Reynolds Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 21, 1947

74 N.L.R.B. 1622 (N.L.R.B. 1947)

III the Matter of REYNOLDS CORPORATION and UNITED STEELWORKERS
OF AMERICA. CIO
Case No. 10-C-1579.-Decided August 21, 194
Messrs. Dan M. Byrd, Jr., and Albert D. Maynard, for the Board.
Mr. Walter L. Rice, by Mr. Elmer M. Cunningham and Mr. Joel
Denton, of Richmond, Va., and Twrpin and Lane, by Messrs. McKibben
Lane and William, C. Turpin, of Macon, Ga., for the respondent.
Mr. Martin C. Raphael, of Washington, D. C., and Mr. R. E. Starnes,
of Atlanta, Ga., for the CIO.
Mr. C. Baxter Jones, of Macon, Ga., and Mr. Marion Ennis, of
Milledgeville, Ga., for the Association.
llliss Anne E. Freeling and Mr. Louis R. Mercado, of counsel to the
Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon amended charges duly filed on September 2, 1944, by United
Steelworkers of America, CIO, herein called the CIO, the National
Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Direc-
tor for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued its complaint
dated September 5, 1944, against Reynolds Corporation, Milledgeville,
Georgia, herein called the respondent, alleging that the respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (2), and (3), and Section
2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein
called the Act. Copies of the complaint, together with notice of
hearing thereon, were duly served upon the respondent, the CIO, and
the Association.
With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleged in
substance, that the respondent : (1) from about May 1, 1944, to the
date of the complaint, engaged in certain specified conduct interfering
with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the _
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act; (2) sponsored, formed,
promoted, assisted, dominated, and contributed support to the Workers
74 N L. R. B., No. 248.
1622
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1623
Welfare Association, Inc., a labor organization hereinafter called the
Association ; and (3) during June and August 1944, discharged em-
ployees George Porter, Sidney Gibson, Thomas Paschal, H. E. Tyler,
and Ruby Collins, and thereafter failed and refused to reinstate them,
for the reason that they joined or assisted the CIO, engaged in con-
certed activities, or had refused to join or assist the Association.
On September 8, 1944, the respondent filed a motion for a Bill of
Particulars, and also filed an answer denying that it had engaged in
unfair labor practices. On September 12, 1944, the motion for a Bill
of Particulars was granted in part and denied in part by David Kara-
sick, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner.
On the same day, counsel for the Board filed a Notice of Intention to
Move to Amend the Complaint. On September 15, counsel for the
Board filed a Bill of Particulars.
Upon due notice, a hearing was held at Milledgeville, Georgia, from
September 18 to September 27, 1944, before Charles W. Schneider,
the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner to
take the place of the Trial Examiner previously designated to conduct
the hearing. The Board, the respondent, the CIO, and the Association
were represented at and participated in the hearing. Fullopportunity
to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties. At the opening
of the hearing, upon motion by counsel for the Board, and over objec-
tion by the respondent, the complaint was amended in accordance with
the afore-mentioned Notice of Intention. A motion by counsel for the
Board for a Bill of Particulars of the respondent's answer, and a
motion by the respondent for a Bill of Particulars of the amended
complaint, were both denied by the Trial Examiner. During the
course of the hearing, upon motion by counsel for the Board and over
objection by the respondent, the complaint was amended to include an
allegation that about July 29, 1944, the respondent discharged Kathryn
Cowart because of her activities on behalf of the CIO. At the con-
clusion of the Board's case the Trial Examiner denied, without preju-
dice to its renewal at a later point in the hearing, a motion by the
respondent and the Association to dismiss the complaint as amended.
At the close of the hearing the Trial Examiner denied motions by the
respondent and the Association to strike certain names from the
complaint as amended, and reserved ruling on motions by the same
parties to dismiss the complaint. The motions to dismiss the complaint
were denied by the Trial Examiner in his Intermediate Report.
On October 16, 1944, upon motion filed by counsel for the respondent
on October 10 and over objection by counsel for the Board, the Chief
Trial Examiner reopened the record and directed that a further hear-
ing be held. On October 24, 1944, upon due notice, a further hearing
1624 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
was held in Washington, D. C. The Board, the respondent, and the
CIO were represented at and participated in this hearing. The Asso-
ciation did not appear. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the
issues was afforded all parties. At this hearing, upon motion by
counsel for the Board and over objection by the respondent, the com-
plaint was further amended to allege, additionally, that on or about
October 17, 1944, the respondent initiated, formed, sponsored, and
promoted a grievance committee, hereinafter called the Grievance
Committee, and assisted, dominated, and contributed support thereto
in violation of Section 8 (2) of the Act.
Upon due notice, a further hearing was held at Milledgeville,
Georgia, on November 9, 1944. The Board, the respondent, the Associ-
ation, and the CIO were represented at and participated in this hear-
ing. The Grievance Committee did not appear. All parties were
afforded full Opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues. At the
close of the hearing the Trial Examiner denied a motion by counsel
for the respondent to dismiss the allegations of the amended complaint
with respect to the Grievance Committee, on the ground that the
question was moot, and reserved ruling on a motion to dismiss on
the merits. The latter motion was denied by the Trial Examiner in his
Intermediate Report. Although afforded the opportunity, none of the
parties filed a brief with the Trial Examiner.
On December 18, 1944, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate
Report, copies of which were duly served upon the respondent, the
CIO, and the Association. In the Intermediate Report, the Trial
Examiner found that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging
in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8 (1), (2), and (3), and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, and
recommended that the respondent cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the pglicies of the Act.
He further found that the respondent had not discriminated against
Kathryn Cowart and had not engaged in certain other unfair labor
practices, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed in these
respects. Thereafter, the respondent and the Association filed excep-
tions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. Oral argu-
ment, in which the respondent and the Union participated, was had
before the Board at Washington, D. C., on March 1, 1945.
On May 26, 19.45, the Board issued its Decision and Order in the
above-entitled proceeding, finding that the respondent had engaged
in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (2), and (3), and Section 2
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1625
(6) and (7) of the Act, and ordering the respondent to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action'
Thereafter, the Board filed with the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit a petition for enforcement of its
order, and the respondent filed a cross petition to review and set aside
the Board's order. On May 27, 1946, the Circuit Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the Board for the purpose of receiving and con-
sidering certain evidence which the respondent had offered to the
Board's Trial Examiner or to the Board, and which had been excluded.
In general, the issues as to Which the Circuit Court desired further
evidence and consideration were: (1) whether the respondent's opera-
tions at the Milledgeville plant affected interstate commerce within
the meaning of the Act; (2) whether the respondent was the em-
ployer of the employees at that plant; (3) the effect of the declara-
tion of naval labor policy, and also of the discharges of employees
other than the complainants herein, on the merits of the unfair labor
practice findings: and (4) the effect of the termination of the respond-
ent's operation of the plant. In its opinion remanding the case,
the Circuit Court stated as follows:
We retain the case upon our docket. We direct that with con-
venient speed the evidence which we have held was improperly
excluded be received by, the Board, and that it likewise take
evidence touching the present status of the Milledgeville Plant
and the Reynolds Corporation, and certify all said evidence to
this court. The Board may reconsider and modify all its findings
in the light of all the evidence and make new findings if it so
desires; and may make recommendations as to the modification or
setting aside of its original order; and may reconsider its determi-
nation, under all the present circumstances, to seek enforcement.
Pursuant to the direction of the Circuit Court, and upon due notice.
a further hearing was held at Washington, D. C., on July 11, 1946,
before Trial Examiner Charles W. Schneider. The Board and the
respondent were represented by counsel and participated in the hear-
ing. All parties who appeared were given full opportunity to be
heard, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues raised by the
Circuit Court's order.2
On July 23, 1946, the Trial Examiner issued his Supplemental
Intermediate Report finding, upon consideration of the evidence taken
pursuant to the remand order of the Circuit Court, that the respondent
had engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce as previously
found by the Board, but recommending modifications in the Board',s
1 Matter of Reynolds Corporation , 61 N L R . B 1446.
s The Workers Welfare Association , Inc, the Grievance Committee , and the CIO , parties
to the original proceeding , although served with notice, did not appear at this hearing.
1626 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
remedial order in view of the fact that the respondent had ceased
operations at Milledgeville, Georgia. Thereafter the respondent filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. Upon
request of the respondent, the Board at Washington, D. C., on Decem-
ber 10, 1946, heard oral argument, in which the respondent partici-
pated; neither the Union nor the Association appeared.
The Board has reconsidered its findings in view of the questions
raised by the remand order of the Circuit Court, and in the light of
the additional evidence received in compliance with the Court's order.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE ImSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Reynolds Corporation was, during the period,herein involved, a
Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Reynolds
Metal Company, and was engaged at Milledgeville, Georgia, in the
manufacture of naval ordnance for the United States Government
under contract with the Navy Department. The plant, facilities,
equipment, raw materials, and finished products were, at all times
during operation of the plant, the property of the Navy Department.
The respondent was compensated by the Navy Department on a cost-
plus-fixed-f ee basis. In the course of its business at the Milledgeville
plant the respondent used raw materials, valued in excess of $100,000,
which were shipped to it from points outside the State of Georgia. A
substantial portion of the products manufactured at the Milledgeville
plant, valued in excess of $100,000, was transported and delivered
to points outside the State of Georgia.
On November 5, 1945, the respondent ceased operations, its contract
with the Navy was terminated, and the plant was completely surren-
dered to the Navy.
One of the matters to be reconsidered herein in conformity with
the Circuit Court's remand order is the question of the Board's juris-
diction over the respondent. Although the respondent conceded at
the original hearing before the Trial Examiner that it was engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act, it later contended that
the Board had no jurisdiction over the respondent on the grounds
that its operations did not affect commerce within the meaning of the
Act, and that it was not an employer' within the meaning of the Act.
The Trial Examiner found in his Supplemental Intermediate Report,
and we agree, that the Board has jurisdiction over the respondent.
A. Interstate commerce
It was conceded by the respondent that the raw materials used at
the Milledgeville plant were transported to it from points outside the
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1627
State of Georgia and that the finished products were transported to
points outside the State of Georgia. These raw materials and finished
products moved in the stream of commerce by means of instrumentali-
ties of interstate transportation. A labor dispute among the respond-
ent's employees would therefore have had a direct and adverse effect
upon the movement (both inflow and outflow) and the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce. The respondent contends, nevertheless,
that, as the plant, equipment, raw materials, and finished products
were owned by the United States Government, and as the respondent
was compensated on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, the movement of raw
materials and finished products between the States was not interstate
commerce but "administrative acts of Government, unrelated to com-
merce." None of these factors, singly or jointly, would, however, de-
prive the Board of jurisdiction. The movement of goods across State
lines constitutes interstate commerce whether title to such goods is
vested in the Federal Government or in private owners. Section 2 (3)
of the Act defines "commerce" to include "transportation" among the
several States. Clearly there was such "transportation," here, both
of raw materials and of finished products. The scope of the power of
Congress under the Constitution to regulate commerce is not limited
to commercial or business transactions but includes any movement
across State lines. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "It
is immaterial whether or not the transaction is commercial in char-
acter." 3 That Congress can regulate the interstate transportation of
Government-owned goods cannot be denied. The only question, then
is, whether Congress intended to withhold the transportation of goods-
to which the Government has title from the commerce regulated by the
National Labor Relations Act.
There is nothing in the legislative history of the Act which indicates
a congressional intent to narrow the broad statutory definition of the
term "commerce" as including "transportation" so as to except the
transportation of Government-owned goods and to exclude those who
manufacture goods for the Federal Government from the operation
of the Act. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared
that Congress, in respect to the Act, was exercising the full scope of
its powers under the commerce clause.4 In view of these pronounce-
ments of the Supreme Court, and the absence of any language or intent
3 Edwards v. California, 314 U S 160, 172; Canivnetti v. United States, 242 U S 470,
491, United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U. S 533; Thornton v.
United States , 271 U. S 414 ; United States v. Hill, 248 U. S 420, 423 ; Gooch v. United
States, 297 U. S. 124 ; Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S 432 See also, to the same
effect, Walling v Haile Gold Mines, 136 F. (2d) 102, 104-5 (C C. A. 4) ; and Bell v.
Porter, 159 F. (2d) 117, in which the Seventh Circuit, citing the above cases, stated that
"these cases, we think, make it clear that interstate commerce is not limited to interstate
trade "
4 N. L. it. B v. Fainblatt, 306 U S 601, 607 ; N. L. R B v Hearst Publications , 322 U S.
111, 125.
1628 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to exclude that part of commerce which consists of the transportation
of Government-owned goods, the contention that Congress intended
to protect the interstate transportation of privately owned goods from
the burdens and obstructions arising out of labor strife, but to leave
unprotected against such disruptions the interstate movement of goods
owned by the Federal Government, lacks any substantial support.
Nor is there any greater merit to the contention .that the regulations
adopted by Congress for the protection of interstate commerce are in-
applicable when the interstate transportation consists of materials of
war. To the contrary, it is the interstate movement of materials of
war in time of ivar which is entitled to the fullest measure of protec-
tion against interference that it is within the broad power of Con-
gress to grant. During the war a large part of the productive capacity
of the Nation was devoted to fulfilling war contracts, with title to the
raw materials and to the finished products frequently vested in the
Government and not in the private contractor. The legislative history
of the Act is similarly devoid of any indication that Congress intended
the transportation of war materials not to be included in the concept
of commerce and to be without the protection of the Act.
We have carefully considered the court decisions bearing upon these
questions. Many of these are cases under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, which contains a definition of "conunerce" substantially like that
in the Act, and includes "transportation." These decisions disclose
that the greater weight of jiidicial authority supports the position we
have adopted. They reject the theory that transportation of Govern-
ment-owned goods or of war materials is not included in the concept of
commerce but is something different to be classified as an administra-
tive act of the Government. Thus, the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Newport News Shipbuilding cC
Dry Dock Co. v. N. L. R. B., 101 F. (2d) 841, has clearly indicated its
view that the interstate movement of materials of war constitutes in-
terstate commerce within the ineaning of the National Labor Relations
Act. The Court specifically rejected the arguinent that the construc-
tion of men-of-war for the U. S. Navy, which constituted 91 percent
of the employer's business, could not be considered interstate coni-
inerce because such ships were "not designed. to serve as carriers of
commodities for sale or barter." As the Court pointed out, such ves-
sels would nevertheless "navigate the public waters of the United States
and . .. transport persons and property from State to State and to
foreign countries." In Clyde v. Broderick, 144 F. (2(1) 348, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that ware-
liouse employees of a contractor constructing an ammunition plant
for the Government, who were engaged in handling tools and equip-
ment used in the construction of the plant , either receiving them or
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1629
preparing them for interstate shipment, were engaged in commerce
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court in that case reversed
the District Court, which had embraced the "administrative act" theory
of transportation of Government-owned goods, and stated :
There is nothing in the Fair Labor Standards Act which indi-
cates an intent or purpose to exempt from its coverage employees
whose activities relate to the movement in interstate commerce
of personally owned goods of an employer or goods moving inter-
state for the convenience of the United States Government.
[Italics supplied.]
In another case involving the Fair Labor Standards Act, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Bell v.
Porter, 159 F. (2d) 117, held that the transportation of Government-
owned ordnance constituted interstate commerce. The circumstances
there involved were similar to those in the instant case. There the
company was engaged in the manufacture of munitions under a cost-
plus-fixed-fee contract with the Government. Title to the plant,
equipment, and materials was vested in the Government, and all muni-
tions produced were shipped to Army installations. The Court there
found that "the production of goods for interstate transportation by
or for the Government is production for commerce within the mean-
ing of the Act," ' and, further, that Congress did not intend "that
transportation effected by the Government or of Government goods
be treated differently from all other transportation." a
Although, under the foregoing authorities, the Board may assume
jurisdiction over an employer whether or not his operations have "a
commercial aspect," the respondent's operations did in fact have a
commercial aspect. Under its contract with the Navy, the respondent
had "complete supervision of the operation of the plant,"' determined
the methods of manufacture, purchased supplies and materials, and
shipped out the finished products. .For such services the Navy Depart-
ment contracted to reimburse the respondent for all reasonable costs
and to pay the respondent a fee which was related to the cost. The
respondent was guaranteed a minimum fee of $150,000, and was also
given certain cash advances. Under these circumstances, it is clear
that the respondent was engaged in a commercial venture for profit.
We have noted in the opinion of the Court remanding the instant
case the statement that, "Jurisdiction of the Board is further ques-
tioned on the ground that in the statutes authorizing the building and
operation of the emergency war plants like that at Milledgeville, it was
provided that contracts and arrangements might be made by the Army
The Court here cited Umthem V Day cC Zimmciman. 16 N \V (2d) 258 Timberlake v
Day & Zimmeinman, 49 F Supp 2S. Clyde v Broderick, 144 F (2d) 348. 351
° Cf Rntoh v Puget sound Bridge and Dr edginq Co , 156 F (2d) 334 (C C A 9), and
Dimes v Hazeltine Electronics Corp. 12 Labor Cases, Par 63, 828 (C C A 2)
1630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Navy Departments without respect to existing laws." While we
are aware of statutes and executive orders which authorized the mak-
ing of such contracts without regard to the usual requirements for
Government contracts, found in existing law, thereby permitting the
letting of contracts without competitive bids, the use of cost-plus-fixed-
fee contracts, etc., we are not aware of any such statute or executive
Grder, and none has been cited to us by respondent, which has exempted
operations of contractors under a contract such as is here involved from
the National Labor Relations Act.
We further note the statement in the Court's opinion on remand that,
"things which interfere with the war effort may more appropriately be
dealt with by agencies of the Government other than the Board,"
which seems to suggest that, whatever legal basis might exist for the
Board to assert jurisdiction herein, as a matter of discretion and policy
the Board should waive its legal jurisdiction in favor of other agencies,
presumably the War and Navy Departments. Any doubts which might
have existed as to whether, as a matter of policy, we should exercise out
discretion to assert jurisdiction over cost-plus-fixed-fee contractors for
war materials have been resolved for us by the War and Navy Depart-
ments. These departments, far from indicating that they regard such
action as an unwelcome intrusion, expressed concern lest the Board's
jurisdiction over war plants 7 should be jeopardized by the successful
assertion of the type of jurisdictional defense sought to be made herein.
B. The respondent's employer status
The respondent has further contended that the Government, and not
the respondent, was the employer of the employees at the Milledgeville
plant. We have given careful consideration to this contention in the
light of the evidence, including the factors mentioned in the Court's
opinion, but we find that the contention is lacking in merit. It was the
respondent which operated the plant and which, under the contract,
' Duiing the war, the war and Navy Departments were faced with reimbursable poten-
tial liabilities in staggering amounts undei theii cost-plus-fixedfee contiacts, arising out
of claims and suits against the contractors for overtime under the Fair Labor Standards
Act These departments recommended to the Department of Justice, which was defending
such suits because of the financial interest of the Government, that the defense be made
that the production of war materials for delivei y to the Govei nment at the plant site and
the subsequent interstate transportation of such goods did not constitute "production of
goods for commerce" or "comineice" under the Fair Laboi Standards Act, but only "if in
the opinion of the Attorney General it would not impair or cast substantial legal doubt"
upon the luiisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board over war plants cinder date
of July 12, 1944, the Attorney General wrote the Secretary of War and the Secretary of
the Navy, informing them that in his opinion a Supreme Court holding sustaining such a
defense under the Fair Labor Standards Act would constitute a precedent of great weight
in determining similar questions under the National Labor Relations Act, and that he
therefoie shared their opinion that uncle, such circumstances it would be inappropriate to
raise the defense It is interesting to note that the Attorney General went even further
in the same letter and expressed his opinion that the defense "lacks substantial merit," and
would not be sustained in the Supreme Court.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1631
determined the methods of manufacture, hired the supervisory staff
and the employees, determined their Wages, hours, and -working condi-
tions, directed their duties and functions, paid their salaries, and
trained, promoted, demoted, and discharged them." These controls
over employment conditions and methods of operation were exercised
by the respondent for the most part upon its own initiative and within
its own discretion. It Was under no obligation to follow suggestions or
recommendations which it deemed operationally unwise, unsound, or
even unnecessary. The respondent's manager admitted at the original
hearing that the respondent was "solely responsible" for labor relations
at the plant. The Naval commanding officer testified that he could
'Conly suggest" ; that he could not "give orders" to the respondent. It is,
true that the Navy Department maintained supervision and rigid in-
spection of the plant to see that it was operated in strict accordance
with the contract, and that the product conformed to specifications.
It is also true that there were certain limitations on the contractor's
freedom of operations, such as the provision that approval of the Chief
of the Bureau of Ordnance or his representative must be had on all pur-
chases of materials in excess of $500 unless and to the extent that there
might be a waiver of such requirement. We do not consider, however,
that the various contractual limitations on- the contractor were incon-
sistent with an independent contractor status or were sufficient to alter
the respondent's position as the substantial employer. Nor, assuming
that the respondent was bound by provisions not inserted in its con-
tract, do we believe that any of the restrictions in the Statement of
Labor Policy Governing Government Owned, Privately Operated
Plants, dated June 22, 1942, deprived the respondent of its employer
status.a The Court's opinion refers to paragraph 8 of this document
ae reserving to the Navy approval of all pay-roll costs and proposed
wage scales at such plants. We note, however, that both the opening
Article I (b) of the contract provided, inter alga :
The conti actor will have complete supervision of the operation of the Plant subject
only to the provisions of this contract, but will do no work within the Plant that is
not diiectly or indirectly required by job orders or supply contracts issued to the
Contractor by the [Navy] Department or required for proper maintenance, operation
and repair of the plant
Article I (e) provided as follows
This contract contemplates and is intended to provide for the complete management,
maintenance, repair, and operation of the Plant by the Contractor for the manufacture
of component parts for fuzes, primers, and tracers, including the procurement of
necessary materials, supplies, and services (except such materials and supplies as
shall be furnished to the Contractor by the Department) and for the employment
and training of supervisory and working forces for the benefit of the Plant The
methods of manufacture used shall be at the Contractor's option so long as the product
confoims to specifications and is produced in the required quantity and at a reasonable
cost to the department.
° We consider the effect of this Statement, and actions of the Navy commanding officer
at respondent's plant pursuant thereto, in connection with the merits of the unfair labor
practice charge relating to the Grievance Committee, in the section of this decision which
bears that heading.
7 5542 0-4 8-vol 74-104
1632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
,sentence of this paragraph, and the unnumbered second paragraph of
the Statement which refers to advance approval of wage scales, merely
recite the fact that "in most instances" the contracts under which such
plants are operated so provide. Thus, paragraph 8 begins, "The War
and Navy Departments in most instances, have contractual responsi-
bility for the approval of all costs including pay roll costs," and the
remainder of the paragraph dealing with the matter of advance ap-
proval of wage scales presumably deals only with situations where such
',contractual responsibilities" exist. On examining the contract in-
volved herein, we are unable to find any section which provides for the
NRvy to snake advance approval of proposed wage scales. But even if
there were such a provision or if such were the piactice,10 we do not
believe that an independent contractor ceases to be the employer of
those he hires, fires, compensates, and directs in their work, merely be-
cause the party who has agreed to reimburse the independent con-
tractor's labor and material costs insists that the wage scales paid
receive prior approval as a condition to such reimbursement. Regard-
less, therefore, of the relationship between the respondent and the
Navy Department, the relationship between the respondent and the
,employees at the plant was, as the Trial Examiner found, an employer-
employee relationship.il
Moreover, the mere fact that the respondent performed services for
the Federal Government, on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, will not sup-
port a, claim that it was not an employer within the meaning of Section
2 (2) of the Act, but was only an agent for the Government which is
to be regarded as the employer, and that the exemption granted the
United States from the definition of "employer" accordingly applies.
The Supreme Court has frequently held that those who contract to
furnish supplies or render services to the Government under arrange-
ments similar to the respondent's do not thereby become governmental
agents or instrumentalities so as to share in the sovereign immunities
reserved to the Federal Government.12 The Seventh Circuit, in Bell v.
Porter, supra, also held that ". . . cost-plus-fixed-fee contractors
10 It is readily undei etandahle that the contractor might voIuiititriiv seek pi tot approval
of its wage scales to preclude the possibility at a later date of the Navy's refusing reim-
bursement as to amounts which night be deemed unreasonable and excessive
11 See N L R B v Hearst Publications, life, 322 U S Ill N L R B v Jones S
Laughlin Steel Corp , 331 U S 416 N L R B v Atkins d Co , 331 U S 398
12Penn Dairies v bilk Control Commission, 318 U S 261, 269. Alabama v King CC
Boozer, 314 U S 1, 13 James v Drava Contracting Co, 302 U S 134, 149, Carry v.
United States, 314 U S 14 See also Host v !Moore-AlcCorniack Lines, 66 S Ct 1218, in
which the Supreme Count held that it seaman on a merchant vessel owned by the United
States but operated by a private contractor, under it contiact analogous to the one in the
instant case had =tutus as an employee of the i,ontiactot entitling hint to recover
for mluries received tit the course of his duties at sea under the laws enacted for
the piotection of seamen in piivile einploi iriespectise of his status as ,i teniporaiv
employee of the United States by virtue of the transfer of the maritime industry to
tenipoi iiy goveinmenta1 control during the wai Cf N L R B i William H Carroll,
120 F (2d) 457 (C C A 1) . Carroll v Social Security Board, 128 F. (2d) 876, 879
(C C A 7)
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1633
with the Government engaged in war production, are not agents of the
Government and do not share the Government's sovereign immunities."
We have uniformly found the Act applicable to enterprises which pro-
vide 'goods and services for the Federal Government under contracts
similar to the one that the respondent had with the Navy Department."
Accordingly, we find, as in our original Decision, that the activities
of the respondent, during the period here in question, affected com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, and
that it was an employer within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America, affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, and Workers Welfare Association, Inc.,
unaffiliated, are labor organizations admitting to membership em-
ployees of the respondent at the Milledgeville plant.
The Grievance Committee consisted of a number of persons who
had been selected by employees at the respondent's Milledgeville plant
for the purpose of representing said employees in the negotiation of
grievances. We find that the Grievance Committee was a labor
organization, within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Iol,terf ere^tee , rests aint , an d coercion.; domination of and interference
with the Association and the Grievance Committee
1. The appearance of the CIO
The plant at Milledgeville, Georgia, was constructed by the Govern-
ment in 1943; partial production was conuneiiced in the fall of that
year. It was the only industrial enterprise of any coiisequence within
a radius of 25 miles. The area is predominantly agricultural.
Ninety-five percent of the respondent's employees was drawn from the
inhabitants of the surrounding area, whose previous employment had
been mainly agriculture and who were virtually without previous
industrial experience of any kind.
During the latter part of April 1944, following overtures by a
number of the respondent's employees, C. H. Gillman and R. E.
Starnes, representatives of the'CIO, conferred with employees respect-
ing the establishment of a CIO organization at the plant. As a result
of these conferences, the CIO opened an office in Milledgeville about
',Matte, of Luba4-Harold Corp . 44 N L R B 730 Matter of Un,ted States Cartridge
Company. 42 N L N B 191. Matte? of War Tncergency Pipelines. Inc, 56 N L R B 64,
Matte? of II K Dickson. 41 N L R B 1230, Matter of Bi own Sh?phu?Iding Company, Inc,
57 N L It B 326, 58 N L R B 99S, Matter of War hemp Indutr,es, Inc, 57 N L R B.
1709.
1634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
May 1, 1944, and embarked upon an open organizational campaign-
The appearance of the CIO in Milledgeville evoked immediate hostile
reaction in the community. The city of Milledgeville adopted a licens-
ing ordinance requiring union organizers, as a condition of obtaining a
license, to pay a fee of $5,000 per year and to establish 12 months' resi-
dence in the town. On May 17, 1944, upon evidence that Starnes had
talked in his office to several men with reference to organizing the
respondent's employees, he was arrested and convicted of violating the
ordinance.14
Similar antagonism to the CIO found expression among certain of
the respondent's employees. The result was to divide a large number
of the respondent's employees into two rival factions, one antagonistic
to the CIO and the other favorable to it. A third group stood inde-
cisively aloof from both factions.i5
2. The speeches of Lieutenant Commander Banks and
General Manager Smith
On May 18, 1944, the day after organizer Starnes was arrested and
when feeling in the community was at a high pitch, the respondent's
employees on both shifts were assembled at the plant during working
hours and addressed by Lieutenant Commander Banks, a United States
Naval officer on duty at the plant,'(; and Harry G. Smith, general
manager of the plant and vice president of the respondent.17
Banks spoke first. He told the employees that the Navy had to take
notice of anything that might affect production, such as "dissention
among workers, taking of so-called sides, personal arguments or any-
thing" that would distract their attention from their work; and that
anyone who did those things was as "guilty of treason as the deserter
who assists the enemy." He then told the employees that, because of
the necessity for management to devote its full attention to production,
many problems had not been remedied, but assured them that they
would be in due time, and expressed confidence that the employees
would not permit "small things" to interfere with their "real objec-
tive" and that they would "set an example for the rest of the country
to follow."
Smith, after some introductory remarks, told the employees that the
Navy and the management were working "shoulder to shoulder," and
14 On August 29, 1944, the ordinance was declared unconstitutional by the Georgia Su-
preme Couit. Starnes v City of Milledgeville, 15 L R R. 76
"No finding of unfair labor practices is predicated upon the above findings They are
relevant, however, to show the circumstances under which the subsequent events occurred
and for a proper understanding of the probable effect upon the employees of the event
19 A number of naval officers and civilian employees were stationed at the plant as repre-
sentatives of the Navy Department to insure that the terms of the contract were carried
out
"The full text of these speeches appears in Appendix "A," attached to this Decision.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1635
stated that he wanted them to know that rates of pay were set by the
War Labor Board; that the Company had requested approval of in-
,creases three times, each of which had been denied, but that on the
fourth appeal approval had been secured and increases recently put
into effect. He told them that the policy of the company and his
own desire was to treat the employees fairly and to make the plant
the most desirable place to work in the State of Georgia. He then
urged them to bring their grievances directly to management; to take
them first either to the foremen or the personnel director, and then,
if they were not thus satisfactorily disposed of, to bring them directly
to him. He then said that he would not permit any interference with
production; that there were reports circulating which tended to dis-
tract the employees' attention; that there were rumors of attempts to
organize a union in the plant; that the employees were free to join or
not join; and that whether they did or not would not affect their jobs.
However, he said that it was his duty to advise them; announced that
they would not be required to join a union in order to hold their jobs,
and that wage increases would be given irrespective of whether or not
there was a union; repeated that not only rates of pay but the rates of
increase were fixed by law ; and told them that they should ask them-
selves whether they had a clean, pleasant and safe place to work,
whether their pay was in accordance with their ability and experience,
and whether they needed a union to enjoy those things. He con-
cluded with the statement that "personally" he could "see no reason
for a Union in this plant," but that they were privileged to accept that
opinion or to reject it; that management would not coerce them either
way; and that they not permit others to coerce them.
Thereafter, the supervisory employees were instructed by Vice-
President Smith and other management officials to be neutral with
respect to union organization and not to express even their personal
opinions thereon. The employees, however, were not at that time
informed of the neutrality instructions given to the supervisors.
3. The formation of the Association
Shortly after the delivery of the above speeches, literature opposing
unions in general and the CIO in particular, and proposing the forma-
tion of, and the solicitation of applications for, an independent organi-
zation under the name of Workers Welfare Association, made its
appearance in the community. This literature 18 was composed by
" Much of this literature was intemperate in language and emotional in character.
Typical of the ideas expressed were the following: Employees , while without control over
dues and assessments , had to pay " tribute" to unions or lose their jobs ; unions were un-
democratic and interested only in the money they got from workers , held up production,
fomented strikes and riots and were communistic ; the CIO was an "international group
of bloodsuckers ." The literature further stated that the emDlovees could run their busi-
1636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Howard Cass , employed by the respondent as a senior set-up man and
at one time as a "job training coordinator ," and was distributed by
Cass , set-up men Fox, Durden and Sapp , and- machinist repairman
Borders , all employees of the respondent , and by other persons. The
distribution of this literature took place over a period of 5 or 6 weeks
on the highway outside the plant, where CIO adherents also distrib-
uted their literature. James Sibley , a Milledgeville business man,
arranged to have some of the literature printed, took an active part in
the promotion of the Association and financed some of its activities.
Sibley is a brother of Martha Sibley , who was assistant personnel
director at the respondent 's plant and editor of the Narvord Fuze Box,
the respondent 's official plant publication which was distributed to all
its employees . General Manager Smith lives with Sibley.
Early in June, employee Fox presented a letter to General Manager
Smith, reiterating in substance the statements contained in the Asso-
ciation literature referred to heretofore . Smith told Fox that the
company could have nothing to do with the organization.
Thereafter , the Association embarked upon an intensive organiza-
tional campaign both inside and outside the plant . The campaign
inside the plant is discussed more extensively hereinafter.
During the latter part of June or early July, two organizational
meetings of the Association were held in the courthouse at Milledge-
ville, with James Sibley presiding as chairman . Both he and the
Mayor of Milledgeville spoke at the first meeting and urged the
employees to join the Association . On July 29, 1944 , the Association
was incorporated and received a charter from the State Court;, on
July 30, officers were elected and bylaws adopted. No other general
meetings of the membership have been held . The Association never
asked the respondent for recognition.
4. The respondent's promotion of the Association and opposition to
the CIO
(a) Solicitation in the plant
Non-supervisory adherents of the Association engaged in solicita-
tion in some departments in the plant both during and outside of work-
ing hours. Association dues envelopes and literature of the character
previously described made their appearance in these departments.
These envelopes and Association petitions were passed down the pro-
ness without outsiders , that the Association would keep out national organizations and
keep money in the community and out of the hands of northern radicals , that it would
have no high-priced leaders, would keep its books open to inspection at all times by the
employees and the management, would outlaw strikes during wartime, and prevent outside
agencies from ` inteifering with our work, ' since outside agencies distiacted the minds
of the workers and resulted in production slow - downs.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1637
duction line, freely circulated, and membership openly solicited and
clues collected during working hours, without objection by super-
visors, although the respondent's rules forbade such activity during
working hours.19
(b) Supervisory promotion of the Association; disparagement of
the CIO and repression of CIO activity
The respondent's supervisory employees actively campaigned on be-
half of the Association and took steps to suppress the CIO. The fol-
lowing supervisors were the most flagrant offenders :
Foreman Buffington: On one occasion Buffington assembled a group
of his subordinates during working hours and talked to them about a
plant union, stating that those who joined the CIO would be sorry in
6 months because the CIO would bring Negroes into the plant. He
urged them to join the Association and passed around cards for the
employees to sign. Buffington also told the employees that they did
not have to sign and not to do so if they were members of the CIO,
stating that he would not fire them if they were CIO members. • any
of the employees signed the Association cards on this occasion, in-
cluding employee Mathis who concluded that he would "stand a poor
chance" if he did not sign.20 Under all the circumstances, the em-
ployees could reasonably conclude from Buffington's statements that,
unless they signed the Association cards, they would be harked as CIO
adherents.
James H. Holton, an employee under Buffington, credibly testified
that he heard Buffington's talk on behalf of the Association and that
on the afternoon of the same day he had a conversation with Buffing-
ton. Holton at this time gave his CIO dues receipt, signed by H. E.
Tyler, to Buffington who turned it in to Manager Smith.
Alton T. Ivey, another employee in the group thus addressed by
Buffington, did not sign the Association card. Later, Buffington
gave Ivey a written warning slip for talking about the CIO during
working hours. Buffington then told Ivey that he could talk about
anything else he wanted to, but that the union talk was holding up
production and had to stop. When Ivey protested that it was a free
country and that a man has a right to belong to a union, Buffington
accused him of attemptinto get employees to join the CIO and de-en
The above findings ai e based on undenied and credible testimony of Myrtle Hack, Mrs.
Adele Johnson, Kathryn Cowart, Clinton Cowart, Theron McElhenny, William \V Holmes,
na S Tanner, Edwin Blount, J. W Aycock, Pryoi Cason, Jewell Harris, and Rubv Collins.
20 These findings are based on the testimony of employees Mathis, Ivey, and Holton,
whom we, like the Trial Examiner, credit Buffington admitted talking to the employees on
the occasion set forth above, and expressing his opinion to the effect that no union was
needed in the plant, that the Association looked like a good thing, and that the money
would be kept in the plant for use by the employees themselves He denied having asked
the employees to join the Association, or having made remarks in opposition to the CIO
1638 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Glared that he was not going to have it. Ivey thereafter abandoned all
his organizational efforts on behalf of the CIO.21
On another occasion, Buffington called the employees on the pro-
duction line away from their work one at a time during working
hours, and asked them whether they wished to join the Association.
Some of the employees did join on that occasion.22
About the same time, Buffington unsuccessfully solicited employee
Ruby Collins to join the Association. Collins was an active CIO
protagonist and for several weeks wore a union button in the plant.
Several clays after her solicitation, Buffington called Collins into his
office during working hours; reproved her for allegedly suggesting to
several employees that they refrain from joining the Association; indi-
cated his approval when she told him she was thinking of joining the
Association; stated that he was opposed to the CIO because it would
lead to strikes and the introduction of Negroes in the plant; and
pointed out that the CIO was futile in any event because wages were
frozen.23
About July 19, Dorcas Margrove, who worked with Ruby Collins,
reported to Buffington that Collins had talked about the CIO on the
job and had handed out "two fistsfull of buttons." Buffington there-
upon called Collins into his office during working hours, and gave her
a warning slip for "walking around and talking Union on the job
during working hours. Also being late returning to work after recess."
Collins admitted to Buffington that she had engaged in union talk
during production break-downs. Buffington thereupon told her that
the union talk would have to stop; that it was going to be stopped; that
he did not want the Union in the plant; that the Company did not want
it; and that they were not going to have it. He also told her that if
the CIO did not get into the plant he felt sorry for her.24 We find that
the latter statement constituted a threat of economic reprisal against
'Collins for her CIO activities, should the CIO fail to organize the
plant and thus be in no position to protect her. This threat was
carried out a few weeks later when Collins was in fact discharged
because of her activities on behalf of the CIO, as hereinafter found.
Ila S. Tanner, a lathe operator, joined the CIO at a recess period on
June 23, and received a dues receipt signed by H. E. Tyler. Immedi-
ately after the recess she was summoned to the office of Lieutenant
Commander Banks, where, in the presence of Banks, Manager Smith,
Buffington, and another naval officer, she was questioned as to whether
21 The above findings are based upon Ivey's testimony, which Buffington did not specifi-
cally deny and which 1w e, like the Trial Examiner credit.
22 This finding is based on the testimony of Ila Tanner, whom we credit, as did the Trial
Examiner
x' These findings are based on the credible testimony of Ruby Collins, which Buffington
did not specifically deny
24 These findings are based on the credible testimony of Hargrove and Collins
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1639
she had been upsetting employees and taking their minds off their work
by telling them that they had to join the CIO in order to hold their
jobs. Tanner denied these accusations. During the questioning
which followed, Tanner, who was nervous and upset, denied that she
was a member of the CIO. Employee Philips was then called in and
confirmed Tanner's denial of the accusations. Banks then told Tanner
and Philips to keep their minds off the Union and on their work, and
they were excused. As they left, Smith told Tanner to "hit the ball,"
because, as Smith testified, he "had been watching her," and "knew
[that she] was lying." 25 Later in the day, Tanner admitted to Buffing-
ton that she was a member of the CIO. Buffington then secured her
dues receipt and sent it to Commander Banks .213 Thereafter, Tanner
joined the Association at the solicitation of Buffington during working
hours.
Foreman Power: 27-W. B. Power, foreman of the bar stockroom,
called his employees together during working hours in June and,
according to the credible testimony of employees Croons and Miller,
told them "not to fool with that mess" and "not to sign CIO cards." 28
A day or two later Power observed Gibson, an employee in the oil
recovery department, talking briefly on several occasions with em-
ployees Croons and Miller, who worked for Power. During the after-
noon, Power asked Miller what transpired during these conversations.
25 While the testimony of the participants in this incident differs as to some of the state-
ments made, the Timl Examiner found , and so do we, that the above facts are substantially
undisputed Banks testified that the conterence was called as a result of it report from the
naval duty officer that Tanner had been causing unrest by stating that employees would
have to join a labor organization [the CIO ] to hold their lobs , and that lie and Smith called
the conference in order to get the matter "straightened out "
"While the above findings ate not disputed , there is substantial conflict between
Buffington and Tanner as to the circumstances under which they occurred Tanner testified
that, after she had returned lions lunch , Buffington approached her and asked whether
she had not in fact joined the CIO Tanner's testimony was that she had "had enough
of it by that time" ; that she therefore admitted that she had joined , that Buffington
then asked her whether she had any CIO literature , that she answered that she had a
dues receipt , that Buffington asked for it, and that she gave it to him
Buffington's version was that Tanner called him over and told him that she was nervous
and upset , that she had lied in the conference , that she was a member of the CIO and did
not know at the time she joined what she was joining , and that he should take her clues
receipt to Banks and assure him that she would have no more to do with the CIO; that
lie questioned her about Tiler, and that she told him that Tyler had been in the depart-
ment soliciting for the CIO.
The Trial Examiner did not iesolve the conflicts in this testimony , nor do we. Like
the Trial Examiner we conclude that Buffington ' s account , in any event , indicates the
disquieting effect of the confeience upon Tanner , a conclusion supported by Manager
Smith s testimony that on the following day Tanner told him that she had not told the
truth at the conference about hen CIO membership , and that she had given her dues
receipt to Buffington
2 ' Also sometimes referred to in the record as Powers
28 Power denied generally that lie had ever criticized the CIO or urged his employees to
join or not to join any labor organization . However , he did not specifically deny having
made the above statements or the fact that this meeting took place. Moreover, he ad-
mitted that he discussed the CIO and the Association with sonic employees Since the
Trial Examiner found Power to be a witness unworthy of belief, we find that the meeting
took place and that the statements weie made in the manner set forth in the text.
1640 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Miller told Power that Gibson had given Crooms two CIO cards.
Power then asked Crooms if he had the CIO cards, Who had given them
to him, and what he was going to do with them. He also asked to see
the cards. Crooms replied that Gibson had given him the CIO cards
during a recess period,'0 and gave the cards to Power, who put them in
his pocket and never returned them.30 Later the same afternoon,
Power complained to Gibson's foreman, Brooks, that Gibson was
loafing in Power's department. Gibson was discharged that after-
noon for his CIO activities, as hereinafter found.
Two or three days later, Power again called his employees together,
read some Association literature to them and told them that they could
join any organization they wanted but that the Association was "a
mighty good thing" and that he was going to join it himself. He then
asked the employees whether they wished to join the Association.
When the men, only one of whom could read or write, indicated their
assent, Power signed their names to an Association petition. Power
also signed his own name to the petition.31
Foreman Brooks: Ben Brooks, the foreman of the oil recovery de-
partment, questioned C. B. Paradise, one of his subordinates, concern-
ing his joining the CIO. Paradise explained that during his lunch
hour on the preceding day he went to another part of the plant where
employee Tyler, a volunteer CIO organizer, gave him a CIO card
which he had signed. Brooks thereupon requested Paradise to sign
a statement to the effect that he had gone to Tyler "for the discussion
of matters other than our regular duties on the jobs," took Paradise's
CIO card to substantiate Paradise's statement, and forwarded both
the statement and the dues receipt, containing Tyler's name, to Per-
sonnel Director Massee. Tyler was then discharged because of his
CIO activities, as hereinafter found. Subsequently, Brooks talked to
Paradise, and told him that the Association was a good thing and that
he could join if he wished. Paradise did thereupon join the Associa-
tiol1.32
Foreman Stembridge: Stembridge, foreman of the plating depart-
ment, assembled the employees of his department during working
29 We, like the Trial Examiner, credit the testimony of Crooms and Gibson that the cards
were handed to Crooms during the recess period
'° The above findings are based on the credible testimony of Crooms, Miller. and Gibson
The Trial Examiner did not credit Powell's testimony insofar as it was in conflict therewith,
nor do we
si The above findings are based on the testimony of Crooms and Dliller, whom we credit,
as did the Ti ial Examiner
32 The above findings are substantially undisputed Brooks testified that Paradise volun-
teered the infoimation that he had joined the CIO, an assertion which the Trial Examiner
did not credit, nor do we Brooks also testified that he had sent the statement concerning
Paradise to Massee because the incident involving the payment of (]ties occurred during
Paradise's working bouts Paradise testified that it occurred during his recess period.
Like the Trial Examiner, we find it unnecessary to resolve the latter conflict, since Asso-
ciation activities were carried on dining working hours with the knowledge and, in some
cases, the assistance of supervisory employees
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1641
hours; talked to them about joining an organization involving a health
plan; told them that "they don't want a union in the plant, they were
trying to, keep it out, if the CIO calve in the plant, [they] would work
among niggers"; circulated a petition in favor of the Association;
and stated to the employees that he would like to have them sign the
petition although they did not have to.33
Foreman Reeves : According to the credible and uncontradicted testi-
mony of Theron W. McEllleuny, a toolroom employee, he heard Fore-
man W. E. Reeves tell another employee that he, Reeves, "didn't see
why anybody wanted to belong to the damn Union."
On another occasion, Reeves told employee Paschal that he wanted
no part of a union in wartime, although after the war it might be all
right.34 In the latter part of June, Reeves called employee Paschal
to his office and told him that he had to discharge him because "they"
were "on his neck" about Paschal's soliciting employees in the plant to
join the CIO.35 After Paschal's discharge because of his CIO activi-
ties, as hereinafter found, Reeves told Foreman Rudolph that Paschal
was fired for "Too much talking about the Union around the plant,"
and that "he didn't see why anybody wanted to belong to the damn
Union for." 36
Foreman Collins: Shortly after the commencement of Association
activities, Foreman Cliff Collins asked employee Norman C. Strick-
land when he was going to join the Association, and stated that, if
Strickland did not join, the CIO might "come in." Strickland, who
became a member of a CIO committee, was later advised by Collins
that he (Strickland) "ought to keep his mouth shut about" the CIO.37
Foreman Long: Around the end of June, Johnny Long; a foreman,
gave employee William W. Holmes a paper which he told Holmes to
pass around for the signature of employees favoring the Association.
Holmes secured a number of signatures over a period of 2days, and
then returned the paper to Long.38
Foreman Lee: Foreman Winifred Lee solicited at least one employee
for the Association. Lee also gave line leader Dixon a paper for the
Association, Which Dixon circulated among employees on her line
during working hours and which the employees signed.39
"The above findings are based on the uncontradicted testimony of employees Edwin
Blount and J W Aycock, whom we, like the Trial Examiner, credit
'Although Reeves denied having made such a statement, we, like the Trial Examiner,
credit Paschal
"This finding is based on Paschal's testimony which we, like the Trial Examiner, credit
30 This finding is based on the uncontradicted testimony of employee McElhenny, whom
we, like the Trial Examiner, credit
3' Collins denied generally having asked anyone to join the Association The first con-
versation related above is otherwise undenied. The second conversation was admitted by
Collins we find that the conversation took place as related in the text
^ These findings are based on the uncontradicted testimony of Holmes
39 These findings are based on the uncontradicted testimony of employees Hack and Jewell
Harris.
1642 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Assistant Plant Manager Pittman: About June 26, at the request
of a number of male operators, a conference was held between these
operators and Jack Pittman, assistant plant manager, in which the
men asked Pittman for information about unions. Pittman answered
their questions. He told the employees that it was up to them whether
or not to join a union, and that there were good and bad unions ;
produced union cards showing that he had been a member of several;
stated that the Company could not grant wage increases unless ap-
proved by the War Labor Board, that it had made a request for such
increases, that he had once been on a sympathetic strike and did not
know what he had been striking about, that he had been assessed twice
by unions, and that he did not see how a union could improve conditions
in the plant. At a similar conference held a few days later, Pittman
told a group of women employees substantially what he had previously
told the men.40 We find that Assistant Plant Manager Pittman
thereby emphasized the futility of the CIO as a bargaining agent.
Other supervisory employees: Tool engineer Jackson, Foreman
Reeves' superior, referred to McElhenny, a CIO adherent, as John L.
Lewis, had attempted on several occasions to remove the CIO button
which McElhenny wore. When McElhenny offered to provide Jack-
son with a button if he wanted one, Jackson replied that McElhenny
had better not bring him a "Goddam button." On another occasion,
Jackson removed from McElhenny's procket a pencil marked CIO,
broke it in several pieces, threw it away, and gave him one of his own.4L
Supervisor McKinzie, in charge of the drafting room, permitted
employee Cass to solicit an employee in the drafting room during
working hours.42 According to the uncontradicted and credible testi-
mony of James Holton, he was solicited for the Association by Assist-
ant Foreman Hartley.
(c) Respondent's liability for the activities of supervisory employees
The respondent contends that it is not responsible for the activities
of the employees set forth in the preceding section. The record
shows, and the respondent conceded in its first brief before the Board,
that the assistant plant manager, the personnel director, foremen,
assistant foremen, drafting supervisor McKinzie, and tool engineer
40 The above findings are based on the testimony of Pittman and employee William
Layfield
41 Jackson admitted referring to McElhenny as John L Lewis, and breaking McElhenny s
pencil, but denied that he attempted to remove McElhenny ' s button . He testilied that his
reference to John L Lewis and the pencil incident were jocular in nature McElhenny's
testimony does not indicate that he so viewed the incidents . We, like the Trial Examiner,
credit the testimony of McElhenny
42 This finding is based on the testimony of employee Bell that Cass had a conversation
with McKinzie and then solicited him (Bell) to join the Association McKinzie did not
testify . We are convinced and find. from all of the surrounding circumstances , that Cass'
solicitation of Bell was with the approval of McKinzie.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1643
Jackson had authority at least to recommend the discharge of em-
ployees. That these recommendations were acted upon appears from
the fact that many of the discharges, hereinafter found to have been
discriminatory, were based at least in part upon such recommendations.
The respondent further contends that Lou- and Lee were set-up
men, that Power was a working leaderman, and that their activities
are not attributable to the respondent. The record shows, and we
find, that these employees were foremen or assistant foremen. Thus,
Long, who was carried on the respondent's books as an assistant fore-
man, assigned work to his subordinates, attended foremen's meetings,
made reports respecting the conduct and work of employees, and was
consulted about and recommended discharges. According to the creel-
ible testimony of employees Jewell Harris and Myrtle Hack, Lee was
assistant foreman'at the time he solicited on behalf of the Association
and later became foreman over line leader Dixon, Hack's immediate
superior. According to Hack's further credible and uncontradicted
testimony, Lee gave orders through Dixon, and Hack received a raise
through Lee. The record shows that Power was in complete charge
,of the bar stockroom (a warehouse for metal stock) and supervised
a crew of six to eight employees, most of whom were common laborers
and illiterate; that he made daily written reports of inventory condi-
tions and was responsible for the receipt and disbursement of ware-
house materials and for providing machines with stock; and that he
was regarded by the employees as a foreman. Like the Trial Exam-
iner, we credit the disputed testimony of the employees that Power
did no manual work whatever. That the respondent regarded Power
as being identified with management appears from the fact that, shortly
after Power read some Association literature to the employees, Pro-
duction Manager Hall told Power that he was supposed to be neutral.
Upon consideration of the entire record, we find, like the Trial
Examiner, that Assistant Plant Manager Pittman, Personnel Director
Massee, Tool Engineer Jackson, Drafting Supervisor McKinzie, As-
sistant Foremen Hartley and Rudolph, and Foremen Buffington, Stem-
bridge, W. B. Power, Long, Collins, W. C. Reeves, Lee, and Ben
Brooks were supervisory employees whose conduct and activities are
attributable to the respondent.
(d) The discriminatory discharges
As hereinafter found, during the organizational campaigns of the
CIO and the Association, the respondent discharged employees Tyler,
Collins, Paschal, Porter, and Gibson because of their activities on be-
half of the CIO. These discharges not only discouraged membership
in the CIO but also encouraged membership in and further promoted
the Association.
1644 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. The Grievance Committee
On July 21, 1942, the Chief 'of the Bureau of Naval Ordnance issued
a document entitled "Statement of Labor Policy governing Govern-
ment owned, privately operated plants."'i This declaration of policy,
adopted by the Army and Navy, was approved by Philip Murray,
President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and by Wil-
liam Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, and a
copy was filed with the Board. This statement was forwarded to
naval inspectors in various such plants, including one operated by
the respondent at Macon, Georgia, with the instruction that "the,in-
spectors are requested to inform the contractor-operators that full
compliance with this policy is expected." The declaration contained,
inter alia, the following provisions : ,
2. The recognition of an exclusive bargaining agent for the em-
ployees in any appropriate bargaining unit within any plant
will be deferred until a majority of the estimated total of that
unit has been hired, unless special circumstances shall justify
an earlier designation of such exclusive bargainingagent. The
War and Navy Departments will undertake to estimate with
reasonable promptness the total employee complement of the
appropriate unit.
3. While no recognition shall be accorded any organization as
the exclusive representative of any group of employees until
the proper collective bargaining agency shall have been deter-
mined under the conditions described above, provision will be
made for the handling of grievances and other disputes, and
the elimination of friction between employees and manage-
ment during the period pending such determination. These
procedures should be approved by the representative of the
Army or Navy in charge of operations at the plant. (Italics
supplied.)
In early October 1944, within 2 weeks after the close of the original
hearing in the instant case, and while the unfair labor practice charges
were awaiting determination, Captain Russell G. Sturges, Command-
ing Officer or Naval Ordnance Inspector at the plant, suggested to the
respondent's Acting Plant Manager Simpson the establishment of a
Grievance Committee for the processing of accumulated grievances.
In accordance with this suggestion, the respondent posted the follow-
ing notice :
43 This document was originally excluded by the Trial Examiner Pursuant to the re.
mand order of the Circuit C 'ouit , however , this document was admitted at the later hearing,
and has been given careful consideration.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1645
9 OCTOBER 1944
To ALL E1irI oYEES :
1. The Management of this plant has had many employees
suggest the desirability of having a Grievance Committee act for
them. This Committee to be elected by the employees in the plant
and to have full authority to present the grievances of the people
directly to Management. Management strives to do everything
practicable to please the workers in this plant, but it realizes that
it is helpless at times, because it does not know the desires of the
employees . This Grievance Committee , which will be composed
of your own fellow-workers, will be in a position to tell Manage-
ment of your wishes; and thus Management and the employees
will have a much better understanding than may have been the
case in the past.
2. We offer the following suggestions : That the plant be divided
into areas as follows: [the notice then sets out the various areas,
being four in number].
That there be three people (including one woman) elected from
each area. It is suggested that voting be held by secret ballot
and that a count be made at the end of the voting and the three
people as named above having the highest total number of votes
be designated as the Grievance Committee from the area. It is
suggested that the clay shift hold their voting at second recess
Tuesday, 10 October 1944, and that the night shift hold their
election at first recess, Tuesday, 10 October 1944. It is further
recommended that a chairman be elected by the various Committee
members who will serve for a suggested period of ninety- days. It
is also suggested that the Grievance Committee serve ninety days,
with the privilege of re-election.
3. The above are merely suggestions, and the Management
wishes to point out at this time that this is your committee, elected
by you to serve for you and to represent you with Management.
It is in no way a committee sponsored by Management, but instead
it is definitely and positively your committee. If you do not want
a committee, so state on your ballot. You have Management's
consent to elect this Committee in any way that you see fit, but
we thought that the above might be the best way to arrive at same.
Management can see many possibilities for a smooth-working
Committee; namely, it could meet once a week with Management
and your wishes could be aired before a representative of Man-
agement-possibly the General Manager, the Plant Manager, or
the Personnel Director-and the'Commanding Officer of the Navy.
1
1646 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL' LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In this way, there is no doubt in our minds but that we will have
the best working conditions possible in this plant as a result of
the work of this suggested Grievance Commnittee.
4. You have the assurance of Management that as soon as you'
have elected your Committee of fellow-workers to represent you
it will assist this Committee in every way possible in its work.
S. R. SIDIPSON,
Plant Manager.
Thereafter, the supervisory employees distributed cards to be used
by the employees in voting, chose employees to conduct the balloting,
and instructed them as to how it should be done. On October 10,
elections were held in the plant in accordance with the suggestions in
the posted notice and the instructions of the supervisory employees.
Although the casting of ballots was secret, employees were required
to sign their names on the cards. The results were then tabulated by
-the employee tellers and forwarded to the foreman, who nn turn for-
warded them, along with the cards, to Personnel Director Massee.
Shortly thereafter the CIO filed a charge alleging that by the
election the respondent had violated Section 8 (2) of the Act.
The results of the election were never announced to the employees.
,On October 20, 1944, following the filing of this CIO charge, the
respondent posted the following notice on its bulletin board :
BULLETIN
OCTOBLR 20,1944.
To ALL EMPLOYEES OF U. S. NAVAL ORDNANCII PLANT, MILLEDGEVILLE,
GA.:
It has been suggested that there may exist among the employees
.some misunderstanding as to the Grievance Committee, which was
announced in a bulletin on Monday, October 9, 1944, and for which
an election was held Tuesday, October 10, 1944. This committee ms in
no way sponsored or favored by Reynolds Corporation. Neither is
the company in any way opposed to it. It is strictly your cornmlittee.
From time to time employees have complained to Naval Officers
stationed at this plant. The Commanding Officer had felt that some
procedure to handle such complaints might aid production and sug-
gested that the employees might select a Grievance Committee. This
suggestion was passed on to you by the bulletin of October 9, 1944, and
a method of selecting such a committee was suggested. The announce-
anent appropriately stated that if you did not want a committee you
were free to say so on your ballot.
In assuring you that Management was willing to cooperate with a
committee of your fellow workers, which you might elect, it was not
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1647
intended by Management to indicate that it would not cooperate in a
like manner and to the same degree with any other employees'
organization.
We call this matter to your attention now in order to make clear to
each employee the policy of this company in labor matters as it has
existed and as it now exists. Reynolds Corporation does not favor or
oppose any organization, committee, association or union of its em-
ployees. It will, under appropriate circumstances deal with any au-
thorized representative of its employees or groups of its employees. It
has not and it will not discriminate against any employee because he
or she has not joined any organization of employees, or because he or
she has joined any organization of employees. Mr. Smith has been
carrying out this policy. He is the only one authorized to speak in
these matters for the Reynolds Corporation, at the Milledgeville
Plant. If any employee at the Milledgeville Plant indicates that the
policy of this company is not as stated above, disciplinary action will
follow.
The election has now been held, but in view of certain questions
raised by the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board,
the Management will not deal with the committee hitherto elected
until the matter is settled.
6. Conclusions
(a) The Association
The differences of opinion among some of the respondent's employees
with respect to the CIO, the hesitancy of others, and the opposition
to the CIO among certain community elements, called for the adop-
tion of a neutral position on the part of the respondent, in order to
avoid any inference by the employees that the respondent was taking
sides in the controversy. But the respondent did not observe such a
course. Instead it threw its weight on the side of the anti-CIO
opinion.
Plant Manager Smith and Commander Banks testified that the
reason for the speeches of May 18, 1944, was that the confusion among
the employees threatened to interfere with production. Smith further
testified that his purpose was to dissipate that confusion and to assure
the employees that their joining or not joining a union would have no
effect on their jobs. That there was confusion is evident. That it
was Smith's and Banks' duty to allay such a potential source of trouble
in a munitions plant is unquestioned. Had the speeches been di-
rected to that purpose alone, they would have been unobjectionable.
But they went further than that. After adopting the sentiments of
Banks, Smith urged the employees to deal directly with management;
emphasized the futility of a union; misled the employees into believ-
75 5420-48-v ol. 74-105
1648 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ing that there was no area open for collective bargaining with respect
to wages; I and stated that he personally saw no need for a union
in the plant.
When the Association thereafter emerged, its literature adopted
some of the ideas advanced in the speeches of Banks and Smith, par-
ticularly in the appeals to patriotism and the claims that the CIO
would distract the minds of employees and interfere with production.
The purpose of the Association was proclaimed to be to keep national
unions out of the plant. Many of the Association's protagonists were
supervisory employees who at times stated, as Smith had, that an out-
side union would'be futile because wages and increases were fixed by
the War Labor Board. Association adherents were permitted the use
of the respondent's premises during working time in promoting the
Association and were actively assisted by supervisory employees.
Under these circumstances, the impetus for the formation of the Asso-
ciation was, if not furnished, at least furthered by the respondent.
In any event, the respondent, through its supervisory employees,
threw its economic power in favor of the Association and in opposition
to the CIO. While supervisory employees permitted Association so-
licitors in several departments to make widespread use of their work-
ing time in promoting the Association on the respondent's premises,
CIO adherents were watched, reported, questioned, reprimanded, and,
as hereinafter found, discharged for CIO activities. At the same
time, not content with passive toleration of the Association's activities,
supervisory employees actively campaigned on its behalf during work-
ing hours, expedited the circulation of its literature, and solicited mem-
bers, while at the same time warning employees against joining the
CIO and threatening them with reprisals if they did so. Addressing
the employees at various times during working hours either in groups
or individually, a number of foremen spoke in opposition to the CIO ;
advised employees not to sign CIO cards; told them that the respond-
ent would not stand for the CIO and that the purpose of the Associa-
tion was to keep the CIO out; urged them to join the Association,
sometimes adding that otherwise the CIO might get in; reprimanded
employees for soliciting for the CIO and against the Association;
threatened economic reprisals against the CIO adherents; and imple-
mented these threats by in fact discharging five employees for their
CIO activities, the most potent form of support which the respond-
ent could render the Association. The Association was thus promoted
not only by the respondent's opposition to the CIO but also by direct
participation of supervisory employees. Under these circumstances,
44 While Sinith stated that rates of pay and of increases were fixed by law; he failed to
point out that a union could still bargain with the respondent on wage increases subject to
War Labor Board approval, a practice frequently engaged in while the War Labor Board
was in existence.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1649
the Association cannot be said to represent the employees' free and
uncoerced choice. Such promotional activities were in themselves
sufficient to render the Association an organization proscribed by the
Act.
That this conduct by the supervisors was without authority and in
violation of specific instructions to maintain strict neutrality, as the
respondent asserts, is immaterial. The instructions were obviously
not followed, and the employees were not informed of them until
October 20, almost 5 months after the launching of the Association
and after five employees had been discharged for their CIO activities,
when the first statement was posted disavowing partisan conduct by
the supervisors.
The respondent has also contended that it should not be held re-
sponsible for the actions of its supervisory employees in assisting the
Association and suppressing the CIO, on the ground that such actions
were contrary to the respondent's policy. In support of this conten-
tion the respondent introduced evidence to show the neutral policy
of its higher management and of its parent company, Reynolds Metal
Company, and to show their favorable labor relations record. This
evidence has been considered, but the anti-union 'policy and activities
of the supervisors at the only plant herein involved can hardly be effec-
tively rebutted by a top management policy not communicated to the
employees or by a policy in effect at other plants.
The respondent has claimed, further, that the employees found
Smith's speech "positively reassuring" of the respondent's neutrality.
The employees, however, must have found anything but positive re-
assurance in their employer's summoning them from their essential
war work a day or two after the CIO began to organize, in order to
announce that they could do as they pleased but that joining a union
would not assist them to obtain wage increases as the War Labor Board
controlled such matters; or in their employer's asking them, "Do you
need a union to enable you to enjoy your work, to earn good pay or to
have a clean and pleasant place to work," and answering his own
-rhetorical question by stating that, "Personally I can see no reason for
a Union in this plant." Nothing in Smith's speech convinces us that
it neutralized the effect of the respondent's subsequent coercive con-
duct, which included threatening statements and five discriminatory
discharges.
The respondent has also urged that evidence was presented show-
ing that the employees understood that the respondent was neutral.
This evidence consisted of testimony by several employees to the effect,
that they had heard Smith say that they were free to join or not to
join a union. This statement of neutrality was inadequate to counter-
act the effect of the subsequent manifestations of CIO hostility and
1650 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Association preference by the supervisory staff. It is clear that many
employees understood the respondent's policy to be anything but a
neutral one. Thus, employee Collins testified that many girls on her
line, despite Smith's speech, "were afraid Mr. Buffington Would have
them fired if they would have anything to do or say about the Union."
Employee Mathis testified that he signed the Association petition
which Buffington asked the employees to sign, because he "figured [he]
would stand a poor chance if [lie] didn't." The conduct of employees
Tanner and Holton in turning over their CIO dues receipts to Buffing-
ton as evidence that they were resigning from the CIO is consistent
only with the conclusion that they feared having Buffington suspect
they were CIO members. These facts refute the respondent's argu-
ment that Smith's speech gave the employees a feeling of freedom of
action with respect to joining a union. Also, such affirmative evidence
of intimidation refutes negative testimony that some employees did
not feel they had been intimidated.
Upon the entire record, we find that the respondent dominated and
interfered with the formation and administration of the Association
and contributed support to it, thereby interfering with, restraining,
and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act 45
(b) The Grievance Committee
The Grievance Committee was similarly proscribed by the Act.
The entire plan was suggested by the respondent; the balloting took
place on the respondent's premises; the ballots were distributed by
supervisory employees; and the employees were required to sign
their names to the ballots, which were then forwarded to Personnel
Director Massee. The public selection of representatives at the sug-
gestion of, under the auspices of, and according to the plan of organi-
zation of, an employer, constitutes neither the self-organization en-
visioned by the Act, nor a free and voluntary selection of representa-
tives. Especially is this so when, as here, another labor organization
is engaged in organizing the employees, and has been the object of
unremedied unfair labor practices. We find that the respondent's
conduct with respect to the Grievance Committee constituted an
illegal attempt to provide its employees with a labor organization.
The respondent has contended that the Grievance Committee was
not a labor organization within the meaning of the Act; that the'
Grievance Committee never came into existence; and that in any event
the respondent's conduct was not unlawful because it acted at the sug-
45 In so finding , we, contrary to the Trial Examiner , do not - rely upon the membership and
activities of Howaid Cass, West F DIosteller, and leadermen, and the activities of James
Sibley.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1651
gestion of the naval officer stationed at the plant, who in turn was
acting pursuant to his interpretation of written instructions from the
Navy Department. We find these contentions to be without merit.
The Act defines a labor organization as "... any organization of any
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan,
in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances. . . " The plan for the establishment of the Grievance Com-
mittee required that the plant be divided into four areas, that three
employees from each area be selected to represent the remaining
employees in the area in dealing with the respondent concerning
grievances of the employees in the respective area, that each commit-
tee designate one member as chairman, that the committeemen hold
office for 90 days with the right of reelection, and that the committees
meet weekly with management. The record shows, and we find, that
the Grievance Committee had all the attributes and characteristics of,
and was, an employee representation committee for the purpose of
dealing with the respondent concerning employee grievances, and
was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
We find, further, that the Grievance Committee was in fact in exist-
ence. The elections had been held; the ballots were tabulated by
departments; and only the final tally of the departmental totals and
the announcement of the identity of the committeemen remained.
This final action was withheld by the respondent upon the filing of
unfair labor practice charges with respect to the Grievance Commit-
tee. Moreover, the mere attempt on the part of the respondent to
form a labor organization was violative of Section 8 (2) of the Act,
even though the resulting organization never functioned or the re-
spondent's efforts were unsuccessful and no labor organization
resulted.4'
The respondent has urged the above-described declaration of labor
policy, and the fact of naval participation in the suggestion for the
Grievance Committee, in refutation of the charge that the respondent
violated Section 8 (2) of the Act by its part in the election of the
Grievance Committee.
It is to be observed, initially, that the declaration of labor policy
did not provide for the selection of a labor organization or for the
election of representatives to represent employees in the prosecution
of grievances. It provided, instead, for the establishment of a griev-
ance procedure. The connnitteemeii elected pursuant to the Grievance,
Committee plan, however, would have been bargaining representatives
6 Matter of Crystal Springs Finishing Company, 12 N. L. R. B. 1291, enf'd 116 F. (2d)
669 (C. C. A. 1).
1652 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for the employees in the presentation of grievances. What was thus
sought to be set up was not only a procedure for the settlement of
grievances , for which the declaration of policy provided, but a labor
organization to prosecute them. Manifestly, the declaration did not
contemplate such a result. In fact, Section 3 plainly stated that recog-
nition would not be awarded any organization as the exclusive repre-
sentative of "any group of employees until the proper collective bar-
gaining agency" had been determined.
The two sections of the declaration quoted above are to be read
together. When thus considered , it seems clear that Section 3 was
inserted in order to bridge the hiatus referred to in Section 2, and
that the former section was intended to apply primarily to plants
where operations had not developed sufficiently to warrant holding
an election . The Milledgeville plant was not in such a category.
However, in any event, it was hardly contemplated that the declara-
tion should authorize the setting up of machinery for the selection
of employee representatives, particula7•ly in a situation such as was
present here, where two rival organizations were contending for
majority status and the Board had already assumed jurisdiction.
The declaration therefore did not establish a naval policy consonant
with the setting up of the Grievance Committee 47
Nor is the respondent relieved of its responsibility by reason of
the participation of naval personnel in the suggestion for the Com-
mittee. The credible testimony of Captain Sturges was that he con-
ceived the idea as a method of disposing of unsettled grievances, and
that he suggested it to Simpson. This was merely a suggestion, how-
ever, and, as Captain Sturges' testimony discloses , in no sense-an
order. He testified as follows:
. . . it was my duty as a representative of the Navy Depart-
ment, and they would expect me to do it, would be to suggest, as
the contract says I may do. I can suggest. I can scrutinize and
I can look things over but I' can't give orders. I can only sug-
gest. And I suggested, after reading that, that that would be a
good solution until such time came as they had a bargaining
agency in this plant, and that's all I tried to do.
* * de * * *
I thought this would be an opportune time to do it, so their
I put it in writing and sent it [the management], so if they didn't
want to do it they could send it back to me and say : We don't
want to do it-and I had done my duty.
47 It may be noted parenthetically that, beyond a stipulation that the respondent "has had
[the declaration] in its possession," there is no evidence that the respondent relied upon it
at the time of the establishment of the Committee as authority therefor. Acting Plant Man-
ager Simpson, who acted for the respondent in setting up the plan, did not claim to have
relied on the declaration . His testimony does not reveal that lie was even aware of its
existence at the time he acted.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1653
I thought if they wanted to use it, all right, but naturally,
I couldn't force them to do it. I had it so if anybody came down
and said Why haven't you got a grievance committee at this
plant, I could say : Here it is. I suggested it and the management
didn't want it but I have clone all I could, on my part.
Two facts are clear from this testimony : that the authority of the
naval personnel at the plant was limited to making suggestions, and
that the respondent was not acting on orders from the naval com-
mandant. The operation of the plant was under the direction of the
respondent. The Navy representatives had no authority to interfere
with the 'respondent's contractual function in the operation of the
plant, and there is no evidence that they attempted to do so. Par-
ticularly the respondent "could not be ordered to violate any law,"
.as it conceded in its first brief before the Board. The respondent can-
not absolve itself from responsibility by seeking to implicate the Navy
representatives. Nor does the fact that the Grievance Committee plan
originated with the naval commandant absolve the respondent. There
was no obligation to adopt it, and it was presented to the employees
as the plan of the respondent, not of the Navy.
That the responsible officials who executed the plan, may have been
mistaken as to its validity is likewise no defense. The respondent's
actions were not inadvertent or accidental ; they were consciously per-
formed, with a full understanding of their nature. That there may
not have been understanding that the conduct was proscribed by the
Act establishes only the absence of specific intent to violate the law,
an intent which the Trial Examiner found, and we also are persuaded,
did not exist. Nevertheless, misapprehension as to the legality of the
conduct does not excuse it. The Act was designed to insure to eni-
ployees, by use of the device of self-organization, the unfettered and
uninfluenced exercise of their own will in the matter of collective
action, in the selection of the form of their labor organization, and
in the choice of their representatives. The intrusion of an employer
into this process, however benign his motives, was an interference in
affairs which were strictly the employees' business, and constituted
.an interference which the Act explicitly sought to avoid. Here the
employer not only suggested the selection of a form of organization
and representatives, but presented the employees with a complete plan
of organization, and then proceeded to establish it.
That such participation by an employer in the matter of employee
organization was proscribed by the Act would not seem to be open to
question.
We find that the respondent dominated and interfered with the
formation and administration of the Grievance Committee and con-
tributed support to it, 'thereby interfering with, restraining, and
1654 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in the
Act.
(c) Interference, restraint, and coercion
We find further, as in our original Decision, that the respondent,
by acts and statements of supervisory employees, including the state-
ments of Foreman Buffington to Ruby Collins that the respondent did
not want the CIO and was not going to have it in the plant, and his
threat of economic reprisals against Collins for her CIO activities
should the CIO fail to organize the plant and thus be in no position
to protect her; Foreman Power's statement to his subordinates "not
to fool with the mess" and "not to sign C. I. O. cards"; Foreman Stem-
bridge's statements to his subordinates that they were trying to keep
the CIO out of the plant; Foreman Collins' statement to employee
Strickland that if he did not join the Association the CIO might come
in the plant, and that Strickland "ought to keep his mouth shut about"
the CIO: and Foreman Reeves' statement to employee Paschal that
Reeves wanted no part of the Union during wartime and that he'had to
discharge Paschal because "they" were "on his neck" about, Paschal's
soliciting employees in the plant to join the CIO, engaged in conduct
interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.48
Nor does the evidence adduced pursuant to the remand by the Circuit
Court alter any of the above findings. The actions of the respondent's
supervisors in attempting to prevent organization of the employees by
the CIO, and in assisting in the campaign on behalf of the Association,
are attributable only to the respondent and not to the Navy Depart-
ment. Under the contract the respondent had complete control of
labor relations matters, and the Navy Department was given no au-
thority to interfere in such matters.
B. The discharges
1. H. E. Tyler
Tyler was hired as a trainee on March 29, 1943, at 75 cents per hour,
and after about 2 months became- an operator of an automatic screw
machine. During his employment by the respondent he received three
48 We do not find, as we did before, that Smith' s speech, separately or in conjunction with
other acts of the respondent, constituted interference, iestraint or coercion violative of
Section 8 (1). Although, in the original Decision , Assistant Plant Manager Pittman's
statements to the assembled employees concerning the futility of the CIO as a bargaining
agent were found to constitute interference in violation of the Act, we are not basing our
present findings on these statements , inasmuch as they were made at conferences held at
the request of the employees, were in response to questions propounded by the employees,
and were not of a coercive character.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1655
raises aggregating 25 cents per hour. He was regarded as a good
worker and was never criticized by his supervisors.40
Several days before Manager Smith's speech of May 18, 1944, Tyler's
set-up man, Fulghum, recommended Tyler for a 5-cent per hour raise,
and on the day after the speech, Fulghum recommended that Tyler
be made a set-nip man.
Tyler joined the CIO on May 9, 1944. On June 9, he was made a
volunteer organizer and thereafter became one of the CIO's most active
members. He wore a union button in the plant and talked about the
CIO during recess and lunch periods. He wrote many applications.
Among others, he secured the membership of O. B. Paradise, James
Holton, and Ila Tanner, who have been referred to heretofore.
On June 24, 1944, Tyler was summoned to the office of Personnel
Director Massee and given a discharge slip signed by J. E. Pittman,
assistant plant manager, and Foreman Greer, which stated that he
was discharged for "continual loafing and interfering with other em-
ployees." Tyler vehemently denied the truth of the accusation and
demanded that Pittman be called in. When Pittman appeared he told
Tyler that the report had been made by Greer and that there was
nothing he could do about it. Tyler charged that he was being dis-
charged because of his union activity and demanded that Greer be
called in. This was refused, but he was permitted, upon request, to
see Commander Banks. Tyler repeated to Banks his charge that he
was being discharged because of union activity, and stated that his
production records would disclose that the assertions in the discharge
slip were untrue. During the conversation which ensued, Tyler ad-
mitted having signed lip some employees at his machine during work-
ing hours. After some further conversation, Banks suggested that
Tyler see Massee and Manager Smith and ask them to reconsider the
discharge. Tyler then saw Massee who said that he would see Smith
and let Tyler know the outcome. Tyler then left the plant. He never
heard from Smith or Massee.
The respondent's contentions respecting Tyler
On July 7, in a memo to the Regional Director, the respondent
gave the following reasons for Tyler's discharge: (1) reports to the
naval officers at the plant to the effect that Tyler was loafing on the
job; 50 (2) a written report from Foreman Buffington to the effect
that Tyler had been in his department during working hours in-
terfering with Buffington's employees; and (3) complaints from Fore-
"There is some testimony by Foreman Greer that he once told Tyler that Tyler was not
setting his tools properly Greer admitted, however, that Tyler' s work was satisfactory.
0 The memo did not indicate who made the reports.
1656 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
man Brooks that his employees were leaving their jobs during working
hours in order to contact Tyler."
No evidence supporting the first of these allegations, or indicating
that any naval officers had made complaints respecting Tyler, or had
requested his discharge, was introduced at the hearings.
According to Foreman Greer's testimony, the decision to discharge
Tyler was made by him.5" His testimony was that he decided to
discharge Tyler because of "inefficiency," and also because Tyler had
caused trouble among his fellow employees, had kept them in a state
of unrest by complaints that he was being mistreated, had by this
conduct led the other employees to believe that they were also being
mistreated, and had thereby caused them to lose interest in their
work. Greer's further testimony, however, indicated that his charge
of "inefficiency" related solely to Tyler's alleged troublemaking.
Greer also testified that Tyler could not "get along" with set-up man
Fulghum. However, according to Greer, he had no personal knowl-
edge of these facts. His testimony was based on statements pur-
portedly made to him by Fulghum, who had given Greer many
"unfavorable" reports over a period of more than 60 days, the last
occasion being about 10 days prior to the discharge.
According to Greer, nothing unusual occurred on the day of the
discharge. He merely "got to the place where [he] got tired of
hearing [the complaints, so he] decided to let Tyler go"; and there-
upon he went to the personnel office and signed, a discharge slip in
blank and did not discuss the matter with anyone.
Pittman testified that he had had reports from Fulghum that Tyler
was causing "dissension" on the line, and reports from Fulghum
and Buffington to the effect that Tyler was solicting during working
hours.
Buffington's testimony was that he saw Tyler in his department
several times talking to his employees and "loafing" during working
hours ; and that, although he did not know whether Tyler was there
on his own time or on company time, he had sent a report to the
personnel office about it.,, However, while other employees engaged
"A reference to the statement secured by Bi ooks from 0 B Paradise, which has been
discussed heretofore
52 Greer insisted that he alone made the decision to discharge Tyler, and that it was
based solely on his troublemaking , whereas Personnel Director Dlassee gave reports by
other foremen as the basis of the discharge. We find, as to this and other aspects of his
testimony, that Greer was an unreliable witness
51 The record does not clearly establish whether Buffington's report was made before or
after June 23, the date on which he discovered Tyler's name on Tanner's dues receipt
Buffington's report was not produced at the hem ings The record does contain a memoran-
dum from Personnel Director Dlassee dated July 7, which states that Buffington's report
was dated June 20, that is, 3 clays before the Tanner incident. Buffington refused to state
on the witness stand whether his report was made before or after the Tanner incident In
any event , the fact remains that Buffington unquestionably obtained possession of Tanner's
dues receipt , signed by Tyler. on June 23, the day before Tyler was discharged , and, as the
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1657
in similar conduct, Buffington did not make any reports respecting
them.
Fulghum did not testify.
Conclusions respecting Tyler's discharge
It will be recalled that on June 23, the clay before Tyler's dis-
charge, Tanner and Paradise joined the CIO during Tyler's free
time. On the same day, their dues receipts, bearing Tyler's signature,
were taken up by Buffington and Brooks, and Paradise's statement
and dues receipt were forwarded to Massee.
The grounds asserted by the respondent for the discharge of Tyler
are in conflict. Thus, of the reasons cited in the memo of July 7, only
one can be construed as having any relation to the complaint stated
in Tyler's discharge slip, and as to that reason no evidence was in-
troduced at the hearing. The grounds asserted by Greer, who claimed
responsibility for the discharge, have no relation either to the reason
stated on the discharge slip or to those asserted in the July 7 memo.
No reliance can be placed on the testimony of Greer. The Trial
Examiner was not favorably impressed by Greer's testimony or by
his demeanor as a witness. The charge of "inefficiency," which Greer
first asserted as a ground for the discharge, was refuted by Greer's
later admission that Tyler was a good worker and producer, and
that Greer did not discharge him for inefficiency. In addition, va-
rious extrinsic factors cast doubt upon Greer's testimony. Thus,
Greer's alleged decision to discharge Tyler was based on second-hand
information supplied by Fulghum. The reports ascribed to Ful-
guhm, namely, that Tyler, by complaining of his own mistreatment,
caused his fellow employees to become dissatisfied and to lose interest
in their work, and that Fulghum could not get along with Tyler, are
not supported by the evidence. Fulghum was not called as a wit-
ness and the failure to do so was not explained: It is implausible
that, if Fulghum was making constant complaints to Greer and Pitt-
man respecting Tyler, he would have recommended Tyler for a raise
and a promotion. No adequate explanation was given by Greer as
to why, after receiving Fulghum's final complaint about Tyler, he
waited 10 days to discharge him.
The persuasive inference from the July 7 memo and Pittman's
testimony is that the discharge of Tyler was based upon the reports
of Buffington and Brooks. The reason stated on the discharge slip
could have come only from information supplied by Buffington, who
was actively engaged in prompting the Association and suppressing
respondent concedes, it received employee Paradise's CIO dues receipt signed by Tyler on
the same day Consequently, there is ample basis for the finding as to the respondent's
knowledge of Tyler's union activities.
1658 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOAR])
the CIO. In view of Buffington's efforts to repress CIO activity,
some of which have already been described, and more of which will
appear hereinafter, we are unable to credit his testimony that Tyler
"talked" and "loafed around" in his department. There is no ade-
quate explanation why, of all the employees who engaged in such
conduct, Tyler should have been singled out for special treatment.
In any event, it appears clear from the July 7 memo and the other
circumstances that the discharge was based on union activities which
had occurred on Tyler's own time. No contention was made by the
respondent that Tyler's conduct in signing up employees at his ma-
chine during working hours, or in soliciting during working hours,
was the ground for his discharge; nor would it constitute valid ground
if so urged. We do not condone the misuse of working time, regardless
of its purpose. But the respondent's supervisors were permitting the
Association representatives to make extensive use of company time
for solicitation, and were themselves actively assisting such activity
during working hours. The discharge of Tyler for CIO solicitation,
while ignoring the much more widespread similar conduct on the
part of the Association, was discriminatory.'
We find that Tyler was discharged for his activities on behalf of
the CIO.
2. Ruby Collins
Collins was hired on January 10, 1944, and discharged on August 7.
Her regular job was operating an electric reamer under Foreman Buf-
fington, Leaderman Vera Barker and line leader Thompson. She
received three raises during her employment by the respondent.
Collins joined the CIO on June 22, became a volunteer organizer,
and secured over 25 members, some in the plant on her own time. Her
connection with the CIO became well known. She wore a union
button in the plant and was the only employee on her line to do so.
In early July, approximately, Collins had a conversation with Lead-
erman Barker. Barker told Collins that she had had a conversation
with Buffington in which Buffington had told Barker that he had
noticed Collins "flashing" a CIO button. Barker further told Collins
that she (Barker) had replied to Buffington that she had told her em-
ployees that if she were they and wanted to hold her job, she would not
wear such a button in the plant, and that Buffington had told respondent
that that was a "bright idea." Buffington did not specifically deny
having made these statements to Barker. The Trial Examiner found
Barker to be a, witness unworthy of belief. We do not credit Barker's
denials, and find that the conversation occurred as testified to by
Collins.
b' Matter of Ridge Tool Compan4j, 58 N. L. R. B. 1095; Matter of Carter Carburetor Cor-
poration, 48 N. L. R. B. 354, enf'd 140 F. (2d) 714 (C. C. A 8).
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1659
Buffington, Barker, and Thompson unsuccessfully solicited Collins
to join the Association.
Shortly prior to July 19, 1944, Buflingtoll, Assistant Plant Manager
Pittman, Assistant Foreman Hartley, and Barker began to watch
Collins at her work. Collins then went to Manager Smith and com-
plained that she was being spied upon. Smith told her that if she
was doing her work she had nothing to fear. Several days thereafter,
Buf ington summoned Collins to his office, accused her of advising em-
ployees not to join the Association, and told her that he was opposed
to the CIO and that it (the CIO) would bring strikes and Negroes
into the plant.
About July 19, Mrs. Dorcas Hargrove, who worked next to Collins,
in the course of a conversation with Collins and other employees asked
Collins if she belonged to the CIO. Collins told Hargrove that she
had distributed a "double handful" of CIO buttons among the em-
ployees. Hargrove then reported the conversation to Buffington and
told him that Collins had engaged in union talk on the job.55
Buffington thereupon called Collins to his office and gave her a warn-
ing slip for "walking around and talking `union' on the job-during
working hours. Also being late returning to work after recess." 56
Collins admitted having engaged in union talk on occasion, when work
had halted because of production break-downs. Buffington told her
that the union talk would have to stop, and that it was going to be
stopped; that he didn't want a union in the plant; that the company
didn't want it; and that they were not going to have it. He also told
her that if the CIO didn't get into the plant he felt sorry for her.57
As we have heretofore found, the latter statement constituted a threat
of economic reprisal against Collins for her CIO activities, should the
CIO fail to organize the plant and thus be in no position to protect her.
On August 7, due to a lack of work, several employees, among them
Collins, were transferred to another line. On that day materials were
slow in coming through, and there were delays of 10 to 20 minutes dur-
ing which the employees were out of work. In the interim the women,
as was the custom, sat at their places and talked. Near the end of the
day Collins was summoned to the personnel office, where Foreman Em-
mett Harris told her that she had not done "two minutes" work allday,
and discharged her. Collins told him that he was a liar. As she left
the office she met Massee, to whom she protested. Massee told her that
he, Harris, and others had watched her all day, and that she had done
an unusual amount of talking and laughing.
65 The finding as to Hargrove ' s conversation with Collins and her report,to Buffington
are based on Hargrove ' s testimony , which the Tual Examiner credited, as do we
66 Collins had been ill on that day and had returned to work 5 minutes late after a recess
period.
57 Buffington apparently made no investigation of Hargrove ' s accusation , but accepted it
as a fact . He refused to give Collins the name of the informer.
1660 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Other than the warning notice from Buffington, Collins' work or
conduct had never been criticized by her supervisors.53
The respondent's contentions and confusions
Collins' discharge slip states, as the reason for her separation, " loaf-
ing on the job and disturbing others while working, and not a depend-
able worker."
According to the testimony of Massee ,. on the afternoon of Col-
lins' discharge, he, Lieutenant Smith (a naval officer), and Production
Manager Tom Hall, saw Collins talking while other employees were
working and called it to Buffington's attention. According to Buf-
fington, he then reported it to Harris. Harris did. not testify. Ac-
cording to Massee he had no knowledge that Collins would be dis-
charged until, an hour and a half later, he received her discharge slip
signed by Harris; and he approved the discharge because she had
been previously warned by Buffington concerning her loafing on the
job.
Buffington's testimony was that Collins had been a good worker up
to about the time the CIO organizational campaign started, and that
then she began to talk and waste her time. He testified that,
I would say that in the beginning that Mrs. Collins used to be
as good a worker as I had in that plant, and at that time I had
about 140. In fact, she was a line leader at one time and she was
really a good worker. And then she got to where she didn't want
to do anything only talk. Well, I warned her about this once or
twice. I didn't give her any written warning slip or anything.
Then, she didn't pay attention to her work, she just kept talking.
I have known her to leave her place of work and go up and down
the line talking during working hours, during the time the parts
were coming down the line. This was reported by the line leaders
[Barker and Thompson].
However, Buffington's partisan interest in the Association, and his
vigilance in suppressing CIO activity in the plant, as evidenced by-his
actions heretofore described and by similar reports he made on Tyler
and on Thomas Paschal, whose discharge is discussed hereinafter, in-
dicate, and we find, that Buffington's objection to Collins' conduct was
based on her activity for the CIO. While some attempt was made to
show that Collins was an inordinate talker, we, like the Trial Ex-
aminer, are persuaded from the evidence that the women were allowed
to and customarily did talk while working, and that Collins was no
greater offender in this respect than the others. The Trial Examiner
did not credit Buffington's testimony that Collins, after months of
66 The foregoing findings , except where otherwise indicated , are based on Collins' testi-
mony. Where there is conflict , the Trial Examiner has credited Collins , and so do we.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1661
satisfactory work, suddenly became talkative, left her work and be-
came generally unsatisfactory, nor do we. The coincidence between
the advent of the CIO and Buffington's dissatisfaction with her work
is significant.
In approving the discharge, Massee admittedly relied on Buffing-
Ion's reports concerning Collins. We infer and find that Harris also
acted upon them, since there is no evidence that he had personal knowl-
edge of any of the facts. We find that these reports were based not
upon Collins' work or conduct, but upon her CIO affiliation and ac-
tivity, and constituted part of Buffington's total program of support-
ing the Association and discouraging the CIO. We find that Ruby
Collins was discharged because of her activity on behalf of the CIO.
3. Thomas Paschal
Paschal was hired on February 15, 1943, quit voluntarily on October
16, 1943, was rehired on March 27, 1944, and was discharged on June
24, 1944, the same day on which Tyler was discharged. He was em-
ployed as a tool maker. His work was good. During his employment
he received two raises in pay.
Paschal was a member of the United Automobile Workers union
when he was hired by the respondent. On May 9, 1944, he became a
member of the Steelworkers (CIO) and was made a volunteer or-
ganizer. He secured 10 to 12 members, and wore both Steelworkers'
and Automobile Workers' buttons in the plant. Lanthier, foreman of
the gauge control room, asked him one day if he had any more buttons.
Reeves, tool maker foreman, told Paschal on one occasion that he
wanted "no part of the Union" during wartime; but that after the war
it might be all right.
Paschal's work required him to go into different departments of the
plant. This was especially true of the toolroom, where the grinding
machines were located, and where Paschal had to go for the grinding
of tools and parts which he used. Sometimes Paschal would do the
grinding himself; at other times it would be done for him, if grinder
operators were available. Frequently he would have to wait until
someone was free or until a machine was vacant.
On May 25 Paschal received a warning slip from Reeves stating :
You are hereby being warned about continued gossiping. You
are not only wasting your own time but the time of others. This
will be your only warning about this matter.
Reeves told Paschal that Jackson, toolroom foreman, whose activities
have been described heretofore, had made complaint about Paschal's
talking to men in the toolroom. Later Paschal went to Jackson and
asked him whether he had made such reports. Jackson denied it.
1662 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On June 24, Reeves called Paschal to his office and told him that
"they" were "on his neck'.' about Paschal; that Paschal had been re-
ported as going all over the plant getting employees to join the CIO;
and that he had to discharge him.--
On the same or the following day, Reeves told Rudolph, assistant
toolroom foreman, that Paschal had been discharged for doing too
much talking about the Union in the plant °°
The respondent's contentions and conclusions
Reeves testified that he discharged Paschal because of oral and
written reports from Jackson and Buffington, oral reports from Lan-
thier, and Reeves' own observation, that Paschal went to other de-
partments, talked to men working there, and wasted his time and
theirs. The warning slip of May 25, according to Reeves, was based
on oral reports by Jackson, Lanthier, and Buffington.
Jackson and Buffington testified that Paschal had, during working
hours, "loafed" and talked to men in their departments and that they
had made oral and written reports to Reeves concerning Paschal.
Lanthier did not testify.
Buffington's written report dated June 24, the day of Paschal's dis-
charge, is as follows :
On several occasions this morning I have observed T. T.
Paschal going through the different departments of the plant.
He is not only wasting his time but also the time of others. I
would investigate this because this is causing unrest among the
employees.
As between Reeves' two statements to Paschal and Rudolph, at the
time of Paschal's discharge, to the effect that Paschal was discharged
for talking about the CIO in the plant, and Reeves' testimony at the
hearing that Paschal was discharged for the reasons which are now
asserted, we accept, as did the Trial Examiner, the former two state-
ments, which were made contemporaneously with the event, as more
probably reflecting the true fact.
Like the Trial Examiner, we find the testimony of Reeves, Jackson,
and Buffington to be unconvincing. Thus Reeves asserted at the hear-
ing that the May warning slip was based on reports of Jackson,
Lanthier, and Buffington, and Jackson testified that he had made re-
ports to Reeves about Paschal ever since Paschal had been rehired.
Yet, when Paschal had asked Jackson about the reports, Jackson had
denied having made any. Paschal's work necessarily took him into
different departments of the plant, including Jackson's and Buffing-
60 The above findings are based on admitted facts and on credible testimony by Paschal
which was not substantially or specifically denied.
60 This finding is based on Theron McElhenny's uncontradicted testimony.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1663
ton's. Jackson admitted that Paschal could have been talking about
his work. Jackson's description, on cross-examination, of what Pas-
chal was doing when Jackson observed him, is as consistent with the
conclusion that Paschal's conduct was in the course of his work, as it
is with the conclusion that it was not. Buffington also admitted that
he reported Paschal even though he knew that Paschal came to his
department on business, and also admitted that, except for Tyler, he
made no written reports on other employees who came into the depart-
ment without having business there.
Paschal admittedly did good work, and men of his skill were hard
to find. Upon his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner
concluded that the testimony of Reeves, Jackson, and Buffington,,as
to the conduct of Paschal and the reasons for the discharge, is not en-
titled to credit. We agree, and do not credit the testimony of these
witnesses.
On the basis of these conclusions and the whole background of oppo-
sition by the respondent to the CIO, we find that the reasons asserted
by the respondent for the discharge of Paschal were pretexts and with-
out foundation, and that Paschal was in fact discharged because,of
his activities on behalf of the CIO.
4. George Porter
Porter was hired in May 1943 at 90 cents per hour, and after working
as a machine operator for some time, was promoted to set-up man.
During his employment he received several wage increases aggregating
35 cents per hour. On March 11, 1944, Porter quit voluntarily to go
into the garage business. Assistant Plant Manager Pittman unsuc-
cessfully attempted at that time to persuade him to stay. On April 3,
1944, he was rehired by Pittman and Massee.
On'June 7, 1944, Porter joined the CIO and became a volunteer
organizer. He discussed the Union in the plant and solicited member-
ship during his free time. His foreman, Johnny Long, whose activity
on behalf of the Association has been related heretofore, was aware
of Porter's activity.
On June 13, Porter borrowed $100 from the respondent to pay a
hospital bill of his wife.
On June 14, during a recess, as Porter was displaying his organizer's
card and some membership cards to a number of employees, Long came
by and saw him. Later that day, Porter asked Pittman for permission
to work overtime in order to repay the loan. Pittman told Porter that
he was sorry and that Porter had already misrepresented the company
enough. When Porter asked what he meant, Pittman replied "you
know as well as I do," and directed Porter to come to his office at 4
o'clock. When Porter went to Pittman's office at that time, Pittman
755420-48-vol 74-106
1664 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
told him that his work was not satisfactory and discharged him. Long
was also present.61
Conclrusion,
It will be recalled that late in June, Pittman, on two different occa-
sions, talked to groups of employees about unions and told them,
among other things, that he did not see how a union could improve
conditions in the plant.
According to Pittman, Porter was discharged because of unsatisfac-
tory work and because he had received unfavorable reports, both oral
and written, from Porter's supervisors, Foreman Greer, Grishham,
Graves, and Long. The written reports are all dated the day of
Porter's discharge. They indicate that Porter had been "under sur-
veillance"; that he was inefficient, his work was of the "very poorest"
standard, and his attitude was poor; and that he loafed, would not
work, displayed no initiative, and wandered off the job.
Of the four supervisors, only Greer testified.
Pittman's testimony was that, prior to Porter's discharge, he had
received oral reports from four supervisors to the effect that Porter's
work was unsatisfactory; that he spoke to Porter several times about
the quality of his work and about the reports; and that the complaints
were reduced to writing when Porter denied their truth. Porter
denied that his work had ever been criticized, or that he was ever
informed of any reports by supervisors. Greer's testimony was similar
to Pittman's. The testimony of neither Pittman nor Greer indicates
that any particular incident relating to his work precipitated the de-
cision to separate Porter.
Like the Trial Examiner, we do not credit the testimony of Pittman
and Greer. During 1943 Porter had left the respondent's employment,
and,he was subsequently rehired at a higher rate of pay. His last pay
increase of 15 cents per hour was given on the recommendation of
Pittman. During his employment he was promoted to set-up man.
Pittman tried to persuade him not to quit in March 1944, and reluc-
tantly gave Porter his release. The separation slip he was given at
that time stated that he would be recommended for rehiring. On
April 3, Pittman rehired him. It is evident, therefore, that Porter's
work was satisfactory up to April 1944. The assertions of Pittman
and Greer that it became completely unsatisfactory thereafter are
not entitled to credit.
Porter was never given a warning slip, although it was conceded
that that was the customary practice. Pittman first testified that
"'The above findings are based on Porter's testimony, which, except for the finding
that,Porter asked Pittman whether he could work overtime in order to repay the loan, was
undenied. On that point, the Trial Examiner, who had an opportunity of observing the
witnesses, credited Porter , and so do we.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1665
Porter was transferred from one job to another in order to find a posi-
tion where he could do satisfactory work. On cross-examination, how-
ever, he admitted that these transfers were normal shifting around
and had had no connection with the calibre of Porter's work. Pitt-
man's testimony was in other respects contradictory, evasive, and
unconvincing. We also agree with the Trial Examiner that Greer's
testimony is generally untrustworthy.
Grisham, Graves, and Long did not testify, and no explanation was
advanced for the failure to call them as witnesses.62
Upon these considerations, and upon his observation of the wit-
nesses, the Trial Examiner rejected the testimony of Pittman and
Greer, and credited Porter's assertions that his work was never criti-
cized during his employment. We agree with the Trial Examiner and
make the same findings. Porter's previous satis'^'actory work record,
the failure to give him any warning slips, and the absence of criticism
of his work indicate that it was not dissatisfaction with his services
that motivated his discharge. The fact that he was loaned $100 on
the day before his discharge indicates that the decision to separate him
was made suddenly thereafter. The fact that Long alone, of all the
supervisors, recommended Porter's discharge in the written reports,
and that Long was present when Pittman discharged Porter, leads us
to infer that Long, who had assisted the Association and had that day
witnessed Porter discussing the CIO with employees, was immediately
responsible for the discharge. In view of the background of opposi-
tion to the CIO among the supervisory, employees, the discriminatory
discharges of other volunteer CIO organizers, and the implausibility
of the reasons asserted for the discharge, Nye find that. Porter was
discharged because of his activities on behalf of the CIO.
5. Sidney Gibson
Gibson was hired on October 12, 1943, was laid off on November 6
for lack of materials, was rehired on December 9, 1943, and was there-
after continuously employed until June 23, 1944, when he was dis-
charged. He was employed as a laborer in the oil recovery depart-
ment, under Foreman Ben Brooks.
Employee Walker Crooms was employed, under Foreman W. B.
Power, in the bar stockroom adjacent to the oil recovery room. On
the evening of June 22, 1944, Gibson told Crooms that he was going
to join the CIO. Crooms told Gibson that he would like to join also,
and requested Gibson to get him a card. On the following morning,
prior to starting to work, Gibson joined the CIO and received a CIO
button and several blank applications for membership.
82 J. M Parker testified that he understood that Graves was ill. No request was made,
however, for opportunity to take"his testimony
1666 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
During the recess that morning, Gibson met Crooms in the wash-
room and gave him the blank cards.63
Several times during the course of that day, as Gibson passed
through the bar stockroom on his way to the toilet, he stopped and
spoke briefly to Crooms and Miller. Power watched him each time.
During the afternoon Power approached Crooms and Miller and asked
them what Gibson had been talking about. Miller said that Gibson
had asked him to join the CIO. Power asked Crooms whether Gibson
had given him any cards. Crooms said that he had. Power asked
Crooms to give him the cards. Crooms did so. Part of this conversa-
tion was in the presence of E. E. Lavendar, assistant to Production
Manager Tom Hal], Brooks' superior. Sometime later in the day
Power went into the oil room and talked to Brooks.64
At about 4 p. m. Massee requested Power to make a written report
of the incident. Power sent in the following memorandum :
On June 23, 1944, Mr. Sidney Gibson of the Oil Recovery De-
partment came into my department during working hours upon
three different occasions , and was talking to some of my men.
Upon investigating the reasons for Mr. Gibson's visits, I was
told by my men that he was soliciting membership for the C. I. O.
Union.
At 4: 30 Brooks told Gibson to go to Massee's office , where Gibson
was discharged. During the discharge interview, Gibson told Massee
and Brooks that he didn't think that the company would kill anyone
who joined the union; that he had been soliciting for the "0. P. A.";
and either said that he had "hoped to get 5 members that day," or that
he had "signed up 5 that day."
Conclusions
Gibson's separation notice states as the reason for his discharge
"unable to do work, found loafing twice today." According to the re-
spondent's testimony, the decision to discharge Gibson was made by
Brooks. The latter testified that at the time of the discharge he had no
knowledge of Gibson's visits with Crooms and Miller in the bar stock-
room that afternoon, and asserted that the reason for the discharge
was that during the day of the 23rd, he saw Gibson standing in a bin
door; that that constituted "proof" that Gibson was loafing; and that
he therefore discharged him sb According to Brooks, he had on pre-
03 The above findings are based on undisputed testimony of Gibson , Crooms and employee
Willie Miller.
°' The findings in the above paragraphs are based on testimony by Gibson, Crooms, Miller,
and Power, much of which was in conflict. The above represent what we, like the Trial
Examiner, conclude, after consideration of the testimony and other events of that day,
are the facts
as The oil room houses bins in which scrap metal is collected . Part of Gibson 's job was
to shovel metal into the bins.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1667
vious days noticed that Gibson was outside of the department when he
had no business to be, he had reported it to Pittman, and Pittman had
"evidently" suggested dicharging Gibson. Pittman testified that
Brooks had complained to him two or three times about Gibson's
leaving the job and that he had instructed Brooks to keep Gibson on
the job or send him home. On no occasion, however, did Brooks warn
Gibson or speak to him about his conduct.
Like the Trial Examiner, we do not credit the testimony of Brooks
and Pittman. It will be recalled that, on the day of Gibson's dis-
charge, Brooks took O. B. Paradise's CIQ dues receipt and forwarded
it, along with a report on H. E. Tyler, to Massee. The incident which
allegedly motivated Gibson's discharge is too insignificant to be per-
suasive . Power's favoritism toward the Association is evidenced by
his action, 2 or 3 days later, in applying for membership himself and
inducing his men to join it. We conclude that both Massee and
Brooks were informed of the occurrence in the bar stockroom during
the afternoon of the 23rd and that Gibson was discharged as a result
of that information, and not for the reason asserted by Brooks °s The
discharge was thus based upon Gibson's suspected union activity. It
was therefore discriminatory.
Whether Gibson's conversations in the bar stockroom that day were
on company time, as Power asserted, or at recess, as Crooms and
Gibson asserted, and whether Gibson was actually soliciting for the
CIO, it is unnecessary to determine. Even though he had been solicit-
ing during working hours, we would nevertheless find that he was
discriminatorily discharged. Association adherents were soliciting
extensively during working hours with impunity, and with the ap-
proval and assistance of supervisors. As has been indicated heretofore,
the enforcement against one labor organization of a rule prohibiting
solicitation, while ignoring or assisting the same activities by another
was discriminatory.
We find that Sidney Gibson was discharged because of his activities
on behalf of the CIO.
6. The respondent's additional contentions
At the original hearing, the Trial Examiner refused to admit into
evidence exhibits containing information with regard to other ein-
ployees wljo were discharged during the period herein involved. At
°° Thus, Lavendar was present when Power talked to Ciooms and Miller ; Power made out
a written report at the request of Massee ; and shortly before Gibson ' s discharge, Power
went into the oil room and talked to Brooks While Brooks testified that he did not know,
at the time of the discharge , of the incident in the bar stockroom , and although both he
and Power denied that Power informed Brooks of it on the 23rd , we, like the Trial Exami-
ner, do not credit their testimony on this point, and conclude from the circumstances that
Power did inform Brooks
1668 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the supplemental hearing, in accordance with the Circuit Court's
remand order, this evidence was admitted and has been considered by
the Trial Examiner and by the Board.
During the period in question, the respondent discharged 162 em-
ployees, and approximately 500 employees voluntarily quit. The union
affiliation or non-affiliation of the employees who quit does not appear.
Of the discharged employees, however, 22 were members of the CIO
and 12 were members of the Association. The remainder were evi-
dently unaffiliated. There is no evidence that the respondent was
aware of the fact of affiliation or non-affiliation at the time of the
discharges of any of these employees other than the 5 herein found to
have been discriminatorily, discharged. The total membership of the
CIO among the plant employees is not disclosed. With respect to the
Association, however, West Mosteller, its president, testified that that
organization received some 1200 to 1500 applications for membership,
and that of this number of applicants, some 800 to 1,000 became mem-
bers by the payment of dues.
This evidence clearly does not warrant any modification in our find-
ings with regard to the discriminatory discharges. The information
demonstrates that the ratio of Association membership to total em-
ployment was more than 40 percent, while its ratio with respect to the
total number of discharges was only about 10 percent. The record does
not disclose, however, the ratio of CIO discharges to the total CIO
membership. Nor are the circumstances or the reasons for the dis-
charges disclosed, except as to the 5 employees involved in this proceed-
ing. Of these 5 employees, 4 were volunteer CIO organizers and the
fifth distributed CIO cards. The 22 CIO members who were dis-
charged may have constituted the entire CIO membership in the plant.
Even if they did not, however, failure to effect a complete house clean-
ing of the CIO members does not rebut the evidence of discrimination
with regard to the complainants." Furthermore, in the atmosphere of
opposition which the CIO encountered, widespread militancy among
its members was hardly to be expected. After Alton Ivey, for example,
received a warning slip from Foreman Buffington for talking about
the CIO, he ceased his solicitation. Ila Tanner, when her CIO activi-
ties became the subject of investigation, renounced the CIO. The
number of CIO advocates staunch enough to brave openly such opposi-
tion by their supervisors must necessarily have been small.
Furthermore, whether the respondent discharged a comparatively
large or small percentage of CIO adherents, the issue nevertheless
remains whether each individual employee named in the complaint
67 See, e g , Matter of Stewart Warner Corporation, 55 N. L. R. B. 593, 610 ; Matter of
Montag Bros, Inc, 51 N L R B 366, enf'd 140 F. (2d) 730 (C C. A 5).
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1669
would have been discharged absent his CIO activity. It is therefore
decisive that, as to each individual herein involved, there is clear evi-
dence both that the respondent's officials who caused the discharges
intended to discriminate, and that the reasons given for the discharge
were specious rather than real. The direct evidence that union activity
was the motivating cause of the discharges is not rebutted by the
general evidence as to other discharges. Accordingly, upon our review
of the discharges in the light of the additional evidence, we again find,
as did the Trial Examiner, that H. E. Tyler, Ruby Collins, Thomas
Paschal, George Porter, and Sidney Gibson were discharged because
of their activities on behalf of the CIO, and that the respondent
thereby discriminated with respect to hire and tenure of employment,
discouraged membership in the CIO, encouraged membership in the
Association, and interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
C. The alleged unfair, labor practices
The discharge of Kathryn Cowart
Cowart was hired on December 28, 1943, at 55 cents per hour, and
was raised to 60 cents on January 31, 1944, to 65 cents on May 22, and to
70 cents on July 3. She was employed on the night shift, originally as a
machine operator, later as a line leader. She joined the CIO on May
17, 1944, and became one of its most active members and a volunteer
organizer.
During the second week in June, Foreman Harrington promoted
Cowart to line leader.
On July 3, Harrington sent the following letter to Cowart and
set-up man James Golden, who-worked on Cowart's line :
To Kathryn and Golden:
I wish to personally express appreciation to you, your workers,
and the inspectors for the excellent job you all did last month in
meeting the quota on C-48.
It was with your leadership, cooperation, and interest, assisted
by the willing cooperation of your workers and the inspectors that
this job was well done.
I feel sure that even though the quota is gradually increasing,
you and those working with you are qualified to meet it.
Around the first of July Cowart had her picture taken by a photog-
rapher in Milledgeville for the July 31 issue of the CIO newspaper,
which was distributed weekly outside the plant. About 2 weeks later,
set-up man Golden approached Cowart and warned her not to let the
picture appear in the paper. He told Cowart: "I am telling you for
1670 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
your own good." 611 On August 1 the CIO paper, carrying Cowart's
picture and a story of her CIO activity on the front page, was distrib-
uted in Milledgeville.
On Tuesday, July 25, Cowart became ill and was advised by her
doctor to remain away from work for several days. Cowart sent word
to the plant. She was out the rest of the week. On the following Mon-
day afternoon, July 31, Clinton Cowart, Kathryn's husband and also
an employee at the plant, phoned Paul McClanahan, foreman of both
the Cowarts, and told him that he could not come to work that night
because he had to take Kathryn to the hospital for a check-up. Mc-
Clanahan told Clinton that it was all right for him not to come in, but
that Kathryn was discharged. When Clinton asked why, McClanahan
told him that she was out too much.
Subsequently Cowart received a discharge slip marked "Didn't work
regularly. Out due to sickness." When she protested, she was given
a new slip indicating that she had quit, that her services were satis-
factory, but that she had been excessively absent due to sickness and
would not be recommended for rehire.
Conclrusions
The respondent contended that Cowart was discharged for absentee-
ism. It was conceded that she was a good worker. The respondent's
records indicate that she was discharged on July 29.
During the early part of 1944, Cowart had been ill. She was absent
2 days in February and the entire week ending March 12. She worked
on March 13, but on the 14th she left to undergo an operation. She
did not return to work until April 21. Thereafter, she did not work on
April 29, May 11, 12, 13, 15, and 22, and July 10. On March 4, April 2
and July 14 she did not work full shifts.69
The absences of May 11 to 15 were apparently occasioned by the re-
turn home of Cowart's brother, a service man, on furlough, and Cowart
received advance permission from her foreman. All the other ab-
sences were for illness, and on each occasion Cowart sent word to the
plant. 7 °
Cowart's record for absences establishes plausible ground for her
discharge. On the other hand, other factors suggest that the absences
constituted a mere pretext. Thus, Cowart was a volunteer organizer
for the CIO. Other volunteer organizers had been discharged by the
respondent on one pretext or another. Her work was satisfactory.
"There is no substantial evidence that Golden was a supervisory employee . However,
he solicited for the Association on company time, and was a dues collector and active
member
°U On July 15, 17, and 18 , she was on vacation
70 The above findings are based on admitted facts, Cowart ' s time records , and uncontra-
dicted testimony
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1671
Her absences appear to have been for adequate cause. They evoked
no comment or warning from her supervisors, and were apparently
deemed sufficiently unimportant to warrant McClanahan's recommend-
ing her fora raise on May 22, and again on July 3, and her promotion
in June.
On the other hand, she received the wage increases and the promo-
tion after she had become active in the CIO, and presumably after the
respondent was aware of that activity. McClanahan and Harrington,
her foremen,-were not implicated in any incidents indicating that they
were opposed to the CIO. Cowart's job as line leader obviously re-
quired more or less regular attendance. The discharge was contem-
poraneous with her first extended absence after May. The recurrence
of absences in July suggests that, whatever the cause, regularity in
attendance could not be expected from her. The supposition that she
was discharged because the respondent had learned that her picture
would be published in the CIO paper appears doubtful, in view of the
respondent's probable prior knowledge that she was active on behalf
of the CIO. Moreover, on the basis of the evidence adduced, knowledge
of the impending publication cannot be attributed to the respondent.
Therefore, although the discharge of Cowart is suspicious because
of the pattern of the other discriminatory discharges, because of its
arbitrary nature, and because of the failure to warn Cowart or at least
to discuss with her the likelihood of securing more regular attendance,
we, like the Trial Examiner, are unable to find that the respondent
seized upon.the week-long absence in July as a pretext for discrimina-
torily discharging her. We shall, therefore, dismiss the complaint as
to Cowart.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the respondent, set forth in Section III, above, oc-
curring in connection with the operations of the respondent described
in Section I, above, had a close, intimate, and substantial relation to
trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tended to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the
free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Following the cessation of hostilities in August 1945, the Navy De-
partment served notice of termination of the contract under which the
respondent had operated the plant. Manufacturing operations then*
ceased. On November 5, 1945, the plant was closed and surrendered
by the respondent to the Navy. As far as appears, the tespondent's
interest in the plant has wholly terminated. The stipulation dealing
with the cessation of operations at the Milledgeville plant, however,
1672 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
avoids any reference to the respondent's intentions with regard to
operating this plant in the future. The stipulation, which is dated
July 11, 1946, merely states, after referring to the surrender of the
plant to the Navy Department on November 5, 1945, that "since that
date and as o l this date Reynolds Corporation is not engaged in manu-
facturing operations." (Emphasis supplied.) The possibility of the
respondent's resuming operations at the Milledgeville plant in the
future under some new arrangement with the Navy has therefore not
been foreclosed, and is a factor to be considered in determining an ap-
propriate remedy.
Having found that the respondent engaged in unfair labor practices,
we shall order that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain af-
firmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
We have found that the respondent dominated and interfered with
the formation and administration of, and contributed support to, the
Association and the Grievance Committee. With the closing of the
plant, however, the Association and Grievance Committee apparently
ceased to exist as labor organizations among the respondent's em-
ployees. Nevertheless, we shall order the respondent, in the event
that it resumes operations at the Milledgeville plant, and in the further
event that the Association and the Grievance Committee, are revived
among the respondent's employees, to disestablish and withhold all
recognition from the Association and the Grievance Committee as
representatives of any of the respondent's employees for the purpose
of dealing with the respondent concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment.
We have found that the respondent discriminated in regard to the
hire and tenure of employment of H. E. Tyler, Ruby Collins, Thomas
Paschal, George Porter, and Sidney Gibson. After his discharge,
Paschal secured other employment and did not desire ,to be reem-
ployed by the respondent. Accordingly, in order to effectuate the
policies of the Act, we shall order that, when and if the respondent
resumes operations at the Milledgeville plant, it shall offer immediate
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges,
to Tyler, Collins, Porter, and Gibson. We shall also order that the
respondent make whole Tyler, Collins, Porter, and Gibson for any
losses of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's dis=
crimination against them, by payment to each of them of a sum of
money equal to the amount which he or she normally would have
earned as wages during the period from the date of his or her discharge
to the date on which his or her employment would have terminated
in accordance with the Navy Department orders to cease production
at the plant, and, in the event the plant is reopened by the respondent
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1673
and operations are resunied which require the services of employees
possessing the same or equivalent qualifications , during the period
from the date of such resumption of operations to the date of respond-
ent's offer of reinstatement, less his or her net earnings during these
S.7 1 We shall also order that the respondent make whole
Paschal for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the
respondent 's discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum
of money equal to the amount which he normally would have earned
as wages during the period from the date of his discharge to July 30,
1944, the date be secured the employment he held at the time he testi-
field, less his net earnings during that period.
We find no merit in the respondent 's contention that it would not
effectuate the policies of the Act to hold it liable for any back pay
because the Government would ultimately bear the added expense
under the contract. In the first place, the contention is based upon a
false assumption . Under the termination settlement agreement be-
tween the respondent and the Navy Department , reimbursement for
legal and other expenses incurred by the respondent in the instant
proceeding was denied , with the respondent reserving the right to file
a separate claim for reimbursement . There is nothing in the contract
requiring the Government to reimburse the respondent for expenses
for which the Government received no tangible benefit and which the
respondent incurred solely because it violated a Federal statute. It is
un-reasonable to assume that it was the intention of the contracting
parties that the contract should comprehend expenditures incurred as
a result of the respondent 's own actions in violation of law. The
Comptroller General has so ruled in a decision in which he refused to
' allow a contractor , constructing an ordnance manufacturing plant for
the Govermuent under a contract apparently closely analogous to the
one herein involved , to obtain reimbursement for back wage payments
to discriminatorily discharged employees made pursuant to a settle-
ment agreement with the Board. See 22 Decisions of the Comptroller
General 348 , 356-357.
Having heretofore found that there was nothing in either the con-
tractual relations between the respondent and the Navy Department or
in the actions of any Navy officers which would or should exculpate
the respondent from responsibility for unfair labor practices com-
niitted by it as an employer , we likewise find that there are no reasons
to alter the normal conclusion that the respondent must pay the back
pay custouiarlly ordered for discriminatorily discharged employees in
- By "net e.unings " is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transportation, room,
and board , ncuired by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where than for the tespoudent, which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful
discharge and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere See Matter
of Crossett Lumber Company, 8 N. L. R. B 440. Moines received for work performed
upon Federal , State, county , municipal or other work relief projects shall be considered
as earnings . See Republic Steel Corporation v. N. L. R. B , 311 U S 7.
1674 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
order to remedy the unfair labor practices and effectuate the policies
of the Act.
Because of the respondent's unlawful conduct and its underlying
purpose, we are of the opinion that the unfair labor practices here-
tofore found are persuasively related to the other unfair labor prac-
tices proscribed by the Act and that danger of their commission in
the future, in the event that the respondent resumes operations at the
Milledgeville plant, is to be anticipated from the respondent's conduct
in the past.72 Unless the order is coextensive with the threat, the
preventive purpose of the Act will be thwarted. In order, therefore,
to make more effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7,
to prevent a recurrence of unfair labor practices, and thus minimize
industrial strife which burdens and obstructs commerce, and thus
effectuate the policies of the Act, we shall order the respondent to cease
and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire
record in the case, the Board makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1. United Steelworkers of America, affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, is, and `Yorkers Welfare Association, Inc.,
and the Grievance Committee were, labor organizations, within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By dominating and interfering with the formation and admin-
istration of Workers Welfare Association, Inc., and the Grievance
Committee, and contributing support to them, the respondent engaged
in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (2) of
the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employ-
ment of H. E. Tyler, Ruby Collins, Thomas Paschal, George Porter,
and Sidney Gibson, and thereby discouraging membership in United
Steelworkers of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, and encouraging membership in Workers Welfare Asso-
ciation, Inc., the respondent-engaged in unfair labor practices, within
the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the
respondent engaged in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of
Section 8 (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices were uhfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7)' of
the Act.
72 N L. R. B. v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U. S. 426.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1675
6. The respondent did not engage in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act by the discharge of
Kathryn Cowart.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the re-
spondent, Reynolds Corporation, and its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns shall:
1. In the event that the respondent's operations at Milledgeville,
Georgia, are resumed, cease and desist from :
(a) Dominating or interfering with the administration of, or con-
tributing support to, Workers Welfare Association, Inc., and the
Grievance Committee, and dominating or interfering with the forma-
tion or administration of, or contributing support to, any other labor
organization of its employees;
(b) Discouraging membership in United Steelworkers of Ainerica,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or any other
labor organization of its employees, or encouraging membership in
Workers Welfare Association, Inc., or any other labor organization
of its employees, by discharging or refusing to reinstate any of its
employees, or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of their employ-
ment ;
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist United Steelworkers of America,
affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining, or other mutual aid or protection, as
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) In the event that the respondent's operations at Milledgeville,
Georgia, are resumed, and in the further event that the Workers Wel-
fare Association, Inc., and the Grievance Committee or either of them,
are revived, withhold recognition from and completely disestablish the
a fore-named organizations as the representative of any of its employees
for the purpose of dealing with the respondent concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment;
(b) Offer H. E. Tyler, Ruby Collins, George Porter, and Sidney
Gibson immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substan-
1 676 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tially equivalent positions,' without prejudice to their seniority and
other rights and privileges, when and if its operations are resumed at
Milledgeville, Georgia;
(c) Make whole H. E. Tyler, Ruby Collins, George Porter, Sidney
Gibson, and Thomas Paschal for any loss of pay they may have suf-
fered by reason of the respondent's discrimination against them, bN
payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to that which he or
she normally would have earned as wages but for the respondent's
discrimination against him or her, in the manner set forth in the section
entitled "The remedy" ;
(d) In the event that the respondent's operations are resumed, post
at the plant at Milledgeville, Georgia, copies of the notices attached
hereto, marked "Appendix B." 14 Copies of said notice, to be furnished
by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly
signed by the respondent's representative, be posted by the respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60)
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken by the respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material ;
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT Is FuRThER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that
the respondent discriminated against Kathryn Cowart, within the
meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
Ci:IAIRMAN HERZOG took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
APPENDIX A
The speeches of General Manager Smith and Lieutenant Commander
Banks
Lieutenant Commander Banks
I am very glad of the opportunity to meet you as a group and to
speak a few words to workers whose primary interest, I know, is
winning the war. I am speaking for the Commanding Officer, whose
73 In accordance with our consistent interpretation of the term, the expression "former
or substantially equivalent position" is intended to mean "former position wherever possi-
ble, but if such position is no longer in existence , then to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion " See Matter of The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto
Rico Branch, 65 N L R B 827.
74 In the event this Order is enforced by decree of a Circuit Court of Appeals, ther e shall
be inserted, before the words "A DECISION AND ORDER," the words . "A DECREE- OF
THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING "
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1677
absence is -necessary because of plans to increase this plant's value Iii
accomplishing that result. He regrets that he is not able to be here
personally and talk to you. As you probably all know, this plant is
owned by the Navy, which is a. department of the United States Gov-
ernment. Because it is owned by the Navy and the Government, it is
owned by you. The contractor, who is the Reynolds Corporation,
entered into an agreement with the Navy Department, to operate the
plant for the purpose of manufacturing ordnance equipment. The
contractor and you, the employees, are working to fulfill the terms of
this contract. The Navy's interest is to see to it that the terms of the
contract are niet, and to assist, as your representative in exerting.
every effort to produce in quality and quantity, all that the plant is
capable of producing. To accomplish this, we must take notice of
events that may affect the productive capacity of this plant. I speak
of dissension among workers, taking of so-called sides, personal ar-
guments, or anything that will cause you to take your minds off your
business and be diverted from the primary job which is the winning
of the war. We, the Navy. would be guilty of neglect of duty to the
country and to you if we failed to snake every effort to prevent this.
The Commanding Officer does not, nor do I need second hand infoi -
mation about the importance of the product that you are snaking. We
both have seen what your fuzes are doing and we know how essential
it is to have perfect ones in a tremendous quantity. There is no time
for personal animosity to enter into the picture now. This is true
about you as it is about your sons and husbands who are firing the
fuzes that you are making. Anyone,-male, female, manager or
worker, who wilfully commits an act that will retard production-by
that I mean not so much as physical violence but anything that will
take workers' minds off what they are doing so they can produce at a
maximum capacity-is as guilty of treason as the deserter who assists
the enemy. The plant is new and we have not yet hit our stride. There
are many problems having to do with management which have not, as
yet, been given the necessary attention for smooth running all around
organization. Some of these problems have been buried because of
the necessity of devoting full time to getting the fuzes out. These
problems will be niet and solved as time goes on. I am qualified to
speak as a Georgian and I feel confident that we, speaking in that re-
spect, will not permit small things to interfere with our real objec-
tive and will set an example for the rest of our country to follow-.
Thank you for your attention.
Harry G. Smith
Thank you, Commander. It has been some time since I have had
the privilege of speaking to you people as a group, therefore , it is my
1678 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
desire to compliment you personally for the job you have done. You
have increased production by 250 percent since the first of December
and at the same time, you have decreased scrap and rejects by 50 per-
cent. While you were doing these things, you have been producing
fuzes that our loading plant unqualifiedly states are as good as the
best.
Secondly, I want to outline to you briefly, the job that faces us in
the immediate future. I have just returned from Washington, and
your Navy still needs an increase in production of at least 50 percent
on the Mark 46 fuze parts and they need an increase of approxi-
mately 60 percent on the Mark 20 fuze parts. I have told the Navy,
for you, that we will increase the production in the amount. required
as soon as possible. These fuzes that we produce here are some of
the most critical items on the Navy's list and I am sure that each of us
will do everything possible to obtain the quantity required. There
are a number of problems yet facing us and we all know that the
majority of us need more training and more experience in order that
we may do the task required. We must continue to improve the
methods of manufacturing and we shall aggressively follow this
course. Those of you who are supervisors have a large task before you.
Briefly, each supervisor not only must continue to learn himself,
but must continually pass on to this (sic) people, to you, the best
ways of doing their particular job. They must continually build up
a better understanding between each of us and we must learn to work
with each other, even better than we have done in the past, for it is
only by teamwork that we can hope to accomplish the results required.
One of the misunderstandings that has existed is that of pay increases,
and I want to take this opportunity of stating the facts connected with
pay increases.
First, the Reynolds Corporation is operating this plant, under a
direct Navy contract and the terms of this contract require strict ad-
herence to all Federal and State laws governing the conditions of
employment. Our rates of pay for this plant are set up by the War
Labor Board. Our rates of increases are set up by the same board.
The Navy has stationed at this Ordnance Plant a group of officers
whose duties parallel those of our Management, in that it is their duty
to see that production is attained and that all terms of the contract
are properly carried out. In this, the Navy Officers and Your Man-
agement are working shoulder to shoulder.
Nearly a year ago, the management of this plant asked for certain
changes in rates of pay for toolmakers, tool grinders, and automatic
screw machine set-up men, in view of the fact that our rates of pay
as established by the War Labor Board were, in our opinion, too low
for these classifications. Our request for an increase was rejected and
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1679
we appealed the decision. Again it was rejected. We appealed it the
second time, and the second time it was rejected. We appealed it the
third time and the third time it was rejected, and finally on the fourth
appeal, our request was approved, and therefore immediately after
April 14, the date of the approval, your management made changes
in the rates of pay for the men in the classifications mentioned before,
where the progress of the mien warranted the increases, and we also
at that time contacted the other individuals in those departments
whom Ave felt were not producing up to par, and pointed out to them
as individuals, ways to improve their work so that they too could be
granted increases in pay.
The policy of the Reynolds Corporation and its affiliated companies
(and the history of these companies bears out the fact) has been, and
will continue to be, a policy of treating everyone in the organization
absolutely fairly, being sympathetic at all times to your desires and'
at all times we are dedicated to the policy of doing everything possible
toward making this plant a desirable place to work.
Your General Manager has spent his life in manufacturing plants
and therefore he too has as his personal wish a desire to live as closely
as possible to you people, to know your problems, and to make this
plant the best place to work in the State of Georgia.
I personally want you to feel that all doors are open to you to lay
your suggestions and desires, or complaints directly before the Man-
agement. If at any time you feel that you have a suggestion to make,
or a grievance to air-first contact your foreman. If he does not
handle the matter promptly, contact the Plant Manager or the Chief
Inspector, depending on whether you are in production or inspection.
Now should you choose, you may take another course, and contact the
Personnel Department and Mr. Massee will give attention to the
problem. The General Manager has instructed these men to handle
all of your suggestions or grievances promptly.
I regret that in an organization of this size, it is impossible for me
to talk with each of you individually, however, if you feel that either
your foreman, your Plant Manager, your Chief Inspector, or Person-
nel Manager has not handled your problem to your satisfaction, please
,do not hesitate to call upon nme if you should meet me on the floor, or
call my secretary, to make an appointment with me and I will certainly
promise that your problem will be handled to the best of my ability.
Your job, my job, the Navy's job, all our jobs, are one and the same-
to produce the best fuzes possible in the quickest way possible in order
that we may save every hour in the winning of this war, and in so doing
we may save every life possible-your son's, your husband's-your
sweetheart's or your friend's. To this end we are all pledged and I for
one. and I know you too, will not permit anything to occur which will
755420-48-vol 74-107
1680 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
delay this job to which we are pledged. I say again for all of us, that
we will not permit any interference with production, and that is one
reason why I say to you what I am about to say.
Reports are circulating which tend to distract your attention from
your job, and I want to discuss them briefly with you at this time.
During the past two or three weeks you have heard rumors of activities
to organize a Union in this Plant. I want to take this opportunity of
pointing out to you certain facts in the natter.
First, you are free to determine for yourself whether you desire to
join a Uni on or not desire a Union. There will be no action on the part
of the Management to prevent you from joining a Union or not join-
ing any organization. Neither your General Manager or any other
part of management will in any way prevent or attempt to prevent
you from doing as you see fit.
Secondly, let me further state that it is my duty to counsel and
advise with you in the matter and I am therefore going to point out
to you that whether you belong to a Union, or whether you do not
belong to a Union, it is your personal business and it will in no
way affect your job. Let me say to you further, that you will not
be required to belong to a Union in order to hold your job here.
Whether there is a Union here or not, you will be given increases
in pay as fast and as often as your progress and the laws permita
Please' remember that the War Labor Board has established not
only the minimum and maximum rates of pay, but they have
established the rates of increases between minimum and maximum
figures. Briefly, if your work has been satisfactory you may be
granted increases in any calendar year up to two-thirds of the differ-
ence between the maximum and minimum limits set by law provided
the increases in the plant do not average more than five cents per hour
for all the people now employed here. This part of the law makes it
necessary for us to check carefully so that any unjustified increases are
not granted in order that more than five cents per hour may be granted
to the more deserving employees. The laws govern the handling of
these natters and regardless of statements made to the contrary, these
are facts. Use your intelligence and carefully consider these facts in
deciding the matter for yourself.
Let me ask a few questions. Do you have a clean place to work? Is
it a safe place to work? Is it a pleasant place to work? Are you earn-
ing rates of pay in keeping with your ability to produce and in keep-
ing with your experiences in this kind of work? Finally, ask yourself,
do you need a Union to enable you to enjoy your work, to earn good pay
or to have a clean and a pleasant place in which to work? Personally,
I can see no reason for a Union in this plant. This is my personal
opinion. You are privileged to accept this opinion or reject it as you
REYNOLDS CORPORATION 1681
see fit. This management will never coerce you either way and I sug-
gest that you do not permit anyone else to coerce you either way. Be
your own judge of the matter. In closing, I ain sure that none of us
will permit anything to interfere with our producing our Navy's re-
quirements. We are just beginning to hit our stride and this plant is
really beginning to roll. I know you will keep it rolling clay and night
until the war is over. Thank you.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
Should the Workers Welfare Association, Inc., and the Griev-
ance Committee be revived, we shall immediately disestablish them
as thQ representative of any of our employees for the purpose of
dealing'with us concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment,
and we will not recognize either of them or any successor thereto
for any of the above purposes.
We will not dominate or interfere with the formation or admin-
istration of any labor organization or contribute financial or
other support to it.
We will offer to the employees named below immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions
without prejudice to any seniority or other rights or privileges
previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of pay suf-
fered as a result of the discrimination.
H. -E. Tyler
Ruby Collins
George Porter
Sidney Gibson
We will make whole the following employee for any loss of pay
suffered as a result of the discrimination.
Thomas Paschal
We will not in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist United Steelworkers of America, affili-
ated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or any other labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
1682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. All our em-
ployees are free to become or remain members of this union, or any
other labor organization. We will not discriminate in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
against any employee because of membership in or activity on behalf
of any such labor organization.
REYNOLDS CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated ------------------------- By ---------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
NOTE : Any of the above-named employees presently serving in the
armed forces of the United States will be offered full reinstatement up-
on application in accordance with the Selective Service Act after dis-
charge from the armed forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and
.must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.