[Redacted], Yvette H., 1 Complainant,v.Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Apr 14, 2021

Appeal No. 2019005671 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 14, 2021)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Yvette H.,1 Complainant, v. Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency. Appeal No. 2019005671 Hearing No. 480-2015-00305X Agency No. SF-14-0258-SSA DECISION On September 6, 2019, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s September 4, 2019, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Claims Representative, GS-11 at the Agency’s Indio Field Office in Indio, California. On April 10, 2014, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of disability (physical) when: 1. She was subjected to a hostile work environment based on the following events: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2019005671 2 a. since September 27, 2013, management has failed to reasonably accommodate Complainant and in December 18, 2013, denied her request for a continued workplace adjustment in or reassignment to the office in Palm Springs, California, and ordered her to return to her assigned office in Indio, California, where a flood contaminated the workplace. Complainant alleges since returning to her old office, she has suffered severe allergic reactions, including hives, rashes, and asthma attacks and has been forced to take sick leave and leave without pay; b. from September 2013 and continuing, Complainant was denied repeated requests for credit hours, different work schedules, and given lower graded assignments. Complainant alleges that her coworkers were granted work schedules they requested and allowed to work on tasks normally assigned to them; c. on August 26, 2013, Complainant’s supervisor stated, “don't be a drama queen and stop being dumb,” in response to Complainant’s question about whether it was safe to eat in the break room due to the flood; d. on August 27, 2013, Complainant started breaking out in hives and rashes and was having trouble breathing; e. on November 11, 2013, Complainant's supervisor gave her an annual performance review with a downgrade in performance. Complainant's supervisor stated at the performance review, “you used to do so much more before, what happened?” The Complainant responded to the supervisor, “I got sick.” Complainant reported the incident to management but no action was taken; f. on November 14, 2013, Complainant suffered a major asthma attack in front of her supervisor and coworkers, who failed to call an ambulance; g. on November 15, 2013, Complainant reported incident [f] to management, instead of granting her workplace adjustment, Complainant's supervisor instructed her to provide a doctor's note to take off work; h. on October 1, 2013-November 15, 2013, during the time the Complainant was ordered to go back to her old office, the Complainant alleges she was verbally abused, humiliated, and physically abused by coworkers, while she was working in a temporary office. Complainant alleges that coworkers made derogatory comments to her; and i. on January 13, 2014, Complainant's supervisor denied her request for advance sick leave due to her medical condition. 2019005671 3 Complainant also alleged she was subjected to reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when: 2. On or about December 2014, Complainant received an annual performance review with a downgrade in performance; and 3. On March 3, 2015, Complainant was denied a promotion to a Series 0105, Grade 12 position as Social Insurance Specialist (Technical Expert) (Title II) (TEMP), Vacancy ID 1313940.2 Complainant experiences complications from degenerative keratoconus (a disease of the cornea), severe allergies, and asthma. Chief among Complainant’s allergies is an allergy to mold. As a result of these conditions, Complainant had problems seeing, breathing, and suffered asthma attacks. On August 25, 2013, the Indio region was affected by heavy rain. Complainant and the Agency disputed the characterization of the impact that rain had on the Indio office. The Agency stated that “water seeped into the Indio Field Office, including in the break room.” Complainant argued that the Agency minimized the extent of water damage and asserted that the Indio Field Office was “flooded.” In Claim (1)(c), on August 26, 2013, Complainant observed a cleaning crew drilling holes in the wall and the break room filled with machines and cords and expressed reservations about whether it was safe to be in the office given the water contamination. A supervisor said to Complainant, “we are not in the Titanic, of course it’s safe.” When Complainant asked if it was safe to eat in the break room, the supervisor told Complainant not to be a drama queen and stop being dumb. On August 27, 2013, Complainant went home sick. Complainant alluded to this incident in Claim (1)(d) and said she broke out in rashes and hives and filed a workers’ compensation claim. Complainant’s supervisor, the District Manager of the Indio office (S1) called Complainant at home and offered to allow her to work at the Palm Springs office if she wanted. Thereafter, Complainant worked at the Palm Springs office from August 28, 2013, until September 30, 2013. On September 3, 2013, a restoration company completed its cleanup of the Indio office. According to the technician involved, the building was “bone dry.” Complainant then returned to the office on September 3, 2013, but said she had another allergic reaction. Agency management provided Complainant with workers’ compensation documents and told her not to return to Indio until the Agency completed its cleanup efforts. 2 The EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) assigned to the matter granted Complainant’s motion to amend to add Claims (2) and (3). Complainant, however, specifically does not challenge Claim (3) in her appeal. As discussed below, we find no basis to disturb the Agency’s final order adopting the AJ’s decision in that regard. 2019005671 4 On September 5, 2013, the Agency enlisted an outside company to conduct mold testing. In their tests, the company detected mold on “a small area on the northwest corner by the base cabinet drywall.” On September 13, 2013, the Agency began remediation efforts, and three days later received a report from the company finding no evidence of mold. Complainant claimed that the company only conducted visual testing, and not air or surface testing. During this time, Complainant submitted medical documentation asking the Agency to consider a permanent alternate worksite “due to repeated water damage to old office and residual allergens.” Complainant returned to Indio on September 23, 2013 and reported an allergic reaction. Management then allowed Complainant to return to Palm Springs. On September 24, 2013, the remediation company replaced tiles, drywall, and kitchen cabinets in the break room in Indio. In addition, the Agency installed “a negative air machine inside the break room and air scrubbers directly outside, removing and inspecting all items (including cabinets and countertops) in the break room, replacing any cabinetry showing signs of water damage or microbial growth, cleaning the carpet and replacing any damaged carpet, and replacing drywall.” Complainant contacted the District Manager of Palm Springs (DM) on September 27, 2013 and asked for a transfer as a reasonable accommodation. DM did not accept Complainant’s request, telling her that she needed to raise the issue with S1. During this time, S1 suggested that Complainant could request a hardship transfer to the Palm Springs office because the Agency evaluated such requests differently than a reasonable accommodation request. Complainant submitted paperwork from her doctor several times during Fall 2013, all indicating that Complainant suffered from mold allergies and might benefit from a move out of the Indio office. In Claim (1)(b), Complainant alleged the Agency denied her the ability to use credit hours from September to November 2013. Complainant asserted that her supervisors’ decision was because she requested reasonable accommodation as a result of the flood. On November 5, 2013, Complainant formally requested a permanent transfer to the Palm Springs or Yucca Valley offices as a reasonable accommodation. On November 7, 2013, Complainant provided medical documentation stating that she could return to full duty and that “[r]emoval from the Indio office should significantly reduce [Complainant’s] exposure to mold and thus help greatly to reduce her allergy symptoms.” The doctor believed that removal from Indio “would be expected to reduce symptoms and thus improve her work performance…” Complainant argued that this documentation does not prove that she could return to full duty at the Indio office. While Complainant’s request was pending, in November 2013, Complainant received a rating of “3 - Successful” on her annual performance appraisal, which consisted of a rating of “3” in all performance elements. Complainant had received a rating of “5” in two of four elements on her 2011 performance appraisal, and when her supervisor asked what happened, Complainant said, “I got sick.” 2019005671 5 On November 14, 2013 (Claims (1)(f) and (g)), Complainant experienced a major asthma attack while in the office. She began coughing non-stop during a staff meeting and had to step out. When she returned to the meeting, the staff continued to witness the attack, but she did not know whether her coworkers or supervisors understood that she was having an asthma attack. Complainant herself did not realize that it was an asthma attack until after she left the office but asserted that someone should have called 911 on her behalf. The next day, Complainant told S1 she could no longer work in the Indio office. S1 told Complainant that she would need a doctor’s note in order to be off work, but Complainant stated she was not seeking to be off work, but rather be allowed to work in a different location. In Claim (1)(h), Complainant claimed that a coworker (CW1) called her “bitch” twice between October 1, and November 15, 2013. Complainant reported the second incident to S1, who took no action to investigate the incident. On October 11, 2013, Complainant alleged that CW1 and other coworkers were joking about her condition, and then CW1 shook water above Complainant’s head, purportedly to do a “cleaning on her to get rid of the witchcraft.” S1 investigated this incident and CW1 denied the incident but said that she had gotten up to fill her water bottle, some water may have unintentionally splashed on Complainant. On December 18, 2013, the Agency denied Complainant’s request for reasonable accommodation and explained that its remediation efforts resulted in a significant reduction or elimination of Complainant’s exposure to Alternaria mold. In its decision, the Agency noted that Complainant’s medical documentation indicated that testing showed she had allergies to olive trees, Bermuda, rye, and local mix grasses, ragweed, and dust, cats, and Alternaria mold. The Agency directly addressed Complainant’s allergy to Alternaria mold and explained that it had completed remedial efforts after the storm damage, and before Complainant’s return to Indio. “Therefore, [Complainant’s] exposure to Alternaria mold has been significantly reduced or eliminated.” Additionally, the Agency said it was impossible to eliminate Complainant’s exposure to all other allergens. Further, the Agency noted that reassignment or transfer as a reasonable accommodation is the accommodation of last resort and offered an air purifier at her workstation as an alternative accommodation. The Agency granted Complainant’s advanced sick leave request for approximately 180 hours between December 20, 2013, and January 13, 2014. Complainant sought an additional 240 hours on January 13, 2014, but the Agency denied that request, explaining that she needed to return to work. Later in January 2014, the Agency reversed its decision and offered Complainant the remaining balance. However, Complainant refused and opted to exhaust advanced annual leave, then later utilize advanced sick leave while applying for donated leave through the Agency’s Voluntary Leave Transfer Program. Complainant ultimately utilized the 240 hours. Complainant formally requested a hardship transfer to the Yucca Valley Office in March or April 2014; Complainant asserted that the Agency received her request on April 8, 2014. The Agency granted this request, effective May 4, 2014. 2019005671 6 On May 5, 2014, Complainant provided medical documentation that stated that a portable air purifier was not a sufficient accommodation. This was the first time that she informed the Agency of this matter. On October 31, 2014 (Claim (2)), Complainant received a final rating of “3” on her annual performance appraisal. Complainant believed that the Agency utilized her prior performance appraisals as a basis for this rating. The rating official for Complainant’s performance appraisal was the new supervisor (S1a) assigned to her after her hardship transfer was granted. Complainant believes that S1a was aware of her prior EEO activity but offered no evidence in support. In Claim (3), Complainant was not selected for a Technical Expert position. The Agency asserted that a Human Resources Assistant (HRA) reviewed all applications and assembled a best qualified list with a cut off score of 88. Complainant did not make the list with a score of 83. The Agency explained that it does not contact district managers for feedback on applications but does contact applicants’ managers. Complainant disputed the Agency’s statement by explaining that HRA no longer works for the Agency and did not provide an affidavit or declaration. Thus, she believed that the Agency’s explanation was not grounded in fact. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s motion and issued a summary judgment decision on August 27, 2019, finding that Complainant was not subjected to discrimination, reprisal or a hostile work environment as alleged. The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully adopting the AJ’s decision. The instant appeal followed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Complainant argues that the Agency improperly delayed its response to her request for accommodation, failed to accommodate her, and that the AJ erred in finding ambiguity in her medical documentation. Complainant questions why the Agency was able to transfer her via a hardship transfer but was not able to do so as a reasonable accommodation but proffers no further information or evidence. Then, when the Agency denied her request for accommodation, Complainant contends that it forced her to take leave, contrary to established precedent. Complainant contends that the record is clear that management “disdained Complainant’s request for accommodation.” Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the final order. We note that Complainant does not challenge the finding regarding Claim (3). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). 2019005671 7 An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. In rendering this appellate decision, we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a)(stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review…”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO-MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (as revised, August 5, 2015)(providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). An AJ may issue a summary judgment decision only after determining that the record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is adequately developed. To successfully oppose summary judgment, Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Here, however, Complainant has failed to establish such a dispute. Even construing any inferences raised by the undisputed facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in Complainant’s favor. Denial of Reasonable Accommodation - Claim (1) Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o) and (p). After receiving a request for reasonable accommodation, the employer should engage in an informal process with the disabled individual to clarify what the individual needs and identify the appropriate reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation), EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002); see also Abeijon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120080156 (Aug. 8, 2012). Protected individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodation, but they are not necessarily entitled to their accommodation of choice. Castaneda v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01931005 (Feb. 17, 1994). Here, Complainant indicated to the Agency within days of when the Indio office suffered water damage that she was suffering an allergic reaction. Complainant does not dispute that the Agency immediately permitted her to work from the Palm Springs office on a temporary basis while they undertook remediation efforts. Complainant emphasizes in her argument that the Agency’s remediation efforts are irrelevant to our analysis. We disagree. We note that, although individuals protected under the Rehabilitation Act are entitled to reasonable accommodation, they are not necessarily entitled to their accommodation of choice. See Castaneda v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01931005 (Feb. 17, 1994). 2019005671 8 The facts here make clear that Agency management were keenly aware from Complainant’s complaints at the time that she was suffering from conditions resulting from water damage, and were responding directly to that concern by allowing Complainant to perform her work at an alternative worksite and enlisting a remediation company to eliminate the damage on more than one occasion, escalating its efforts each time. After the completion of the remediation efforts, Complainant submitted a formal request for a transfer to the Palm Springs or Yucca Valley office as a reasonable accommodation on November 5, 2013. The Agency analyzed the medical documentation Complainant provided and concluded that it had adequately addressed Complainant’s exposure to mold, and that it would be impossible to eliminate her exposure to other allergens. Further, the Agency offered an air purifier as an alternative accommodation. Based on these facts, we cannot conclude the Agency failed to accommodate Complainant in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. We are also not persuaded by Complainant’s argument that the Agency’s ability to transfer her under its hardship transfer policy meant that it necessarily was able to transfer Complainant as a reasonable accommodation. The Commission has long held that reassignment is the reasonable accommodation of last resort and is required only after it has been determined that there are no effective accommodations that will enable Complainant to perform the essential functions of her current position or all other reasonable accommodations would impose an undue hardship. Zachary K. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120130795 (November 19, 2015) citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (October 17, 2002). Moreover, in cases regarding reassignment a complainant must present sufficient evidence to support a finding that, more likely than not, there was a vacant, funded position, for which she was qualified and to which she could have been reassigned. See Barnard v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 07A10002 (Aug. 2, 2002). There is no evidence in the record that the Agency had a vacant, funded position in either Palm Springs or Yucca Valley prior to May 2014. As a result, the Commission finds that Complainant was not denied reasonable accommodation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Hostile Work Environment To establish a claim of discriminatory hostile environment harassment, Complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the Agency. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 2019005671 9 In short, to prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she was subjected to conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a “reasonable person” in Complainant’s position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant must also prove that the conduct was taken because of a protected basis. Only if Complainant establishes both of those elements, hostility and motive, will the question of Agency liability present itself. The Commission finds that the alleged incidents were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a legally hostile work environment. The Commission notes that the anti-discrimination statutes are not a civility code. Rather, they forbid “only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). Even assuming that the alleged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment, the Commission finds that Complainant failed to show that the Agency's actions were based on discriminatory animus. As a result, the Commission finds that Complainant was not subjected to discrimination or a hostile work environment as alleged. Disparate Treatment - Reprisal (Claim (2)) Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Soc. Sec. Admin., EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976), and Coffman v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473 (Nov. 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000). In this case, the Commission agrees with the AJ that Complainant has not presented evidence that would raise an inference of retaliatory motive regarding Claim (2). Here, the record shows that Complainant received a rating of 3 on her performance appraisal for 2014, after her hardship transfer took effect. Complainant received the same rating in her 2013 appraisal; therefore, there was no “downgrade.” Further, there is no record evidence demonstrating that S1a was aware of Complainant’s prior protected EEO activity and there is no other evidence raising an inference of retaliatory animus. Thus, the Commission finds that the AJ properly found that Complainant was not subjected to reprisal as to Claim (2). We note once again that Complainant specifically does not raise any challenges regarding Claim (3) on appeal and the Commission can find no basis to disturb the AJ’s finding that she failed to establish reprisal as to that claim as well. As a result, the Commission finds that Complainant was not subjected to discrimination, reprisal, or a hostile work environment as alleged. 2019005671 10 CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final order. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). 2019005671 11 COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations April 14, 2021 Date