Renee Sands, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 29, 2004
01a43272_r (E.E.O.C. Nov. 29, 2004)

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01a43272_r

11-29-2004

Renee Sands, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Renee Sands v. United States Postal Service

01A43272

November 29, 2004

.

Renee Sands,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A43272

Agency No. 1C-284-0003-04

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final decision by

the agency dated March 9, 2004, finding that it was in compliance with

the terms of a December 3, 2003 settlement agreement. See 29 C.F.R. �

1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b); and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The December 3, 2003 settlement agreement provided that:

(1) A roster of the next day's assignment will be posted on a daily or

weekly basis.

(2) A lunch and break schedule will be set up for all employees.

Plan 5 briefings will be reinstituted to improve employee-management

communications.

(4) All employees will be treated equitably[,] with integrity and respect

by management personnel.

Ethics training will be provided for management personnel as soon as

possible[,] but not later than 120 days from the date of this agreement.

By an undated letter to the agency received on January 9, 2004,

complainant claimed that the agency breached the settlement agreement.

Regarding provision (1), complainant claimed that her supervisor failed

to create a roster of the next day's assignment and post it on a daily

or weekly basis. Complainant stated that she was still being assigned a

different machine each night when junior and non-postal career employees

have permanent partners on a permanent basis.

Regarding provision (2), complainant asserted that her supervisor failed

to set up a lunch schedule for all employees, and instead set up a lunch

schedule only for her on December 22, 2003, by giving her �a directive�

to take lunch at 1:30 a.m �no matter what.�

Regarding provision (4), complainant claimed that on December 19, 2003

her supervisor �violated her rights� by asking her to relieve 2 junior

employees for lunch,� and stated that singling her out from 51 employees

to monitor her every move was not equal, dignified or respectful.

Complainant also noted that other employees were given the option �in

the first Plan 5 briefing� referenced in provision (3), to either take

lunch at 1:30 or let the supervisor know if they did not want to go at

that time.

In its March 9, 2004 decision, the agency found no breach. The agency

first noted that provisions (1) and (2) did not have �begin� dates

because management could not ensure schedule and roster implementation,

and that complainant was told in mediation that she is as a mail

processing clerk with a principle assignment area of �automation,� and

that she does not bid on a certain machine.

Regarding provision (1), the agency found that complainant's supervisor

asked complainant who she would like to work with, and when she received

no response after two weeks, she was assigned to a partner on a particular

machine. The agency also stated that a copy of the daily roster has been

posted daily since mid-January. Regarding provision (2), the agency

stated that a manageable lunch and break schedule had been set up for

all employees provided that the operation is fully staffed; and that on

nights when there is short staff, employees take lunch based on volume

and scheduled dispatch time. The agency stated that on December 22,

2003, complainant did not agree with lunch based on operational needs,

so she was given a permanent lunch schedule no matter what machine

she was working on at the time. Regarding provision (4), the agency

determined that it had the right to move employees to accomplish the

mission of the agency, and that no seniority rights apply.

On appeal, complainant contends that no work schedules have been

implemented on a regular basis, except when it �suited their needs,�

and that �a daily roster has not been posted on a regular basis since

mid-January.�

The record contains a sample employee schedule or roster from February

5, 2004, and a statement from the Manager of complainant's facility

stating that although the sample version was created on February 5,

2004,�the actual assignments were made in Mid January.� Concerning

provision 2, the record contains a March 2, 2004 statement from the

same Manager indicating that, even though he was �down 17 employees� he

had �the preliminary [lunch break] schedule finished.� In a March 30,

2004, statement, the manager also asserted that on the day of asserted

breach �[t]he employees were given the option to take their lunch at 0130

. . . or later if they felt the 0130 lunch break would interfere with

their [work].� The Manager further revealed that [w]e don't schedule

lunch relief by seniority, we schedule by which machine needs to go to

lunch regardless of who is operating the machine.�

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement

agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at

any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.

The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a

contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules

of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further

held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,

not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.

Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795

(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard

to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally

relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states

that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,

its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument

without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery

Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).

The Commission determines that complainant did not show that the agency

breached the December 3, 2003 settlement agreement. Regarding provision

(1), which required a posting of �a roster of the next day's assignment,�

the record reflects that the agency began posting a roster or schedule

of employee assignments in mid-January 2004, and that the practice

has continued since that time. Although complainant denies the agency

claim that a daily roster has been posted on a regular basis on appeal,

she has failed to provide any evidence to substantiate her contentions.

We note that complainant has also failed to show the relevance of her

assertion (that she was assigned to a different machine each night),

to the requirement that the agency post a daily roster.

Regarding provision (2), that a �lunch and break schedule� be set for

all employees, we find that the agency had a lunch and break schedule

in place at the time of the alleged breach, that met the requirements

of the agreement. The record indicates that employees could take their

lunch at 0130, or choose a later time if their work made it necessary,

and that lunch relief was scheduled by the relative needs of each machine

operated. Complainant in essence asserts that a permanent set time for a

lunch break was necessary for all employees under the agreement; however,

nothing in the settlement agreement sets such limits on the flexibility

of the �schedule.� Moreover, the record also indicates that the agency

has subsequently set up a more predictable schedule for times when the

facility is fully staffed, while maintaining a flexible arrangement for

instances when it is not. We therefore find that complainant has failed

to show an agency breach of provision (2).

Finally, we find that provision (4), which requires agency management to

treat employees �equitably� and with �integrity and respect,� is too vague

to allow a determination as to whether the agency has actually complied

with its requisite terms. See Bruns v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01965395 (June 24, 1997). Furthermore, a promise by

an agency to treat a complainant equitably and respectfully does not

constitute consideration for withdrawal of a complaint, as it only

agrees to provide something to which complainant was already entitled.

See Cockrell v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01956101

(1996). We find that this provision of the settlement agreement is void

and unenforceable. Given that other consideration was exchanged through

other provisions of the agreement, we determine that the entire settlement

agreement is not invalid, but rather reformed without provision (4).

The agency's finding of no breach of the December 3, 2003 settlement

agreement is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

November 29, 2004

__________________

Date