Revere Metal Art Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 5, 1964

146 N.L.R.B. 253 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

REVERE METAL ART COMPANY, INC.
APPENDIX
253
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF GRUNDY MINING
COMPANY
Pursuant to a Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management
Relations Act, as amended , we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT instigate or participate in violence or threats against employees
of Grundy Mining Company to prevent them from meeting at Dunlap, Ten-
nessee, or elsewhere , or to prevent them from otherwise exercising their right
to organize , form, join, or assist Southern Labor Union or any other labor
organization.
• WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees of
Grundy Mining Company in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
All employees are free to become or refrain from becoming members of Southern
Labor Union or any other labor organization.
UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL No. 7244,
Labor Organization.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 528
Peachtree-Seventh Building , 50 Seventh Street, NE., Atlanta , Georgia, Telephone
No. 876-3311, Extension 5357, if they have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions.
Revere Metal Art Company, Inc. and Amalgamated Union
Local 5, Metal , Iron and Miscellaneous Workers, District 5
and Affiliated Unions. Case No. 2-CA-99348. March 5, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
- On November 5, 1963, .Trial Examiner George J. Bott issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Decision. There-
after, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a support-
ing brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act; the Board has 'delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [-Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Leedom and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
-at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The -Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the
.entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.
146 NLRB No. 26.
254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the
Trial Examiner.'
1 The Recommended Order is hereby amended by substituting for the first paragraph
therein the following paragraph
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders
that Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge of unfair labor practices filed on April 5, 1963, by Amalgamated
Union Local 5, Metal, Iron and Miscellaneous Workers, District 5 and Affiliated
Unions, herein called the Union, against Revere Metal Art Company, Inc., herein
called Respondent or Company, the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing dated May 28, 1963, alleging
that Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the Act.
Respondent filed an answer admitting certain allegations of the complaint but
denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a hear-
ing was held before Trial Examiner George J. Bott at New York, New York, on
August 28, 1963. All parties were represented at the hearing. Subsequent to the
hearing General Counsel filed a brief which I have considered.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is a New York corporation maintaining its principal office and place
of business in the city of New York where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale,
and distribution of electronic metal parts and related products. During the year
prior to the issuance of the complaint, which period is representative of Respond-
ent's annual operations, Respondent in the course and conduct of its business opera-
tions manufactured, sold, and distributed at its New York City plant, products
valued in excess of $50,000, of which products valued in excess of $50,000 were
shipped from said plant to States of the United States other than the State of
New York. Respondent concedes, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
HI. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain collectively with the Union
1. The appropriate unit and the Union's majority status
On January 3, 1963, the Regional Director for the Second Region of the National
Labor Relations Board, having previously conducted a secret-ballot election, certi-
fied that a majority of the employees of Respondent in an appropriate unit had
designated and selected the Union as their representative for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining. The unit found appropriate was: all production land mainte-
nance employees, shipping and receiving department employees, inspectors, and
leadmen of Respondent, employed at its New York City plant, exclusive of office
clerical and professional employees, guards, watchmen, and all supervisors as defined
in the Act. I find that since January 3, 1963, the Union has been the statutory
representative of the employees in the above appropriate unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
REVERE METAL ART COMPANY, INC . 255
2. Respondent 's refusal to sign a written agreement with the Union
embodying agreed-upon terms
Negotiations between the parties for a collectve-bargaining contract began some-
time in January 1963. Respondent was represented in bargaining by Harry Kason,
its president, and Leonard Kimmell, its attorney, and on at least one occasion,
Harry Kason's brother, who is is stockholder, also attended. The Union was rep-
resented by Benjamin Ross, its general manager, and Peter Curley, its attorney.
After several bargaining sessions, agreement was reached on all terms and condi-
tions of employment on or about January 31, 1963. It had been understood all
along, and it was agreed at the last meeting, that Attorney Kimmell would reduce
the agreed-upon terms to writing and send the contract to Ross, the Union's repre-
sentative , for signature.
On February 7, 1963, Kimmell forwarded the contract to Ross for signature.
Kimmell's covering letter stated that ". . . a final copy of the agreement negotiated
between your union and the Revere Metal Art Company, Inc." was enclosed.
Kimmell advised Ross to return the executed copy for signature by the Company
and that the copy signed by Kason would then be returned to Ross. A copy of
Kimmell's covering letter went to Harry Kason, Respondent's president, and Peter
Curley, the Union's attorney. Ross executed the contract and returned it to Kim-
mell on or about February 8, 1963. Kimmell immediately sent the executed copy
to Kason for his signature.
Sometime in the middle of February, during Ross' absence from the city, Milton
Shkop, vice president of the local union, telephoned Kimmell and asked him to
return an executed copy of the agreement. Kimmell told Shkop that Harry Kason
was angry because the Union had filed a matter with the New York State Media-
tion Board involving one Jiminez , an employee of Respondent , and would not sign
the contract, but, if the Union withdrew the case, Kimmell would see to it that
Shkop received an executed copy of the agreement. Shkop withdrew the matter
filed with the State board near the end of February and again telephoned Kimmell
about the unexecuted labor agreement. ^ Kimmell asked Shkop if he had with-
drawn the case at the State board, and when Shkop informed him that he had,
Kimmell said he had not been so advised by the State board but would telephone
and find out about it. Shkop had no other conversations with Kimmell and did not
talk with Kason. In his conversations with Kimmell the only reason given for delay
in execution of the contract was the filing of the case with the State board.
Peter Curley, the Union's attorney, also telephoned Kimmell in Ross' absence,
to inquire about the unsigned contract. Curley's first call was during the week of
February 10 to ask Kimmell where the contract was because representatives of the
Union had told Curley that it had been signed by Ross and sent back to Kimmell.
Kimmell expressed surprise that the Union had not received the agreement and
promised to get after Kason. - No mention was made about a charge in this con-
versation. Shortly thereafter, Curley telephoned Kimmell again on the same sub-
ject and this time Kimmell told him that Kason was annoyed about the matter
filed with the State board. Curley agreed to withdraw the case and Kimmell said
that Kason would then forward a signed copy of the agreement. In later conversa-
tions between Curley and Kimmell, Curley mentioned that employee Jiminez, who
had been discharged by Respondent and who was involved in the case filed with
the State board, was a "vocal" union member and could not be ignored. There
was also discussion of withdrawing the case from the State board and filing it with
.the National Labor Relations Board, and this was subsequently done. After a
charge was filed with the NLRB on February 26, 1963, Curley had another con-
versation with Kimmell about the unsigned agreement . In this conversation Kim-
mell told Curley that Kason was now annoyed because a charge had been filed
with the NLRB. Curley reminded Kimmell that he had said that a contract would
be forthcoming if the Jiminez case were withdrawn from the State board, but
Kimmell indicated that he was having difficulty, controlling his client.
Sometime in early March , Ross returned to his office after a vacation and tele-
phoned Kimmell about the contract . Kimmell told him that Kason was angry
about the charge now filed with the National Board . Ross argued that the Union
had withdrawn its case from the State board on Kimmell 's assurances that the
contract would be signed . He told Kimmell that the Union was waiting for dis-
missal of the charge since it had been advised by Board officials that it had no merit.
-Kimmell told Ross to telephone Kason and explain things to him.
744-670-65-vol. 146-18
256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Ross telephoned Kason and told him the charge was going to be dismissed, but
Kason told him "seeing is believing ." Nothing was said in this conversation with
Kason, or the previous ones with Kimmell , about any reason for not signing the
agreement except the pendency of proceedings before the State or National Board.
On March 27 , 1963 , the NLRB dismissed the charge involving Jiminez. Ross then
telephoned Kimmell and again asked for the contract but Kimmell told him to
telephone Kason , which he did . Kason told him that the contract was a good
contract but that he could not sign it because of the welfare payments which he
could not afford . Kason asked Ross to visit him to discuss the matter but Ross
protested that he had a full agreement with Respondent and would not negotiate
again.
On April 5 , 1963, Kimmell telephoned Curley and said Kason wanted to re-
negotiate the contract . Curley refused , stating that the Union had an agreement
and wanted a signed copy. That day the unfair labor practice charges in this
case were filed , and to date the Respondent has not executed the agreement pre-
pared by its counsel which embodied the agreement of the parties. Attorney
Kimmell wrote Curley on April 8 and referred to their conversation of April 5.
He stated that the "financial position of the company had taken a severe turn for
the worse since the parties reached tentative agreement on the terms of the bargain-
ing agreement . . ." and asked for renegotiation of "certain of the economic pro-
visions of the tentative agreement . . .
To this point there is, and can be, no dispute about the facts, but Harry Kason
testified and gave his reasons for withdrawing from his early agreement . He also
added a conversation with Ross, as early as February 8, in which he says he alerted
Ross to the Company's economic difficulties . Kason testified that his reasons for
not signing the agreement were basically economic and that he telephoned Ross
sometime before Ross' departure from the city to tell him that he could not sign
the contract because of declining sales. Ross left for his vacation on or about
February 10, 1963. He admitted that Kason spoke to him after the terms of the
contract were agreed to and before he left the city , but he denied that Kason said
he could not execute the agreement because of business conditions . He stated that
the conversation related only to the discharge of employee Jiminez and the filing
of the case with the State board . I credit Ross, and find that Kason did not raise
the question of his financial inability to meet the terms of the contract until Ross
telephoned him on or about the first of April to tell him that the Jiminez case had
been dismissed by the NLRB. The record in the case supports Ross. Kimmell,
Respondent 's attorney , stated on the record that the reason that the contract was
not signed initially was that Ross filed a case involving Jiminez with the State board.
In addition , Kason, under examination by his own counsel , testified that he called
Kimmell after the Union filed the Jiminez case to tell him he thought it was unfair
tactics. He told his counsel in this conversation that he would not sign the contract
until the Jiminez case was disposed of. No mention was made of his asserted
financial inability to meet the contract terms.
Finally, Shkop , Ross, and -Curley all testified without contradiction to conversations
with Kimmell during the weeks after February 7 (when he sent a copy of the con-
tract to Ross ). According to these witnesses , Kimmell never raised the question
of financial inability to abide by the contract terms until April 5 , when he talked to
Curley, the Union's attorney . I cannot believe that if Kason had informed Ross
on February 8 that the contract was financially burdensome he would not have so
advised- his attorney who could certainly have mentioned it to the union representa-
tives in his many conversations . To the contrary , Kimmell told them all that the
contract would be signed when the Jiminez case was withdrawn.
With respect to Respondent 's business difficulties as a reason for not signing the
contract , the record shows the following . Before April or May 1962 , Respondent
was engaged in the manufacture of cartridges for ballpoint pens. In April or May,
after the settlement of a patent infringement suit at a financial loss to it, Respondent
started in its present business with a relatively small complement of employees, but
-at the same location and with the same basic equipment . Respondent's monthly
sales are only about one third , of what they , were when it was in the ballpoint pen
business.
Kason testified that he explained his financial position to the Union during their
negotiations in late January 1963 , but that after some give-and-take in negotiations,
he felt he could "carry the burden and go along with a contract ... . He based
his judgment , he said , on his sales figures for the month of January . He testified
that within a few days , however, he decided that he could not meet the economic
REVERE METAL ART COMPANY, INC. 257
terms of the agreement and so informed Ross .' His judgment here was based on
his evaluation of February sales. The record does not reflect the February 1963
sales but sales in April 1963 were down from January. Respondent's sales in the
last 6 months of 1962 ranged from about $18,000 to $25,000.
Kason testified that he did not have sales figures for a particular month until a
few weeks after the month ended, but later he indicated that based on his experience
he might have a good idea during the month what sales would be for that month.
Since sales (shipments) are based on prior orders on the books, Kason also would
have an idea in one month what the sales would be in the next.
When negotiations between the Union and Respondent began in January 1963,
the Company had been engaged in its present line of business for about 8 months.
The patent infringement suit had been settled in April 1962, and its effects were
known to the Company. Kason knew what his sales had been for the last 8 months
and admitted that he had all those factors in mind when he negotiated and agreed
to the terms of a labor contract. I do not believe him in his testimony that he
agreed to the contract on the basis of the January sales only, and that a radical
change in circumstances made it impossible for him to execute the agreement. He
knew what the past year's experience had been and, as a good businessman, had
an idea of what February would bring. I find that he agreed to the labor contract
on the basis of the Company's condition as evidenced by the Company's records
for the period during which it manufactured electronic parts and that, in any case,
the record does not show as radical a difference in sales in 1963 as Kason would
have us believe. He admitted, for example, that April 1963 sales were greater than
November 1962 sales. Moreover he stated that between January 31 and Febru-
ary 10 he discussed the Company's economic position with his brother and decided
that "the tendency was down .. . As a result, he decided that he could not "go
along with a contract" such as he had agreed to. As indicated above, Harry
Kason's brother attended at least one of the negotiating meetings . The logical
inference is, therefore, that Kason decided to avoid the obligations of his agreement
with the Union almost immediately after negotiations were concluded.
3. Respondent's unilateral wage increases - .
The contract negotiated by the parties in late January 1963, and which Respond-
ent refused to execute, provided for a wage increase for all unit employees of 7
cents per hour for the first year of the agreement, 6 cents for the second, and 7
cents for the third. Respondent never put these increases into effect. -
On April 1, 1963, however, Respondent, without notifying the Union, granted
a 10 cents an hour increase to 13 employees and a 5 cents an hour increase to 5
others. The rest of the approximately 30 employees in the unit got no increases.
Harry- Kason testified that he granted these increases to quiet unrest in the plant.
Respondent's attorney, Kimmel], in his conversations with the Union's attorney
,during February and March 1963, did not advise or consult with him about the
possibility of wage increases and Harry Kason did not mention it to Ross in his
conversation with him in late March. Kason testified that he first told Ross about
the increases in May 1963.
4. Discussion and conclusions with respect to the alleged refusal to bargain
Without passing on General Counsel's first contention that Respondent's refusal
upon request to execute the contract-agreed to on or about January 31, 1963, is a
violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act regardless of Respondent' s reasons or
motivation, I find that the circumstances of this case establish that Respondent's
refusal to execute the agreement was in bad faith .2 Respondent entered into an
1 I have found above that this alleged conversation did not, take place as testified to
by Kason.
°For his first position of a.."per,se"-violation, General Counsel relies on H. J. Heinz
Company v N.L.R B., 311 ' U.S. 514, and the definition of bargaining in Section 8(d) of
'the Act'which includes the requirement of the "execution of a written contract incorporat-
ing any agreement reached if requested by either party" See, however, Justice
Frankfurter's separate opinion in N.L.R B v. Insurance Agents' International Union,
AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins. Co.),'361 U.S. 477, 509, in which he explains ' that, the Court
in Heinz regarded the refusal to execute the agreement as a manifestation that the,em-
ployer's state of mind was hostile to agreement with the union. 'But see also, N.L.R.B. v.
Benne Katz, d/b/a Williamsburg Steel Products Co., 369 U.S. 736, where the Court sus-
tained the Board in finding certain unilateral actions during negotiations as violations
of Section 8(a) (5) without an accompanying finding of overall subjective bad faith.
258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
agreement with the Union based upon a business experience of 8 months and after
at least five bargaining sessions during which Respondent's financial position was
discussed. Within a week, however, Harry Kason had talked to his brother and
changed his mind about the contract, although there was no radical change in
circumstances or nothing in existence that he could not have reasonably foreseen
Although Kason's final position at the hearing was that his refusal to sign was
basically for economic reasons, he and his attorney insisted for months to the
Union that the agreement would be signed if charges were withdrawn from the
State or National Labor Board.3 In my view, and I so find, Respondent's many
references in FebruLry and March of 1963 to the matters pending either before
the State or National Board were nothing more than a cloak to cover its intention
to avoid its obligation to bargain with the Union.
Finally, Respondent's grant of wage increases on April 1, 1963, without prior
notification to or discussion with the Union, and in an amount greater and differ-
ent from that already negotiated with the Union, is evidence of and reveals Respond-
ent's rejection of the principle of collective bargaining. At the time of the increases
Respondent had not only avoided its obligation to sign the agreement on the pretext
of the charges but was now avoiding its obligation to meet with the Union at all
about matters which vitally affected the employees. Moreover, Respondent's wage
increases were given at a time when Respondent was asserting that it could not
afford the Union's welfare plan agreed to in the earlier negotiations and reflect
adversely on Respondent's plea of inability to make the payments under the plan.
I find on the basis of Respondent's total course of conduct that its refusal to execute
the agreement negotiated by the parties on or about January 31, 1963, was in bad
faith and that by such conduct Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of \the
Act.
I also find that Respondent's bypassing of the Union and granting wage increases
to employees in the circumstances set forth above was an independent violation
of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act .4
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with its operations set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices
it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It will be recommended that, upon request of the Union, the Respondent sign the
agreement it agreed to on or about January 31, 1963. If no such request is made
by the Union, pit will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to bargain collec-
tively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees
in the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Revere Metal Art Company, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees, shipping and receiving department
employees, inspectors, and leadmen of the Company, employed at its New York
City plant, exclusive of office clerical and professional employees, guards, watch-
men, and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
S Respondent may not condition bargaining on the withdrawal of charges. Homer
Gregory Co., Inc., 123 NLRB 1842.
4 N.L.R.B. v. Benne Katz, supra.
REVERE METAL ART COMPANY, INC. 259
4. At all times since January 3, 1963, the Union has been, and now is, the ex-
clusive representative of the employees in the unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing on or about February 8, 1963, to execute'the agreement finally
agreed to by the parties on or about January 31, 1963, Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
6. By unilaterally granting wage increases to-certain employeesion April 1, 1963,
Respondent also violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
7. By the foregoing conduct, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7).
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is
recommended that Revere Metal Art Company, Inc., its officers, agents, succesors,
and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing, if requested to do so by the Union, to sign the agreement reached
with the Union on or about January 31, 1963, or, if no such request is made,
refusing, on request, to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement.
(b) Making or effecting any changes in rates of pay, wages, hours, or other terms
or conditions of employment of its employees in the appropriate unit without first
,giving notice to and consulting the statutory representative of its employees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the
extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(a) (3)
of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the.
policies of the Act:
(a) Upon the request of the Union, sign forthwith the agreement reached with
the Union on or about January 31, 1963. If no such request is made, upon request
of the Union, bargain collectively with it as the exclusive representative of the
employees in the above unit, and if an understanding is reached, embody such under-
standing in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its plant in New York, New York, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional
Director for the Second Region, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized
representative of Respondent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof and maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Second Region, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision 6 and Recommended Order what steps it
has taken to comply therewith.
5 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "A
Decision and Order" shall be substiuted for the words "The Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "A Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "A Decision
and Order."
e In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, you are notified that:
WE WILL, if requested to do so by Amalgamated Union Local 5, Metal, Iron
and Miscellaneous Workers, District 5 and Affiliated Unions, sign the agree-
ment reached with the above Union on or about January 31, 1963. If no such
request is made, we will, upon request, bargain collectively with the above-
named Union for the unit described herein with respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, and if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees, shipping and receiving de-
partment employees, inspectors, and leadmen employed at the Company's
New York City plant, exclusive of office clericals and professional em-
ployees, guards, watchmen, and all supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT make or effect any change in rates of pay, wages, hours, or
other terms or conditions of employment of our employees in the appropriate
unit without first giving notice to and consulting with the statutory representa-
tive of our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the
Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
REVERE METAL ART COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Fifth
Floor, Squibb Building, 745 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, Telephone No.
751-5500, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions.
Kingsport Press, Inc. and Local 175, Electrotypers Union, Inter-
national Stereotypers & Electrotypers Union of North Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO and Kingsport Printing Pressmen & Assistants'
Union No. 336, International Printing Pressmen & Assistants'
Union of North America, AFL-CIO and Progressive Lodge
No. 1694, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO
and Bindery Workers Union, Local No. 82, International
Brotherhood of Bookbinders, AFL-CIO, Petitioners.' Cases
Nos. 10-RC-5804, 10-RC-5805, 10-RC-5806, and 10-RC-5807.
March 5, 1964
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTIONS
Upon separate petitions duly filed under Section 9(c) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, a consolidated hearing was held before
'The several Petitioners are referred to herein as the Electrotypers, the Pressmen, the
Machinists, and the Bindery Workers, respectively. The Pressmen intervened in Cases
Nos. 10-RC-5806 and 10-RC-5807 on the basis of representative showings of interest,
i.e., In excess of 30 percent. For this reason, we shall treat the Pressmen as a cross-
petitioner in those two cases.
146 NLRB No. 136.