REVESTOR LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 29, 2021

2019005960 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/592,086 05/10/2017 William A. Lyons 4942.0003 CON 1018
84278 7590 01/29/2021
PATENT LAW GROUP: Atkins and Associates P.C.
123 W. Chandler Heights Road, Unit 12535
Chandler, AZ 85248
EXAMINER
GOTTSCHALK, MARTIN A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/29/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
main@plgaz.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
1

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte WILLIAM A. LYONS
____________

Appeal 2019-005960
Application 15/592,086
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.

MOHANTY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF THE DECISION
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as REVESTOR,
LLC. (Appeal Br. 1).
Appeal 2019-005960
Application 15/592,086

2

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The Appellant’s claimed invention relates to a real estate investment
system and method (Spec., para. 2). Claim 1, reproduced below with the
italics added, is representative of the subject matter on appeal.

1. A method of controlling communications over an
electronic network including a first computing system and a
second computing system involving a property investment
analysis tool for a real property asset, comprising:
providing a plurality of real property assets;
collecting information related to the real property assets
from a plurality of property data sources using the first
computing system over a communication network, wherein the
information includes a plurality of transaction values for each
of the real property assets;
storing the real property assets and the information as a
data structure consolidating the information from the property
data sources in a database on the first computing system;
searching the real property assets in the data structure
on the first computing system based on search criteria using
the property investment analysis tool on the second computing
system by calculating key investment indicators including net
operating income, capitalization rate, debt service ratio, cash
flow, cash-on-cash return, and return on investment from the
information in the database;
identifying the real property assets in the database on the
first computing system matching the search criteria for the key
investment indicators and rank ordering the identified real
property assets by a selected search criteria; and
selecting one of the identified real property assets and
displaying the key investment indicators and an investment
rating of the key investment indicators against established
ranges on the second computing system for one of the
identified real property assets.

Appeal Br. 53, 54 (Claims App.).

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THE REJECTIONS
The following rejections are before us for review:
1. Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to non-statutory subject matter.
2. Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Halpin (US 2006/0190370 A1; pub. Aug. 24, 2006) and
Tripp (US 2007/0027787 A1; pub. Feb. 01, 2007).

FINDINGS OF FACT
We have determined that the findings of fact in the Analysis section
below are supported at least by a preponderance of the evidence2.

ANALYSIS
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
The Appellant argues that the rejection of claim 1 is improper because
the claim is not directed to an abstract idea (App. Br. 13–20). The Appellant
argues further that the claim is “significantly more” than the alleged abstract
idea (App. Br. 20–24).
In contrast, the Examiner has determined that the rejection of record is
proper (Final Action 2–7; Ans. 3–6).
We agree with the Examiner. An invention is patent eligible if it
claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted

2 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the
Patent Office).
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35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice,
573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
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statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187
(“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving
of patent protection.”).
In January 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the
Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application, i.e., evaluate whether the claim
“appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner
that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such
that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the judicial exception.” (see Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54; see also MPEP § 2106.04(d).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance.
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The Specification at page 1 states that the invention generally relates
to asset management and controlling a commercial system by generating key
investment indicators. Here, the Examiner has determined that the claim
sets forth “evaluating a potential real estate investment by performing
calculations, analyzing data, and providing a rating based on the analysis”
and is a method of organizing human activity and abstract idea (Final
Act. 2). We substantially agree with the Examiner. We determine that the
claim sets forth the subject matter in italics above which describes the
concept of: [1] “providing a plurality of real property assets”; [2]
“collecting information related to the real property assets”; [3] “storing the
real property assets and the information as a data structure”; [4] “searching
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the real property assets in the data structure … based on search criteria using
the property investment analysis tool … by calculating key investment
indicators including net operating income, capitalization rate, debt service
ratio, cash flow, cash-on-cash return, and return on investment from the
information in the database”; [5] “identifying the real property assets in the
database … matching the search criteria for the key investment indicators
and rank ordering the identified real property assets by a selected search
criteria”; and [6] “selecting one of the identified real property assets and
displaying the key investment indicators and an investment rating of the key
investment indicators against established ranges”, and is drawn to the
concept of collecting information on real property assets that are analyzed to
identify and select from based on investment indicators, which is a certain
method of organizing human activities and fundamental economic practice.
See Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016) where collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying results from
certain results of the collection and analysis was held to be an abstract idea.
A method, like the claimed method, is “a process that employs mathematical
algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional
information [that] is not patent eligible.” Digitech Image Techs, LLC v.
Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Courts have
found claims directed to collecting, recognizing, and storing data in a
computer memory to be directed to an abstract idea. Content Extraction and
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, 776 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
We next determine whether the claim recites additional elements in
the claim to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. The Guidance is incorporated in the
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c)
and (e)–(h).
Here, the claims do not improve computer functionality, improve
another field of technology, utilize a particular machine, or effect a
particular physical transformation. Rather, we determine that nothing in the
claims imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the
claims are more than a drafting effort to monopolize the judicial exception.
For example, in the claim, the additional elements beyond the abstract
idea are the recited “computing system[s]” and “communication network”.
The claimed limitations of “collecting”, “storing”, “searching”,
“calculating”, “identifying” and “selecting” as claimed “do not purport to
improve the functioning of the computer itself,” do not improve the
technology of the technical field, and do not require a “particular machine.”
Rather, they are performed using generic computer components. Further, the
claim as a whole fails to effect any particular transformation of an article to
a different state. The recited steps in the claim fail to provide meaningful
limitations to limit the judicial exception. In this case, the claim merely uses
the claimed computer elements as a tool to perform the abstract idea.
Considering the elements of the claim both individually and as “an
ordered combination” the functions performed by the computer system at
each step of the process are purely conventional. Each step of the claimed
method does no more than require a generic computer to perform a generic
computer function. Thus, the claimed elements have not been shown to
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application as set forth in the
Guidance, incorporated into MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c) and (e)–(h).
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Turning to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, we determine
that the claim 1 does not contain an inventive concept sufficient to
“transform” the abstract nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application.
Considering the claim both individually and as an ordered combination fails
to add subject matter beyond the judicial exception that is not well-
understood, routine, and conventional in the field. Rather the claim uses
well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known in
the art and they are recited at a high level of generality. The Specification at
paragraph 28 for example describes using conventional computer
components such as individual computers, cellular telephones, and
electronic communication networks in a conventional manner. The claim
specifically includes recitations for computing systems to implement the
method but these computer components are all used in a manner that is well-
understood, routine, and conventional in the field. Here, the claimed generic
computer components which are used to implement the claimed method are
well understood, routine, or conventional in the field. Here, the claim has
not been shown to be “significantly more” than the abstract idea.
For these above reasons the rejection of claim 1 is sustained. The
remaining claims are directed to similar subject matter and the rejection of
these claims is sustained for the same reasons given above.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Appellant argues that the rejection of claim 1 is improper because
the prior art fails to disclose the claim limitation for:
searching the real property assets in the data structure on
the first computing system based on search criteria using the
property investment analysis tool on the second computing
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system by calculating key investment indicators including net
operating income, capitalization rate, debt service ratio, cash
flow, cash-on-cash return, and return on investment from the
information in the database;
identifying the real property assets in the database on the
first computing system matching the search criteria for the key
investment indicators and rank ordering the identified real
property assets by a selected search criteria; and
selecting one of the identified real property assets and
displaying the key investment indicators and an investment
rating of the key investment indicators against established
ranges on the second computing system for one of the identified
real property assets.

(App. Br. 40).
In contrast, the Examiner has determined that the cited claim
limitation is disclosed by the “searching function” of Halpin and Tripp at
paragraphs 15–17, 19, 49, 67, 95, 347, 417, 735, 737, 739, 741 (Ans. 8, 9).
We agree with the Appellant. Here, elements of the specifically
claimed limitations for key investment indicators such as the capitalization
rate and debt service ratio are not disclosed or suggested by the citations to
Halpin and Tripp as listed above. Additionally, the citations fail to
specifically disclose that the display of the key indicators against the
established ranges is on the “second computing system”. Accordingly, the
rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims is not sustained.
The Appellant argues a similar limitation for both independent claims
7 and 14. These claims also recite display of key investment indicators on
the “second computing system” and the above citations to the prior art fail to
disclose this. Accordingly, the rejection of independent claims 7 and 14 and
their dependent claims is not sustained.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude that Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-
statutory subject matter.
We conclude that Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Halpin and Tripp.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
1–20 103 Halpin, Tripp 1–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED