[Redacted], Theresa E., 1 Complainant,v.Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Eastern Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Jul 22, 2021

Appeal No. 2020000006 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 22, 2021)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Theresa E.,1 Complainant, v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Eastern Area), Agency. Appeal No. 2020000006 Hearing No. 530-2019-00015X Agency No. 4C-080-0006-18 DECISION On September 9, 2019, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s August 8, 2019, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. ISSUE PRESENTED Whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) correctly found that Complainant was not subjected to discrimination regarding wages, discipline, and reasonable accommodations. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020000006 2 BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a City Letter Carrier, Pay Grade 01 at the Agency’s Post Office in Pleasantville, New Jersey. On February 2, 2018, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African American), disability (physical - bulging disks in back, arthritis in knee), age (52), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when: 1. on many occasions between January and December 2017, two occasions in May 2017, and on September 14 and 15, 2017, Complainant was not paid for hours worked; 2. on October 16, 2017, and other occasions, Complainant was told to schedule doctor’s appointments outside her work schedule and harassed when she returned from taking sick leave; 3. on October 5, 6, 12, 16, 23, and 31, and November 1, 3, 10, 2017, and multiple other times, Complainant was denied the use of a “knocker,” but coworkers were not; and 4. on or around September 17, 2017, Complainant was issued a Letter of Warning (LOW). Complainant made initial EEO contact regarding the instant complaint on October 16, 2017. Record evidence indicated that the earliest the Postmaster (PM1) could have become aware of Complainant’s EEO activity was on November 29, 2017, when he was contacted by the EEO Specialist regarding Complainant’s availability. The record also indicated that the earliest Complainant’s supervisor (S1) became aware of Complainant’s current EEO activity was when the EEO Specialist contacted S1 and PM1 on December 8, 2017, to prepare the Counselor’s Report. Complainant alleged that she required accommodations and was harassed when she requested accommodations, which, Complainant indicated, the Agency failed to provide. Complainant stated that prior to her return to work, she was instructed by S1 to have her doctor present a note that stated, “no restrictions.” Complainant also stated that the disability persisted at the time of the instant complaint; and that she walked with a “hitch or limp.” The record reflected that Complainant has four bulging disks in her lower back and severe arthritis in her right knee. She was out of work on Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave and returned on September 11, 2017, with no restrictions. The evidence indicated that Complainant was presented with medical documentation for her doctor to fill out to determine whether she had any restrictions; and that the documents that Complainant returned to the Agency indicated she had no restrictions. 2020000006 3 At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. On May 21, 2019, the AJ assigned to the case issued an Order for an Initial Conference Report (ICR) and an Initial Teleconference. The Order directed Complainant to respond in writing identifying the relevant evidence in the ROI and identify any additional relevant information necessary to determine whether discrimination occurred. The Order also directed the Agency to identify its legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its actions and to address Complainant’s evidence of pretext. On July 1, 2019, the AJ held an Initial Conference. Both parties submitted their ICR and participated in the Initial Conference. Following the conference, Complainant was directed to respond to the Agency’s ICR and to specifically address the Agency’s timeliness arguments. The Agency had argued that any claim for discrete acts that took place prior to September 1, 2017, were time barred because Complainant did not initiate contact until October 16, 2017. Complainant did not address the Agency’s argument as she was specifically ordered to do in the AJ’s Order of July 1, 2019. Accordingly, any claims for discrete acts that took place prior to September 1, 2017, including some of the alleged events raised in Claim 1 regarding payment of hours worked, were dismissed by the AJ as untimely. The Agency was directed to respond to the items raised in Complainant’s ICR and to supplement the record with evidence of the Agency’s policy on the use of knockers. The record indicated that knockers are wooden, dumbbell-shaped door knockers used by letter carriers on their rural delivery service rounds. They are convenient, lightweight and easy to grasp; the knocker saves wear and tear on hands and sounds a loud crack to announce the carrier’s arrival. Both parties timely responded. The AJ issued a decision without a hearing on August 7, 2019, on grounds that taking the facts as presented in the ROI and in the parties’ submissions, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Complainant, there were no genuine issues of material fact that required a hearing. Regarding Claim 1 and the failure to pay Complainant for hours worked, which, Complainant indicated, dated back to 2004, Complainant requested that an adverse inference be made against the Agency because it failed to produce Delivery Management System (DMS) information which could have verified Complainant’s time worked. The AJ denied Complainant’s request that an adverse inference be made against the Agency, stating that Complainant had failed to present evidence or argument, beyond her own assertions that, assuming such action did occur, that it happened due to a discriminatory motive. 2020000006 4 The AJ asserted that Complainant had identified no comparators or other evidence that would indicate that a failure to fully pay her on two occasions (as only September 14 and 15, 2017, were timely claims) was due to her disability. Moreover, the AJ stated an adverse inference would be improper at that particular point in the hearing process. Regarding Claim 2, Complainant alleged that she was told to schedule doctor’s appointments outside of her work schedule and harassed when she returned from taking sick leave. The AJ found that Complainant had not addressed the issue in her Reply to the Agency’s ICR. Therefore, the AJ found no merit to this claim. The Agency did not cite any policy for allowing employees to take leave to go to a doctor. Complainant’s direct supervisor however asserted that all of Complainant’s time off requests for doctor appointments were granted. Regarding Claim 3 and the denial of the use of knockers, the Agency produced evidence of a policy that precluded the use of knockers, absent a documented medical need, because it involved double-handling of parcels and was considered an inefficient use of carriers’ time. The AJ explained that while a tracking system was not in place to log employees who were permitted to use a knocker for medical reasons, the supervisors in Complainant’s office recalled a few employees who used them who all had medical documentation to support the need. Even Complainant admitted to some knowledge that carriers with documented medical conditions were permitted to use knockers. The AJ stated that Complainant had not presented any evidence that she had any medical documentation that she submitted to the Agency to support her need to use the knockers, noting that Complainant admitted that she did not submit medical documentation because she thought it would be “useless.” The AJ found that Complainant had not put forth any evidence that would show that she was entitled to or required the use of knockers as an accommodation. Regarding Claim 4 and the issuance of a LOW for failing to complete her duties, the AJ stated that Complainant did not address the Agency’s argument that the issuance of a LOW under the facts alleged did not demonstrate any discriminatory animus. In fact, the AJ stated, Complainant testified that it was “not clear” if the issuance of the LOW was motivated by her medical condition. The AJ found that Complainant had presented no evidence or argument that she was subjected to standards harsher than employees who were not disabled or not perceived as disabled. Regarding Complainant’s claims that the alleged management actions constituted a hostile work environment, the AJ indicated that since no pretext was found on individual claims, the alleged management actions did not rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment, noting that the only evidence on which Complainant’s entire argument rested was that Complainant interpreted S1’s statement to her to return to work with “no restrictions” to mean that the Agency has a “100% healed” policy which is a per se violation of the ADA. 2020000006 5 However, the AJ stated, the evidence produced by the Agency of allowing carriers the use of knockers with documented medical need belied Complainant’s argument as not all carriers were “100% healed” if some were accommodated with the use of knockers. The AJ concluded that taken together, and viewing all the allegations as a whole, the alleged events were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal followed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL In her Appeal, Complainant asserts that the AJ rendered a summary judgment decision too early in the hearing process and failed to allow Complainant to present corroborating evidence for her denial of reasonable accommodations allegations. Complainant requests that her case be returned for a hearing so as to hear testimony from her witnesses whom, Complainant believes, will demonstrate that the actions of the named managers towards Complainant: 1) were discriminatory on the basis of a disability known to them; and 2) created a hostile work environment on the basis of that disability. In its Appeal Brief, the Agency asserts that Complainant had improperly presented new evidence on appeal that was never submitted to the AJ, despite having the opportunity to do so. The Agency also asserts that Complainant has failed to provide the requisite affirmative showing that the presented new evidence was not reasonably available prior to or during the underlying investigation or the proceedings before the AJ. The Agency requests that the Commission decline to consider all exhibits submitted by Complainant in support of her appeal; and that the Commission dismiss Complainant’s appeal and enter judgment in its favor. STANDARD OF REVIEW In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, § VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge’s determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions 2020000006 6 of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). We determine whether the AJ appropriately issued the decision without a hearing. The Commission’s regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing upon finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). EEOC’s decision without a hearing regulation follows the summary judgment procedure from federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The U.S. Supreme Court held summary judgment is appropriate where a judge determines no genuine issue of material fact exists under the legal and evidentiary standards. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the judge is to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial, as opposed to weighing the evidence. Id. at 249. At the summary judgment stage, the judge must believe the non-moving party’s evidence and must draw justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Id. at 255. A “genuine issue of fact” is one that a reasonable judge could find in favor for the non- moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A “material” fact has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS AJ’s Issuance of a Decision Without a Hearing An AJ may issue a decision without a hearing only after determining that the record has been adequately developed. See Petty v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We carefully reviewed the record and find that it is adequately developed. To successfully oppose a decision without a hearing, Complainant must identify material facts of record that are in dispute or present further material evidence establishing facts in dispute. Here, Complainant expressed dissatisfaction with the timing of the AJ’s summary judgment decision in the hearing process, focusing her contentions on the AJ’s failure to allow Complainant to present evidence in support of her allegations that the Agency denied her reasonable accommodations that were available to other employees, including employees without disabilities. Complainant however does not raise any genuine issues of material facts in dispute. Ultimately, the AJ correctly determined that there are no genuine issues of material fact or credibility that merited a hearing. Therefore, the AJ’s issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate. Claim 3 2 After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ correctly determined that Complainant did not establish her claim that the Agency failed to accommodate her disability when she was not allowed the use of the knockers. 2 We note that Complainant does not raise Claims 1, 2, or 4 on appeal. Therefore, this decision does not address any dismissed claims or bases that Complainant did not raise on appeal. 2020000006 7 Under the Commission’s regulations, a federal agency may not discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability and is required to make reasonable accommodations to the known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the Agency can show that reasonable accommodation would cause an undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o), (p). To establish that she was denied a reasonable accommodation, Complainant must show that: (1) she is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a “qualified” individual with a disability pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the Agency failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Bill A. v. Dep’t of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 0120131989 (Oct. 26, 2016). An individual with a disability is “qualified” if he or she satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the employment position that the individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). Reasonable accommodation includes modifications to the work environment or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential job functions. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(ii). Here, record evidence reflects that Complainant is an individual with documented physical impairments (bulging disks in back and arthritis in knee). Complainant is also substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. See Higgins v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 07A30086 (Sep. 14, 2005) (finding that a complainant with herniated disks and knee impairments, substantially limited in the major life activities of standing and walking, was an individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act); Durinzi v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A11800 (July 18, 2003), req. for recon. den’d, EEOC Request No. 05A31158 (Sep. 24, 2003) (finding that a complainant diagnosed with fibromyalgia was an individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act); Rafalski v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120064487 (Mar. 26, 2009) (finding that a complainant diagnosed with degenerative disc disease was an individual with a disability under the Rehabilitation Act). The record also reflects that Complainant is a qualified individual with a disability because she was able to perform her duties of delivering mail. Since Complainant has demonstrated that she is a qualified individual with a disability, Complainant must then establish that the Agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. Generally, a complainant with a disability must request a reasonable accommodation by letting the employer know she needs an adjustment or change at work for a reason related to a medical condition. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Accommodation Guidance), EEOC Notice No. 915.002, (Oct. 17, 2002). After receiving the request for reasonable accommodation, the employer should engage in an informal process with the individual with a disability to clarify what the individual needs and identify the appropriate reasonable accommodation. Id. 2020000006 8 Complainant argued that the Agency failed to properly engage in the interactive process, indicating that the Agency failed to accommodate Complainant knowing that she walked with a noticeable limp and performed her duties with difficulty. In this case, however, there is no evidence to indicate that Complainant’s walking impairment was so obvious on its face that the Agency did not need a doctor to state that she had a mobility impairment that needed accommodation. Under the Commission’s regulations, “to determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation, it may be necessary for [the Agency] to initiate an informal interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of an accommodation [which identifies] the precise limitations resulting from the disability and the potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(3). Here, while Complainant may have walked with a noticeable limp, we find that the Agency did not err when, as the record indicates, it presented Complainant with medical documentation for her doctor to fill out to determine whether she had any restrictions; and how those restrictions are related to Complainant’s impairments so that her requested accommodation was necessary for the performance of her job duties. That request for medical documentation is, indeed, part of the required interactive process. See Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans With Disabilities Act (Enforcement Guidance) Questions 6 (Oct. 17, 2002). Rather than present the required documentation, however, the documents from her doctor that Complainant returned to the Agency indicated she had no restrictions that needed an accommodation. Therefore, Complainant’s argument fails. Moreover, the Agency produced evidence of a policy that precluded the use of knockers, absent a documented medical need, because it involved double-handling of parcels and was considered an inefficient use of carriers’ time. This is a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for not allowing Complainant the use of the knocker which Complainant did not refute with any persuasive evidence. Complainant presented no evidence to demonstrate that her stated noticeable limp and walking impairment was so substantially limiting that she could not perform the essential functions of her job without the use of knockers. Nor did she show that she had any medical restrictions on her mobility. Instead, Complainant has, in effect, asked the Agency to speculate that Complainant needed a specific reasonable accommodation which her physician indicated she did not need, and for which Complainant felt the required documentation was useless. Complainant also argued that the actions of the named managers towards Complainant were discriminatory on the basis of a disability known to them. Importantly in that regard, we find that Complainant has failed to show that she was treated less favorably than any similarly situated employee under similar circumstances. As the AJ rightly noted, Complainant herself admitted to some knowledge that carriers with documented medical conditions were permitted to use knockers. 2020000006 9 Neither did Complainant refute the testimony of supervisors in her office indicating that all employees who used knockers had medical documentation to support the need. See Aguilar v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01944167 (Aug. 8, 1995) (asserting that in general, in the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, if the complainant cannot identify any similarly situated comparison employees who were treated more favorably, he or she will not prevail). Complainant requested that her case be returned for a hearing so as to hear testimony from her witnesses who would demonstrate that discrimination occurred. However, Complainant did not describe how the additional testimony would show that she was entitled to or required the use of knockers as accommodation for which Complainant presented no medical documentation. Moreover, it is the Commission’s position that as a general rule, no new evidence will be considered on appeal unless there is an affirmative showing that the evidence was not reasonably available prior to or during the investigation. EEO MD-110 at Ch. 9, § VI.A; see also, Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,654 (Jul. 12, 1999) ("[N]o new evidence will be considered on appeal unless the evidence was not reasonably available during the hearing process"). We find no such showing in the instant complaint. Regarding Complainant’s assertions that her managers’ denial of reasonable accommodation created a hostile work environment on the basis of her disability, we determine that the AJ’s finding that, under the standards set forth in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), Complainant’s claims of a hostile work environment must fail. See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994). A finding of a hostile work environment is precluded by our determination that Complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000). With respect to Complainant’s assertions that the AJ rendered a summary judgment decision too early in the hearing process, it is the Commission’s position that an Administrative Judge has full responsibility for the adjudication of the complaint, including overseeing the development of the record, and have broad discretion in the conduct of hearings. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(a)(e). Given the AJ's broad authority to regulate the conduct of a hearing, a party claiming that the AJ abused his or her discretion faces a very high bar. Trina C. v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0120142617 (Sept. 13, 2016) citing Kenyatta S. v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0720150016 n.3 (June 2, 2016) (responsibility for adjudicating complaints pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(e) gives AJ's wide latitude in directing terms, conduct, and course of administrative hearings before EEOC). CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the AJ’s decision and the Agency’s final action adopting it. 2020000006 10 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0620) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if the complainant or the agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx. Alternatively, complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). 2020000006 11 COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations July 22, 2021 Date