Regency Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation Center

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 30, 2006

347 N.L.R.B. 1143 (N.L.R.B. 2006)

REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER
347 NLRB No. 106
1143
Regency Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation Center
and SEIU 1199 New Jersey Health Care Union1
and Local 300s, Production Service & Sales Dis-
trict Council, a/w United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union.2 Case 22–CA–
26231
August 30, 2006
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND WALSH
On August 5, 2005, Administrative Law Judge Steven
Davis issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel
filed a brief in support of the judge’s decision, and the
Charging Party, SEIU 1199 New Jersey Health Care
Union (SEIU 1199) filed an answering brief to the Re-
spondent’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record in
light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm
the judge’s rulings, findings,3 and conclusions as modi-
fied, and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.4
The judge found, among other things, that the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by failing
to grant an April 1, 2004 wage increase to employees
Belinda Walling, Amarjeed Kaur, and Norma Harvey
because those employees had not signed Local 300s
membership and dues-checkoff authorizations. The
judge rejected the Respondent’s affirmative defense that
this allegation was time-barred by Section 10(b) of the
Act. Contrary to the judge, we find merit in the Respon-
dent’s 10(b) defense, and we dismiss this allegation.

1 We have amended the caption to reflect the disaffiliation of the
Service Employees International Union from the AFL–CIO effective
July 25, 2005.
2 We have further amended the caption to reflect the disaffiliation of
the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union from
the AFL–CIO effective July 29, 2005.
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
4 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order and substitute a
new notice to reflect: (a) our reversal of the 8(a)(3) finding that the
Respondent unlawfully denied an April 2004 wage increase to three
employees, discussed infra; and (b) that employees who voluntarily
joined Local 300s prior to January 8, 2004, are not entitled to reim-
bursement of their dues and fees. See, e.g., Dairyland USA Corp., 347
NLRB No. 30, slip op. at 5 (2006); Elmhurst Care Center, 345 NLRB
No. 98, slip op. at 7 (2005).
The Charging Party, SEIU 1199, filed its original
charge on February 19, 2004, alleging that, since January
9, 2004, the Respondent recognized Local 300s at a time
when that union had not obtained authorization cards
from a majority of the unit employees. On September
30, 2004, SEIU 1199 filed its first amended charge addi-
tionally alleging that, on January 9, 2004, the Respon-
dent entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with
Local 300s that contained a union-security clause at a
time when Local 300s did not represent a majority of the
unit employees. The complaint, which also issued on
September 30, 2004, contained both of these allegations.
SEIU 1199 filed a second amended charge during the
hearing on January 14, 2005, alleging that on and after
various dates in January 2004, the Respondent condi-
tioned the employees’ receipt of wages and bonuses on
employees’ signing forms in support of Local 300s.
When the General Counsel introduced this second
amended charge into the record, he simultaneously orally
amended the complaint to allege that, in April 2004, the
Respondent unlawfully failed to pay contractually-
required wage increases to employees who had not
signed union membership and dues-checkoff authoriza-
tion cards.
Applying the Redd-I test (Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB
1115 (1988)), to the second amended charge (as clarified
in the amended complaint), we find that the April 2004
denial-of-wage-increase allegation was not closely re-
lated to a timely filed charge.5 Accordingly, it cannot
survive the Respondent’s 10(b)-based challenge.
With respect to the first Redd-I factor, we find that the
otherwise untimely allegations of the second amended
charge do not involve the same legal theory as the allega-
tions in the timely charge. The legal theory behind the
timely filed allegation of unlawful recognition was that the
Respondent recognized Local 300s at a time when the em-
ployees had not selected it as their collective-bargaining
representative. In contrast, the alleged unlawful denial of a
wage increase to three employees rests on a legal theory of
discriminatory motive or disparate treatment.6

5 Under Redd-I, in determining whether an amended charge relates
back to an earlier charge for 10(b) purposes, the Board applies a three-
pronged “closely related” test. See Redd-I, 290 NLRB at 1118. “The
Board considers (1) whether the otherwise untimely allegations of the
amended charge involve the same legal theory as the allegations in the
timely charge; (2) whether the otherwise untimely allegations of the
amended charge arise from the same factual situation or sequence of
events as the allegations in the timely charge; and (3) whether a re-
spondent would raise the same or similar defenses to both the untimely
and timely charge allegations.” WGE Federal Credit Union, 346
NLRB No. 87, slip op. at 2 (2006).
6 See, e.g., WGE Federal Credit Union, supra, where the Board
found that different legal theories underlay the timely 8(a)(3) discharge
allegation and the subsequent allegation that the employer violated Sec.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1144
Considering the second Redd-I factor, we find, con-
trary to the judge, that the wage-increase allegation does
not arise from the same set of facts as the original
charge. The failure to provide the wage increase oc-
curred on April 1, 2004, almost 3 months after the Re-
spondent unlawfully entered into the collective-
bargaining agreement with Local 300s. It affected only
three employees, while the unlawful recognition affected
the entire unit.7 Finally, the failure to provide the wage
increase was not part of the Respondent’s overall scheme
to extend unlawful recognition and engage in a collec-
tive-bargaining relationship with a minority union, as
were the earlier allegations.
With respect to the third Redd-I factor, we find that the
Respondent would not raise the same or similar defenses
to the wage-increase allegation as it would to the timely-
filed charges. The Respondent’s defense to the original
charge and, indeed, to the first amended charge, is that it
recognized Local 300s only after 300s attained majority
status. As to the wage-increase allegation, however, the
defenses might include whether the alleged discriminatees
were actually denied the wage increase, or whether there is
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the Re-
spondent’s failure to provide it to them; indeed, the Re-
spondent has asserted both of those defenses. Thus, we
conclude that the defenses to the wage-increase allegation
differ from the defenses to the earlier allegations.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the second
amended charge is not closely related to any timely filed
charge. Therefore, we reverse the judge and dismiss the
allegation that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) by failing to provide Belinda Walling, Amarjeed
Kaur, and Norma Harvey with the April 1, 2004 wage
increase because they had not yet joined Local 300s.
On the other hand, we find no merit to the Respon-
dent’s 10(b) defense to the other allegations. Specifi-
cally, we adopt the judge’s finding that the original
charge was timely, even though the Respondent initially
recognized Local 300s in May 2003, more than 6 months
before the original charge. The charge was filed by
SEIU 1199. We need not pass on the issue of whether
SEIU 1199 or the employees are the “adversely affected

8(a)(1) by threatening potential postelection job losses. The Board
explained that the timely charge focused on the employer’s discrimina-
tory motivation, while the later charge rested on a legal theory of
unlawful interference with Sec. 7 rights.
7 See Ajoma Lumber, Inc., 345 NLRB No. 19, slip op. at 3 (2005)
(events found not to arise from same set of facts, where the event al-
leged in the timely-filed charge was specifically limited to five named
employees, while the later-alleged event affected an entire shift).
party” for purposes of 10(b) notice.8 The record estab-
lishes that the Respondent intentionally concealed its
recognition of Local 300s, and that neither its employees
nor SEIU 1199 learned of that recognition until after
January 8, 2004. The original charge was filed within 6
months of that date.
As to the 8(a)(3) allegation based on the Respondent’s
entering into a contract with Local 300s containing a
union-security clause, the judge found, and we agree,
that this additional allegation was closely related to the
original charge, and therefore was not barred by Section
10(b).9 The allegation concerning the union-security
clause involves the same legal theory as the initial charge
(entering into a collective-bargaining relationship with a
minority union), arises from the same sequence of events
(the collective-bargaining agreement flows from the
unlawful recognition), and the Respondent’s defense to
both allegations would be the same (that it lawfully rec-
ognized Local 300s as the exclusive representative of the
Respondent’s employees).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Regency
Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Dover, New
Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order as modified.
1. Delete paragraph 1(b) and reletter the subsequent
paragraph.
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b):
“(b) Reimburse, with interest, all of its former and pre-
sent unit employees for fees and moneys deducted from
their pay pursuant to the union-security and dues-
checkoff clauses of the contract dated January 8, 2004.
However, reimbursement does not extend to those em-
ployees who voluntarily joined and became members of
Local 300s prior to January 8, 2004.”
3. Delete paragraph 2(c) and reletter the subsequent
paragraphs.
4. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

8 See Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 321 NLRB 924 (1996), enfd. sub
nom. Machinists District Lodge 64 v. NLRB, 130 F.3d 1083, 1087
(D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 926 (1998).
9 Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB at 1118.
REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 1145
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT recognize Local 300s, Production Ser-
vice & Sales District Council a/w United Food and
Commercial Workers International Union, as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of our employ-
ees and enter into, maintain or enforce a collective-
bargaining agreement containing union-security and
dues-checkoff provisions with Local 300s when Local
300s does not represent a majority of our employees in
the following unit, unless and until such time as Local
300s shall have been certified by the Board:
All full time and regular part time service employees,
maintenance employees and LPNs employed by us at
our Dover, New Jersey facility, but excluding all offi-
cers, managerial and professional employees, confiden-
tial employees, temporary employees, all other em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
set forth above.
WE WILL withdraw and withhold recognition from Lo-
cal 300s as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees in the above unit, and cease maintaining or
giving effect to any collective-bargaining agreement with
it, or any modifications, renewals, or extensions thereof,
concerning the employees in the above unit, unless and
until such time as Local 300s shall have been certified by
the Board as your exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative, provided, however, that nothing herein shall
require us to withdraw or eliminate any wage increase,
benefit, or other terms and conditions of employment
which may have been established pursuant to any such
agreement.
WE WILL reimburse, with interest, all of our former
and present unit employees for fees and moneys de-
ducted from their pay pursuant to the union-security and
dues-checkoff clauses of the contract dated January 8,
2004. However, reimbursement does not extend to those
employees who voluntarily joined and became members
of Local 300s prior to January 8, 2004.
REGENCY GRANDE NURSING &
REHABILITATION CENTER
Bernard Mintz, Robert Gonzales, and Brian Caufield, Esqs., for
the General Counsel.
Morris Tuchman, Esq., of New York, New York, for the Re-
spondent.
Ellen Dichner, Esq. (Gladstein, Reif & Meginnis, LLP), of New
York, New York, for the Charging Party.
Bruce Cooper, Esq. (Haydon, Straci & Cooper, Esqs.), of New
York, New York, for the Party in Interest.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was
tried in Dover, New Jersey on 12 days between January 5 and
March 11, 2005. The original charge and a first amended
charge were filed by SEIU 1199, New Jersey Health Care Un-
ion, AFL–CIO (SEIU 1199) on February 19, and September
30, 2004, respectively, and a complaint was issued on Septem-
ber 30, 2004 against Regency Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation
Center (Respondent or Regency). Local 300s, Production Ser-
vice & Sales District Council a/w United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union, AFL–CIO (Local 300s) was
named as a Party in Interest. On January 14, 2005, a second
amended charge was filed by SEIU 1199.
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that on
about May 22, 2003 the Respondent unlawfully granted recog-
nition to Local 300s as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of a unit of service, maintenance and licensed
practical nurses, and on about January 8, 2004, executed a con-
tract with that union containing union-security and dues-
checkoff provisions notwithstanding that Local 300s did not
represent a majority of the employees in that unit. The com-
plaint further alleges that since on about April, 2004, the Re-
spondent failed to grant a 3-percent wage increase required by
the collective-bargaining agreement to employees who had not
signed membership and dues-checkoff authorizations on behalf
of Local 300s.
The Respondent and Local 300s filed answers denying the
material allegations of the complaint. Both answers assert as
affirmative defenses that Section 10(b) of the Act requires dis-
missal of the complaint since the charges were untimely filed.
The Respondent’s answer also asserts that the Board must defer
to the arbitration award which found that Local 300s repre-
sented a majority of the unit employees. Prior to the opening of
the hearing, the Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment with the Board, demanding dismissal of the complaint
based on the above affirmative defenses. On December 8,
2004, the Board denied the motion stating that the Respondent
“has failed to establish that there are no genuine issues of mate-
rial fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1146
by the General Counsel, SEIU 1199, and the Respondent, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation having an office and place of
business in Dover, New Jersey, has been engaged in the opera-
tion of a nursing home and rehabilitation center. During the
past 12 months the Respondent derived gross revenue in excess
of $100,000, and purchased goods valued in excess of $5000
directly from points outside New Jersey. The Respondent ad-
mits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and
a health care institution within the meaning of Section 2(14) of
the Act, and that SEIU 1199 and Local 300s are labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
In about May or June, 2002, David Gross began operating a
management company in behalf of the Dover Christian Nursing
Home, a nonunion facility. Dover Christian ceased operating
the facility on December 31, 2002, and the Respondent was
issued a license to immediately begin operating the facility,
which is a long-term care facility consisting of 135 long-term
care and 20 residential health care beds. Gross is the president
of the Respondent. Ray Crossen, the administrator for Dover
Christian, remained employed by the Respondent in that capac-
ity until about April, 2003, when Joseph Olszewski became the
administrator. Gross also owns two other nursing homes in
New Jersey, both of which have contracts with SEIU 1199.
B. The Organizing Drive and the Authorization Cards
James Robinson, the president of Local 300s, has been affili-
ated with that union since 1973, and has been its president for
10 years. Local 300s has collective-bargaining agreements with
about 44 employers, three of which are nursing homes and two
are assisted living centers.
According to Robinson, the Local 300s campaign was
prompted by an employee who works at Confidence Manage-
ment, a company which does the laundry at the two other nurs-
ing homes owned by Gross. The laundry workers are repre-
sented by Local 300s, and one told an official of Local 300s
that Gross was opening a nonunion home in Dover.
Robinson testified that he first appeared at the Respondent’s
facility in mid-February 2003, but did not begin organizing
there until late February or early March 2003. His pretrial affi-
davit contradicts this testimony somewhat in that it states that
organizing did not begin until about mid-March. In the begin-
ning, he was present at Regency every other day, and then
every few days, always accompanied by other union agents. In
addition to Robinson, three other union agents were involved in
the organization of Regency, but there was no employee orga-
nizing committee. Robinson stated that a Local 300s agent was
present outside the facility about once every 3 days through
April 2003. Their practice was to arrive in the morning for the
incoming shift and outgoing late night shift, and then attempt to
return in the afternoon for the incoming evening shift. During
this period of organization, Local 300s agents distributed leaf-
lets, flyers and authorization cards in the form of a postage-paid
postcard.
Gross testified that in late winter or early spring 2003, ad-
ministrator Crossen told him that union agents were distribut-
ing cards and leaflets outside the building in an attempt to or-
ganize the employees. Gross determined, based on literature he
was given by a supervisor, that Local 300s was organizing.
Gross saw the union agents, including Robinson, outside the
building for about 1 month. Crossen told Gross that when orga-
nizing activity occurred in the past, Dover Christian cam-
paigned against the union. Gross told his department heads not
to permit access to the property to the union agents. Gross
knew that he had to be very careful if he spoke to employees
about unionization, so he decided that the Respondent would be
“silent” on the issue, and not present an antiunion campaign,
asserting that this was a “free country” and he could not tell his
employees what to do.
On April 22, 2003, Robinson wrote to the Respondent, stat-
ing that Local 300s has been actively engaged in organizing its
employees. Robinson denied otherwise having any contact with
the Respondent during the organizing drive, except being told
that he could not enter the Respondent’s property.
In support of Robinson’s testimony concerning the organiz-
ing drive of Local 300s, the Respondent adduced testimony
concerning organizational activity in and around the facility
during the time that Local 300s distributed literature from Feb-
ruary to April, 2003. Thirty employees heard conversations in
the facility during the first half of 2003 concerning the issue of
a union’s attempting to organize the employees, and 36 work-
ers, some of whom are the same as those who heard such con-
versations, saw people outside the building soliciting member-
ship in a union at such time. One employee, Juanito Pasion,
stated that he saw employees signing papers outside the build-
ing, and Nora Aguado testified that certain unnamed employees
told her that they signed cards and mailed them to a union.
As further proof of Local 300s’ organizational activity,
Gross testified that in late spring or early summer, 2003, he and
Administrator Olszewski received requests for raises from cer-
tain unnamed employees. The workers were told that the Re-
spondent was negotiating a contract with a union and all raises
had to be negotiated with the union and none could be given
until the contract was signed. This testimony was somewhat
corroborated by Kathy Rohde, the Union’s shop steward. She
stated that in the spring and summer of 2003 she heard rumors
that a union would represent the employees. In September or
early October 2003, she asked Olszewski a question on some
matter and he replied that it depended on what the contract
provided which had to be discussed with the union, and “that
could change if we get the union.” He then asked Pam Alvarez,
the nursing director “the union’s in, right?” Alvarez said it was.
Nancy Groman testified that in about April 2003, she asked
Olszewski for a raise based on her promotion. He replied that
he could not get her any more money because “there was union
activity going on.”
Robinson stated that the union obtained a total of 68 signed
authorization cards from employees at Regency from February
or March to April, 2003. He testified that during the 2-month
REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 1147
period of organizing, Local 300s agents received only three or
four signed cards in person at the facility. The remainder, about
64 or 65 cards, were mailed to that union.
Apparently the authorization card was attached to a ques-
tionnaire which asked employees only to indicate which of 23
items they were “most interested in” so that Local 300s “may
start research and development programs to assist us to prepare
for the time when we are able to start negotiations with your
employer.” The questionnaire asked the workers to fill it out
and return it and the attached authorization card to the Union.
Despite the fact that 64 or 65 cards were allegedly returned by
mail to the union, no completed questionnaires were received
in evidence. Robinson’s testimony that he received some re-
sponses, but did not retain them is doubtful since he stated that
the questionnaire asked employees to list their current benefits.
However, the questionnaire asked only what the employees
wanted in negotiations with the Respondent, and not their cur-
rent benefits.
Robinson stated that he and his agents were informed by
employees that there were about 120 employees in the unit, and
on May 5, Robinson wrote to the Respondent, advising it that
Local 300s represented a majority of its employees, and re-
questing that its representative call within 24 hours to discuss a
contract.
In contrast to Robinson’s testimony concerning Local 300s’s
organizing efforts, testimony was received from 81 unit em-
ployees who were employed on May 22, 2003 when the Re-
spondent recognized Local 300s. Of those witnesses, 74 credi-
bly testified that they did not sign a card for Local 300s prior to
that Union’s recognition, or indeed at any time before January,
2004.1 Two additional witnesses testified that they could not
recall signing a card for that Union.2 Only one employee, Aida
Basualto, testified that she signed a card before Local 300s was
recognized, and as set forth below there is some question about
whether she actually signed a card before May 22, 2003.3 The

1 Clara Raab Contreras, Shila Smith, Mauricio Gonzalez, Paola
Mella, Leatha Gatling, Vanessa Cuartes, Shaun Dindial, Minnie Conk-
lin, Joshua Waer, Michele Meikle, Sheena Joy, Dana Spangler, Steven
Shann, Nattie Thomas, Ana Camacho, Manuela Figueroa, Jose Omar
Fauste, Andrea Kimbrough, Eliana Muneton, Elvira Tavera, Sebastian
Gimenez, Rosana Coppola, Francisco Castro, Lucrecia Artigas, Carlos
Balbuena, Maria Carmona, Harry Smith, Carole Carr, Michele Harris,
Shenette Williams, Belinda Walling, Frieda Palomba, Patricia Secola,
Carole Gardner, Robin McCord, Mary Walker, Elizabeth Barbounis,
Helen Phelan, Patricia Bendsen, Eleanor Augustine, Angela Zaretskie,
Florie Archer, Victoria Montenegro, Amarjeed Kaur, Krystal Lloyd,
Alnora Sturdivant Finlayson, Jaclyn Sgro, Francisco Valentin, Juana
Greta Heath Morillo, Jose Sanchez, Rosita Romero, Maria Cocio,
Maria Oulds, Michael Gibbons, Anna Ferreira, Cristal Estudillo, Kerry
Hickenbottom, Rita Noel, Carmen Montanez, Alba Franco, Nilsa
Ayala, Norma Harvey, Johanna Rudas, Marion Culleny, Kelly Arm-
strong, Juanito Pasion, Azra Ali, Vivienne Waysome, Selina Akther,
Kathy Rohde, Marion Roberts, Heather McQuown, Claudia Cortes,
Ella McKlin, Donna Nunn, Nora Aguado, Aida Basualto, Claudia
Montoya Agrensoni, Nancy Groman, and Belinda Walling.
2 Swalaha Mohamed and Mary Terry.
3 The testimony of Juana Greta Heath Morillo was confusing on this
issue. She first testified that in the first half of 2003, she signed for a
union whose name she does not recall, possibly “311,” but then said
five remaining employees were not asked directly whether they
signed a card for Local 300s.4 As set forth below, following the
recognition of Local 300s, Robinson threw out the cards re-
ceived by employees, and none were received in evidence.
Accordingly, not one employee unequivocally testified that he
or she signed a card for Local 300s before that union was rec-
ognized on May 22.
In addition, 38 employees testified that they were unaware of
Local 300s’s presence prior to January, 2004, 27 workers, some
of whom are the same as those who were unaware of Local
300, stated that they did not see any union organizers outside
the building soliciting membership in a union, and 28 workers
did not recall seeing such people. Twenty workers heard no
conversations in the facility about a union trying to organize
employees during that period of time, and 15 could not recall if
there were such discussions.
Most of the employees who testified that they saw a union
organizing in the first part of 2003, or heard conversations re-
garding a union at that time, were either not asked which union
they were referring to, did not know which union was organiz-
ing at that time, or simply did not identify which union was
organizing.
The following evidence relates to questions whether em-
ployees saw a union organizing in the first half of 2003. Castro
testified that SEIU 1199 was organizing at that time, and not
Local 300s. Valentin stated that in April or May, 2003 or in late
2003, SEIU 1199 distributed cards outside the building. He
denied any knowledge of Local 300s prior to January 9, 2004.
Morillo stated that she signed a paper for “311,” but then noted
that she signed such a document in 2004. Romero stated that
she was given a card from SEIU 1199. Oulds stated that before
Regency Grande purchased the facility, SEIU 1199 tried to
organize the employees, but that after the sale, another union,
not 1199, tried to distribute papers and become the employees’
representative. She said that probably there were two unions at
that time. Montanez stated that he saw Local 300s outside the
facility, and perhaps SEIU 1199 was there also. Harvey stated
that SEIU 1199 was outside the building in the summer of
2003, following the purchase by the Respondent. Armstrong
believed that employees were talking about Local 300s, but is
not certain, and he was given a postage-paid postcard by the
agents. Similarly, after the purchase by the Respondent, Way-
some was given a postage-paid postcard by Local 300s agents.
Rohde saw the same Local 300s agents in the facility in Janu-
ary, 2004 that she saw in the first half of 2003, speaking out-
side to employees. Roberts said that she received a card in late
2003 which was from either Local 300s or SEIU 1199, but
believes that it was for SEIU 1199. She noted that at the time of
the purchase of the facility by the Respondent, there was first
one union organizing and then another. She did not see two
unions organizing at the same time. Aguado was told by other
unnamed employees that they mailed back cards to a union, but
she did not know which union it was. Montoya stated that

she believes that she signed in about 2004. Then she testified that in the
first half of 2003 no one gave her a card outside the facility.
4 Carole Carr, Minnie Conklin, Claudia Cortes, and Kerry Hicken-
bottom.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1148
shortly after the purchase of the facility in early January, 2003,
Local 300s agents solicited employees outside the building, and
that there were two unions organizing at that time. Groman
could not recall the name of the union which solicited employ-
ees at that time, but believed that it was a grocery store union
and Robinson was involved in the solicitation. She also stated
that when Robinson was introduced at the January 9 meeting,
she recognized him as being the union agent who was distribut-
ing literature the previous winter. She further stated that SEIU
1199 began organizing after Local 300s.
Robinson could recall the name of only one employee, Aida
Basualto, who signed a card for Local 300s before that union was
recognized. Basualto testified that she signed two cards for Local
300s in late winter or early spring 2003 and mailed at least one of
them to that union. Even this is in doubt, however, since a card
signed by her and received in evidence was dated December 8,
2003.5 She stated that she signed another card either the day
before or the day after she signed the December 8 card. Thus,
some doubt is cast on her testimony that she signed a card for
Local 300s before that union was recognized in May 2003. Rob-
inson did not ask his other organizers if they remembered the
names of any employees who signed cards for Local 300s.
The Respondent adduced much testimony concerning affida-
vits and petitions signed by employees after the contract was
executed. The affidavit prepared by counsel for the general
counsel, asked the following questions, among others: “Did
you sign a card for Local 300s sometime in about the spring of
2003 (on or before May 21, 2003) authorizing it to represent
you for the purpose of collective bargaining?” A petition, circu-
lated by employees or SEIU 1199 agents, stated: “Before Janu-
ary 1, 2004, I had not signed a Union authorization card or any
other document selecting Local 300s, UFCW as my union rep-
resentative.”6
This evidence was adduced in order to prove that SEIU 1199
pressured employees into signing the petition saying that they
did not sign a card for Local 300s, and that the Board agent had
an “agenda” which included a belief, before fully investigating
the case, that the Respondent deliberately recognized a minor-
ity union. At most, the SEIU 1199 solicitors said that the em-
ployees would get better benefits if that union represented the
employees. Regarding the Board agents, one was quoted by
employee Williams as saying that the “employees . . . fighting
against the union . . . because they’re not being treated right. So
they don’t want . . . that union . . . and “trying to get the union
out.” None of these comments, or other matters relied on the
Respondent regarding this issue rise to a level that it could be
said that employee testimony was compromised. Indeed, there
was absolutely no evidence that the Board agents conducted
themselves in any way other than the highest standard expected
of government attorneys.
Employees who may have been confused by questioning
concerning the petition and affidavit nevertheless testified at
the hearing that they did not sign cards for Local 300s. No

5 GC Exhibit 63.
6 Castro, Sanchez, and Valentin testified that office clerk Lampron
gave them the petition to sign. Such testimony is not believable.
physical or other credible evidence was presented that they did,
and I credit their testimony.
C. The Card Count
Sometime after May 5, 2003, Robinson told Gross that they
should obtain an arbitrator who could confirm or reject the
union’s claim of majority status. Gross testified that he did not
believe that he was aware that the Respondent had a right to
insist on a Board election to prove the union’s claim.
On May 21, a card count was conducted by arbitrator Jay
Nadelbach, pursuant to a written agreement requested by the
arbitrator. The agreement provides that the arbitrator will de-
termine the claim of Local 300s to represent a majority of em-
ployees in the service and maintenance unit. The licensed prac-
tical nurses (LPNs) were not separately mentioned. Robinson
considered those workers to be part of the service and mainte-
nance unit. Nadelbach was selected because he was known to
the parties. He had done a prior card count for Local 300s and
for Morris Tuchman, the Respondent’s attorney. Robinson
testified that he presented 68 signed authorization cards to the
arbitrator.
Prior to the card count, Robinson did not receive W-4 docu-
ments or any other papers which bore the signatures of em-
ployees. He denied that either he or any Local 300s representa-
tive signed any of the cards which were presented to the arbi-
trator. Robinson did not have a list of employee names prior to
the card count, and did not know how many names were on the
payroll. However, prior to the count, he and Gross discussed
the job titles of the workers employed at the Respondent.
According to the parties, the arbitrator requested and was
given W-4 forms signed by employees, and a list of all em-
ployees employed at the facility, with notations as to who were
supervisors. The list was prepared by payroll clerk Connie
Lampron from the last payroll preceding May 21, which would
have been the payroll period ending May 10. The list which
was presented to the arbitrator was not retained, so the record
does not contain the actual document that the arbitrator used in
the card count.
A recreated list was prepared by Lampron for this hearing.
The first list she prepared was for a later payroll period, which
was thus was not in existence at the time of the card check.
When informed of this error, she prepared a second recreated
list, containing the names of 117 unit employees, but contained
certain errors. Thus, Paulette Tammone was included in the
unit although it was stipulated that she should have been ex-
cluded as a professional employee. In addition, that list does
not contain the name of Alnora Sturdivant Finlayson, a unit
employee, or Juanito Pasion. He was excluded from the unit,
but at hearing, the parties stipulated that he should have been
included in the unit.
Nadelbach worked alone for about 3 to 3-1/2 hours, and then
told Robinson that Local 300s had proven its majority status.
Robinson then “discretely” told some employees he saw in the
building at that time whose names he cannot remember, that
following a card count his union represented a majority of em-
ployees, an arbitrator had just certified it, and negotiations
would begin as soon as possible.
REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 1149
On May 22, the arbitrator issued the following Award, in
relevant part:
The Union furnished me with the signed authorization cards it
had obtained from bargaining unit employees authorizing it to
represent them for the purposes of collective bargaining. And
the Employer furnished me with a complete set of W-4 forms
containing the signatures of all eligible employees.
In accordance with the parties’ agreement and with the au-
thority vested in me, I then compared the signatures on the
cards provided by the Union with the signatures on the W-4
forms. Based upon that comparison, I hereby certify that the
Union has been selected by a majority of eligible employees
as their collective bargaining representative.
I hereby further direct the Employer to recognize the Union as
the collective bargaining representative for the agreed upon
bargaining unit.
About 6 months after the card count, in about late November
2003, Robinson threw out the signed cards, before substantial
progress had been made in negotiations, because he believed
that they were no longer needed. He was advised by his attor-
ney that if no charge was filed or issues raised regarding the
cards within 6 months of recognition they were no longer
needed.
Robinson conceded that when he received the charge in the
instant case which was filed on February 19, 2004, and which
alleged that the Respondent recognized Local 300s at a time
when that union “had not obtained authorization cards from a
noncoerced majority of employees”, he knew that the question
as to whether Local 300s had obtained cards from a majority of
employees was a “significant issue.” Nevertheless, following
the filing of the charge he did not attempt to have any employ-
ees verify that they had signed cards on or before May 21,
2003, the date of the card count.7 In addition, Robinson did not
retain copies of the cards, a list of the card signers or their ad-
dresses, notes showing which employees were contacted who
supported the union, or those who may have been helpful in
organizing and representing the workers. Moreover, although
Robinson had diaries showing the dates of his organizing ef-
forts, he discarded them at the end of 2003.
D. The Negotiations and the Contract
Immediately after the card count on May 21, Robinson told
Gross that he wanted to immediately send a letter to employees
advising them of its majority status, but Gross asked him not to
do so, and requested that he wait until he received a letter from
the arbitrator. The letter arrived the next day at which time the
Respondent recognized Local 300s. Gross further suggested
that they “keep everything at a low, quiet, even-keel pace”
while they negotiated. Accordingly, Robinson did not notify
any employees in writing that Local 300s had been recognized.

7 The charge was filed against the Respondent only, and accordingly
a copy of the charge was mailed to the Respondent and apparently not
to Local 300s. However, it may reasonably be assumed that Robinson
received a copy of the charge or was notified of its filing immediately
by the Respondent or its counsel since its valid representation of the
unit was in question.
Nor did the Respondent meet with employees to let them know
that Local 300s had been recognized as their representative.
Gross’ reasoning was that if Robinson’s letter caused the em-
ployees to be “stirred up,” they would take a more “adversarial
or militant” approach to wage raises. So he sought to avoid the
issue altogether until it was “appropriate” to grant a raise, in-
asmuch as he had granted all employees a raise in March, 2003.
Robinson agreed with these suggestions. He stated that em-
ployees were kept uninformed about the fact that negotiations
were taking place, no employees participated in the negotia-
tions, employees were not part of a negotiating committee, no
employees were told that he was negotiating a contract, none
were told about the progress of the talks, and no letters were
sent to employees asking them for their input in negotiations. In
fact, following the union’s recognition on May 22 until the
contract was executed 7-1/2 months later on January 8, 2004,
Robinson had no meetings with the employees. This is consis-
tent with many employees’ testimony, as set forth above, that
they never heard of Local 300s prior to the execution of the
contract. In addition, this is also consistent with the testimony
of Patricia Secola, who testified that she asked Robinson on
January 9 who negotiated the contract and how were the terms
agreed to because no one asked her for her input. Robinson’s
response that he spoke to certain unnamed coworkers about the
terms they desired is not credible, as follows.
According to Robinson, during the organizing campaign he
asked certain unnamed employees what benefits they had and
what they were most concerned about, and distributed a leaflet
asking for a response to those questions. He did not retain the
responses, and worked from memory as to the benefits the em-
ployees had. This testimony regarding his contact with employ-
ees is suspect in that Robinson also testified, as set forth above,
that no employees were told that he was negotiating a contract,
none were told about the progress of the talks, and no letters
were sent to employees asking them for their input in negotia-
tions. The leaflet received in evidence was a questionnaire
which asked employees only to indicate which of 23 items they
were “most interested in” so that Local 300s “may start re-
search and development programs to assist us to prepare for the
time when we are able to start negotiations with your em-
ployer.” It is significant that the questionnaire did not ask em-
ployees what benefits the employees had, as Robinson testified.
A fair inference may be drawn that Robinson did not retain the
responses because there were none, and even if there were any,
the questionnaire did not ask for the workers’ current benefits.
As set forth below, Robinson’s first offer was the Elmhurst
Care Center contract to which Local 300s was a party. Since
Robinson believed that the employees’ current benefits were
less than provided in the Elmhurst contract, he felt certain that
they would be receiving greater benefits if the Elmhurst con-
tract was agreed to. However, the Elmhurst contract’s terms
were reduced in the negotiations with the Respondent, so the
unit employees here did not receive even those terms in the
contract executed on January 8. Accordingly, I cannot find that
Robinson involved any employees in the discussion of a new
contract or asked any what terms they desired. If he conducted
even a rudimentary review of their basic, current terms of em-
ployment, he would have learned that they were receiving
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1150
greater benefits, prior to being represented by Local 300s, than
the contract he executed on January 8.
Before beginning negotiations, Robinson was aware that
Gross had contracts with SEIU 1199 at the two other facilities
he owned, Regency Park and Regency Gardens. Nevertheless,
Robinson did not ask Gross for copies of those contracts not-
withstanding that Robinson was “curious” as to employees’
wages and benefits in those agreements, because he did not
believe that he had a right to obtain those contracts from him,
or even ask for them. Interestingly, Robinson stated that if he
knew that SEIU 1199 had “excellent” contracts with Gross at
the other facilities, he may have wanted to know that informa-
tion so that he could request the same wages and benefits.
However, inasmuch as he did not believe that those contracts
contained excellent terms, he did not pursue it. Nor did Robin-
son even ask Gross what wages and benefits he was providing
at the other unionized locations since it is his practice to nego-
tiate a contract for the location involved, and try to get the best
package for those employees.
In preparation for the negotiations, Robinson did not ask for
payroll records or current wage rates, and he received no list of
employee seniority dates, no detailed description of the health
and dental plan provided by the Respondent or their cost, and
no employment or personnel manuals regarding the terms and
conditions of the employees’ employment. An employee told
Robinson that the amount of their last raise was 3 percent, but
Robinson did not confirm that figure with Gross during nego-
tiations.
On June 8, Robinson sent a letter to Gross which stated that
Nadelbach conducted a card count to establish whether the
union had a “sufficient showing of interest. I have received an
award . . . certifying that the union in fact had a sufficient
showing of interest and directed the Employer to recognize the
Union for the agreed to bargaining unit.” The letter requested
an appointment to begin negotiations.
Gross stated that in response to the letter he was not anxious
to meet with Robinson or sign a contract. He wanted to delay
the negotiations, and “buy myself time.” The Respondent had
given a 3-percent wage increase to the workers only 3 months
before, in March, and Gross wanted to delay having to pay
more money in wages or increased benefits.8 Not having re-
ceived a response to his June 8 letter, Robinson sent another
letter on July 1 asking for a meeting before July 24.
Robinson called Gross periodically after that. Gross agreed
to meet but did not do so. Finally, before July 24, Gross told
Robinson that they could discuss language and benefits, but
that any discussion of increased money would have to be de-
ferred. Gross warned Robinson that he should not get the em-
ployees “worked up” into believing that they would get more
money because he could not give another raise immediately.
Robinson testified that negotiations began in July, when he
sent Gross, by e-mail, the Union’s first proposal, which was the
contract with Elmhurst Care Center. Robinson believed that the
terms of that contract would be acceptable to Gross. They used

8 The employees received wage raises every year, in November or
December. During the transition from Dover Christian to the Respon-
dent, the raise expected in late 2002 was deferred until March 2003.
that contract as a framework for a new agreement. He and
Gross offered proposals to each other by making changes to the
Elmhurst contract and e-mailing the contract back and forth
between themselves and Respondent attorney Morris
Tuchman.9 Robinson estimated that 90 percent of the negotia-
tion was done by e-mail. They made proposed changes con-
cerning the number and method of payment of sick days and
vacation days, holidays, pay raises, and dates of pay raises.
Robinson’s first proposed pay raises were the amounts set forth
in the Elmhurst contract. According to Robinson, such e-mailed
changes continued to late August or early September. Robinson
estimated that he made three or four proposals by modifying
the Elmhurst contract. The major modifications were to the
amount and method of payment of sick days and holidays.
The above testimony, that negotiations were a lengthy, lei-
surely, contemplative process is contradicted by the documen-
tary evidence. Thus, SEIU 1199 subpoenaed all records con-
cerning bargaining and bargaining proposals. The earliest e-
mail communication provided was that of December 17, 2003,
in which Robinson sent the Elmhurst contract to Gross. Since
90 percent of the bargaining was conducted by e-mail, it would
be expected that earlier communications, if they took place,
would be represented by e-mail messages. I have taken into
consideration that the Elmhurst contract was sent back and
forth between the parties with proposed changes, but if the
contract was sent earlier than December 17, it would have
made its appearance in an earlier e-mail. Robinson stated that
his first proposal was the Elmhurst contract which he sent by e-
mail. Accordingly, it appears that bargaining, as represented by
the first proposal, did not begin until December 17.
Robinson and Gross met face-to-face only two times. The
first time was at a negotiation session in late September or early
October at which they had a 30-minute discussion concerning
language in the proposed contract, including how unused sick
days would be paid. At that meeting, Robinson proposed a
reduction in the amount of raises from the amount set forth in
the Elmhurst contract. The second in-person meeting was on
January 8, 2004 when the contract was executed.
Robinson stated that agreement on wages, which was not a
major issue, was reached in late November, 2003. In December
2003, Robinson received an e-mail copy of the Elmhurst con-
tract which was modified for this facility. No wage rates were
contained in the contract. Robinson stated that after this docu-
ment was sent, he and Gross exchanged proposals and at-
tempted to reach final agreement. Gross stated that before that
contract was sent, he discussed a new contract with Robinson
but did not know if he made any written proposals.
On about December 29, 1993, Gross received an e-mail from
the Respondent’s controller, Aaron Stefansky, regarding his
review of the Dover Christian employee manual and other
items which he believed should be included in the new con-
tract. Gross received a final draft of the contract on January 5.
At 5:34 p.m. on Thursday, January 8, 2004, Stefansky sent
an e-mail to Robinson, attaching the “final contract.” Robinson

9 Robinson did not take any notes of the negotiations, other than the
contract which was e-mailed. Robinson discarded old copies of the
contract once it was revised.
REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 1151
and Gross met at about 10:45 p.m. that evening at a diner
where 30 or 40 minutes were spent during which Robinson
read the contract and it was executed by both men. Gross stated
that he had “run out” of his home to sign the contract, conduct
which he called “very unusual.” The contract, which was ret-
roactive to January 1, 2004, had a 4-year term, expiring on
December 31, 2007, and contained union-security and dues-
checkoff clauses.
A record of SEIU 1199 house visits to the homes of employ-
ees shows that three homes were visited by that union’s agents on
January 6, three homes were visited on January 7, and one home
was visited on January 8 at 2 p.m. In addition, as set forth above,
a number of employees testified that SEIU 1199 was organizing
in the period of time shortly before they became aware, on Janu-
ary 9, that Local 300s would be their representative.
Robinson denied signing the contract because he knew that
SEIU 1199 was organizing the employees, adding that he did
not know whether that union was attempting to organize the
Respondent’s employees. Robinson denied rushing into signing
the contract, noting that it took 8 months to negotiate. He first
learned of SEIU 1199’s organizing effort among the employees
2 to 3 days after the contract was signed.
Similarly, Gross testified that he first learned that SEIU 1199
was organizing on January 11 when he was told by Olszewski
that employees were approached by that union. Olszewski’s e-
mail of January 11, in relevant part is as follows: “Update—
new info filtering in—Staff reports that 1199 is aggressively
going door to door telling staff not to sign Local 300 union
cards because 1199 has a better deal . . . .” Gross also testified,
however, that there was a “very, very active grapevine” in the
facility and the town of Dover, with many of his employees
being related, and most employees walking to work. He stated
that “when anything happened in the building, within, really,
before the end of the day, there were not [sic] secrets, many
employees knew what was going on and would come down to
my office to talk about it or to some other department head. It
would circulate.” This “active grapevine” undermines Gross’
testimony that he did not learn that grapevine that SEIU 1199
was organizing prior to January 11, particularly in view of Ol-
szewski’s “update.”
The contract provides that Local 300s is the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the Respondent’s employees
in the following unit:
All full time and regular part time service employees, mainte-
nance employees and LPNs employed by Respondent at its
Dover, New Jersey facility, but excluding all officers, mana-
gerial and professional employees, confidential employees,
temporary employees, all other employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
E. The Events of January
Robinson testified that on January 9, the day after he signed
the contract, he went to the Respondent’s premises, at Gross’
invitation, in order to meet with the workers and advise them of
the contract. Gross escorted Robinson and three of his agents
into the cafeteria, where they remained for about 3 hours, from
1:45 p.m. to 5 p.m.
At the meeting, Gross announced that a card count had taken
place, and that he had signed a contract with Local 300s, which
he described, including that it provided for a 3-percent wage
increase effective in April, and noted that the employees would
receive a $100 bonus that day. The $100 bonus paid to employ-
ees on January 9 was authorized by Gross early that week, and
it appeared in their paycheck that day. Gross, who was at the
meeting for about 30 minutes, introduced Robinson, and then
left. That was the first time since the recognition of Local 300s
that Gross notified a group of employees that they were repre-
sented by that union, although he testified that he had informed
unnamed individual employees prior to that time. Gross had not
posted any notices or sent notices to employees prior to January
9 notifying them that they were represented by a union.
Robinson introduced himself to the employees and told them
that dues would be deducted from their pay beginning in April.
The employees then signed dual purpose dues-checkoff and
authorization forms for Local 300s.10 Robinson explained the
benefits and other provisions set forth in the contract, but he
did not distribute copies of the contract. Certain workers told
him that the benefits he described were inferior to what they
already received without a union. For example, their preunion
benefits included eight holidays and two personal days, but the
new contract provided for only seven holidays and no personal
days. Further, their current vacation benefit was 2 weeks for
employees who worked less than 5 years, but with representa-
tion by Local 300s such employees received only a 1-week
vacation.
Robinson stated that Gross told the employees at the meeting
that if they had benefits in excess of those provided in the con-
tract they would continue to receive those additional benefits.
Accordingly, additional benefits provided before the contract’s
execution were added to the contract on January 19. In addition
to the above, such additional benefits included sick days, dental
benefits, night-shift differentials, and life insurance benefits.
On Monday January 12, Gross and Robinson again met with
other employees, at which time Robinson obtained more signed
cards for Local 300s. Some asked him about SEIU 1199, spe-
cifically whether representation by that union would be better
or worse than Local 300s, and whether SEIU 1199 could offer
a better contract. In late January and early February, Robinson
distributed copies of the contract, in English and Spanish, to the
employees.
F. The Conditioning of Pay Raises on Joining the Union
The contract provides that “effective April 1, 2004, the facil-
ity shall increase the wages of all post probationary employees
by three percent (3%).”
Belinda Walling was told by the Respondent’s payroll office
that since she worked only part time and was not entitled to bene-

10 There was much conflicting testimony concerning employees al-
legedly being threatened that they would not receive their paychecks or
would be discharged if they did not sign union cards, whether Lampron
gave them union cards to sign, and whether union agents distributed
paychecks. I need not resolve any of this testimony because none of
these allegations have been made the subject of a charge, they are not
before me, and the General Counsel does not rely on them to support
the allegations of the complaint.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1152
fits, she did not have to join the Union. She did not sign a card
for Local 300s until May 14, and did not receive the 3-percent
wage increase in April. Robinson testified that Walling told him
that she was told that she would not receive a raise unless she
signed a union membership form. Robinson told Gross that Wall-
ing, and all unit members are entitled to all contractual benefits
regardless of whether they signed that form.
Amarjeed Kaur did not receive the 3-percent raise in April,
2004, and had not signed a card for Local 300s by that time He
told Lampron on May 13 that he did not receive the raise, and
she advised him to sign a card for Local 300s. He did so and
thereafter received the raise. It was stipulated that Norma Har-
vey did not receive the wage increase in April. She did not sign
a card for Local 300s until April 26, 2004. Walling, Kaur, and
Harvey were postprobationary employees.
Robinson testified that certain employees did not receive the
raise because “in some cases the facility for whatever reason
did not implement a raise unless they received back a signed
form from us indicating the person had joined the union.” Rob-
inson told Gross that all unit members are entitled to all con-
tractual benefits regardless of whether they signed such a form.
Analysis and Discussion
I. THE UNLAWFUL RECOGNITION OF LOCAL 300S
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) and (2) when it extends
recognition to a union as the exclusive representative of its
employees at a time when the union represents only a minority
of the employees in the appropriate unit. International Ladies’
Garment Union, AFL-CIO (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp), v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961). The employer also violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act when it executes a contract with such a
union containing a union-security clause. Duane Reade, Inc.,
338 NLRB 943, 944 (2003). The burden is on the General
Counsel to establish that the union does not represent a major-
ity of the employees at the time of recognition. I find that the
General Counsel has met his burden.
The main question before me is whether Local 300s repre-
sented a majority of employees in an appropriate unit when it
was recognized on March 22, 2003. Absent an election, the
usual method of proving such status is the presentation at hear-
ing of cards signed by employees designating the union as their
representative. In this case, however, the cards were destroyed
by Local 300s. The General Counsel argues that Local 300s did
not have signed cards from a majority of the unit employees.
Respondent asserts that it did, and they were used by the arbi-
trator in a valid card count, the results of which may not be
disturbed.
None of the 81 employees who testified stated that he or she
signed a card for Local 300s before it was recognized on May
22. Seventy four employees in a unit of 117 testified that they
did not sign a card or authorize Local 300s to represent them
before it was recognized. Robinson, however, said that he pre-
sented 68 signed cards to the arbitrator. His explanation that he
discarded the cards 6 months after obtaining recognition is
reasonable, inasmuch as Section 10(b) would ordinarily toll any
challenge to the cards. However it is somewhat unusual that as
an experienced union president who has been affiliated with the
labor movement for more than 30 years, he would have kept no
record of who signed the cards, and could not identify the
names of anyone who did.
Sprain Brook Manor, 219 NLRB 809 (1975), a case quite
similar on its facts to this case, involved a situation where Lo-
cal 999 presented signed authorization cards to an arbitrator,
who after conducting a card count, found that it represented a
majority of the 77 unit employees. Following the count, Local
999 destroyed the cards. Seventy employees testified or it was
stipulated that they would have testified that they never author-
ized Local 999 to represent them. The Board rejected the re-
spondent’s defenses that the arbitrator’s award was binding
pursuant to Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 NLRB 1080
(1955), holding that the charging party was not a party to the
card-check agreement or award. The Board held that the gen-
eral counsel made a prima facie showing that neither a majority
of the respondent’s employees in the recognized or contractual
unit authorized Local 999 to represent them, and that the bur-
den thus shifted to the respondent to establish the majority
status of Local 999. In finding that the respondent had not met
its burden, the Board found a violation of Section 8(a)(1), (2),
and (3) of the Act.
In commenting on the testimony by employees in that case
that they had not signed cards for Local 999, the Board noted
that “conventional proof is not available here because the cards
. . . were destroyed by Teamsters, Local 999.”
[I]n presenting 70 employees who were willing to testify and
be subject to cross-examination as to whether they authorized
the Teamsters to represent them, the General Counsel pre-
sented the best objective evidence available as to the validity
of the cards in question and presented the same type of evi-
dence which has consistently been accepted by the Board as
proof as to the lack of majority status on the part of a union.
219 NLRB at 810.
In Windsor Castle Health Care Facilities, 310 NLRB 579,
590 (1993), in finding that the union did not represent a major-
ity of the unit employees, notwithstanding that an arbitrator
issued an award that it did, the Board noted that, as here, the
precise cards and the list of employees which were submitted to
the arbitrator were not presented at hearing. Thus, there, as
here, the reliability of the count is questionable. It was also
noted that the employer rushed to recognize the union with
little evidence of negotiations at a time when another union was
soliciting the workers to join. It was also observed that the unit
description in the contract varied from the one described in the
arbitrator’s award.
In American Service Corp., 227 NLRB 13 (1976), the union
and employer respondents refused to produce any material
evidence of the union’s majority status. The general counsel
called 22 witnesses in a unit of 39 who testified that they had
not signed authorization cards for the union. The Board, in
holding that the respondents violated Section 8(a)(1), (2) and
8(b)(1)(A) stated:
[A]part from using any inference from Respondents’ failure
to put on a defense, the General Counsel’s evidence, by it-
self, proved the charged violations. The record shows that
the . . . unit, of which the Respondent Union claimed to be
exclusive bargaining representative, consisted of 39 em-
REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 1153
ployees and that 22 of these employees testified that they
had not authorized the Union to be their bargaining repre-
sentative at the time the Respondent Employer recognized
the Union. 227 NLRB 13, fn. 1.
The administrative law judge, affirmed by the Board in Crest
Containers Corp., 223 NLRB 739, 742 (1976), stated, in lan-
guage applicable to the instant case: “But in a situation where it
has been established, as I find it has here, that the union granted
recognition was a minority union, nothing further must be
shown to support a finding of a statutory violation. For majority
designation is a sine qua non to lawful recognition of an exclu-
sive bargaining agent under the statute.”
In applying the above precedents to this case, and in deter-
mining whether the Respondent recognized Local 300s at a
time when it did not represent a majority of the unit employees,
I have also taken into consideration the facts that the Local
300s president destroyed the cards following the card count,
and that prior to their destruction he did not record the names
of the employees, notwithstanding that a contract had not been
achieved.11 Further, I have considered that Robinson did not
inquire of the Respondent the size of the unit so that he could
test whether the cards he allegedly received constituted a ma-
jority of the unit. I have also considered that the arbitrator did
not identify in his award the number of cards he received, the
number of employees in the unit, or which categories of em-
ployees were encompassed in the unit. In addition, not only
were the cards which were presented to the arbitrator not avail-
able at hearing, but the precise list the arbitrator worked from
was also not available.
In this regard, it is possible that the list presented to the arbi-
trator was not accurate. Thus, the first recreated list prepared
for this hearing used the wrong payroll period. The second
contained the name of one employee who should not have been
included, and omitted the names of two other workers which
should have been included. Thus, there is some question
whether the list provided to the arbitrator which was prepared
by the same person as the one who prepared the subsequent
lists suffered from similar irregularities. Further, the arbitrator
did not mention in his Award that he even received a list, or
that he compared the names on the list with the names on the
cards and the W-4 forms. He stated only that he compared the
signatures on the cards to those on the W-4 forms.
The Respondent cannot argue that it honored the arbitrator’s
award in good faith because it believed, based on the award,
that Local 300s represented a majority of the unit employees.
The Supreme Court held in Bernhard-Altmann that an em-
ployer’s “good faith” does not preclude a finding that the em-
ployer violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act by recogniz-
ing a union which, in fact, represented a minority of the em-
ployer’s employees at the time of the union’s demand for rec-
ognition. Based on the reasoning in Sprain Brook Manor, I also
reject the Respondent’s defenses here that it was bound by the
arbitrator’s award, and it could not challenge that award.

11 Robinson did not testify that it was his practice to destroy the
cards 6 months after recognition. In Sprain Brook Manor, above at 812
fn. 14, the union’s policy was to discard the cards after recognition and
a contract were achieved.
“The Board is not bound, as a matter of law, by an arbitra-
tion award. . . . The Board has exercised its discretion in the
past to remedy an unfair labor practice even though the parties
had used arbitration to dispose of an issue.” Spielberg, above,
at 1081–1082. As the policy of deferring to an arbitrator’s
award originates from theories of contract and estoppel, third
parties, such as SEIU 1199 which are not subject to an arbitra-
tion agreement are not bound thereby. Sprain Brook Manor,
above, at 810. Accordingly, since SEIU 1199 was not a party to
the arbitration award, it is not bound by it. Based on all of the
above, I find that deferral to the arbitrator Nadelbach’s award is
not warranted. Windsor Castle; Sprain Brook Manor, above.
I further find that the Respondent’s reaction to the request
for a card count was not consistent with Gross’ desire to delay
the time when he would have to give a wage raise to employ-
ees. Why would he immediately agree to a card count if the
result of such an action could have been, as occurred here, the
award of majority status to Local 300s, and perhaps an imme-
diate demand by that union for wage raises for the workers.
Gross could have deferred an obligation to recognize Local
300s if he exercised his right to a Board election. In this con-
nection, I cannot credit Gross’ testimony that he did not believe
that he was aware that the Respondent had such a right. If he
was not aware of it, certainly his able labor counsel would have
brought it to his attention. The answer to this question is that
the Respondent sought to conceal from the employees, and
ultimately from SEIU 1199, the fact that it had recognized Lo-
cal 300s. A Board election, which would immediately become
public knowledge, could not have been concealed from the
employees or SEIU 1199.
In viewing all of the circumstances surrounding the recogni-
tion, this appears to have been a “desk-drawer” recognition
kept secret from the employees and arranged for the purpose of
providing the Respondent with a readily-available method of
supporting a hastily agreed-on contract. I find support in this
finding in the fact that there is no credible evidence that in the
7½ months between the recognition and the execution of the
contract, employees were made aware of the recognition, or
that any meaningful negotiations occurred. No effort was un-
dertaken to negotiate or conclude a contract until SEIU 1199
solicited employees shortly before the contract was signed. If
the negotiation process was as long as Gross and Robinson
imply, Robinson, an experienced union president, would have
obtained basic, rudimentary information as to the benefits the
employees were receiving so that the January 19 modifications
to the contract would not have been necessary, and Gross
would not have taken the “very unusual” step of having to “run
out” of his house to sign the contract at a diner at 10:45 p.m.
This is not to say that a contract cannot be entered into after
intense, speedy bargaining, but the impression sought to be
given by the parties is that negotiations were lengthy, involving
much deliberation and negotiation. Indeed, Gross said the bar-
gaining was “hard”, and Robinson said negotiations took a long
time. But if the negotiations had begun in July, as testified by
Robinson, it is odd that he would not have become aware of the
employees’ current terms of employment in the ensuing 5
months of bargaining.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1154
Based on all of the above, particularly the facts that not one
of the 81 employees who testified stated that he or she signed a
card for Local 300s, and that 74 employees out of the 117
members of the unit affirmatively stated that they did not sign a
card authorizing that union to represent them before it was
recognized, I find that the General Counsel has made a prima
facie showing that Local 300s did not represent a majority of
the unit employees when it was recognized by the Respondent
on May 22, 2003. “The General Counsel’s evidence, by itself,
proved the charged violations.” American Service Corp., 227
NLRB 13, fn. 1. I further find that the Respondent has not met
its burden of proving the majority status of Local 300s. Sprain
Brook Manor; Windsor Castle, above.
The contract contains a union-security clause requiring the
employees to become and remain members of Local 300s as a
condition of employment. I accordingly find that by executing
and maintaining that clause at a time when Local 300s did not
represent a majority of the Respondent’s unit employees, the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Duane Reade,
above.
II. THE 10(B) DEFENSES
A. The Fraudulent Concealment
The Respondent argues that the charges were untimely filed
and barred by Section 10(b) of the Act. Section 10(b) states that
“[n]o complaint shall issue based on any unfair labor practice
occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge
with the Board.” “The Board recognizes that the 6-month limi-
tations period of Section 10(b) does not begin to run until the
charging party has ‘knowledge of the facts necessary to support
a ripe unfair labor practice.’” Alternative Services, Inc., 344
NLRB No. 99, slip op. at 2 (2005), citing St. Barnabas Medical
Center, 343 NLRB No. 119, slip op. at 3 (2004). “The Board
has consistently held that the 10(b) period does not commence
until the charging party has ‘clear and unequivocal notice’ of
the violation.” Vallow Floor Coverings, 335 NLRB 20 (2001).
The burden of showing such notice is on the party raising the
affirmative defense of Section 10(b). Leach Corp., 312 NLRB
990, 991 (1993).
I have found, above, that the evidence establishes that the
Respondent unlawfully recognized Local 300s, and executed a
contract with it at a time when it did not represent a majority of
the Respondent’s unit employees.
However, the recognition occurred on May 22, 2003, more
than 6 months before the original charge was filed on February
19, 2004. The Respondent correctly argues that, under a strict
application of Section 10(b), all the charges should be dis-
missed. Machinists Local 1424 (Bryan Mfg. Co.) v. NLRB, 362
U.S. 411 (1960). The General Counsel argues that the evidence
also establishes that the Respondent deliberately concealed the
material facts from SEIU 1199, the charging party, which was
ignorant of those facts without any fault or want of due dili-
gence on its part. The General Counsel argues accordingly that
Section 10(b) should be tolled.
In Browne & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 321 NLRB 924 (1996), the
Board stated that it considers the following elements in decid-
ing whether to toll the limitations period for this reason: “(1)
deliberate concealment has occurred; (2) material facts were the
object of the concealment; and (3) the injured party was igno-
rant of those facts, without any fault or want of due diligence
on its part.” It has been held that “while the running of the limi-
tation period may also be tolled by acts of fraudulent conceal-
ment on the part of the perpetrator of the alleged unfair labor
conduct, fraud does not appear to be a prerequisite to the rule
that the 10(b) period does not begin to run until notice is given
to the adversely affected party.” UPF Corp., 309 NLRB 832,
839 (1992).
The question is thus whether the Charging Party, SEIU 1199,
and not the employees, had notice of the facts concerning the
unfair labor practice. Even if the employees’ knowledge could
be attributed to SEIU 1199, there is limited, credible evidence
that employees were aware that Local 300s was organizing.
However, there is affirmative evidence that the material facts
constituting the unfair labor practice—the recognition of that
union by the Respondent—was deliberately concealed from the
employees. Further, even if SEIU 1199 knew that Local 300s
was organizing the employees, it had no reason to know of the
existence of the recognition, which was deliberately withheld
from the workers.
Thus, although there was evidence that employees were
aware of organizing taking place in the period in which Robin-
son claimed to be soliciting workers, in many cases there was
no clear identification of the union which was organizing. As to
the evidence that certain workers requested raises and were told
that the Respondent was negotiating a contract with a union, or
that union activity was taking place, there was no identification
of the union involved. I do not believe that this evidence is
sufficient to charge SEIU 1199 with knowledge that Local 300s
had been unlawfully recognized by the Respondent. Indeed, 38
employees stated that they were unaware of the presence of
Local 300s prior to the contract being signed in January 2004.
I cannot find that Robinson even “discretely” told certain
employees immediately after the arbitrator concluded the card
count, that his union had been recognized. He could not name
any of those employees, and none of the 81 employees who
testified stated that they were so told. As set forth above, Rob-
inson agreed to Gross’ request that he keep everything “quiet,”
and he did so, not notifying any employees in writing that Lo-
cal 300s had been recognized, and he conceded that employees
were kept “uninformed” about the fact that negotiations were
taking place and the progress of the negotiations. Certainly, if
the employees became aware of the recognition, word would
have spread quickly through the “grapevine.” Nevertheless, the
record as a whole supports a finding that the recognition of
Local 300s was deliberately withheld from employees, and that
they were not aware of such recognition.
The Board’s finding in UPF Corp., above, applies well to
the facts established here. The “record on the whole indicates
that the employees were kept completely in the dark concerning
[the union’s] newly acquired status as their recognized repre-
sentative until [the contract was executed]. In fact, prior to that
date, there is no evidence that IUPIW even made known to the
affected employees that it possessed the intention to represent
them. Clearly, Respondent’s maintenance and production em-
ployees received neither actual nor constructive notice of the
alleged unfair labor conduct.”
REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 1155
I accordingly find that the 10(b) 6-month statute of limita-
tions did not run until January 9, 2004, when SEIU 1199 had
“knowledge of the facts necessary to support a ripe unfair labor
practice.” Alternative Services, above; Avne Systems, Inc., 331
NLRB 1352, 1352–1354 (2000). At that time, SEIU 1199
learned of the Respondent’s January 9 execution of the contract
and its prior recognition of Local 300s. I also find that SEIU
1199 was ignorant of those facts without any fault or want of
due diligence on its part. I accordingly find that the original
charge was timely filed on February 19, 2004, as it was within
6 months of the time that SEIU 1199 learned the above facts.
I further find that the Respondent has not met its burden of
showing that SEIU 1199 possessed such knowledge within the
6-month period following recognition by the Respondent of
Local 300s.
B. The Addition to the Complaint of Closely
Related Charges
Inasmuch as I have found, above, that the 10(b) statute of
limitations was tolled because of the deliberate concealment
from SEIU 1199 and the employees of the facts relating to the
unfair labor practice, and that the charge filed on February 19,
2004 was timely, the question therefore becomes whether the
additional charges filed thereafter were timely filed.
The original charge filed on February 19, 2004, alleges that
since on about January 9, 2004, the Respondent recognized
Local 300s at a time when it had not obtained authorization
cards from a noncoerced majority of employees. The first
amended charge filed on September 30, 2004, repeats the above
allegation, and further asserts that since about January 9, 2004,
the Respondent entered into a contract with Local 300s that
contained a union-security clause at a time when Local 300s
did not represent a majority of the Respondent’s employees.
The second amended charge, filed during the hearing on Janu-
ary 14, 2005, repeats the two allegations set forth above, and
further asserts, to the extent relevant here, that on various occa-
sions in January 2004, the Respondent conditioned its employ-
ees’ receipt of wages and bonuses on employees’ signing forms
in support of Local 300s.
In Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115 (1988), the Board held that
in deciding whether complaint amendments are closely related
to charge allegations, it would apply the closely related test, as
follows. First, the Board looks at whether the otherwise un-
timely allegations involve the same legal theory as the allega-
tions in the pending timely charge. It is not necessary that the
same section of the Act be invoked. Citywide Service Corp.,
317 NLRB 861, 862 (1995). Second, the Board looks at
whether the otherwise untimely allegations arise from the same
factual circumstances or sequence of events as the pending
timely charge. Finally, the Board examines whether a respon-
dent would raise similar defenses to all the allegations.
The original charge, which I find was timely filed on Febru-
ary 19, 2004, alleges that the Respondent recognized Local
300s at a time when it had not obtained authorization cards
from a noncoerced majority of employees. The subsequent first
and second amended charges, alleging, respectively, that the
Respondent executed a contract containing a union-security
clause when Local 300s did not represent a majority of the
Respondent’s employees, and that the Respondent conditioned
its employees’ receipt of wages on its employees’ signing
forms in support of Local 300s, clearly arise from the same
factual circumstances as the original charge. Thus, the original,
timely filed charge alleges the initial unlawful action engaged
in by the Respondent, the recognition of Local 300s. The sub-
sequent charges alleging the illegal contract and the failure to
pay wage increases to nonmembers flowed from that action—
the contract followed the recognition, and the failure to pay the
wage increases was the consequence of the contractual provi-
sion requiring such payments. All the alleged conduct by the
Respondent interfered with the employees’ freedom of choice
in selecting their own bargaining representative.
Accordingly, the first and second amended charges arose
from the same factual circumstances or sequence of events as
the pending timely charge. Whitewood Maintenance Co., 292
NLRB 1159, 1170 (1989). It is also reasonable to expect that
the Respondent would raise the same defense to all the
charges—that Local 300s is not a minority union. Its defense
thus relates to its initial alleged unlawful recognition of Local
300s, and the subsequent consequences of such recognition. I
accordingly find that all the charges herein were timely filed.
III. THE FAILURE TO GRANT THE CONTRACTUAL WAGE RAISE
TO NONMEMBERS OF LOCAL 300S
The complaint alleges that since on about April, 2004, the
Respondent failed to grant a 3-percent wage increase required
by the collective-bargaining agreement to employees who had
not signed membership and dues-checkoff authorizations on
behalf of Local 300s.
A contractual 3-percent wage raise was payable to all unit
employees on April 1, 2004.
As set forth above, employees Harvey, Kaur and Walling did
not receive the raise in April, and had not, by then, signed a
dues-checkoff form or authorization card for Local 300s. All
three workers were entitled to the raise but did not receive it on
April 1, 2004. Robinson testified that the Respondent did not
grant the raise to certain employees because they had not
signed a form indicating that they joined the union, and the
Respondent required the union to certify that those workers
were union members before it would give them the raise.
I accordingly find, as alleged in the complaint, that the Re-
spondent unlawfully failed to grant the wage increase to the three
employees because they had not joined Local 300s. By providing
greater remuneration to employees who were union members
than to those who were not, the Respondent discriminated against
the nonmembers, which would tend to encourage membership in
Local 300s in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Kaufman Dedell Printing, Inc., 251 NLRB 78, 79–80 (1980);
Prestige Bedding Co., Inc., 212 NLRB 690, 691 (1974).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By recognizing Local 300s as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its employees, and by entering
into, maintaining, and enforcing a collective-bargaining agree-
ment containing union-security and dues-checkoff provisions
with Local 300s on January 8, 2004, covering its employees in
the following unit, at a time when Local 300s did not represent
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD1156
a majority of the employees in such unit, the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act:
All full time and regular part time service employees, mainte-
nance employees and LPNs employed by Respondent at its
Dover, New Jersey facility, but excluding all officers, mana-
gerial and professional employees, confidential employees,
temporary employees, all other employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
2. By failing to grant a 3-percent wage increase required by
the collective-bargaining agreement to employees who had not
signed membership and dues-checkoff authorizations on behalf
of Local 300s, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1),
(2), and (3) of the Act by recognizing and contracting with
Local 300s at a time when Local 300s did not represent a ma-
jority of the unit employees, I shall recommend that the Re-
spondent withdraw and withhold recognition from Local 300s
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its em-
ployees in the above unit, and cease maintaining or giving ef-
fect to any collective-bargaining agreement between them, or
any modifications, renewals, or extensions thereof, concerning
the employees in the above unit, unless and until such time as
Local 300s shall have been certified by the Board, provided,
however, that nothing in the remedial order shall require the
Respondent to withdraw or eliminate any wage increase or
other benefit, terms, and conditions of employment which may
have been established pursuant to any such agreement.
Since the Respondent has given effect to a union-security
provision requiring payment of union dues as a condition of
employment or continued employment, and since the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement also contains a clause authorizing
the checkoff of union dues from the pay of unit employees, I
will also recommend that the Respondent be required to reim-
burse all of its former and present unit employees for fees and
moneys deducted from their pay pursuant to those clauses, with
interest added to such reimbursements in the manner prescribed
in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977), and New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). I shall also
recommend that the Respondent reimburse employees Norma
Harvey, Amarjeed Kaur, and Belinda Walling, to the extent
that it has not already reimbursed them, for its failure to grant
them a contractual 3-percent wage increase because they were
not members of Local 300s. Interest shall be added to such
reimbursements as set forth above.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended12

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
ORDER
The Respondent, Regency Grande Nursing & Rehabilitation
Center, Dover, New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Recognizing Local 300s, Production Service & Sales
District Council a/w United Food and Commercial Workers
International Union, AFL–CIO, as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of its employees and entering into,
maintaining and enforcing a collective-bargaining agreement
containing union-security and dues-checkoff provisions with
Local 300s when Local 300s does not represent a majority of
the employees in the following unit, unless and until such time
as Local 300s shall have been certified by the Board:
All full time and regular part time service employees, mainte-
nance employees and LPNs employed by Respondent at its
Dover, New Jersey facility, but excluding all officers, mana-
gerial and professional employees, confidential employees,
temporary employees, all other employees, guards and super-
visors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended.
(b) Failing to grant wage increases required by a collective-
bargaining agreement to employees who had not signed mem-
bership and dues-checkoff authorizations on behalf of Local
300s.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Withdraw and withhold recognition from Local 300s as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its em-
ployees in the above unit, and cease maintaining or giving ef-
fect to any collective-bargaining agreement between them, or
any modifications, renewals, or extensions thereof, concerning
the employees in the above unit, unless and until such time as
Local 300s shall have been certified by the Board, provided,
however, that nothing herein shall require the Respondent to
withdraw, or eliminate any wage increase or other benefit,
terms, and conditions of employment which may have been
established pursuant to any such agreement.
(b) Reimburse, with interest, all of its former and present
unit employees for fees and moneys deducted from their pay
pursuant to the union-security and dues-checkoff clauses of the
contract dated January 8, 2004.
(c) Reimburse employees Norma Harvey, Amarjeed Kaur,
and Belinda Walling, to the extent that it has not already reim-
bursed them, for its failure to grant them a contractual 3-
percent wage increase because they were not members of Local
300s.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re-

adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
REGENCY GRANDE NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER 1157
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
facility in Dover, New Jersey, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”13 Copies of the notice, on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 22, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall
be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecu-

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
tive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceed-
ings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since May 22, 2003.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.