Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 15, 1939

12 N.L.R.B. 944 (N.L.R.B. 1939)

In the Matter of REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING COMPANY and
STEEL WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE OF THE C. I. O.
Case No. C-601.Decided May 15, 1939
Nut, Bolt, and Screw Manufacturing Industry-Interference, Restraint, and
Coercion : anti-union statements or petitions , propaganda campaign by means
of radio, press releases , and literature mailed to employees ; discrediting union
and leaders , characterizing it as "alien", imputing mercenary motives to its
leaders, vilification ; employer financed publicity campaign to influence public
opinion and break down morale of strikers ; initiating and fostering anti -strike
sentiment ; soliciting strikers to return to work ; coercing employees to form
and join a back -to-work movement-Labor Organization : back-to-work move-
ment , inactive , as-Company Dominated Union: charges of, dismissed for want
of a labor organization-Unit Appropriate for Collective Bargaining : produc-
tion , maintenance , and shipping-room employees , excluding supervisory and
clerical employees ; no controversy as to-Representatives : proof of choice :
comparison original signatures with signed union cards-Collective Bargain-
ing: meaning of; strike , effect upon , when enjoinable under State law;
avoidance of concession or agreement while at same time attacking union
by propaganda-Discrimination : refusal to reinstate employees because of
participation in illegal strike, employees had violated injunction and were
arrested for breach of peace in connection with strike-Reinstatement
Ordered-Back Pay: awarded-Contracts : brought about by unfair labor
practices , executed with employees over heads of union representatives, when
union was exclusive bargaining representative of all employees ; abrogated-
Strike: enjoined-Picketing-Conciliation: efforts at , by United States De-
partment of Labor, Massachusetts State Board or Arbitration , and mayor of
Worcester , Massachusetts.
Mr. Edward Schneider, for the Board.
Vaughan, Esty, Clark c Crotty, by Mr. J. Clark, Jr., of Worcester,
Mass., and Mr. Donald W. Webber of Auburn, Maine, for the
respondent.
Mr. Samuel Angoff f and Mr. Sumner Marcus, both of Boston.
Mass., for the Union.
Mr. Charles Ward Johnson, of Worcester , Mass ., for the
Intervenors.
Mr. Francis Hoague, of counsel to the Board.
12 N. L. R. B., No. 97.
944
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO . 945
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges and amended charges having been duly filed by Steel
Workers Organizing Committee of the C. I. 0., herein called the
Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board,
by A. Howard Myers, Regional Director for the First Region
(Boston, Massachusetts), issued its complaint dated November 17,
1937, against Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, Worcester,
Massachusetts, herein called the respondent, alleging that the
respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1),
(2), (3), and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the
complaint, accompanied by notice of hearing, were duly served upon
the respondent and the Union. With respect to the unfair labor
practices, the complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleged in sub-
stance : (1) that the respondent from May 28, 1937, to June 14, 1937,
conducted a campaign of propaganda against the Union by dis-
tributing among its employees circulars criticizing and disparaging
the Union, and holding it up to scorn, contempt, and ridicule for the
purpose of (a) discouraging its employees from membership in the
Union, (b) breaking the Union's strike, (c) causing a "back-to-
work" movement among its employees, (d) avoiding collective
bargaining with the Union, and (e) causing its employees to bargain
individually with the respondent; further, that the respondent cir-
culated "back-to-work" petitions and by coercion, intimidation, and
promise of consideration caused employees to sign these petitions
and to sign a contract with the respondent; (2) that the respondent
had dominated, interfered with, and fostered the formation and
administration of a labor organization of its employees; (3) that
the respondent, by the discharge of and refusal to reinstate certain
named employees on or about July 16, 1937, and August 3, 1937,
had discriminated in regard to their hire and tenure of employment,
thereby discouraging membership in the Union; and (4) that
although the Union had at all times since April 20, 1937, represented
a majority of the respondent's employees in a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining, the respondent on April 28,
1937, and at all times since had refused to bargain collectively
with the Union.
On November 26, 1937, the respondent filed its answer in which it
admitted that it was engaged in interstate commerce, but denied the
946 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
alleged unfair labor practices. The answer stated affirmatively that
(1) the questions involved in that section of the complaint alleging
unfair labor practices under Section 8 (1) and (2) of the Act had
become moot; (2) that the Act was in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States; (3) that the Union
had been guilty of lawless conduct; and (4) that the Board had no
jurisdiction to determine either the facts or the law relating to an
alleged contract signed on July 13, 1937, between the respondent and
411 of its employees and subsequently signed by approximately 100
additional employees.
Pursuant to notice duly served upon the respondent, the Union,
and Charles Ward Johnson, the attorney for certain of the respond-
ent's employees seeking to intervene, a hearing was held at Worcester,
Massachusetts, from December 6, 1937, to January 17, 1938, before
Alvin J. Rockwell, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Board.
At the outset of the hearing Charles Ward Johnson, representing cer-
tain of the respondent's employees, filed a motion for leave to in-
tervene on their behalf. The motion was allowed as to five of the
employees named in the motion but denied as to 523 other employees.,
Thereafter the Board, the Union, the respondent, and Johnson par-
ticipated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evi-
dence bearing on the issues. At the close of the hearing the Trial
Examiner granted a motion to dismiss the allegations of the com-
plaint concerning Mae Hadley. During the course of the hearing the
Trial Examiner made several rulings on motions and on objections
to the admission of evidence. The Board has reviewed the rulings of
the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial errors were com-
mitted. Except as stated below, the rulings are hereby affirmed.
Thereafter the respondent, the Intervenors, and the Union filed
briefs. On April 23, 1938, the Trial Examiner filed his Interme-
diate Report in which he found that the respondent had engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and
(5) of the Act. He accordingly recommended that the respondent
cease and desist from engaging in such unfair labor practices, that
the respondent inform its employees that the purported contract dated
July 13, 1937, was unlawful and that the respondent would not en-
force any portion of it against its employees, that the respondent
reinstate four named employees with back pay from July 16, 1937,
that the respondent upon demand bargain collectively with the Union,
and that the complaint in so far as it alleged unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (2) of the Act be dismissed.
1 This ruling is dealt with below in Section III A 3 f of the Findings of Fact.
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 947
Thereafter the respondent and the Intervenor filed exceptions to
the Intermediate Report. Pursuant to notice duly served on all the
parties, a hearing for the purpose of oral argument was had before
the Board in Washington, D. C., on October 27, 1938. The respond-
ent and the Union were represented by counsel and participated in
the argument. The Board has considered the exceptions to the In-
termediate Report, and in so far as they are inconsistent with the
findings, conclusions, and order set forth below, finds them to be
without merit.
Upon the entire record in the case the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The respondent is a Massachusetts corporation having its principal
office and place of business in Worcester, Massachusetts. It is en-
gaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of nuts, bolts, and
screws. During the year 1936, the respondent purchased raw mate-
rials of an approximate value of $1,250,000, for use at its plant at
Worcester, of which approximately 90 per cent were shipped to the
respondent from points outside Massachusetts. During the same year
the respondent sold approximately 14,000,000 pounds of manufac-
tured products, of which approximately 90 per cent were sold to cus-
tomers outside of Massachusetts. The respondent in its answer
admitted that it was engaged in interstate commerce.
On March 19, 1937, the respondent had approximately 782 produc-
tion and maintenance employees.
II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Steel Workers Organizing Committee is a labor organization affili-
ated with the Committee for Industrial Organization. Amalgamated
Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North America, Lodge
No. 1315, represented by Steel Workers Organizing Committee in
this case, is also a labor organization, affiliated with Steel Workers
Organizing Committee and the Committee for Industrial Organiza-
tion, and admits to membership all production, maintenance, and
shipping-room employees of the respondent, excluding supervisory
and clerical employees.2
2 The Steel Workers Organizing Committee functions under an agreement with the
Amalgamated Association of Iron , Steel & Tin Workers of North America whereby the
Committee is to conduct organizational work and to negotiate with employers, all for the
benefit of the Amalgamated. We will refer to both organizations as "the Union" without
differentiation.
169134-39--vol. 12-61
948 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain collectively; interference, restraint, and
coercion; and the alleged domination of and interference with the
formation and administration of a labor organization
1. Appropriate unit
The complaint alleges that the production and maintenance em-
ployees of the respondent excluding clerical and supervisory employ-
ees constitute the appropriate unit within the meaning of Section
9 (a) of the Act. The respondent's answer admits this allegation.
At the hearing, however, it appeared that the Union had organized
the shipping-room employees together with the production and main-
tenance employees in a single unit, and had dealt with the respondent
as the representative of such unit. At no time has the respondent
controverted the appropriateness of such a unit. The respondent's
plant is a typical mass-production factory, in which there are no
strong lines of demarcation between the types of work performed by
the various employees. The normal industrial unit appears to us to
be the most appropriate one for the purposes of collective bargaining.
Upon all the evidence, therefore, we find that the respondent's pro-
duction, maintenance, and shipping-room employees, excluding super-
visory and clerical employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining and that such a unit insures to em-
ployees of the respondent the full benefit of their right to collective
bargaining and otherwise effectuates the policies of the Act.
2. Representation by the Union of the majority in appropriate unit
Prior to 1937, no labor organization had been active at the re-
spondent's plant. In the middle of February 1937, the Union com-
menced a membership drive among the respondent's employees. By
March 19, 1937, at least 703 of the 782 employees within the appro-
priate unit had signed cards accepting membership in the Amalga-
mated Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North America
and authorizing "Steel Workers Organizing Committee, its agents or
representatives" to act for them "as a collective bargaining agency
in all matters pertaining to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, or other conditions of employment." By April 20, 1937, an
additional 38 had signed similar cards."
The only evidence which was introduced at the hearing to show
defection from the ranks of the Union after April 20 was the signing
8 These cards were produced at the hearing and checked by a bank teller against original
signatures of employees of the respondent . The teller found that of 757 signatures on
the original cards, all except approximately 16 were genuine.
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 949
of "back-to-work" petitions and the "back-to-work" movement in
June and July 1937. As set out hereafter, the petitions and the
movement were the products of the respondent's unfair labor prac-
tices and therefore cannot be held effective to detract from the
Union's right to represent the employees 4 We find that on March 19,
1937, and at all times thereafter the Union was the duly designated
representative of a majority of the respondent's employees in the
appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, and that
pursuant to Section 9 (a) of the Act, it was the exclusive representa-
tive of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ-
ment, and other conditions of employment.
3. The refusal to bargain collectively; interference, restraint, and
coercion ; and the alleged domination of and interference with
the formation and administration of a labor organization
a. The preliminary contract
In the middle of March 1937, the Union requested a conference
with the respondent to discuss the terms of a collective-bargaining
contract. The respondent granted the request and three conferences
between representatives of the respondent and the Union were held
on March 16, 18, and 19, respectively. During the conferences the
Union stated that it represented a majority of the respondent's
employees. This was not disputed by the respondent. The nego-
tiations resulted in the signing of a preliminary agreement on
March 19. By the terms of this agreement the respondent recog-
nized the Union as the collective bargaining agency for such em-
ployees of the respondent as were members of the Union. The
agreement provided for a 121/2-per cent raise on all base and piece
rates, a 40-hour Monday to Friday workweek, and an 8-hour day.
The agreement further provided that the parties should meet again
not later than April 2, 1937, "for the purpose of effectuating a
written agreement on working conditions, application of wage rates,
hours, rules and a method for the adjudication of disputes arising
under the terms of this agreement, and which agreement shall incor-
porate the terms of this agreement."
On April 2, the appointed day, the Union representatives met
with the respondent and discussed various features which the Union
desired the permanent agreement .to cover. It was decided to turn
these matters over to the Union's attorney to be drawn up in legal
' See Matter of Arthur L. Colten and A. J. Colman, co-partners , doing business as Kiddie
Kover Manufacturing Company and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 6 N. L.
B. B., 355; Matter of Bradford Dyeing Association ( U. S. A.) (a Corporation ) and Textile
Workers Organizing Committee of the C. 1 0., 4 N. L. R. B. 604.
950 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
terminology and then to be discussed by him with the respondent's
attorney. Within the following weeks the Union's attorney sub-
mitted drafts of the proposed final contract to the respondent's
attorney. The second of these drafts was the basis of discussion
during subsequent negotiations.
b. Negotiations for a permanent contract
On April 28, May 7, 10, 11, and 19, the respondent met with the
union representatives and discussed the terms that should be em-
bodied in the final contract. The Board's complaint raises the ques-
tion whether the respondent during negotiations on the above dates
bargained in good faith with the intention of reaching an agreement
if possible, or whether it merely went through the formality of
negotiations with the intent of avoiding any agreement. In deter-
mining the question of good faith, it should be noted that up until
April 28 relations between the two parties were cordial and coop-
erative. On April 28 and thereafter the respondent's representa-
tives showed a marked change in their attitude toward the Union.
Whereas the preliminary agreement of March 19 had been reached
without serious controversy, the negotiations on April 28 and there-
after were marked by a show of hostility toward the Union and by
a tendency to raise and magnify objections over matters of trivial
concern. At the hearing the respondent freely admitted a change
of attitude, but claimed that this was due to the conduct of the
Union organizer, Martin J. Walsh, in unjustifiably ordering the
shipping department to change the hours of employment, and of
the Union in voting to authorize its negotiating committee to call
a strike should negotiations fail to reach a successful conclusion.
The respondent explained this change of attitude on the further
ground that various newspaper articles, brought to its attention
during the period of negotiations, raised doubts in its mind con-
cerning the responsibility of the Union.
The evidence shows that this change was related in part at least
to the appearance of two new figures on the respondent's negotiating
staff. The attorney who up to this point had handled negotiations
for the respondent was replaced by his associate, Jay Clark, Jr.
Clark acted as spokesman for the respondent at the conferences which
followed and played a prominent part in the respondent's activities
during the period following the conferences. On his recommenda-
tion the respondent took steps to' hire one Charles F. Gallagher to
assist the management. At the hearing it was contended by the
respondent that he was hired to take the place of E. Windsor Reed,
who prior to his death on February 13, 1937, had been in charge of
engineering and production at the plant. Gallagher testified that
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING Co . 951
he was experienced in many fields of manufacturing and distribution g
However, the facts are that he had not long previously written an
article on strikebreaking for a trade magazine in which he styled
himself "Labor Counsel to Industry," that his stationery was headed
"C. F. Gallagher and Company, Inc. Labor Counsel to Industry,"
and that, except for minor matters, his services up to the date of the
hearing in this case concerned only matters relating to the Union and
its members. On April 25 or thereabouts, the respondent decided to
engage Gallagher's services for $36,000 a year. On May 3, 1937, an
agreement was signed by the respondent and C. F. Gallagher and
Company 6 whereby the Gallagher Company was "to act as counsel
in all matters affecting the client's (respondent's) Public Relations
Policy and to advise the client, upon request, on matters affecting
employer-employee relations." It is noteworthy that the contract
makes no mention of management or advisory duties in connection
with engineering or production. From May 3 on, Gallagher was the
general who guided the respondent's strategy in dealing with the
Union. He never appeared at any of the conferences, nor was his
name or existence ever mentioned to the Union. He established
offices in a hotel, at which he conferred with the respondent's officials
and Clark before and after each bargaining conference. There the
details of the bargaining conferences would be discussed and plans
would be laid for the next steps to be taken by the respondent. Gal-
lagher admitted that during this period his office maintained a file
of newspaper clippings, which linked the C. I. O. with Communism,
sit-down strikes and industrial warfare. These clippings he showed
to the respondent's officials, and there were discussions regarding
Communism and industrial warfare. It is clear that the progress of
the negotiations with the Union was seriously hampered by the anxi-
ety engendered in the officials by this course of action. Negotiations
were further hampered by the fact that the respondent was relying
for guidance upon the advice of a person who refused to expose him-
self to the tempering influence of the conference table.
Despite the fact that during the negotiations much time was con-
sumed by the respondent's bickering over matters that could not
have given it serious concern, we do not think the evidence warrants
a finding that from April 28 to May 19 the respondent did not
i Gallagher testified that he was equipped to advise clients regarding : sales, merchandis-
ing, packaging, insurance, real estate, shipping and freight problems, bonus and incentive
plans, engineering, metallurgy, public relations, labor relations, time systems, shop lay-out,
mining, fire prevention, taxes, social events for employees, pricing and distribution
problems, and community projects.
8 Gallagher acted through a corporation, C. F. Gallagher and Company, Inc., over which
he had exclusive control.
952 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
expect or intend to enter into a contract with the Union if terms
acceptable to both sides could be reached.
At the end of the last of the five conferences, on May 19, the two
parties had agreed tentatively to the preamble and four sections
of the contract which dealt respectively with (1) recognition, (2)
wages, (3) hours of work, and (4) vacations. Most of the pro-
visions of these sections had been covered by the preliminary con-
tract. In addition the respondent now agreed to a minimum wage
provision provided that a minimum production standard could be
agreed to. The Union on its part agreed to a 44-hour week for the
shipping department provided that the shipping employees voted to
accept this variation of the preliminary contract, and left the granting
of vacations to the discretion of the respondent. Although mentioned,
no agreement was reached as to grievance procedure, holidays, access
to the plant for a union delegate, adjustment of inequalities in rates
of pay, minimum production standards, and the inclusion or exclusion
of citizenship as a consideration in promotions and lay-offs.
c. The strike
On May 25, 1937, Walsh and the negotiating committee, feeling
that the respondent was delaying negotiations unduly, called a strike,
and work ceased at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. An hour or
so after the commencement of the strike, Walsh received from Clark
a copy of an uncompleted draft of the contract as the respondent
wished it to be. Accompanying the draft was a letter which stated
in part : "We wish it to be distinctly understood that in typing this
draft for you we are doing so purely as a matter of courtesy and
it is not to be construed in any sense as the submission of a contract
by the management or the Company . . . Due to the fact that you
have persisted in your contention that you feel that aliens as a
matter of seniority should have equal preference to United States
citizens and Americans we feel very strongly on this point, but are
willing to concede that there may be some definite reason on your
part why you feel that aliens should stand on the same footing as
American citizens . . . Will you therefore be good enough to write
us at once the basis of your contention that aliens should have equal
rights with American citizens."
On or about June 3, 1937, the respondent sent Walsh a completed
form of contract, signed by the officers of the respondent. This pro-
posed contract set up a grievance procedure and a method of ad-
justment of wages which had been rejected by the Union, and
included citizenship as a consideration in promotions and lay-offs.
It provided no pay for holidays and gave no access to the plant for
a union delegate, as requested by the Union. It also contained the
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING Co. 953
following provision: "During the continuance of this agreement, or
any extension thereof, or at any time in the future, the employees
and the union agree that they will not request or demand either a
closed shop agreement or the check-off system so-called." Together
with this contract was sent a letter which, although addressed to
Walsh, shows on its face that it was intended for employee consump-
tion. Copies of this letter were mailed by the respondent to each
employee and read in part :
If it is dues, fines, and assessments you are after-and we can-
not believe the employees are interested in those things-that is
another matter.
We had 52 years of peaceful, harmonious relations with our
employees until you and the C. I. O. became "intermediaries"
for our workers.
Since then our employees and ourselves have had nothing but
trouble, strikes, loss of work and wages, etc.
Our Directors could quickly settle with our employees if you
did not needlessly agitate said employees, mis-inform and mis-
lead them. The law . . . for the present . . . forces us to deal
with you-and as U. S. citizens (despite your dislike of them and
desire to exalt the alien) we still, speaking for the company, do
and will obey the law.
Judging from the many unsolicited letters received by the
management from our employees, you will undoubtedly find that
the great majority of them are anxious to return to work, are
opposed to this C. I. O. sabotage of their wage earning capacity,
and will enthusiastically welcome your prompt signing.
We find that the respondent was fully aware that this proposed
contract would not be acceptable to the Union, and that the respond-
ent sent it to Walsh with the letter purely as a strategic maneuver
to undermine the faith of the union members in their leaders, and
not as an attempt to reach an agreement. As set out more fully in
following sections, this constituted an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
d. Tactics used by the respondent to defeat collective bargaining and
to break the strike
(1) Interference, restraint, and coercion
With the beginning of the strike Gallagher and his corporation
expanded their activities. In the magazine article mentioned above,
entitled "Public Relations and Strikes," he had written :
954 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A labor crisis today demands new methods for quickly and
skilfully organizing public opinion-methods which capital until
recently has been too proud or too indifferent to accept. Force
and bloodshed are entirely unnecessary; also the thick-headed
guards, the provocative private detectives, and questionable
characters of all types, who practice the so-called `Art of Strike
Breaking.' Instead of these strong armed men, a scientific staff
swings into action to present the facts, to organize public opinion,
to defend business against the attacks of labor racketeers. Spot
news men, reporters, wire men, statistical men land at the strike
headquarters. Government, Federal, State and Local laws and
labor requirements are at their finger tips, or at the end of a
telephone. Every conference is planned; the military strategy
of warring armies is no more carefully prepared than that of a
big industrial dispute. Full cooperation is given the national
and local press. No favors are asked. What is wanted by the
newspapers is news and the truth. They get it. The strategy
of the opponent is carefully watched, checked and in many cases
pre-diagnosed. Weak points are attacked; strong points call for
a strong defense or counter offense.
Instead of trying to settle the strike by collective bargaining as
requested by the Union and required by the Act, most of the respond-
ent's activities during the strike, under the direction of Gallagher,
conformed to the campaign advocated in the foregoing quotation.
Gallagher's office, employing four persons, was equipped with mimeo-
graphing machines and mailing facilities. From May 28 to June 14,
bulletins, cartoons, reprints of correspondence, and a copy of a radio
address given on June 1, 1937 by Chester T. Reed, the respondent's
president, were mailed to all employees. News releases were given to
the press.
The dispatches were aimed primarily at discrediting the Union
and its leaders in the eyes of its members. One of several means of
discrediting the Union was by stigmatizing it and its methods as
"alien" and "Un-American." Thus in the letter to Walsh on June 3,
copies of which were distributed to the employees, the respondent
said : "The law ... for the present ... forces us to deal with you ...
and as U. S. citizens (despite your dislike of them and desire to
exalt the alien) we still ... will obey the law." Again on June 14 a
dispatch to the employees said: "They (the employees) are realizing
that the only way they can ever get back to work is to go down to the
Union meeting ... and take a written ballot, supervised by their own
people, and not a group of aliens and foreigners, to go back to work."
An oblique method of reinforcing this stigma was the hiring of a
stamping machine which printed on envelopes sent to employees the
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO . 955
legend "U. S. Citizenship is an Asset." We are convinced that the
respondent's choice of this legend was in no way induced by patriotic
motives; on the contrary we find that this was one of the many
devices used by the respondent to discourage the employees' allegiance
to the Union.
Another method of attack running through all the dispatches was
the imputation of pecuniary motives to the union leaders. Thus on
June 7 the respondent mailed a mimeographed letter to each em-
ployee, which reads in part:
The New York Herald Tribune of February 16, 1937, states :
"John L. Lewis as head of the United Mine Workers in one year
disciplined 4,031 members with fines aggregating $387,205.00 and
with expulsions amounting to 150,117 years; an average fine of
about $70.00 and an average period of exile of 37 years for each
culprit. The nature of the offense was not revealed, but the
accused has to pay the fine once it is assessed and cannot work
at the one calling at which he is experienced unless the fine is
paid."
Ask C. I. 0. Walsh to tell you about this C. I. 0. "scheme"
for getting money from your pay envelope. If our employees
want this kind of an arrangement where eventually their pay
envelopes are slashed by fines and assessments, we can do
nothing.
It is costing our employees $30,000.00 a week-$6,000.00 a
day-$12.50 every minute-in wages, that "Salary" Walsh holds
you out on strike and the C. I. 0. refuses to let you work.
"Salary" Walsh gets his salary, he never goes on strike-his pay
never stops-while he opens up soup kitchens and offers you
charity, the Company offers honest work and good wages.
Which do you want, Charity-"hand outs" at a soup kitchen,
or decent work, with decent hours, at decent wages? C. I. 0.
offers you the former, the Company the latter. You won't find
"Salary" Walsh on strike taking any charitable hand-outs from
a soup kitchen. He gets paid, whether you work or starve. The
C. I. 0. takes care of him. Has it taken care of you, did it pay
you substitute wages for what you are losing? From its bulging
financial treasury is it paying you benefits? Ask yourself what
it is costing you to listen to the mis-information that is being
put in the press by C. I. 0. "Salary" Walsh. We can and have
proved his statements are false. Some of his demands are im-
possible . . .
The Company cannot by law tell you that you must join or
must not join any organization. It cannot and will not inter-
fere with any union activities. But when our employees are the
956 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
victims of what has all the earmarks of a well organized "racket"
we can, and will, tell them what the law is, what their rights
are, and see that they are not exploited.
On June 14 this idea was expanded by sending to each employee
a newspaper article written by a syndicated columnist, Westbrook
Pegler, denouncing the "ruthless dictatorship robbing the children of
the workers ... in the guise of altruistic labor leadership."
A third theme running through the dispatches was the suggestion
that the Union was being managed by the leaders in disregard of
the wishes of the members. In the radio speech referred to above,
Reed said : "The C. I. O. is your servant, not your master. It merely
represents you. They cannot order you around, and make you do
what you do not wish to do." And again in the letter of June 3 it
was said, "you (Walsh) may realize you are really their agent or
servant and not their dictator or master." The June 7 letter to the
employees reads : "The Company feels that those active in the strike
are just being made `dupes' and `used' by the C. I. O. but can't as
yet realize they are just puppets while the C. I. O. pulls the strings.
The Company . . . regrets . . . that a few lent themselves to a
scheme to fool the workers."
A fourth resort was to outright abuse and name-calling. The
letter of June 14 reads : "Little by little we are exposing the FAKES
and CROOKED moves of Walsh and his C. I. O. group." Later in
the letter the respondent continues :
Arthur O. Wharton, President of the International Associa-
tion of Machinists, in the New York Times, characterizes the
C. I. O. as follows :
"Lewis, Hillman, Dubinsky, Howard, and their gang of
sluggers, communists, radicals and soap box artists, professional
bums, expelled members of labor unions, outright `scabs' and all
the . . . red affiliates."
This is what one of the leading labor authorities says of
C. I. O.
Which classification does C. I. O. Walsh and his group belong
to?
Most of the literature contained invitations and pleas to the em-
ployees to write letters to the respondent setting forth their indi-
vidual views as to the justification for the strike. "We promise your
names will not be divulged, and as President of the Company I will
be glad personally to answer each and every letter and make any
explanations you may request or furnish you with any data you may
require." 7
't Chester T. Reed's radio speech of June 1, 1937.
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 957
During the strike a number of letters were sent in by employees.
One such, written by Arthur T. Royal, Jr., is in evidence. A reply
to this was sent by Reed which read in part : "From the many replies
we are receiving from our people we realize that a great majority of
our employees do not, and did not, want this strike." Further on in
the letter Reed referred to the pecuniary motives of the union leaders,
and castigated the Union as being run by "a minority of foreigners,
aliens and outsiders." The letter in no way attempted to answer a
specific question concerning wages which Royal had asked in his
letter. It is clear that the respondent's solicitation of letters was not,
as announced, for the purpose of answering questions that had arisen
in the minds of the employees, but was a scheme of further poisoning
the minds of those employees wl,o showed themselves to be particu-
larly responsive to the respondent's propaganda, as well as to ascer-
tain the effectiveness of such propaganda.
It is unnecessary to quote further from the mimeographed material
that was mailed to the employees. For the respondent to address
such anti-union propaganda to its employees was coercive and
derogated from the rights of the employees to self-organization. The
respondent in defense contends that these were merely expressions of
opinion and were made for the purpose of defending the Company's
good name from misstatements made by the Union. The matter
quoted above as well as much of the other material contained in the
respondent's literature had no relation to correcting misstatements
or defending the Company's good name, but served merely as a part
of a deliberate campaign used to break the Union and coerce and
intimidate the employees from joining and assisting the Union. We
find that by disseminating this anti-union propaganda the respondent
has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
(2) The back-to-work movement and the contract of July 13
From the radio speech of June 1, until June 14, each piece of lit-
erature sent out by the respondent contained an exhortation to the
employees to turn against the union leaders. After the mailing of
the contract to Walsh on June 3, this suggestion of revolt became
associated in the respondent's literature with the signing of the con-
tract and the ending of the strike. Thus in the second letter of June
3, Reed said :
We believe our employees may descend upon you (Walsh) in
a body with such a strenuous demand to be allowed to sign this
contract and go back to work and insist upon their right to tell
you what to do and how to do it that you may realize you are
really their agent or servant and not their dictator or master.
958 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4
Neither your threat of imposing fines nor the so-called crack-
ing of the whip will deter some of these employees judging by
the tone of their letters to the management from taking pretty
prompt action in forcing you to obey their wishes, sign the con-
tract, call off the strike and permit them to go back to work.
On June 14 the respondent's letter read in part :
Walsh and his C. I. O. understrappers don't fear any com-
pany union. They fear the rising tide of angry employees, the
men and women they have forced out of work for weeks, without
work, without pay, into debt and worry-these people are be-
ginning to awaken-they have tired of listening to Walsh and
the C. I. O.-they are tired of his miserable charity, hand
outs-they can't eat "hot air" and "blah." They are awakening.
They are coming from their homes and residences. They are
realizing that the only way they can ever get back to work is
to go down to the union meeting, demand the right to have the
contract signed by the union officers, and take a written ballot,
supervised by their own people, and not a group of aliens and
foreigners, to go back to work.
This rumbling roar C. I. O. hears in its ears is a group of
determined Americans ready to fight for the right to work
through the ballot. They have had enough of delay, of unfilled
promises, of lies and CHARITY. Our people do not want to have
to beg for their bread in a C. I. O. soup line. They want work,
and the avalanche of our people is about to descend. Walsh and
the C. I. O. are afraid-those who booed our people are about
- ready to hunt their holes.
Similar advice was contained in the bulletins and letters mailed
out June 7, 10, and 11.
After suggesting this in the letter of June 7, the respondent said :
What are you going to do about it? The Company is ready,
willing and able to open the factory, when a majority of our
employees demand that they return to work. Delay may change
this plan.
During the third week of the strike a movement began among some
of the employees to return to work. On June 10, 1937, Hargrove
and Stoddard, two employees, went to the office of Charles Ward
Johnson, an attorney whom both of them had previously known, told
him that they believed that a majority of the employees wanted to
return to work, and asked him what could be done. Johnson pre-
pared a written motion for a vote of the union members by secret
ballot as to whether or not the strike should be ended and the re-
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 959
spondent's contract accepted. This he gave to Hargrove and Stoddard
with the suggestion that they present it at a meeting of the Union.
At a union meeting on the following Tuesday, June 15, Hargrove
and Stoddard caused Johnson's motion to be presented and it was
unanimously voted to hold such a secret ballot at a subsequent meet-
ing. On the following day Hargrove and Stoddard learned that at
a meeting of the Union held at noon on that day, the vote for a secret
ballot had been rescinded. This meeting had not been attended by
Hargrove or Stoddard. On Thursday, June 17, Hargrove and Stod-
dard again called at the office of Johnson and told him the result.
Johnson stated that in his judgment the Union was not playing fair
with the workers and that the back-to-work group must take the
initiative in circulating a petition among the employees. Johnson
then called Clark, the respondent's attorney, on the telephone and told
him that there had been a new development in the strike situation.
A few minutes later Clark appeared at Johnson's office and Johnson
explained the situation to him. Clark replied that he was sorry but
he could not touch the matter with a 10-foot pole. In reply to John-
son's question, however, he did indicate that if Johnson represented a
majority of the respondent's employees he supposed the respondent
would be obliged to deal with him. Hargrove and Stoddard then left
Johnson's office and arranged another meeting for Saturday, June 19,
which was attended by about 30 of the employees.
At the meeting of June 19, Johnson gave the employees mimeo-
graphed forms of a petition upon which they were to secure the signa-
tures of as many workers as possible. The petitions were addressed
to the respondent and read as follows :
We, the undersigned employees of the Reed & Prince Manu-
facturing Company of Worcester, Mass. herewith state that we
are desirous of returning to work and are willing to accept the
contract offered by the Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company
and signed by said Company and delivered to the C. I. O. head-
quarters under date of June 2, 1937,8 and we on behalf of our-
selves herewith authorize the annexation of our signatures to said
contract and agree that this act shall constitute our acceptance
and approval of said contract and the ending of the present
strike.
The testimony of witnesses called by Johnson shows that the mem-
bers of the back-to-work movement had little or no interest in signing
any contract before returning to work. A large number of these
witnesses testified on cross-examination that they desired the contract
because they felt that they could get back to work sooner with this
• This should properly have been June 3, 1937.
960 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contract than without it. The fact that the signing of the respond-
ent's contract was always coupled in the respondent's literature with
the ending of the strike is the only explanation of the inclusion of both
in the motion presented to the union meeting, and in the back-to-work
petition. This coincidence, together with the fact that a motion for
a secret ballot was also suggested in the respondent's bulletins, indi-
cates that this movement was the looked-for result of the respondent's
campaign of propaganda. It is also clear that some of the employees
felt that the acceptance of the contract was a necessary condition to
returning to work. We find that the signing of the petitions was in-
duced and brought about by the suggestions .and exhortations con-
tained in the literature which the respondent mailed to its employees.
During the following weeks several of the employees were active in
soliciting signatures to the petitions. By July 12, 1937, 411 of the
respondent's employees had signed these petitions. At a meeting
held in Johnson's office on that day it was decided to give Walsh a
final opportunity to sign the respondent's contract on behalf of the
Union. A committee was, therefore, sent to Walsh with a letter from
Johnson stating that Johnson had in his possession the signatures
of a majority of the employees of the respondent "with the authori-
zation that their signatures may be annexed to the contract offered by
the Reed & Prince Mfg. Company and delivered to the C. I. O. head-
quarters under date of June 2, 1937,9 such act to constitute their
acceptance and approval of said contract and the ending of the
present strike." The letter finished with this paragraph : ". . . if
said contract has not been delivered to the Reed & Prince Mfg. Com-
pany by ten A. M. July 13th, 1937, with the proper signatures of the
officers of the C. I. O. attached thereto, I shall feel free to offer the
signatures in my possession to Jay Clark, Esq., attorney for the Reed
& Prince Mfg. Company for their annexation to the said contract"
This letter indicates the confusion in the mind of Johnson and the
leaders of the back-to-work movement as to whether these petitions
signified the desire of the employees that the Union should execute
the respondent's contract or whether they authorized the annexation
of the signatures of the employees directly to the respondent's con-
tract. Walsh told the committee which called upon him with John-
son's letter that he would not sign the respondent's contract. Johnson
thereupon communicated with the respondent and a conference was
arranged, to be held in Clark's office on Tuesday, July 13. On July
13 Johnson and a committee met at Clark's office and annexed the
signed petitions to a contract similar to the June 3 contract, but sub-
stituting the words : "the employees of the Company" for "the Union."
This should properly have been June 3, 193T.
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING Co. 961
When the plant reopened on July 14 after the strike, as discussed
below, it was generally known, of course, that a majority of the em-
ployees had signed the respondent's contract and that the respondent
had these signatures in its possession. Word circulated through the
plant that the respondent's contract was available for signature in the
office of Irvine, the personnel manager. Subsequent to the reopening
of the plant 107 additional employees affixed their signatures to this
contract. Those who signed the contract left their work at various
times and went to Irvine's office. According to Irvine's testimony he
always gave employees a chance to read the contract and offered to
explain any provisions of it to them. It appears, however, that few
availed themselves of this opportunity. We find that the employees
signing the contract after the plant had reopened were impelled to
this step not because they understood the contract and independently
desired to become parties to it, but because they did not want to set
themselves apart from the majority of the employees in the eyes of
the respondent. It was, therefore, merely a continuation of the origi-
nal impetus given the back-to-work movement by the respondent's
propaganda.
It is not clear whether the petitions envisaged a collective agree-
ment or a series of individual contracts. They were not in any sense
the result of collective or individual bargaining. Whatever their
status as contracts may have been, they were the result of the exhorta-
tions and admonitions contained in the respondent's literature and a
part of its plan for destroying the Union. When a contract is
brought about through unlawful means and for an unlawful purpose
it partakes of the illegality with which it is associated, and is
therefore invalid.
Furthermore, if this was intended as a collective contract it is
invalid for the further reason that it was signed and executed at a
time when the Union was the exclusive representative of the employ-
ees to negotiate and sign a contract. The only evidence introduced at
the hearing of a defection from the ranks of the Union, which other-
wise had the membership of an overwhelming majority, was that of
the back-to-work movement. We have found that this was the prod-
uct of the respondent's unfair labor practices and therefore cannot
be held effective to detract from the Union's right to represent all
the employees. The contract, having been made in contravention of
this superior right, must give way to it, and is invalid.
If the contracts were individual contracts with each employee they
were made as a result of the respondent's direct dealing with the
employees over the heads of the union leaders. At this time no
impasse had been reached between the respondent and the Union.
962 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Such a practice of dealing with individual employees over the heads
of their representatives is destructive of the principles of collective
bargaining, for it not only undercuts the authority of the chosen
representatives to act within the sphere of representation but subjects
the individual employee to the very pressures which collective bar-
gaining would obviate. The contracts, having been attained by going
over the heads of the union representatives, are the intended result
of the respondent's unfair labor practice and are therefore invalid.
We find that the respondent, by using coercive means to induce
employees to repudiate the strike and to sign the contract, has inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
From July 12 until the hearing in this proceeding, the back-to-
work movement was inactive as a labor organization. It never per-
fected its structure or held meetings. It had no further contact with
the respondent. Because it has not functioned in the plant as a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act, we shall
dismiss the allegations of the complaint that the respondent has en-
gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (2)
of the Act.
(3) Attempts by the Union to bargain collectively after commence-
ment of the strike
Shortly after the beginning of the strike the Union had taken steps
to secure a conciliator from the United States Department of Labor.
On June 4, James L. Bernard, the conciliator, arrived in Worcester
and conferred with both parties separately. On the next day, June 5,
Bernard and the union representatives met with the respondent.
Bernard stated that he felt that all the differences could be settled if
the respondent would agree to a provision setting up an arbitration
system as a final recourse for the settlement of grievances. The re-
spondent, however, both promptly refused this compromise and re-
sented the efforts of Bernard to persuade the respondent to accept it.
Ernest C. Boyd, the respondent's vice president, testified that at the
conference of June 5, Bernard was an "excellent C. I. O. advocate."
Following the conference of June 5, Bernard made the following
statement to the press :
I found that the contract as submitted by the Company would
leave no legal redress for an employee seeking an adjustment
of a grievance. The law courts of Massachusetts have no jurisdic-
tion in labor matters unless such matters concern the discharge
of an employee for union activities. No judge would admit a
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 963
case of a dispute between employer and employee. It does not
belong in the courts. My suggestion to revise this paragraph in
the contract was turned down by the Company. It was accepted
by the Union, however.
While the statement that no judge would admit a case of a dispute
between an employer and employee may not be technically accurate,
it is obvious that law courts have no jurisdiction over the normal
employee grievance inasmuch as the subject matter is usually within
the discretion of the employer. Whether or not the issuance of this
statement exceeded the bounds of propriety, the respondent's reaction
affords eloquent proof that its representatives were in no mood for
bargaining. On June 6, the respondent sent to Secretary of Labor
Perkins an extravagantly worded telegram which, after quoting the
first three sentences of Bernard's statement, continued :
OUR COMPANY AMAZED AT PUBLIC UTTERANCE OF SUCH INCORRECT,
FALSE, UNTRUE AND DAMAGING STATEMENTS BY A GOVERNMENT REPRE-
SENTATIVE IN A STRIKE. ON BASIS OF BENARD [sic] STATEMENTS WE
DEMAND HIS IMMEDIATE RECALL AND SUSPENSION OF SUCH DISCIPLINARY
ACTION AS DEPARTMENT MAY DECIDE. STATEMENTS BY BENARD SHOW
ABSOLUTE AND TOTAL IGNORANCE OF ELEMENTAL LABOR PROCEDURE, LA-
BOR LAWS BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL, REQUIREMENTS OF HIS OWN DE-
PARTMENT, JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD AND
COLOSSAL IGNORANCE OF THE VERY FUNDAMENTALS OF THE WAGNER
ACT ITSELF....
WE DEMAND THE SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL OF THIS GOVERNMENT
CONCILIATOR WHO ISSUES SUCH UNWARRANTED, BIASED, UNTRUE AND
FALSE STATEMENTS AND LEAVES THE COMPANY IN THE POSITION OF THESE
FALSE CLAIMS WENT UNANSWERED, OF BEING UNCOOPERATIVE, WE CAN-
NOT FIND LANGUAGE STRONG ENOUGH TO CONDEMN SUCH UNFAIR AND
UNTRUE PUBLISHED STATEMENTS BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT WHOSE JOB IS ACTUALLY TO TRY TO END THE
TERRIFFIC LOSS OF WAGES TO OUR EMPLOYEES AND BE IMPARTIAL BUT
WHO BY HIS OWN PUBLISHED STATEMENTS HAS IN EFFECT JOINED FORCES
WITH THE C. I. O: IN THEIR CAMPAIGN OF MISREPRESENTATION TO OUR
EMPLOYEES IT IS BEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION WHY THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT THROUGH ITS REPRESENTATIVES WOULD PERMIT ITSELF
TO BECOME PART OF THIS QUESTIONABLE STRATEGY. WE SHALL CONTINUE
AS BEFORE TO TELL THE PUBLIC AND OUR EMPLOYEES THE PLAIN TRUTH
AS TO WHY THEY WERE FORCED OUT ON STRIKE. THEY WELL KNOW WHAT
IT IS COSTING THEM AND DOZENS HAVE WRITTEN IN TO US PROTESTING AT
THE UN-AMERICAN METHODS TO WHICH THEY ARE OPPOSED CONTINUOUSLY
BEING USED BY THE C. I. 0. AND THEIR AGENTS.
This telegram was given by the respondent to the press. Thereafter
Bernard withdrew from the negotiations.
A second effort to resolve the dispute was made by the Union a few
days later when Clinton S. Golden, northeastern regional director of
the Union, wrote Chester T. Reed the following letter :
169134-39-vol. 12--62
964 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
STEEL WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE,
3600 Grant Building, Pittsburgh, Pa., June 9, 1937.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. CHESTER T. REED, President,
Reed and Prince Manufacturing Company,
Worcester, Massachusetts.
DEAR MR. REED: (1) As indicated above this is a personal and
confidential letter to you. It is not being released to the press,
nor will its contents be made known to anyone by us. It is sent
you with the hope that a way may be found to effect an honor-
able settlement of the controversy between our organization rep-
resenting your employees and your Company.
(2) When the original contract was entered into with your
-Company, the reports reaching us indicated you were an honor-
able man to deal with and that you commanded the respect both
of your employees and our representatives. We looked forward
to developing a sound and mutually satisfactory collective bar-
gaining relationship of a permanent character.
(3) From this distance it appears that some mistakes have
been made by our representatives and that you have been badly
advised by someone.
(4) As for the responsibility and integrity of the officers of
this Committee and of the writer we refer you to the executives
of any of the several score of companies with whom we have
dealt and with whom we have concluded contracts.
(5) We would much prefer a settlement on an honorable and
mutually satisfactory basis of the present controversy than to
have to continue it. If it continues indefinitely, both your Com-
pany and our organization will lose.
(6) From all I have heard of you prior to the strike I believe
you and I can reason together and pave the way at least for a
settlement. May we meet° as man to man without either of us
being burdened or handicapped by the presence of lawyers or
other experts? I will be glad to hear from you.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) CLINTON S. GOLDEN,
Director, Northeastern Region.
CSG/mgs
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO . 965
To this letter the respondent sent the following reply :
REED & PRINCE MFG. CO.,
1 DUNCAN AVENUE,
Worcester , Mass., U. S. A., June 11, 1937.
Mr . CLINTON S. GOLDEN,
Director, Northeastern Region,
Steel Workers Organizing Committee,
3600 Grant Building , Pittsburgh, Pa.
DEAR SIR : This will acknowledge your amazing letter of June
9th, marked "Personal and Confidential ," and I have numbered
the six paragraphs so that I may reply to it by reference con-
secutively.
1. You state that you have not released your letter to the press,
nor will the contents be made known to anyone by you. Let us
make ourselves clear , Mr. Golden . We are not going into any
secret back room conference with the C. I. 0., and permit our
employees "to be sold down the river ." We believe Collective
Bargaining should be out in the open between the Company and
the alleged representatives-the cards on the table-and we want
no part of any secret or confidential bargaining as you suggest.
Your Mr. Walsh tried to get a secret meeting with me , and stated
in front of the employees ' committee it was not concerning the
proposed contract . His later admission proved his statement
to be false.
2. Secondly , you state that reports reaching you indicated that
I was an honorable man and commanded the respect of our em-
ployees. Both reports are still correct , Mr. Golden.
3. You state that some mistakes have been made by your rep-
resentative . I presume you refer to the following:
A. Calling an unjustified strike in the middle of collective
bargaining.
B. Destroying by this action, through loss of orders, etc.,
dozens of permanent jobs for our employees.
C. Causing an unjustified loss of thousands of dollars in
wages to our employees.
D. Continuing to hold out these employees on strike at fur-
ther heavy loss, without reason.
E. Refusal to sign the fair, honest contract signed by the
Company, and continuing to hold our employees from
working.
F. Coercing the Company to sign an illegal contract, and
unless we do , prohibit us from operating.
G. Issuing false statements to the press , and deliberately at-
tempting to mis-lead our employees.
966 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
H. Threatening our officials with violence, if we attempted
to exercise our legal rights and ship merchandise.
I. Your Mr. Walsh showed C. I. O.'s true purpose and stand-
ard of conduct when he said "to Hell with the courts
of Massachusetts. They are 50 years behind the
times." That was a mistake worthy of being con-
ceived in the womb of a Russian Communist.
There are more , but I will not tire you.
You further state that we have been badly advised by some-
one. We were advised by Conciliator Bernard of the U. S. De-
partment of Labor to sign the C. I. O. stock contract, that others
had signed, without debate, and submit to an umpire scheme,
and give up the company's rights in court, and throw overboard
the National Labor Relations Board. You are right-we were
badly advised. But we are no longer taking Mr. Bernard's
advice.
4. As to your references as to responsibility and integrity of
your C. I. O. executives, you refer us to the executives of several
score of companies with whom you have contracts.
We notice you failed to include the names of the companies.
Do you by any chance refer to General Motors with whom
C. I. O. has a contract-with 65 strikes since February 11th?
Do you possibly mean the dozens of companies in Michigan about
whom we read so much in the press? Or do you refer to the-
Chrysler Company with its strikes after contracts?
5. You say you want an honorable and mutually satisfactory
contract. This is the third time you, of all people, use the word
"honorable." Very well, Mr. Golden, instruct your local C. I. O.
agent to do what our employees want him to do. Sign the con-
tract the company has already signed, and permit our many
employees to return to work without further loss. That's the
only answer, Mr. Golden.
And now for the most important part of your letter.
You state that if the controversy continues indefinitely both
our company and your organization will lose.
Not a single word in your whole letter about the eight hundred
employees, our people, who are without work, without wages,
because of C. I. O. and its agent's despicable refusal to permit
them to work. You ignore the loss of $6,000 a day, now $72,500,
to our employees.
What about all these people, Mr. Golden? We are losing
money, it is true, lots of it. But we are interested in our em-
ployees; we understand what it means to be without work, with
no wages coming in, with bills to pay, people to feed, clothes
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 967
to buy, homes to purchase, payments to make. We understand
and sympathize with our people and their problems. But your
only worry is your organization. Isn't it the dues, fines and
assessments which you annually collect from employees that you
and the C. I. O. are losing, which you bemoan, rather than the
wages of our employees?
That's the trouble with this whole strike. The employees who
are the most concerned-the people most affected-you don't even
mention them. They don't count apparently so long as the
C. I. O. organization is taken care of. We have suspected right
along that was the case and now you confirm it.
6. And finally you want us to meet as man to man, without,
as you state, "being burdened or handicapped by the presence
of lawyers or other experts."
No, Mr. Golden, that will never happen with the Reed and
Prince Company. We do our business out in the daylight; we
are neither burdened or handicapped by the presence of lawyers
or other experts. Our counsel, we have found, has been of im-
measurable value and service to us, and our policy is to retain
the best possible. We want no part of any "secret" meetings, no
"back room" conferences. We are not going "to sell our em-
ployees down the river" in any confidential deal.
If you really want to end this strike, Mr. Golden, there is only
one answer. The contract the Company has signed contains all
the clauses mutually agreed. upon in collective bargaining. It is
already signed by us. All it needs is the signature of the alleged
representatives of our employees on it. This can be done in ten
minutes.
And the strange part of this whole wasteful strike is, that if
your agent Walsh of the C. I. O. were to call a meeting of all the
employees of our mill, and employees only-and take a vote on
the two questions :
(1) Do they wish the contract signed by the Company to be
signed by the employees' representatives?
(2) Do they wish to call off the strike and return to work?
he would get only one answer.
Take a written, "secret" ballot on that-if you want secrecy,
Mr. Golden-and you will find, that our employees will be back
at work Monday morning.
We regret we cannot accept your kind invitation for a "secret"
meeting.
Yours very truly,
REED & PRINCE MFG. COMPANY,
CHESTER T. REED, President.
968 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A mimeographed copy of Golden's letter and Reed's reply was
mailed to each employee. Reed's reply shows on its face that he was
not insisting on the right to have "lawyers or other experts" present
at bargaining conferences, but was using Golden's request as an op-
portunity to heap abuse upon the Union.
In this letter, as well as in other mimeographed material distributed
to the employees, the respondent endeavored to picture the arbitration
provision as a novel and dangerous device. It was variously char-
acterized as "illegal," "C. I. 0. `umpire scheme,' " "anti-American,
alien, foreign doctrines," "the `umpire scheme' concocted by the
Union," "scheme of umpires" which would "throw overboard the
courts of Massachusetts and the National Labor Relations Board."
At the hearing Gallagher testified that he had seen "hundreds" of
labor contracts containing arbitration provisions. The respondent
was fully apprised from other sources that such a device was far from
uncommon in labor contracts. To misrepresent intentionally this
subject to its employees over the heads of the union leaders is clearly
indicative of an attitude inimical to collective bargaining.
Similar insincerity is to be found in the manner in which the re-
spondent represented the issue of citizenship as a consideration in
promotions and lay-offs. Prior to the strike, approximately 15 per
cent of the employees were aliens. No substantial distinction had
ever been made by the respondent between aliens and citizens. It
was testified that if all other factors were equal between two em-
ployees, a citizen would be preferred, to an alien. No instance, how-
ever, of such a preference could be cited. The respondent's president
testified that he would "consider citizenship of minor importance."
Subsequent to the strike, Irvine, the manager of industrial relations,
told an employee, a citizen who had been laid off, that the issue of
citizenship "is something we played up during the strike." The re-
spondent's attitude on the citizenship issue at the time of the hearing
stands in contrast to its efforts to magnify it during the strike. We
find that it was merely a device to sow dissension among the union
members.
A third effort by the Union resulted in a conference before the
State Board of Arbitration and Conciliation on June 28. At this
conference Samuel Angoff, the attorney who now represented the
Union, "raised certain questions as to other clauses (than the sen-
iority and grievance clauses), wanted then to reopen negotiations on
clauses we had already agreed to with the Union, clauses relating to
time, equitable adjustment of rates, all of which he wanted to reopen
and swap one clause against another, and we (the respondent) de-
clined to do that." 10 Regarding the seniority and grievance clauses
10 Statement made by Clark before the Superior Court of Worcester County, June 30,
1937, in an injunction suit.
REED Bc PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO . 969
the respondent refused to make any concession. The respondent ap-
pears to have agreed to limit to a 10-year period the provision that
there should be no request for a closed shop. No further compromise
was reached. At the conclusion of the discussion Angoff asked Clark
for another conference. Clark replied in substance that he would
wait until after the court hearing on the respondent's bill in equity,
seeking an injunction and damages against those who participated
in the strike, which had been filed in the Superior Court on June 23.
The testimony of Reed at the court hearing on June 30 throws
light on the attitude of the respondent. We quote:
Q. You have made statements to the press that you would
never modify the contract that you submitted to the Union ; isn't
that true ?
A. Maybe. I don't recall particularly.
Q. Do you insist that this Exhibit 3, or this agreement marked
Exhibit 3 and signed by you and other officers of the Reed &
Prince Corporation is the only contract you will agree to?
A. I will say yes.
Had the respondent had any intention of trying to reach an agree-
ment, it is inconceivable that Reed would not have denied the pub-
lication of such an ultimatum. His subsequent statement that the
respondent would sign no contract other than the one offered by the
respondent confirms its attitude as one of complete intransigence.
A final effort to bring the parties together was made by the Union
through the mayor of Worcester. At a conference on July 15
between the mayor and the respondent's representatives, the mayor
requested that the respondent meet with the Union. Clark refused
flatly this time on the ground that the respondent had already signed
a contract with its employees (discussed above) and that the Union
no longer represented them.
e. Conclusions regarding the refusal to bargain collectively
It is obvious that in order that the collective bargaining contem-
plated by Section 8 (5) of the Act may be an effective means of
settling a strike which is already under way, more is necessary than
a mere statement of ultimata. The employer must meet the union
in an honest attempt to-compose the differences wherever possible.
In the present case there were some items in the contract offered by
the respondent that had not been taken up prior to the strike and
several more items that had merely been alluded to without any
serious discussion or negotiations. The respondent admitted that
after the conference of May 19 and prior to the strike they felt that
negotiations were going satisfactorily and expected that through
970 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELkTIONS BOARD
further negotiations the differences would be ironed out and a con-
tract arrived at which would be satisfactory to both parties. Instead
of continuing this course during the strike, the respondent stood
flatly on the offered contract as it was. We find that with the begin-
ning of the strike the respondent entirely abandoned its efforts and
intention to reach an agreement acceptable to both parties.
The first two efforts made by the Union to meet with the respond-
ent after the beginning of the strike, were utilized by the respondent
merely as material from which to mold propaganda which it directed
to its employees in an effort to forestall bargaining with their duly
designated representatives. At the meeting before the State Board,
the respondent held firmly to all the provisions of its contract except
for the one concession above mentioned, which it must have realized
was so insubstantial as to be no concession at all. The fourth over-
ture through the mayor met with a flat refusal.
The respondent contends that the specific responses, with which the
first three overtures of the Union were met, did not constitute refusals
to bargain collectively but were merely the insistence upon rights
which the respondent undoubtedly had. Although, viewed as acts
isolated from their context, this might appear to be the true situation,
nevertheless considering the negotiations prior to the strike, and the
whole course of the respondent's violently anti-union conduct subse-
quent to the strike, we find that these were part of a larger plan to
avoid any concessions that would be acceptable to the Union and in
the meantime to break the ranks of the Union so that collective bar-
gaining would be unnecessary. The carrying out of this plan in the
face of the various overtures from the Union constituted a refusal to
bargain collectively within the meaning of the Act.
The respondent raises the question as to whether the Union made
a proper request for collective bargaining within the contemplation
of the Act, when it insisted on bargaining on behalf of its members
only. At the conference on April 28, 1937, Clark made an objection
to the Union's proposed contract on the ground that it was a contract
on behalf of its members only. He maintained that under the Act
the Union was the exclusive representative of all the employees, and
that it therefore was under a duty to bargain on behalf of non-
members as well as members. The Union, however, insisted upon a
contract on behalf of its members only. At the second conference,
on May 7, the respondent acceded to the Union's stand but stated that
it would extend the benefits of the contract to all employees regardless
of their affiliation, and that it would post notices to that effect. The
Union did not object to this stand. In fact the benefits of the pre-
liminary contract were extended to all employees by the respondent.
At no point thereafter was this objection ever raised by the respond-
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING Co. 971
ent as the basis for refusing to bargain with the Union. It is prob-
able that had this objection been voiced as the reason for the refusal
to bargain, the Union would have changed their demands to obviate
the difficulty. We do not feel that the respondent can be heard at
this time to raise such an objection 11
The respondent maintains that under Massachusetts law the strike
was "unlawful and illegal." 12 The implication is that the respondent
was thereby relieved of its duty to bargain collectively. Nothing
in the language of the Act affords any support for such a proposition.
Nor would such a construction of the Act tend to effectuate its spirit
or purposes. The objective of the Act is to substitute collective bar-
gaining for industrial warfare by requiring that an employer shall
bargain collectively with the freely chosen representatives of his em-
ployees. If this objective is to be achieved it is fully as important
that the bargaining process be as available during the course of a
strike as prior to or subsequent to a strike. And the fact that the
strike may be tortious or enjoinable does not alter the situation. Were
the respondent's argument to be accepted it would mean that, at the
very point when an industrial controversy becomes most bitter and
when the collective bargaining provisions of the Act should provide
a peaceful means of settlement those provisions are cast aside and
the employer is permitted to engage in unrestricted violation thereof.13
We find no merit in the respondent's contention.
Furthermore, the alleged illegality of the strike was never given by
the respondent as a reason for refusing to bargain with the Union
during this period, nor do we find that the alleged illegality was in
any way related to the refusal to bargain. It cannot be raised at this
date as a ground for refusal.
We find that on June 5, 1937, and thereafter, the respondent re-
fused to bargain collectively with the Union as the representative of
its employees within the appropriate unit, and that such refusal
prolonged the strike. We also find that by such refusal the respond-
ent has interfered with, coerced, and restrained its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
f. The motion to intervene
As stated above, at the outset of the hearing Johnson presented a
motion signed by 5 employees and Johnson to intervene on behalf
of themselves and 523 other employees. The Trial Examiner granted
the motion as to the 5 signers but denied it as to the 523 on the
ground that Johnson had not adequately proved his authority to in-
U See National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A.
2d), certiorari denied, 304 U. S. 576.
32 This contention is discussed below in Section III B.
23 See National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., footnote 11 supra.
972 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tervene on their behalf. Thereafter, Johnson fully participated in
the hearing in all respects as if the motion had been granted in its
entirety. Toward the end of the hearing Johnson introduced into
evidence mimeographed petitions signed by 552 employees which
read as follows :
We the undersigned, employees of the Reed & Prince Mfg.
Company, of Worcester, Massachusetts, herewith authorize,
instruct and direct Charles Ward Johnson of said Worcester to
intervene in our behalf in all proceedings before the National
Labor Relations Board, where in his judgment our interests are
affected and more particularly in case $E1-C-307 and we further
authorize, instruct and direct Charles Ward Johnson to protect
our rights and interests in our contract dated July 13, 1937 with
the Reed & Prince Mfg. Company.
Of these 552 signatures Johnson testified that 528 had been signed
prior to the hearing and 24 during the hearing. He further testified
that of this number 417 had called at his office and had either signed
the authorization petition in his presence or had ratified their earlier
signature. It was stipulated that all the signatures were genuine
and that all the signers were employees of the respondent. The
Trial Examiner granted a motion by Johnson to amend his original
motion to intervene by dropping the names of certain employees and
adding the names of others thereby enlarging the number of inter-
venors from 528 to 547.
The denial by the Trial Examiner of Johnson's original motion to
intervene on behalf of 523 of the 528 employees was proper at the
time it was made. After the introduction of evidence of Johnson's
authority to represent them in this proceeding, however, it should
have been allowed as to all the employees named in the motion as
amended, other than the five employees as to whom it had already
been granted. We are of the opinion, however, that the rights of the
542 employees have not been prejudiced by the ruling of the Trial
Examiner. The interests of all 547 employees were identical, so that
in representing the 5 named intervenors, Johnson protected the inter-
ests of such other employees as joined with the 5. No restriction on
Johnson's participation in the proceeding resulted from the partial
denial of the motion to intervene. We hereby grant Johnson's
motion and consider him as having participated in the hearing on
behalf of all 547 intervenors.
B. The refusals to reinstate
Following hearings before the Superior Court of Worcester County,
Massachusetts, on June 30 and July 1, 1937, the Court on July 12 issued
a preliminary injunction which prohibited all strike activity including
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 973
picketing. The injunction was based on the theory, hereafter dis-
cussed, that the strike was illegal in that one of the purposes of the
strike was to obtain an arbitration provision. On July 14 the respond-
ent opened its plant and 249 employees returned to work. The Union,
however, did not immediately call off the strike. On Thursday, July
15, shortly before noontime, a group of union members and sym-
pathizers variously estimated at between 72 and 200 were picketing
on Cambridge Street, which adjoins the respondent's property but
is about 200 feet from the plant. In this group were Roy Harold
Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael C. Sullivan, and Mary P.
Sullivan, who were members of the Union and had been working at
the plant at the time of the strike on May 25. Mary Sullivan is
the sister of Michael Sullivan. All four had been active in the
Union during the strike. During the course of the picketing on
this day a number of persons, including some or all of the four named
employees, yelled "scab" and "rat" at the employees in the plant.
Shortly after noon, police officers of the city of Worcester arrested
the four named employees, together with three pickets not employed
by the respondent, and charged them with disturbing the peace. The
evidence shows that most, if not all the other pickets had shouted
"scab" and "rat" also. Later that afternoon the strike was called off
and the members of the Union sought to return to work. All who
applied were reinstated with the exception of the four employees who
had been arrested. The respondent announced to them that they
would not be reinstated until they had cleared themselves of the
charges. 14 Within a few days these four employees were tried in
the local District Court. Clark, the respondent's attorney, appeared
and prosecuted the cases. At the close of the evidence the judge
placed their cases "on file," which under Massachusetts practice means
that the four defendants were neither acquitted nor convicted.
Thereafter, the respondent continued to refuse to reinstate them,
giving as the reason that they had not cleared their names of the
charges. The three men subsequently reapplied for reinstatement
and were refused; Mary Sullivan, having heard from her brother
of the respondent's stand, did not reapply. It was admitted that
she would have been refused reinstatement had she applied.
At the hearing the respondent's president testified that the sole
reason for not reinstating these four employees was their conduct
in committing a breach of the peace and violating the injunction
on July 15. That the violation of the injunction was not the true
reason, however, is indicated by the respondent's professed willing-
ness to reinstate these four if they were found not guilty of the breach
14 Stevens and Gallant applied for reinstatement July 16, Michael Sullivan July 15, and
Mary Sullivan July 17.
974 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the peace. Also, the respondent took no disciplinary action against
other of its employees who had violated the injunction against pick-
eting to the respondent's knowledge. A moving-picture film of the
picketing, which it introduced as an exhibit in this proceeding, was
a means of identifying these employees. In connection with the
arrests, the -respondent's manager of industrial relations, Irvine, was
watching the picket line both before and after the arrests took place.
We find that he knew the identity of at least some of the other em-
ployees who shouted "scab" and "rat" No disciplinary measures
of any kind were taken regarding these others. A further fact which
discredits the respondent's contention that its refusal to reinstate
the four employees was motivated by their arrests was the rehiring
of an employee, Gustav Gasturas, with the others at the end of the
strike, with the knowledge that he had been arrested and charged
with an assault and battery, committed during the strike. At first
it was contended that the reason for differentiating between him
and the other four was that Gasturas' offense had been committed
3 miles from the plant. The respondent's president, however, testi-
fied that it would have made no difference if the four had been
arrested for activities out of sight and hearing of the plant, so long
as they were trying to prevent the respondent's employees from
coming back to work. It is to be noted that during the noon hour
on the day of the arrests, employees who had returned to work
passed freely through the picket line.
We feel that had the respondent really considered the breach of
the peace and violation of the injunction so serious an offense as
to merit, even for the purpose of setting an example, the harshest
form of punishment within its power to give, it would have taken at
least some minor form of discipline or given some indication of dis-
approval in these other similar situations. The fact that it did not
leads us to the conclusion that it did not consider this type of offense
very reprehensible and that it was not because of these violations
that the four employees were refused reinstatement. For all the
reasons stated above, we find that the respondent was unwilling that
the strike, called and prosecuted in defiance of the respondent, should
go entirely unpunished. The provisions of the Act forbade discrim-
ination against the strikers as strikers. The arrests of these four
furnished a pretext for the refusal to reinstate them. The desire
of the respondent to have the four convicted, as evidenced by Clark's
prosecution of the charges, supports this view. We find that the
respondent refused to reinstate these four employees because they
participated in the strike. By such refusal the respondent discrimi-
nated against them in regard to hire and tenure of employment,
thereby discouraging membership in the Union.
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO . 975
The respondent, however, maintains that the strike itself was
illegal, apparently arguing that therefore it was free to discriminate
against employees for engaging in the strike. Two cases decided by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts would indicate that in
Massachusetts a strike is enjoinable where it has for one of its objects
the obtaining of an arbitration agreement with the employer.I5 One
of the objectives of the strike called by the Union was to obtain an
arbitration provision in the grievance clause, and presumably the ac-
tivities of the strikers must, therefore, be deemed to be tortious under
the Massachusetts law. There is no question but that, except for the
tortious nature of the strike, the refusals to reinstate were discrimina-
tory under the Act, inasmuch as a strike to enforce demands is a
legitimate union activity and cannot be made the basis for disci-
plinary action. We do not feel that the fact that by Massachusetts
law a strike to enforce a demand for an arbitration clause is tortious
should alter the situation in this respect. The situation is very differ-
ent from that in the case of the National Labor Relations Board v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation 'e in which the Court held that an
employer could properly discharge employees because they had seized
and held the plant of the employer and had participated in violence
and destruction of property. We do not think that the holding of the
Supreme Court in that case was intended to apply to a situation such
as this where the action of the strikers was peaceful and involved no
violence. The strike in the present case was at most a civil tort from
which the respondent had adequate protection in the courts of Massa-
chusetts. It cannot be said seriously that engaging in this strike was
of sufficient gravity to reflect on the personal character of the four
employees, certainly as far as their suitability for employment was
concerned. We therefore feel that tortious nature of the strike was
not a legitimate ground for refusing to reinstate these four employees
and that in refusing to reinstate them the respondent engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
We find that the activities of the respondent set forth in Section III
above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent
described in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relation to trade, traffic, and commerce, among the several States, and
tend to lead and have led to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
15 Folsom Engraving Company v. McNeil (1919 ) 235 Massachusetts 269; Reynolds v.
Davis (1908) 198 Massachusetts 294.
16 306 U. S. 240.
976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, we will order it to cease and desist therefrom and to
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
We have found that on June 5, 1937, and thereafter, the respondent
has refused to bargain collectively with the Union. The respondent
contends that the Union no longer represents a majority of its em-
ployees within the appropriate unit. We have found, however, that
prior to the respondent's unfair labor practices the Union had the
membership of a large majority of such employees. If this member-
ship waned at all, it was a result of these unfair labor practices.
To permit the respondent to relieve itself by such methods of the
obligation to bargain collectively, would violate the purposes and
policy of the Act 17 We shall, therefore, in order to effectuate the
policies of the Act, order the respondent, upon request, to bargain
collectively with the Union.
For reasons set forth above, we will order the respondent to notify
each employee personally in writing that the contract or contracts
executed with its employees on July 13, 1937, and any other contracts
made since then in derogation of the Union's right of exclusive repre-
sentation, are void and of no effect.
We shall also order the respondent to offer reinstatement to Roy
Harold Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael C. Sullivan, and
Mary P. Sullivan to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions, and shall order the respondent to make them whole for any
loss of pay they have suffered by reason of the respondent's dis-
criminatory refusal to reinstate them, by payment to each of them a
sum equal to the amount which he normally would have earned as
17 In Hatter of Inland Steel Company and Steel Workers Organizing Committee and
Amalgamated Aacociation of Iron. Steel and Tin Workers of North America, Lodge Nos.
64, 1010, and 1101, 9 N. L. R. B. 783, we said:
The necessary delays incident to the adjudication of a dispute have postponed the
Board's order until a time considerably subsequent to the original wrongful refusal to
bargain. The refusal to bargain collectively disrupts the morale of the men, has a
deterring effect upon the organizational activity of the Union and a discouraging
influence on members already gained which tends to induce them to drop from the
ranks . . . If an order to bargain collectively cannot be deemed an appropriate
remedy for the refusal to bargain collectively unless the [Union's] majority is kept
intact until the Board can issue a decision, the plain policy and intent of the Act will
be defeated. The respondent would be permitted further to evade the obligation of
Section 8 (5) by profiting from the discouraging effects of its already accomplished
violation of that very obligation . We cannot concede the validity of such a doctrine
of futility, and we hold that to effectuate the policies of the Act, the respondent's
refusal to bargain must be remedied by an order to bargain , based on the majority
obtaining on the date of the refusal to bargain.
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING CO. 977
wages from the date he was refused reinstatement to the date of
offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings is during said period.
We feel that in this case the usual remedy of reinstatement will
best effectuate the policies of the Act, as in other cases where em-
ployees have been discriminated against. Neither the strike, the
alleged breach of the peace, nor the violation of the injunction were
of sufficient gravity to constitute a reason for not applying this
remedy. As set forth above in Section III B, we are of the opinion
that the Fansteel decision is not applicable to the facts of this case
and does not foreclose the remedy of reinstatement.
Further, even assuming that the respondent's refusal to reinstate
these employees did not constitute an unfair labor practice, never-
theless we feel that as a means of removing the consequences of the
respondent's refusal to bargain with the Union and of its campaign
of intimidation and coercion during the strike, it is necessary to order
these four reinstated. Here the strike had been peacefully conducted
by the Union for 6 weeks. The refusals to reinstate occurred at the
end of the strike during the course of which the respondent had en-
gaged in numerous unfair labor practices. By July 15 its campaign
to break the strike was beginning to succeed. On that day these four
were arrested for a minor offense, in connection with the strike. They
were prosecuted for these alleged offenses by the respondent but not
found guilty. Despite this they were refused reinstatement. Under
these circumstances the employees would naturally, although mis-
takenly, consider the fate of these four an example of what happens
to an employee who engages in activities protected by the Act. Such
an atmosphere constitutes an impediment to their freedom of self-
organization into a union of their own choosing. Reinstatement of
these four will remove this impediment. We will, therefore for this
additional reason, order the reinstatement of Roy Harold Stevens,
Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael C. Sullivan, and Mary P. Sullivan.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the en-
tire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Steel Workers Organizing Committee and Amalgamated Associa-
tion of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North America, Local No. 1315,
1e By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transportation, room,
and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else-
where than for the respondent , which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful
discharge and the consequent necessity of seeking employment elsewhere . See Matter of
Crossett Lumber Company and Untied Brotherhood of Corpenters and Joiners of America,
Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local 2590 , 8 N. L. R. B 440 . Monies received for
work performed upon Federal , State, county , municipal , or other work -relief projects are
not considered as earnings , but, as provided below in the Order, shall be deducted from the
sum due the employee , and the amount therof shall be paid over to the appropriate fiscal
agency of the Federal , State, county , municipal , or other government or governments
which supplied the funds for said work -relief projects.
978 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employ-
ment of Roy Harold Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael C.
Sullivan, and Mary P. Sullivan, thereby discouraging membership in
Steel Workers Organizing Committee and Amalgamated Associa-
tion of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North America, Lodge No. 1315,
the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
3. The production, maintenance , and shipping-room employees of
the respondent, excluding supervisory and clerical employees, con-
stitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act.
4. Steel Workers Organizing Committee is the exclusive representa-
tive of all the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
5. By refusing on June 5, 1937, and thereafter, to bargain col-
lectively with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee as the ex-
clusive representative of all its employees in such unit, the respondent
has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act.
6. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed- in Section 7 of the Act, the
respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7)
of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of
law and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations
Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the
respondent, Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, Worcester,
Massachusetts, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Steel Workers Organizing Com-
mittee and Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers
of North America, Local 1315, or in any other labor organization
of its employees, by discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure
of employment or any other term or condition of employment;
(b) In any manner giving effect to the contract or contracts exe-
cuted between the respondent and its employees or some of them
on July 13, 1937, and thereafter, hereinbefore described, or to any
other contract or agreement concerning wages, hours, and working
REED & PRINCE MANUFACTURING Co. 979
conditions which it may have entered into with its production, main-
tenance, and shipping-room employees or any of them, excluding
supervisory and clerical employees, or the representative of such
employees other than Steel Workers Organizing Committee or Amal-
gamated Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers of North Amer-
ica, Local 1315, in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment;
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively with Steel Workers Organ-
izing Committee as the exclusive representative of its production,
maintenance, and shipping-room employees, exclusive of supervisory
and clerical employees;
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with Steel Workers Organ-
izing Committee as the exclusive representative of its production,
maintenance, and shipping-room employees, exclusive of supervisory
and clerical employees;
(b) Offer to Roy Harold Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant, Michael
C. Sullivan, and Mary P. Sullivan immediate and full reinstatement
to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without preju-
dice to their seniority and other rights and privileges;
(c) Make whole Roy Harold Stevens, Jr., Clifford A. Gallant,
Michael C. Sullivan, and Mary P. Sullivan for any loss of pay they
may have suffered by reason of the respondent's refusal to reinstate
them, by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to that
which he would normally have earned as wages from the date of
the respondent's refusal to reinstate him, to the date of such offer
of reinstatement, less his net earnings during said period; deducting,
however, from the amount otherwise due each of the said employees
moneys received by him during said period for work performed on
any Federal, State, county, municipal, or work-relief projects, and
pay over the amount so deducted to the fiscal agency of the Federal,
State, county, municipal, or other government or governments which
supplied the funds for said work-relief projects;
(d) Personally inform in writing each of its employees who has
entered into one or more of the contracts described in paragraph 1
(b) of this Order, that such contracts were entered into pursuant to
169134-39-vol. 12-63
980 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
unfair labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, that such contracts are null and void, and that such
contracts will therefore be discontinued as a term or condition of
employment and will in no manner be enforced;
(e) Immediately post notices in conspicuous places throughout its
plant, and maintain such notices for a period of sixty (60) con-
secutive days, stating that the respondent will cease and desist in the
manner set forth in 1 (a), (b), (c), and (d), and that it will take
the affirmative action set forth in 2 (a), (b), and (c) of this Order;
(f) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region in writing
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the
respondent has taken to comply herewith.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is,
dismissed in so far as it alleges that the respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (2) of the Act.