Reginald Newton, Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 16, 2012
0120100593 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 16, 2012)

0120100593

02-16-2012

Reginald Newton, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southeast Area), Agency.




Reginald Newton,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Southeast Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120100593

Hearing No. 490-2009-00093X

Agency No. 4H-370-0146-08

DECISION

On November 23, 2009, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s

October 29, 2009, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity

(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,

29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to

29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission

AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order which found that Complainant failed

to show that he was subjected to discrimination based on his disability.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented in this case is whether Complainant was discriminated

against on the basis of his disability (physical) when on or around August

7, 2008, he was involuntary reassigned from the Frayser Station to the

Memphis P & DC (third-street plant) and his duty hours were changed from

5:00 a.m. through 1:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. through 10:00 p.m.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a limited duty Mail Clerk, Level 6 at the Agency’s Frayser Station

facility in Memphis, Tennessee. Complainant submitted a Form CA-17,

Duty Status Report, dated August 6, 2008, which indicated that he had

“permanent osteo-arthritis right knee.” His restrictions were listed

as: can lift/carry 10 lbs continuous and 25 lbs intermittently for two

(2) hours per day, sit four (4) to eight (8) hours per day and perform

hour of standing and walking and less than 1 hour of kneeling, bending

and twisting per day.

On September 26-27, 2007, a Function 4 audit was conducted by the

Southeast Area Office. At the time of the audit, the Frayser Station

had ten clerks on Staff. Upon the audit team’s review of the station,

information was inputted into the Automated Workforce Projection System

(AWPS). The AWPS data was then inputted into the Customer Service

Variance (CSV). The report from the CSV revealed that the Frayser Station

had sufficient mail volume to support staffing for only seven clerks.

All clerks were informed of the results of the audit. One of the Frayser

clerks retired and another bided out of the unit. According to the union

contract the excess employees were to be determined first according

to whether they were unassigned in the unit and then by seniority.

Complainant was an unassigned clerk and was, therefore, excessed in

order to get the unit within the balance recommended by the AWPS data.

Management indicated that 23 additional employees received involuntary

reassignments as a result of the Function 4 Audit.

Complainant was offered a position at the third-street plant as a

limited duty mail processing clerk. His duty hours were also changed.

Complainant contends that he along with other disabled employees were

transferred in order to cause them to retire.

On November 10, 2008, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

the Agency discriminated against him on the basis of disability when he

was involuntary reassigned from the Frayser station to the third-street

plant; and his duty hours were changed.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant

timely requested a hearing. The AJ assigned to the case determined

sua sponte after issuing an Order to Show Cause1 that the complaint did

not warrant a hearing and over the Complainant's objections, issued a

decision without a hearing on October 9, 2009.

The AJ determined that, even assuming arguendo that Complainant was

is a qualified individual with a disability, the Agency articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that

as a result of the findings of an audit, employees were reassigned

to areas where the work could support the number of employees and

the determination of who would be reassigned was based on seniority.

The AJ found that Complainant offered no evidence which indicated that

the Agency’s articulated reason was pretext for discrimination.

More importantly, however, the Complainant admitted that he had told no

supervisor or management official involved in his reassignment, during the

time in question, that he had a disability. He also admitted that he did

not know if the Postmaster was aware of his disability. The Postmaster

stated that she was not aware of Complainant’s physical condition at

the time the reassignment notice was signed. The AJ found that there

was no evidence in the record which suggested that discriminatory

animus was involved with the decision to reassign Complainant. The

Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding

that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to

discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant contends that there is no language in the report

that specifically says that clerks needed to be excised. Although the

Function 4 Review report made certain recommendations on how to improve

the operation of the stations and how to make clerks more efficient at

their work, there was no language in the report that recommended the

excessing of clerks. Further, Complainant maintains that the transfer

severally impacted his disability and his job. He explains that at

the third-street plant he has to constantly dodge fork lifts which is

difficult due to his physical limitations. He also maintains that he has

to walk long distances and climb stairs to get access to the break-room

and lockers. Complainant contends that there is a restriction on the

use of elevators.

Complainant also asserts that he is an individual with a disability as

supported by his limited duty position, which was offered to him by his

former supervisor and his Office of Worker’s Compensation claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal

and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them,

de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an

appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review

. . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.B. (November 9, 1999)

(providing that both the Administrative Judge’s determination to issue

a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, are subject to de

novo review). This essentially means that we should look at this case

with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or

reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and

legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional

discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal

employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9,

§ VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires

that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and

legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC

“review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including

any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its

decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and

its interpretation of the law”).We must first determine whether it

was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing

on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a

decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine

issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is

patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held

that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given

the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case,

there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, a court’s function is not to weigh the evidence

but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial.

Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at

the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn

in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is

“genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder

could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103,

105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential

to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally,

an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing

unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given

(1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing,

(2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts,

(3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance

to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to

the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment “where the

[party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover

information that is essential to his opposition.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge

must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary

to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing.

Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge

could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to

a motion for a decision without a hearing). In the instant complaint,

we find that a decision without a hearing was properly issued as there

are no material facts at issue in this case.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In the instant case, the Commission finds that even if we assume

arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of

disability discrimination, we find the Agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, namely, that as a result of

the findings of an audit, employees were reassigned to areas where the

work could support the number of employees; and that reassignments were

based on seniority. Therefore, we find that the record indicates that

Complainant was reassigned because he was the clerk with lowest seniority.

We also find that Complainant has not presented nor does the record

support his argument that he was reassigned because of his disability.

The record evidence shows that with respect to the clerk craft, the

three employees that were reassigned were chosen based on seniority.

The record also shows that twenty-three other employees were reassigned

due to the results of the audit. We find that no evidence was offered

which indicates that only employees with disabilities were reassigned. In

fact, Complainant listed only one other employee with a disability, other

than himself, who was reassigned; and that employee was from another

craft. Additionally, we note that the AWPS determined the number of

employees that needed to be reassigned. The record also indicates that

the managers who approved Complainant’s reassignment were not aware

of his disability. We find that Complainant has failed to show that

the Agency’s articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were

pretext for discrimination.2

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on

appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM

the Agency’s final action which found that Complainant failed to

demonstrate that he was subjected to discrimination as was alleged.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

__2/16/12________________

Date

1 The AJ found that Complainant was less than forthcoming during the

investigation; therefore the Order to Show Cause was issued.

2 With respect to Complainant’s contentions on appeal, wherein

Complainant maintains that he is experiencing hardship in his current

position due to his disability, Complainant is advised that he may

request a reasonable accommodation.

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0120100593

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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