Reza B'Far et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 27, 2020

13932286 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/932,286 07/01/2013 REZA B'FAR 088325-0857739
(131100US)
1066
51206 7590 03/27/2020
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP/Oracle
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street
Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309
EXAMINER
BOYCE, ANDRE D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/27/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
KTSDocketing2@kilpatrick.foundationip.com
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
oraclepatentmail@kilpatricktownsend.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte REZA B’FAR, KENT SPAULDING, YASIN CENGIZ,
SREEDHAR CHITULLAPALLY, ALAN WAXMAN and YENAL KAL
____________________

Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,2861
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JEFFREY S. SMITH, JON M. JURGOVAN, and
KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.

JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Non-Final
Rejection of claims 1–22. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant(s)” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Oracle
International Corporation. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Our Decision refers to the Specification (“Spec.”) filed July 1, 2013, as
amended on December 31, 2014, the Non-Final Office Action (“Non-Final
Act.”) mailed August 24, 2017, the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed
February 26, 2018, the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed June 15, 2018,
and the Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed August 15, 2018.
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

2
CLAIMED INVENTION
The claims are directed to obtaining “provenance data” associated
with an employee of an enterprise. Spec. ¶ 7. “Provenance data” may
include information that reflects positively, negatively, or not at all, on the
enterprise. Id. ¶ 4. For example, the data may include an employee wishing
another person a happy birthday, using profanity, or discussing the
enterprise’s confidential information on a social networking system. Id.
¶¶ 4–5. Various reputation metrics and scores are calculated from the
provenance data. Id. ¶ 6. Based on a detected change in an employee’s
reputation score, the scope of provenance data obtained changes. Id. In
addition, the reputation score determines whether provenance data is stored.
Id. The provenance data is dynamically managed by repeating the described
actions. Id. ¶ 7.
Claims 1, 11, and 21 are independent. Appeal Br. 19, 22–23, 25–26
(Claims Appendix). The remaining claims are dependent from one of these
three claims. Appeal Br. 20–26 (Claims Appendix). Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
obtaining, by a data processing system, provenance data
associated with an employee of an enterprise from each of a
plurality of data sources according to a scope defining an amount
and type of provenance data to obtain, wherein:
the plurality of data sources comprises at least one
data source operated by the enterprise,
the plurality of data sources comprises at least one
external data source operated by or on behalf of an entity
different from the enterprise, the at least one external data
source being accessible to the data processing system via
a network, and
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

3
at least one of the at least one external data sources
is at least one social networking system;
calculating, by the data processing system, a plurality of
reputation metrics for the employee;
calculating, by the data processing system, a reputation
score for the employee of the enterprise based on the obtained
provenance data associated with the employee and the plurality
of reputation metrics for the employee, the reputation score
indicating a level of risk to the enterprise associated with the
employee;
detecting, by the data processing system, a change in the
reputation score for the employee that exceeds a threshold value;
changing, by the data processing system, the scope of the
provenance data to obtain for the employee based on the detected
change in the reputation score, wherein the scope after the
changing defines at least one of a different amount or a different
type of provenance data to obtain for the employee;
determining, by the data processing system, whether to
store the provenance data used to calculate the reputation score
for the employee of the enterprise based at least in part on the
reputation score; and
dynamically managing the provenance data associated
with the employee by repeatedly performing the obtaining,
calculating, detecting, changing, and determining operations.
Appeal Br. 13 (Claims App’x).

REJECTIONS
(1) Claims 1–22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Non-Final Act. 2–5.
(2) Claims 1–5, 11–15, 21, and 22 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Bhaskaran (US 2010/0125911 A1, published May
20, 2010) and Barcelo (US 8,812,342 B2, issued Aug. 19, 2014). Non-Final
Act. 6–12.
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

4
(3) Claims 6 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based
on Bhaskaran, Barcelo, and Omoigui (US 2010/0070488 A1, published Mar.
18, 2010). Non-Final Act. 12–14.
(4) Claims 7–9 and 17–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
based on Bhaskaran, Barcelo, Omoigui, and Fang (US 7,945,586 B1, issued
May 17, 2011). Non-Final Act. 14–17.

ANALYSIS
§ 101 Rejection
Patent eligibility is a question of law that is reviewable de novo.
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, we review the Examiner’s § 101 determinations concerning
patent eligibility under this standard.
Patentable subject matter is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101, as follows:
[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court emphasizes that patent
protection should not preempt “the basic tools of scientific and technological
work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Benson”); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)
(“Mayo”); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(“Alice”). The rationale is that patents directed to basic building blocks of
technology would not “promote the progress of science” under the U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, but instead would impede it.
Accordingly, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, are not
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

5
patent-eligible subject matter. Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850
F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 216).
The Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for subject matter
eligibility in Alice (573 U.S. at 217–18). The first step is to determine
whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception to patent eligibility,
specifically, an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon. Id.
(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76–77). If so, then the eligibility analysis
proceeds to the second step of the Alice/Mayo test in which we “examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 79). There is no need to proceed to
the second step, however, if the first step of the Alice/Mayo test yields a
determination that the claim is directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
USPTO Step 1–Categories of Invention in 35 U.S.C. § 101
The Patent Office has recently revised its guidance for how to apply
the Alice/Mayo test in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”).3 Step 1
of the Revised Guidance (which is unchanged from the prior guidance) is to
review the claims to determine whether they fall within one of the
enumerated categories of invention under § 101.

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the Revised Guidance. USPTO,
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019
Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

6
Claims 1–10 recite “methods” which qualify as “processes” under
§ 101. Claims 11–20 recite “systems” which qualify as “machines” under
§ 101. Claims 21–22 recite “non-transitory, computer-readable memories”
which qualify as “manufactures” under § 101.
Thus, the claims satisfy Step 1 of the subject matter eligibility
analysis, and we proceed to USPTO Step 2A, which is the first step in the
Alice/Mayo test.
In our subsequent § 101 analysis, we group all claims together and
select claim 1 as representative of the group, as the Examiner and Appellant
have done. See Non-Final Act. 2–5; Appeal Br. 7–13; 37 C.F.R.
§ 31.47(c)(1)(iv). Accordingly, all claims stand or fall with claim 1. We
will address the claims generally where possible, but when it is helpful to
refer to explicit claim language, we will refer to claim 1 only.
USPTO Step 2A – Alice/Mayo Step 1 (Are the Claims Directed to a Judicial
Exception?)
In Step 2A of the Revised Guidance, we determine if the claims are
“directed to” a judicial exception. Step 2A of the Revised Guidance
corresponds to the first step of the Alice/Mayo test but is in part changed
from the 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79
Fed. Reg. 74618–74633 (December 16, 2014), by separating the first step
into two prongs. We address these prongs in order below.
USPTO Step 2A—Prong 1 (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?)
In Step 2A, Prong One, of the Revised Guidance we determine
whether the claims recite a judicial exception including (a) mathematical
concepts; (b) certain methods of organizing human activity; or (c) mental
processes. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52.
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

7
The Examiner determines that “the claims are directed to the abstract
idea of managing provenance data.” Non-Final Act. 3; Ans. 9. The
Examiner further determines that the stated abstract idea relates to “human
activity.” Id. at 4. The Examiner states the claimed steps relate to concepts
found by the courts to be abstract ideas. Id.
We agree with the Examiner that the claims recite the abstract idea of
managing provenance data of an employee of an enterprise. Non-Final Act.
3; Ans. 9. The last step of claim 1 summarizes that the purpose of
performing the claimed steps is to manage provenance data. Further,
according to the first step of claim 1, the managed provenance data pertains
to an employee of an enterprise. The claim thus relates to business relations,
or managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between
people, which constitute “certain methods of organizing human activity”
under the Revised Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. 52.
Our reviewing courts have found similar types of claims to recite
abstract ideas. Examples of these cases include Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (receiving e-mail and
other data file identifiers, characterizing the e-mail based on identifiers, and
communicating characterization); Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (real-time performance monitoring of
electric power grid); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial
Corporation, 850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (retrieving, manipulating,
updating, creating, and displaying extensible markup language (XML)
documents for a mobile application interface and firewall system); In re TLI
Communications LLC Patent Litigation, 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(taking, transmitting, and organizing digital images); Content Extraction and
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

8
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (extracting data from documents, recognizing specific
information, and storing that information in memory of automated teller
machine); In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (organizing
business or legal relationships in structuring a sales force); Bancorp
Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (managing a life insurance policy on behalf of a policy
holder).
The similarities between these cases and the present claims are
evident. For example, Symantec, Electric Power Group, Capital One, TLI,
and Content Extraction all involve gathering or collecting data similar to the
claimed step of obtaining provenance data. Many of these cases, such as
Symantec, Electric Power Group, and Capital One, involve processing the
obtained data in some way, similar to the claimed calculating. At least
Content Extraction is selective in the data that it extracts and stores, similar
to the claimed step of determining whether to store provenance data.
Ferguson establishes business relationships like the claimed employee-
enterprise relationship, are abstract. Bancorp establishes managing
information for a life insurance policy, like the claimed step of managing
provenance data, is abstract.
Accordingly, we conclude that the claims recite a judicial exception to
patentability, namely, managing provenance data, which falls under the
category of abstract ideas identified as “certain methods of organizing
human activity” in the Revised Guidance.
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

9
We thus proceed to USPTO Step 2A, Prong Two, of the Alice/Mayo
test to determine whether the abstract idea embodied in the claims is
integrated into a practical application.
USPTO Step 2A—Prong 2 (Integration into Practical Application)
Under Step 2A, Prong Two, of the Revised Guidance, we (a) identify
whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the
judicial exception, and (b) evaluate those additional elements individually
and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the
exception into a practical application.
We discern no additional element (or combination of elements)
recited in the claims that integrates the judicial exception into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
For example, Appellant’s claimed additional elements (e.g., “data processing
system,” “data sources,” “network,” “social networking system,” “system,”
“processor,” and “memory”): (1) do not improve the functioning of a
computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with any particular
machine (except for a generic computer system); (3) do not effect a
transformation of a particular article to a different state; and (4) are not
applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See id.; MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Instead, the additional
elements are used merely to obtain, calculate, store, and manage a particular
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

10
kind of data in a generic manner, with no practical application. See Non-
Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 8–9; see, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 69–76; Fig. 6.
Appellant argues the claims provide an unconventional technological
solution to a technological problem. Appeal Br. 9–10 (citing Amdocs
(Israel) Limited v. Opennet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016));
Reply Br. 2. Appellant argues that the claimed steps dynamically manage
collection of provenance data of an employee based on reputation score
calculated from the provenance data, and its self-tuning system avoids the
problem of blindly collecting all data for analysis and storage, resulting in
overuse of resources, slow computing, and system failures. Id. Appellant
contends claim 1 is an unconventional technological solution because the
scope of provenance data obtained changes according to the employee’s
reputation score, solving the technological problem of collecting, analyzing,
and storing all data associated with an employee’s online activities. Id.
Appellant further argues because the claims limit the amount of provenance
data collected for an employee, claim 1 relates to a technologically self-
tuning system that is necessarily rooted in computer technology similar to
DDR Holdings, LLC V. Hotels.com, L.P., (Fed. Cir. 2015). Appeal Br. 10–
11; Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant further cites McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) to support its
contention that because claim 1 recites an improvement, it is patent-eligible.
The present case is distinguishable, however, from Amdocs, DDR and
McRO. Amdocs’s claims pertained to collecting network communications
usage information, filtering and aggregating that information to prepare data
records corresponding to users, storing the data records in a database,
allowing selection of a report, querying the database, and outputting the
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

11
selected report of network usage information. Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1304.
This functionality in the recited claims in Amdoc was dependent on the
system’s unconventional distributed architecture. Id. DDR’s claims
achieved the improvement of retaining website customer traffic while
allowing them to access offers from third party websites. DDR, 773 F.3d at
1257–58. The claims in DDR “specif[ied] how interactions with the Internet
are manipulated to yield a desired result—a result that over[ode] the routine
and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a
hyperlink.” Id. at 1258. McRO’s claims applied a stream of output morph
weight sets to a sequence of animated characters to produce lip
synchronization and facial expression control of animated characters,
improving how the physical display operated. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1308,
1313. We are not persuaded the claims here are like those in Amdocs, DDR,
or McRO for the reasons set forth by the Examiner. Ans. 6–10. For
example, what is accomplished with the claims at issue here is the mere
storage of provenance data with generic computer components, which is
used for no purpose in the claims as recited. In other words, the claims at
issue here do not recite a practical application of the abstract idea embodied
therein.
Moreover, claim 1 is not constrained in all circumstances to provide
the improvement that Appellant contends it achieves. Viewing claim 1
under its broadest reasonable interpretation, as the Examiner is obligated to
do (see In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2004)), the scope of provenance data is nowhere defined in the claim to be
less than all available data. Furthermore, even if the scope of provenance
data is narrowed starting from all available data, claim 1 does not recite that
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

12
stored provenance data that is outside of the scope is deleted or overwritten.
Accordingly, as the claim is recited, the amount of provenance data stored
corresponds to the widest scope of provenance data reached as the
provenance data is dynamically managed, which could be as much as all
available data.
Thus, the claims, when viewed as a whole, recite no additional
elements or combinations thereof that amount to integration of the abstract
idea recited in these claims into a practical application.
We next proceed to Step 2B of the subject matter eligibility test,
corresponding to step two of Alice/Mayo.
USPTO Step 2B—Alice/Mayo Step 2 (Do the Claims Recite an Inventive
Concept?)
We now evaluate whether the claims recite an inventive concept that
that is significantly more than the abstract idea embodied therein and
transforms the judicial exception into patentable subject matter. Under Step
2B of the Revised Guidance, an “inventive concept” can be evaluated based
on whether an additional element or combination of elements:
(1) “[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations
that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity
in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept
may be present;” or
(2) “simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is
indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.”
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
We agree with the Examiner that the additional limitations or
combination of elements perform generic computer functions on a general
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

13
purpose computer and are well-understood, routine and conventional
activities. Content Extraction involved “the generic, well-known steps of
collecting data, recognizing data, and storing data.” Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v.
Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Content
Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347). Similarly, the recited steps of obtaining
provenance data, recognizing provenance data within scope, and storing
provenance data are likewise generic, well-known steps.
Additionally, Electric Power Group held that claims that gather,
analyze, and display information using conventional and generic technology
were insufficient to constitute an inventive concept. Electric Power Group,
830 F.3d at 1356. In the present case, the claimed obtaining provenance
data is data gathering under Electric Power Group, the claimed calculating,
detecting, and changing are data analysis under Electric Power Group, and
the claimed determining whether to store provenance data is more abstract or
generic than the displaying of Electric Power Group.
The references cited by the Examiner show that tracking user
activities online in an organization and generating risk scores for the user
were known in the art. Final Act. 6–10; Bhaskaran Abstract ¶¶ 5–10, Fig. 1;
Barcelo Abstract, 1:18–2:13, Fig. 9. Thus, the claimed calculating and
detecting steps are not candidates to define an inventive concept. The
claimed changing of the scope of provenance data is unrestricted in scope
and thus may cover all available data, providing no inventive concept.
The additional elements of a “data processing system,” “data
sources,” “network,” “social networking system,” “system,” “processor,”
and “memory” are generic elements as claimed and described in the
Specification, and merely link the judicial exception to a technological
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

14
environment defined by these additional elements. Spec. ¶¶ 69–76; Fig. 6.
This is insufficient to constitute an inventive concept. Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 595 (2010). Furthermore, nothing is accomplished with the stored
provenance data, so the claims add insignificant extra-solution activity to the
judicial exception. See CyberSource v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Appellant argues the claims do not preempt the use of all systems for
collecting and analyzing provenance data. Appeal Br. 11–12. As the scope
of provenance data is unlimited in the claim, and nothing is accomplished
with the stored provenance data, we do not agree—the preemption posed by
these claims is significant. In any case, “questions on preemption are
inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis” so we find it unnecessary to
consider preemption beyond the analysis we have already provided. Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Thus,
we find Appellant’s argument unpersuasive.
Conclusion on Section 101 Analysis
Accordingly, we conclude that the claims are directed to the abstract
idea of managing provenance data, and that the claims do not recite a
practical application or inventive concept that transforms the judicial
exception into patent-eligible subject matter under § 101. Thus, we sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–22 under § 101.
§ 103 Rejections
A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the
differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

15
subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) where present, objective
evidence of nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
(1966).
In response to the Examiner’s § 103 rejections, Appellant argues for
patentability of all claims together as one group. Appeal Br. 13–17. We
select claim 1 as representative of the group and specifically address only
this claim in our analysis. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Changing Scope of Data Obtained
Claim 1 recites “changing, by the data processing system, the scope of
the provenance data to obtain for the employee based on the detected change
in the reputation score, wherein the scope after the changing defines at least
one of a different amount or a different type of provenance data to obtain for
the employee.” Appeal Br. 19 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner finds this
limitation disclosed by Bhaskaran. Non-Final Act. 8–9 (citing Bhaskaran
¶¶ 43, 67, Fig. 7); Ans. 10–11.
Appellant argues Bhaskaran does not teach or suggest the recited
claim element because the reference fails to disclose changing the scope of
provenance data to obtain for an employee based on a reputation score.
Appeal Br. 13–14; Reply Br. 3–4. Instead, Appellant argues, Bhaskaran’s
end risk score is used to identify violations and deviations from security
policies and alert an administrator if a threshold is exceeded; and to
chronologically identify risks posed by the user’s behavior. Id.
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

16
We agree with the Examiner that Bhaskaran (¶¶ 43, 67, Fig. 7) teaches
the argued feature of claim 1. Specifically, Bhaskaran teaches the following:
Deviation of the generated end score of the user from one or more
previously generated end risk scores of the user is calculated for
a selected time frame for identifying the violations of the security
policies by the user. The deviation may be computed using
multiple previously generated end risk scores over a time frame
or an average of the previously generated risk scores over the
time frame. The end risk scores enable the organization to
chronologically identify the risks posed by the users’ behavior
and can later be used by the organization for compliance
purposes, governance purposes, optimizing resources, etc.
Bhaskaran ¶ 43.
Accordingly, Bhaskaran uses deviation in the user’s end risk score
(corresponding to the claimed change in reputation score) to chronologically
identify security risks posed by the user’s behavior (corresponding to the
claimed change of scope of provenance data obtained for the employee). Id.
In other words, Bhaskaran uses the deviation in end risk scores to identify
when a user has engaged in risky behavior, thereby chronologically
narrowing the scope of data obtained. Id. Bhaskaran thus teaches the
claimed limitation, and Appellant’s argument is not persuasive.
Appellant further argues “Bhaskaran appears to disclose a system that
tracks all activities of a user and stores them all.” Appeal Br. 14 (citing
Bhaskaran ¶¶ 38, 55). As just noted, Bhaskaran (¶ 43) teaches the scope of
data obtained can be narrowed chronologically. Also, Appellant does not
explain, nor does claim 1 recite, how the claimed data processing system
could determine whether to store data without that data being stored, at least
temporarily, somewhere in the data processing system. Moreover, claim 1
does not limit the scope of data from encompassing all data available, so
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

17
Appellant’s argument is not supported by corresponding language in the
claim.
Likewise, Barcelo teaches “[a]s compliance data 322 may include
event information from a large number of sources, not all audit data in
compliance data 322 needs to be collected by risk score module 308 and
copied to risk data 310.” Barcelo 11:27–30. Although Appellant argues
Barcelo does not determine which data to store based on the reputation score
of the employee, the Examiner relies on Bhaskaran, not Barcelo, for this
teaching. Non-Final Act. 9. Thus, Appellant’s argument does not address
the Examiner’s rejection as applied. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Accordingly, we find Appellant’s arguments concerning the changing
of scope of provenance data obtained to be unpersuasive.
Dynamically Managing Provenance Data
Claim 1 recites “dynamically managing the provenance data
associated with the employee by repeatedly performing the obtaining,
calculating, detecting, changing, and determining operations.” Appeal Br.
19 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner finds this limitation is taught by
Bhaskaran. Non-Final Act. 7, 9–10 (citing Bhaskaran ¶¶ 39, 47); Ans. 11.
Appellant argues Bhaskaran, Barcelo, Omoigui, and Fang all fail to teach or
suggest dynamically managing the amount of provenance data because none
of them teaches or suggests changing the scope of the provenance data
collected. Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 4.
As the Examiner finds, Bhaskaran (¶ 39) discloses “[a]n end risk score
is dynamically generated 103 for the user for each of the associated group
risk ranking profiles” (emphasis added). Non-Final Act. 7. As explained in
the previous section, Bhaskaran (¶ 43) further teaches deviation in end risk
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

18
score over a selected time frame enables an organization to chronologically
identify security risks posed by a user’s behavior, which narrows the scope
of activity data. Bhaskaran (¶ 47) further teaches that tracked activities, risk
scores, and time frames are stored in a log database and used to generate
reports displayed to an administrator on an interactive dashboard interface to
identify violators of the organization’s security policies.
Accordingly, Bhaskaran dynamically generates end risk scores which
are used to chronologically identify security risks posed by a user, thereby
teaching changing of the scope of tracked activity data collected for such
purposes as generating reports. Thus, Appellant’s argument that Bhaskaran
fails to teach the argued claim limitation is unpersuasive.
Determining Whether to Store Provenance Data
Claim 1 recites “determining, by the data processing system, whether
to store the provenance data used to calculate the reputation score for the
employee of the enterprise based at least in part on the reputation score.”
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims Appendix). The Examiner finds this claim limitation
is taught by Bhaskaran. Non-Final Act. 9 (citing Bhaskaran ¶¶ 42, 47); Ans.
12.
Appellant argues Bhaskaran does not disclose this claim element.
Appeal Br. 16–17; Reply Br. 5. Appellant again argues Bhaskaran tracks all
activities of a user and stores them all, and there is no discretion in which
activities are stored. Id. at 16 (citing Bhaskaran ¶¶ 38, 55).
Bhaskaran (¶¶ 42, 43, 47) teaches that deviation in reputation score is
used to chronologically identify a user’s activity data that poses a security
risk, and that the corresponding data is used to generate a report to display
on an administrator’s interactive dashboard interface. In order to display the
Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

19
report, the interactive dashboard interface necessarily stores the part of the
tracked activities, risk scores, and time frame reflecting the security risk. In
this regard, we note that claim 1 does not recite where the data is stored, nor
from where it originated. Appellant also does not explain how its data
processing system could calculate a reputation score based on provenance
data without storing the provenance data at least temporarily. And
Appellant’s argument fails to consider that claim 1 does not recite that the
scope is less than all available provenance data.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the Examiner errs in the § 103
rejections of claims 1–22.

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 are
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are
affirmed.

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–22 101 Eligibility 1–22
1–5, 11–
15, 21, 22
103 Bhaskaran, Barcelo 1–5, 11–
15, 21, 22

6, 16 103 Bhaskaran,
Barcelo, Omoigui
6, 16
7–9, 17–
20
103 Bhaskaran,
Barcelo, Omoigui,
Fang
7–9, 17–
20

Overall
Outcome
1–22

Appeal 2018-008910
Application 13/932,286

20
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED