less than the Trial Examiner, are persuaded that
Respondent approached the bargaining table, not, with a sincere pur-
pose to reach agreement, but rather with an intent to prolong negotia-
tions until the end of the certification year so that it might then, as in
fact it did, refuse to bargain further by asserting a doubt as to the
Union's majority. Among the factors evidencing such intent were
Respondent's procrastination in negotiating, its dilatory tactics in
furnishing wage information, its total failure to furnish other rele-
vant information, its rigidity in insisting over many months that no
cost items be discussed until all other terms were agreed upon, and
its complete termination of negotiations near the end of the certifica-
tion year, although, as found by the Trial Examiner, it did not then
have a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority. In assessing Re-
spondent's bargaining attitude we have taken into account that Re-
spondent did at times recede from previously expressed positions on
minor items, but, considering the totality of Respondent's bargaining
conduct, we are nonetheless satisfied that Respondent used such seem-
ing reasonableness merely as a cloak to mask its real intent to put off
more meaningful bargaining.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner, and orders that Respondent, Rhodes-
Holland Chevrolet Co., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed on June 19, 1963, by Lodge 1049 of the International Asso-
ciation of Machinists , AFL-CIO, herein at times called the Union , the General
Counsel, acting through the Regional Director for the Ninth Region , issued a com-
plaint on July 26, 1963, alleging that Rhodes -Holland Chevrolet Co., herein at
times called the Company or Respondent, failed to bargain in good faith with the
Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act. Respondent filed an
answer in ' which it denied having committed any unfair labor practice.
Thereafter , pursuant to due notice , a hearing was held before Trial Examiner
Rosanna A. Blake on August 21 and 22 , 1963, at Charleston , West Virginia. All
parties were represented and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to present
evidence , to examine and cross -examine witnesses , to argue orally , and to file
briefs. No oral argument was presented and only counsel for the General Counsel
filed a brief.
Having considered the entire record in the case, the brief filed by counsel for the
General Counsel , and from my observation of the witnesses while testifying, I make
the following: 1
1 All credibility determinations made herein are based in part upon my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.
1306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTIONAL FINDINGS; THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Rhodes-Holland Chevrolet Co., a West Virginia corporation, is engaged in South
Charleston, West Virginia, in the retail selling and servicing of new automobiles and
trucks and the sale of used automobiles. During the year prior to the issuance of
the complaint, a representative period, the Company sold and distributed products,
the gross value of which exceeded $500,000. During the same period, the Company
purchased and received products valued in excess of $50,000 which were transported
to its place of business directly from outside the State of West Virginia.
Upon the foregoing undisputed facts, I find that Respondent is and has been at
all times material herein engaged in "commerce" and in operations "affecting com-
merce" within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Respondent does not deny and I find that Lodge 1049 of the International
Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE 2
A. Background3
On July 3, 1962, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining represent-
ative of the Company's employees in an admittedly appropriate bargaining unit.4 On
or about July 10, Union Representative Jesse G. Young told Company Vice President
Unless stated otherwise, the findings in this and subsequent sections are based on a
composite of the testimony of Union Representatives Jesse G. Young, Orr W. Mellott,
Robert E. Blocksom, and Pete MacCagno and of Company Negotiator Edward Ernest
Tryban, Respondent's only witness. The relatively few conflicts in the testimony on criti-
cal matters are discussed and resolved infra. Where conflicts occur on matters which
would not materially affect my ultimate conclusions, the findings are based on what
appears to me, from the record as a whole, the more accurate testimony. Company
Negotiator Tryban assertedly had little independent recollection of what was said at the
various meetings and his notes, to which he was permitted to refer, were far from com-
plete. In one case, for example, he had only three or four lines of notes although he
estimated that the meeting lasted about 2 hours. As a result, much of his testimony was
general, rather than specific and some was clearly conclusionary. For example, after
testifying that the •Company made a wage proposal to the Union, he was asked when
this was done to which he replied, "It was, I will say from the middle of negotiations, of
course, I am supposed to take the pulse of what's happening and what have you and I
will say from the middle of negotiations it was inferred and understood that wages would
remain as Is . . . . Now, that's my opinion now." At another point after testifying that
wage information was given every time it was asked for he was asked to give an example
of the information furnished. Ile replied, "Rates were brought up generally . . . and we
mentioned a lot of our rates were on a flat rate basis and also we talked about specific
rates." In view of Tryban's many years of experience in labor relations and contract
negotiations, I doubt that his recollection of what was said at the various meetings was
as hazy as he would have It appear. I also note that, in contrast, he gave unequivocal
answers to questions by Respondent's counsel concerning critical matters, such as questions
about the Union's requests for information and the Company's responses thereto. The
foregoing facts, as well as my observation of Tryban's demeanor on the stand, convince
me that he was not a wholly forthright and reliable witness. Accordingly, I do not credit
all of his testimony. Nor do I credit all of the testimony of Union Negotiator Blocksom,
my reason in his case being (in part) his obvious hostility toward Respondent.
. 3 The testimony upon which findings with respect to events which occurred more than
6 months prior to the filing of the charge was admitted without objection. Of course, the
parties' actions during this period are considered as background only, that is, for the pur-
pose of shedding light upon the true character of events which occurred within the
statutory period . Local Lodge No. 1424, International Association of Machinists, AFL-
CIO; of at. (Bryan Manufacturing Co.) v. N.L.R.B., 362 U.S. 411, 416.
* The unit Is composed of all garage, service department, and parts department em-
ployees, including mechanics, bodymen, painters, partsmen, helpers, porters, washers,
polishers, get-ready men, cleanup men, lot 'boys, inventory clerks in parts department,
service salesmen, cashier, service file clerk, excluding service clerk, owner-relations co-
ordinator, all new and used automobile and truck salesmen, office clerical employees,
guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined by the Act. Respondent does
not challenge the validity of the Board election and certification.
RHODES-HOLLAND CHEVROLET CO. 1307
and General Manager Joe Holland that the Union wanted to begin bargaining negotia-
tions and that it needed the names, rates of pay, classifications, and hiring dates of
the employees in the bargaining unit.5 Holland replied that Young should "do all
[his] dealings through George Gardner, counsel for the Company."
In a letter to Gardner dated July 14, Young again stated that the Union wanted
to begin bargaining negotiations and again asked for the names, classifications, rates
of pay, and hiring dates of all employees in the bargaining unit. Gardner wrote
Young on July 22 that he would assemble the requested information as soon as
possible.s
On August 16, Union Representative Young mailed Company Counsel Gardner
a proposed contract with a covering letter both of which were received by Gardner
in due course. In his letter, Young pointed out that the contract contained no wage
proposal because the Union had not received the wage information previously re-
quested. The letter also stated that negotiations thereafter would be handled by
Union Representative Orr W. Mellott and that communications with respect to the
matters dealt with in the letter should be addressed to Mellott at an address in
South Charleston.? On August 27, Gardner wrote Mellott that because of a pend-
ing unfair labor practice charge against the Company, "it would appear desirable
to postpone negotiations until the case has been heard." Gardner added that he
was "quite involved" in preparing the Company's defense and would find it difficult
to meet for the remainder of time until [the] hearing." 8 The charge alleged that
the Company had engaged in conduct which violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The case was settled on September 20.
About the middle of September, Union Representative Mellott and Robert E.
Blocksom went to the Company's premises and spoke to Vice President Holland about
"setting up" a negotiating session.. Holland told Young that Gardner Associates in
Roanoke were counsel for the Company and that the union representatives should
"contact" them. Holland gave Blocksom the Gardner firm's telephone number
and permitted Blocksom to place a call from a telephone in the showroom. Block-
som placed a person-to-person call for Gardner and was told that he was out of the
office. Blocksom left a telephone number at which he could be reached but received
no call from Gardner. Thereafter, Blocksom called Gardner a number of times
but was always told that he was not in the office.9 Sometime in October, Blocksom
spoke to Gardner who said that Personnel Consultant Edward Tryban would handle
negotiations for the Company and gave Blocksom Tryban's Charleston telephone
number.
After a number of unsuccessful efforts to reach Tryban by telephone, Blocksom
spoke to Tryban who said he had been trying to "contact" Blocksom for "quite a
while." 10 In the course of their conversation, Tryban and Blocksom arranged a
meeting for November 8.
The November 8 meeting was attended by Vice President Holland, President R. D.
Rhodes, and Consultant Tryban for the Company. Blocksom, Mellott, and Staff
Representative Bruce Campbell were present for the Union."
Blocksom, the Union's chief spokesman, said that he understood that the Company
had a copy of the Union's proposed contract but Tryban said he had not been "in
contact with Mr. Gardner" and the files were in the latter's office. Blocksom then
furnished the company representatives with copies of the Union's proposed contract
and the parties went through it article by article.. Blocksom explained that he could
not discuss wages until he had received the wage and other data previously requested.
5 This information is at times referred to herein collectively as wage information.
OAlthougb I credit Young's testimony that he received no reply from Gardner, Union
Representative Orr W. Mellott testified that he received a "penciled memo or note" from
Gardner on some unspecified date. Gardner's note to Young was written in longhand on
a memo pad.
7 Young was transferred to another assignment and left the Charleston area the latter
part of August.
81 admitted Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 for a limited purpose only. Having now
examined it in the light of the entire record; I believe that it should have been admitted
for all purposes. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 is
received without limitation.
O There is no evidence in the record that Gardner attempted but was unable to reach
Blocksom by telephone.
. 10 Although Tryban was a witness for Respondent, he did not testify that he had tried
to "contact" Blocksom.
11 Campbell took little or no part in the meeting.
1308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
When Blocksom showed Tryban the Union's letter asking for the data, Tryban said
he was "unaware" of it.12
The parties met again on November 21 with Blocksom and Mellott present for
the Union and Tryban and Holland present for the Company. Tryban said that the
"intent" of various paragraphs of the Union's proposed contract was not clear
and he wanted to review them. As a result, each paragraph was again discussed.
Blocksom brought up the subject of wages and asked for the information previously
requested.13 Tryban gave the Union some wage information-probably in the
form of a formula--concerning the rates of the used car mechanics and helpers
and there was a general discussion of wages and a more specific discussion concerning
certain job classifications with which Union Representative Mellott was familiar.14
The Company took the position that wages and other cost items should not be dis-
cussed until after agreement was reached on the noneconomic clauses.
On December 13, Blocksom and Tryban met for approximately 30 minutes.15
Tryban furnished Blocksom with a counterproposal which contained a statement of
"intent and purposes," recognition and duration clauses, a management rights clause,
a clause on seniority, a grievance and arbitration procedure, and a section on shop
rules. It contained no provision on wages, hours, or working conditions generally.16
Blocksom indicated that he was "disgusted" with the proposal, particularly its failure
to provide a wage increase. Tryban told Blocksom that he (Tryban) would have to
discuss wages with President Rhodes and, Vice President Holland. Blocksom
reiterated his need for the data previously requested "so we could get down to
negotiating this contract to get it resolved „ 17
Blocksom knew that he would be transferred to another area in early January and
sometime after the December 13 meeting told Tryban that he would be leaving and
would like to get an agreement worked out before he left. If Tryban could arrange a
meeting before Blocksom left the area, Blocksom told Tryban to call him collect at a
Parkersburg, West Virginia, hotel. Blocksom received no call from Tryban and
the next meeting was not held until January 31.
19 The above finding is based upon the undenied testimony of Blocksom.
13 Although Tryban first denied that the Union requested any information at the Novem-
ber 21 meeting, he later "modified" his answer by saying that "early in the meetings, I
don't know exactly what date, Dir. Blocksom mentioned that he had asked you, Mr.
Gardner, for a list of wage rates."
14 Although I credit Tryban's testimony that he furnished the Union some wage in-
formation at the November 21 meeting, I do not credit his testimony that the Union made
a proposal on wages and that he and Blocksom discussed "the guaranteed wages of $2 per
hour that the Union requested ; also our 50 percent of the customer's labor charge which
ever is greater." I do not believe that the Union made a specific wage demand so early in
negotiations when it had very little information concerning job classifications and wage
rates. Thus, it might well turn out, as it in fact did, that some of the employees were
already receiving substantially more than $2 an hour. Tryban was not specific concerning
the information furnished and it may have been too general to be very helpful. However,
I do not credit Union Negotiator Blocksom's testimony that no information was supplied
at any of the November-December meetings. In addition to the reasons stated supra for
refusing to credit all of Blocksom's testimony, I note in his testimony that there was a
"general discussion" on November 21 of wages for "certain classifications."
15 Union Representative Owen Muffler was also present but did not participate in the
negotiations.
le The section on shop rules did not deal with the employees' working conditions, such
as wages or hours, but provided for disciplinary action by the 'Company against em-
ployees who engaged in such conduct as the use of intoxicating liquors or narcotics on
company property, fighting on the job, and stealing.
17I do not credit Tryban's testimony that the Union requested no information either at
this or at some of the other meetings or his testimony that "we verbally gave information
on wages at any time . . . it was asked for." In addition to the reasons previously stated,
I note that he did not specify what information was supplied and his notes admittedly
did not show what information was furnished. The Union sought information concerning
the 41 employees in the unit and Tryban, who was an independent labor consultant, clearly
was not personally familiar with the Company's wage rates and I do not believe that Vice
President Holland had all of the details concerning the wage rates of 41 employees on the
tip of his tongue. In short, I am convinced that if any but the most general information
were furnished, it would have come from either memorandums or notes which Tryban or
Holland would have consented to furnish the Union.
RHODES-HOLLAND CHEVROLET CO. 1309
B. The negotiations in January, February, March, May, and June 1963
. 1. The meeting on January 31
The parties met on January 31, 1963, with Pete MacCagno and Mellott present for
the Union and Tryban and Vice President Holland present for the Company.18
The Union's proposed contract, which company representatives said was too long
and too complicated, was discussed from "A to Z." When MacCagno, who was the
chief spokesman for the Union, asked for a counterproposal from the Company,
one of the company representatives replied that one had been submitted at an earlier
meeting and gave MacCagno a copy of the document handed Blocksom at the
meeting on December 13. MacCagno indicated disbelief that the Company seriously
regarded the December 13 document as a counterproposal. The Company answered
that it could not agree to the Union's proposals and stay in business.
The Union again asked for the name, seniority date, job classification, and rate
of pay of each employee in the unit. Vice President Holland said that it would take
"considerable time" to prepare the information and that the Union had other means
of obtaining it, namely, from- the employees.19 The Company also restated its
position that it "wasn't inclined to negotiate" concerning cost items, such as wages,
until the parties had "got through" all the noneconomic clauses.
In part at least because of the Company's complaint that the Union's proposed
contract was too long and too complicated, the Union agreed to prepare another
and mailed a revised draft to the Company on February 4. The Company also
agreed to "rewrite" the leave of absence and bulletin board provisions and in fact
did so.
2. The meeting on February 12
The next meeting took place on February 12. Present for the Union were
MacCagno and Mellott and for the Company Tryban and Holland. At the outset
of the meeting, the Company handed the Union a one-page document headed "Job
Classifications and Rates of Pay." 20 The Union asserted that the information pro-
vided was insufficient and again requested the names, seniority date, pay rate, and
classification of each employee. Tryban advised MacCagno to get the information
from the employees.21
The Union had proposed that the Company pay the entire cost of the employees'
insurance and it requested a copy of the insurance booklet given the employees and
a statement of the amount paid by the Company as its share of the premiums.22
18 Although Mellott attended most of the meetings , he was having serious ear difficulties
and apparently did not participate extensively in the discussions . Although he impressed
me as a truthful witness, I think It likely that he did not hear everything that was said.
19 The testimony of MacCagno and Mellott upon which this finding is based is undenied.
20 The document contained the following information:
Service Department:
1. Service salesmen________________________________ $2.00 per hour to $2.75.
2. Mechanical technicians___________________________ 50-50 flat rate.
3. Body technicians________________________________ 50-50 flat rate.
4. Painters --------------------------------------- 50-50 flat rate.
5. Miscellaneous ---------------------------------- $0.85 to $1.50 per hour.
New Car Get Ready:
1. Technicians (apprentice)_________________________ $1.00 to $1.50 per hour.
2. Miscellaneous ---------------------------------- $1.00 per hour.
Used Car and Truck Department:
1. Mechanical ------------------------------------ $1.25 to $2.00 per hour.
2. Miscellaneous ----------------------------------- $0.85 to $1.25 per hour.
Parts Department:
1. Parts clerks*___________________________________ $2.25 to $2.50 per hour.
2. Miscellaneous __________________________________ $1.00 to $1.25 per hour.
* Comment.-Both our service salesmen and our parts clerks are paid considerably
above the average for our area and we are more interested in reducing these rates
than raising them.
21 The above finding is based on the undenied testimony of MacCagno.
22 The Company first told the Union that it paid 50 percent of the premiums and the em-
ployees paid 50 percent. According to the undenied testimony of Union Negotiator Young,
Vice President Holland later stated that the Company's share was "closer" to 40 percent.
1310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Company replied that the Union could get a copy of the booklet from the
employees 23
As noted above, the Union mailed a revised contract to. the Company on Febru-
ary 4 and on February 12 the parties went through it as well as through the Union's
first proposal.
Agreement was reached on several matters such as a leave-of-absence clause, I day
off with pay in case of death in the immediate family, and a 1-year duration clause.
As a result, Union Negotiator MacCagno commented that "it looked like we [arel
making some progress" and are "heading in, the right direction." As to uniforms,
the Union asked that the Company pay the full cost of four uniforms a week. The
Company said it would maintain its present policy of "paying whatever they were
paying." In two cases (reporting-in pay and call-back pay), the Union withdrew
its demands.
The Company did not even want to discuss the union-shop provision saying that
it would not grant a union shop or dues checkoff. However, Vice President Holland
indicated that he "might" agree to a maintenance-of-membership clause24 On
seniority, the Union had requested a 30-day probationary period and the Company
wanted a 180-day period. After some discussion, the union negotiators believed that
a 90-day period had been agreed upon. No agreement was reached on hours of
work or time off for jury duty.25
There was little if any discussion about wages, paid holidays, vacations, overtime,
or other "money" items because of the Company's position that other clauses should
be negotiated first.
It was agreed that the Union would "rewrite" the seniority provision and certain
parts of the grievance procedure and on February 15, the Union sent Tryban "re-
vised" proposals on these subjects.25
3. The meeting on March 7
MacCagno , Mellott, Tryban, and Holland met again on March 7.27 Among the
matters discussed were the revised clauses which the Union mailed the Company on
February 15. As previously stated , the Union believed that a compromise had been
reached on the length of the probationary period and its February 15 revision in-
corporated the compromise figure. The Company stated , however, that it still
wanted a 180-day period and the Union said in that case it would return to its
30-day demand.
Agreement was reached on the arbitration clause and the Company agreed to
provide a bulletin board for the Union 's use and to notify the Union when leaves of
absences were granted . On vacations , the Company said that the plan proposed by
the Union was the one in effect.
Most, if not all, of the items still in dispute were discussed but no agreement was
reached on any of them such as overtime, insurance , and wages . The Union main-
tained that the employees were entitled to some pay increase but in the absence of
the requested information had not specified the amount . According to the Company,
it was more interested in decreasing than in increasing costs, its employees were
already among the highest paid in the city, and it did not want its wage rates to get
"too far" ahead of those of its competitors . When MacCagno asked if the Company
would agree to the existing wage rates and other benefits, the Company answered in
the negative.
During the course of the meeting, the Union renewed its request for the informa-
tion previously requested and was again told it could get the information from the
employees.
There was a brief meeting on March 8 which was adjourned in order that the
Union could meet with the employees who, apparently, were threatening to strike
25 McCagno's testimony upon which this finding is based is undenied.
24 NTo agreement was ever reached on this subject, however.
'5The Union apparently later withdrew its demand for "jury duty pay."
se Although Tryban testified that the parties met again on February 13, I think he was
probably mistaken. In any event, his testimony discloses that the Issues discussed were
the same as those discussed the day before.
21Present also for the Company was a Mr. Davis who, Tryban testified, was familiar
with wage rates and was present as a source df information. Davis supplied the rates of
certain employees whose names were mentioned but did not furnish information concern-
ing all of the employees.
RHODES-HOLLAND CHEVROLET CO. 1311
because two of their number had been discharged.28 As a result of the meeting,
one employee returned to work and the other was given a "good recommendation
to find a job elsewhere."
4. The meeting on March 28
On March 21 the Company mailed the Union a second counterproposal which
was the basis of much of the discussion at the meeting on March 28.29 The Union
agreed to the "intent and purpose" clause and to the management rights clause.
The Company, in turn, indicated that there would probably be no problem when
employees requested leave to attend union conventions. No agreement was reached
on union security, seniority, or on any money items. On wages, the Company re-
peated its contention that "competition would not permit [it] to grant wage in-
creases." When the Union again requested the information previously sought, it
was again told that compiling it was a complicated job and to get it from the
employees 30
The Union objected to the "shop rules" section in the Company's proposed contract,
in part because it lacked knowledge of the Company's past "policy" on the matters
covered. Although it indicated that some of the rules would probably be ac-
ceptable, it wanted to negotiate with respect to each of them31 At one of the meet-
ings-probably this one-MacCagno asked for a copy of the employee handbook
distributed by-the Company.
5. The meeting on May 15
When MacCagno learned that he would be transferred to another assignment, he
advised management that Jesse Young would take over as chief negotiator for the
Union. Young was the representative originally designated by the Union to con-
duct the negotiations with the Company and in mid-April he met with MacCagno
and Mellott to bring himself "up to date" on what had happened since he had been
transferred the previous August. Young asked if the Company had complied with
the request for information contained in his July 1962 letter and was given the
document furnished by the Company at the March 7 meeting. In Young's opinion,
the information supplied fell far short of that requested and he believed that the
Union needed all of the information asked for so that it could determine whether there
were any inequities within the classifications and to be able to compare the work be-
tween the classifications.32 Young thereupon wrote a letter to Company Negotiator
Tryban on April 18, in which he again requested the name, classification, rate of pay,
and hiring date of each employee in the unit.
Young had received no reply when the parties met on May 15 and his first ques-
tion on that day was whether his letter had been received 33 Tryban said that it
had been adding that the information had been prepared. Tryban then handed
Young a list of the names, job titles, pay per hour, and hiring dates of each of the
41 employees in the unit.34 Since Young had not had an opportunity to study
the information, wages were discussed only briefly and generally with Vice President
Holland again stating that "he was only interested in decreasing, not in increasing,"
wages.
29 Company Negotiator Tryban testified that the parties "agreed that it would be more
vital to take care of (the discharge question] than . .-. to work on the contract" so the
Union (with the Company's permission) set up a meeting with the membership at the
plant for that day.
29 The record does not indicate all the persons present at this and one or more later
meetings.
so This. finding is based on the undenied testimony of MacCagno.
311 do not credit Tryban's testimony that the Union stated that shop rules, as such,
should not be included in the contract.
Mellott testified that the information was needed so that the Union could "intelligently
make a wage proposal."
3 Tile Union was represented by Young, MacCagno, and Mellott and the Company by
Tryban and Holland.
sa The list showed that partsmen Williams and Tucker were paid by the hour. Upon
questioning by Young, Holland stated that the two men were paid a salary plus com-
mission. Holland said he could not explain how the hourly rate "got" on the sheet.
Further information concerning the pay of Williams and Tucker was furnished by the
Company at the next meeting.
744-670-65-vol. 146-84
1312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
. Young, like MacCagno earlier , asked for information about the cost to the Com-
pany and to each employee of the existing insurance plan, and also asked for a
copy of the insurance booklet given employees 35 According to the Company,
Young's request "involved a lot of work and a great deal of effort " and "why
couldn 't [the Union ] just get a copy of the booklet from the employees ." 35 How-
ever , the Company agreed to bring information concerning the cost of the existing
plan to the next meeting. The Company also agreed to submit a new contract
proposal . As for the employee handbook requested earlier , Young indicated that
the Union had obtained a copy, presumably from one of the employees.
The Company 's proposals were discussed although the Union pointed out that
neither contained a wage clause . Although agreement had apparently been reached
on a 40-hour week , Vice President Holland said , "I am sorry but I will have to take
this back. We cannot agree to this because we have certain employees who work
a 48-hour week , therefore , we would have to make an exception to this and change
it . . . for the employees who work a 48-hour week .. . When Young asked if
the Company would sign its second proposed contract , Holland answered in the
negative saying that he would first have to take it back and "talk to" other members
of the Company.
At either this or an earlier meeting, MacCagno asked management if "their delay
in negotiations was for the purpose of consuming time so that they could proceed
with decertification proceedings ." The Company made no response 37
6. The meeting on June 12
At the outset of the next meeting, held on June 12, Tryban stated that the Com-
pany had reconsidered and had decided not to submit a new contract proposal be-
cause it was the Union's "turn" to do so. However , the Company gave Young a
copy of the insurance booklet , a document showing the monthly premium paid by
each employee in the unit who had elected to participate in the plan , and photo-
stats of checks showing the total amount paid by the Company to the insurance car-
rier for each of the past 6 months. The checks included both the Company's and
the employees' contribution and included an undisclosed number of employees not
in the bargaining unit. When Young asked for a breakdown of the information,
Holland asserted that it would require a great deal of work and he "didn't see how"
the Company could show the amount paid for each individual. However, the Com-
pany offered to have a representative from the insurance company come to the
next meeting and explain the plan , the premiums, etc.
. In addition , the Company gave the Union a document showing that partsmen
Williams and Tucker were paid a salary of $300 a month plus 10 percent of 10
percent of fixed gross.38 Holland was unable to explain what "fixed gross" meant
and suggested that Young ask the partsmen.39
The Union indicated that it might file an unfair labor practice charge and in fact
did so on June 19.
A day or two before June 25, the date set for the next meeting , Federal Mediator
Steele called Young and reported that Tryban had called to say that the Company
intended to file (or had already filed) a decertification petition and, therefore, saw
no use in meeting again.
80 Young testified that be wanted the information so that be could "make some intelligent
analysis of the plan " and compare it with the Union's plan to determine whether the latter
might provide the employees greater benefits at lower cost.
sa The above finding is based on the undenled testimony of Young.
37 Federal Mediator Steele was present at this meeting and I credit Tryban's testimony
that it was be who called Steele after it had been agreed that a mediator should be
brought in . I also credit MacCagno 's testimony that when he suggested in March that the
conciliation service be brought in, the Company expressed the opinion that such a move
would be premature.
38 It was also stated on the document that salaries were paid the last of the month and
the commissions were paid the middle of the month . The sheet also contained information
concerning the pay of a man named Baker who was not in the bargaining unit.
39 Sometime after the meeting , Young asked partsman Williams what "fixed gross"
meant , Williams said that the plan had been changed , that he "couldn ' t figure it out since"
the change , and that he had asked for but had not been given an explanation. At an
earlier date , Williams told Union Negotiator MacCagno that he did not know how his
"rate" was computed.
RHODES-HOLLAND CHEVROLET CO. 1313
Tryban testified that he told Steele that "we felt at this time that the Union was
not representing the boys, therefore, we were going to write the NLRB and ask them
how we could get an election." The Company, Tryban testified, had a good-faith
doubt of the Union's majority because:
I think one of the first reasons [ was that] at no time during these negotiations was
there any local people at negotiations and in my fifteen years negotiating with
[the] Machinists I found it just the opposite. I always had to watch the number
of representatives they sent . . . another item was that I understand that some
of the people came to management and told them they were fed up with the
Union and [asked] how could they get out 40
In a letter to Tryban dated June 25, Young reported what he had been told by
Steele and asked if Steele 's information was correct . On July 2, Holland replied to
Young's letter to Tryban saying that the information in Young's letter was not correct.
On July 10, Young wrote Holland asking him to explain "your intentions" with respect
to further collective bargaining and whether the Company intended to ask for a
decertification election . The letter also stated:
The letter you sent on July 2nd was shown to Mr. Steele . . . He again
repeated the information as set forth in my letter of July 25th, to Mr. Tryban
as being that received from Mr. Tryban in regard to cancellation of the June 25th
meeting.
Please be informed that the Union stands ready , to meet to continue to try
to negotiate an agreement covering wages, hours, and working conditions of the
employees in the bargaining unit as certified by the National Labor Relations
Board 41
There is no evidence that any company representative replied to the above letter.
C. Analysis and conclusions
A week after the Union was certified it requested the Company to bargain and
was told to "deal" with Company Counsel Gardner. On July 14 Young wrote
Gardner that the Union wanted to begin bargaining negotiations and requested the
name, hiring date, rate of pay, and job classification of each employee in the unit.
Although Gardner replied that he would -assemble the requested information as
soon as possible , he did not refer to the Union 's bargaining request and admittedly no
information was furnished the Union until November 21. Even then, the Company
supplied , at best , only a small fraction of that requested.
On August 16, the Union sent Gardner a copy of its proposed contract and renewed
its request for information. On August 27, Gardner replied that it appeared desirable
to postpone negotiations until after the hearing on a pending unfair labor practice
charge. That case was settled on September 20.
After a visit to the garage and numerous telephone calls, the first bargaining ses-
sion was held on November 8, almost 4 months after the Union first requested the
Company to bargain with it . Furthermore , when the parties finally met, Company
Negotiator Tryban was not aware that the Union had submitted a proposed contract
or had requested wage information.
Another meeting was held on November 21 and still another on December 13.
Seven weeks passed before the next meeting which took place on January 31. There-
after , meetings were held on February 12, March 7 and 28 , May 15 , and June 12.
Although another meeting was scheduled for June 25 , it was canceled on the
grounds that the Company doubted that the Union still represented a majority of the
employees.
The facts set forth above convince me and I find that the 4-month delay between
the Union 's bargaining request and the first meeting was due to deliberately evasive
-tactics by Respondent . 42 Respondent offered no real explanation , and certainly no
justifiable explanation , for the long delay and, in my opinion, its conduct , disclosed
an attitude wholly inconsistent with its obligations and the employees ' rights under
fO This is the only evidence in the record indicating any defection from the Union. Al-
-though Tryban admitted that he "first" doubted the Union's majority "at the last meet-
1n,-," i.e., on June 12, no employee representative had attended any of the meetings.
f1 Steele was not called as a witness by Respondent.
u In my opinion, the record would not support a finding that the Company thereafter
sought to avoid or did avoid meeting with the Union on or about the dates proposed by
the latter. There is little evidence that the Union, after mtd-January 1963, made any
:serious effort to get Respondent to meet more often or more promptly.
1314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Act 43 Moreover, although the Company met with the Union eight times there-
after, its failure to furnish the Union with the requested wage information until
10 months after it was requested achieved the same result as did its earlier unavail-
ability for meetings: delay and postponement of meaningful bargaining negotiations.
Although an employer is not required to agree to any of the union's proposals, mere
willingness to meet and talk is not enough. N.L.R.B. v. Marion G. Denton and
Valedia W. Denton, d/b/a Marden Mfg. Co., 217 F. 2d 567, 570 (C.A. 5), cert.
denied 348 U.S. 981. The employer "must [also] approach the bargaining -table with
an open mind and purpose to reach an agreement consistent with the respective rights
of the parties." L. L. Majure Transport Company v. N.L.R.B., 198 F. 2d 735, 739
(C.A. 5).
That Respondent's failure to furnish the Union the requested data was inconsistent
with Respondent's obligation -and the rights of the Union, as the collective-bargaining
representative of the employees, is too well established to require extensive discus-
sion. As the court said in International Woodworkers of America, Local Unions 6-7,
and 6-122, AFL-CIO (Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., et al.) v. N.L.R.B.,
263 F. 2d 483, 484-485 (C.A.D.C.), "Wages and hours are the heart and core of the
employer-employee relationship and information concerning existing and past wage
rates and patterns is essential to the Union to enable it to bargain -intelligently." As
a result, according to the court, "it appears that a union's right to such information
cannot be seriously challenged. This is the only conclusion we can draw from
N.L.R.B. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra, where the Supreme Court summarily
reversed (without benefit of argument and without opinion) the Ninth Circuit's re-
fusal to enforce a Board order requiring the production of wage information." 44
Although the Company at times complained that it would take "considerable"
time to assemble the data and that it was a "complicated" job, I cannot believe that
it would require very long and certainly not 10 months to make a list of the 41 em-
ployees in the unit, their hiring dates, job classifications, and rates of pay. The
information sought was simple, definite, clearly within the Company's possession,
and required no "complicated" computations or analysis. Copies of the employee
handbook and the insurance booklet were either readily available or could have been
obtained with little or no difficulty. And I do not believe that the Company did not
know or could not have easily ascertained the amount it paid in insurance premiums
for each employee in the unit.45 In short, I am convinced and find that the Com-
pany's refusal over many months to furnish the Union with the requested informa-
tion was motivated by a desire to handicap the latter in bargaining negotiations and
to prolong negotiations throughout the certification year.
The Company's repeated suggestion that the Union could and should get the in-
formation from the employees is likewise indicative of its attitude toward the
Union and the bargaining negotiations generally. As is this case, employees fre-
quently do not have complete or accurate information concerning their wage rates,
hiring dates, and classifications. Moreover, unless every employee in the unit is
willing to cooperate, the Union can obtain only part of the information required.
As for the claim that the information was "confidential," the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit long ago observed "We can conceive of no justification for
a claim that . . . information [with respect to wages] is confidential . . . . And if
there be any reasonable basis for the contentions that this may have been confiden-
tial data of the employer before the passage of the Act, it seems to us it cannot be
so held in the face of the expressed social and economic purpose of the statute."
Aluminum Ore Company v. N.L.R.B., 131 F. 2d 485, 487 (C.A. 7).
"See Exchange Parts Company, 139 NLRB 710, 713-714; N.L.R.B. v. Morris Harris,
et at., d /b/a Union Manufacturing Company, 200 F. 2d 656, 658 (C.A. 5).
44 352 U.S. 938, reversing N.L.R.B. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 235 F. 2d 319 (C.A. 9).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also cited In support of its hold-
ing N.L.R.B. v. Whitin Machine Works, 217 F. 2d 593, 594 (C.A. 4), in which the court
enforced the Board's order in a case in which the employer had furnished the union the
names of the employees, their hiring dates, their job categories, and the wage rates gen-
erally but not the rate of each employee, the ranges, or the number of employees in each
rate range. In enforcing the Board order, the court said, "It is well settled that it is an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act for an employer
to refuse to furnish a bargaining union a list of the employees represented by It together
with the wages paid them, as such Information is necessary to proper discharge of the
duties of the bargaining agent."
45 Although the Union did not request information concerning the insurance plan and a
copy of the employee handbook until February-March 1963, little or none bf this informa-
tion was ever supplied.
RHODES -HOLLAND CHEVROLET CO. 1315
The instant case illustrates the soundness of the Board's conclusion that a union
cannot bargain intelligently concerning wages and other legitimate subjects of col-
lective bargaining unless it has information concerning existing wage rates and
other terms and conditions of employment. In the absence of such information,
the Union here was unable to formulate a wage demand or to discuss wages except
generally. Although the Union believed on the basis of the information it had that
the employees were entitled to a wage increase while the Company insisted that its
costs should not be increased, it is possible that if the Union had received the in-
formation it sought, its demands would have cost the Company much less than the
latter supposed.46 As MacCagno pointed out at the hearing, the problem "possibly"
could have been settled on the basis of adjustment of- rates." Also, the Union might
have asked for no or only nominal increases for employees in certain classifications.
And although the Union might have asked for larger increases for certain classifica-
tions, they might have added up to a comparatively small amount because of the
small number of employees in these classifications 47 That what appear to be dis-
agreements are found not to be disagreements at all when all of the facts are known
is also demonstrated by this case. Thus, although the Company originally rejected
the Union's vacation proposal, the issue surely disappeared when the Company told
the Union that the latter's proposed vacation plan was the one then in effect.
Concededly, the Company eventually furnished all of the wage information re-
quested and some information concerning the insurance plan then in effect. But by
this time-May and June 1963-nearly a year had passed since the Union was cer-
tified and on or about June 24 the Company broke off negotiations on the ground
that it doubted that the Union currently represented a majority of the employees.
In short, the Company waited months before complying with the Union's request
for information and then broke off negotiations so soon after supplying it that the
Union had no opportunity to make any use of it. I therefore conclude that the
employer here, like the one in N.L.R.B. v. International Furniture Company, 212
F. 2d 431, 433 (C.A. 5), "was bargaining with the Union for the sole purpose of
pursuing the bargaining process until the end of the Union's year of certification, at
which time it could challenge the continuation of the certification on the ground
that the Union was no longer the representative of the majority of Respondent's
employees."
Although, as the court went on to say, "there is a presumption that the majority
status of the union continues after the year of certification, the employer has a right
to refuse recognition [or to bargain] after the year has passed where the refusal
arises from a belief in good faith that the Union does not represent a majority of
the employees" (ibid.). That its doubt was not asserted in good faith in the instant
case is clear. Indeed, Tryban's own statement of the reasons for the Company's
claim discloses that its position was without legal basis. Moreover, its long delay in
furnishing the requested information provides further evidence that its claim was put
forward, not in good faith, but to avoid further bargaining negotiations. Finally,
it is reasonable to infer that the Company's delay in furnishing the information was
or may have been one of the reasons for the Union's inability to obtain a contract.
It is also reasonable to conclude that if any employee dissatisfaction with the Union
existed, it stemmed at least in part from the Union's inability to obtain a contract.
Of course, if its failure to obtain a contract was due in whole or in part to the
Company's failure to bargain in good faith, Respondent was not relieved of its obli-
gation to bargain even assuming, arguendo, that the Union had lost its majority.
Franks Bros. Company v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 702, 704-705; N.L.R.B. v. Irving
Lambert, et al., d/b/a Sue-Ann Manufacturing Company, 211 F. 2d 91, 94 (C.A. 5).
The complaint also alleges that the Company failed to bargain in good faith with
the Union by "Adopting a firm and fixed position on its contract proposals and by
[failing] and refusing to deviate or depart therefrom." Although, as previously
noted, the Company was not required to agree to anything, it is equally clear that
it did not bargain in good faith if it entered into negotiations with a fixed determina-
49 Some of the questions asked by Respondent's counsel on. cross-examination implied, at
least, that the Union should have determined the prevailing wage rates in the area. It
seems to me that it would be very difficult for the Union to obtain such information since,
apparently, few comparable businesses in the area are unionized. The Company, on the
other hand, claimed to have the information for it asserted that its rates were already
among the highest in the city and asserted that it did not want its pay scale to get "too
far" ahead of that of its competitors.
47 The possibility that the Union's wage demands might not have greatly increased the
Company's costs is suggested by the latter's claim that its employees were already among
the highest paid in the city.
1316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion to make no concessions or to do nothing which might lead to the negotiation
of a collective-bargaining agreement.48 Needless to say, the line between these two
principles or to put it another way, the line between "hard" bargaining and "bad-
faith" bargaining, is a difficult one to draw.
In the instant case, for example , agreement was reached on what is generally
regarded as one of the important clauses in a contract, i.e., the grievance and
arbitration procedure. Agreement was also reached on other provisions such as
those providing for a bulletin board for the Union's use, leaves of absences, and a
day off on the death of a member of the immediate family. Furthermore, Union
Negotiator MacCagno testified that at one point he felt progress was being made and
the parties were "heading in the right direction ." Although agreement was not
reached on all noneconomic matters, cost items, such as wages, were the chief
stumbling block. Indeed, no real effort to reach agreement in these areas was ever
made due in part to the failure of the Company to furnish the Union the wage data
it sought, in part to the Company's position that noneconomic issues be settled be-
fore money matters were discussed and, finally, in part to the Company's breaking
off of negotiations in June on the ground that it doubted the Union 's majority.
But if I had to decide whether or not the Company bargained in good faith solely
on the basis of the positions it took at the bargaining table on contract terms, I
would probably conclude that a preponderance of the evidence did not support the
allegations of the complaint . It is well settled , however , that the issue of good-faith
or bad-faith bargaining must be determined on the basis of the Company's entire
course of conduct. When the Company's position on contract terms is viewed
in the light of its other conduct, I believe that the preponderance of the evidence
establishes that it approached the bargaining table with a firm and fixed position on
various issues which was inconsistent with its obligation to bargain , was designed
to prolong negotiations and prevent agreement , and was responsible , at least in part,
for the failure of negotiations to produce a contract.
Take the matter of wages, for example. It may well be that the Company's as-
sertion that its wage rates were among the highest in the city was true and that it
was justified in claiming that its cost should not be increased . 49 But its refusal
over many months to tell the Union its current wage rates. makes me doubt that
its position on wages and other money matters was asserted in good faith.
I also note the Company's insistence that economic clauses be discussed only
after all other matters had been agreed upon. It is certainly true that there is no
hard and fast rule concerning the order in which contract terms will or should be
discussed . But it is entirely possible that a union would agree to less favorable
nonmoney clauses if it got good or fairly satisfactory wage rates, insurance and
pension plans, and other similar benefits. By insisting that the nonmoney matters
be settled before cost items were even discussed, the Company put the Union in the
position of being unable to make significant concession in these areas as a quid pro
quo (consciously or subconsciously) for a wage increase, for example. Collective
bargaining is not a series of discussions on isolated and unrelated subjects. On
the contrary , there is often an interrelation , as a practical matter, between clauses
which, on their face, deal with entirely different subjects and agreement is often
reached because one party gives something in one area and the other is therefore
willing to modify or withdraw its demand with respect to an apparently unrelated
subject. Although wages and' other economic benefits are not the only important
terms in a modern collective -bargaining contract , they are among the important sub-
48 As the court said in N.L.R . B. v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company , 205 F. 2d
131, 134-135 ( C.A. 1), cert. denied 346 U.S. 887 , "If the Board is not to he blinded by
empty talk and by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining , it must take some,
cognizance of the reasonableness of the positions taken by an employer in the course of
bargaining negotiations."
40 In reaching my conclusions on this aspect of the case , I have considered Union
Negotiator Blocksom's statement that he had never signed a contract which did not in-
clude "some" wage increase. The clear implication of this statement , I believe, is that
he would not have signed one with this Company that did not provide a wage increase.
Blocksom 's attitude , however, was clearly not responsible , even in part , for the failure of
negotiations for it was in no way responsible for: (1 ) the long delay before the first bar-
gaining meeting ; ( 2) the long delay in furnishing the information requested and the
failure to furnish most of the insurance information requested ; or (3) the breaking off
of negotiations in June 1963 , on the grounds that the Company doubted the Union's
majority . Moreover, Blocksom participated in no negotiations after December 13, 6 months
before the breaking off of negotiations and before the beginning of the 6-month limitation
period.
RHODES-HOLLAND CHEVROLET CO. 1317
jects discussed in most if not all contract negotiations. This being the case, it is
reasonable to infer that Respondent's refusal to make any offer on wages, its refusal
to agree to incorporate existing wage rates into the contract, and its position that
cost items should not be discussed until agreement was reached on all other issues,
prolonged negotiations and' contributed to some degree to the failure of negotiations
to produce agreement.
In view of the Company's long delay in meeting with the Union initially, its even
longer delay (which continued long after January 1, 1963) in furnishing the wage
data requested by the Union, its failure to furnish at any time most of the insurance
information sought and the employee handbook, its termination of negotiations in
June although it did not have a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority, I am
convinced and find that the Company's position on the economic terms of the
contract was not asserted in good faith but was motivated by a desire to prevent
meaningful discussions on contract terms.50 In my opinion, its attitude was designed
to and did prolong negotiations throughout most or almost all of the certification
year at which time it could, and did, refuse to bargain further on the ground that
it doubted the Union's majority. Insulating Fabricators, Inc., Southern Division,
144 NLRB 1325.
To summarize, on the basis of the foregoing facts, particularly Respondent's delay
after, as well as before, January 1963, to furnish the Union the wage data requested,
its failure to furnish the employee handbook and most of the insurance data (which
were not requested until after January 1963), its refusal in March 1963 to incorpo-
rate its existing wage rates into a contract, its refusal in May 1963 to sign its own
second proposed contract without further consultation with other members of the
firm, its insistence that no cost items be discussed until all other terms were agreed
upon, its breaking off of negotiations in June 1963, although it did not have a good-
faith doubt of the Union's majority, I conclude and find that a preponderance of the
evidence supports the allegations of the complaint that Respondent, since January
1963, failed to bargain in good faith with the Union by adopting fixed positions
during negotiations, by refusing to furnish within a reasonable time, wage data
requested by the Union, by failing to furnish some data at any time, and by refus-
ing to bargain with the Union on and after June 25,.1963. It follows, therefore,
and I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.51
III. THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent failed to bargain in good faith with the
Union, it will be recommended that it cease and desist from the unfair labor practice
found and take affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Since the Union obtained a copy of the employee handbook, I will not order the
Company to supply the Union with another unless the handbook had been revised.
Furthermore, my Recommended Order will require the Company to furnish the
names, job classifications, dates of hire, and rates of .pay of each employee currently
in the unit only if there have been changes since May 1963, in personnel, classifica-
tions, and rates of pay. Similarly, the insurance information required to be furnished
refers to current information. Cf. N.L.R.B. v. John S. Swift Company, Inc., 302 F.
2d 342 (C.A. 7) Nothing in the order is to be interpreted as requiring the Company
to furnish again the same information previously supplied.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Rhodes-Holland Chevrolet Co. is engaged in commerce and in operations affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Lodge 1049 of the International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By failing to bargaining in good faith with the certified representative of its
employees, by failing to furnish until well after January 1963, the wage information
requested by the Union, by failing to furnish the employee handbook and some of
the insurance information requested, by taking positions on contract terms designed
to prolong negotiations throughout most or all of the certification year at which time
501 note that Respondent never claimed that negotiations had reached an impasse and
It is undisputed that the parties had scheduled another bargaining meeting. Moreover,
many of the terms (money items) had never really been discussed.
51The Company's failure to furnish the information requested until months after it was
requested and its failure to ever furnish some of the information constituted an inde-
pendent violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Wh itin Machine Works,
217 F. 2d 593, 594 (C.A. 4), cert. denied 349 U.S. 905, and cases cited therein.
1318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
it could and did refuse to bargain on the ground that it doubted the Union 's majority,
even though it did not have a good -faith doubt of the Union 's majority , Respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of
Section 8 ( a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor practice affecting
commerce.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the record -as a whole, the findings of fact , and conclusions of
law made herein , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act , as amended , the Trial
Examiner hereby recommends that the Respondent , Rhodes-Holland Chevrolet Co.,
its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union and
in any like or related manner interfering with its employees ' rights to bargain
collectively.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Bargain , upon request , with the Union and furnish it, upon request, with:
(1) the name of each employee in the unit , his current job classification , hiring date,
and current pay rate, if such information has not already been furnished; (2) a
copy of the employee handbook if the copy in the Union 's possession is not the one
currently distributed to employees ; and (3 ) the current insurance booklet given to
the employees if the copy furnished previously is no longer in use , and the cost of the
plan to both the Company and the employees.
(b) Post at its South Charleston , West Virginia , premises, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix ." 52 Copies of the notice , to be furnished by the Regional
Director for the Ninth Region , shall, after being signed by Respondent 's representa-
tive, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for
a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced , or covered by
any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region , in writing , within 10 days
from date hereof of this Decision and Recommended Order , what steps it had
taken to comply herewith 53
521n the event that this Recommended Order shall be adopted by the Board , the words
"A Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner " in the notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "A Decree of the United States
Court of A ppeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "A Decision
and Order."
511n the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, In writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to
comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Lodge 1049 of the Inter-
national Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, as the certified representative of
all our employees in the appropriate unit described below.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with the efforts of the
aforesaid Union to bargain collectively on behalf of the employees in the unit
described below.
WE WILL , upon request , bargain collectively with the aforesaid Union as the
certified representative of all our employees in the unit described below with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment , and other terms and condi-
tions of employment , and embody any agreement reached in •a signed contract.
The bargaining unit is:
All garage , service department , and parts department employees , includ-
ing mechanics, bodymen , painters , partsmen , helpers, porters, washers,
polishers , get-ready men, cleanup men, lot boys, inventory clerk in parts
LOCAL 375, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, ETC. 1319
department , service-salesmen , cashier , service file clerk; excluding service
clerk , owner-relations coordinator , all new and used automobile and truck
salesmen, office clerical employees , guards , professional employees, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL furnish the Union, on request , any wage data not previously supplied
it; we will also give the Union a copy of the employee handbook and the in-
surance booklet, if the Union does not have tip -to-date copies ; and we will
supply the Union with information concerning the cost both to the employees
and to the Company of the insurance plan currently in effect.
RHODES-HOLLAND CHEVROLET CO.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Transit
Building, Fourth and Vine Streets , Cincinnati , Ohio, Telephone No. 381-1420, if
they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
Local 375, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Ind. and Glenn Cart-
age Company
Local 375, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America , Ind. and Service
Transport, Inc.
Local 375, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America , Ind. and The Kaplan
Trucking Co. Cases Nos. 3-CC-252, 3-CC-253, 3-CC-256. May
4, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 21, 1964, Trial Examiner William Seagle issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent
had not engaged in the alleged unfair labor practices and recommend-
ing that the complaint herein be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth
in the attached Trial Examiner 's Decision. Thereafter, the Charging
Parties filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a sup-
porting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations, Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members
Fanning and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
146 NLRB No. 158.