[Redacted], Queen L., 1 Complainant,v.Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Western Area), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 7, 2021Appeal No. 2020004830 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 7, 2021) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Queen L.,1 Complainant, v. Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Western Area), Agency. Appeal No. 2020004830 Agency No. 4E-980-0019-20 DECISION On June 15, 2020, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s June 10, 2020, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Assistant Rural Carrier (ARC) at the Agency’s Everson Post Office in Everson, Washington. She began employment effective November 30, 2019 and was a probationary employee within a training period. On February 13, 2020, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of religion (Seventh Day Adventist) when, effective December 5, 2019, it removed Complainant from employment. The Agency accepted Complainant’s claim for EEO investigation. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 2020004830 2 During the investigation, Complainant stated that she cancelled her first Long Life Vehicle (LLV) Training due to it conflicting with her religious Sabbath (Saturdays). Complainant stated that she rescheduled the LLV for another day with the District Safety Specialist, but the Everson Postmaster (S1) subsequently contacted her stating that she could not perform the ARC job if she could not work on Saturdays. Complainant stated that she told S1 she has another job but could work before 7:45 a.m. other days to make up for Saturday absences, and that she could work Sundays and holidays. Complainant stated S1 removed her from employment and cancelled her LLV test. Complainant stated that the Agency violated her religious freedom and did not give her a chance in the position. The Postmaster, S1, stated that she is not aware of Complainant’s religion. S1 stated that she informed Complainant that she was hired as an ARC, which requires working weekends and holidays as expressed in the job description. S1 stated that she informed Complainant that she was supposed to have training and perform some holiday parcel delivery on Saturdays, but she could accommodate her request not to work Saturdays. S1 stated that she contacted the Training Department and got an alternate LLV training day of Tuesday, but Complainant later changed that date. S1 stated that she called Complainant regarding availability and reminded her that she needed to receive training to work. S1 stated that Complainant informed her that she could not work holidays unless her other job was closed and she informed Complainant that she could not meet the requirements of the position if she could not work holidays, many of which fell on a weekday. S1 stated that she accommodated Complainant’s request not to work Saturdays, but Complainant made it very clear that she could only work the ARC job if her other job allowed it. S1 also stated that it was not feasible for Complainant to work delivering parcels before having to leave Agency work for her other job. S1 stated, with Complainant’s other job, the ARC position was not a “good fit.” The record contains emails between S1 and Complainant regarding trying to find appropriate time for training. S1 offered Monday training and, on November 24, 2019, Complainant responded, “I cannot do on Monday to Friday unless they are holidays for training because I have other job.” In a November 26, 2019 email, S1 stated she was trying to get Complainant approved for self-study training and “While I would like to use you Saturdays . . . I can accommodate you on that.” S1 stated, however, she needed Complainant to be available the other required days for the position. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or an immediate final agency decision. In accordance with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. The instant appeal from Complainant followed. 2020004830 3 ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). Denial of Religious Accommodation Under Title VII, employers are required to accommodate the religious practices of their employees unless a requested accommodation is shown to impose an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b)(1). The traditional framework for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination based on religious accommodation requires an employee to demonstrate that: (1) she has a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with their employment; (2) she informed the Agency of this belief and conflict; and (3) the Agency nevertheless enforced its requirement against Complainant. Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993); Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984). Once a complainant establishes a prima facie case, the Agency must show that it made a good faith effort to reasonably accommodate Complainant’s religious beliefs and, if such proof fails, the Agency must show that the alternative means of accommodation proffered by Complainant could not be granted without imposing an undue hardship on the Agency’s operations. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(a)-(e), the Commission’s “Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion” (the Guidelines), alternatives for accommodating an employee’s religious practices include, but are not limited to, voluntary substitutes and swaps, flexible scheduling, and lateral transfers and job changes. Undue hardship does not become a defense until the employer claims it as a defense to its duty to accommodate. Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986). In order to show undue hardship, an employer must demonstrate that an accommodation would require more than a de minimis cost. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). An Agency’s obligation to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of its employees, if this can be done without undue hardship, applies equally to probationary and permanent employees. Brewer v. U. S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05880283 (August 12, 1988). Here, Complainant was a probationary Assistant Rural Carrier who claimed that the Agency failed to provide religious accommodation by forcing her to work/receive training on Saturdays. Complainant is a Seventh-Day Adventist whose observance of the Sabbath fell on Saturday. 2020004830 4 Complainant’s position required working Sundays and holidays but scheduled Complainant for LLV training on a Saturday before starting to work. When Complainant informed her supervisor, S1, that she could not work or receive training on Saturdays due to her Sabbath, S1 stated that she could accommodate Complainant and sought to find alternate days. S1 suggested some weekdays as an alternative, but Complainant stated that she has another job that she works Monday through Friday and could only work or receive training at the Agency prior to 7:45 a.m. on a weekday unless her other job was closed. In addition, Complainant stated that she could not work Mondays that were holidays unless her other job was closed. S1 tried to work with Complainant but then told her the position was not a “good fit” based on her other work schedule. S1 stated the ARC position required working holidays, many of which fell on a weekday. Summarily, Complainant was a probationary employee and a Seventh-Day Adventist who sought to have Saturdays off so that she could observe the Sabbath in accordance with the tenets of her faith. S1 approved Complainant’s request to not receive training or work on Saturdays, but Complainant still was unable to meet the needs of the ARC position. Complainant did not show that the Agency enforced the requirements of the ARC position that conflicted with her religion. We therefore find, based on the evidentiary record before us, that Complainant did not establish that the Agency denied her request for a religious accommodation. Disparate Treatment A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health 2020004830 5 and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). Here, we find, assuming arguendo, Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on religion, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Agency officials stated that Complainant was not a good fit for the position because she worked another job that prevented her from receiving training on weekdays or working holidays. Management stated that working holidays was a primary requirement of the ARC position. We find that Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s actions were based on discriminatory motives. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the final agency decision finding no discrimination. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0920) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider this appellate decision if Complainant or the Agency submits a written request that contains arguments or evidence that tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the agency. Requests for reconsideration must be filed with EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. If the party requesting reconsideration elects to file a statement or brief in support of the request, that statement or brief must be filed together with the request for reconsideration. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of another party’s request for reconsideration within which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). Complainant should submit his or her request for reconsideration, and any statement or brief in support of his or her request, via the EEOC Public Portal, which can be found at https://publicportal.eeoc.gov/Portal/Login.aspx Alternatively, Complainant can submit his or her request and arguments to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, via regular mail addressed to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail addressed to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. 2020004830 6 In the absence of a legible postmark, a complainant’s request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if OFO receives it by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. An agency’s request for reconsideration must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). Either party’s request and/or statement or brief in opposition must also include proof of service on the other party, unless Complainant files his or her request via the EEOC Public Portal, in which case no proof of service is required. Failure to file within the 30-day time period will result in dismissal of the party’s request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted together with the request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. 2020004830 7 Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations December 7, 2021 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation