Redcor Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 4, 1967

166 N.L.R.B. 1013 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

REDCOR CORP. 1013
Redcor Corporation and International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. Case
31-CA-233
August 4, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA
On March 6, 1967, Trial Examiner Allen
Sinsheimer, Jr., issued his Decision in the above-
entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint and recommend-
ing that it cease and desist therefrom and take cer-
tain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. He also found that
Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mended dismissal of those allegations. Thereafter,
the Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner, with the modifications
set forth below.
1. The Trial Examiner found that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening an
employee, Jeffrey Karlin, with discipline if he con-
tinued to hand out union cards on company
premises.
Briefly, the facts relied on by the Trial Examiner
reveal that, on September 29, 1965, Karlin, in plain
view of supervisor Marianne Kravitz, was engaged
in handing out authorization cards during working
hours. Kravitz testified that she told Karlin that he
was violating several company rules and that she
showed Karlin a booklet containing company rules,
including one prohibiting solicitation during work-
ing hours, and another prohibiting distribution of
written or printed matter on company premises
without written permission. She further testified
that she told Karlin that she was primarily con-
cerned with the violation of the company time rule
and the disruption of production caused by his ac-
tivities. She conceded that she told him that if his
conduct did not cease that he would receive a writ-
ten reprimand. To the extent material, Karlin's
testimony differs from Kravitz, principally in failing
166 NLRB No. 120
to reflect that Kravitz stated that her concern was
limited to his violation of the "company time" rule.
The Trial Examiner did not credit Kravitz in this
respect. On October 1, 1965, the rule affecting dis-
tribution of literature was changed to prohibit such
activity in "working areas."
Contrary to the Trial Examiner we find that
Respondent did not violate the Act by the foregoing
conduct of Kravitz. Karlin's union solicitation ac-
tivities did violate a valid rule prohibiting such ac-
tivities during working time. While it appears, on
the basis of the Trial Examiner's credibility resolu-
tions, that the threatened reprimand was not care-
fully and precisely based solely on the violation of
that company time rule, but was more broadly
based on Karlin's violation of several company
rules, it also appears that on October 1, 1965, the
no-distribution rule was changed to prohibit dis-
tribution of literature only in working areas.
Moreover, it appears that Karlin continued his ac-
tivities throughout the remainder of September 29,
and on September 30, without further warning, and
that he was not, in fact, reprimanded for his activi-
ties.
In these circumstances, we conclude that, though
a violation of the Act may be spelled out by taking
a narrow and technical view of Kravitz' conduct,
Kravitz' conduct was not intended to exert and did
not exert a restraining effect on Karlin's legitimate
exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act. Accordingly, we shall dismiss this aspect of
the complaint.
2. We agree with the Trial Examiner, for the
reasons stated in his Decision, that during the group
meetings with employees on October 14, and
November 2, Respondent, in effect, announced and
established a revised seniority policy and a revised
grievance procedure and - promised to give em-
ployees sick leave benefits. We also agree that
Respondent's grant of the employees' request to
change the starting and finishing hours of the work
shift and the announcement of a definite policy of
job posting constituted changes in working condi-
tions made to influence the employees' decision in
the scheduled election. We further agree with the
Trial Examiner that these changes in working con-
ditions and the promise of benefit were calculated
to influence employees in the exercise of their Sec-
tion 7 rights in the scheduled election. Accordingly,
we find that in all these respects Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
We do not agree, however, that the discussions
during the group meetings of other matters listed in
the Trial Examiner's Decision amounted to changes
or promise of changes in benefits or working condi-
tions. Accordingly, we do not adopt the Trial Ex-
aminer's finding that Respondent's discussion of
these matters amounted to violations of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The complaint alleged, and the Trial Ex-
aminer found, that Respondent violated Section
308-926 0-70-65
1014 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8(a)(1) of the Act by prohibiting the distribution of
union handbills at the plant gates on the morning of
the election. The record shows that on that morning
Ralph Wever, production control manager, told em-
ployees that they could not, as they were then en-
gaged in doing, pass out handbills on company
premises that day because "there was a 24-hour
moratorium on doing any type of campaigning be-
fore the election." Wever immediately thereafter
went into the building and talked with Mounts,
director of operations, who informed him he was in
error. Wever returned within 10 minutes of his ini-
tial discussion with the employees and told them
they could continue with their distribution. The em-
ployees testified that despite Wever's earlier state-
ment that they continued to distribute the handbills
and did so the rest of the day up until the time of the
election some 8 hours thereafter. In all of these cir-
cumstances, we find that Wever's short-lived ban
on distribution, which stemmed from a mistaken
view of the Board's rules governing electioneering
on the day of an election, was inconsequential in its
effect on employees' handbilling activities, and we
find contrary to the Trial Examiner that the
Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) by
Wever's conduct.
4. The complaint alleged, and the Trial Ex-
aminer found, that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by interrogating employees as to their union
activities, sympathies, and desires. As proof of this
allegation, the General Counsel relied upon af-
fidavits given to Respondent by 8 of the 25 em-
ployees who were interviewed by Respondent's
counsel and Mounts during the course of counsel's
preparation of Respondent's case. These affidavits
did not state the questions asked of employees but
contained generalized statements dictated by the
employees to a company stenographer. The Trial
Examiner found that, because the eight affidavits
contained statements of the affiants' subjective
reasons for signing authorization cards, Respondent
must have asked the affiants questions requiring, or
designed to evoke, such information. We do not
agree.
In the absence of evidence demonstrating that
steps were taken to insure that the affiants' af-
fidavits included only statements responsive to the
inquiries of Respondent's representatives, we are
not persuaded that the statements contained in the
eight affidavits justify the conclusion that they were
made in response to objectionable questions or
statements made by Respondent's officials and
counsel. Accordingly, in the absence of direct
evidence to the contrary,I we find that the General
Counsel has not established by a preponderance of
the evidence a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified
below, and hereby orders that Respondent, Redcor
Corporation, Canoga Park, California, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom-
mended Order, with the following modifications:
1. Delete from paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a),
(b), and (d), the present subparagraphs (c) and (e)
being relettered as (a) and (b), respectively.
2. Delete from paragraph 2(a) of the Trial Ex-
aminer's Recommended Order the words "to be
furnished," and substitute therefor the words "on
forms provided ...."
3. Amend the Trial Examiner's proposed notice
to employees by deleting the first, second, and
fourth paragraphs.
' Mounts testified that on two occasions, he started to ask employees
what they understood the cards were for but that Powell (Respondent's at-
torney) stopped him and advised him that Respondent was not interested
in that information Contrary to the Trial Examiner , we do not view this as
an admission that improper questions were asked on these occasions, but
rather as evidence of Respondent 's intention to confine questioning within
proper bounds
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ALLEN SINSHEIMER , JR., Trial Examiner : This con-
solidated proceeding was heard at Los Angeles, Califor-
nia, on April 26-29 and May 2-5, 1966. The representa-
tion proceeding in Case 31 -RC-I12 was initiated by a
petition filed by the Union on October 4, 1965; it was fol-
lowed by an agreement for consent election and then by
an election on November 4, 1965, which the Union lost
and to which the Union filed timely objections. The
complaint1 in Case 31-CA-233 issued on January 31,
1966.2
On March 14 , 1966, the Regional Director for Region
31 issued a report on objections directing a hearing 3 on
the objections and other "conduct of the employer dis-
closed in the investigation." The two cases were con-
solidated and notice of hearing on objections was issued
by said Regional Director on March 31, 1966.
An original charge was filed on October 18, 1965, and an amended
charge on January 31, 1966
2 On February 9, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss parts of the
complaint This motion was denied by Trial Examiner Irving Rogosin on
March 2, 1966 Special leave to appeal said ruling was denied by the
Board on March 3 without prejudice to its renewal A similar motion was
denied by me at the commencement of the hearing and various motions
made and denied at the end of the General Counsel's case in chief These
were renewed at the conclusion of the hearing and ruling reserved for
disposition herein Also, motions to dismiss «:1ich were set forth in
Respondent 's brief will be resolved.
S At the hearing I granted a motion by Respondent to sever said case.
An interlocutory appeal was taken during the hearing by the General
Counsel to the Board which reversed said ruling and ordered the cases
reconsolidated It was understood and agreed that all testimony taken dur-
ing pendency of the interlocutory appeal would be applicable to both cases
in event said ruling was reversed.
REDCOR CORP.
During the hearing several amendments to the com-
plaint were made over objection of Respondent.4 The
questions presented are: (1) whether Respondent-Em-
ployer engaged in conduct which warrants setting aside
the election; and (2) whether Respondent-Employer, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1), interfered with, restrained,
and coerced employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights.
Upon the entire record,5 including my observation of
the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs of
the General Counsel and Respondent-Employer, I make
the following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent, a California corporation, is engaged in the
manufacture of computers and computer converters at
Canoga Park, California. It annually ships products
valued in excess of, $50,000 from points located in
California to points outside said State. I find Respondent
is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act and that the assertion of jurisdic-
tion is warranted.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is admittedly a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and I so find.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction and Issues
Commencing about September 29, 1965, the Union
commenced organizational activities among employees
of Respondent-Employer, followed by a petition for elec-
tion filed October 4 and an election November 4 which
it lost. The complaint alleges various acts in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) commencing September 29, 1965, and
continuing through February 28, 1966.6
Respondent denies the allegations and in some in-
stances also contends that they do not state a violation of
the Act even if proven. Respondent admits that Attorney
Lyman Powell served in a consulting capacity to it but de-
nies (on basis of lack of knowledge) "that he was an agent
at all times or for all purposes of the complaint." Respond-
ent also denies "that Jaromir Henyk is or was a super-
visor under the Act, or that he is or was an agent of the
Respondent in respect to any matter alleged in the com-
plaint."
4 Par . 14 was amended to change the second date therein from
December 30, 1965, to February 28, 1966.
Par. 6(a) was added to allege: "On about September 29, Respondent by
Mary Ann Kravitz, threatened employees with discipline if they con-
tinued to solicit authorization cards on company premises "
Par. 9 was amended by adding the name of Lyman B. Powell to the list
of names following : " Respondent, by."
Par. 14 was further amended by adding the name of Philip H. Mounts
following the name of Lyman B Powell Although the transcript does not
reflect it , the sense of the amendment would require an "and" between the
names of Powell and Mounts and the record is hereby corrected ac-
cordingly , sua sponte.
Respondent's request (or motion) contained in its brief that its answer
be considered as also applying to all amendments to the complaint is
hereby granted.
1015
Respondent admits and I find that the following per-
sons were, at all times material herein, supervisors within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act:
Thomas L. Taggart President
Philip H. Mounts -Vice President - operations
Gerald G. Feijoo -Personnel Manager
Ralph E. Wever -Production Control Manager
Marianne Kravitz -Supervisor of RCA Project in as-
sembly area.
B. The Incidents Involving Kravitz and Karlin
On September 29, 1965, the Union commenced or-
ganizational activities at Respondent. Jeffrey Karlin, an
expediter, passed out union authorization cards and
openly solicited about 20 workers in the "clean room"
during working time in plain sight of the supervisor, Mari-
anne Kravitz, and other employees. Karlin admitted that
practically everyone in the room knew about his activities
shortly after they commenced.
According to Karlin, about 1:30 p.m., Kravitz spoke to
him in the lunch area just outside the "clean room." Kar-
lin testified "She told me that she had seen me passing out
authorization cards in the clean room on company time
which was in violation of two Redcor laws, one that none
of this activity could take place on company time, and
second that it could not take place on company
premises ." Karlin added that Kravitz told him that both
of these were against company policies and that it had
better be stopped or disciplinary action would be taken.
He replied that he was aware it was against the company
policy to do this on company time but he was not aware
that it was against company law to do it on company
premises. Karlin said Kravitz told him that it was and it
had to be stopped. Karlin added that Kravitz then asked
where he got the authorization cards from and he told her
that he didn't feel that it was his obligation to tell her.
Karlin testified "She then stated that there was no point
of me trying to hide anything, because they already knew
who the people were who were participating in the Union
campaign and everything about it." Kravitz did not
specifically mention names.
Karlin said that Kravitz spoke to him again after the af-
ternoon break about 3 p.m. and told him that she had
been to personnel and been told that they "knew" the
union activity that he was participating in, that a warning
slip was going to be filled out by personnel stating that he
had broken Redcor rules in passing out the authorization
cards and that if he were to receive another one it could
lead to stronger disciplinary action and possibly his
dismissal. Karlin testified that in the past, at unspecified
S On June 28, Respondent filed an 18-page motion to correct the tran-
script of testimony. No objection thereto has been filed. I have carefully
reviewed the requested corrections and conclude that they are in order.
Accordingly said motion to correct transcript , being marked as Resp. Exh.
20, is granted in its entirety and received as part of the record herein. It
should be noted that there are numerous other errors in the transcript both
in testimony and in quotation of remarks and statements of the Trial Ex-
aminer but I believe a careful reading of the record will obviate the
necessity for additional corrections
8 While all of these will be considered herein as applicable to the com-
plaint case, only those occurring between the time of filing the petition,
October 4, and the election on November 4 could apply to the objections
to the election. See Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 138 NLRB
453.
1016 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
times, he had observed a leadwoman twice pass out an
Avon catalogue describing its products, but he could not
say whether the supervisor was present. There is no
evidence to indicate that any supervisor was present at
such times.
Under cross-examination Karlin admitted that his sol-
icitation was open and obvious 7 and that he had not sol-
icited away from the plant. He said he did not get the im-
pression that he was spied upon insofar as his solicitation
was concerned. He also testified that he did not believe
Kravitz' statement that "they knew who the people are
that are doing this in the plant." Karlin said that he felt
she was just telling this to him to make him feel more at
ease and give out further information.
Kravitz testified that she had noticed that Karlin was
not at his work station, that he was talking to other assem-
blers, and that one girl had gotten up and run out of the
room, crying and upset. She then called Karlin over and
said to him that she noticed that the whole morning he
hadn't been doing his work, that he was talking to one as-
sembler and another, and one girl was quite upset.
Kravitz said she would like to know "what is all this con-
versation, does it have to do with your work?" Karlin an-
swered "No, it doesn't." She asked, "What is it all
about?" Karlin replied "Union affairs." She then
testified: "And I said that I didn't think I should discuss
it with you; so I am not going to discuss it but I am telling
you that you are breaking several of the Company rules
by doing it on Company time, and I suggest that you stop
your delaying production in this room . . If you con-
tinue to do this on company time I will have to give you
a written reprimand ... "
Kravitz said that she had another discussion with him
later that day and that Karlin said to her that he was just
told that he could solicit for the Union on company
premises and, "you cannot give me a reprimand for doing
this." Kravitz then replied "I most certainly can give you
a written reprimand and I can give it to you on several
rules, not just one." Kravitz testified that she said "If you
will just wait a minute I'll get a copy of the rules."
Kravitz then pointed out to Karlin several rules which,
according to her, Karlin was breaking. She testified the
main one was that he was distracting people from their
work and was hurting the schedule. Kravitz denied saying
that she or someone else knew which employees were
soliciting cards for the Union, but testified that she told
Karlin that it was no secret that "we've got a union cam-
paign going on; management knows, all of the supervisors
know it." She added that everybody knew there was a
campaign because it was obvious that Karlin was passing
out white slips and that some of the girls had come back
and told her. Kravitz said Karlin admitted his activities.
After her conversation with him, no disciplinary or other
action was taken nor any further word said to him
' John DeVito, another employee, testified that he solicited in the
presence of his supervisor, Kelly, but did not specify when
s G C Exh. 19
The other rules, referred to, deal with interference with production or
with performing unauthorized personal work on company time
11 Rule B7, although couched in terms of distribution, was brought forth
and shown to Karlin in the discussion involving his solicitation and
passing out of authorization cards in the clean room and on company time
Whether or not passing out of authorization cards involves distribution
(Cf minority and majority contentions in Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing
Co , 138 NLRB 615), its application to bar solicitation at all times on
On cross-examination Kravitz was shown a copy of the
work rules which were in effect on September 29. She
testified she had pointed these out to Karlin at that time,
and referred specifically to rules A9, B4, B7, and C7.8
In connection with rule B7, according to Kravitz, she
told Karlin that she was concerned with company time.
However, the rule itself prohibits: "Distributing written
or printed matter of any description on company premises
[emphasis supplied] without written permission."" Rule
B7 was subsequently changed on October 1 by the Com-
pany to read: "Distributing written or printed matter of
any description in working areas." [Emphasis supplied.]
While Kravitz denies that she referred to company
premises and Karlin asserts that she did, the indications
are that although she may not have so intended, she
nevertheless conveyed the impression, which Karlin
drew, that she was referring to company premises as well
as company time. There is no question that Karlin's ac-
tivities were on company time and could have been
properly interdicted. However, it appears probable,
under the excitement of the moment, that Kravitz was not
careful to distinguish between company time and com-
pany premises. Although I do not consider her an unrelia-
ble witness, I believe that the evidence points to a conclu-
sion that in one way or another she did indicate a prohibi-
tion of solicitation and also distribution on all company
premises as well as company time. I reach this conclusion
particularly because of her reference to the company
rules, and rule B7 specifically, which as set forth on Sep-
tember 29 was not limited in its prohibition.
Accordingly, in pointing out these rules, Kravitz cer-
tainly indicated a prohibition of solicitation on (all) com-
pany premises as well as company time.10 Such a limita-
tion would be improper and, coupled with a threat of
discipline for engaging in such solicitation, would con-
stitute a violation as alleged in paragraph 6A of the
amended complaint. i i I have noted that no such action
was taken and as set forth above that the Company did
change its rule B7 on October 1, quite possibly as soon as
counsel were retained and had an opportunity to examine
the rule. Nevertheless this disciplinary threat to Karlin
does constitute a violation under the circumstances. 12 I
accordingly find that Respondent did violate Section
8(a)(1) by threatening an employee with discipline if he
continued to solicit on company premises.
As to the allegation in paragraph 6 of the complaint,ta
Respondent claims this does not even state a violation of
the Act. First while it may not constitute an allegation of
surveillance, I consider that an inference can properly be
drawn of an allegation of the "impression" of surveillance
which has been held to constitute a violation of Section
8(a)(1).14 However, the question remains whether such
an impression can be drawn from the facts herein. I do
not believe that such a conclusion may fairly be reached
company premises would be a violation and so also its literal prohibition
of all distribution on company premises
Fn 4,supra
2 See Stoddard-Quirk, supra , and Walton Manufacturing Company,
126 NLRB 697
13 Paragraph 6 alleges "On or about September 29, 1965, Respondent
by Marianne Kravitz informed employees that Respondent knew which
employees were distributing authorization cards for the Union."
" The Paymaster Corporation, 162 NLRB 123 ( Fn 21, citing Boot-
Ster Manufacturing Co, 149 NLRB 933,944-945 )
REDCOR CORP. 1017
because: first, the activities that had occurred were
openly conducted in the presence and in front of manage-
ment representatives ; 'S second , there is no evidence that
management representatives made any particular efforts
to obtain information through surveillance of any kind;
and finally , the witness himself did not consider that any
such surveillance was being conducted . It is true that
under certain circumstances what a witness infers is not
material, such as where the language or conduct clearly
indicates surveillance . However , in the instant case I be-
lieve the witness ' inferences may have a bearing where
the language used was possibly susceptible of different
implications. Accordingly, I do not find that there was
either surveillance or an impression of surveillance of em-
ployees.
C. Mounts' Alleged Advising of Formation of an
In-Plant Union
On September 30, John DeVito, a leadman, who was
an active member of the union organizing committee,
requested and obtained an interview with Philip Mounts,
director of operations. DeVito told Mounts that he and
other employees had sought to bring in the Union and
asked Mounts what the chances would be of having an in-
plant union. According to DeVito, Mounts' reply was
that he had worked at a plant that had a grievance com-
mittee , it had worked there and that he saw no reason
why it couldn't work at Redcor also. DeVito asked about
details of how such a thing was set up and Mounts ex-
plained what the arrangements had been.
DeVito testified "I asked if it would be possible to talk
to the other employees after our conversation and he said
`yes' as long as it wasn 't on company time." DeVito was
then asked if those were Mounts' exact words and replied
"I doubt if I would give exact words for anyone. O.K." In
an affidavit submitted to the Respondent in February
1966, DeVito said " . . . I told him (Mounts) that I was
going to go back to the employees and talk to them about
an in-plant union. There may have been a reply from Mr.
Mounts but I don't recall what it was." On cross-ex-
amination, DeVito testified: "Q. Now did you tell him
that you were going to go back and speak to other em-
ployees about what had transpired? A. I asked him if I
could, yes."
On redirect examination , DeVito was asked as to his
present recollection as to what Mounts answered and
DeVito stated "I believe it was just an answer, `yes,' to
my question ; I could talk to people." He was then asked,
"Did he say anything about company time or working
hours?"DeVito answered, "I don't recall."
Mounts was questioned about whether he had ever in-
structed or advised DeVito to form a plant union, to
which he answered , "No, I certainly did not ." Mounts
was then asked, "Did you give Mr. DeVito any
authorization to go back to the employees and discuss the
meeting between you or advise him to get up and bring it
to the-." Mounts answered, "No, I did not."
In the course of his testimony on cross-examination,
DeVito also stated in connection with his original discus-
sion with Mounts about an in-plant union that " . . . He
went on to say that this was something that could have
been done had the union not already been called in."
DeVito was asked whether Mounts explained why they
couldn't do anything and he replied, "Yes, he said that the
company was kind of tight because they couldn't grant or
promise anything until after the union campaign."
On cross-examination , DeVito was subsequently
asked:
Q. Did Mr. Mounts tell you that he would check
into the matter of a plant grievance committee and let
you know in a certain period of days what the com-
pany's answer would be?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. Did you ever have a subsequent conversation
with Mr. Mounts after that date?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you have a discussion with him at the Red
Robin Restaurant after the meeting that we have
talked about?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall what he said in that meeting?
A. Exact words, no; but he did mention that he
had talked about it and that since the union had been
called in, there was nothing that could be done.
In a meeting at the Red Robin on October 6, a labor
relations attorney was present to advise Respondent.
Present were supervisors and, at that time, leadmen,
since the exact status of leadmen had not then been
resolved . The attorney had advised Respondent that it
could not consider the matter of a company union and
Mounts had informed DeVito, according to Mounts, that
DeVito's idea would be out of the question . This is in es-
sence what DeVito also testified to as set forth.
The foregoing, without delving into the question of ex-
actly what Mounts told DeVito with respect to speaking
to other employees on September 30,16 rather clearly in-
dicates that any question of an in-plant organization was
instigated by DeVito and that the Respondent did not
suggest such an organization nor instigate it. DeVito
testified that he went out to this group of employees and
... told them what the answer was that it would have
been possible before but now that the union was in their
campaign , they would have to wait until after it was
over."
As a final support for his contention that the Company
suggested and initiated such an organization , the General
Counsel relies on a question which arose at one of a
number of group meetings conducted by the Company.17
This one was held in the standard products assembly
area, on October 14. The following arose:
Question: What will happen though if the union
doesn't come in? Are we also going to have a
grievance committee around here? ...
Mounts: I will say that we will certainly continue
to make Redcor a good place to work . And if you de-
cide that you want a grievance committee , present us
with a plan, and if it appears to represent the will of
the majority, we will certainly recognize it.
This was followed by other discussion including a rather
lengthy explanation by Attorney Powell with respect to
the Company 's position that it could not make any com-
15 As set forth, supra, Karlin had not solicited anywhere else and this event, I will consider it briefly infra
was the first day of the union campaign.
16 Although I question how much weight or significance this has in any
17 These meetings are discussed more fully infra.
1018 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mitments at that time and that a grievance committee
would in essence be the same as a union in that it would
be necessary to have to go through proper proceedings
before anything could be done. In the light of the entire
context I do not believe that this quote from Mounts con-
stitutes any promise or commitment other than a state-
ment of what would be a necessary legal position at such
time.
Looking at the entire posture of the question of forma-
tion of an in-plant committee, it appears that the subject
was first broached by DeVito, one of the union or-
ganizers. It was discussed with Mounts . Mounts in-
dicated that he could not do anything because of the
Union but would check into the matter and let DeVito
know. At that point, according to DeVito, there was a
discussion about whether he could talk to the employees
about such an in-plant organization. Mounts denied
authorizing DeVito to go back to employees to discuss
their meeting. DeVito gave a number of versions in this
connection, supra. I would conclude that, if the version
were one of those presented by DeVito, it more likely
would be the one that if he were going to do any talking to
employees it would have to be on his own time (with the
Company not being a party to it). In any event, I find that
Respondent did not authorize or cause him to go back to
employees to form or discuss an in-plant union. I con-
clude that the question of an in-plant union was initiated
by DeVito and was not sponsored or abetted by the Com-
pany but rather, shortly after DeVito's initiation, was re-
jected by the Company as not being properly raised at
that time.18
D. The Henyk Incident
Paragraph 8 of the complaint alleges that, "On several
occasions during October 1965, Respondent, by Jaromir
Henyk, ordered employees to remove their union badges
and to refrain from talking about the Union and warned
employees that conditions in the plant would be different
after a forthcoming Board-conducted election." The
Respondent denies that Henyk is a supervisor and also
denies the allegations of the paragraph.
The record reflects that Henyk was a leadman in the
receiving inspection department commencing in early
September 1965. It also reflects that a petition filed by
the Union requested the inclusion of leadmen in the unit;
that the consent election agreement executed by the
Union on October 20 included leadmen in the unit; that
Henyk appeared on the eligibility list provided for the
election on November 4; that Henyk voted at that elec-
tion without challenge; and that the union observer at said
election was another leadman, DeVito.19 There is no
evidence that Henyk was specifically encouraged or
authorized to act as an agent for the Company apart from
the allegation of supervision, nor that he was acting in any
way so as to estop the Respondent. Under the foregoing
circumstances, the decisions of the Board indicate that
the Respondent is not to be held responsible for such al-
leged actions of Henyk as charged herein .20 The forego-
ing is sufficient to dispose of the above allegations. How-
ever, were it necessary to make a finding as to Henyk's
supervisory status, I would conclude that at no time was
he a supervisor within the meaning of the Act and particu-
larly not before November 18, 1965, when a new system
of assigning cases was instituted .2 1 Based on the above,
I find no violation of the foregoing paragraph of the com-
plaint.
E. AllegedAnnouncement , Promise, Granting and
Commencement of Benefits
Paragraph 9 of the complaint, as amended, alleges the
following:
In order to persuade its employees to reject the
Union as their collective bargaining representative
in the forthcoming representation election, Respond-
ent by Thomas L. Taggart, Philip H. Mounts,
Gerald G. Feijoo, and Lyman B. Powell, on or about
October 14, 1965, and again on November 2, 1965,
at a series of meetings with employees at which their
attendance was compulsory:
(a) informed employees for the first time that it was
instituting employment benefits, including, inter
alia, a policy of granting retroactive pay based
on late merit reviews and a policy of permitting
employees to grieve directly to its president;
(b) informed employees for the first time of its pol-
icy with respect to various other employment
benefits, including, inter alia, merit review,
promotions, pay for jury duty, and an educa-
tional assistance plan;
(c) gave assurances to employees that it was study-
ing certain other employment benefits, includ-
ing, inter alia, sick leave pay, and that it in-
tended eventually to put such benefits into ef-
fect.
18 In view of this finding I consider it unnecessary to discuss Respond-
ent's contention that decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit hold it is not illegal to make a suggestion as to formation of an in-plant
union.
19 Who was also on the eligibility list.
PO See Hy Plains Dressed Beef, Inc., 146 NLRB 1253; Montgomery
Ward & Company, Incorporated, 115 NLRB 645, and Indianapolis
Newspapers, Inc., 103 NLRB 1750. The recent case of J. M. Machinery
Corporation, 155 NLRB 860, is clearly distinguishable on its facts.
41I have carefully analyzed all the record testimony including
testimony of Kelly, Henyk, Scannell, and Wilson. I credit Kelly and
Henyk msofar as inconsistent with Scannell and Wilson both from obser-
vation of witnesses , analysis of the testimony as a whole and application
of commonsense to the entire factual situation. Accordingly, the record
clearly indicates Henyk at most was a leadman in a department with three
or four other people who appear to have worked independently of him;
that Henyk had no power to hire or fire or effectively recommend the
same; that Henyk did not have authority to grant time off; that Henyk did
not make merit review recommendations; that the assignment of work at
least until November 18 was ordinarily automatic, the work being
generally taken off the top, that any reporting of leaving work, on the part
of workers, to Henyk was for the purpose of keeping a record, that Henyk
did not approve vacation schedules; that Henyk, who was second highest
in seniority , was paid only ten cents more than the next highest employee
in the department, that Henyk did not attend supervisors' meetings nor
handle grievances; that the only real supervisor over the people in this de-
partment was Kelly, chief inspector and supervisor of the receiving in-
spection department at the time of the union campaign, whose desk was
nearby and who could observe what was taking place; that, further,
Henyk's work was largely clerical in nature, and that Kelly, who was a
salaried supervisor over these people and a total of some 14 people, in all,
was in the area generally for several hours a day. The foregoing clearly in-
dicates that Henyk was at no time a supervisor.
REDCOR CORP. 1019
Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint, respectively, al-
lege that for the purpose stated in paragraph 9, above, "on
or about October 25, 1965, Respondent granted em-
ployees retroactive wage increases based on late merit
reviews" and that on or about October 28,1965, Respond-
ent, "in a letter to employees, impliedly promised that it
would institute a sick leave pay plan and other employ-
ment benefits."
Prior to the hearing, at and during the hearing, and
thereafter, Respondent moved to dismiss paragraph 9,
particularly paragraph 9(b), on the ground that it did not
state a violation of the Act. This motion was denied and
is hereby again denied for reasons more fully set forth
hereafter.
All of the individuals referred to above were admittedly
supervisors of the Respondent except for Lyman B.
Powell. The answer, as indicated, denies, on the basis of
lack of knowledge, Respondent's responsibility for
Powell. However, the record indicates that Powell, an at-
torney at law, was retained by the Company to advise it
in connection with the union campaign, its relationship to
the National Labor Relations Board, and the labor laws
relating to activities such as here involved. Powell was
also retained to participate in group meetings to be
referred to more fully hereafter and to answer technical
questions thereat, which he did. In addition he also of-
fered "opinions." Insofar as Powell participated in these
meetings, either his conduct, statements, or utterances
therein were specifically authorized; or Respondent by its
conduct ratified the same; or Respondent is estopped
from denying his agency.22 The same is also true with
respect to Powell's interrogation of employees which is
referred to subsequently. There is no question that he was
conducting these interviews in preparation for possible
defense of charges filed against Respondent and doing so
as its attorney and agent. I find Respondent is responsible
for all the acts, utterances, and conduct of Powell relating
to matters herein.
As a preliminary to the group meetings and to the con-
sideration of alleged announcements, promises, and
grants of benefits, it should be noted that the Respondent
had a change in top management occurring during the
year 1965. Taggart, who was a management consultant,
became chief executive officer in February and president
on July 1. Mounts was employed as director of opera-
tions on August 16, and Feijoo, the personnel director,
was employed July 6. Respondent at the time of employ-
ing Feijoo did so with the understanding that he was to in-
stitute certain personnel programs and develop and
propose other programs both as to personnel matters and
employee benefits which he considered appropriate.
Respondent might or might not adopt these depending on
management's view of these matters and of course the
cost involved. Respondent's position with respect to most
of the matters alleged is that they were either in effect or
adopted or were in process of being put into effect or
adoption just prior to and during the time of the union
campaign.
As set forth, the Union began organizational activities
September 29, filed a petition October 4, and on October
20 entered into a consent-election agreement. Two series
of group meetings, one on October 14 and the other on
November 2. were conducted by Redcor officials in the
plant during working hours. At these sessions there were
present on behalf of management the following persons:
Thomas Taggart, president; Philip Mounts, director of
operations; Gerald Feijoo, personnel manager; and
Lyman B. Powell, attorney. At the meetings in the "clean
room" there were 25 to 40 employees. About 30 em-
ployees were present at the meetings in the test depart-
ment and 40 to 60 in the standard products assembly
area.
Taggart admitted that prior to these meetings he had
seen union propaganda promising to seek or secure cer-
tain benefits including specifically wage increases, sick
pay, jury duty, and seniority. Taggart could not recall any
others. As previously set forth at the time Feijoo was em-
ployed, he was to formulate a personnel administration
and policy program which he considered applicable to the
Redcor situation. According to Taggart among the items
which Feijoo was working on were matters such as a
merit review program, a job classification program, the
matter of sick leave, of which Feijoo was an advocate but
as to which, according to Taggart, the Company had
made no decision, and the matter of seniority and layoff
policy.
This latter had been reduced to writing on June 11, and
according to Taggart was the only policy here involved
which he knew of, that had been actually reduced to writ-
ing prior to September 28 or 29. This had been dis-
tributed to the management staff but apparently not to
employees generally. As to its actual application, it ap-
pears that no layoffs occurred after the adoption of the
policy on June 11.
According to Taggart the purpose of the meetings was
twofold: "One was to express to the employees the
management's philosophy and opinion about the issue,
and secondly, to answer any questions about the law or
any other factual matters which the employees might
want to ask. In other words, to better inform them." The
Company ostensibly at these meetings was seeking to
avoid promises, indicating it could not make such
promises and would not do so. However, the question is,
did Respondent deliberately or inadvertently either make
promises or the equivalent of such by statements,
opinions, or other utterances which could cause em-
ployees to reasonably believe that certain benefits would
be forthcoming? Another question is, did Respondent put
into effect new programs or ones never generally known
to be in effect?23 In the latter connection, if so, to what
extent and number?
Taggart stated that during the course of the October 14
meetings it had become obvious, from the questions
asked at the meetings, that not as many of the Company's
"policies" had been disseminated to employees as he had
thought. He said he knew they had been disseminated to
second line management but he felt that the employees
who had not been informed were entitled to know what
the current policies were. Taggart said that, as a result,
some of these were then placed on the bulletin board.
Feijoo, in testifying in connection with an alleged pol-
icy as to jury duty, said that it was posted between the
22 At the time of Powell's expressions of "opinions" in the course of the pohcy9 What is the necessary extent of distribution andlor operation?
meetings, there were present both the company president, Taggart, and How many acts equal a pohcy9 Relative thereto, see the discussion of jury
then director of operations (now vice president), Mounts. duty, infra.
23 Here other questions may well be. When does the company have a
1020 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
first and second meeting, October 14 and November 2,
because "It came about as a result of our decision to post
current policies and any new policies, to acquaint people
with what these policies were because we found at the
October meeting that many people were not aware of
what policies were; so we wanted to advise them of new
policies and existing policies."
The General Counsel in his argument points out that at
a meeting in the standard products assembly area on Oc-
tober 14, Mounts told employees that the Company
would "continue to place into being, here, policies and
benefits which are as good or better than any benefits that
you could get from another employer in this area." The
significance of this, if any, will be discussed more fully
hereafter. At a meeting in the test department on
November 2, Mounts said, " ... we have been exerting
a lot of effort ... to get company policies written down,
cleared, and published. And it's our intention to do more
of that. And there have been-there are areas that we
have just not been able to get to yet .... So I hope that in
the weeks to come, we're going to have more time to
devote to doing some of the things that will benefit you
and benefit this company in its growth."
The General Counsel has spelled out in detail the par-
ticular employee benefits which he contends that the
Respondent either never had or had not previously com-
municated to the employees, but which, during the period
September 29 to November 4, it set forth, granted or
promised employees. These will be considered seriatim,
setting forth the General Counsel's contentions as well as
the Respondent's.
One item that the General Counsel refers to is that of
job posting. At the meeting in the "clean room" on Oc-
tober 14 a question apparently was asked with respect to
promotion policy and Mounts replied that they knew that
there had been some cases in the past where perhaps
some of them "had reasons to think that this policy was
not in effect." Mounts said that he wished to restate and
assure them that it was company policy to enable any of
them who were interested in promotional opportunities to
know that opportunities exist and then said, "We will
[emphasis supplied] post them on the bulletin board."
Subsequently on November 2 he told the employees in
the standard products assembly area, "I don't know how
it has been in the past in terms of whether everyone has
had an equal opportunity to get training but I can assure
you in the future, point to the fact that we are [emphasis
supplied] posting every opportunity, every opening of
any consequence in the company-every opening as a
matter of fact-." The record further reflects that Feijoo
had told several supervisors about a job posting program
in September but had not instructed them to commu-
nicate this information to employees. Until the group
meetings there was no direct communication of such pro-
gram. However, according to Feijoo, actual notice of
posting was effected, commencing on September 15
when a job was posted on the bulletin boards for an elec-
trical inspector. Feijoo also said two other jobs, for a
drafting position and a secretary were posted between
September 15 and 29. From the foregoing, standing in
isolation, I would be reluctant to reach a conclusion of
improper practice on the part of the Company. However,
its ultimate significance can best be evaluated in conjunc-
tion with other matters set forth hereafter.
Another benefit set forth by the General Counsel re-
lates to jury duty. Testimony of General Counsel's wit-
ness, Gladys Miller, an employee in the clean room, was
that about July 1965 she had first asked her supervisor,
Kravitz, whether there was any policy with respect to pay
for jury duty and was told that Kravitz did not know. Sub-
sequently she spoke to Feijoo and asked him if there was
a policy as far as wages (for jury duty) were concerned
and he told her that he hadn't come up against the situa-
tion as yet since he was new but he would find out and let
her know. He did not inform her of any company policy
nor was she called to serve on the jury. According to em-
ployee DeVito, at the meeting at the Red Robin, about
October 6, Feijoo was asked whether there was any jury
duty plan and answered that he believed that Redcor did
have a jury duty plan but was not too sure of what it
said.24 Feijoo was asked whether at the time of the
meetings with the employees he was aware as to whether
or not there was a jury duty practice or policy and he
testified, "Yes it did come up and as it turned out I stated
to the employees that there was no policy at the meeting
but in fact we had made payments to these two people.
We had a policy that was working and I was not aware of
that policy." Later Feijoo testified that he had not said at
any meeting that the Company had no policy on jury
duty. Feijoo then testified, "I said we did have a policy on
it, but [sic] it had been posted and had been in opera-
tion."2i For reasons set forth in footnote 24, I credit this
latter response as to what was said by Feijoo at the group
meetings.
In response to a question of whether pursuant to
request of company counsel he had ascertained whether
or not employees requested and received pay for jury
duty at any time in the past, Feijoo answered, "Yes, I did
institute that study and there were found that there were
two employees who were willing and able members of the
voting unit who were paid for jury duty. They requested
jury duty pay in September, they served jury duty in Sep-
tember and were paid a differential payment the first
week in October." Later Feijoo testified that he knew of
'' Feijoo's testimony does not directly respond to this but he testified
that he had first learned there was a jury duty policy in August.
LS Feijoo said he had been confused about what items he had been an-
swering the day before and thought the question related to military leave
and bereavement pay on which they had no policy While his original
testimony (pp 708-709 of the transcript ) follows questions as to jury
duty, it also supports his subsequent testimony (at p. 816) since he was
asked (at p 709)
Q How did the matter of jury duty pay come up at these
meetings9
A In the test department, I believe, the second meeting, the
question was asked by an employee It was a three -part question. The
question was, do we have a jury duty policy, and two other questions
at the same time.
The transcripts of the meetings show no jury duty discussion on October
14, but the meeting in the test department on November 2 reflects the fol-
lowing.
Question: To bring up one or two other questions. Jury duty pay,
death in the family pay and military leave . What is our company pol-
icy and are we formulating anything on this
Mr. Mounts. Jury duty pay is [emphasis supplied] up on the bul-
letin board . That policy has been published and put up there, and
I-Jerry-what it essentially says is that we will make up the dif-
ference if you produce evidence of it
Mr Feijoo: Everyone is eligible and we don 't have any limitations
on the amount of time . So we pay the difference in payment for any-
body who has to go, and spend time on a jury
The foregoing indicates Feijoo's latter version is correct as to what he
said at the meetings.
REDCOR CORP.
two such payments on September 29.26 There is no indi-
cation in the record as to when it was decided to pay these
employees jury duty pay. Vice President for finance of
Redcor, John Wiester, testified that there had been a jury
duty policy and someone had been paid in September.
Possibly this individual is one of those referred to by
Feijoo.
As set forth in footnote 24, supra, at a meeting in the
test department on November 2, the question was asked
about what was company policy as to jury duty pay, and
Mounts and Feijoo replied that it was on the bulletin
board and provided Respondent would pay the difference
in pay without any limitations on the amount of time. This
policy appears to have been posted on the bulletin boards
about November 1.
Although I have credited Feijoo's latter version that he
at no time in the group meetings said Respondent had no
jury duty policy but rather had said it did have and
described it at a November 2 meeting, the foregoing still
raises a question of whether the Company had a policy
before September 29. Were the two instances actually a
policy? It is evident the personnel director did not know
of a policy in July. Also as late as October 6, he believed
there was a policy but wasn't sure what it provided. This
may not be conclusive, but it does give rise to considera-
ble doubt about an existing policy. Whether payment to
two individuals would constitute a policy is arguable.
However, even these two did not receive the payment ac-
cording to Feijoo, until either October (or September
29?) which was after union activity commenced. Here
again, were this the only item involved, I might have seri-
ous reservations as to its significance. However, it con-
stitutes part of a total picture to be considered infra.
Another matter referred to by the General Counsel
presumably under the inter alia provisions in paragraph
9 of the complaint, refers to maternity leave. A question
was asked about this at a meeting in the standard
products assembly area on November 2. Feijoo said the
situation had recently arisen and he hurriedly looked
through the files to see what precedent there had been in
the past as to maternity leave and found none. They had
then discussed the matter relating to a particular in-
dividual, determined that at the end of a 6-month period
she would be required to take her maternity leave and be
eligible to return to the Company when her doctor
released her but no sooner than 6 weeks after delivery of
her baby. This was essentially what was decided but was
not a formal policy as yet. He believed that this would be
the established policy.
In the absence of any specific case, or any question, it
might appear to be a promise of a policy, that was not
required at the time, but only designed to deal with the
union situation. However, with an actual case pending, a
question asked, and employment of a very large number
of women,27 it would appear that the Company would
normally answer such a question when raised and in-
dicate what it was then doing. Further it would not seem
unreasonable to intimate that such would probably be its
policy. It is possible that it could have said: "This is what
we are doing but we can say no more." But the realities
would certainly appear to preclude evasive statements as
21 Apparently the same ones.
21 Over half of the bargaining unit are women.
28 Other changes involved formalization, initiation by the personnel
manager, and indicated assurance of timeliness.
1021
to company attitude relative to such a matter and to call
for expression of some reasonable position. However,
even assuming I were to conclude Respondent's ex-
pressed views as to maternity leave were not made in
relation to union organizational activities, such need not
be ignored in evaluating Respondent's conduct as a
whole.
Another contention of the General Counsel relates to
merit review procedure and certain retroactive wage in-
creases in connection with the review procedure. A writ-
ten merit review procedure in detail was distributed to
management about September 20, 1965, according to
Feijoo who had been responsible for its initiation and
compilation.
The policy which was new in certain respects was not
communicated to employees by means of bulletin boards
until after the union campaign commenced. There is some
variation among Respondent's witnesses as to prior prac-
tices. However, it appears that perhaps the main dif-
ference, between the prior review policy and that set forth
in the procedure distributed to management on Sep-
tember 20, was that under the earlier policy an initial
regular review would occur 3 months after the date of hire
and another review 6 months following that, whereas
under the "new" policy the first review would be after 6
months and each subsequent review 6 months
thereafter.28 At the time of the October 14 meetings the
employees did not have knowledge of the "new" policy
but it was posted after the meetings for their information.
In the course of three meetings on October 14 it was
brought out by questions that certain reviews were late in
being made under the policy (whether old or new). Pres-
ident Taggart acknowledged that some may have been
overdue but promised in two of the meetings that any
reviews that were late would be made retroactive to the
time that he became president. Subsequently he honored
this promise and three bargaining unit employees were
granted retroactive wage increases during October.29 The
total amount of such increases was approximately $60.30
Prior to the union campaign no such retroactive payments
had been made or promised. However, Taggart had in
fact given retroactive payments to two salaried em-
ployees whose merit increases had been late.
The new merit policy appears to have been in process
of completion well before the union organizing campaign
and was circulated to management before that time.
Other than formalization and the change of the initial
regular merit increase period from 3 to 6 months, it does
not appear to represent such a new or changed policy as
to divert in any major way from the preceding policy.
Under the circumstances and in the light of the questions
arising with respect thereto at the meetings it would seem
to be a normal response for it to have been announced
and posted by the Respondent for the information of the
employees. With respect to the merit increases, in small
amounts, that were granted retroactively, this is a policy
that might well result from ordinary fairness. It was previ-
ously manifested in the conduct of Taggart toward
salaried employees and in any event did not involve a
large amount. Standing by itself I would consider it
possibly in the nature of de minimis but here again, con-
29 Stipulation. One of these three was DeVito who received $7.25,
another, Jean Kayes, received $27
3° According to testimony subsequent to the aforesaid stipulation, it ap-
pears this sum was distributed to about five persons.
1022 DEC ISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sidered in the light of the overall actions and conduct of
the Respondent during the period involved , it may have
greater significance.
The General Counsel refers to a payroll deduction
bond plan promised by Respondent j i At the November
2, standard products assembly meeting, Mounts told the
employees "We might just also mention that the payroll
deduction bond plan that has been suggested previously
will be announced in effect the latter part of November."
This was the first occasion on which employees were told
that Redcor would make such a plan available to them It
was also indicated in the meetings that such an item does
involve some expense administratively to the employer.
This latter item alone is perhaps not great hut it is an ele-
ment of benefit to employees at an expense to an em-
ployer which appears to fall within the ambit of prohibited
conduct particularly if done in connection with other like
acts during the period between September 29 and
November 4.
The General Counsel also refers to the employer an-
nouncing to the employees at the group meetings its
senority policy quoting from Mounts at a group meeting
on October 14 as follows: "There is a seniority policy
which was written and published and it is obvious from
what we ran into this morning that -the publication was
on a very limited basis - and we have already promised,
one of the promises I think we can make without danger,
is that we will get the seniority policy up on the bulletin
board.... I honestly can't quote seniority policy because
I am not sure I even read it ." Management representa-
tives at two meetings discussed in some detail either ex-
isting or contemplated policies on seniority and layoff pri-
ority which related to employees ' rights to recall , promo-
tion , overtime, assignment , transfer, and classification.
These were in part set forth in exhibits, submitted at the
hearing by Respondent , which appear to have been ex-
ecuted and adopted in June 1965 and distributed only to
the staff of President Taggart but not to all supervisors.
The first time the policies were communicated to em-
ployees was on their posting after the October 14 group
meetings. These were issued before Fetjoo became per-
sonnel director. There was no occasion to test them as
company policy because there were no layoffs thereafter
and apparently no other issue arose involving seniority.
The General Counsel points to certain discussions occur-
ring during the meetings which indicated the Company
was actually thinking or speaking in terms of a seniority
policy different from that set forth in the written policy
adopted in June . He refers to President Taggart at a meet-
ing in the clean room on March 2 referring to `families"
of classifications for the purpose of seniority, whereas the
June policy refers to the classification as the basis of
seniority . He also points out a discussion of excluding ex-
tended leave (of more than 2 weeks ), in the computation
of seniority These may well be variances or amplifica-
tions, but, were they standing alone , they would not
necessarily reflect improper conduct on the part of
Respondent . The fact that the policies were not fully
communicated or set forth does not refute their existence.
Neither does the exhibition of typed material prove the
application of the policy, particularly where it never had
occasion to be applied. However, for rea,ons set forth,
infra, I do not believe that this can be viewed by itself but
must be considered in relation to and as part of the total
expressions and conduct of Respondent.
Another subject which came up during the meetings
and resulted in a company promise of benefits was that of
shift hours . Employees had raised the question of
whether they were going to have their hours changed. At
a meeting in the standard products assembly area on
November 2, Mounts replied , "Yes, we are going to ex-
ceed [sic] to your wishes in that regard and make the
starting hour of the operations and activities 7:30. We will
announce this and get the formal details of it nailed down
" Apparently this was the first announcement to
Redcor workers of the change in working hours, accord-
ing to Feijoo.
One of the matters which the General Counsel con-
tends involved a promise or change in benefits was that of
the grievance procedure. Prior to the union organizational
campaign it appears that the grievance procedure of the
Company consisted of the right to go to a supervisor, and
after Feijoo became personnel director to take a matter
up to him. However , at the three meetings on October 14,
employees were informed of a grievance procedure under
which they could take their complaints from their super-
visor to Feijoo and from him to the department or divi-
sion head32 and ultimately , if necessary, to President Tag-
gart . Fetjoo told the employees that he had completed a
first draft of the new procedure . Powell told them that
Feijoo had been working on it and it was in its final
stages. At a group meeting on November 2, Mounts
promised employees that they would come out with a
grievance policy which would be posted on the bulletin
board and tell them exactly how things would be handled
if they felt they had any complaints . This grievance
procedure which had been outlined prior to the election
was, in fact, posted on the bulletin board of the Company
a week thereafter.
No such procedure had been communicated to the em-
ployees prior to October 14, and , in fact , it had not been
applied . The employees had been neither advised nor per-
mitted to bring a grievance to the company president be-
fore the campaign began . Respondent apparently con-
tends that no one had sought to bring a grievance to the
president . However, whether or not this is the case, there
is no doubt that no one had actually taken a grievance up
in the fashion set forth in the newly outlined grievance
procedure nor had it ever been spelled out before.
A second contention of Respondent appears to be that
this was one of the matters that Feijoo as personnel
director was working on and that he simply continued to
do so during the organizing campaign . No doubt practi-
cally every modern industrial organization does have a
grievance procedure . The question though is the same as
with certain other matters herein . To what extent had a
new procedure been developed at the time the union or-
ganizational campaign began9 Were this and other mat-
ters expedited in the face of or because of the union cam-
paign9 It is, of course , difficult to determine the impact of
the union campaign on the various items that are involved
herein . However, conclusions or reasonable inferences
may be drawn upon consideration and analysis of items
that were discussed and matters which Respondent an-
nounced, promised or put into effect during this period. In
order to properly evaluate the allegations and proof, it is
a' Presumably this comes under the " inter alia ' provis ions of paragraph
9 of the complaint
32 Mounts was also referred to but the written procedure ultimately
posted after the election does not appear to refer to his position
REDCOR CORP. 1023
necessary to look at the total picture rather than a
piecemeal observation . Before so doing, one other matter
needs to be considered - namely , sick leave.
The General Counsel and the Respondent are in
dispute as to whether the Company did any more than
discuss the subject of sick leave . General Counsel con-
tends that by its utterances and conduct , including a
letter , the Company in fact promised to provide sick leave
or at least implied that sick leave would be granted after
the election was over with. What does the General Coun-
sel rely on?
Feijoo , in response to a question in the test department
meeting on October 14, answered that the first draft of
the grievance procedure had been completed, that job
descriptions were completed for the test area , and he was
personally working on job descriptions for other areas.
Feijoo added , "We are looking into additional areas of
benefit. We must be very careful about what we say re-
garding benefits during an organizing campaign , but since
I have been here, I have been studying the sick leave pol-
icy in regard to hourly employees . I will continue to work
on that policy. I don't know what legal policy is in arriv-
ing at a final policy regarding sick leave . I guess that we
cannot commit ourselves during the campaign , but I can
guarantee you that work will be accomplished and a deci-
sion will be made regarding that particular benefit."
Subsequently, at the same meeting on October 14, a
question was asked about the timing of the sick pay and
other policies and when they could be expected. First,
Powell indicated that the lawyers had to caution the em-
ployers that it was unlawful for an employer to promise
anything to employees during a union drive. Feijoo then
answered as follows:
Let me answer , I think I can answer your question
without getting us into too much trouble . Sick pay
has been a concern of mine since I started here. I
philosophically believe, personally, in sick leave; I
think we should have it. I think to be competitive we
should have it. That is my personal philosophy.
[Emphasis supplied.] Shortly after I started with the
company I enunciated this policy with incorporated
sick pay for hourly employees. That policy has not
yet been approved. Additional work has to be accom-
plished regarding whether or not this is what the
community is doing and I am compiling those facts
now. [Emphasis supplied.] We will continue to
review the question of sick pay and a decision will be
forthcoming at some time after the election. What the
decision is I cannot say at this point. I don't know
whether I got us into trouble or not.
On October 14, as previously set forth, Mounts told
the employees in the standard products area: " ... We
can say to you and we do say it, in as clear tones as possi-
ble, we will continue to place into being, here, policies
and benefits which are as good or better [emphasis
supplied] than any benefits that you could get from
another employer in this area ." On the same day in the
test department group meeting , Taggart said "Our basic
policy is one of equalling or bettering the area practice in
both wages and benefits and working conditions and so
forth and so forth . . . " Following the foregoing, on Oc-
tober 28, Mounts sent a letter to Redcor employees in
which he stated as follows:
We discussed with you at the group meetings the fact
that Redcor has been reviewing the Sick Leave Pay
policies and practices of other companies within the
area for some time . This study was started by Jerry
Feijoo when he joined Redcor in July, 1965.
As you know , if we were to change the wages and
benefits during this organizational drive , we would
risk the danger of the IBEW claiming that we were
trying to bribe you for your vote against union
representation . Therefore , we must postpone
[emphasis supplied ] action on such changes until the
election is past.
However , we have completed gathering the informa-
tion and believe the results will be interesting to you.
They show that in the area of sick leave benefits at
least, employees of companies without unions seem
to be better offthan unionized employees.
The letter then states that 10 companies were contacted
in Los Angeles, 5 having unions, 4 of which were the
IBEW , and 5 having no union . It asks employees to look
at the facts and draw their own conclusions about their
need to be represented by a union , then explains the fac-
tors involved in the survey and sets forth a summary of
findings in relation to it . Following these findings and
analysis, the concluding paragraph reads: "Based on the
above observations , the IBEW did not get a better or
even as good a sick leave benefit for its members as was
given without IBEW representation."
Attorney Powell , at a meeting in the test department on
November 2, said:
. But I don 't have any qualms about criticizing
the company where I feel it's behind . Like on sick
leave [emphasis supplied]. I've always argued
that-along with Jerry (Feijoo)-that sick leave is
something that the company should have [emphasis
supplied]. On the other hand you've got to realize
that this is a company that's been in existence [sic]
a relatively short time, and I think that you have to
take into consideration that it is a company that is
fairly young so I'm not excusing the company . I think
sick leave is a thing that should be put into effect
[emphasis supplied].. . .
Statements that an employer's policy is "to equal or
better area practice in both wages and benefits" may not
be per se improper . However, these may be considered in
conjunction with all utterances , statements , letters, and
conduct of an employer to determine what is the overall
effect. So here we have these statements together with an
announcement that study of sick leave was being made
and the expressed view of the personnel director that the
employees should have sick leave . This is followed by a
letter to employees which referred to the prior discussion
of sick leave at the group meetings and a study of sick
leave policies of other companies it had been making; in-
formed employees that if they "were to change
[emphasis supplied] the wages and benefits during this
organizational drive, we would risk the danger of the
IBEW claiming that we were trying to bribe [emphasis
supplied] you for your vote against union representation.
Therefore , we must postpone 33 [emphasis supplied] ac-
11 Webster's Third New International defines "postpone" as follows: ble. Otherwise why refer to "change " wages and benefits and allude to
1: To hold back to a later time defer, delay . A fair implication (or in- "bribe" which connotes reward or benefit
ference) is that action will be taken subsequently and that it will be favora-
1024 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tion on such changes until the election is past." It con-
cluded results of the study show "that in the area of sick
leave benefits at least, employees of companies without
unions seem to be better off than unionized employees."
This in turn is followed by the expressed opinion of the
company attorney in the presence of its president and
other officals that "sick leave is something that the com-
pany should have [emphasis supplied].. . I think sick
leave is a thing that should be put into effect [emphasis
supplied].. .
In resolving the allegations as to Respondent's
"promise" or intention to put into effect a sick leave plan
there should be considered: (1) the preceding repeated
general statements on October 14 of company policy to
equal or better area benefits; (2) Respondent's letter of
October 28, analyzing area sick benefits, with its conclu-
sion that those of nonunion companies were better than
union employees and stating that it must "postpone" ac-
tion on benefits until after the election; (3) the expressed
opinions of its personnel director on October 14 and its
attorney on November 2 that the Respondent should
have or put into effect such leave; (4) and also all of the
utterances and conduct of Respondent as to other pro-
grams and benefits set forth, supra. Similarly, in resolving
the other allegations pertaining to benefits, the ut-
terances, statements, letter, and opinions relating to sick
leave should be considered.
What constitutes a promise may be made clearly and
directly or it may be made is a variety of ways. Even if a
promise is not intended, if utterances are made in a way
that lead others to believe that a promise had been made,
then a finding may properly be reached that such a
promise has been made.34
In analyzing the allegations of paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and
12, are the allegations and evidence dealing with each
item previously set forth to be looked at in isolation or in
relation to each other and all others in arriving at a proper
conclusion? While answers may be obtainable in isola-
tion , I consider that ultimate conclusions herein can best
be achieved by viewing the whole picture, i.e., looking at
all the items in relation to one another
The foregoing approach reveals that Respondent con-
ducted series of group meetings on October 14 and
November 2 (before the November 4 election) ostensibly
to express management views about the issues and
answer questions of law or factual matters. Actually, a
very substantial portion of these meetings was devoted to
what were either grievances, desired changes in work
conditions, or desired changes in benefits. No doubt some
of the matters raised involved items set forth by the
Union in its campaign and conceivably could be said to
fall under the issues thereof. However, it is questionable
whether the campaign issues covered the gamut of mat-
ters considered at these meetings. Moreover, and cnti-
34 Am Jur 2d, Contracts §2-"Promise" state',
In ordinary use the word "promise" frequently bears different
shades of meaning In both popular and legal usage, however, a
promise is an assurance in whatever form of expression given that a
thing will or will not be done
"No special form of words is necessary to create a promise All
that is necessary is that a fair interpretation of the words used shall
make it appear that a promise was intended This is sufficient even
though the promise is not stated in clear terms The mere expression
of an intention or desire is not a promise, however the promise is an
undertaking to carry the intention into effect
31 See discussion, supra, as to these dates
cally important, either during the course of these
meetings or following them, the Respondent: (1) for the
first time formally set forth as policy, matters which ap-
peared to have been previously at most (a) isolated in-
stances or (b) in different form and content or (c) in vary-
ing stages of alleged gestation which were evidently ex-
pedited; (2) made actual announcements of changed
benefits (in addition to those referred to in (1); (3) made
promises, direct or implied, of other changes and benefits.
More specifically, Respondent: (1) spelled out and an-
nounced a definite policy of job posting whereas previ-
ously such had been undefined and its existence as a pol-
icy, if at all, was predicated on actual posting of three
jobs; (2) spelled out, announced, and posted a jury duty
policy whose prior "existence," if any, involved two per-
sons who applied for jury duty pay in September but did
not receive such until either October or September 29 at
the earliest'35 apparently after union organizational activi-
ty commenced, (3) announced a seniority policy (which
had several months earlier been communicated to top
management only), but which for the first time was an-
nounced to -employees at the meetings and there
discussed with newly proposed modifications thereof,
particularly as to families of classifications as its basis
rather than a classification; (4) granted requested shift
hour changes; (5) granted and announced a bond deduc-
tion program;36 (6) granted maternity leave in an in-
dividual case, and indicated policy with respect thereto;
(7) spelled out and announced at the meetings a new pro-
gram of merit reviews which, although distributed to
management about September 20 to 22, was not posted
on bulletin boards until after the union campaign began;
(8) granted retroactive pay increases in October (for first
time), albeit in small amounts, to several employees
whose merit reviews were late, (9) spelled out and an-
nounced at meetings (and posted a week after the elec-
tion) a detailed grievance procedure such as had not
previously existed at Respondent; (10) as set forth, in-
formed employees it would equal or better existing area
wages and benefits, discussed sick leave and told em-
ployees it was under study, permitted its personnel
director, Feijoo, in the presence of President Taggart, to
state that he favored sick leave, then sent a letter to em-
ployees claiming nonunion companies had better sick
leave benefits than union ones, but that it was necessary
to postpone action on benefits because of the union cam-
paign, and thereafter permitted its attorney in the
presence of Taggart (and other officials) to state that sick
leave should be put into effect The foregoing relative to
sick leave, viewed in the light of all the preceding items
announced and put into effect, could cause employees to
expect that sick leave would be granted to them after the
election. I find from all of the foregoing that Respondent
impliedly promised employees a sick leave plan.37
9" Note also Respondent's response at the test department meeting on
November 2 where a question was asked with respect to purchase of com-
pany stock whether Respondent had such stock and a person could buy
some and have so much a month taken out to buy it Taggart responded
that the Company had no treasury stock nor such plans Then he added-
"If enough people in the company would like to have a stock purchase
plan, sure they can have it
11 The General Counsel does not discuss in his brief the matter of edu-
cational assistance alleged in the complaint While there is some evidence
pertaining thereto, I conclude that it is insufficient to support the allega-
tions in paragraph 9 relating thereto Accordingly, I do not find any viola-
tion in respect to that part of the allegation of paragraph 9(b) relative to an
educational assistance plan
REDCOR CORP. 1025
Further, an employer who, in a 30-day period between
the filing of a petition and an election, does and says all of
the foregoing and more in clarifying, establishing, and im-
pliedly promising benefits is not simply responding to
questions. Respondent's total conduct reflects the very
substantial announcement, granting, and promising of
either changed or new benefits at a time and under cir-
cumstances when it may not properly have done so.38
These were part of Respondent's overall acts and con-
duct calculated to influence employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act through
granting or the holding out of promise of benefits.39
Accordingly, I find that Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(1) by, during the period of union organizational ac-
tivities, (1) formalizing and announcing as policies, mat-
ters either not previously policies or previously un-
defined, or vague in their import, (2) changing and modi-
fying existing policies and programs and announcing
such, (3) granting various benefits and favorable changes
in working conditions, and (4) impliedly or otherwise
promising sick leave and other benefits .40
Paragraph 10 of the complaint alleged that during the
meetings the Respondent, by Thomas L. Taggart (its
president), told employees "there was no need for an
outside union, because Respondent would grant em-
ployees employment benefits equal to or better than
those which the Union could secure for them."
I have found that Taggart did say at a group meeting
that the Respondent's basic policy was one of "equalling
or bettering the area practice in both wages and benefits
and working conditions." I have also referred to this
statement in connection with my finding, supra, that
Respondent impliedly promised to adopt a sick leave pro-
gram after the election.
However, this does not necessarily support the conten-
tion of the General Counsel that such statement is to be
considered the same as the allegation in paragraph 10 of
the complaint. It is possible to argue such implication
from all of Respondent's utterances and conduct. How-
ever, I believe clearer proof (than submitted herein) is
necessary before such inference should be drawn (from
Taggart's statement) that no union was necessary
because Respondent would give them as good or better
benefits than the Union could (possibly) obtain. The
General Counsel refers to the Trane Company case '41
where the Board in finding a violation said in part:
In its April 18 letter to employees, after stating
that its wage policy is to pay wages equal to or better
than the average paid by other similar firms in the
area, the Employer emphasized that "This is and will
continue to be our wage policy - union or no union."
Further, after reciting wage increases voluntarily
given employees , the paragraph added , "No union is
necessary for this- and NO UNION CAN GET
YOU ANY MORE THAN THIS!" Finally, in the
closing paragraph of this letter, referring to the
benefits above described , the letter concluded:
You have gotten this without having a
union-without having to pay dues-and
without the loss of pay through costly "strikes."
What, then, can a union offer you?42
The foregoing from Trane is clear in its implications. It
may be that employees of Respondent could draw similar
inferences herein (to those which would follow from the
statements in Trane), but I am unable to conclude that
such inferences would generally be drawn from the state-
ments and evidence submitted.
Accordingly, I do not find a violation as alleged in para-
graph 10 of the complaint.
F. Alleged Prohibition of Distribution of Handbills
The complaint alleged that "on or about November 4,
1965 Respondent by Ralph Wever (production control
manager) prohibited employees from distributing hand-
bills for the Union."
According to employee Jeff Karlin, shortly after 7:30
a.m., on November 4, the morning of the election, he ar-
rived at the parking lot of Respondent and received some
handbills from Frank Salerno, IBEW organizer. As he
started walking across the parking lot, Ralph Wever,
production control manager of Respondent, came out of
the building, walked over to him and told Karlin that he
could not pass out the leaflets on company premises that
day because "there was a 24-hour moratorium on doing
any type of campaigning before the election." Karlin said
Salerno, who was nearby when Wever said this, told Kar-
lin to give the leaflets back to him, and told Wever he was
wrong. Wever insisted it was illegal, whereupon Karlin
gave the leaflets back to Salerno, and went into the build-
ing to go to work. Karlin said he distributed no handbills
that morning. 43
Wever denied that he had any conversation with Karlin
on that particular morning about handbills, although ad-
mitting that he did have a discussion with Salerno in
which he asked Salerno, who was passing out literature,
to leave the premises, that is, the company parking lot.
According to Wever he also told Salerno it was his un-
derstanding 'here was a 24-hour moratorium on any ac-
tivity but that Salerno indicated this was not so. It may be
that Wever had forgotten about any discussion with Kar-
lin (or in which Karlin may have been involved), as a
38 See N.L R.R. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405 (grant of
economic benefit as a violation of Section 8(a)(1), Waynline , Inc., 81
NLRB 511 at 521 (announcement or promise of benefits , purportedly
planned for some time , shortly after union organizing commenced),
Northwest Engineering Company, 148 NLRB 1136 at 1137 to 1141 (new
insurance program effective week before election, initiation of meetings as
to grievances by respondent followed by adjustments, relative to over-
time, work assignments , and availability of parts , shortly before election-
compare above meetings and adjustments, etc.), Copeland Oil Co., Inc,
157 NLRB 126 at 135 ("could promise nothing" before election but
would "recommend" granting of requested benefits), Lincoln Manufac-
turing, 160 NLRB 1866 at 1868 (delayed announcement of new vacation
program). See also Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (C A. 2) (thinly veiled
promises); Crown Tar & Chemical Works, 365 F.2d 588 (C.A. 10)
(delayed putting into effect a wage increase until after union organiza-
tional effort was under way).
39 See fn. 37 , supra.
48 While the complaint in paragraphs 9a, b, and c, 11, and 12 may not
have in all cases completely spelled out or precisely detailed all of the mat-
ters herein considered, discussed and found to be violative of the Act, I
have passed on them because : ( 1) all of them appear to be definitely
within the ambit of said allegations and (2), in any event were both similar
to said allegations and fully litigated herein . See Montgomery Ward &
Co., Incorporated, 160 NLRB 1729, p. 1734, fn 6 (citing Granada Mills,
Inc., 143 NLRB 957,958; Monroe Feed Store, 112 NLRB 1336).
41 137 NLRB 1506, at 1509-10.
42 Trane, supra, 1510
43 The handbills were a final appeal to the employees to support the
Union.
1026 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
result of the controversy with Salerno at that particular
time. In any event, it appears that Wever admittedly
spoke to two other employees shortly after his discussion
with Salerno, about not distributing campaign literature.
Based on these conversations, the incident with Salerno
and an admitted discussion shortly thereafter between
Wever and Mounts about the "24 Hour Rule,"44 I con-
clude that such a conversation, as set forth, occurred as
stated by Karlin.
Following the discussion with Salerno (and Karlin),
Wever proceeded to the rear of building #I where em-
ployee Isaac Knight had been distributing handbills for
about 5 minutes. According to Knight, Wever said that he
would have to stop distributing the handbills since it was
against "Labor Relations Board laws." Knight said that
he then returned most of the handbills to Salerno but kept
some which he continued to distribute from a place where
he felt he could not be seen. Knight testified that Wever
again came out and accused him of giving out literature,
which he denied, that Wever went back in again and
about 10 minutes later 45 came out and informed him that
it was all right for him to distribute such literature. Knight
said this was about 5 or 10 minutes to 8 a.m. and he con-
tinued to distribute literature until he went to work.
Employee Scannell testified that he arrived at the plant
about 20 minutes to 8, parked his car, received some
handbills or circulars from Salerno, went to the rear door
of building #2, and started to pass these out. Shortly
thereafter, Wever approached and said, "Don't you know
that you are exposing yourself?" Scannell said that
Wever told him there was something about a 24-hour
moratorium on passing out union literature and that he
was also on company property in doing so. Scannell
stated he did not solicit thereafter but would give some-
body literature if they asked for it. Wever returned later
and told Scannell that he had seen Mounts and that he
could continue to distribute literature. Scannell said that
it was late by then so he just threw the ones he had left in
the trash can and went to work. According to Scannell,
Wever had told him that he would be liable for "repercus-
sions" if he continued to distribute literature.
Wever admitted he had spoken to Knight and Scannell
about their distributing literature but said that he had told
them that it was his "understanding" or he was "under
the impression" that there was a 24-hour moratorium and
that he "suggested" that they "check" and "make sure"
that each was able to pass out literature "without any con-
sequence" both to them and to the Company. (Emphasis
supplied.) From the foregoing, I find that Wever, in es-
sence, told Knight and Scannell that they were not to con-
tinue their distribution. According to Wever, after speak-
ing to Mounts, he returned and told Knight and Scannell
they "could continue to pass out literature." In the mean-
time, as set forth, they either discontinued or were ham-
pered in such distribution.
Knight also testified that he took what literature
remained with him into the plant and continued to give it
out the rest of the day right up to the time of voting in the
afternoon.
I have previously found that Wever told Knight and
Scannell to discontinue distribution of literature and so
also Karlin. This was clearly improper interference with
44 All discussed infra.
45 Wever testified that he had spoken to Mounts in the interval and
Mounts told him there was no ruling against passing out literature on elec-
the rights of Knight, Scannell, and Karlin to distribute
literature. But even assuming Wever's version, he would
have still been improperly interfering with the rights of
Knight and Scannell.
The period of time involved, while perhaps not great,
appears to have been at a rather crucial time, a last minute
distribution to employees occurring between approxi-
mately 7:35 a.m. and 7:55 a.m. Whether the time was 10
or 15 or 20 minutes, there is no doubt that there was an
interference with such distribution at a time when em-
ployees were normally coming to work. Although the
leaflet itself may not appear from its content to be a par-
ticularly decisive instrument in connection with the elec-
tion, and the incident may not seem crucial, nevertheless,
it was an unwarranted interference at a very important
time46 with the rights of the employees guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7, and I so find. I further find that by so doing,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged.
G. Alleged Improper Interrogation by Respondent
The complaint as amended alleges: "On or about vari-
ous dates between on or about November 30, 1965 and
on or about February 28, 1966, Respondent by Lyman B.
Powell and Philip H. Mounts interrogated employees and
engaged in surveillance of employees with respect to their
union activities, sympathies and desires."
The General Counsel did not submit direct evidence in
support of this allegation, but instead elected to rely on
certain admissions of Respondent's witnesses and on a
series of affidavits taken by Respondent, purportedly in
preparation for answering charges and election objections
filed with the Board by the Union. This poses a problem
as to the inferences that may properly be drawn from
such evidence. As a preliminary, it should be pointed out
that to establish a case based on such evidence requires
very careful analysis and detailed scrutiny of the items set
forth.
Respondent's officials testified that its purpose in tak-
ing the affidavits was the preparation of a defense to the
election objections and charges. These charges were:
1. A charge filed on November 18, 1965, that "Since
on or about October 5, 1965, the above-named employer
(Redcor) has refused to bargain with the below-named
union which represents a majority of its employees in an
appropriate unit.
"The above-named employer has interfered with,
restrained and coerced its employees in the exercise of
their rights to select a bargaining representative. By these
and other acts, the employer has interfered with,
restrained and coerced its employees in the exercise of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended."
2. An amended charge filed January 31, 1966, which
omitted the allegations involving refusal to bargain and
changed the first date of October 5 to October 6.
Pursuant to the above, between November 18, 1965,
and about February 18, 1966, Powell and Mounts took
about 25 affidavits from Redcor employees. In general,
the employees were selected by Mounts, called to his of-
fice at the Company, and given oral and written instruc-
tions which included statements that the purpose of the
interview was solely to permit the company attorney and
tion day.
46 Much greater weight or significance may attach at such time to what
might be unimportant at another time.
REDCOR CORP. 1027
officials to prepare the Company's legal defense to the
Union's objections and unfair labor practice charges. The
employees were further informed: that no questions
would be asked concerning union membership, sym-
pathy, or activities or how they voted; that no questions
would be asked as to whether they had seen a Board offi-
cial, filed charges, or given testimony; that they were not
to volunteer any information about union memberships or
sympathies; that participation in the interview was volun-
tary, and they had a right to select another individual to
be present if they so desired; and that the Company was
simply trying to get at the truth. Each individual indicated
that he understood the instructions and voluntarily agreed
to participate in the interview.
The individuals were usually questioned in the
presence of Mounts, Powell, or both, with a secretary
present to take down any statements that they wished to
dictate. The aforesaid instructions were read, questions
were then asked, and in some instances discussed, fol-
lowed by dictation of answers by the individual. Accord-
ing to Mounts and Powell, the secretary would take the
dictation of the affiant and write it as he or she gave it 47
While the General Counsel refers to some specific
questions allegedly asked by Respondent which might be
arguably improper'48 the essence of the General Coun-
sel's contention is that the Respondent, in the course of
these interviews, inquired of numerous affiants concern-
ing their state of mind, intention, or understanding either
at, before, or after the time each signed a union authoriza-
tion card. The argument of the General Counsel is that
the questions asked involved an inquiry into the subjec-
tive intention or subjective state of mind of the affiant
which would be improper under the decisions of the
Board.49
As previously stated, although there is no direct
testimony of the General Counsel witnesses other than
that which can be gleaned from the affidavits submitted,
the following is set forth in support of his position. Attor-
ney Powell, as a witness, was examined by the General
Counsel and testified as follows:
Q. You didn't ask what they believed the card
was for?
A. I would say in one or two instances that was
asked, yes. Not by myself, but I believe Mr. Mounts
asked that question after they had volunteered what
they were told. I would say that in the majority of the
cases the employees stated as part of their comments
to the effect that although - .. .
The answer is: One or two cases. In one or two oc-
casions they were asked by Mr. Mounts what they
understood the purpose of the card was when they
signed it.
Q. Now, on any occasions, Mr. Powell, did you
ask employees what they thought about the Union at
the time they signed the card?
A. I believe on one occasion that I could recall,
Mr. Mounts, I believe, asked an employee whether
they had made up their mind at the time they signed
it-let's see - well, I didn't - no, I didn't ask any such
question as that, and you would have to ask some-
body else if they did. I do not know.
Mounts, under examination by the General Counsel,
testified as follows:
Q. Now isn 't it a fact, Mr. Mounts , that either you
or Mr. Powell specifically asked two employees what
they had made up their minds or not about the Union
at the time they signed the card?
A. No, I don't believe so. At a couple of the
meetings where I was present with Mr. Powell in at-
tendance , I did ask two employees , I believe, what
they understood the card was for , and Mr. Powell
very carefully directed me and indicated that was not
information that we wanted to know , and made me
aware rather specifically that this kind of information
was to be excluded from the discussions.
Q. Were the employees prevented from answer-
ing that question?
A. I believe they were.
Q. How would you explain the fact that their an-
swers were in the affidavit?
A. As I stated before they did express their un-
derstanding in their affidavits but not in response to
questions put to them.
Other than the extent of the foregoing admissions,
Powell and Mounts denied that they or either of them had
asked any improper questions. When asked why various
individuals set forth their "understanding," attitude, state
of mind, interpretation, or other subjective matter in their
affidavits, the explanation given was that the affiants
were allowed to set forth in their affidavits their exact
responses. Powell and Mounts testified that the in-
dividuals dictated the affidavits to the secretary in their
own language and without interference or change by any-
one else. The position of Respondent through Powell and
Mounts is that the questions asked were "what were they
told," or "what was said," and that the individuals
proceeded to respond using language such as they "un-
derstood," or setting forth what they intended, in-
terpreted, etc.
A look at the actual affidavits of a number of these in-
dividuals will reflect certain fairly consistent patterns of
responses to questions. What inferences may be drawn
therefrom is a matter to be resolved. Accordingly, the fol-
lowing affidavits, taken by Respondent, are referred to:50
Dorothy Nicholas, Michael Randall, Janet Richey, Viola
Braun, Ola Groomer, Mary Raymond, and James Kent.
Employee Dorothy Nicholas gave an affidavit to
Respondent on November 30. In it, she first refers to one
of her fellow employees who in the beginning of October
asked her to sign a card, sets forth the conversation and
states she refused to sign a card at that time. She also
refers to a subsequent conversation with John DeVito,
47 Powell testified, " . So for the most part we did not inject our-
selves into their dictation "
48 Such as "who contacted you to get you to solicit cards"-from
testimony of Karlin
41 Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770; Bishop & Malco, Inc., dlbla
Walker's 159 NLRB 1159 at 1178 The rule, in essence applicable, is that
while interrogation as to union activities, for purpose of defense, may be
permitted under certain circumstances , it may not where unnecessary
because immaterial thereto See Retail Clerks v. N.L.R.B. (Montgomery
Ward & Co.) (C.A D.C), 373 F 2d 655, citing cases including Joy Silk
Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R B., 185 F 2d 732, 743. That the subjective state of
mind of card signers is generally immaterial, see Marcellus S. Merru and
Geraldine R Merru, co-partners, d/b/a Merrill Axle and Wheel Service,
et al, 158 NLRB 1113, citing N L R.B. v. Cactus Petroleum, Inc, 355
F.2d 755 (C A 5).
so Inasmuch as these are referred to not for the truth of what was said
therein but as to what was in fact set forth in the affidavit, there is no hear-
say question involved.
1028 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
during the period preceding the election , about signing a
card in which she says in her affidavit, "I ask John
DeVito again whether this was a vote and he said, `No,
this doesn't mean you are for the Union."' She then says
DeVito told her it was not a vote and it was only for the
purpose of allowing the Union to come in and meet with
Redcor executives for a meeting so they could both see
both sides of the picture, that it was just to enable the
Union to meet with Redcor executives and discuss what
they would do for the employees if allowed to. Nicholas'
affidavit continues: "With the understanding it was not a
vote, that it was strictly confidential, that it would not
mean I was dissatisfied with the company, I signed the
card. I still don't know anything about the Union. As far
as I understood there was no legal authorization for the
Union to represent me" [Emphasis supplied].
Powell testified as to this affidavit that he asked
Nicholas " . . . what she was told the purpose of those
authorization cards was," but that the statement above
set forth was made by Nicholas and taken down and that
he saw no reason to exclude it from her affidavit.
The affidavit of Michael Randall, dated December 1,
1965, sets forth that about September 29 he was ap-
proached by an employee about bringing in an outside
union and refers to their conversation . It then states that
a few days later he was contacted by John DeVito who
gave him a card and they discussed the matter of signing
the card. Next it refers to their conversation. The af-
fidavit then states:
.. At another later date he told me that the purpose
behind the card was to get an election into the com-
pany as to whether we wanted a union and that was
all. So I signed the card under the intention that there
would either be a time when the company would be
forced into a position to recognize an employee or-
ganization or that an election would be held
[ Emphasis supplied].
My understanding was that one or two things
would happen by signing the cards - either the com-
pany would be forced into a position to recognize an
employee organization and drop the union complete-
ly out of the picture or there would be a vote to see if
we wanted to be represented by a union. I
understood that the cards could be set aside if the
employees so wished [ Emphasis supplied]
I didn't realize that the signing of the cards was a
final commitment and that the union could demand
recognition on the basis of the cards [ Emphasis
supplied]
Mounts testified that Randall was asked " . . if he
would be willing to make an affidavit to what he was told
at the time he received an authorization card." Mounts
further said they did not explain to employees inter-
viewed that they were not interested in what the em-
ployees thought the card meant or how they felt.
Employee Janet Richey on December 1 signed an af-
fidavit which neither Mounts nor Powell could recall. In
it, Richey stated that she was approached about signing
an authorization card and then said-
I don't recall exactly what they said the card was for,
but my understanding when I signed the card was
that it would cause an election to be held at Redcor.
I believe this was the understanding by the other
girls and I don ' t believe they would have signed them
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
if the union could just come in on a card count. At the
time my primary interest was provoking the company
to produce some policies and do something, and at
the time I did not think this card would authorize the
Union to come in [Emphasis supplied].
On December 2, an affidavit was signed by employee
Viola Braun which neither Mounts nor Powell could re-
call. In her affidavit she says:
On or about September 29th an employee presented
the Authorization Card to me and told me that all it
involved if I signed the card was that it just
authorizes the union to come in and hold a free elec-
tion. That was all I was told- that was the extent of
the statement [ Emphasis supplied]
Immediately following the foregoing is another paragraph
in the affidavit which reads:
After reading the card , I interpreted it to mean only
that if enough cards were signed , we would have a
free election , and if the Union won we would go
union, if management won, then that would be it. I
did not think that my signature authorized the Union
to use it as a `yes' vote for the Union . At the time I
signed the card , I had not made up my mind how 1
felt about union representation [ Emphasis supplied].
On December 15, following an interview in which
Mounts recalled having questioned her, employee Ola
Groomer executed an affidavit in which she said that dur-
ing the first week of October she had been approached
about signing an authorization card , then set forth what
she had been told, and in the next paragraph stated: "At
the time I signed the authorization card, I had not made
up my mind whether I wanted a union at Redcor"
[emphasis supplied].
On December 15, after Mounts had interviewed her
with respect to the signing of an authorization card, em-
ployee Mary Raymond executed an affidavit in which she
stated that she had been approached by a Redcor em-
ployee and asked to sign an authorization card and then
added:
I hesitated because if this was going to involve me or
say that I was for or against the union I did not want
to do it. I mentioned to him that I did not understand
this union business , and he said that the card was
nothing , it did not mean that I was voting either for
or against the union , so I signed it [Emphasis
supplied].
At that time I did not know what I wanted to do
about this and had not made up my mind whether I
was for or against a union [Emphasis supplied].
On December 27, following an interview by Mounts,
employee James Kent executed an affidavit in which he
said that one of the employees in October had given him
a union authorization card to sign and then stated:
It was my understanding that the card was to show
how many people would support a company type
union , and then have an election . I did not know that
it would be affiliated in any way with the I.B.E.W. I
understood that I.B.E.W. was around only to show
employees how to set up a company type union.
REDCOR CORP. 1029
If I had known at the time I signed the card that the
I.B.E.W. could use it to obtain recognition and
represent me, I never would have signed it.
[Emphasis supplied].
Respondent contends that, in some affidavits in
evidence which it took, there do not appear such
references to "understanding," "intention," "knowl-
edge," "interpretation," etc.51 First, the fact that
some (four) affidavits do not reflect such does not
establish that these questions relating to subjective mat-
ters were not asked of others. Second, in any event, the
particular affidavits set forth, supra, refer in repetitive
detail to items indicating a revelation of the subjective
state of mind of the employees interviewed. Respondent,
as set forth, admitted that in one or two instances it may
have asked them about such state of mind or understand-
ing. The affidavits referred to, coupled with Respondent's
admission, lead to an inference that in those particular
cases the employees were asked something more than
merely to recite what was said and by whom. It may be
that 1 or 2 affidavits standing alone could not result in
such an inference but here we have some 7 affidavits (out
of 11 in the record, about 25 in all)52 which clearly in-
dicate this, coupled with testimony of respondent wit-
nesses admitting to so questioning 2 people. The
references to "understanding," or "not made up my
mind," or "not know," etc., appear regularly after a
preliminary discussion of what was said. I do not believe
that this was either accidental or coincidental. Such a
consistent pattern by employees who were separately in-
terviewed would not occur unless questions were
directed to them with respect to their state of mind, their
understanding, or their intention. Accordingly, I find that
such questions were so directed to them. As set forth,
supra, the Board has held in a number of cases that such
questioning of employees, in preparation of defense, as to
their subjective state of mind, their understanding or their
intention with respect to signing authorization cards is not
permissible since it is not relevant or material.53
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent by so doing en-
gaged in improper interrogation and thereby violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE ELECTION
In his report on objections and order directing hearing,
dated Mauch 14, the Regional Director ordered "that a
hearing be held to resolve the issues raised by the peti-
tioners' objections and by other conduct of the employer
disclosed in the investigation as set forth in paragraphs 8
through 13 of the complaint in Case 31-CA-233." He
also specified in his report those objections which he con-
sidered properly before him for resolution.
The order further provided "That the Trial Examiner
designated for the purpose of conducting the hearing shall
prepare and cause to be served on the parties a decision
containing resolutions of the credibility of witnesses,
findings of fact, and recommendations to the undersigned
as to the disposition of said issues."
In his order of March 31, 1966, "Consolidating Cases
and Notice Of Hearing On Objections," the Regional
Director provided "that these cases be and they hereby
are, consolidated for hearing for the purposes of hearing,
ruling , and decision by a Trial Examiner and that
thereafter Case 31-RC-112 shall be severed and trans-
ferred to the undersigned Regional Director for further
processing. Within 20 days following the date of service
of the Trial Examiner's Decision, any party may file with
the undersigned Regional Director, exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision relating to the objections in
Case 31-RC-112."54
Without passing on the propriety in a case involving a
consent-election agreement, of an "order" from the Re-
gional Director to a Trial Examiner to render a "decision
containing resolutions of the credibility of witnesses,
findings of fact, and recommendations to the undersigned
as to the disposition of said issues," but construing the
Board's ruling (supra) reversing my severance of the
cases as requiring my decision on such matters, I shall
proceed accordingly.
The election objections in substantial part either over-
lap or intertwine with the allegations of the complaint. In-
sofar as the allegations of the complaint set forth in para-
graphs 8 to 1355 thereof are concerned, I have previously
found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by its announcements, promises and grants of certain
benefits,56 a substantial part of which actions occurred in
connection with the group meetings, referred to in the
election objections. I have also found that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) as alleged in paragraph 13 of the
complaint improperly restricting distribution of union
handbills.
I have made no separate findings as to whether or not
the group meetings per se were violative of the Act. In
view of my findings aforesaid, I do not deem it necessary
to make such a finding. Similarly, I have not found the
letter of October 28, 1965, dealing with the sick leave
study, standing alone, to establish a violation of the Act
but as set forth, supra, have found a violation of Section
8(a)(1) based on a consideration of numerous matters of
which the letter of October 28, 1965, was but one.57
With respect to the objection which refers to payments
to certain employees for retroactive pay after late merit
51 It should be noted that with respect to Karlin he testified that he was
also asked about how many authorization cards were distributed, how
many employees had signed cards , where he had conducted organizing ac-
tivities , whether employees had solicited outside the plant and whether
they visited employees ' homes, the extent of Knight's organizing activity
in his department , how long Karlin stopped passing out cards after his
discussion with Kravitz, etc. These are other items that may or may not go
beyond what would appear necessary by way of a defense.
However, the General Counsel refers to but does not stress these in his
brief. Respondent in his brief points out that in some instances set forth,
the foregoing testimony of Karlin was changed by him, in others con-
tradicted and in still others the questions were relevant to matters alleged
in charges or pertinent to election objections . Under all the circumstances,
and in view of my finding post re interrogation by Respondent , I do not
deem it necessary to make findings in connection with the aforesaid
testimony of Karlin.
52 Of these 11, only 8 appear to delve into what was said about signing
a card. Only one such affidavit (which was submitted by Respondent)
does not contain any references to "understanding" or "state of mind,"
etc.
53 See fn. 49
51 Of course , the time, manner , and procedure for exceptions to any
rulings, findings, recommendations , orders , etc., in the complaint case are
governed by the Board's Rules and Regulations.
15 I have specifically found that Respondent did not violate the Act as
alleged in paragraphs 8 and 10 of the complaint.
56 This finding as detailed under heading E, supra, was based on the al-
legations of paragraphs 9, 11, and 12 of the complaint as litigated herein.
57 Since I consider it unnecessary , I make no finding as to whether or
not the letter of October 28 by itself would be violative of the Act.
308-926 0-70-66
1030 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
wage reviews , I have discussed this , supra, in relation to
my overall findings of violation of Section 8(a)(1) by
Respondent through its announcements , promises, and
grants of benefits . I have also considered it separately,
supra. Here too, in view of my overall findings , I do not
deem it necessary to make a separate finding or recom-
mendation.
It is evident from the foregoing that during the critical
period between October 4 and November 4, the Respond-
ent engaged in certain unfair labor practices in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) as set forth , supra, particularly by its
announcements , promises and grants of benefits, and by
Wever 's improper and unlawful restriction of the distribu-
tion of literature on election day.
The Regional Director in his report on objections and
order directing hearing points out correctly that conduct
violative of Section 8(a)(1) is a fortiori conduct which in-
terferes with the exercise of a free and untrammeled
choice in an election . 58 Accordingly based on my
findings, supra , that such unfair labor practices occurred
during the critical period , the election should be set
aside and I so recommend.
At the inception of the hearing , I granted a motion to
sever the complaint case proceeding in Case 31-CA-233
from the election objections hearing in Case 31-RC-112.
This severance ruling was subsequently overruled by the
Board which directed that the cases be heard as initially
consolidated by the Regional Director However, at this
time I believe that it is clear that a severance not only
may properly be made but should be, both under the deci-
sions of the Board which has no authority under the con-
sent-election agreement to rule on the election objec-
tions"' and under the order consolidating cases issued by
the Regional Director set forth , supra. Under that order,
it should be noted that the Regional Director allows for a
20-day period to file exceptions to "the Trial Examiner's
Decision relating to the objections in Case No.
31-RC-112." I am accordingly hereby severing Case
31-RC-112 from the consolidated proceeding and trans-
ferring it to the Regional Director for Region 31 for
further processing.
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section
III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of
the Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close , intimate , and substantial relationship to trade, traf-
fic, and commerce among the several States , and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing the free
flow thereof.
VI. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.
Because of the nature and extent of the unfair labor
practices engaged in by Respondent , as found above, it
will further be recommended that Respondent be ordered
to cease and desist from in any other manner infringing
upon the rights of employees guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions , and upon the entire record in the case, I
make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent , Redcor Corporation , is engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
2. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, in the manner found herein , the Respond-
ent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and upon the entire record in this case, it
is recommended that Respondent Company, its officers,
agents, successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Prohibiting or restraining its employees during
nonworking time from soliciting their fellow employees
to join or support International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers , AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
(b) Prohibiting or restraining employees , when they
are on nonworking time , from distributing handbills or
other literature in nonworking areas, in behalf of the
above-named or any other labor organization.
(c) Announcing, promising , or granting , improved or
new benefits , better working conditions , or other
economic favors to its employees in order to interfere
with their choice of a bargaining representative , or as an
inducement to reject and refrain from activities in support
of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-C IO , or any other labor organization.
(d) Unlawfully interrogating employees with respect
to union membership or activities.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to
self-organization , to form , join, or assist International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization , to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain
from any or all such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment , as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.
58 Citing Dal-Tex Optical Company, Inc, 137 NLRB 1782 19 See Chardon Telephone Company, 139 NLRB 529
REDCOR CORP. 1031
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant at Canoga Park, California, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."60 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 31 (Los Angeles, California), after being duly
signed by an authorized representative of the Respond-
ent, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof,
and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 31, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this
Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.61
Case 31-RC-112 is hereby severed from the con-
solidated proceeding, and transferred to the Regional
Director for Region 31 for further processing.
60 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
61 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 31, in'writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization.
WE WILL NOT prohibit or restrain employees,
when they are on nonworking time , from distributing
handbills or other literature, in nonworking areas, in
behalf of the above-named or any other labor or-
ganization.
WE WILL NOT announce, promise, or grant, im-
proved or new benefits, better working conditions or
other economic favors to employees in order to inter-
fere with their choice of a bargaining representative,
or as an inducement to reject and refrain from activi-
ties in support of International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor or-
ganization.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate employees
with respect to union membership or activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all
such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
Dated By
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
WE WILL NOT prohibit or restrain employees dur-
ing nonworking time from soliciting their fellow em-
ployees to join or support International Brotherhood
REDCOR CORPORATION
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 10th Floor,
Bartlet Building, 215 West Seventh Street, Los Angeles,
California, Telephone 688-5801.